daniel dennett - precis of consciousness explained

8/4/2019 Daniel Dennett - Precis of Consciousness Explained

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International Phenomenological Society

Review: Prcis of Consciousness ExplainedAuthor(s): Daniel C. DennettReviewed work(s):

Consciousness Explained by Daniel C. DennettSource: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 53, No. 4 (Dec., 1993), pp. 889-892Published by: International Phenomenological SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2108259

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PhilosophyandPhenomenologicalResearchVol. Lm,No. 4, December993

Pr6cis of ConsciousnessExplained*DANIELC. DENNEITTufts University

Consciousnesshasalwaysbeen a bafflingphenomenon,and some have seen itto be fundamentallymysterious,irretrievablybeyond humanunderstanding.I argue, on the contrary,that its mysteries are beginningto dissolve, thankslargely to the onslaughtof empirical and conceptualadvances in cognitivescience. So entrenched,however, are the traditionalways of addressingthephilosophicalproblems,that a frontal assault on them is doomed. One can-not hope to convince philosophersby straightforwardrguments o abandonthe "obvious"assumptionswhose mutualacceptancehas definedthe debates.

A more indirectapproach s called for ("Preview,"pp. 16-18), postpon-ing a direct confrontationwith the traditionalcategories until a new per-spective has been created,andthe readerfamiliarizedwith some of its pow-ers. This is a three-stageoperation. n PartI, a surveyof phenomenaandputa-tive difficulties sets the problem and establishes a method. The goal is tocreate a materialistic,scientifically supportedbut still deliberatelysketchy,model that can actually explain all the puzzlingphenomena.The method forachieving this goal requiresa philosophicallyand scientifically neutralwayof describingthe data-a phenomenologyin its originalsense of a pre-theo-reticalcatalogueof phenomena.In PartII, the sketchof the model, the Mul-tiple DraftsModel, is developedandsupported,andput throughsome of itspaces. Finally, in Part III, the philosophical implications of the MultipleDraftsModel are examined.Only thendo I confront the challenges invokingfolk psychological categories, and such philosophical terms as qualia,epiphenomenalism,zombie, and inctionalism, the staplediet of philosophi-cal debate n recentyears.

(This indirect approachdoes not work for all readers, I have learned.Some find the temporarysuspension of allegiance to traditionalcategoriesbeyond them, or are unwilling to venture it. Those who insist on trying toimpose theirfavoritephilosophicaldistinctionson the book from the outsetare almost bound to find the first two parts "exasperatinglyelusive, even* Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1991), pp.xiii, 511.

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self-contradictory" Block, 1993). This can prevent such a readerfrom everentertainingseriously the possibility that the arguments n Part In succeedin undercuttingthe traditionaldistinctions.)

In Part I, the method of heterophenomenology s presented,motivated,and analyzed.It capturesthe actualpracticeandbackgroundassumptions ofcognitive scientists studying consciousness, providing a frameworkwithinwhich theoreticaldisagreementsregarding he explanationof the datacan beexpressed,while permitting he data to be acknowledgedby all sides.

In Part II, the method is put to the test by considering some initiallycounterintuitivephenomena involving the timing of "events in conscious-ness." The paradoxical flavor of these phenomena is due, I argue, to thewidespreadbut tacit assumptionof a certainpictureof how consciousnessmust be relatedto the brain,which I call the CartesianTheater.Contempo-rary theorists have abandonedDescartes' notoriously problem-riddendual-ism, with its miraculoustrans-substance nteractionat the pineal gland, butthey have not discardedenough; they have clung to the Cartesian dea thatconsciousness of a stimulus (or other event) happenswhen and only whentrains of neuralevents caused by the event in question get transduced ntosome central medium (the CartesianTheater). According to this doctrine,which I call Cartesianmaterialism,thereis a cerebralseat of consciousness"where it all comes together."Exposing this bad idea is not very hard,anddecrying it is fun for all, but findingan alternativevision is an uphill battleagainst intuitions that many persist in deeming innocent. The analysis andcriticismof these intuitions,and a re-investigationof the phenomena,yieldssome constraintson models which arethenelaborated nto a sketch of an al-ternativemodel (or family of models), the Multiple DraftsModel. The ini-tially curious and unfamiliarfeatures Qfthe model are shown to have plau-sible evolutionary sources, and a chapteris devoted to how the model candeal with some of the most recalcitrantproblemsof language production.

