Data and Applications Security Developments and Directions

Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham

The University of Texas at Dallas

Secure Object Systems

October 1, 2010

Outline

Background on object systems Discretionary security Multilevel security Objects for modeling secure applications Object Request Brokers Secure Object Request Brokers Secure frameworks Secure Multimedia and Geospatial Systems

Concepts in Object Database Systems

Objects- every entity is an object

- Example: Book, Film, Employee, Car Class

- Objects with common attributes are grouped into a class Attributes or Instance Variables

- Properties of an object class inherited by the object instances Class Hierarchy

- Parent-Child class hierarchy Composite objects

- Book object with paragraphs, sections etc. Methods

- Functions associated with a class

Example Class Hierarchy

DocumentClass

D1 D2

Book Subclass

B1# of Chapters Volume #

Print-doc-att(ID)

Method1:

JournalSubclass

J1

Print-doc(ID)

Method2:

ID Name

Author

Publisher

Example Composite Object

CompositeDocument

Object

Section 1Object

Section 2Object

Paragraph 1Object

Paragraph 2Object

Security Issues

Access Control on Objects, Classes, Attributes etc. Execute permissions on Methods Multilevel Security Security impact on class hierarchies Security impact on composite hierarchies

Objects and Security

Secure OOMUnified Object Model is Evolving

Secure OODBPersistentdata store

Secure OODADesign and analysis

Secure DOMInfrastructure

Secure OOPLProgramming

languageSecure FrameworksBusiness objects

Secure OOTTechnologies

Access Control

EMP ClassInstance Variables:SS#, Ename, Salary, D#

OID = 100 OID = 200

OID = 300

1, John, 20K, 10 2, Paul, 30K, 20

3, Mary, 40K, 20

Increase-Salary(OID, Value)

Read-Salary(OID, amount)

Amount := Amount + Value

Write-Salary(OID, Amount)

DEPT ClassInstance Variables:D#, Dname, Mgr

OID = 500

OID = 60010, Math, Smith

20, Physics, Jones

Access Control Rules:John has update access to EMP ClassJane has read access to DEPT ClassJane has update access to object with OID = 500Mary has execute access to Increase Salary method

Access Control Hierarchies

M GRSubclass

ENGSubclass

EM PClass Access Control Rules on Class Hierarchy

John has update access to EM P ClassJohn has read access to M GR Class

Book

Object

Introduction

Set of Sections

References

Access Control Rules on Aggregate HierarchyJohn has update access to Introduction and ReferencesJohn has read access to Set of Sections

Secure Object Relational Model

BOOK

ISBN# Bname Contents

1 X

2 Y

3 Z

+ + + +

########

John has update access to Book object with ISBN #1Jane has read access to Book object with ISBN #2

Access Control Rules

Policy Enforcement

Policy Enforcement Mechanisms:

Query Modification Algorithm on objects and instance variables

Rule processing integrated with method execution for enforcing access control

Visualizing access control policies on objects using UML and other specifications

Sample Systems

Example Systems:Security forGemstone (originally Servio Logic)Objectstore (originally Object Design)Ontos (originally Ontos Inc)Starburst (IBM Almaden)O2 (Altair Group)ORION (MCC)IRIS (HP Labs)

Multilevel Security

Book

Object

Book

Object

Introduction

Set of Sections

References

Unclassified

TopSecret

Secret

Some Security Properties

Security level of an instance must dominate the level of the class Security level of a subclass must dominate the level of the

superclass Classifying associations between two objects Method must execute at a level that dominates the level of the

method

Multilevel Secure Object Relational Systems

BOOK

ISBN# Bname Contents

1 X

2 Y

3 Z

+ + + +

########

Level

TopSecret

Secret

Unclassified

Sample MLS Object Systems

Design Approaches:SORION (Thuraisingham, MITRE)SO2 (Thuraisingham, MITRE)Millen-Lunt (Millen and Lunt, SRI)SODA (Keefe et al, U. of MN)Morgenstern (Morgenstern, SRI)UFOS (Rosenthal et al, MITRE)Message Passing (Jajodia and Kogan, GMU)

