cyber-security: some thoughts v.s. subrahmanian center for digital international government computer...

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Cyber-Security: Some Thoughts V.S. Subrahmanian Center for Digital International Government Computer Science Dept. & UMIACS University of Maryland [email protected] www.cs.umd.edu/~vs/ 1 Parts of this talk reflect joint work with M. Albanese, S. Jajodia, C. Molinaro, A. Pugliese, N. Rullo, C. Thomas V.S. Subrahmanian, Geo- Intelligence India 2013

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Page 1: Cyber-Security: Some Thoughts V.S. Subrahmanian Center for Digital International Government Computer Science Dept. & UMIACS University of Maryland vs@cs.umd.edu

Cyber-Security: Some Thoughts

V.S. SubrahmanianCenter for Digital International Government

Computer Science Dept. & UMIACSUniversity of Maryland

[email protected]/~vs/

1

Parts of this talk reflect joint work with M. Albanese, S. Jajodia, C. Molinaro, A. Pugliese, N. Rullo, C. Thomas

V.S. Subrahmanian, Geo-Intelligence India 2013

Page 2: Cyber-Security: Some Thoughts V.S. Subrahmanian Center for Digital International Government Computer Science Dept. & UMIACS University of Maryland vs@cs.umd.edu

Disclaimers

V.S. Subrahmanian, Geo-Intelligence India 2013 2

• All work described in this talk only uses open-source data.

• All work in this talk is basic research tested wherever possible against real-world data.

• All work reported in this talk has been published in the scientific literature.

Page 3: Cyber-Security: Some Thoughts V.S. Subrahmanian Center for Digital International Government Computer Science Dept. & UMIACS University of Maryland vs@cs.umd.edu

Talk Outline

• Terminology– Vulnerabilities– Exploits

• Technology– Monitoring networks for known attacks– Monitoring networks for unknown attacks– Social media (Sybil, sockpuppet) attacks

3V.S. Subrahmanian, Geo-Intelligence India 2013

Page 4: Cyber-Security: Some Thoughts V.S. Subrahmanian Center for Digital International Government Computer Science Dept. & UMIACS University of Maryland vs@cs.umd.edu

Terminology• Vulnerability: Feature of software

that can be used by an attacker – usually in a way unanticipated by the software designer – to attack a system. US National Vulnerability Database (nvd.nist.gov) contains over 56K vulnerabilities together with suggested patches.

• Exploit – a piece of code that takes advantage of a vulnerability to carry out an attack. Databases of exploits also exist, e.g. some sites claim over 22K exploits in their database

4V.S. Subrahmanian, Geo-Intelligence India 2013

Page 5: Cyber-Security: Some Thoughts V.S. Subrahmanian Center for Digital International Government Computer Science Dept. & UMIACS University of Maryland vs@cs.umd.edu

The Cyber Trade: The Scary Part

• “Exploits as a service” is now cheap and efficient for attackers [criminals, nation states]

• Exploits (or parts thereof) for different kinds of attacks can be bought for a very small price compared to the prices for artifacts used in kinetic attacks

5V.S. Subrahmanian, Geo-Intelligence India 2013

Page 6: Cyber-Security: Some Thoughts V.S. Subrahmanian Center for Digital International Government Computer Science Dept. & UMIACS University of Maryland vs@cs.umd.edu

- DatabaseReal-time

ObservationData

- Network- Resource

use- and

more

ALEActivity

Learning Engine

Known Activities -

Bad

Known Activities -

Good

PASSParallel Activity Search

System

Parallel Unexplained Activity Detection

Security AnalystInterface

tMAGICActivity Detection Engine

Unexplained ActivityDetection Engine

OFFLINE ONLINE

V.S. Subrahmanian, Geo-Intelligence India 2013 6

Page 7: Cyber-Security: Some Thoughts V.S. Subrahmanian Center for Digital International Government Computer Science Dept. & UMIACS University of Maryland vs@cs.umd.edu

Attack Graphs

7

Attack Graphs

•C’s are conditions•V’s are vulnerabilities•C4 and C5 are both needed to exploit vulnerability V4.•Vulnerability V4 causes condition C6.

Temporal Attack Graphs

•Only worry about vulnerabilities.•Figure on left says vulnerability V4 can be exploited if V3 and either V1 or V2 can be exploited.•Probabilistic versions exist.

Databases of vulnerabilities and attack graphs are available

V.S. Subrahmanian, Geo-Intelligence India 2013

Page 8: Cyber-Security: Some Thoughts V.S. Subrahmanian Center for Digital International Government Computer Science Dept. & UMIACS University of Maryland vs@cs.umd.edu

Attack Graphs Can be Merged

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Merging a large set of attack graphs means that you can solve a task once to search for multiple

occurrences within a single stream of transactional data !

V.S. Subrahmanian, Geo-Intelligence India 2013

Page 9: Cyber-Security: Some Thoughts V.S. Subrahmanian Center for Digital International Government Computer Science Dept. & UMIACS University of Maryland vs@cs.umd.edu

Attack Graphs

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Attack graphs can be built semi-automatically to monitor live network traffic. But two key problems need to be solved:

•How to monitor huge volumes of traffic ?•How to identify unexpected activities that you did not know about in the past and add them to your activity knowledge base ?• Activities are both bad (attacks) and good (innocuous). • Need models of both good and bad activities in order

to identify what is abnormal or unexplained.

