[crowood press] [aviation series] supermarine seafire

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Peter . mith

Ken Delve

Kev Darling

Malcolm L. Hill

Kev Darling

Martin W. Bowman

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J rry Scutts

Barry Jones

Kev Darling

Martin W. Bowman

Peter C. mith

Kev Darling

Martin Bowman

Barry Jone

Scon Thomp on

Martin W. Bowman

Ron Mackay

Martin W. Bowman

Jerry cutts

teve Pace

David Baker

Ray ang r

Duncan Curtis

Peter E. Davi

Peter C. Smith

Malcolm Hill

Barry Jones

Supermarine•

Kev Darling

The Crowood Press

First published in 200 byThe Crowood Press LtdRamsbury, MarlboroughWiltshire 2HR

ww\v.crowood.com

© Kev Darling 20

All rights reserveu. 0 part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by anymeans, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage andretrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication DataA catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

ISBN 978 I 86126 990 4

Contents

Introduction 6

1 HEARTS OF OAK 7

2 SEAFIRE HERITAGE 17

3 SHIPBOARD SPITFIRES 28

4 INTO ACTION 40

5 ANATOMY OF THE SEAFIRE 57

6 FLYING THE SEAFIRE 84

7 GRIFFON POWER 100

8 AGAINST THE RISING SUN 117

9 ONE MORE WAR 137

Appendices

I

II

III

IV

V

Seafire Production and Contracts

Fleet Air Arm Seafire Units

Seafires Sold Overseas

Seafire Technical Details

Technical Details of Royal Navy Aircraft Carriers

152

154

161

165

167

Typeset by Florence Production Ltd, Stoodleigh, DevonPrinted and bound in Great Britain by The Cromwell Press Ltd

BibliographyIndex

5

171172

The issue of air power at sea has always beena controversial one. Land-based air forceshave always considered themselves morethan capable of defending the fleet, yet seabased air power has often proved betterplaced to do o.

It is, therefore, hardly surprising that theemergence of the Fleet Air Arm as a viablefighting force was not a straight-forwardprocess. The merger of the Royal aval AirService with the Royal Flying orps, whichproduced the Royal Air Force in 1918,meant that the newly-created air armpossessed aircraft designed to support navaloperation together with the necessaryexpertise. While the Admiralty was allowedto build aircraft carriers, the control of theaircraft that operated from them remainedwith the Air Ministry. The navy did thebest it could, but a basic lack of understanding of naval air needs meant that theaircraft provided were less than ideal.Eventually, however, the Admiralty gainedcontrol over its air assets and set aboutbringing them up to an improved standard.

Introduction

Having rid itself of various out-datedbiplanes - although not the indispensableSwordfish - the Fleet Air Arm progressedvia a series of monoplane fighters to theSeafire. Often photographed in an undignified pose following one of the flight deckaccidents commonly suffered by the type,the Seafire might not have been the greatestnaval fighter. It was, however, one with animpeccable pedigree. Hurriedly developedfrom the Spitfire, the Sea Spitfire, as it wasinitially known, revealed design defectsthat had not become apparent in the landbased versions.

Short of a compl te redesign of the rearfuselage and tail assembly, however, themanufacturer's best suggestion was to allowthe various separations and wrinkles tocontinue until they reached a set limit, atwhich point extensive repairs would berequired. Yet even with this limitation,Seafire pilots carried out their tasks withdistinction and even managed to shootdown some enemy aircraft in the process.Although the emergence of more capable

6

American naval fighters seemed to mark theend of the Seafire as a front-line fighter, thechoice facing Britain at the end of the warto purchase or return them meant that theSeafire was reinstated. It served during theearly stages of the Korean War but wasreplaced by the Hawker Sea Fury.

urprisingly little has been publishedabout the Seafire and some of that iscontradictory. However, with help fromthe Fleet Air Arm Museum at Yeovilton,Air Britain, Ray Sturtivant, Laurence M.Bean, Will Blunt, Stephen Fox, RickHarding, Chris Michel/Airframe Assemblies (Isle of Wight) Ltd, Mark Russell andPeter Russell Smith, 1 have managed topiece together what I hope is a reasonablehistory of the Seafire and its exploits. As itwas a stalwart of the British Pacific Fleet,the forgotten navy, 1would like to dedicatethis book to all who were involved with theSeafire throughout its service life.

Kev DarlingWales, 2007

John 'Jackie' Fisher, more formally Admiralof the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone, isrecognized as one of the Royal Navy's mostoutstanding leaders. He was also one of themost innovative.

The man behind the DTeadnoughc, the allbig-gun battleship, and the battlecruiseralso replaced steam power with oil fuel andintroduced submarines to the Royal Navyduring his first period as First Sea Lord.Fisher also ordered a large number of aircraft, includ ing the small airships, oftencalled 'blimps', which proved to be of greatvalue for reconnaissanc during the earlypart of World War 1.

