cybersecurity and legal lessons after apple v fbi

70
Cybersecurity and Legal Lessons after Apple v FBI Benjamin Ang Senior Fellow, Centre of Excellence for National Security Education Chair, Internet Society Singapore Chapter

Upload: visual-law-school

Post on 13-Jan-2017

181 views

Category:

Law


1 download

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

Cybersecurity and Legal Lessons after Apple v FBI

Benjamin AngSenior Fellow, Centre of Excellence for National SecurityEducation Chair, Internet Society Singapore Chapter

Page 2: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

Where we come from

CENS

Multinational team of

specialists in national and

homeland security

Based at NTU’s RSIS,

working closely with

NSCS and CSA

ISOC.SG

Dedicated to ensuring

that the Internet stays

open, transparent and

defined by you.

Organizing events,

Providing education,

Engaging policy

Myself

Former Lawyer

Former CIO

Senior Research Fellow

in Cybersecurity Law and

Policy

Page 3: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

Cybersecurity issues in IPV6

Page 4: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

Misconception #1

Misconception:

IPV6 automatically

applies IPSEC because

IPSEC is built in

Reality:

IPSEC is an option

Solution:

Enable IPSEC

Page 5: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

Misconception #2

Misconception:

Every device should

have its own IP address

Reality:

NAT protects devices

which only need to

reached within network

Solution:

Use both IPV4 and IPV6

Page 6: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

Misconception #3

Misconception:

Encryption will protect

everything

Reality:

Metadata can still be

exposed

Solution:

Be aware

Page 7: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

Timeline of Apple v FBI

As of mid 2016

Page 8: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

16 Feb

Judge orders Apple to

help FBI unlock iPhone

belonging to dead

terrorist

17 Feb

Tim Cook (Apple CEO):

This would undeniably

create a backdoor, we

will NOT comply

18 Feb

Twitter, Google, Former

NSA Director: USA is

safer with unbreakable

encryption

19 Feb

FBI filed motion that

Apple is not above the

law

1 Mar

Apple General

Counsel spoke to

House Judiciary

Committee

Page 9: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

1 – 15 Mar

Apple and US DOJ

lawyers file arguments

in court

21 Mar

US attorneys ask to

vacate hearing

28 Mar

US govt announces it

has gained access to the

phone without Apple’s

help

8 April

US DOJ said they

need help to unlock an

iPhone 5s in New York

22 Apr

US DOJ no longer

needs Apple’s help

because they also

unlocked this phone

Page 10: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

What’s at stake

Page 11: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

The ‘Security’ Argument

FBI:

We need access so that

we can investigate

crime, prevent crime

Fears:

‘Going dark’

Page 12: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

The ‘Privacy’ Argument

Technology Cos:

Creating back doors will

expose users to

criminals

Page 13: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

What if it happened in Singapore?

Criminal Procedure Code

Page 14: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

Criminal Procedure Code

39.—(1) A police officer or an authorised person, investigating an arrestable offence, may at any time —

access, inspect and check the operation of a computer that he has reasonable cause to suspect is or has been used in connection with the arrestable offence; or

use or cause to be used any such computer to search any data contained in or available to such computer.

Page 15: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

Power to access computer

I’m investigating an

arrestable offence, so I want

to ACCESS all the data on

this computer Do you need a

warrant?

No.

Page 16: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

Criminal Procedure Code

39(2) The police officer or authorised person may also require any assistance he needs to gain such access from —

… 39 (5) (3) Any person who obstructs the lawful exercise … or who fails to comply with any requirement of the police officer … shall be guilty of an offence

Page 17: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

Power to access computer

Can I

refuse?

No.

Page 18: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

Criminal Procedure Code

40.—(2) The police officer shall be entitled to —

access any information, code or technology which has

the capability of retransforming or unscrambling

encrypted data into readable and comprehensible format

or text for the purposes of investigating …;

Require [any person] to provide assistance

Page 19: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

Power to access decryption

I’m investigating an arrestable

offence, so I want to

DECRYPT all the data on this

computer Do you need a

warrant?

