cyberspace and organizational structure: an analysis of
TRANSCRIPT
Air Force Institute of TechnologyAFIT Scholar
Theses and Dissertations Student Graduate Works
3-24-2016
Cyberspace and Organizational Structure: AnAnalysis of the Critical Infrastructure EnvironmentMichael D. Quigg II
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Recommended CitationQuigg, Michael D. II, "Cyberspace and Organizational Structure: An Analysis of the Critical Infrastructure Environment" (2016).Theses and Dissertations. 409.https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/409
CYBERSPACEANDORGANIZATIONALSTRUCTURE:
ANANALYSISOFTHECRITICALINFRASTRUCTUREENVIRONMENT
THESIS
MichaelD.QuiggII,Captain,USA
AFIT‐ENV‐MS‐16‐M‐177
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE AIR UNIVERSITY
AIRFORCEINSTITUTEOFTECHNOLOGY
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio
DISTRIBUTIONSTATEMENTA.APPROVEDFORPUBLICRELEASE;DISTRIBUTIONUNLIMITED.
TheviewsexpressedinthisthesisarethoseoftheauthoranddonotreflecttheofficialpolicyorpositionoftheUnitedStatesAirForce,UnitedStatesArmy,DepartmentofDefense,ortheUnitedStatesGovernment.ThismaterialisdeclaredaworkoftheUnitedStatesGovernmentandisnotsubjecttocopyrightprotectionintheUnitedStates.
AFIT-ENV-MS-16-M-177
CYBERSPACEANDORGANIZATIONALSTRUCTURE:
ANANALYSISOFTHECRITICALINFRASTRUCTUREENVIRONMENT
THESIS
PresentedtotheFaculty
DepartmentofSystemsEngineeringandManagement
GraduateSchoolofEngineeringandManagement
AirForceInstituteofTechnology
AirUniversity
AirEducationandTrainingCommand
InPartialFulfillmentoftheRequirementsforthe
DegreeofMasterofScienceinEngineeringManagement
MichaelD.QuiggII,BBA
Captain,USA
March2016
DISTRIBUTIONSTATEMENTA.APPROVEDFORPUBLICRELEASE;DISTRIBUTIONUNLIMITED.
AFIT-ENV-MS-16-M-177
CYBERSPACEANDORGANIZATIONALSTRUCTURE:
ANANALYSISOFTHECRITICALINFRASTRUCTUREENVIRONMENT
MichaelD.QuiggII,BBA
Captain,USA
CommitteeMembership:
LTCMasonRice,PhDChair
MichaelR.Grimaila,PhD,CISM,CISSPMember
MajBenjaminRamsey,PhDMember
AFIT-ENV-MS-16-M-177
iv
Abstract
Nowmorethanever,organizationsarebeingcreatedtoprotectthe
cyberspaceenvironment.Thecapabilityofcyberorganizationstaskedtodefend
criticalinfrastructurehasbeencalledintoquestionbynumerouscybersecurity
experts.Organizationaltheorystatesthatorganizationsshouldbeconstructedtofit
theiroperatingenvironmentproperly.Littleresearchinthisarealinks existing
organizationaltheorytocyberorganizationalstructure.Becauseofthecyberspace
connectiontocriticalinfrastructureassets,thefactorsthatinfluencethestructureof
cyberorganizationsdesignedtoprotecttheseassetswarrantanalysistoidentify
opportunitiesforimprovement.
Thisthesisanalyzesthecyber‐connectedcriticalinfrastructureenvironment
usingthedominantorganizationalstructuretheories.Byusingmultiplecasestudy
andcontentanalysis,2,856samplingunitsareanalyzedtoascertainthelevelof
perceiveduncertaintyintheenvironment(complexity,dynamism,and
munificence).Theresultsindicatethatthegeneralexternalenvironmentofcyber
organizationstaskedtoprotectcriticalinfrastructureishighlyuncertainthereby
meritingimplementationoforganicstructuringprinciples.
AFIT-ENV-MS-16-M-177
v
TomySaviorJesusChrist,thesourceofeverythinggoodinmylife;momanddad;my
wifeformodelingChrist’slovewhileraisingthegirls.
vi
Acknowledgments
IwouldliketothankLTCMasonRiceforjoyfullyacceptingmeasaresearch
pupilandforguidingmewithpassion,creativity,andkindness;JuanLopezforbeing
thepersonificationofmentorship,professionalism,andexcellenceduringmy
research;Dr.Grimailaforyourwisdomthroughoutandfornurturinganideaintoa
thesis;Dr.Ramseyforthetime,attention,andlevelofdetailyougavetomakingthis
aworkIcantrulytakejoyin.IamalsoindebtedtotheDepartmentofHomeland
Securityforfundingthisresearch.
Finally,thankyoutoMAJDerekYoung,StephenDunlap,andCPTJungsang
Yoonforyourincredibleselflessnessinsupportofthisresearch.
MichaelD.QuiggII
vii
TableofContents
Page
Abstract.........................................................................................................................................................iv
Acknowledgments....................................................................................................................................vi
TableofContents......................................................................................................................................vii
ListofFigures.............................................................................................................................................ix
ListofTables................................................................................................................................................x
I.Introduction.............................................................................................................................................1
OperationalMotivation......................................................................................................................1ResearchQuestions.............................................................................................................................3Methodology...........................................................................................................................................3Limitations..............................................................................................................................................4Implications............................................................................................................................................4
II.LiteratureReview................................................................................................................................6
StructuringOrganizations................................................................................................................6OrganizationalStructureTheory...................................................................................................7InstitutionalTheory..........................................................................................................................8ResourceDependenceTheory.......................................................................................................8PopulationEcologyTheory............................................................................................................9StructuralContingencyTheory..................................................................................................10
Contingencies......................................................................................................................................10Technology..........................................................................................................................................11Size…......................................................................................................................................................11StrategyandStrategicChoice....................................................................................................12Environment.......................................................................................................................................12
EnvironmentalUncertainty..........................................................................................................13Complexity...........................................................................................................................................14Dynamism(Turbulence)...............................................................................................................14Munificence(Resource).................................................................................................................14
Structures.............................................................................................................................................15MechanisticandOrganicinPractice.........................................................................................16MechanisticOrganization:U.S.Army......................................................................................16CreatingMechanisticOrganizations.......................................................................................18OrganicOrganizations:ApacheIndians,AnonymousandAlQaeda.........................21CreatingOrganicOrganizations................................................................................................23
viii
StructureandEnvironmentalUncertaintySynthesis........................................................25
III.Methodology......................................................................................................................................26
ResearchDesignandMethodology...........................................................................................26DataCollection....................................................................................................................................26ArtifactDiscrimination..................................................................................................................27OrganizationalDiversity...............................................................................................................29
Coding.....................................................................................................................................................29ContentCategories...........................................................................................................................30CoderTraining...................................................................................................................................32
DataReduction...................................................................................................................................32Validity...................................................................................................................................................33Reliability..............................................................................................................................................33
IV.AnalysisandResults.......................................................................................................................34
DescriptiveStatistics.......................................................................................................................34IntercoderAgreement.....................................................................................................................35CodeDistribution..............................................................................................................................36StrataAnalysis....................................................................................................................................38Complexity...........................................................................................................................................38Dynamism............................................................................................................................................38Munificence.........................................................................................................................................39
CoderAnalysis....................................................................................................................................40RecommendationsforAction......................................................................................................40
V.Conclusions..........................................................................................................................................42
ConclusionsofResearch.................................................................................................................42RecommendationsforFutureResearch..................................................................................44MeasureGovernmentCyberOrganizations..........................................................................44ReplicatetheStudy..........................................................................................................................44IdentifyDominantFactorsforMunificence..........................................................................44
AppendixA.ArtifactFinalSelection(FrontPageInformation).........................................45
AppendixB.ArtifactsMeetingSelectionCriteria.....................................................................65
AppendixC.RecordingUnitClassificationDiagram...............................................................67
AppendixD.CodedArtifactExample............................................................................................68
AppendixE.CoderTrainingBriefing.............................................................................................71
Bibliography..............................................................................................................................................87
Page
ix
ListofFigures
Figure Page
1.TheExternalEnvironmentandUncertainty........................................................................15
2.ArmyForceDevelopmentProcess(AR71‐32)[56]...........................................................19
3.ProcessMapforCreatingArmyOrganizations....................................................................20
4.ApacheStructuralDepiction........................................................................................................24
5:OrganizationalStructure,UncertaintyandtheExternalEnvironment.....................25
6.MaxqdaGraphicalUserInterface...............................................................................................30
7.UncertaintyintheGeneralExternalEnvironment.............................................................37
8.PercentageofUncertaintybyDimensionandStrata.........................................................38
9.CoderOverlap.....................................................................................................................................40
x
ListofTables
Table Page
1.StructuralDimensionsofOrganizations....................................................................................7
2.CharacteristicsofMechanisticandOrganicStructures....................................................16
3.U.S.ArmyInfantryDivisionStructure......................................................................................17
4.ApacheIndians,AnonymousHackerGroupandAlQaedaStructures.......................22
5.StructuralFactorsPresentinCreatingOrganicOrganizations.....................................23
6.ArtifactCriteria..................................................................................................................................28
7.ArtifactRetrievalResults...............................................................................................................28
8.CodeCategoryDefinitions.............................................................................................................31
9.TotalCodesbyCoder.......................................................................................................................34
10.PagesCodedbyStrata..................................................................................................................34
11.Flesch‐KincaidReadingScores.................................................................................................35
12.CohensKappa...................................................................................................................................36
13.FrequencyAnalysisofCodes.....................................................................................................37
1
CYBERSPACEANDORGANIZATIONALSTRUCTURE:
ANANALYSISOFTHECRITICALINFRASTRUCTUREENVIRONMENT
I.Introduction
OperationalMotivation
InhisbookBlink,Gladwell[27]describestheabilitytorenderaccurate
expertjudgmentinsituations(e.g.,detectingfraudulentartordiagnosingamedical
condition)quicklywithoutcollectingandanalyzingmassamountsofdata.Experts
incybersecurity,usingtechniquesdescribedbyGladwell,havedeclaredthat
governmentsarenotpreparedtorespondtocyber‐attacks[5,10,13,36].These
experts,understandingcriticalinfrastructurecybersecurity,inherentlyknowthat
responseorganizationscurrentlyinplaceareill‐fittohandleacrisisthatmaybe
rightaroundthecorner.
