daladier and the munich crisis: a reappraisal author(s): susan bindoff butterworthreviewed...

8/13/2019 Daladier and the Munich Crisis: A Reappraisal Author(s): Susan Bindoff ButterworthReviewed work(s):Source: Journ

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Daladier and the Munich Crisis: A ReappraisalAuthor(s): Susan Bindoff ButterworthReviewed work(s):Source: Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Jul., 1974), pp. 191-216Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/260030.

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aladier n d t h u n i c hC r i s i s eappraisalSusan Bindoff Butterworth

In 1965 in an article entitled 'Appeasement: the Rise of aRevisionist School', Donald Watt drew attention to the needfor a much closer investigation of the actual, rather than theformal, functioning of the British foreign policy-makingapparatus during the 1930s. Instead of a simple analysis goingno further than the personalities and prejudices of a handfulof principal characters he suggested that consideration shouldbe given to such wider phenomena as the breakdown of bothparliamentary and cabinet government, the power of thesenior civil servants, the nature and expression of publicopinion, and the loss of faith in democratic processes. MrWatt also referred to 'Professor Arthur Furnia's somewhatperverse study of 7TheDiplomlacy of ippeasement'2 in whichhe argued enthusiastically for a rehabilitation of EdouardDaladier, who presided over French 'appeasement'. Thisbrings us to the two main points of the present article whichare that the kind of analysis described by Mr Watt is asconspicuously lacking in the French as in the British case andthat, perverse though his account is, Professor Furnia maynot have entirely misplaced his sympathy.Essentially this is a rehearing of the case against Daladier'sconduct of France's part in the Munich crisis. He has beenfreely abused by critics such as 'Pertinax'3 as being weak

D. C. Watt, 'Appeasement: the Rise of a Revisionist School', PoliticalQuarterly, XXXVI (1965), 191-213.2 A. Furnia, The Diplomacy of Appeasement, (Washington 1960).3 'Prtinax' (pseud. Andre Geraud), The Gravedzigers of France, (New York1944), Section II, passim.

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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYbehind a facade of dour peasant strength, indecisive andincapable of managing his Cabinet. Without rushing to theopposite extreme and absolving him of all these faults thetime has come to show that his problems were greater, andhis freedom of action far more narrowly constricted than hasusually been realized, and the more so when set in thecontext of the very serious decay of parliamentary life andthe social conditions existing in France in 1938. There havebeen many versions of the Munich crisis and of the Frenchrole in it but not even the most complete and up to date hasmade any serious attempt to probe the forces acting uponDaladier. Superficial diplomatic evidence and his publicactions and speeches have been accepted at face value and ithas been too readily assumed that either he was duped by thenefarious schemes of Neville Chamberlain or that he gladlyrelinquished control of French policy into British hands so asgracefully to avoid the unpleasant duty of honouringFrance's commitments to Czechoslovakia.To examine the total picture is outside the scope of thisarticle. What it does is to examine four aspects of it and todraw attention to several others in the hope of provokingquestions for further research, for instance into the Frenchdiplomatic documents as they become available. There areparticular difficulties with this topic, because it is a study ofintra-Cabinet relations without the basic raw materials,Cabinet records, for none were ever kept during the wholeThird Republic period.5 Any picture of its inner workings,therefore, must be reconstructed from fragments in memoirs,published documents and contemporary journalisticaccounts, which inevitably make it somewhat more tentativethan one would wish. The four fields of inquiry are: first, thegeneral context of French politics in 1938; second thepolicies and personal relations of Daladier and GeorgesBonnet; third, the relations among other members of the

s See Jean Zay, Souvenirs et Solitude, (Paris 1945), 154-5. Zay wasDaladier's Minister of Education. According to him no official minutes ofCabinet meetings were ever kept; indeed, President Lebrun was known toreprimand any Minister who took notes. The Press communique was invariablybrief and uninformative, thus the only guides to what really happened were theprivate notes made afterwards by Ministers.

192



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DALADIER AND THE MUNICH CRISIS: A REAPPRAISALCabinet and their influence on policy, and fourth, to touchupon the role of two groups of civil servants, those of theTreasury and the Quai d'Orsay.In The Gravediggers of France4 'Pertinax' wrote a bitterdenunciation of Daladier's choice of ministers. He claimedthat the Premier was afraid to get rid of men of the stamp ofBonnet, de Monzie and Pomaret in case he would thereby beforced to ally with such strong, forceful characters asReynaud, Mandel, Campinchi, Herriot and Sarraut. He goeson to say: 'But in such a Cabinet Daladier knew that hewould no longer be the master ... As against unity in theCabinet- but a unity that would tie him up in a strait-jacket - he preferred an ill-assorted collection of ministers,even if traitors - the word is his own and he used it morethan once - should continue to sit at the Council table.'

This passage refers actually to the events of 1940 but asthe Cabinet was still substantially the same as in 1938 and assimilar charges were made against Daladier then it will servevery well to encapsulate the usual interpretation of hisbehaviour at that time. It raises three questions which shallbe considered here.

Was it indeed practicable for Daladier to have thrown outthe 'traitors'? The word is so damning that it is scarcelyconceivable that any leader would keep such associates if hehad any better alternative. Is there anything to show that hewas any more the master in a cabinet which contained themthan he would have been in one that did not? And wouldReynaud, Mandel and the others have been as strong andunited as 'Pertinax' supposes? The lesser but interestingquestion of why Daladier appointed two such corruptmediocrities as de Monzie and Pomaret at the height of thecrisis will also be considered later.For 'Pertinax', all is to be explained in terms of the defectsof one man's character. We can agree with him that Daladierwas not the most inspired leader that France or even theThird Republic ever had and that his personal style wassometimes inept and not calculated to enhance his

4 151-2.193



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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYauthority.6 On the other hand his difficulties would havetaxed a statesman of genius. He was heir not only to anominous European situation and the accumulated unsolvedproblems of depression which hit France harder in 1937-8than earlier, but, most particularly, to a situation of politicalstalemate which virtually dictated his choice of ministers-andpolicies in advance. Approve them or not he had absolutelyno option but to endorse them for fear of the most disastrousconsequences for France.The choice of a foreign minister and foreign policy wasparticularly narrow for reasons originating in the politicalvicissitudes of the previous ten years if not, indeed, of thewhole post-war period. This problem can best be approachedby an examination, first of the general considerations limitingthe choice of a Foreign Minister, second of the politicalsituation of April 1938 when Daladier formed his Cabinet,and third, of the individual qualifications of those candidatessurviving this preliminary screening.