What emerges from all this is a cognitive "architecture" f conscious-ness, summarizedn a ThumbnailSketch:

There s no single,definitive stream f consciousness,"ecause here s no centralHead-quarters, o CartesianTheaterwhere "it all comestogether"or the perusalof a CentralMeaner. nstead f sucha singlestreamhoweverwide),therearemultiple hannelsn whichspecialist ircuits ry, n parallel andemoniums,o do theirvarious hings,creatingMultipleDraftsas theygo. Mostof thesefragmentaryrafts f "narrative"layshort-livedoles n themodulation f current ctivitybut someget promotedo furtherunctional oles, n swift suc-cession,bytheactivity f a virtualmachinen the brain.Theseriality f thismachine its "vonNeumannesque"haracter)s nota "hard-wired"esign eature, utratherhe upshot f a suc-cessionof coalitions f thesespecialists.

Thebasicspecialists repartof ouranimalheritage.Theywerenot developedo performpeculiarlyuman ctions,uchasreading ndwriting, utducking, redator-avoiding,ace-rec-ognizing,grasping, hrowing, erry-picking,ndotheressential asks.Theyare oftenoppor-

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tunisticallynlistednnewroles, orwhich heirnative alentsmoreorless suitthem.There-sult s notbedlam nlybecause he trends hatareimposedon all thisactivityare themselvestheproduct f design.Someofthisdesign s innate,and s sharedwith otheranimals.Butit isaugmented,nd ometimesvenoverwhelmednimportance,ymicrohabitsf thoughthataredevelopedn theindividual, artly diosyncraticesultsof self-explorationndpartlyhepredesigned iftsof culture. housandsf memes,mostlyborne y language,ut alsoby wordless'images" ndotherdata-structures,akeupresidencen an ndividual rain, hapingts tendencies and herebyurningtintoa mind. pp.253-54)

This eclectic model draws heavily on the work of many researchersincognitive science, and the final chapterof Part II orients the model with re-spect to that literature,acknowledging sources, adjudicatinga few of thecontroversies,and elaboratingsome of the importantdetails in preparationfor the philosophical work of PartIII.

PartIII opens with a challenge regardingthe phenomenaof mental im-agery, and addresses, in turn, the philosophical literature on the natureofmental representation,belief and thought,the statusof folk psychology, theproblematic (indeed incoherent) philosophical concept of zombies, thepathologies of blindsightand unilateralneglect, and the ubiquitousand be-guiling concept of "fillingin" by the brain. The idea that there is somethinglike a "phenomenal ield"of "phenomenalproperties" n addition to the in-formational/functionalpropertiesaccommodatedby my theory is shown tobe a multi-facetedillusion, an artifactof badtheorizing. Otto, a fictional in-terlocutor,occasionally interrupts he proceedingsin orderto express undercover of anonymitythe most persistentphilosophical objections I encoun-tered in presentationsof early drafts of these chapters. (This turns out tohave been a valuableexpositorytactic,I think.Ottohas been denouncedas astooge or strawman by some, but others have hailed him as my"philosophicalconscience" and exp-ressed heir allegiance to his doctrinesand even endorsedhis expressionof them.In fact, everythingOtto says wasdrawn, with scant editorial amendment, from heated discussions withphilosopherswith impeccable credentials.)

Chapter 12, on qualia, exemplifies the "end run"strategy of the wholebook, eschewing the direct confrontation for which, see Dennett, 1988) foran explanationof why the whole idea of qualia is forlorn to begin with. Asubstituteis provided:an accountof some relevant phenomena-color andour attitudestowards colors-that does the work qualia-theorieswere sup-posed to do without ever entangling the theorist in the definitional andmethodological problems that beset that literature.

The last two chapters defend answers to the perennial problems aboutthe nature of the self, the problemof other minds (especially the minds ofotheranimalsand robots), and the hidden agenda thatdrives so much theo-rizing by philosophersof mind: the dimly imagined moralimplications of amaterialisttheoryof consciousness.

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ReferencesBlock, N., 1993, review of ConsciousnessExplained,Journalof Philosophy,

90,pp.181-93.Dennett, D., 1988, "QuiningQualia," n A. Marcel and E. Bisiach, eds., Con-

sciousness in ContemporaryScience, Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press,pp. 42-77.

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daniel dennett - precis of consciousness explained

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