Theorganizationsthataresupposedtodefendagainstthesethreats(e.g.,
DepartmentofHomelandSecurityandU.S.CyberCommand)maynotbeableto
resistorrecoverfromapersistentcyber‐attack[36,59].Thissituationis
particularlytroublingbecausetheNationalSecurityAgency’sDirectorstatedthat
severalcountries,includingChinaandRussia,havethecybercapabilitiestodisrupt
electricalutilitiesthroughouttheUnitedStates[53].Withoutnecessarilyanalyzing
thecyberoperatingenvironment,expertsfullyunderstandthegovernmentis
modelingcurrentcyberdefenseorganizationsafterpracticallyeveryother
2
governmentorganization(e.g.,rigid,slowtochange,andhierarchical).Perhapsthe
issuestheseorganizationsfacearefoundational.
AsColquitt,LepineandWessonstate,almosteverythinginorganizational
behaviorstartswithstructure[16].Ifsecurityandresilienceincyberspacearea
goal,thenananalysisofstructureshouldbeaninitialprimaryconsideration.
Thestudyoforganizationalstructureislargelyadisciplinewithinthesocial
sciencesandchampionedbyorganizationalstructuretheorists.Overthelastfifty
years,thisareaofresearchhasgrownconsiderably.Recenttheoryhasadvanced
significantlyfromthedivisionoflaboranalyzedbyAdamSmithandMaxWeber.It
appearsthatoncestablesystemsarenowrapidlyrestructuringinuncertain
emergentglobalmarkets,markedbyrapidtechnologicalchangeandtremendous
competition.
PersonalobservationswhileassignedtotheheadquartersstaffforanArmy
organizationtaskedwithcreatinganewcyberunitwereenlightening.Numerous
leadersworkedfuriouslytofindoutthebestwaytoaccomplishthetask.Timewas
limited.Thepressuretobereadytodefendthenetworkwasgreat.Attackson
militarynetworksweregrowingbytheday.Thissituationdidnotallowforslow
anddeliberatetheoreticalanalysis.Rather,itcreatedacyber‐organizationsolution
whosefutureeffectivenesswasinquestion.
Situationslikethisonearehappeningeverywherethereisaneedtodefend
criticalcyberassets.Theurgencyofthecircumstancecreatestheneedfor
3
immediateaction.Thepervasivenessofinformationtechnologyandsocieties
increasingdependenceoncyberisnotlikelytoresolvequickly.Indeedacoupleof
decadesagoIlinitch,D’AveniandLewinclaimedaboutthisnewenvironment,
“Althoughnumerousorganizationsarebeingcreated,fewareexaminingthe
organizationalresearchandmanyareexperimentingwithdisaster”[32].Thisthesis
seekstofillthegapintheliteraturetoaddressthiscriticalissue.
ResearchQuestions
Thisthesisanalyzesrelevantorganizationalstructuretheoryandits
connectiontocyberorganizationstoanswerthefollowingresearchquestions:
1. Whatisorganizationalstructure?
2. Whattheoriescontributetoorganizationalstructure?
3. Howshouldorganizationsstructureincyberenvironments?
Methodology
Theresearchapproachisqualitative,pragmatic,andexploratoryinnature,
usingmultiplecasestudyandcontentanalysis.Theenvironmentofcyber‐connected
criticalinfrastructure,definedascriticalinfrastructurethatconnectstocyberspace
(primarilytheinternet),willbeevaluatedfromtheperspectiveoftheacademic,
governmentalandprivate/practitionercommunities.Documentsprovidethe
informationforanalysis.Contentanalysiscategorizesandquantifiesthelevelof
uncertaintyintheenvironment.
4
Limitations
Limitationsrangedfromsoftwarefunctionalitytomethodselection.
Significantsoftwarelimitationsincludedthelackofflexibilityinsoftware
modification,anduserlicensesrequiringeachcodertohavetheircopyofthe
software.Theresearcherlimitedthecasestothecyber‐connectedcritical
infrastructureenvironment(thoughthenatureofcybercloselylinksthisresearch
withothercyberenvironments),andthesearchenginestoeightsources.
Documentation,providedbythesearchenginesforthedataset,were(insome
cases)limited;notallinformationonthecyber‐connectedcriticalinfrastructure
environmentisavailableandsomerequiredsubscriptions.Theavailabilityof
personnelwithknowledgeofthephenomena,theappropriatereadinglevel,and
codingexpertisewaslimited.Humancodingsufferednaturallimitationsfromthe
ambiguityofwordmeaningtofatigue.Themultiplecasestudyapproachwith
multiplestratawasusedtoovercomedatatriangulation(multipledatacollection
techniques,e.g.,surveys,interviews).Thisresearchusedappropriatetechniquesto
mitigatetheselimitationsandothers(e.g.,rest,training)
Implications
Theorydictatesthatorganizationsshouldstructuretofittheiroperating
environment.Theinsightsofthisanalysisshouldhelpstrategiccyberleaders,
particularlythosetaskedtoprotectcriticalinfrastructure,understandcritical
5
aspectsoftheenvironment.Theconnectionsmadebetweenstructureand
environmentwillaidinstructuringmoreeffectivecyberresponseorganizations.
6
II.LiteratureReview
StructuringOrganizations
Whendiscussingorganizationalstructure,itishelpfultodefinethemeaning
of“organizationalstructure.”Manypeople,whenhearingorganizationalstructure,
willconjureupapictureofanorganizationalchartofsomesort.However,
organizationalstructureencompassesfarmorethanachart.Organizational
structurecommonlybreaksintotwodimensions:structuralandcontextual[17,50].
Thesedimensionshelpexplaintheformsorganizationstakeandwhytheytake
them.Thestructuraldimensionsincludehoworganizationsattempttocontrol
behaviorandcompletetasks.Contextualdimensions,oftencalledcontingencies,are
forcesactingwithinandoutsidetheorganization,whichaffectthestructural
dimensions.Table1displayssomeofthesignificantstructuralandcontextual
dimensions.
7
Table1.StructuralDimensionsofOrganizations
Type Dimensions TraitsStructural Specialization;centralization;
formalization;spanofcontrol;chainofcommand;personalspecialty.
Howmanytasksina job;whohastheauthority tomakedecisionsandwhere;howstandardizedandexplicitaretherules,policiesandprocedures;howmanypeoplearesupervised inaparticulargroup;whoreportstowhomupthehierarchy;whatiseveryonerequiredtoknow.
Contextual Size;strategy;culture;externalandinternalenvironment(competition,hostility,geography);technology.
Whatsizeistheorganizationanditssubunits;whatchoicesarebeingmadebyleadership;perceivedvaluesandbeliefs;whatishappeninginandaroundtheorganizationwhichcanaffectit;thepresenceandeffectsoftechnology.
Thisthesiswillexplorethesedimensionstodeterminetheirimplicationfor
structuringorganizationstooperateincyberspace.Whatfollowsisareviewofthe
dominanttheoreticalprinciples.