Objects for Secure Applications

Object Modeling Technique for Secure Database Applications:

Object Model: Models the static aspects of the application and security properties using objects

Dynamic Model: Models the activities and the security properties of the activities

Functional Model: Generates the data flow diagrams and the security levels of the methods

Object Modeling

SHIP ClassRange: Unclassified ---- Secret

Unclassified Attributes:IDNameGroup

Secret AttributesCaptainMission

SHIP InstanceID: YYYName: FloridaGroup: ZZZCaptain: SmithMission: AAA

Dynamic Model

CaptainLevel: UOperational Level C

ShipLevel: U

Mission-PlanLevel: UWith U, C and S attributes

MissionLevel: UOperational level: S

Reserve ship:security problem-information flow from C to U

Reserved status

Carry out mission

Get mission details

Mission details

Mission statusProblem: information flow from S to C

Functional Model

SHIP

plan

good status

Mission ID

bad status

status

GET PLAN

EXECUTE MISSION

CAPTAINRESERVE

MISSION PLAN

UML and PoliciesPolicy A: User has Roles

User Class:Attributes of the UserNameAgeGender- - - - - -

Role Class:Attributes of the RoleNameFunctions- - - - - - -Has

User Class:Attributes of the UserNameAgeGender- - - - - -

Activity Class:Attributes of the ActivityNameDescription- - - - - - -Carries

out

Policy B: User Carries out Activities

User Class:Attributes of the UserNameAgeGender- - - - - -

Role Class:Attributes of the RoleNameFunctions- - - - - - -

Has

Activity Class:Attributes of the ActivityNameDescription- - - - - - -

Carries out

Merged Policy C: User has Roles andCarries out Activities

Policy A: User has Roles

User Class:Attributes of the UserNameAgeGender- - - - - -

Role Class:Attributes of the RoleNameFunctions- - - - - - -Has

User Class:Attributes of the UserNameAgeGender- - - - - -

Activity Class:Attributes of the ActivityNameDescription- - - - - - -Carries

out

Policy B: User Carries out Activities

User Class:Attributes of the UserNameAgeGender- - - - - -

Role Class:Attributes of the RoleNameFunctions- - - - - - -

Has

Activity Class:Attributes of the ActivityNameDescription- - - - - - -

Carries out

Carries out Activities

Distributed Object Management Systems

Integrates heterogeneous applications, systems and databases Every node, database or application is an object Connected through a Bus Examples of Bus include

- Object Request Brokers (Object Management Group)

- Distributed Component Object Model (Microsoft)

Object-based Interoperability

Object Request Broker

Client

Object

Server

Object

Example Object Request Broker: Object Management Group’s (OMG) CORBA (Common Object Request Broker Architecture)

Javasoft’s RMI (Remote Method Invocation)

RMI Business Objects

Clients Java-based Servers

Objects and Security

Secure OOMUnified Object Model is Evolving

Secure OODBPersistentdata store

Secure OODADesign and analysis

Secure DOMInfrastructure

Secure OOPLProgramming

languageSecure FrameworksBusiness objects

Secure OOTTechnologies

Secure Object Request Brokers

Object Request Broker:

Client

Object

Server

Object

Security Service:Ensures secure communication between client and server

Object

CORBA (Common Object Request Broker Architecture) Security

Security Service provides the following:

- Confidentiality

- Integrity

- Accountability

- Availability URLs

- http://www.javaolympus.com/J2SE/NETWORKING/CORBA/CORBASecurity.jsp

- http://student.cosy.sbg.ac.at/~amayer/projects/corbasec/sec_overview.html

- www.omg.org

OMG Security Specifications

ATLAS:Service that supports obtaining authorization tokens to access a target system

CSlv2:Service that supports interoperation, authentication, delegation and privileges

CORBA Security Service:Provides basic security for the infrastructure

DataOMG SecuritySpecifications

CORBA (Common Object Request Broker Architecture) Security

Security Service provides the following:

