cvt thrust area four ( )
TRANSCRIPT
Detection of Undeclared Activities and Inaccessible Facilities:Monitoring, Situation Awareness,
and Forensics
Dr. Milton A. GarcésInfrasound Laboratory, University of Hawaii, Manoa
CVT Thrust Area Four ( )
2014 NNSA RoadmapGround-‐based Nuclear Detonation Detection
DOE/NNSA/NA-‐22/GNDD-‐Roadmap-‐2014
Challenges and Gaps
GAPS & CHALLENGES
• Detect and identify small-‐yield nuclear explosions • Uncertainty management in source identification• Data collection under Additional Protocol• Improved tools for site inspections
CVT Thrust Area
Undeclared Activities and Facilities
Comprehensive Nuclear-‐Test-‐Ban Treaty (CTBT)Treaty on the Non-‐Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
Global NetworkInternational Monitoring System Stations: All
Global NetworkInternational Monitoring System Stations: Seismic
Global NetworkInternational Monitoring System Stations: Infrasound
Global NetworkInternational Monitoring System Stations: Radionuclide
Detect, Analyze, ModelIn order of signal speed
SeismologyPaul Richards, FY2015 T4 Lead: Thank you!Columbia University: [email protected] Garces, FY2016 T4 LeadUniversity of Hawaii: [email protected]: 1.808.327.6206, Cell: 1.808.960.6393Radionuclide Atmospheric TransportJohn Lee, University of Michigan: [email protected] Farsoni, Oregon State University: [email protected] of Fuel Cycle MonitoringPaul Wilson and Meghan McGarry, University of Wisconsin [email protected], [email protected]
Proposed FY2016• Identify possible gaps and challenges in CTBT and NPT
monitoring and verification• Concentrate on Monitoring and Forensics, including attribution • Expedite discrimination between natural, chemical, and nuclear
explosions• T4 integration with speed-‐of-‐light technologies, such as particle
detectors and imagers • Understand rules and boundaries to data sources and
monitoring agencies, and repercussions of breaches in conduct• Establish trusted routes to access IMS/other available data• Establish trusted information pathways to/from responsible
agencies• Build technology and skills to addresses real-‐world national and
international security challenges
Evaluation of seismic events in North Korea Paul Richards, Columbia UniversityPerformed FY2015
• Seismic reanalysis of event on 12 May 2010 near North Korean test site improved source identification.
• Initiated new approach to routinely locating large numbers of earthquakes in the oceans
Explosion population (12 events, chemical and nuclear), shown as triangles, earthquake population (12 events) shown as circles. May 12 event shown as a green square near the earthquake population.
Seismic SignaturesPaul Richards and Mike Howe, Columbia UniversityProjected FY2016
• Discuss and debate 12 May 2010 reanalysis • Discuss impact of being able to identify small events• Continue data rescue efforts• Uncertainty reduction in source locations through surface
wave cross-‐correlations
Infrasonic SignaturesMilton Garces, University of HawaiiPerformed FY2015
• Next-‐generation sensor development, testing, and evaluation.• Enhance global detection capability
Infrasonic Signatures M. Garces, A. Christe, J. Schnurr, University of HawaiiUbiquitous Sensors, Machine Learning, Data Mining
REDVOXInfrasound recorder in Apple App Store
In progress!
Infrasonic SignaturesM. Garces, A. Christe, J. Schnurr, University of Hawaii Performed FY2015
• Source and signature characterizations (CTBT, NPT)• Collaborations with INL, SNL, LLNL, CTBTO and its signatories• Event re-‐evaluation and forensics: US NDC, IMS, and IRIS data• Improve minimum detectable yield and energy resolution
Tianjin Harbor Explosion, 12 August 2015, ~15:34 UTC
Infrasonic Signatures M. Garces, A. Christe, J. Schnurr, University of HawaiiForensic Studies: Supplementary Networks
Some infrasound stations in the Chinese network (Yichun Yang et al., 2014)
• Initiated atmospheric transport modeling (ATM) with the FLEXPART and HYSPLIT codes
• Studied Bayesian data assimilation methods with synthetic data
• Obtained access to Fukushima radionuclide data for 11 U.S. IMS stations
HYSPLIT synthetic 2-‐source inverse problem
Radionuclide Atmospheric TransportJohn Lee, Matthew Krupcale, Fariz Abdul Rahman,University of MichiganPaul Eslinger, Pacific Northwest National LaboratoryPerformed FY2015
• Benchmark the HYSPLIT and FLEXPART codes• Reconstruct radiological source using inverse ATM with
radionuclide data• Characterize uncertainties in ATM and source reconstruction• Develop systematic ATM methods
US IMS particulate radionuclide stations
Radionuclide Atmospheric TransportJohn Lee, Matthew Krupcale, University of MichiganProjected FY2016
RadioxenonDetection via Beta-‐Gamma Coincidence Abi Farsoni, Oregon State UniversityPerformed FY2015
• Two-‐element cadmium zinc telluride (TECZT) detectors were designed, built, and tested by injecting radioactive 135Xe gas into the gas cell.
• Preliminary measurement agree with models and show improved energy resolution
• Reduce noise level (trigger threshold) below 20 keV• Test with other xenon radioisotopes (131mXe, 133mXe, and 133Xe)• Calculate minimum detectable xenon concentration • Test and troubleshoot 8-‐channel digital pulse processor
RadioxenonDetection via Beta-‐Gamma Coincidence Abi Farsoni, Oregon State UniversityProjected FY2016
Preliminary behavioral models of fissile material diversion
Signal processing techniques for anomaly detection (with T2)
Spatiotemporal models for fuel cycle metrics
Fuel Cycle Simulation as Virtual CVT TestbedPaul Wilson and Meghan McGarry, U. of Wisconsin Performed FY2015
T3: (TBD) -‐ Variability in radionuclide source terms from declared facilities
T2: Hero-‐ Anomaly detection with multi-‐
modal data from fuel cycle facilities
• Interdisciplinary collaborations• Development of socio-‐behavior models for agents based on historical records• Comparison of signatures and signals from national and multinational facilities
Fuel Cycle Simulation as Virtual CVT TestbedPaul Wilson and Meghan McGarry, U. of Wisconsin Projected FY2016
Proposed FY2016• Identify possible gaps and challenges in CTBT and NPT
monitoring and verification• Concentrate on Monitoring and Forensics, including attribution • Expedite discrimination between natural, chemical, and nuclear
explosions• T4 integration with speed-‐of-‐light technologies, such as particle
detectors and imagers • Understand rules and boundaries to data sources and
monitoring agencies, and repercussions of breaches in conduct• Establish trusted routes to access IMS/other available data• Establish trusted information pathways to/from responsible
agencies• Build technology and skills to addresses real-‐world national and
international security challenges