OrganizationalStructureTheory
Thestudyoftheexistenceoforganizationsandhowtosustainthatexistence
hasincreaseddramaticallyinthelast75years[49].Theriseandubiquitousnature
ofinformationtechnologyanditseffectsonorganizationalstructuretheoryinthe
socialscienceshaveledtoproportionatelyrapidtheorydevelopment[45].Few
couldforeseetheuniversalityandimportanceoftechnologicalsystems.Thefour
8
dominant,historicaltheoriesonorganizationalstructureare(i)institutional,(ii)
resourcedependence,(iii)populationecology,and(iv)structuralcontingency.
InstitutionalTheory.
DimaggioandPowellintroducedinstitutionaltheory(orinstitutional
isomorphism)in1983.Thecruxofthistheorycanbesummeduprathersimply–
organizationstendtomimiceachother[20].DimaggioandPowellpointtothree
maintypesofisomorphism,whicharecoercive,mimeticandnormative.Coercion
explainshoworganizationsoftenresultinsimilarstructuresbecauseofsimilar
externalenvironmentalpressures(e.g.,governmentoversight).Mimeticexplains
howorganizationsinestablishedfieldstendtomimiceachotherasabulwark
againstuncertainty.Normativeisomorphicprocessesresultfromthe
professionalizationofafieldaccompaniedbycommontraining,standardsand
practices,whichcreatehomogeneity[20].Itisimportanttonote,thatinthecyber‐
connectedcriticalinfrastructureenvironment,institutionalisomorphismmaynot
behelpful.ObservationofgovernmentcyberstructuringintheU.S.Departmentof
Defenseindicatesthepresenceofisomorphism.Forexample,newlycreatedcyber
forcescloselyresembletraditionalmilitaryforces,eventhoughtherearecritical
differencesintheenvironmentsofeach.
ResourceDependenceTheory.
Resourcedependencetheoryarguesorganizationalsurvivalbeabout
acquiringandmaintainingresources[49].Thereisconsiderableoverlapbetween
9
resourcedependenceandpopulationecology.However,thereareseveral
deviations;someexamplesareintherolesofinformationprocessingandstrategic
choice.Populationecologyarguesthat,givencertainconditions,strategicchoiceis
possible.However,mostorganizationsareoftenpowerlesstochoosebecauseof
inter‐organizationaldependenciesandinformationprocessingissues[1].Resource
dependencecountersbyofferingthatinformationsystemsdetermineorganizational
choiceandprovidecriticalinformation[49].Understandingwhatconstitutesa
resourceincyberisdifficult.However,somegeneralexamplesincludemoneyand
people.
PopulationEcologyTheory.
Populationecologyoffersexplanationsbasedonthenaturalselectionmodel.
AldrichandPfefferargueintheEnvironmentofOrganizationsthatorganizations
changebecauseofthedistributionofresourcesintheorganization’senvironment
[3].Theenvironmentselectstheorganizationalform,whichdemandsaconstant
senseofadaptation.Thelistofoncesuccessfulorganizationsthatdidnotadaptto
theenvironmentandquicklyfoundthemselvesobsoleteislong.Governmentcyber
organizationscanillaffordtobeapartofthisgroup.Aconsistentthemeis
developinginthealignmentoftheenvironmentandtheorganization.Structural
adaptationandflexiblestructuringinhighinformationtechnologyindustriesare
nowprominent.
10
StructuralContingencyTheory.
Thistheoryoffersapotentialsynthesisofideasrepresentedinthetheories
above.Structuralcontingencytheorydeclaresthemosteffectiveorganizational
structureistheonewhichbest“fits”thecontingencies[22].Inherentinthis
definitionisthatstructureshouldbetailored.Donaldson[23]statesthatcertain
factorsinfluencestructure.Thesefactors(knownascontingencyfactors)include
technology,size,strategyandtheenvironment[23,47].Mostcontingenciesinvolve
theinternalboundaryoftheorganization,butsomeofthemostcriticalareoutside
ofthatboundary(e.g.,theexternalenvironment).Contingencytheoryoffersseveral
empiricallyverifiedresultsthatshoworganizationsthatfitthecontingencies
presentintheenvironmentoutperformthosewhodonot[23].Itisimportantto
notethatrarelydoesanorganizationhavetoaddressonecontingencyandnot
others,makingradicalorganizationaloverhaulspreferabletoprolonged
incrementalsteps[51].Heuristically,itisalsodesirabletomakethesechanges
earlierinthelifeofanorganizationthanlater,whichbodeswellforcyber
organizations,astheyareintheirinfancy.
Contingencies
Buildinguponcontingencytheory,whatfollowsisabriefreviewofthe
centralcontingenciesintheresearchliteratureandtheirrelevancetothecyber
environment.
11
Technology.
Technologyandthechangesurroundingitincreaseperceiveduncertaintyfor
organizations[55].Asuncertaintyincreasessodoesthepressuretolearnand
increaseknowledge.Thispressureforknowledgecreatesnewworkroles,
workflows,andevenchangesthelanguageusedtodescribework[55].Thefocusis
notwhetherorganizationswilluseinformationtechnologytoaccomplish
something,buthowtheywillaccomplishthingswithinandaroundit.Cyber
organizationsshouldkeeptheseprinciplesinmind,andbecarefulnottodesign
structuresthatarecomfortablebutinappropriate.
Size.
Sizeconsiderablyaffectsthetypeandclassificationofanorganization[47].
Organizationalsizehasbeenfoundtoaffectnearlyeverythingthatdefines
organizationalstructure.Forinstance,largerorganizationsareoftenmorecomplex,
havemoreformalizationandsurvivelongerthansmallerorganizations[7].
Informationtechnology‐richenvironmentshavebeenshowntoreduceorganization
sizeasinformationsystemsreplacemiddlemanagementandallowother
organizationstoincreaseinsizewithoutdecreasingefficiencyandinnovativeness
[19].Itisimportanttonotethatefficiencyhasnotbeenshowntoimproveas
organizationalsizeincreases[28].Collyer[15]statesthatasthesizeoftheproject
increasessodoesthechanceoffailure.Thelikelihoodofthatfailureiscompounded
byincreasedspeedandquantityofchangeintheenvironment.Theconsensus
12
appearstobeformingwhereinlargerorganizationsformright‐sizedsubunitsthat
performwellwhenbasedontherelevantfactors.
StrategyandStrategicChoice.
Thetypeofstrategyanorganizationpursuessignificantlyaffectsthe
structureoforganizations[1,12,23,47].Perhapsmostimportantly,when
organizationschooseastrategytomatchstructuretotherelevantcontingencies,
performanceincreases[21].Thisisastrategycyberorganizationsshouldpursue.
Environment.
Inlinewiththepopulationecologyandresourcedependenceperspectives,
organizationsthatcannotadapttotheirenvironmentcannotsurvive[33].
Environmentalcontingenciesarefundamentallyimportanttoorganizations.They
areofparticularimportancetocyberorganizations,whichhaveaprincipalsecurity
function.Itishelpfultoseparatetheinternalenvironmentoforganizationsfromthe
externalenvironmentoforganizations.Thisresearchwillexclusivelyfocusonthe
generalexternalenvironment,heredefinedastherelevantphysicalandsocial
factorsoutsidetheboundariesofanorganization[24]whichgenerallyeffectall
withinthecyber‐connectedcriticalinfrastructurearea.Limitedresearchconnecting
organizationalstructuretothecyberspaceenvironmentisavailable.However,
researchisbeginningtoemergeonorganizationaloperationsinacyber‐
environment.Forexample,Liuetal.,[41]haveaddressedcommandandcontrolin
cyber‐physical‐socialsystems(CPSS).However,Liu’sresearchfocusesfarmoreon
13
thepotentialcapabilitiesofCPSSandfarlessonoptimalstructuraldimensionsfor
thoseoperatingincyberspace.
Thepresenceofcompetitionandhostilityintheenvironmentcan
significantlyaffectorganizations.Forexample,ifanorganizationperceivestheir
environmenttobehostileorcompetitive,itwillmovetowardcentralizationand
formalization[34,48].Thisreactionmaybeinstinctive.However,itcanleadtoa
structurethatisill‐suitedtomeetthechallengingcharacteristicsofthe
environment.Thisphenomenonisinsightfulinlightofnewlycreatedgovernment
cyberorganizations.Itappearscentralizationandformalizationareincreasingin
theseorganizationsconceivablytotheirperil.
Eachorganizationalenvironmenthasuniqueextrinsicfactors.Thesefactors
influenceorganizationalshape,meansandactionswithintheenvironment[11].In
assessingenvironmentalconsiderations,uncertaintyemergesasafocalpoint[11,
24,39].