One thing that should not be forgotten is that sinceFrance's most chronic and difficult post-war problems hadbeen those of finance and international relations these twoministries had acquired a kind of senior status and taken onthe character of political prizes. Thus a Premier appointing tothese posts would need to consider not only the abilities andexperience of the various contenders, but also their personalpolitical influence and the amount of support they would belikely to bring to or alienate from the Government. In asituation where coalitions were unavoidable the 'plums' hadto be judiciously distributed so as to secure the loyalty of theconstituent groups and their leaders, and the minis-ters-designate had to command the confidence of thecoalition as a whole. In the case of the Foreign Minister healso had to be acceptable to the more important foreigngovernments. As we shall presently see, all these factors hadto be taken into account in April 1938.

6 See 'Pertinax', 101 n. His dour public speaking style also lent itself tocaricature. General (then Captain) Paul Stehlin in Temoignage pour I'Histoire,(Paris 1964) relates, 100-1, how on meeting Daladier for the first time at Munichhe was struck by the difference between the man himself, for whom he developeda great respect, and his public image which he had always found repellent.194



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DALADIER AND THE MUNICH CRISIS: A REAPPRAISALThis was a moment of incredible confusion. The Anschluss

had just occurred and France had had no Government evento register the fact, much less do anything about it.7 ThePopular Front had at last fallen to pieces. There were strikesin the aircraft and engineering industries. Czechoslovakia wasshowing alarm about her future, and with good cause.Everyone agreed that it was time to stop playing the powergame and have a Government of Union Nationale 'fromThorez to Reynaud',8 which would, for once, rule and notmerely occupy power, but no-one seemed to know whatformula could be used which had not already been tried andabandoned during the endless shuffling and reshuffling ofcabinets during the last ten years.Ever since the end of World War I France's affairs had beenpossessed by a kind of rhythmic instability lurchingerratically from left to right and back again at two-yearlyintervals. With no party able to create a simple majoritycoalitions had been inevitable and, except for 1928-32 whenthey voluntarily withdrew from the scene, the inevitableanchor of such coalitions had been the Radical-Socialistparty, the largest in Parliament although' they only camesecond to the Socialists in terms of the popular vote. Despitetheir traditional pretensions to being a party of the Left, theRadicals now, in practice, occupied the centre of the politicalspectrum.Sprawling, disorganised and lacking anything that couldhave been recognized as a programme or party discipline, theparty was a haven for moderates of all sorts. That is to saythat, although it excluded the doctrinaire Marxism of the farleft and the various pro-fascist and royalist fetishes of the farright, it accommodated men of widely different leanings.There was also a heavy sprinkling of mediocrities, theambitious and opportunist, and those who saw the party,

7 Camille Chautemps had resigned as Premier on 10 March, for no verypressing reasons, two days before the Anschluss, apparently because he did notwant to have to deal with the foreign crisis. See P. J. Larmour, The FrenchRadical Party in the 1930's (Stanford 1964), 236-7, also Alexander Werth, TheTwilight of France, reprint ed. (New York 1966), 157.8 The formula is attributed to Reynaud himself by E. Beau de Lominie in LaMort de la Troisieme Republique, (np, 1951), 68.

195



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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYhowever improbably, as a vehicle of reform because it wasthe only one consistently in power.It had begun as a militantly anticlerical party during theDreyfus affair but had developed into the vehicle of arespectable, unimaginative, old-fashioned liberalism.Generally speaking, it distrusted the exercise of stateauthority on the individual, particularly in economic matters.This meant that it was unwilling to use such measures asdevaluation, exchange control or national economic planning.It was, therefore, tied to the orthodox but outmoded andconstricting financial concept of the balanced budget whichproved to be so hopelessly ineffective against the Depression.This was the single greatest cause of the political shambles ofthe 1930s as successive administrations were unable to solvethe financial problems by such traditional methods ofrigorous deflation as cutting Government employees' salariesand raising taxes, and yet were unable to rid themselves ofthis economic theory.

Coalitions formed to left and right of this politicalwatershed, in either case bringing to the fore the mostcompatible elements in the Radicals. Thus, such combin-ations were always fairly moderate, not to say mediocre, andthe frequent redistribution of portfolios among the samesmall clique began to give government a jaded, threadbareappearance.With the beginning of the 1930s and the onset of the realeconomic and social problems of the Depression, the tend-ency to shift between a left-wing and a right-wing formulahad become dangerously and dishearteningly regular.Approximately every two years the government recipe,whether Cartel des Gauches, Bloc National, Concentration, orFront Populaire was shown to have failed wretchedly to dealwith financial instability and social unrest at home. Abroad,there was a mounting list of cases where French foreignpolicy had been either quite paralysed or else inept andineffective. As government after government fell whileFrance floundered, confidence in the whole idea of parli-amentary government was strained to the limit, and theextremist elements of right and left openly repudiated it.In early 1938 the overthrow, in quick succession, of two196



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DALADIER AND THE MUNICH CRISIS: A REAPPRAISALmore governments, those of Blum and Chautemps, provedthat the Popular Front had at last dragged out its miserableexistence to an exhausted and bankrupt end. After havingbeen deliberately edged out of the government by Chautempson 15 January, the Socialists, in disillusion, had decided toreturn to their old doctrine of 'the exercise of power'whereby they refused to participate in any government thatthey did not control.9This had been both cause and consequence of a shift backtowards the right among the Radicals, who had never been atease with the revolutionary appearance of the Popular Front,and it brought into prominence such conservatives as CamilleChautemps, Georges Bonnet, Paul Marchandeau and, in theSenate, Joseph Caillaux. (The term 'conservative' in thiscontext indicates attachment to the Radicals' traditionalfinancial theories, a general lack of sympathy for the socialengineering of the Popular Front, and enthusiasm for betterrelations between France and the Fascist states.'Conservative' is not here synonymous with 'right-wing', forPaul Reynaud, who designated himself as a member of thecentre, further to the right than any of the Radicals, heldunorthodox views on finance and objected to closer ties withItaly and Germany. Similar anomalies are to be found inevery party and group.) However, although the Popular Frontas a programme obviously had nothing more to offer, as asentiment and a memory it still commanded enough loyaltyto confound the creation of a definitely right-wing bloc.Georges Bonnet's attempt to form such a government inJanuary had been routed by the Socialists who, dreading anattack on the social legislation of the past eighteen months,indignantly declared that 'if there is one politician withwhom it is difficult for the parties of the Left to come to anunderstanding now, it is M. Chautemps' former Minister ofFinance.'10 That is to say that they were threatening towithdraw not only their participation but also their support

9 G. Bonnet, DfeT;r~e de la Paix Vol. I, De Washington au Quai d'Orsay,(Geneva 1946), 71 cit. J. Colton, Leon Blum: Humanist in Politics, (New York1966), 291.10 Le Populaire, 15 January 1937, cit. Larmour, 234. (This date is a misprintfor 1938.)

