cyber resilience simon onyons financial stability – resilience team 1

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Cyber Resilience Simon Onyons Financial Stability – Resilience Team 1

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Page 1: Cyber Resilience Simon Onyons Financial Stability – Resilience Team 1

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Cyber Resilience

Simon OnyonsFinancial Stability – Resilience Team

Page 2: Cyber Resilience Simon Onyons Financial Stability – Resilience Team 1

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What is Cyber Risk?

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The risk of attacks carried out on firms’ IT infrastructure to defraud or disrupt their operations through the exploitation of weakness and/or the transmission of viruses and malicious software (MalWare) via the internet or e-mails.

The majority of attacks target the external-facing technology infrastructure which makes regulated entities internet-facing IT systems at higher risk of cyber attacks. There remains a significant risk from the ‘insider attack’.

The FCA recognise that the growing cyber risk presents a significant threat to our strategic and operational objectives and we are working to leverage the work being undertaken in response to a recommendation from the UK Financial Policy Committee to discharge our own regulatory obligations.

What are cyber risks?

Background

Page 3: Cyber Resilience Simon Onyons Financial Stability – Resilience Team 1

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Conduct Regulation and Cyber

• Consumer Impact – Service Availability

• Market Integrity - Data corruption or manipulation

• Competition - Theft of data; M&A, new products, personal data

Page 4: Cyber Resilience Simon Onyons Financial Stability – Resilience Team 1

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Cyber – Coordination with other bodies

Cabinet Office

Her Majesty's Treasury (HMT)

PRA

FPC(Bank of England Committee)

BoE FCA

CPNI

MIDRecommendations Recommendations

Recommendations

Government cyber initiatives: UK Cyber Strategy, BIS 10 Steps to Cyber Security, Cyber Essentials Scheme

GCHQBIS

CERT UK

UK Government and Cyber Agencies

PSR

National Crime Agency

CMORG*Directors Sub

Group

Resilience and Cyber Sub Groups* Cross Markets Operational Resilience Group

Page 5: Cyber Resilience Simon Onyons Financial Stability – Resilience Team 1

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UK regulatory cyber work to date

36 in-scope firms identified as the “core of the UK financial system”. Predominantly Critical National Infrastructures including Retail Banking, Investment Banking, Insurance, Exchanges and Clearing Houses

Objectives:

Enhance understanding of finance sector threat Improve the sharing of information Strengthen work to assess the sector’s current resilience to cyber attack Develop plans to test sector resilience

“HM Treasury, working with the relevant Government agencies, the PRA, the Bank’s financial market infrastructure supervisors and the FCA should work with the core UK financial system and

its infrastructure to put in place a programme of work to improve and test resilience to cyber attack.”

Page 6: Cyber Resilience Simon Onyons Financial Stability – Resilience Team 1

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Develop Testing Plans- “CBEST”• Diagnostic tool developed by the Bank of England, FCA and wider industry to

support the FPC’s cyber recommendation

• CBEST is a framework to deliver controlled, bespoke, intelligence-led cyber security tests

• The tests replicate behaviors of threat actors, assessed by Government and commercial intelligence providers as posing a genuine threat to financial institutions

• Requires interaction with the regulators from the outset – it aims to provide a transparent testing and reporting mechanism so that the regulators and regulated can collectively improve their understanding of the threats the system faces and the extent to which the UK financial sector is vulnerable to those threats

• CBEST is VOLUNTARY – not mandated. Currently available only to the 36 firms in scope under the FPC recommendation

Page 7: Cyber Resilience Simon Onyons Financial Stability – Resilience Team 1

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Develop Testing Plans- “CBEST” Leverage official sector and commercial intelligence on most likely

systemic threats e.g. state sponsored

Going beyond the BIS 10 steps to include sophisticated and persistent attack types

Testing of cyber resilience in key firms and FMIs

Will provide a holistic assessment of people, process and technology

Will mimic tactics, techniques and procedures of threat actors identified through intelligence gathering

Deliver a sector-wide assessment of resilience (and vulnerability) in the face of these threats

Page 8: Cyber Resilience Simon Onyons Financial Stability – Resilience Team 1

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Understanding the ThreatA

ttack C

om

ple

xit

y

Low

Med

ium

Hig

hV

ery

hig

h

0-day

Espionage / Organised

Crime / Hacktivists

Organised Crime

Data deletion Data corruption System unavailability

Network unavailabilit

y

Nation state /

Sponsored actor

Data exfiltration & Espionage

Nation state /

Espionage

Data exfiltrationApplication layer volumetric attacks

Volumetric network attacks

Online banking fraud

Website defacement

Corporate staff information and PC compromise

Defence maturityImpacts

1

1 Operational disruption

2 Loss of data

3Lower confidence in accuracy of information

4 Loss of IP

5 Market sensitive data

6 Disclosure of customer data

7 Web services unavailable

8 Financial loss

9 Brand impact

Disclosed staff credentials and data theft

1

2

1 3

1

4 5

6

7

7

8 9

9

10

Neg-day

BIS 10 Steps

FPC in scope

Out-of-scope e.g. acts of war

Nation state /

Hacktivists

Organised Crime /

Hacktivists

Hacktivists

Nation state /

Hacktivists

Customer impact

System impact

Nation state /

Sponsored actor

10

Sou

rce:

Ban

k of

En

gla

nd

Page 9: Cyber Resilience Simon Onyons Financial Stability – Resilience Team 1

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What have UK Authorities found?High level findings, following a comprehensive thematic assessment by the FCA and the Bank of England, are:

• Cyber undermines existing operational resilience arrangements.

• Testing of cyber for people, processes and technology is still immature.

• Business Engagement and Strategic Planning & influencing for cyber varies widely.

• Firm scale and resources impact effective risk management.

Page 10: Cyber Resilience Simon Onyons Financial Stability – Resilience Team 1

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What have UK Authorities found?

• Articulating target states of cyber maturity is a challenge.

• Cyber investment is technology centric.

• There is generally a low capability to effectively detect cyber attacks and identify threats.

• Oversight of third party suppliers and the supply-chain is immature.

• Challenge from the third line of defence is limited.

Page 11: Cyber Resilience Simon Onyons Financial Stability – Resilience Team 1

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What do the UK regulators want to see?

Cyber Governance arrangements (Mission, Vision, Strategy, Leadership)

Understanding of dependence on technology systems and communication networks

Identification, assessment and mitigation of relevant cyber-security risks

Threat intelligence capabilities

Cyber-security incident management capabilities

Resilience measures to ensure availability of critical processes

Measures to prevent, detect and minimise social engineering attacks

Independent assurance to assess adequacy of cyber-security measures

LEAD IDENTIFY PROTECT DETECT RESPOND RECOVER LEARN