EnvironmentalUncertainty
Dynamism,complexityandmunificenceremaintheprimarydimensionsused
toconceptualizethecentralpropertiesoforganizationenvironments[7,18,25]and
actassignificantmeasuresofperceiveduncertaintyintheexternalenvironment[1,
24,25].Thesethreedimensionsrelatetoforcesintheenvironmentthatcan
influencetheorganization.Forceisoperationallydefinedasanentityexternalto
14
cyber‐connectedcriticalinfrastructureorganizationsthatcaneffectchangeintheir
environment.Theseforcescanbecompetitors,customers,economic,technological,
political,ethical,demographic,culturalandsocial[17,24,57].Notethatwhile
complexity,dynamismandmunificencearecapableofprovidinganextensiveview
oftheenvironment,theyarenottheonlydeterminantsofenvironmentaleffectson
structure[31].
Complexity.
Complexityrelatestothetotalamountofforcesintheenvironment,whether
theyareconnectingwitheachother,andthedegreebywhichtheycaninfluence
otherorganizations.Forexample,aweakforceinisolationlowersuncertainty,
whereasmanyinterconnectingstrongforcesincreaseuncertainty[2,18,24].
Dynamism(Turbulence).
Dynamismreferstochangemeasuredinspeedandquantity.Organizations
thatfaceasignificantamountofchangeoperateinenvironmentsthataremore
uncertain.Organizationsthatexperiencesmallamountsofchangehaveless
uncertainty.Anincreasedrateorspeedofchangeonlyaddstotheuncertainty[2,
18,24].
Munificence(Resource).
Munificencedealswithcapacity,ormoregenerally,theamountofresources
availabletosustainorsupportthatenvironment.Thiscategoryrepresentsa
considerableportionofthefocusofstructuraltheory.Asitpertainstouncertainty,
15
thescarcertheresources,thegreatertheuncertainty[2,18,47].Figure1
conceptuallydepictsmunificence,complexityanddynamismassourcesof
uncertaintyintheexternalenvironment.
Figure1.TheExternalEnvironmentandUncertainty
Structures
Themechanisticandorganicstructuralcontinuumrepresentsthetypeof
formsorganizationscantake[11].Thiscontinuumofferstwoextremesfor
managementsystemsbasedonthelevelofperceiveduncertaintyinthe
environment.Empiricalresultsstronglyindicatethatperceivedenvironmental
uncertaintysignificantlycorrelateswithorganicandmechanisticstructuraltypes.
Table2listscharacteristicsofthetwostructures.
16
Table2.CharacteristicsofMechanisticandOrganicStructures
Mechanistic OrganicSpecializedindividual tasks
VerticalhierarchyIndividualresponsibilityCentralized authority
Increasedrules,policiesandproceduresStandardizedverticalcommunication
DirectivesandordersFixed functionaldepartmentsStatusincreasesuphierarchyNarrowspanofcontrol
Adjustable teamtasksFlexible (flatter)structure
Team responsibilityDecentralizedauthorityDecreasedformalization
All‐encompassingcommunicationAdvice andinformationsharing
Fluid (mixed)functionaldepartmentsStatus increaseswithbrilliance
Wide spanofcontrol
MechanisticandOrganicinPractice
Twoorganizationsareusedasexamplestodemonstratemechanisticand
organicstructures.TheU.S.Armyisusedtotypifymechanisticstructures;Apache
Indians,AnonymousandAlQaedadisplayexamplesoforganicstructures.
MechanisticOrganization:U.S.Army.
AnArmyinfantrydivisionrepresentsanorganizationthatdisplays
mechanisticcharacteristics.WhilenotalloftheArmytrendstowardmechanistic,
mostoftheArmyeasilyfitsthisstructure.Atypicaldivisionislargelymechanistic
whenanalyzingitsdimensionaltraits.
ThisparticulartypeofstructureiscommonthroughouttheArmyregardless
oftheenvironmentandcontextinwhichitconductsbusiness.Recentcombat
operationsinIraqareanexample.Duringtheinitialcampaign,Armydivisionswere
deployedtodominatetheenvironmentwithmassresources,againstasingular,
17
weakerandmechanisticadversary.Asthewarmaturedandkineticoperations
diminished,theArmyfounditsdivisionalstructureill‐suitedfornationbuilding,and
struggledtofindtheflexibilitytoadjustamidstthegrowingdynamicsand
complexities(e.g.,environmentaluncertainty)ofacounterinsurgency[4].This
experienceservestohighlighttheneedforflexibleorganizationalmodification
processes.Table3depictsthestructuraldimensionsofatypicalinfantrydivision.
Table3.U.S.ArmyInfantryDivisionStructure
Dimension Trait StructureSpecialization Highlyspecializeddowntotheindividual
throughtasklists;highlyfunctionalandcompartmentalizedintosubunits.
Mechanistic
Centralization Authoritytomakedecisionsisoftenkeptatmultiplelevelsabovetheworker.
Mechanistic
Formalization Highlyformalizedtasksdrivenbydoctrine,codifiedandcheckedfrequently;dozensofpoliciesandproceduresdictateactions.
Mechanistic
SpanofControl Theamountofpersonnelsupervisedisdoctrinally drivenandrigid;oftenanarrowandverticalhierarchy;difficulttochange.
Mechanistic
ChainofCommand
Doctrinally drivenandconsiderablyverticaloftenwithadozenleaderswithauthority tochangewhatthelowestindividualwilldo.
Mechanistic
Professionalism VariedwithdeliberateintentionsofbeinghighthroughouttheArmy.
Mixed‐Organic
Status Increasesupthehierarchy. MechanisticCommunication Morevertical than all encompassing;directive
andordersbased.Mechanistic
ThemeansofcreatinganArmyorganizationofferssomeexplanationasto
whytheyaremechanistic.
18
CreatingMechanisticOrganizations.
TheArmycreatesorganizationsthroughtheForceDevelopmentProcess
which“consistsofdefiningmilitarycapabilities,designingforcestructuresto
providethesecapabilities,andtranslatingorganizationalconceptsbasedon
doctrine,technologies,materiel,manpowerrequirements,andlimitedresources
intoatrainedandreadyArmy”[56].
TherearefivephasesintheForceDevelopmentProcess,andtheyare:
(1)Developcapabilities.
(2)Designorganizations.
(3)Developorganizationalmodels.
(4)Determineorganizationalauthorizations.
(5)Documentorganizationalauthorizations.
Armyorganizationsfollowthisprocess,toincludeArmycyber
organizations.Thisfive‐stepprocessresultsinthecreationofanorganizational
structure.Figure3showsthemodelofthesystemofsystemsprocesswiththe
inputsandoutputs.
19
OncetheArmyidentifiestherequirementforaneworganization,the
planning,programming,budgeting,andexecution(PPBE)processbeginstodevelop
theorganization.TheprocessmapinFigure4highlightsthekeysteps.
Figure2.ArmyForceDevelopmentProcess(AR71‐32)[56]
20
RecieveGuidancefrom...
•NationalSecurityStrategy,NationalMilitaryStrategy,QuadrennialDefenseReview,NationalDefenseStrategy,DefensePlanningGuidance,GuidanceforDevelopmentoftheForce,GlobalForceManagementImplementationGuidance,GuidancefromtheArmy’sseniorleadership(TheArmyPlan),Jointwarfightingconcepts(suchasrapiddecisive,operations,peaceenforcementoperations),and/ornewmaterielcapabilitiesevolvingfromtheresearch,development,andacquisitionprocess.
then..
•Thecapabilitiesdevelopmentcommunitydevelopstheproposedorganization,designs,missions,andfunctionstomeettherequiredoperationalcapabilities,whichiscapturedinaUnitReferenceSheet(URS).
then...
•TrainingandDoctrineCommand(TRADOC)utilizestheArmyCapabilitiesIntegrationCenter(ARCIC)andproponentcentersandschoolstodevelopandanalyzethedesign.
then...
•TheapprovedURSdesignmovesforwardtoARCIC’sForceDesignDirectorateandtheArchitectureIntegrationandManagementDivisionwhomakessuretheproposedorganizationaldesignfitsthroughouttheArmyandthattheproposalisdoctrinallycorrect.
then...
•ForceDesignDirectorateforwardstheirdesigntothecommandinggeneraloftraininganddoctrinecommandforapproval.
then...
•ApprovedrecommendationsareforwardedtoDeputyChiefofStaffDirectorofForceManagmentforaforceintegrationfunctionalareasanalysis.
then...
•TheForcedesignupdateneedstobeapprovedbytheViceChiefofStaff,ArmyorChiefofStaff,Army.
then...
•TheUSArmyForceManagmentSupportAgency,inconjunctionwiththeappropriateforcemanagementproponent,appliesarchitecture,rules,standards,andguidancetothedoctrinallycorrectdesigntoproducetheorganizationalmodel.
then...
•HeadquartersDepartmentoftheArmyApprovesthemodelknownasaMilitaryTableofOrgranizationandEquipment.
then...
•Theorganizationissubmittedtothetotalarmyanalysis(TAA)processtocompeteforresourcestoperformthespecifiedcapabilitiesitwascreatedtodo.Resourcingvaries.