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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYin Parliament, without which a basically Radical governmentwould have little chance of survival. Thus a left-winggovernment was impossible and a right-wing one prohibited.About all that was possible was the usual Radical-moderatecombination, 'this time with a rightish complexion, but stillwith concessions to the left.11As has already been pointed out, though, this was atimeworn, threadbare arrangement which had appeared overand over again since 1930 and had proved itself equally oftento be incapable of positive action, decision or leadership. Tohave turned to it again for salvation, especially underconditions of acute crisis would have been an advertisementof political bankruptcy so complete that it could onlycontribute to the ruin of confidence in France from withinand without. The question was how to make the old mixturelook different.

By a process of elimination Daladier had been left as theonly candidate for the premiership. After the secession ofBlum and the Socialists, Herriot, Chautemps and Sarraut alldeclined to form a government, and as was described earlierBonnet's attempt was rejected. According to himself,Daladier also had reservations about doing so but acceptedwhen President Lebrun pressed it upon him.12As for a foreign minister, the choice was a little wider butnot much. Leaving out the Socialists, there were severalleading figures among the Radical and Centre parties whowere at least temporarily in the wilderness for variousreasons, and therefore ineligible for either of the two mainministries. Chautemps had discredited himself by theundignified haste with which he had abandoned office a fewdays before the Anschluss; Laval, considerably further to the

There was a twofold necessity to conciliate the Left. In the first placeDaladier had been a founder member of the Popular Front and even given thefluid alliances of French politics it was too soon for him to be able decently torepudiate the connection. Secondly, 1937-8 was France's worst depressionperiod with severe inflation and corresponding industrial unrest.

12 E. Daladier, 'Munich: Vingt-Trois Annees apres', article in Candide, 7September 1961. Daladier says that he told Lebrun that the next Premier shouldbe a man who had stood above the party strife and could head a government ofnational union. The President replied that the presidents of both Chambers hadrecommended Daladier for the post.198



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DALADIER AND THE MUNICH CRISIS: A REAPPRAISALright, had not yet recovered from the Abyssinian debacle of1935; Flandin, president of the Alliance democratique,during his term as Foreign Minister had helplessly looked onat the remilitarisation of the Rhineland in 1936. In any case,he was by now too public a champion of France's with-drawing behind the Maginot Line and abandoning herEuropean allies to be considered.13 Herriot and Sarraut, theleaders of the moderate wing of the Radical Party, had foundthemselves isolated by the rightward drift of the party.14Neither would, of course, have been an impossible choice forForeign Minister for both, especially Herriot, had greatpersonal prestige and experience to offset their presentdisadvantages. On the other hand, a Daladier-Herriot-Sarrautcombination would have been precisely the classic, hack-neyed, Radical clique which was to be avoided. The effectivechoice came down, in fact to three men, JosephPaul-Boncour, Paul Reynaud, and Georges Bonnet.It appears that Paul-Boncour was Daladier's first choice forForeign Minister, even though as leader of a minor Socialistparty (the Union Socialiste republicaine) he was of the leftwing. He was known for his opposition to a Franco victory inthe Spanish Civil War and for his championship of the Leagueof Nations and the maintenance of France's EasternEuropean commitments. Quoting from Paul-Boncour's ownaccount, Henri Nogueresis tells how Daladier summoned himto the War Ministry and listened to his exposition of the needto defend Czechoslovakia, maintain the Russian alliance andabandon false notions about the value of the Maginot Line.Some hours later Daladier telephoned his decision toPaul-Boncour:

I have been thinking. The policy you outlined to me is a very finepolicy, thoroughly worthy of France: I do not think we are in aposition to undertake it. I am going to have Georges Bonnet.13 P. E. Flandin, Politique franfaise 1919-1940, (Paris 1947), Ch. VI, esp.247-250; Werth, 141-6.14 Larmour, 241. Beau de Lomenie, 37-8, says that Herriot was ageing andregarded as being semi-retired in the office of President of the Chamber.5 J. Paul-Boncour, Entre Deux Guerres Vol. III, (Parisand New York, 1946),cit. Henri Nogueres, Munich - or The Phoney Peace, English ed. (London 1965),43. (No page reference in Paul-Boncour given.)

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CONTEMPORARY HISTORY'Since you choose to follow the other policy', repliedPaul-Boncour, 'you could not make a better choice.'

Thus it is assumed by both Paul-Boncour and Nogueresthat Daladier deliberately opted for weakness. What is morelikely, however, is that in the intervening hours the BritishGovernment made known its displeasure at such an appoint-ment. Alexander Werth certainly suspected this for he wrote'that there was good reason to believe that it made it veryplain to M. Daladier... that it would consider the reappoint-ment of M. Paul-Boncour to the Quai d'Orsay as eminentlyundesirable'.16 Lest such overt interference seem too irregularto be likely, there is on record a remark of Sir AlexanderCadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office,to Jan Masaryk. In his opinion M. Paul-Boncour 'was not aforeign minister, who at so serious a moment could be aworthy partner in a discussion of the European crisis'.17Of course it is still arguable that Daladier should haverefused to allow his choice to be dictated from Whitehall andopted for Paul-Boncour's sturdy independence 'which ratherwent on the assumption that England needed France as muchas France needed England and that, if it came to the worst,England could not stay out'.18On the other hand, as Georges Bonnet pointed out somemonths later, France would never be in a worse diplomaticsituation and could ill afford to be, or even appear to be, onbad terms with her one presumptive ally.19

This leaves us with Reynaud and Bonnet. Ordinarily bothmen's forte was finances, although Reynaud had only heldthat ministry once, briefly, in 1930. It was, therefore, amatter of considerable surprise when Reynaud declined toaccept the Treasury and took instead the relatively minorpost of Minister of Justice. 'Pertinax' attributes this to thefact that Reynaud at this time 'favoured dangerous plans fora further devaluation of the franc: 240 to the pound

16 Werth, 162.'7eDirksen PapersVoL I 103. Masarykto Krofta, 4 April 1938.8 Werth, 161.19 J. Zay, Carnets Secrets, (Paris 1942), 5.