In 1910 four Royal Navy officers wereselected for pilot training. One of them, LtC.R. Samson RN, became the first Britishairman to fly an aeroplane from a ship. InJanuary 1912, Samson flew a Short pusherbiplane equipped with buoyancy floats froma steeply-sloped launching ramp mountedon the bow of HMS AfTica moored in theestuary of the River Medway. Actually,Sam on was not the fir t however, thehonour going to an American, Eugene P.Ely. In November 1910 Ely flew a Curtisspusher biplane from a specially-constructedplatform mounted on the forecastle of thecruiser the USS Binningham.

The following May Samson flew a similaraircraft from the pre-Dreadnought battleship HM Hibemia. The launch ramp wasset at a less steep angle compared with thaton the Africa. And this time the ship wasunder way, steaming at 10.Skt (l8.9kmjh).A third series of trials during the summerinvolved the cruiser London. Although useof such ramps was found to be a dead end- the forward guns were rendered unusable- it did pave the way for further experimentsin naval aviation.

The RNAS is Established

While these trials were in progress the armyhad established the Royal Flying Corps(RFC), which comprised military and navalwings and a central flying school. This was

CHAPTER ONE

Hearts of Oak

not an arrangement that found favour withthe Admiralty, however, and on 1July 1914the Naval Wing ceded from the RFC tobecome the Royal Naval Air Service(RNAS). To complement this change, theAdmiralty establi hed an Air Departmentcommanded by Capt Murray euter R

Later that month the RNAS fielded threeairships and seventeen aeroplanes torepresent it at the naval review held atSpithead.

Having established that naval aviationwa a viable proposition, the Admiralty setup operating bases: the Isle of Grain in1912, Calshot, Cromarty, Felixstowe andGreat Yarmouth in 1913. Training anddevelopment continued with the result thatover 100 pilots were available at the beginningof 1914. Work, which would lead to

the development of aircraft carrier, wa alsoin progress. HMS Hermes, originally acruiser, and Ark Royal, which started life asa merchant hip, were among the vesselsconverted to act as seaplane carriers. Moreadventurous was the Cunard liner Carn/Jania, which had a 200ft (60m) woodendeck built over her forecastle. The Faireycompany's new seaplane, also called Campania, was able to take off from it using awheeled trolley placed under the float.

Enter the Aircraft Carrier

Many solutions were tried before the firstaircraft carrier appeared. One of these wasto launch aircraft from lighters towed atspeed by destroyers. This at least got landplane fighters into the air but the aircrafthad to be ditched at the completion of itssortie. The first move that was to lead to apractical aircraft carrier was the conversionof HMS Furious. Originally laid down asone of a class of three battlecruisers, Furiouswas modified during construction with asloping launch platform mounted in thespace intended for the forward 18in gunturret. Beneath it was an enclosed hangarwith space for eight seaplanes, workshopsand stowage for 1,200gal (S,4SSltr) of

7

petrol. Deck landing trials using wheeledaircraft - a Sopwith Pup - were undertakenduring mid-1917. The pilot, Sqn CdrDunning, managed two successful attemptsbut was killed during his third touchdown.As a result, it was recommended that theship be rebuilt to accommodate a landingon deck and a hangar.

Thus modified Furious was released forervice in mid-1918, but the ship was again

rebuilt in 1921 with a full-length deck. Aseparate lower-level nying-off deck wasdeleted in 1932. Two innovations introduced during the conversion included therounding down of the deck's trailing edgeand the first examples of arrestor wires.Furious' two sister ships were also convertedinto aircraft carriers. Courageous andGlorious were commissioned in 1928 and1930 respectively. They were preceded intoservice by the first purpose-designed aircraftcarrier, which had been ordered in 1917 andcommissioned in 1923. Like the earlierseaplane carrier, this ship was also calledHelmes.

Th n came Eagle - converted from aChilean battleship - which was commissioned in 1924. But another Ark Royal,launched in 1937 and commi sioned thefollowing year, was the first large Britishcarrier designed from scratch, predicated onthe basis of experience gained from theconverted vessels and incorporating experience gained from carrier operations in the1920s and 1930s. The Ark featured a flightdeck, which provided much of the ship'sstrength. She was followed by the Illustriousclass, which, with their armoured nightdecks, were to prove their worth in the coming conflict. The name ship was commissioned in 1940 and the last of the class,Victorious, remained in service until 1969.

The Royal Navy had its aircraft carriersbut it had lost control over the aircraftthat operated from them. On 1 April1918 the RFC and RNA merged to formthe Royal Air Force. The R AS' contribution to the marriage was a substantial one.By the end of the war its strength stood at2,949 aircraft and 103 airships operated at

A Sopwith Camel leaves a ship with a very famous name: HMS Ark Royal. It was also one of the few

aircraft carriers to utilize a mizzen mast for longitudinal stability. In 1935 the vessel was re-named Pegasusto enable the original name to be transferred to the new fleet carrier, HMS Ark Royal. FAAM Yeovilton

Confirmation that carrier-borne aviation was feasible was provided by Sqn Cdr E.H. Dunning when he landed a

Sopwith Pup aboard the partly-converted HMS Furious in August 1917. Unfortunately, Edwin Harris Dunning

was killed on 7 August while attempting another landing on Furious in Scapa Flow. FAAM Yeovilton

8

126 bases by 67,000 officers and ratings.This had grown in just four years from anestablishm nt of forty landplanes, thirtyone seaplanes and seven airships mannedby 130 officers and 700 petty officers andratings.