Figure3.ProcessMapforCreatingArmyOrganizations
21
Theprocessmapdoesnotshowalloftheprocess.Forinstance,theArmywill
stillneedtopurchaseequipment,requisitionpersonnel,prepsites,andpublish
doctrine.Allofthishappenswithintheconfinesofwhathasoccurredpreviously.
Thisprocessdoesnothappenquickly.Seniorleaderapprovalcancausebottlenecks
(therearemanyinthisexample),transitionsfromoneorganizationtoanother,
rework,oradditions/modificationsfromapprovingofficials.Leadersoftenchange,
whichcreatesstagnationintheprocess.Severalotherfactorsandvariablescause
delaytoincludeembeddedsubprocesses.Allofthisaddsuptoanorganizational
creationprocessfacilitatingmechanisticentities.Perhapsthemostsignificantpoint
isthattheArmyevaluatesstructuralcontexttodetermineneededcapabilities,not
todeterminestructuralstrategy.
OrganicOrganizations:ApacheIndians,AnonymousandAlQaeda.
TheApacheIndians,AnonymousCyberNetwork,andAlQaedaoffer
examplesoforganicstructuringinanearlypureform.Thesethreeorganizations
exhibitedanunusualabilitytosucceedagainstvastlylargeradversaries;they
operateinhighlyuncertainenvironments,characterizedbysuddenandvast
amountsofchange,considerableforcesthatarepronetoshiftatamoment’snotice,
andlimitedavailabilityofresources.Table4depictsthestructuraldimensionsof
theseorganizations.
22
Table4.ApacheIndians,AnonymousHackerGroupandAlQaedaStructures
Dimension Trait StructureSpecialization Lowlevelofspecializationwithoperators
performingabroadrangeofrandomtaskswithlittle standardization;fluidteamandnetwork‐basedtaskunits.
Organic
Centralization Personnelfollowemergentleadersandoftenactwithautonomy.
Organic
Formalization Frequentlynoformalizationispresentintheperformanceoftasks.
Organic
SpanofControl Emergentandvaried;at timesextraordinarilywide.
Organic
ChainofCommand
Emergentandflexiblebasedoncontingenciesfacingsubunits;nearflat organizationalhierarchywithcommonthemesallowingvariousactorstoplugintotheorganizationwhenneededordesired.
Organic
Professionalism Varied. MixedStatus Increaseswithdisplayedbrilliance. OrganicCommunication Rangesfromhorizontaltoallencompassing;
adviceandinformationsharing.Organic
TheApacheIndianshaveoccupiedwhatarenownorthernMexicoandthe
southwesternUnitedStatesforhundredsofyears.Theyincreasedinfameand
notorietyduringtheeraofSpanishConquistadorsintheAmericasinthe16th
century.TheSpanishappearedtobeunstoppableastheygainedconsiderable
groundthroughoutCentralAmericauntiltheyventurednorthandencounteredthe
Apache.TheSpanishmettheirmatchinanundersizedandunder‐resourced
adversary[9].
23
Theanonymoushackergroupissimilar.TheyclashedwithFortune500
companies,computersecurityfirms,majorreligiousorganizationsandbrought
them,atleasttemporarily,greatdifficulty[44].
AlQaedahasverynoticeablykeptpowerfulmilitariesbusyforoveradecade.
Theyhavedonesousingsimpletechnologyandsneakytacticstomakeupfortheir
lackofairsupport,advancedcommunicationsandweaponry.Thereisa
commonalityinthesethreeorganizationsandtheiradversaries.Alloftheir
adversariesexhibitedtendenciestostructureandoperateinamechanisticfashion
despiteexternalenvironmentalconditionsthatsuggesttheopposite.
CreatingOrganicOrganizations.
Describingthecreationoftheseandotherorganicorganizationsisdifficult;
theyare,almostbydefinition,unstructured.However,BurnsandStalkerhighlight
thepresenceofthreefactorsinthecreationoforganicstructures:sharedbeliefsand
goals,commitmenttoacommonconcern,andpersonnelwithexpertisewhoemerge
asleaders[11].Table5showsthepresenceofthesefactors.
Table5.StructuralFactorsPresentinCreatingOrganicOrganizations
Organization Sharedbeliefs/goals
Commonconcern Emergentleaders
16thCenturyApacheIndians
Yes RepellingtheSpanishinvasion
Nant’ans
AnonymousHackerGroup
Yes Variesonemergent“operations”ofinterest
Opschampion;skilledhackers
AlQaeda Yes Repelthewest;establishacaliphate
Commanders/emirs
24
Thestrengthofthefactorsappearstoincreasethestrengthofthe
organization.Whenbeliefsandgoalsbegintocompetewithoneanother,thiscan
createopposingfactions,effectivelyreducingthecollectivepoweroftheentity.A
commonconcernactstofocusthehorizontalstructure,whichcreatestheimpetus
formoreskilledleaderstochampionit.Weakeningthecommonconcernlikewise
weakenstheintegrationofexistinggroups.Followerschooseleadershipbasedon
proveneffectivenessintheareaofinterest.Theabsenceofskilledleadershinders
theabilityoftheorganizationtoaccomplishgoals.InthecaseoftheApache,leaders
areknownasNant’ans,spiritualandculturalfront‐runnerspeoplelikedfollowing
[9].ThereweremanyNant’ans,andtheywouldattimesalignwitheachotherwhen
needed.Whenonedied,anotherwouldemerge.Figure5isadepictionofhorizontal
andnetwork‐basednatureoftheApacheIndiansinthe16thcentury:
Nant’an
Nant’anNant’an
Nant’an
Figure4.ApacheStructuralDepiction
25
StructureandEnvironmentalUncertaintySynthesis
Asitrelatestoperformance,thegreatertheperceiveduncertaintyinthe
environment,themoretheorganizationshouldtakeanorganicform,andwithless
uncertainty,theyundertakeamechanisticform[11,29,39].Whenanorganization
takesanorganicforminanenvironmentthatishighlyuncertain,thisisconsidered
astructuralfit,whichisshowntoincreaseperformance[21].Thisalignmentseems
intuitive,asorganicstructuresaremorefluidandadaptable.Followingthesame
logic,organicstructuresarenotashelpfulinstableenvironments.Itisworthnoting
thatnosinglecontingencyorstructureappliestoall.Organicormechanistic
structuraltypesareonly“better”iftheyfitthecontingencies.Organizational
structuresandtheirrelationshiptoenvironmentaluncertaintyandstructural
contingencycanbesynthesizedasshowninFigure2.
Thisresearchseekstofindoutthelevelofuncertaintyinthegeneralexternal
environmentofcyberconnectedcriticalinfrastructuretodeterminestructural
guidanceforcyberorganizationstaskedwithprotectingthesecriticalassets.
Figure5:OrganizationalStructure,UncertaintyandtheExternalEnvironment
26
III.Methodology
ResearchDesignandMethodology
Theresearchmethodisamultiplecasestudy.Theapproachisstructuredas
anexploratorystudywitharetrospectivelensfororganizationalpatterns.Thecase
studymethodallowsinvestigatorstoretaintheholisticandmeaningful
characteristicsofreal‐lifeeventssuchasindividuallifecycles,smallgroupbehavior,
organizationalandmanagerialprocessesandthematurationofindustries[60].
Thedataanalysistechniqueiscontentanalysis.Contentanalysisissuitable
forcondensingmanywordswithinadocumentintoasmallsetofcontentcategories
basedonexplicitcodingrulesforthepurposeofexaminingthem[6,30,37,54].The
contentcategorieswereestablishedaprioribasedtheorganizationalstructure
theoriesofpopulationecology,resourcedependenceandstructuralcontingency.
Thecategoriesweredefinediterativelytomaximizemutualexclusivityand
exhaustiveness[58].Thisresearchhighlightsexternalenvironmentaluncertainty
foritssignificantinfluenceinshapingorganizationalstructureacrossthefollowing
threemeasureddimensionalcategories:(i)complexity;(ii)dynamism(turbulence);
and,(iii)munificence(resource)[18].
DataCollection
Onceexternalenvironmentaluncertaintywaschosenasthefocusofthis
research,thecontentanalystwasabletodrawastratifiedpurposivesampleof
27
artifacts(documents)fromthepublishedmaterial.Thestrata(cases)dividedinto
academia,governmentandprivate/practitioner[43,46].Eachrepresents
stakeholdersofpubliclyavailableinformationrelatedtocriticalinfrastructureand
cyberintheUnitedStates.Informationaboutthecyberlinkagetocritical
infrastructureisaspecifictopicofinterestwhererelevantinformationisknown
mostlytoaspecificsubsetofprofessionalswithinthesethreestrata[37].Search
engines(includingGoogle,RAND/CSIS/MITREand.govsources)identifiedthe
artifactsusingalgorithmsthatsortdocumentretrievalfromlargedatabases.This
processhelpstoidentifyartifactswiththemostreferencesandinformationrelated
tocriticalinfrastructureandcyber.TheU.S.GovernmentAccountabilityOffice’s
(GAO)definitionofartifactsasphysicallyseparable,minimallysized,andself‐
containedtextualinformationwasadopted[30].
