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CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015

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Page 1: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

CS151Complexity Theory

Lecture 14

May 13, 2015

Page 2: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

May 13, 2015 2

Arthur-Merlin Games

• IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private– necessary feature?– GNI protocol breaks without it

• Arthur-Merlin game: interactive protocol in which coin-flips are public– Arthur (verifier) may as well just send results

of coin-flips and ask Merlin (prover) to perform any computation Arthur would have done

Page 3: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

May 13, 2015 3

Arthur-Merlin Games

• Clearly Arthur-Merlin IP– “private coins are at least as powerful as

public coins”

• Proof that IP = PSPACE actually showsPSPACE Arthur-Merlin IP PSPACE – “public coins are at least as powerful as

private coins” !

Page 4: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

May 13, 2015 4

Arthur-Merlin Games

• Delimiting # of rounds:– AM[k] = Arthur-Merlin game with k rounds,

Arthur (verifier) goes first– MA[k] = Arthur-Merlin game with k rounds,

Merlin (prover) goes first

Theorem: AM[k] (MA[k]) equals AM[k] (MA[k]) with perfect completeness.– i.e., x L implies accept with probability 1– proof on problem set

Page 5: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

May 13, 2015 5

Arthur-Merlin Games

Theorem: for all constant k 2

AM[k] = AM[2].

• Proof:– we show MA[2] AM[2]– implies can move all of Arthur’s messages to

beginning of interaction:

AMAMAM…AM = AAMMAM…AM

… = AAA…AMMM…M

Page 6: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

May 13, 2015 6

Arthur-Merlin Games

• Proof (continued):– given L MA[2]

x L 9m Prr[(x, m, r) R] = 1

Prr[ 9m (x, m, r) R] = 1

x L 8m Prr[(x, m, r) R] ε

Prr[ 9m (x, m, r) R] 2|m|ε

– by repeating t times with independent random strings r, can make error ε < 2-t

– set t = m+1 to get 2|m|ε < ½.

order reversed

Page 7: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

May 13, 2015 7

MA and AM

• Two important classes:– MA = MA[2]– AM = AM[2]

• definitions without reference to interaction:– L MA iff 9 poly-time language R

x L 9 m Prr[(x, m, r) R] = 1

x L 8 m Prr[(x, m, r) R] ½

– L AM iff 9 poly-time language R

x L Prr[ 9 m (x, m, r) R] = 1

x L Prr[ 9 m (x, m, r) R] ½

Page 8: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

May 13, 2015 8

MA and AM

L AM iff 9 poly-time language R

x L Prr[ 9 m (x, m, r) R] = 1

x L Prr[ 9 m (x, m, r) R] ½

• Relation to other complexity classes:– both contain NP (can elect to not use randomness)

– both contained in ∏2. L ∏2 iff 9 R P for which:

x L Prr[ 9 m (x, m, r) R] = 1

x L Prr[ 9 m (x, m, r) R] < 1

– so clear that AM ∏2

– know that MA AM

Page 9: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

May 13, 2015 9

MA and AM

P

NP

coNP

Σ2Π2

AM coAM

MA coMA

Page 10: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

May 13, 2015 10

MA and AM

Theorem: coNP AM PH = AM.• Proof:

– suffices to show Σ2 AM (and use AM Π2)

– L Σ2 iff 9 poly-time language R

x L 9 y 8 z (x, y, z) R

x L 8 y 9 z (x, y, z) R– Merlin sends y– 1 AM exchange decides coNP query: 8z (x, y, z)R ?– 3 rounds; in AM

Page 11: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

May 13, 2015 11

MA and AM

• We know Arthur-Merlin = IP.– “public coins = private coins”

Theorem (GS): IP[k] AM[O(k)]– stronger result– implies for all constant k 2,

IP[k] = AM[O(k)] = AM[2]

• So, GNI IP[2] = AM

Page 12: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

May 13, 2015 12

Back to Graph Isomorphism

• The payoff:– not known if GI is NP-complete.– previous Theorems:

if GI is NP-complete then PH = AM– unlikely!