No.

Page 20: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

Criminal Procedure Code

39(2) The police officer or authorised person may also require any assistance he needs to gain such access from —

… 39 (5) (3) Any person who obstructs the lawful exercise … or who fails to comply with any requirement of the police officer … shall be guilty of an offence

Page 21: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

Power to access decryption

Can I

refuse?

No.

Page 22: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

Criminal Procedure Code

40(7) … if that person was in possession of any decryption information at any time before the time of the request for access to such information, that person shall be presumed … to have continued to be in possession of that decryption information …, unless—

(a) It was not in his possession at the time of request and

(b) It continued not to be in his possession.

Page 23: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

Power to access decryption

I don’t have the

keys

Didn’t you use to

have them?

Page 24: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

But there is a limit

I got into the laptop, but the files

are individually encrypted by an

unknown software

Page 25: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

What about messages (data in motion)?

Computer Misuse and Cybersecurity Act

Page 26: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

Computer Misuse and Cybersecurity Act

15A.—(1) Where the Minister is satisfied that it is necessary for the purposes of preventing, detecting or countering any threat to the national security, essential services or defence of Singapore or foreign relations of Singapore,

the Minister may, authorise or direct any person or organisation … to take such measures or comply …

Page 27: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

We have a national security

concern, so I’m giving you a

direction

Can you

do that?

Yes

Page 28: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

Computer Misuse and Cybersecurity Act

s15A(2)(c) … (including real-time information)

obtained from any computer controlled or

operated by the specified person, or obtained by

the specified person from another person

Page 29: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

Monitor all messages in real

time to find out if a riot is going

to take place REAL TIME? What if

we catch some

personal data?

Page 30: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

Computer Misuse and Cybersecurity Act

s15A(3) Any measure or requirement …

shall have effect notwithstanding any obligation

or limitation imposed or right, privilege or

immunity conferred by or under any law,

contract or rules of professional conduct …

Page 31: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

Computer Misuse and Cybersecurity Act

s15A(4) A specified person who, without reasonable excuse, fails to take any measure or comply with any requirement directed by the Minister under subsection (1) shall be guilty of an offence

and shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding $50,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years or to both.

Page 32: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

Is there a limit?I can’t monitor the messages,

they’re encrypted end to end!

Page 33: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

On the other hand

Businesses are legally required to protect customer data

Page 34: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

PDPC fined KBOX $50K

“The practice of sending large volumes of members’ personal data via unencrypted email is a vulnerability and an example of how K Box had not sufficiently protected the members’ personal data.” – PDPC

Page 35: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

On the other hand

End users and manufacturers of IOT may need access

Page 36: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

Manufacturers

…need to send

security updates

to IOT Devices

Page 37: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

End users

… sometimes

need to override

our own security

Page 38: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

Humanity

… may one day

need to override

security

Page 39: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

What can we do?

Page 40: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

End Users

• We need choices

Law Enforcement

• We need access

Tech Companies

• We need security

Regulators

• We need to secure

Page 41: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

Weak (or weakening) encryption is unsafe

Because criminals can get access to victims’ data or worse

Page 42: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

How are you going to

get through the user’s

security?

No problem, I found

out the back door that

police use!

Page 43: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

Weak encryption doesn’t really help law enforcement

Because the really serious criminals and terrorists use additional encryption tools

Page 44: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

How are we going to carry

out our secret bomb attack?

Police have back doors into

everyone’s phone!

No problem, I’m using a

Russian encryption app

that has no back door

Page 45: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

But end users and manufacturers need a safe way in

Are there solutions besides encryption alone?