V.S. Subrahmanian, Geo-Intelligence India 2013

Page 10: Cyber-Security: Some Thoughts V.S. Subrahmanian Center for Digital International Government Computer Science Dept. & UMIACS University of Maryland vs@cs.umd.edu

Finding Known ActivitiesPASS Parallel Activity Search System

• Developed algorithm to identify all instances of a [known] activity in an observation stream that have at least a certain probability.

• Demonstrated the ability to automatically detect activities in a stream of observation data arriving at 500K+ observations per second on a 8-node cloud.

• Demonstrated the ability to identify unexplained behavior in observation streams with precision over 80% and recall over 70%.

10V.S. Subrahmanian, Geo-Intelligence India 2013

Page 11: Cyber-Security: Some Thoughts V.S. Subrahmanian Center for Digital International Government Computer Science Dept. & UMIACS University of Maryland vs@cs.umd.edu

Unexplained Activities• How can we look for

activities that have never been anticipated?

• Answer– Set up a framework to

continuously track unexplained activities;

– Present unexplained activities quickly to a security analyst who• Flags it as a bad activity or• Flags it as an OK activity

– Update repertoire of known activity models with this security analyst feedback.

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• What is an unexplained activity?

• It’s a sequence (not necessarily contiguous) of events that are inconsistent with all known activity models (good or bad)

• Unexplained does not necessarily mean bad.

• Also a lot of work on statistical anomaly detection [not in my lab].

V.S. Subrahmanian, Geo-Intelligence India 2013

Page 12: Cyber-Security: Some Thoughts V.S. Subrahmanian Center for Digital International Government Computer Science Dept. & UMIACS University of Maryland vs@cs.umd.edu

Example Unexplained Activity

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Page 13: Cyber-Security: Some Thoughts V.S. Subrahmanian Center for Digital International Government Computer Science Dept. & UMIACS University of Maryland vs@cs.umd.edu

Unexplained Activity Detection

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Totally unexplained

Partially unexplained

Tested using network traffic from a university. Wireshark used to capture network traffic; SNORT used for activity models.V.S. Subrahmanian, Geo-

Intelligence India 2013

Page 14: Cyber-Security: Some Thoughts V.S. Subrahmanian Center for Digital International Government Computer Science Dept. & UMIACS University of Maryland vs@cs.umd.edu

Unexplained Activity Detection

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Tested using network traffic from a university. Wireshark used to capture network traffic; SNORT used for activity models.

Looking for more top-K increases runtime

Looking at more worlds

increases runtime

Increasing reduces run-

time

Increasing sequence length reduces runtime

V.S. Subrahmanian, Geo-Intelligence India 2013

Page 15: Cyber-Security: Some Thoughts V.S. Subrahmanian Center for Digital International Government Computer Science Dept. & UMIACS University of Maryland vs@cs.umd.edu

An Election Social Media Attack

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Page 16: Cyber-Security: Some Thoughts V.S. Subrahmanian Center for Digital International Government Computer Science Dept. & UMIACS University of Maryland vs@cs.umd.edu

Election Social Media Attack

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Page 17: Cyber-Security: Some Thoughts V.S. Subrahmanian Center for Digital International Government Computer Science Dept. & UMIACS University of Maryland vs@cs.umd.edu

Social Media Attacks

• A major state-backed threat.• SMAs cause a viral increase in the number of

social media posts in support of a particular cause or position.

• SMAs can destabilize decision making by a country by providing a false picture of support for or against a given position.

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Page 18: Cyber-Security: Some Thoughts V.S. Subrahmanian Center for Digital International Government Computer Science Dept. & UMIACS University of Maryland vs@cs.umd.edu

Other Relevant Work• Algorithms to identify common patterns in huge

networks (1B+ edges)• Ability to update identified patterns in huge

networks as the network changes (540M+ edges)• Algorithms to find a set of K nodes that optimizes

an arbitrary objective function on a network (31M+ edges)

• Algorithms to identify important nodes in attributed, weighted networks

• Learning to cluster malware variants

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Page 19: Cyber-Security: Some Thoughts V.S. Subrahmanian Center for Digital International Government Computer Science Dept. & UMIACS University of Maryland vs@cs.umd.edu

Current Directions

• Learning Activity Models – given that there is some set of low level events that can be detected, can we learn the stochastic temporal automata directly from the data in a semi-supervised manner?

• Parallel Unexplained Activity Detection – can we scale up our current algorithms to identify unexplained activities in high throughput streams?

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Page 20: Cyber-Security: Some Thoughts V.S. Subrahmanian Center for Digital International Government Computer Science Dept. & UMIACS University of Maryland vs@cs.umd.edu

Contact Information

V.S. SubrahmanianDept. of Computer Science & UMIACSUniversity of MarylandCollege Park, MD 20742.Tel: 301-405-6724Email: [email protected]: www.cs.umd.edu/~vs/

20V.S. Subrahmanian, Geo-Intelligence India 2013