- Confidentiality

- Integrity

- Accountability

- Availability URLs

- http://www.javaolympus.com/J2SE/NETWORKING/CORBA/CORBASecurity.jsp

- http://student.cosy.sbg.ac.at/~amayer/projects/corbasec/sec_overview.html

- www.omg.org

CORBA (Common Object Request Broker Architecture) Security - 2

Identification and Authentication of Principles Authorization and Access Control Security Auditing Security of communications Administration of security information Non repudiation

Dependable Object Request Brokers

Technology

provided by

Project

Technology

provided by

Project

Hardware

Display Processor

&Refresh

Channels

Consoles(14)

Navigation

Sensors

Data LinksData Analysis Programming

Group (DAPG)

FutureApp

FutureApp

FutureApp

Multi-SensorTracks

SensorDetections

Real Time Operating System

MSIApp

DataMgmt. Data

Xchg.

Infrastructure Services

Integrate Security, Real-time and Fault Tolerance Computing

Integrate Security, Real-time and Fault Tolerance Computing

Secure Frameworks

Framework A consisting ofComponents B, C, D

Component C

Component D

Component Y

Component Z

Framework X consisting ofComponents Y and Z

Access Control on Components and Frameworks:John has update access to components B, C, and YJane has update access to Framework A and read access to Framework X

Component B

Directions Object Models

- UML for Security applications is becoming common practice

- Secure distributed object systems has gained popularity

- Evolution into secure object-based middleware

- Secure object-based languages

- Integrating security and real-time for object systems

Distributed Objects

- Security cannot be an afterthought for object-based interoperability

- Use ORBs that have implemented security services

- Trends are moving towards Java based interoperability and Enterprise Application Integration (EAI)

- Examples of EAI products are Web Sphere (IBM) and Web Logic (BEA)

- Security has to be incorporated into EAI products

Why Multimedia Data Management System?

Need persistent storage for managing large quantities of multimedia data

A Multimedia data manager manages multimedia data such as text, images, audio, animation, video

Extended by a Browser to produce a Hypermedia data management system

Heterogeneity with respect to data types Numerous Applications

- Entertainment, Defense and Intelligence, Telecommunications, Finance, Medical

Architectures:Loose Integration

MultimediaFile Manager

Metadata

Module for IntegratingData Manager with File Manager

User Interface

Data Manager for Metadata

MultimediaFiles

Architectures:Tight Integration

User InterfaceUser Interface

MM-DBMS:Integrated data manager and file manager

MM-DBMS:Integrated data manager and file manager

MultimediaDatabase

MultimediaDatabase

Data Model:Scenario

Example:Object representation

Object A2000 Frames

4/95 8/95

5/95 10/95

Object B3000 Frames

Multimedia Data Access: Some approaches

Text data

- Selection with index features

- Methods: Full text scanning, Inverted files, Document clustering Audio/Speech data

- Pattern matching algorithms Matching index features given for searching and ones

available in the database Image data

- Identifying geometric boundaries, Identifying spatial relationships, Image clustering

Video data

- Retrieval with metadata, Pattern matching with images

Metadata for Multimedia

Metadata may be annotations and stored in relations

- I.e., Metadata from text, images, audio and video are extracted as stored as text

- Text metadata may be converted to relations by tagging and extracting concepts

Metadata may be images of video data

- E.g., certain frames may be captured as metadata Multimedia data understanding

- Extracting metadata from the multimedia data

Storage Methods

Single disk storage

- Objects belonging to different media types in same disk Multiple disk storage

- Objects distributed across disks Example: individual media types stored in different disks I.e., audio in one disk and video in another Need to synchronize for presentation (real-time techniques)

Multiple disks with striping

- Distribute placement of media objects in different disks Called disk striping

Security Issues

Access Control Multilevel Security Architecture Secure Geospatial Information Systems

Access Control for Multimedia Databases Access Control for Text, Images, Audio and Video Granularity of Protection

- Text John has access to Chapters 1 and 2 but not to 3 and 4

- Images John has access to portions of the image Access control for pixels?