Page 46: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

Secure Privacy

3FA

Biometrics

Escrow Dual Key

Notification

Blockchain

Page 47: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

3FA

Page 48: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

Biometrics

Page 49: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

Key Escrow

Page 50: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

Dual Key

Page 51: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

Notification

Page 52: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

Blockchain

Page 53: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

The Solution is out there

We all need to work together to create one that works for everyone

Page 54: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

54

Singapore Chapter

Your Membership helps Change the World

Internet Society members achieve change through partnerships and technical expertise.

90+Chapters

Worldwide

Your membership to the Internet Society gives you a

powerful voice.

50000+Individual

Members

140+Organization

Members

Page 55: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

55

Singapore Chapter

Workshops and training

Educational events

You can play a Key Role in Singapore

Public Policy issue advocacy

Networking events

Page 56: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

56

Singapore Chapter

Get Involved

Join the Singapore Chapter, or

Attend an Event

– Blockchain Seminar 2016

Contact us at www.isoc.sg

This is your Internet.Join it!

Page 57: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

Cybersecurity and

Legal Lessons

after Apple v FBIBenjamin AngSenior Fellow, Centre of Excellence for National Security

Education Chair, Internet Society Singapore Chapter

Slides and further discussion at www.isoc.sg

Page 58: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

Background Information

Page 59: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

Centre of Excellence for National Security

Multinational team of research

specialists in national security

Working with National Security

Coordination Secretariat (NSCS) and

Cyber Security Agency (CSA)

Page 60: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

CENS Research Programmes

Homeland Defence

Programme

Radicalisation

Studies Programme

Social Resilience

Programme

Cybersecurity

Programme

• Strategic

Communication

• Social Media

Analysis

• Radicalisation to of

individuals and

groups

• Criminology,

psychology,

sociology, history

and political science

• Multiculturalism,

citizenship, class,

immigration

• How globalised

societies cope with

crises such as

pandemics and

terrorist attacks.

• Cyber threats

• Cybercrime

• Smart Cities

• Confidence Building

Measures

• Controversies

(security vs privacy)

Page 61: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

How CENS influences national policy

Publish Commentaries and Briefs

Educate National Security Officials

Organize workshops and seminars for

to create a community of practice in

public and private sectors

Page 62: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

62

Singapore Chapter

Internet Society Mission

To promote the open development,

evolution, and use of the Internet for

the benefit of all people throughout

the world.

Page 63: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

63

Singapore Chapter

Internet Society Singapore Chapter

Provides

leadership in

policy issues

Advocates open

Internet

Standards

Promotes Internet

technologies that

matter

Develops Internet

infrastructure

Undertakes

outreach that

changes lives

Recognizes

industry leaders

Page 64: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

64

Singapore Chapter

Current Priorities

Internet Governance

Open Internet Standards

Online Identity

IPv6

Blockchain

Domain Name System Security (DNSSEC)

Internet and Human Rights

Intellectual Property and Digital Content

Internet of Things

Page 65: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

65

Singapore Chapter

Programmes

Awards

Internet Hall of Fame

Jonathan B. Postel Service Award

Applied Networking Researching Prize (ANRP)

Grants

Community Grants

ICT Innovation

Individual Fellowships

Page 66: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

66

Singapore Chapter

Examples of the Internet Societyin Action

Page 67: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

67

Singapore Chapter

Public Consultation with MDA on changes to Licensing of Websites

Photo: © Stonehouse Photographic

www.internetsociety.org/wcit

Page 68: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

68

Singapore Chapter

Lodging complaint against law firm representing Dallas Buyers Club in threatening users

Photo: © Stonehouse Photographic

www.internetsociety.org/wcit

Page 69: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

69

Singapore Chapter

Seminars on Charlie Hebdo, Cybersecurity Skills Building, Election Blogging, IOT, and more

Photo: © Stonehouse Photographic

www.internetsociety.org/wcit

Page 70: Cybersecurity and Legal lessons after Apple v FBI

70

Singapore Chapter

World IPv6 Launch

www.WorldIPv6Launch.org