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DALADIER AND THE MUNICH CRISIS: A REAPPRAISAL

sterling',20 and that he stepped down when he failed toimpress this need upon Daladier. According to Sir EricPhipps, the British Ambassador, however, Reynaud 'told mesoon after this government was formed that he did notbelieve that the Government would last long enough toenable him to have any chance of settling the difficultproblem of setting France's financial house in order'.21 If thisis indeed so, it might well explain why Reynaud, anambitious man, did not make any strong bid for the Ministryof Foreign Affairs. Werth dismisses it by saying (without anysupporting evidence) that 'why-he was not made ForeignMinister is simply because he was too great a believer incollective security and old-fashioned remedies to suit MrChamberlain's taste'.22The real key may, however, be personal ambition. Despitea brilliant record as a parliamentary orator and debater,Reynaud's ministerial experience amounted to only a shortspell at the Treasury and a successful term as Minister ofColonies, both in the early 1930s. He was now in his sixtieswithout ever having been Premier, a remarkable feat for amajor French politician. To have accepted the Quai d'Orsayunder an apparently shaky Government with a majorEuropean crisis brewing would have been to court anignominious failure which would consign him to the wild-erness along with Laval and Flandin until he was perhaps tooold ever to realize his hopes.

20 lOOn.21 Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Third Series Vol. III,(London 1950), 257. Reynaud's own account, written long after the event, ismore colourful and turns on the question of the forty-hour week, which heopposed. In In The Thick of the Fight, (London 1955), 143-4, he says, 'Now,the Radicals had been united, but a short time before, with the Socialists in theGovernment and the majority. It would be impossible for them to separate onsuch a burning question. I went, therefore, to see Leon Blum, who, whilst advisingme to enter the Daladier Administration, told me that his party would not allowthe law to become a subject of debate. Under these conditions I shourd haveentered the Government only to overthrow it.' To avoid this situation he took aminor non-finance portfolio. However, since one of Daladier's first actions was tomake the forty-hour law more flexible, this explanation does not sound completeand has, perhaps, the ring of apice justificative.22 p. 163. Werth does not elaborate upon this point and no other writermentions it. It may, therefore, be only speculation on his part, though he isnormally accurate as to matters of fact.

201



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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYBonnet, by all accounts even more painfully ravaged by

ambition, had, on the other hand, already been FinanceMinister several times and had very recently held a majordiplomatic appointment as ambassador to the United States,It was for this reason that Daladier claimed to have pickedhim for Foreign Minister:23

I chose M. Bonnet as foreign minister.. because in 1932 he hadpresided over the Stresa conference on reconstruction of CentralEurope and because when he had been appointed Ambassador toWashington by Leon Blum's government he had been able to gainthe undoubted esteem of President Roosevelt, Sumner Welles, theassistant Secretary of State, and the political circles, as well as afortunate influence over them.

A further consideration must have been Bonnet's personalpolitical influence. Not only was he a leading light of theconservative faction which now dominated the Radical Party,but he was also on good terms with the high financialcircles.24General Gamelin noted his power:

It must be added that he (Bonnet) had a considerable influence, ifnot authority, in political circles. This certainly had a crampingeffect on Daladier who was obliged to reckon with him.25

However pernicious his views on foreign policy, and it seemsthat he made no secret of them,26 a man with these contactscould lend some desperately needed stability to the Govern-ment. The Senate, after all, had made financial powers theissue on which it had overthrown Blum's last government. Itwould not be so likely to oust an administration where itsown favourites held both the key ministries. (Paul

23 Letter written by Daladier to the president of the parliamentary commissionof inquiry into the events that occurred in France between 1933 and 1945. Cit.Nogueres, 45. The letter is dated 21 May 1951 but is annexed to the minutes of themeeting of 18 May 1951.24Werth, 128, 'the Banks liked Bonnet and so did the Senate'. Bonnet had alsobeen an inspector of Finances (Larmour, 270, n. 70), which as Jean Zaycomplained, (Souvenirs . . ., 40-44) was an extremely influential post.25General Maurice-Gustave Gamelin, Servir Vol. III, (Paris 1947), cit.Nogueres, 44. (No page reference in Gamelin given.)26 'Pertinax', 101 n.

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DALADIER AND THE MUNICH CRISIS: A REAPPRAISALMarchandeau, a conservative, was Minister of Finance.)Daladier seems to have been playing the dangerous game oftrying to harness Bonnet and his friends to the Governmentby giving them a worthwhile political prize, while trying tokeep them relatively harmless. France's policy towardEastern Europe had, after all, been laid down for the pastnineteen years, ever since Clemenceau had assisted in settingup the 'succession states', and Daladier may have thoughtthat Bonnet would not dare do anything but follow it.At any rate, Bonnet gave an undertaking not to let hisprivate feelings sway his conduct of foreign policy, whichimplies that someone, presumably Daladier, put him underpressure to give it. This is hardly the action of a PrimeMinister who has every confidence in his lieutenant andargues against Paul-Boncour's assumption that in choosingBonnet Daladier also chose his policy.27In the circumstances the risk may well have seemed worthtaking. The fear of any further ministerial upheavals isreflected in the overwhelming vote of confidence accorded tothe Government which Daladier presented to Parliament on12 April. The Chamber voted for it by 576 to 5 anddelegated financial powers by 574 to 8 with about 100,mainly right-wing, abstentions each time. The Senate carriedthe same two votes unanimously.28 But such'concord, thoughdoubtless welcome, was an unhealthy sign, evidence of neardesperation. Daladier himself has written of it:29

This unanimity was undoubtedly the result of the anxiety causedby the general situation and, perhaps also, of the common desire ofthe Left and the Right to avoid another ministerial crisis. Thiswould have been the third in three months and one could fear thatit would have serious consequences for the regime itself.27 'Pertinax', 392: 'One may form an idea of his duplicity from this fact alone.On 7 April 1938 he accepted the portfolio of foreign affairs from Daladier with afirm promise that he would follow, as regardsCzechoslovakia, a policy repellent tohis own convictions.' Also, 101 n., 'At the time the Cabinet formed Bonnet made

no mystery of his opinions but promised not to be swayed by them.' This is acurious incident, mentioned by no other writer, and by 'Pertinax' without anysupporting evidence. This writer is however, generally reliable on matters of fact ifnot of interpretation, and he does repeat the assertion, which tells againstaccidental or careless inclusion of it.28Nogueres, 46; Werth, 168.29 Daladier, loc. cit. (my translation)203