– Proof: GI NP-complete GNI coNP-complete coNP AM PH = AM

Page 13: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

Derandomization revisited

• L MA iff 9 poly-time language Rx L 9 m Prr[(x, m, r) R] = 1

x L 8 m Prr[(x, m, r) R] ½

• Recall PRGs:

– for all circuits C of size at most s:

|Pry[C(y) = 1] – Prz[C(G(z)) = 1]| ≤ εMay 13, 2015 13

NP

AM

MA

seed output stringGt bits u bits

Page 14: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

Using PRGs for MA

• L MA iff 9 poly-time language Rx L 9 m Prr[(x, m, r) R] = 1

x L 8 m Prr[(x, m, r) R] ½

• produce poly-size circuit C such thatC(x, m, r) = 1 , (x,m,r) 2 R

• for each x, m can hardwire to get Cx,m

9 m Pry[Cx,m(y) = 1] = 1 (“yes”)

8 m Pry[Cx,m(y) = 1] ≤ 1/2 (“no”)

May 13, 2015 14

Page 15: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

Using PRGs for MA

• can compute Prz[Cx,m(G(z)) = 1] exactly

– evaluate Cx(G(z)) on every seed z 0,1t

– running time (O(|Cx,m|)+(time for G))2t

x L 9 m [Prz[Cx,m(G(z)) = 1] = 1]

x L 8 m [Prz[Cx,m(G(z)) = 1] ½ + ²]– L 2 NP if PRG with t = O(log n), ² < 1/4

Theorem: E requires exponential size circuits MA = NP.

May 13, 2015 15

poly(n)

poly-time

Page 16: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

May 13, 2015 16

MA and AM

P

NP

coNP

Σ2Π2

AM coAM

MA coMA

(under a hardness assumption)

Page 17: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

May 13, 2015 17

MA and AM

P

NP

coNP

Σ2Π2

AM coAM

MA = = coMA

(under a hardness assumption)

What about AM, coAM?

Page 18: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

May 13, 2015 18

Derandomization revisited

Theorem (IW, STV): If E contains functions that require size 2Ω(n) circuits, then E contains functions that are 2Ω(n) -unapproximable by circuits.

Theorem (NW): if E contains 2Ω(n)-unapp-roximable functions there are poly-time PRGs fooling poly(n)-size circuits, with seed length t = O(log n), and error ² < 1/4.

Page 19: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

May 13, 2015 19

Oracle circuits

• A-oracle circuit C– also allow “A-oracle gates”

• circuit C– directed acyclic graph

– nodes: AND (); OR (); NOT (); variables xi

x1 x2

x3 … xn

A

1 iff x 2 A

x

Page 20: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

May 13, 2015 20

Relativized versions

Theorem: If E contains functions that require size 2Ω(n) A-oracle circuits, then E contains functions that are 2Ω(n) -unapproximable by A-oracle circuits.

• Recall proof:– encode truth table to get hard function– if approximable by s(n)-size circuits, then use

those circuits to compute original function by size s(n)-size circuits. Contradiction.

Page 21: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

May 13, 2015 21

Relativized versions

0 1 0 01 0 1 0m:

0 1 0 01 0 1 0Enc(m):

0 00 1 0

0 1 1 00 0 1 0R: 0 10 0 0

DC

f:0,1log k 0,1

f ’:0,1log n 0,1

small A-oracle circuit C

approximating f’

decoding procedure

i 2 0,1log k

small A-oracle circuit computing f exactly

f(i)

Page 22: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

May 13, 2015 22

Relativized versions

Theorem: if E contains 2Ω(n)-unapp-roximable fns., there are poly-time PRGs fooling poly(n)-size A-oracle circuits, with seed length t = O(log n), and error ² < 1/4.

• Recall proof:– PRG from hard function on O(log n) bits– if doesn’t fool s-size circuits, then use those

circuits to compute hard function by size s¢n±-size circuits. Contradiction.

Page 23: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

Relativized versions

May 13, 2015 23

Gn(y)=flog n(y|S1)flog n(y|S2

)…flog n(y|Sm)

010100101111101010111001010

flog n:

– doesn’t fool A-oracle circuit of size s:

|Prx[C(x) = 1] – Pry[C( Gn(y) ) = 1]| > ε

– implies A-oracle circuit P of size s’ = s + O(m):

Pry[P(Gn(y)1…i-1) = Gn(y)i] > ½ + ε/m

Page 24: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

Relativized versions

May 13, 2015

Gn(y)=flog n(y|S1)flog n(y|S2

)…flog n(y|Sm)

010100101111101010111001010

flog n:

P

output flog n(y ’)

hardwired tables

y’