ArtifactDiscrimination.
Artifactswereretrievedusingthesearchtermsindustrialcontrolsystem,
SCADA,andcriticalinfrastructurecyber,basedontheircloselinkagetocyber‐
connectedcriticalinfrastructure[8].Theinitialsearchharvestedalargenumberof
artifacts.Infilteringtheresults,additionalcriteriawereappliedtoachievea
relevantandrepresentativesampleforeachstratum.Table6liststhecriteria.The
contentanalystconvertedthefinalselectionofartifacts(AppendixA)into
individualportabledocumentformat(PDF)tominimizethefilesize,standardizethe
formatforallcoders,andmakeimportingintocodingsoftware(e.g.,Maxqda)easy.
28
Table6.ArtifactCriteria
Category CriteriaContent Discusscyberandthecriticalinfrastructuregeneral
externalenvironmentGeography U.S.relatedTimeliness Publishedwithinthelastsevenyears(sinceJuly2008)Availability PubliclyavailableSize Nomorethan20codeablepagesperdocument
Table7containsthesearchresults.Moreartifactsthatareacademicwere
reviewedbecauseoftheirperceivedreliability,validityandtrust.Aslightlyhigher
amountofprivate/practitionerartifactswerereviewedthangovernmentbecauseof
searchenginelimitationsuniquetoRAND,CSISandMITRE.Google’splatform
dominatedbyitsabilitytoreturnresultsconcentratedonthefocusarea,whichwas
verytimely(usuallywithinoneyearofpublication).Governmentartifactselection
alsosufferedfromsearchenginelimitationsandsyntacticissues(e.g.,includedonly
minutesfromcongressionalmeetings)thatincreasedtheamountofartifactsneeded
tobeviewed.
Table7.ArtifactRetrievalResults
Strata InitialSample MetCriteria FinalRandomSampleAcademia 91 34 10(50%)Private/Practitioner 73 17 5(25%)Government 65 17 5(25%)Totals 229 68 20(n=60)
ArtifactswererandomizedusingMicrosoftExceltogeneratethefinalsample.
All68artifacts(AppendixB)meetingtheselectioncriterionwerecodedwithanA,
29
P,G(academic,private/practitioner,andgovernment).Thefinalrandomsample
contained20documentspercoder(distributed10‐A/5‐P/5‐G)foratotalofn=60
documents.Itisimportanttonotethatincontentanalysis,unlikequantitative
statisticalanalysis,anaccuraterepresentationofallthedocumentsintheareaof
cyber‐connectedcriticalinfrastructureisnotthegoal.Thegoalistoretrieveauseful
setofartifactstoanswertheresearchquestionfairly[37].
OrganizationalDiversity.
Thedocumentsanalyzedbythecodersrepresentedadiverseamountof
informationfromallthreestrata.Parentorganizationsthathavepublishedcontent
includedinthefinalsampleare:AssociationforComputingMachinery,IEEE,Forbes,
ArmyResearchLab,InternationalJournalofCriticalInfrastructureProtection,
Economist,Tripwire,DepartmentofHomelandSecurity,InstituteforComputer
Sciences,SocialInformaticsandTelecommunicationsEngineering,WhiteHouse,
GovernmentAccountabilityOffice,DowJonesandCo.,andInternationalFederation
forInformationProcessing.
Coding
Krippendorfdefinescodingasthestepofclassifyingthesamplingor
recordingunitsintermsofthecategoriesoftheanalyticalconstructschosen[37].
Thesamplingunitelectedtocategorizetheinformationpresentintheartifactis
“thesentence”[54],becauseofitsabilitytoobtainmeaninginrelationtotext[37],
30
andduetotheuseofhumancoders[30].Eachsentencewasreadandcodedagainst
thecodecategoriesusingtherecordingunitclassificationdiagramlistedin
AppendixC.Codersweretrainedtolookforrepetitivematerialsoasnottocodethe
sameinformationtwice.Thecoderswereinstructedtointerpretthesamplingunit
(e.g.,sentence)inthecontextofanentireartifact(e.g.,contextunit).This
interpretationismeaningfulandfeasibleforanartifactthatcontainslessthaneight
pagesofcodeablematerial[37].AnexampleofacodedartifactisinAppendixD.
ContentCategories.
TheMaxqdagraphicaluserinterfaceprovidesavisualdisplayofcode
categoriesandcodedmaterialtocheckoperationaldefinitionsagainstsampling
units,asdisplayedinFigure6.
Figure6:MaxqdaGraphicalUserInterface
31
The“NotApplicable”codecategorywasincludedinadditiontotheexistinga
prioricategoriesofcomplexity,dynamismandmunificencetoensure
exhaustiveness[30,54].Allforcesdiscussedrelatetothegeneralexternal
environment.Table8liststhecodecategories.
Table8.CodeCategoryDefinitions
CodeCategory SubCategory DefinitionsComplexity Forcesinterconnecting Are theforcesinterconnecting?
(CONNECTEDNESS)Complexity Forcesnotconnecting Are theforcesdisconnected?
(CONNECTEDNESS)Complexity Many forces Are theforcesmany?(AMOUNT)Complexity Fewforces Are theforcesfew? (AMOUNT)Complexity Forcesarestrong Are theforcesstrong?
(STRENGTH)Complexity Forcesareweak Are theforcesweak?
(STRENGTH)Dynamism Forceschangea lot Isthereahighamountofchange?
(AMOUNT)Dynamism Forceschangeinfrequently Are forceschangingverylittle?
(AMOUNT)Dynamism Forceschangefast Ischangehappeningquickly?
(SPEED)Dynamism Forceschangeslowly Ischangehappeningslowly?
(SPEED)Munificence Resourcesarescarce Are theamountofresources
availablescarce?(AMOUNT)Munificence Resourcesarein
abundanceAre theamountofresourcesavailableabundant?(AMOUNT)
Not Applicable Not Applicable Allothersentences (N/A)
32
CoderTraining.
Qualitativedataanalysissoftware(Maxqda)wasselectedfortheabilityto
managelargevolumesoftext,displayinformationwitheaseandforworkingwith
multiplecoders[52].ThecontentanalystfamiliarizedthecoderswithMaxqda,
operationaldefinitionsandcodecategories(seeAppendixE).Also,well‐defined
explicitcodinginstructionswerewrittenintoMaxqdatoimprovecoding
consistency[54].Onlythecontentanalysttrainedandevaluatedeachcoder[37].
Theyparticipatedinabetacodingsessiontoimprovecodingconsistencyandto
minimizeidiosyncraticjudgmentsinthecodingprocess[37].Thetrainingprocess
producedfavorablereliabilityresults.Thecoderstrainedondocumentsnot
includedinthefinalsample.Nocollaborationamongstthecoderswasallowed
duringthecodingprocess.
Threegraduatestudentswithastrongbackgroundincybercodedthe
documents.Theimportanceofcodersbeingfamiliarwiththephenomenaunder
considerationwasacriticalfactorincoderselection[37].Thereadinglevelofthe
documentsdemandedcoderswithahighereducationlevel.
DataReduction
Oncethecodersfinished,thecompletedthumbdrivesweregiventothe
contentanalysttoaggregate.Thecombineddatasetsgeneratednumerous
descriptivestatistics,charts,andtables.Thecontentanalystscrutinizedthedatafor
33
outliers,incompleteartifacts,andotheranomalies.Alloftheartifactsweredeemed
completeandproperlycoded.ThedatawereimportedintoMicrosoftExceltolook
foranalysisofpatternsandtrendswithinandacrosstheset.Numerousgraphsand
tableswerecollapsedintoatightsetwhichbestarticulatedthefindings.
Validity
Everystepoftheresearchprocesswasconductedtoensurethequalityofthe
resultsledtoanacceptanceoftruth.TheguidelinessetforthbyKlausKrippendorff
[37]forvalidityincontentanalysiswerefollowedandreviewedperiodically
throughouttheresearchprocess.
Reliability
Toensurevalidinferencesfromthetext,wordmeaningandcategory
definitionsweretightened,multiplecoderswereusedandintercoderagreement
wascalculated.CohensKappa[14]wascalculatedasameasureofreliability.Itis
consideredastrictmeasureofagreementbetweencodersbasedontheselectionof
aparticularcodefortherecordingunit[42].