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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYFOR A TIME AT LEAST the risk probably appeared

justified. All of Bonnet's earliest acts seemed to be designedto reassure the world that France would remain loyal to hertreaty commitments, as was unequivocally stated in theMinisterial Declaration:30

In all cases - in the case of strengthening our bonds with ourfriends or in the case of proving our loyalty to all pacts and treatieswe have signed, ... it is indispensable that the national energies beunited.Bonnet also assured M. Osusky, the Czechoslovak Minister,that 'the position of the French Government in relation toCentral Europe [had] not undergone any change'.31From late April onward, however, right throughout theMunich crisis, the leitmotif of relations between Daladierand Bonnet was the indifferently successful attempts ofthe former to keep the latter under control, and the effortsof the latter to subvert the authority of the formerwithout actually pushing him out of office. From whathas already been said it is clear enough what underlaythe conflict. The reasons for which Daladier took Bonnet onremained in force and, indeed, became more pressing. But ifhe was capable of stabilising the Government he was alsocapable of wrecking it since he quickly gathered aroundhimself a clique of like-minded friends in the Cabinet.(Marchandeau, Chautemps, La Chambre, and later de Monzieand Pomaret32 were the outstanding Bonnetistes.) Had the

30 Cit. Werth, 167-8 (emphasis Werth's).31 ibid.32The choice of these two men to replace Frossard, Minister of Public Worksand Ramadier, Minister of Health, who resigned in August over an attack byDaladier upon the forty-hour week, is obscure and not clear to the present writer.Zay, (Souvenirs . . ., 120-1, says that only four days before appointing themDaladier had declared that under no circumstances would he ever have Monzie asone of his ministers. Daladier also knew of Pomaret's defeatism for according to'Pertinax', 150, Champetier de Ribes had warned him of it. Monzie and Pomaretboth belonged to the minor socialist party of their predecessors, so there mayhave been some attraction in keeping the political balance the same, though ithardly seems necessary for Daladier to have taken on two such corruptmediocrities to do this. Was he under pressure to accept them and, if so, fromwhat quarter? Or was it just weakness and vacillation?

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DALADIER AND THE MUNICH CRISIS: A REAPPRAISALPremier, even at the peril of alienating Bonnet's friends in theworld of finance, dismissed him, it is virtually certain thatsome or all of this coterie would have resigned as well, soweakening the Government that Daladier would morally ifnot legally have been compelled to resign. But it would havebeen an irretrievable disaster for France to have been caughta third time without a government during a European crisisof the first magnitude. Her market value as an ally, alreadysuspect, would have vanished altogether.Bonnet, for his part, needed Daladier to keep himselfin office. His defeat at the hands of the Socialists meantthat there was no prospect of a premiership for himas long as the Radicals remained dependent upon themfor Parliamentary support. His chance could onlycome if his party were more firmly oriented towardthe right. Indeed, his bid for the premiership in Januarywas interpreted as a plain advertisement that he intendedto demolish what was left of the Popular Front.33 Thereis much in Bonnet's activities as Minister for ForeignAffairs to suggest that he was laying the foundations of a newright-wing combination with himself as presiding genius. Hisown views on foreign policy, for instance coincidedadmirably with those of the conservative circles which couldbe expected to support him in a further assault on thepremiership.It would, of course be naive to imply that the wholeCzechoslovak crisis was played out on the French side purelyas an incident in a domestic fracas. The external issue wastaken in deadly earnest by both men but the strugglebetween them is an important thread in a complexdiplomatic pattern.Daladier's personal opinion of the Czech problem emergesclearly from such sources as the Documents on BritishForeign Policy 1919-193934 and the private diary of his

33 L'Epoque, 16 January 1938, cit. Larmour, 234.34DBFP Third Series, Vol. II, especially the records of the two Anglo-Frenchmeetings in September, nos. 928 and 1093, but also many other referencesscattered throughout this volume.

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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYMinister of Education, Jean Zay.35 In his own words, he had'never been a partisan of the Treaty of Versailles...[but]regarded the present problem as very much less aCzechoslovak problem than a general problem involving thepeace of Europe'.36 From the records of the Anglo-Frenchmeetings throughout 1938 there can be no doubt that he wasaware of the gravity of the German menace and resigned tothe fact that it would have to be checked sooner or later.Nevertheless, while he believed that the substantial main-tenance of Czechoslovakia was essential to French security,he also felt that she would have to accept some modificationin detail,37 and neither he nor any other responsible leadercould have contemplated committing France at that time to awar which could be avoided by negotiation. Despite theassurances of General Gamelin that the armed forces wereready for action38 and the opinion of the General Staff thatif Czechoslovakia were attacked France should fight underany circumstances,39 the enthusiasm of political circles and

35 J. Zay, Carnets Secrets, 1-30, passim. Strong support for this view comesfrom Zay, pp. 11-15, which indicates that Daladier took the same line withinthe confidential circle of the Cabinet as he did publicly before the BritishMinisters.36 DBFP, 386. He was much more direct than this on other occasions. EduardBenes records in his Memoirs (London 1954), cit. Reynaud, 184, that'Daladier... had never failed... to observe that he was not presentat... Versailles... that it was necessary to adapt oneself to new situations, andthat France could not indulge in the luxury of bothering about the crumblingstates of Central Europe.' Keith EubankMunich, (Norman, Oklahoma, 1963), 129

gives an (unsourced) remark which Daladier is said to have made to Mandel: hecould not 'sacrifice the entire youth of France merely to whitewash the criminalerrors that had been committed by you and your friend Clemenceau and theother members of the Big Four during the Paris Peace Conference'. Too muchshould not, perhaps, be made of these remarks, for Daladier frequently said morethan he meant when irritated or in a sulky mood. His true opinion is probablythat which appears in the DBFP where he had to support it with reasonedargument.37 DBFP. 386-7. Furnia 601-2, cites the U.S. Ambassador, William Bullitt assaying, 'Both Daladier and Bonnet fought the Treaty of Versailles and wreckedtheir careers temporarily by telling the truth about the treaty when the truth wasunpopular. Both are convinced that the treaty must be revised and at bottomregard an alteration in the Czechoslovak State as a necessary revision.'38 Gamelin's report to the British Ministers, 26 September cit. Nogueres, 184,while restrained, is nevertheless confident of a French victory. This was in spite ofan admittedly weak Air Force.9 Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-45 Series D Vol. II(Washington DC 1949), No. 499.