A-oracle circuit approximating f

24

Page 25: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

Using PRGs for AM

• L AM iff 9 poly-time language Rx L Prr[ 9 m (x, m, r) R] = 1

x L Prr[ 9 m (x, m, r) R] ½

• produce poly-size SAT-oracle circuit C such that

C(x, r) = 1 , 9 m (x,m,r) 2 R

• for each x, can hardwire to get Cx

Pry[Cx(y) = 1] = 1(“yes”)

Pry[Cx(y) = 1] ≤ ½ (“no”)May 13, 2015 25

1 SAT query, accepts iff answer is “yes”

Page 26: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

Using PRGs for AM

x L [Prz[Cx(G(z)) = 1] = 1]

x L [Prz[Cx(G(z)) = 1] ½ + ²]

• Cx makes a single SAT query, accepts iff answer is “yes”

• if G is a PRG with t = O(log n), ² < ¼, can check in NP: – does Cx(G(z)) = 1 for all z?

May 13, 2015 26

Page 27: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

May 13, 2015 27

Relativized versions

Theorem: If E contains functions that require size 2Ω(n) A-oracle circuits, then E contains functions that are 2Ω(n) -unapproximable by A-oracle circuits.

Theorem: if E contains 2Ω(n)-unapproximable functions there are PRGs fooling poly(n)-size A-oracle circuits, with seed length t = O(log n), and error ² < ½.

Theorem: E requires exponential size SAT-oracle circuits AM = NP.

Page 28: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

May 13, 2015 28

MA and AM

P

NP

coNP

Σ2Π2

MA = = coMA

(under a hardness assumption)

coAM

AM

Page 29: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

May 13, 2015 29

MA and AM

P

NP

coNP

Σ2Π2

MA = = coMA

(under a hardness assumption)

= coAM

AM =

Page 30: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

May 13, 2015 30

New topic(s)

Optimization problems,

Approximation Algorithms,

and

Probabilistically Checkable Proofs

Page 31: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

May 13, 2015 31

Optimization Problems

• many hard problems (especially NP-hard) are optimization problems– e.g. find shortest TSP tour– e.g. find smallest vertex cover – e.g. find largest clique

– may be minimization or maximization problem– “opt” = value of optimal solution

Page 32: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

May 13, 2015 32

Approximation Algorithms

• often happy with approximately optimal solution– warning: lots of heuristics– we want approximation algorithm with guaranteed

approximation ratio of r– meaning: on every input x, output is guaranteed to

have value

at most r*opt for minimization

at least opt/r for maximization

Page 33: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

May 13, 2015 33

Approximation Algorithms

• Example approximation algorithm:– Recall:

Vertex Cover (VC): given a graph G, what is the smallest subset of vertices that touch every edge?

– NP-complete

Page 34: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

May 13, 2015 34

Approximation Algorithms

• Approximation algorithm for VC:– pick an edge (x, y), add vertices x and y to VC– discard edges incident to x or y; repeat.

• Claim: approximation ratio is 2.

• Proof: – an optimal VC must include at least one

endpoint of each edge considered – therefore 2*opt actual

Page 35: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

May 13, 2015 35

Approximation Algorithms

• diverse array of ratios achievable

• some examples:– (min) Vertex Cover: 2 – MAX-3-SAT (find assignment satisfying

largest # clauses): 8/7 – (min) Set Cover: ln n– (max) Clique: n/log2n– (max) Knapsack: (1 + ε) for any ε > 0

Page 36: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

May 13, 2015 36

Approximation Algorithms

(max) Knapsack: (1 + ε) for any ε > 0

• called Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme (PTAS)– algorithm runs in poly time for every fixed ε>0– poor dependence on ε allowed

• If all NP optimization problems had a PTAS, almost like P = NP (!)

Page 37: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

May 13, 2015 37

Approximation Algorithms

• A job for complexity: How to explain failure to do better than ratios on previous slide?– just like: how to explain failure to find poly-

time algorithm for SAT...– first guess: probably NP-hard– what is needed to show this?