- Video and Audio John has access to Frames 1000 to 2000 Jane has access only to scenes in US

- Security constraints Association based constraints

E.g., collections of images are classified

MLS Security

Book

Object

Introduction

Set of Sections

References

Introduction: Level = UnclassifiedSet of Sections: Level = TopSecretReferences: Level = Secret

Example Security Architecture: Integrity Lock

MultimediaDatabase

Trusted Agentto computechecksums

Sensor

Data Manager

UntrustedMultimedia DataManager

Compute ChecksumBased on say multimedia data value(such as video object content)Security level and Checksum

Compute ChecksumBased on multimedia data valueand Security level retrievedfrom the stored multimedia database

Inference Control

Metadata,Constraints

User Interface Manager

Inference EngineActs as an Inference Controller

MultimediaDatabase

MultimediaDatabaseManager

Securing Geospatial Data

Geospatial images could be Digital Raster Images that store images as pixels or Digital Vector Images that store images as points, lines and polygons

GSAM: Geospatial Authorization Model specifies subjects, credentials, objects (e.g, points, lines, pixels etc.) and the access that subjects have to objects

Reference: Authorization Model for Geospatial Data; Atluri and Chun, IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, Volume 1, #4, October – December 2004.

Bhavani M. Thuraisingham, Gal Lavee, Elisa Bertino, Jianping Fan, Latifur Khan: Access control, confidentiality and privacy for video surveillance databases. SACMAT 2006: 1-10

Details will be given in one of the lectures after the mid-term.

Secure Geospatial Data Management

Secure Geospatial data management References:

- Vijayalakshmi Atluri, Soon Ae Chun: An Authorization Model for Geospatial Data. IEEE Trans. Dependable Sec. Comput. 1(4): 238-254 (2004)

- Elisa Bertino, Bhavani M. Thuraisingham, Michael Gertz, Maria Luisa Damiani: Security and privacy for geospatial data: concepts and research directions. SPRINGL 2008:6-19

Securing Geospatial Data

Geospatial images could be Digital Raster Images that store images as pixels or Digital Vector Images that store images as points, lines and polygons

GSAM: Geospatial Authorization Model specifies subjects, credentials, objects (e.g, points, lines, pixels etc.) and the access that subjects have to objects

Reference: Authorization Model for Geospatial Data; Atluri and Chun, IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, Volume 1, #4, October – December 2004.

Framework for Geospatial Data Security (Joint with UCDavis and Purdue U.)

DATA PRESENTATION COMPONENTS

Access Control Module

Geospatial Data Registration

spatial and temporal registration of geospatial data

Data Integration Services&

Data Repository Access

DATA ACCESS LAYER

DAC/RBAC Policy Specification

Policy ReasoningEngine

Trust & Privacy Management

Authentic Data Publication

Auditing

Misuse Detection

SECURITY LAYER

OpenGeospatialConsortiumFramework

Core &ApplicationSchemas

GeospatialFeatures

GeographyMarkupLanguage

Metadata

GIS Web ServicesTraditional GIS

Wrapper

GeospatialDataRepositories

Example of several GIS repositories and GIS themes/layers for Northern California (Gertz, Bertino, Thuraisingham)

Assume a single GIS data repository that manages information about parcels (being the basic units of geography for local government) and cadastre, including land use and zoning, environmental areas, and municipal utility services.

Such type of repository is typically used by public sector staff to assist property owners and to support emergency, fire, and police operations.

The latter type of usage includes identifying property structures and owners. Parcel maps in particular can be useful to do damage assessment after a disaster.

Example (Continued)

They are also an important access point during emergencies for linking data from different GIS repositories. While such types of geospatial are used to serve the public, e.g., through Web-based interfaces, not all data layers are made publicly available. For example, property owner information is not publicly accessible

A similar separation of public and private GIS data can be made for other types of themes. For example, environmental theme layers do not make information about locations of endangered species or nesting sites public.

Based on this type of separation of GIS data, the following question arises: “What security mechanisms are used to specify and enforce different types of access to data in a single GIS repository?”