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DALADIER AND THE MUNICH CRISIS: A REAPPRAISALof the people as a whole for war was so doubtful and opinionso deeply divided as to make war an extremely dangerousresort. From the outset, therefore, that is, from the time ofthe Anglo-French talks in April, he adopted a policy ofbluff- and was firmly discouraged by -Mr Chamberlain whowas afraid that the bluff might be called.40 Except for somedays in late September after the partial mobilisation had beenso successful, Daladier probably never did intend to fight if itcould possibly be helped, certainly not unless the prospect ofBritish assistance was far better than it appeared at any timein 1938. It does not follow from this that it was necessarilyweakness on his part to try to capitalise on France'sreputation for' strength in order to forestall an armedsolution. Too many students of this period have allowedthemselves to be blinded by the emotions of contemporariesin judging this. While despising the open defeatism of theBonnetistes and admitting that, on the evidence, France wasnot in good heart for a war, understandable outrage at thefate of Czechoslovakia still makes it easy to reproachDaladier with not living up to his fighting words. The manmay indeed have been, as 'Pertinax' was at great pains todemonstrate, hollow behind a facade of strength, but thesame was also true of France herself, and no leader couldhave been stronger than the country he led.In the case of Bonnet, whatever his official pronounce-ments or his notoriously unreliable memoirs may say, his realfeelings were dominated by a terror of war so deep asapparently to paralyse his will to take any effective steps,even by bluff, to forestall it. Like Daladier he had alwaysopposed the Treaty of Versailles and believed that it shouldbe modified. However, where Daladier insisted that anyalterations should take place by international procedurewhich would have the effect of keeping Germany undercontrol, it emerged during the Czech crisis that Bonnet wasprepared to accept any solution, however unjust or fraughtwith future disaster, so long as it did not impair

40DBFP Third Series Vol. I, no. 164, 220.

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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYFranco-German relations.41 The consequences of this divisionbetween his private attitude and his public support of theGovernment's policy was a tale of double-dealing, secret-iveness and intrigue which has been frequently told and needsno further repetition in detail here.Obviously much of this was concerned solely with foreignpolicy, as a means of preventing any possibly dangerous showof energy by Daladier. A case in point, though only one ofmany, was the night of 27 September when, withoutinforming even his own officials at the Quai d'Orsay,42 heinstructed M. Franqois-Poncet, the French ambassador inBerlin, to offer sweeping concessions to Hitler over theSudeten territorial claims and by so doing destroyedDaladier's bargaining position before he even got to Munich.According to Professor Furia,43 Daladier and Alexis Leger,the Secretary-General of the Quai d'Orsay, were unawarehow completely the pass had been sold until they were in theaeroplane for Germany and read the official instructionswhich Bonnet handed over, literally at the last moment.But these manoeuvres may have had another purpose aswell and these will be examined in the next section.HOW FAR WERE THESE TACTICS of Bonnet's designed toserve his own political ambitions by compromising Daladierand keeping him isolated and impotent within the Cabinetand, perhaps, helping him to discredit himself over the. Czechaffair? As we have seen, Daladier could not safely dismissBonnet, nor as head of the Government could he disavow hisactions. Consequently he was unable to win the support ofthe so-called 'resistance group' within the Cabinet - thosewho, without actually seeking war, were willing to risk it by

41 The examples of evidence of this attitude are too numerous to catalogue indetail but e.g. see his interview with the German Ambassador to France vonWelczeck, DGFP Series D, Vol. II no. 422. The tone of this is conciliatory to thepoint of servility in Bonnet's anxiety to keep on friendly terms. Also DBFP SeriesIII Vol. II, no. 874 where on 14 September in the wake of Hitler's NurembergspeechBonnet, almost hysterical, told Phipps that France would accept any solution toavoid war; 'we cannot sacrifice ten million men in order to prevent three and ahalf million Sudetens joining the Reich.'42 'Pertinax', 4 n.43 Furnia, 363-4.208



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DALADIER AND THE MUNICH CRISIS: A REAPPRAISALfirm opposition to Hitler. At the same time he was unable toendorse Bonnet wholeheartedly, a fact which becameembarrassingly obvious in a series of semi-public quarrels44and, therefore, never gained the support of Bonnet's ownfaction. It is significant that though mention is frequentlymade of these two groups, no writer ever refers to a Daladiergroup or clique within the Cabinet, although he had oneamong the Deputies. This omission implies the isolation anddelicacy of his position.Another explanation does, of course, suggest itself, whichis that the isolation was self-imposed as a means of keepingtogether a divided Cabinet by refusing to side with eitherfaction. During the crisis ministers from both groupsthreatened to resign, Mandel, Reynaud and Champetier deRibes on 22 September4s and de Monzie and Pomaret,Bonnet's most ardent toadies, on 27 September.46 Both wereinduced to stay at least until the crisis was over but it is notlikely that they could have done so had they felt that thePremier was too openly against them.A further question arises here which is that, althoughDaladier has often been criticized for not throwing in his lotwith the 'resisters'47 since his point of view was closer to

44 Werth, 239-40, cites the satirical weekly Le Canard Enchaine as recordingseveral quarrels in the latter part of September, i.e. from 13 September onward.H. Ripka, Munich Before and After, facsimile ed. (Ann Arbor 1969), 63, citesL'Europe Nouvelle, 19 November 1938, as saying that Daladier and Bonnet werenot on speaking terms on 25 September in London and that in pique Bonnetafterwards summoned Phipps to put certain embarrassing questions to the BritishGovernment about Britain's willingness to share the cost of a war and tointroduce conscription.45 This was after the discovery that Bonnet had put pressure on Prague toaccept the 'Anglo-French Plan' after promising not to. Werth, 268-9.46 DGFP Series D Vol. II, no. 648; the German Charge d'Affaires, Brauer,reports that Pomaret and Monzie intended to put forward a plan of their own forthe speedy cession of the Sudetenland and to resign if it were not accepted. Thiswas probably connected with the incident with the Right-Wing Deputies whichhad occurred the day before (See below n. 55).47 The composition of this group is somewhat indefinite. I have foundreferences to seven men as opposing the Bonnet line at one time and another;these were: Reynaud, Mandel, Champetier de Ribes, Campinchi, Zay, Gentin andQueuille. Different writers, however, give different combinations, each citingsome names and excluding others. The only ones always named are the three first.The others were either less convinced or only sporadically moved to resist.