34
IV.AnalysisandResults
DescriptiveStatistics
Table9showsthecodingunitsrangefrom1,594to2,067(mean=1,838).The
primaryreasonforthisvarianceliesinhoweachcoderinterpretedthecodingunit.
Theambiguityofthelanguageinthepublishedmaterialmightcauseonecoderto
perceivethepresenceofacodingunitwhileanotherdidnot.
Table9.TotalCodesbyCoder
Coder 1 2 3
Pages 156 156 156Documents 20 20 20Codingunits 2067 1853 1594
Table10showsthateachcoderread156pages,whichaveraged7.8pages
perartifact.Althoughthereweremoreacademicartifactsthangovernment,the
governmentartifactsaveragedmorepages(13.8).Subsequently,thedifficultyof
interpretingthesamplingunit(sentence)inrelationtothecontextunit(artifact)
increased[37].
Table10.PagesCodedbyStrata
Academic Government Private/Practitioner AggregatePagesRead 74 69 13 156PagesPerArtifact7.4 13.8 2.6 7.8
35
Flesch‐KincaidReadingLevelandFleschReadingEasemeasureswere
calculatedforeachartifact.Table11showstheresults.TheFlesch‐Kincaidformulas
aremathematicalderivationsaccountingfortheamountofwordsinasentenceand
syllablesperwordtogenerateagradelevelguideforcomprehensionandeaseof
reading[26,35].Thetotalpagescodedwere156,withanaverage1,838recordable
unitsatagraduatereadinglevelandease(Flesch‐KincaidGrade16/Ease23).The
governmentdocumentsemergedasthemostdifficulttocomprehendbasedon
theseindicesandsufferedthehighestamountofdisagreement.
Table11.Flesch‐KincaidReadingScores
Strata ReadingLevel ReadingEaseAcademic 16 24Government 17 15Private/Practitioner 16 27TotalAverage 16 23
IntercoderAgreement
BasedonLandisandKoch[38],thecoderagreementinTable12rangesfrom
fair(21%‐40%)tosubstantial(61%‐80%)whichresultsinmoderateoverall
agreementwithKapparangingfrom51%‐60%.SeveralfactorscanaffectKappa
(e.g.,amountofcategories(13),specificityofdefinition);sincetheresearchis
exploratory,lowerlevelsofagreementareconsideredacceptable[42].Coderswere
allowedconsiderablelatitudeincontentinterpretationbasedontheirexpertiseand
training.Despitechallenges,theresultsindicateagreementbetweencoders.
36
Table12.CohensKappa
Coders 1and2 1and3 2and3 Mean
Academic 0.66 0.71 0.71 0.69Government 0.39 0.47 0.29 0.38Private/Practitioner 0.36 0.51 0.31 0.40Kappa 0.52 0.60 0.51 0.54
CodeDistribution
Table13liststhefrequencydistributionofcodesacrossthesample(n=60).
Thecodersassignedadimensionalcodeto51.8%ofthecontent(2,856sentences).
Thecategory“notapplicable”wasremovedfromthefrequencyanalysisinTable13
toremovebias.Thefrequencyanalysisindicatesthatcomplexityhasastrong
presence(morethan91%)ineachstratum.Complexity(e.g.,forcesconnecting,
manyforces,forcesarestrong)accountsfor67.43%ofuncertaintyinthecontent
coded.Dynamism(e.g.,amountofchangeishigh,forceschangefast)accountsfor
8.12%ofuncertaintyinthecontentcoded.Munificence(e.g.,resourcesarescarce)
accountsfor5.85%ofuncertaintyinthecontentcoded.Basedoncoder
interpretation,asFigure7indicates,thereisastrongpresence(81.4%)of
uncertaintyinthegeneralexternalenvironmentpresentacrossthethreestrata
sampled.
37
Table13.FrequencyAnalysisofCodes
Parentcode Code Frequency Percent DocumentsComplexity ForcesConnecting 872 30.53 56Complexity ManyForces 537 18.80 55Complexity ForcesareStrong 517 18.10 58Munificence ResourcesareinAbundance 225 7.88 36Munificence ResourcesareScarce 167 5.85 44Dynamism AmountofChangeisHigh 144 5.04 44Complexity ForcesNotConnecting 140 4.90 32Dynamism ForcesChangeFast 88 3.08 25Dynamism ForcesChangeSlowly 65 2.28 20Complexity ForcesareWeak 57 2.00 29Dynamism AmountofChangeisLow 34 1.19 11Complexity FewForces 10 0.35 8
Total 2,856 100.00 ‐
Figure7.UncertaintyintheGeneralExternalEnvironment
38
StrataAnalysis
Thefollowingsectionswillprovideananalysisofthepresenceofuncertainty
inthegeneralexternalenvironment,withinandacrossstrata,displayedinFigure8.
Complexity.
Figure8illustratesthereisstrongevidencetosupportthatcomplexityis
extremelyhigh.Allthreestratashowedastrongpresenceofcomplexityinthe
generalexternalenvironment.Infact,thedataappearstobeastatisticaldead‐heat
atabout90%.
Dynamism.
Dynamismpresentsadifferentpicture.Private/practitionerdisplays
significantlyhigheruncertaintythangovernmentandacademicstrata.Thislevelof
Figure8.PercentageofUncertaintybyDimensionandStrata
39
uncertaintyappearstobereasonablebecauseoftheincreasedcompetitionand
desireforrevenuepresentintheprivate/practitionerenvironment.This
environmentrequirestheabilitytodissolveorcreateorganizationsrapidly,modify
processes,andinnovateinresponsetomarketstimuli.
Thegovernmentstrataexhibitalowerpresenceofuncertainty.Unlike
private/practitioner,governmentfunctionsareslowtochange.Despitethis,coders
agreethereisvastlymorechange(dynamism)inthegeneralexternalenvironment
acrossallthreestrata.Infact,theamountofchangewasdetectedatfourtimesthe
frequency(seeTable13).
Munificence.
Itisclearfromtheresultsthereisexplanatorypowerandameasurable
degreeofresourcescarcity(munificence)intheenvironment.Thepresenceof
uncertaintyisloweroverallacrossallthreeenvironmentalresourcemeasures.
However,theacademicstrataexhibitsignificantlymoreperceivedresourcescarcity
inthegeneralexternalenvironment.Areasonableexplanationforthedifferenceis
thebreadthanddepthofresearchtheacademicsectordedicatestothiscomplex
area.
40
CoderAnalysis
Figure9clearlydemonstratesthecoderswereconsistentintheircoding
acrossallthreedimensionsofuncertainty.Whilethereisslightdisagreementin
munificence(resource)andcomplexity(amount/connectednessofforces),thereis
generalagreementoverall.
RecommendationsforAction
Understandingtheoutcomespresentedinthisstudy,itwouldbelogicalto
structuregovernmentcyberorganizationsoperatinginthecriticalinfrastructure
environmentinanorganicfashionratherthanthecurrentmechanisticstructure.
Thegovernmentshouldgenerateseparateprocessesinthecreationofthese
Figure9.CoderOverlap
41
organizationstoallowforfastimplementationandfrequentmodification.These
cyberorganizationsshouldhavethefollowingcharacteristicsiftheyaretosucceed:
Peopledonotperformhighlyspecializedtasksbuthaveabroaderview.
Achainofcommandexistsbutismoredecentralizedbecauseoftheneedforshiftingresponsibilities.
Thehighlevelofcomplexityandchangeintheenvironmentwarrantsknowledgeablepersonnelworkinginteamsandcoordinatingfrequentlytomakefastdecisionswhenneeded.
Communicationoftenoccursandatmanylevels.
Ordersanddirectivesdiminishasadviceandinformationsharingincrease.
Knowledgeandexpertiseincreaseindividualstatus.
Oneofthemostappealingaspectsoftheresearchisthepotentialfor
generalizabilitytoothercyberorganizationsoperatingwithintheUnitedStatesand
similarlydevelopedcountries.Onecouldmaketheargumentthatthecyber
environmentsoftheDepartmentofHomelandSecurity,theDepartmentofDefense,
privateutilitycompanies,andhightechnologyfirmshavesignificantsimilarities.
Itisworthmentioningthatsignificantbarriersexisttoimplementingthese
principlesintheDoDandothergovernmentagenciesrangingfromcultureto
strategicdirection.Understandingtheconnectionsbetweenorganizational
performance,structure,andtheenvironmentshouldactasanimpetusforthese
difficultchanges.
42
V.Conclusions
ConclusionsofResearch
Fewtopicswithintheareaofnationalinterestaremoreimportantthanthe
understandingofhowtoorganizeincyberandprotectnationalcritical
infrastructureassetsfromcyberspacethreats.ParticipationattheUnitedStates
ArmyCyberTalksattheNationalDefenseUniversityinSeptemberof2015served
tostrengthentheneedforempiricalanalysisandevidencethatcouldleadto
organizationalstructuringdecisionsandadjustments.Innovationandknowledge
managementweredirectconcernsofattendees,whichrelatedirectlyto
organizationalstructure[40].Severalstructuraldimensionswererepeatedly
discussedasinhibitorstoperformancefurthervalidatingtheneedforthisresearch.