• “gap-producing” reduction from NP-complete problem L1 to L2

Page 38: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

May 13, 2015 38

Approximation Algorithms

• “gap-producing” reduction from NP-complete problem L1 to L2

no

yesL1

L2 (min. problem)

f optk

rk

Page 39: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

May 13, 2015 39

Gap producing reductions

• r-gap-producing reduction:– f computable in poly time

– x L1 opt(f(x)) k

– x L1 opt(f(x)) > rk

– for max. problems use “ k” and “< k/r”

• Note: target problem is not a language– promise problem (yes no not all strings)– “promise”: instances always from (yes no)

Page 40: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

May 13, 2015 40

Gap producing reductions

• Main purpose:– r-approximation algorithm for L2 distinguishes

between f(yes) and f(no); can use to decide L1

– “NP-hard to approximate to within r”

no

yes

L1

fk

rk yesno

L1

fk/r

k

L2 (min.) L2 (max.)yes

no yes

no

Page 41: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

May 13, 2015 41

Gap preserving reductions

• gap-producing reduction difficult (more later)

• but gap-preserving reductions easier

fk

rk

k’

r’k’

Warning: many

reductions not gap-preserving

yes

no

yes

no

L1 (min.)L2 (min.)

Page 42: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

May 13, 2015 42

Gap preserving reductions

• Example gap-preserving reduction:– reduce MAX-k-SAT with gap ε – to MAX-3-SAT with gap ε’ – “MAX-k-SAT is NP-hard to approx. within ε

MAX-3-SAT is NP-hard to approx. within ε’ ”

• MAXSNP (PY) – a class of problems reducible to each other in this way– PTAS for MAXSNP-complete problem iff

PTAS for all problems in MAXSNP

constants

Page 43: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

May 13, 2015 43

MAX-k-SAT

• Missing link: first gap-producing reduction – history’s guide

it should have something to do with SAT

• Definition: MAX-k-SAT with gap ε– instance: k-CNF φ– YES: some assignment satisfies all clauses– NO: no assignment satisfies more than (1 – ε)

fraction of clauses

Page 44: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

May 13, 2015 44

Proof systems viewpoint

• k-SAT NP-hard for any language L NP proof system of form:– given x, compute reduction to k-SAT: x

– expected proof is satisfying assignment for x

– verifier picks random clause (“local test”) and checks that it is satisfied by the assignment

x L Pr[verifier accepts] = 1

x L Pr[verifier accepts] < 1

Page 45: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

May 13, 2015 45

Proof systems viewpoint

• MAX-k-SAT with gap ε NP-hard for any language L NP proof system of form:– given x, compute reduction to MAX-k-SAT: x

– expected proof is satisfying assignment for x

– verifier picks random clause (“local test”) and checks that it is satisfied by the assignment

x L Pr[verifier accepts] = 1x L Pr[verifier accepts] ≤ (1 – ε)

– can repeat O(1/ε) times for error < ½

Page 46: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

May 13, 2015 46

Proof systems viewpoint

• can think of reduction showing k-SAT NP-hard as designing a proof system for NP in which:– verifier only performs local tests

• can think of reduction showing MAX-k-SAT with gap ε NP-hard as designing a proof system for NP in which:– verifier only performs local tests– invalidity of proof* evident all over: “holographic proof”

and an fraction of tests notice such invalidity

Page 47: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

May 13, 2015 47

PCP

• Probabilistically Checkable Proof (PCP) permits novel way of verifying proof:– pick random local test – query proof in specified k locations– accept iff passes test

• fancy name for a NP-hardness reduction

Page 48: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

May 13, 2015 48

PCP

• PCP[r(n),q(n)]: set of languages L with p.p.t. verifier V that has (r, q)-restricted access to a string “proof”– V tosses O(r(n)) coins – V accesses proof in O(q(n)) locations – (completeness) x L proof such that

Pr[V(x, proof) accepts] = 1– (soundness) x L proof*

Pr[V(x, proof*) accepts] ½

Page 49: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

May 13, 2015 49

PCP

• Two observations:– PCP[1, poly n] = NP

proof?

– PCP[log n, 1] NPproof?

The PCP Theorem (AS, ALMSS):

PCP[log n, 1] = NP.

Page 50: CS151 Complexity Theory Lecture 14 May 13, 2015. 2 Arthur-Merlin Games IP permits verifier to keep coin-flips private –necessary feature? –GNI protocol

May 13, 2015 50

PCP

Corollary: MAX-k-SAT is NP-hard to approximate to within some constant .– using PCP[log n, 1] protocol for, say, VC – enumerate all 2O(log n) = poly(n) sets of queries– construct a k-CNF φi for verifier’s test on each

• note: k-CNF since function on only k bits

– “YES” VC instance all clauses satisfiable– “NO” VC instance every assignment fails to

satisfy at least ½ of the φi fails to satisfy an

= (½)2-k fraction of clauses.