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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYtheirs than to Bonnet's, it has not yet been established thatthey would have been reliable allies. Mandel for instancewas, as he showed throughout the Munich crisis and later, aman of considerable ability and strong character. He hadbeen Clemenceau's personal assistant in creating the Tratyof Versailles and it was an article of faith with him that theEastern Alliances must be upheld. On the other hand his veryrigidity upon this point would have made him a dangerousally for Daladier. To have, for instance, appointed himForeign Minister would have been an announcement to theworld that France intended to pursue an anti-German lineand would have frightened Britain and antagonised Germany,especially since Mandel was a Jew. Besides this, if thefollowing telephone message, which Mandel is said to havemade to President Benes on 21 September, has been correctlyreported, his enthusiasm for Czechoslovakia far outran hisdiscretion or even his common sense:48

You are at the head of a free and independent nation. Neither Parisnor London has the right to tell you what to do. But if yourterritory should be violated you must not hesitate to give yourarmy, which is prepared, the order to defend your country. Bydoing this you would save Europe from Hitlerism, for I can tell youthat if you fire the first gun it will echo through the world in sucha way that the guns of France and those of Soviet Russia will intheir turn go off, and go off of their own volition. The whole worldwill follow you and Germany will be beaten in six months withoutMussolini; in three months with Mussolini.Such a firebrand could only have been a hindrance in thesearch for a negotiated settlement, and his willingness tounleash war at a moment's notice shows an airy disregard forthe realities of the situation.In the case of Reynaud, it is true that he also was

defending a position that he had held for many years, so thatit is not possible to accuse him of opportunism, but aconversation he had in November 1938 with Otto Abetz,Ribbentrop's emissary, hints that his attitude up toSeptember is not to be taken entirely at face value:49

48 Nogueres, 151-2, cites Robert Bollak, a friend of Mandel who waspresent when the call was made.49 DGFP Series D, Vol. IV, no. 342.210



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DALADIER AND THE MUNICH CRISIS: A REAPPRAISAL... he hinted that France needed the spectre of the German dangerin order to remain strong internally, because otherwise thewillingness of the people to defend themselves and make sacrificeswould disappear completely. He held the view that an agreementcould not be made with mous (by which he obviously meantFlandin), but that it could be made with durs (with a plain hint athimself).

The second part of Abetz's remarks should not be taken asmeaning that Reynaud was a Nazi stooge, although hismistress, Mme de Portes, was strongly attracted in thatdirection. Rather it means that he was aware of the effect ofthe so-called 'Hitler veto' on nervous French politicians andthat his conduct had taken account of the impression to bemade on Berlin by a possible future premier.His reference to the internal strength of France may implythat he had not wanted or expected a war overCzechoslovakia any more than anyone else but that he hadplayed up the issue publicly in order to prepare France for awar later. If this is so then he was bluffing as much asDaladier and, in fact, spoiling the effect of Daladier's bluff bycreating the appearance of disunity and weakness in theCabinet. This would mean that Daladier's irritation with anddislike of this group was founded on something moresubstantial than mere personal factors. Besides, so long as hehad to deal with the Chamberlain Government, it wasscarcely prudent to make confidants of the very men whowere best known for their close connections withChamberlain's bete noire, Churchill.50 It was quite difficultenough to enlist British support without appearing to enterinto a conspiracy against the British Government. Eventhough one instinctively sympathises with Mandel's andReynaud's stand in defence of Czechoslovakia, the factremains that their hard-line determination at that momentwould have rocked, if not indeed sunk, the boat. Daladier

50W. S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm 3rd ed. (London, 1950), 72 refers tohis 'friends in the French Government, Reynaud and Mandel', and visited them inParisat the height of the crisis to dissuade them from resigning.211



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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYcertainly once, if not twice, considered dismissing them butapparently thought better of it.51GIVEN THE CRAMPED AND STRAITENED CIRCUMSTANCESthat have been described, stome of Daladier's moredubious-looking acts and attitudes become explicable. Forexample, his steady refusal to recall Parliament from itssummer recess during the whole of the crisis, while perhapspartly due to an authoritarian streak in his own character, asLarmour maintains,52 can also be seen as a prudent refusal toexpose his shaky administration to any more danger. Theimportunities of vocal, but often irresponsible, Deputiescould have led to a vote of no-confidence and another roundof government making. Indeed, to have called Parliamentwould have been virtually to bid farewell to any prospect of avigorous foreign policy as it was more likely to reveal theapathy and division of the political cliques than to createnational unity. When asked by Sir Eric Phipps,53 SenatorCaillaux, President of the Senate Finance Committee, and aleading Bonnetiste, gave his opinion that the majority of theFrench were against war, and that though a small majority ofthe Chamber might vote for it, a large majority of the Senatewould vote against it. The reason is not far to seek. Apartfrom those who were genuinely against war for reasons ofconviction, every Deputy was aware that there was a generalelection coming up in early 1940, and no-one wanted to beremembered as a belliciste. As Alexander Werth pointed

51 Stehlin, 105, says that after the Munich conference was over Daladier spoketo him for a few moments; he was exhausted and bitterly unhappy and said: 'Jepense que Paul Reynaud et Georges Mandel me remettront leur demission; je lesremplacerai' Anatole de Monzie in Ci-devant (Paris 1942), cit. Nogueres, 165,claims that on hearing of the threatened resignation of Reynaud, Mandel andChampetier de Ribes he went to see Daladier who said that he had 'shown thethree touts the door.... If they had offered me their resignation... I shouldhave accepted it.' This tale from a very dubious source seems to be belied by theword 'remettront' in Stehlin's account, for it indicates that they had given in theirresignations previously. Daladier may, of course, have invented what he said toMonzie for the latter's benefit.52 Larmour 244.53DBFP Third Series Vol. II, no. 1083. Caillaux, it must be remembered, hadalways been in favour of Franco-German cooperation, particularly in economicmatters.212