Thethreeresearchquestionsansweredinthisstudywere:
1. Whatisorganizationalstructure?
Answer:Theresearchliteraturedepictsorganizationalstructureintwodimensions:structuralandcontextual.Thecontextualdimensionssignificantlyaffectthestructuraldimensions.
2. Whattheoriescontributetoorganizationalstructure?
Answer:Institutionalisomorphism,resourcedependence,populationecology,andstructuralcontingencyaredominantorganizationaltheoriesthatcontributetotheexplanationoforganizationalstructure.Ofthesefourtheories,structuralcontingencyprovidesapragmaticexplanationofhowtostructureorganizationsbasedoncontextandcontingency.Theenvironmentemergesasaprominentpointoffocusineverydominanttheory.Thelevelofuncertaintywithregardtotheorganization'sgeneralexternalenvironmentshowsastrongconnectiontostructuraltype.
43
3. Howshouldorganizationsstructureincyberenvironmentstodefendcriticalinfrastructure?
Answer:Theperceivedlevelofuncertainty,asmeasuredbythedegreeofcomplexity,dynamism,andmunificenceintheexternalenvironmentofcyberorganizationsrelateswelltothemechanisticandorganicstructuralcontinuum.Cyberorganizationsshouldstructureorganicallyinhighlyuncertainenvironmentsandmechanisticallyinlessuncertainenvironments.
Asitpertainstothecyber‐connectedcriticalinfrastructureenvironment,
forceswithinandacrossstrataareoverwhelminglynumerous,strongand
connecting.Theamountofchangeatpresentisveryhigh.Thespeedofchangeis
fastandresourcesaretypifiedbyanabundanceofinformationtechnologywithlow
barrierstoentrycreatingopportunityandavailabilityforadversaryandallyalike.
Theseelementscreatetheperceptionofahighlyuncertainsituationfor
organizationsoperatinginthecyber‐connectedcriticalinfrastructureenvironment.
Organicstructuringprinciplesallowfortheadaptabilityandflexibilitythis
environmentrequires.Thisresearchindicatesorganizationsshouldfolloworganic
structuringprincipleswhileoperatinginthecyber‐connectedcriticalinfrastructure
environment.
44
RecommendationsforFutureResearch
MeasureGovernmentCyberOrganizations.
Thisresearchapproachedansweringthequestionofhowtostructure
organizationsincyberspacebyfirstanalyzingthecontextualdimensionofexternal
environmentaluncertainty.Itwillnowbeappropriateandhelpfultomeasure
empiricallystructuraldimensionsofgovernmentcyberorganizations(e.g.,DHSICS‐
CERT,USCYBERCOM),tocontributefurthertotheanswer.
ReplicatetheStudy.
ThisresearchfocusedontheU.S.only.HowevertheU.S.isnottheonly
countryinneedofstrategicdirectioninthecreationofcyberorganizationstasked
toprotectcriticalinfrastructure.Areplicativestudyforotheralliednationswho
mutuallysupportcyberalongsidetheU.S.(GreatBritain,Australia,Canada,andNew
Zealand),wouldcontributetotheoverallsecurityofeachnation.
IdentifyDominantFactorsforMunificence.
Munificence(resource)inthisresearchisbroadlydefined.Withtheinsight
gainedfromthisstudy,itisapparentthatresourceincyberwouldbenefitfrom
structuralequationmodeling(e.g.,confirmatoryfactoranalysis).Thisresearchwill
aidintheidentificationofdominantresourcefactorsinthecyber‐connectedcritical
infrastructureenvironment.
45
AppendixA.ArtifactFinalSelection(FrontPageInformation)
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AppendixB.ArtifactsMeetingSelectionCriteria
AASurveyofSCADAandCriticalInfrastructureIncidentsAATaxonomyofCyberAttacksonSCADASystemsAAWeb‐BasedRemoteLabforSCADAAAdvancedKeyforSecureSCADAACapabilitiesofDynamicReconfigurationMBICSACIDependencyAssessmentACreatingaCyberMovingTargetforCIACriticalInfrastructureDependenciesACyberCIProtectPayloadAnomalyDetectionACyberSecurityRiskAssessmentforSCADAandDCSNetworks2007ISATransactionsADecentralizedRiskManagementCIADetectingIntrusionsinSCADASystemsAEventTriggeredStratICSAFPGAsinIndustrialControlApplicationsAGSMSMSBasedMonitoringControlSystemsAImprovingSecurityforSCADAControlSystemsAIntrusionDetectioninSCADAAMethodologiesandApplicationsforCIANetworkIntrusionDetectionM0DBUSICSANetworkedControlSystemOverviewandResearchTrendsAProbabilisticRiskinCIAPublicPrivateCIARethinkingSecurityPropertiesSCADAASCADASecurityinLightofCyberWarfareASCADATestbedASecuritylssuesinSCADANetworksASecurityRetrofitforSCADAASecurityStrategiesforSCADANetworksAStateoftheArtinCIProtectionAStealthyDeceptionAttacksonWaterSCADASystemsATheCyberThreatLandscapeChallengesandFutureResearchDirectionsComputersSecurityATheSCADAChallengeSecuringCriticalInfrastructure2009NetworkSecurityAWindTurbinesSCADAAWinnHoneypotsPAmericasCIisvulnerabletoCyberForbesPAutomationWorldscada‐attacks‐double‐2014PCrashingtheSystemCITheEconomist
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PCriticalInfrastructureSecurityVulnerabilityTripwirePCSISInsuringICSSecurityPCyberattacksEscalateCIHomelandSecTodayPDHSPhishingCITheHillPIntheCrossfirePMcAfeeIntheDarkPrivateCIViewPMcAfeeonCIGeneralPProtectingtheNationsCIfromCyberPSANSICSCIResponsePStudyHalfofCIprosAttackSCMagazinePSurveyRevealsCIIssuesPTrendMicro‐ReportonCybersecurityandCriticalInfrastructureintheAmericasPVerizonDataBreachPVerizonEnergyCIGArmyResearchLabICSSecurityGCIAssessmentSmartGridSecurityGCyberThreatsfromCRIProtectingCIGDHSIGSecureICSGDHSStrategyforSecuringControlSystemsGDHSYearEndAssessmentGExecutiveOrderImprovingCICybersecurityGGAOCIProtectObservationsGGAOMaritimeCIProtectionGGAO‐15‐290,High‐RiskSeriesCIGICSSummaryReportGIdentifying,Understanding,andAnalyzingCIInterdependGNISTcybersecurityframeworkGNISTGuidetoICSSecurity2008GNISTGuidetoIndustrialControlSystemsSecurity2011GPPDCISecurityGPresidentialCyberspacePolicyReview
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AppendixC.RecordingUnitClassificationDiagram
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AppendixD.CodedArtifactExample
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AppendixE.CoderTrainingBriefing
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CyberspaceandOrganizationalStructure:AnAnalysisoftheCriticalInfrastructureEnvironment
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AirForceInstituteofTechnologyGraduateSchoolofEngineeringandManagement(AFIT/EN)2950HobsonWay,Building640WPAFBOH45433‐8865
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14.ABSTRACT
Nowmorethanever,organizationsarebeingcreatedtoprotectthecyberspaceenvironment.Thecapabilityofcyberorganizationstaskedtodefendcriticalinfrastructurehasbeencalledintoquestionbynumerouscybersecurityexperts.Organizationaltheorystatesthatorganizationsshouldbeconstructedtofittheiroperatingenvironmentproperly.Littleresearchinthisarealinks existingorganizationaltheorytocyberorganizationalstructure.Becauseofthecyberspaceconnectiontocriticalinfrastructureassets,thefactorsthatinfluencethestructureofcyberorganizationsdesignedtoprotecttheseassetswarrantanalysistoidentifyopportunitiesforimprovement.Thisthesisanalyzesthecyber‐connectedcriticalinfrastructureenvironmentusingthedominantorganizationalstructuretheories.Byusingmultiplecasestudyandcontentanalysis,2,856samplingunitsrelatingtoenvironmentaluncertainty(complexity,dynamism,andmunificence) areanalyzedtoshowthegeneralexternalenvironmentofcyberorganizationstaskedtoprotectcriticalinfrastructureishighlyuncertaintherebymeritingimplementationoforganicstructuringprinciples.15.SUBJECTTERMS
Cyberorganizations,organizationalstructure,criticalinfrastructureprotection,contentanalysis,multiplecasestudy
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Rice,Mason,ENG,LTC,Ph.D,USAa.REPORT
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