In particular, “What provisions do GSI data managers have to (1) give public sector staff only access to GIS data relevant to their function, and (2) ensure that no sensitive geospatial data (e.g., parcel owner information) is made publicly available?”

Ideally, GIS repositories should provide access control models and techniques similar to those developed for traditional (relational) databases. However, the diversity of geospatial data (feature-based versus field-based) and the complexity of feature-based geospatial data complicate a coherent and uniform access control model.

Policy Example (Bertino, Gertz, Thuraisingham)

Deny/allow policies with flexible granularity, grouping mechanisms for protected objects, and space-related access restrictions.

Deny/allow policies will be supported through the use of positive/negative authorizations; negative authorizations are crucial in order to support exceptions, by which, for example, an authorization is assigned to all objects in a set but one. In our context this paradigm is complicated by the larger options that we provide for denoting protected objects and by the presence of different object representations and dimensions. The main mechanism that we provide to support flexible grouping is based on the notions of object-locator and spatial window. An object-locator is a query expression that may include predicates against properties of feature types, metadata and provenance data. Predicates may also refer to topological relationships holding among the data objects, such as Within and Touches. An example of a policy using Touches is the one allowing a subject, which has access to information on a particular land parcel, to access information about all adjacent land parcels. The query expression may also include a projection component to specify an object representation and components. A spatial window is simply a spatial region in the reference space and denotes the set of object that are inside the boundary of the region. By combining such two mechanisms, one can specify sets of objects such as “all shelters occupying an area greater than 3000sf in Montgomery County”; in such case Montgomery County represents the authorization window. The use of spatial windows is particularly important to

Policy Example (Continued)

Active policies.

These are policies that when applied to a protected object perform certain transformations on the object, before returning it to the requester. Two relevant classes are the filtering policies and the obfuscating policies. Filtering policies refer to policies that filter out some portions of the objects before returning them to the users. These policies are directly supported by our object locator mechanisms.

Obfuscating policies

These policies act like filter policies except that they do not simply select objects but perform possibly complex computations on the feature(s) to be returned. Typical examples include computing a lower resolution image, and distorting some vector data (but preserving topological relationships). One can even specify policies that return incorrect data (e.g., as a honey pot in the context of misuse detection). In our model these policies are supported by the projection component, suitably extended with the possibility of invoking functions, of the object locator. We will provide a library including a variety of functions to support obfuscating policies.

Policy Example (Concluded)

Context-dependent access control policies.

Under such policies, information from the environment is taken into account by the access control module when taking decisions about access requests. Typical contextual information includes time and subject location. Subject location information is used to specify policies allowing a subject to access a resource only if the current location of the subject verifies certain spatial constraints. Context-dependent access policies will be supported by the introduction of a context component, as part of authorization rules, and by attribute-based specification of subjects in authorization rules.

Event-based access control policies.

Event-based access control policies are novel and are based on the idea that policies can be enabled/disabled depending on the occurrence of specified events. Events can include data modifications, very much like in database triggers, or application-dependent events, such as an emergency. We notice that current sensor networks and intelligent appliances make it very easy for a computer system to detect events arising in the environments. Our model will take advantage of such capabilities.

Policy Language

Take existing geospatial language/model and extend for security

- E.g., GML Take a security model/language and extend for geospatial

- E.g, XACML has been extended to Geo-XACML Develop from scratch

- GRDF, Secure GRDF (developed at UTDallas by Alam Ashraful for PhD research)

• The strength of RDF lies in the ease of composition with which RDF based formalisms can be integrated with other similar languages.

• On the Semantic Web, the goal is to minimize human intervention and to make way for machines to perform rule based automated reasoning.

• We are developing GRDF for geospatial data representation

• Why not use GML? - same reasons for using RDF and not XML – semantics

•Secure GRDF – security extensions for GRDF

Geospatial Semantic Web: GRDF

Directions

Multimedia data security is getting some attention Little research on Geospatial data security Digital watermarking is getting some attention Our focus at UTD is to develop a secure geospatial semantic

web We have developed a system called DAGIS and

demonstrating secure interoperability Details will be given later