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DALADIER AND THE MUNICH CRISIS: A REAPPRAISALout,54 when Henri de Kerillis, the only non-CommunistDeputy to do so, voted against the Munich agreement, mostobservers predicted that he would lose his hitherto safe seatof Neuilly.Another advantage of keeping Parliament dispersed mayhave been that it put a curb on Bonnet's intrigues. HenriNogueres55 describes the obviously preconcerted tableauwhich took place on 27 September, when a delegation fromthe right-wing minority parties called on Bonnet and askedhim certain carefully-phrased questions about the Godesburgultimatum and the British 'authorized statement' of theevening before. The scene gave Bonnet the opportunity ofpublicly adopting certain attitudes for future use. (The mainimpression that he gave was that the Czech question hadresolved itself into a matter of procedure and that there wasno longer a principle at stake worthy of going to war for.)Werth also mentions56 that on 13 September three of theleading Parliamentary Bonnetistes, Caillaux, Flandin andMistler, the President of the Chamber of Foreign AffairsCommittee were 'pulling wires as hard as they could go. Thefirst thing that must be prevented, they thought, was amobilization.' If this kind of thing could happen when therewere relatively few Deputies around, there could have beensome really formidable organized opposition when bothHouses were in session.We have incidentally twice mentioned Senator Caillauxand his influence, which lends some point to what was saidearlier about the power of the conservative financial circles(to which Flandin and Mistler also belonged.) Apart fromisolated references like these it is difficult to prove overtpressure from this direction, but Jean Zay57 complained ofthe omnipotence of the Inspectorate of Finances and theDirectors of the Budget who had a far more real control overthe finances than did most of the ephemeral Ministers they

54 Werth, 264.55Nogueres, 206-8.56 Werth, 217. This was immediately after the Cabinet meeting in theafternoon before Hitler's Nuremberg speech. Measures to be taken in the event ofwar, including mobilization plans, had been discussed.57 Souvenirs... 40-44.

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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYserved. Their displeasure at a particular line of foreign policycould easily, no doubt, be shown by a polite but total lack ofcooperation in matters of internal finance. This was a verysensitive subject for a country faced with the imperative needto rearm and increase all production, both in quantity andquality. Hence the necessity of conciliating them if possible.If the attitudes of the civil servants of the TreasuryDepartment is largely conjectural, we are on more solidground with those of the Foreign Office, the Quai d'Orsay,and particularly that of its Secretary-General, Alexis Leger.Daladier trusted Leger implicitly and placed far more relianceon him than he did upon Bonnet. For this reason Leger'sviews are more important. In her study of the poet-diplomatElizabeth Cameron58 has written that though he hated doingso Leger believed that France had no option but to try tonegotiate a settlement, even at the risk of a further surrenderto German demands. Without allies and with no assurance ofsupport from Britain he thought that it would be madness forFrance to go to war on behalf of Czechoslovakia. Thiscorresponds closely with Daladier's own assessment of thesituation, and probably weighed even more heavily with himthan did the bickering within the Cabinet. Two othermembers of the Quai d'Orsay staff, M. Ren6 Massigli and M.Pierre Comert, head of the Press Section, shared theseopinions. A measure of their influence is that after Munichboth were transferred to other duties by a vindictive Bonnet.He would have removed Leger as well if he had not been tooimportant for such open interference. In the case of Comert,Bonnet was surely taking revenge for the fact that it was hewho had discovered the Foreign Minister's chicanery over theBritish 'authorized statement' which he had first attemptedto suppress and then to repudiate as a forgery.59

58E. Cameron, 'Alexis Saint-Leger Leger' in G. A. Craigand F. Gilbert (eds.),The Diplomats 1919-39 Vol. II (New York 1967). She cites Paul Schmidt, Statistauf diplomatischer Biihne 1923-45, (Bonn 1949), 414, on Daladier's refusal tostart negotiations at Munich without Leger. 'But where is Leger? I won't begin ifLeger is not there.... He knows all the tricks of the trade and I knownothing. . .' Furnia also makes much of this e.g. 328, 363-4.59 Nogueres, 195-200, gives the fullest and most authoritative account of thisincident, decisively establishing Bonnet's responsibility for the attempted sup-pression of the authorized statement.'

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DALADIER AND THE MUNICH CRISIS: A REAPPRAISALEven so limited a study as this must necessarily be hasrevealed a situation so complex that no interpretation of theFrench Government's handling of the Munich crisis could be

complete which confined itself to the Cabinet room.Certainly there were more forces in play than have beenchronicled here. The role of the Press, for instance, is quitewell known and that of the General Staff also. But what ofthe lower levels of military opinion, or of the diplomats onthe spot? General Stehlin's memoirs of his years in Berlin asSir Attache tell a different story. What was the precise stateof working class opinion and how did this effect relationsbetween the Confederation Generale du Travail and theSocialist Party, sand in turn, the Party's relations with theGovernment? Larmour has61 stated that 'Munich traumatisedFrench politics, decisively creating a new pattern of divisionsthat has confused the traditional formations ever since' andyet we know next to nothing about this process as it affectedthe parties and the individual politicians, or how far theCabinet understood what was going on. Did Bonnet orReynaud, or for that matter Daladier, realize that thismetamorphosis was occurring and attempt to use it for hisown ends?What is clear is that Daladier's freedom of action, initiallycircumscribed by the situation of April, became more andmore constricted as the crisis mounted. Quite apart from thepolitically disastrous consequences of either resigning orallowing the defeat of his Government Daladier, of all FrenchPremiers, must have dreaded to appear to be losing his headin an emergency. Not only was there the example ofChautemps' inglorious abdication before his eyes, but alsothe memory of 6 February 1934 when Daladier himself hadpanicked and resigned in the face of the Stavisky crisis. So,he could hardly resign, and yet it is hard to see what he couldhave done to improve his position vis-a-vis his own Cabinet.To alter its composition enough to make any realimprovement he would have had to risk bringing down theGovernment. He clearly tried to check Bonnet, but too often

60 Stehlin, 81-5, 90, 104-5.61 Larmour, 243.215



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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYthe Foreign Minister acted on his own initiative and withoutauthorization, presenting Daladier with a damaging faitaccompli. The Cabinet itself was a battleground of conflictingopinions and personal ambitions, the two being so con-founded that in most cases it is impossible to tell thedifference between them. Munich, in fact, marked one of theclosing stages in a long period of decay in the quality ofFrench parliamentary life, and it is in this context that thecrisis should be viewed.

216