During this period the RNAS had undertaken some brave but perilous missions. On22 September 1914 the Eastchurch, Is Ie ofSheppey-based squadron suppl ied fouraircraft for the first ever air raid on Germanterritory. On Christmas Day, seven aircraftleft the seaplan carrier Engadine, RiveTiaand EmpTess to bomb German hangars atNordholx near Cuxhaven. While manyoperations were undertaken by waterborneaircraft the ervice was to acquire landplanes: Sopwith Camels, Pups and Oneand-a-Half Strutters. In fact, the navy'sfighter strength was now on a par with thatof the RFC.

Fleet Air Arm is Formed

After reaching a peak in 1918, naval airstrength of the newly-formed RAF wasquickly reduced to a singl spotter reconnaissance squadron, a fighter flight and halfof a torpedo squadron. There was also aseaplane flight and a flying boat flight. Thesechanges followed a massive reduction infunding as social programmes were nowgiven priority over military spending. Ittook the next twenty years for thAdmiralty to place both the aircraft andtheir carriers under unified control. Theproce s was completed in May 1939, justin time for another war. In 1921 theAdmiralty managed to secure agreementthat observers would be drawn from thenavy, while in 1923 a Committee oflnquiryrecommended that at last 70 per cent ofpilots should also be of naval origin, holdingdual naval and RAF ranks. In April 1924the title Fleet Air Arm was adopted eventhough it was still officially part of the RAF.The final stage came in 1937 with anannouncement in the House of ommonsthat complete control of the Fleet AirArm was to be transferred to the Admiralty.This was followed by the establishment ofnew land bases at Donibristle, Eastleigh,Evanton, Ford, Hatston, Lee-on-Solent, tMerryn and Worthy Down.

During this period naval aircraft strengthgrew slowly. By January 1924 the inventorywas seventy-eight aircraft in thirteen flights;by October this had become 128 aircraft ineighteen flights. Six years later this had

HEARTSOFOAK

Although it displays a Blackburn Aeroplane Company badge on the fin, this is

actually a Sopwith Baby built under contract. This picture illustrates an

alternative way of carrying fighter aircraft aboard capital ships. Instead of

launching them from flight decks, the resident aircraft could either take-off from a

turret ramp or be craned-off to the sea to take-off under its own power. While the

former was workable it did mean that the gun turret was unusable for its original

purpose. Whichever method was adopted, the pilot had to alight alongside his

ship to be recovered while the vessel was still underway. BBA Collection

Although the Parnell Peto never entered service with the Royal Navy it did represent the dual policy

pursued between the wars of operating wheeled aircraft from carriers and float-equipped aircraft, as seen

here, from capital ships and cruisers. While the Peto performed well enough, the fleet fighter contract went

to the Fairey Flycatcher. BBA Collection

9

HEARTS OF OAK HEARTS F OAK

Most illustrations show the Fairey Flycatcher with floats. but as revealed here by S1286. a

wheeled option was also available. The type remained in service until the early 1930s.

BBA Collection

With the arrival of the Hawker SeaHurricane, the Fleet Air Arm gained its firstsingle eat monoplane fighter able to meetland-based counterpart on equal terms.The conversion involved the tandardHurricane design being reworked to enableit to cope with the rigour of hip-boardoperations. Although it featured an arresterhook, the ea Hurricane wa one of the fewshipboard fighters never to be fitted withfolding wings, although such a conversionhad been con idered. While it was intendedto deploy as many ea Hurricanes a possible on board carriers, the lack of availablefl ight decks meant that another temporarymeasure had to be employed. This wasthe so-called ( atafighter', a Hurricanelaunched from ramps mounted on merchant ships (catapult armed merchantmen

r AM ships) or warships to d fendconvoys from marauding Focke-Wulf Fw200 ondors.

Once launched, however, the aircraftcould not return to the ship and had to ditchin the sea. While the Catafighter represented a u eful temporary expediency, the10 of an aircraft - and the potential 10of an experienced pilot - was Ie welcome.Fortunately for the ea Hurricane pilots,their aircraft were soon fitted with a pair of45gal (2051tr) overload tanks which offeredthe option of returning to friendly territoryif within range. The arrival of e cort carriersfrom the USA meant that a measure ofanti-submarine protection could be given toeach convoy while the ea Hurricane pilotsnow had decks to retum to, albeit small one.

ea Hurricane were deployed on theRu ian convoys where they providedmuch-needed air support. [n a warmerclimate they provided support to the convoys battling their way through to Malta.Although the Sea Hurricane lacked theracy looks of the pitfire/ eafire, the kill,determination and courage of its pilotsen ured that the convoys reached theirdestinations with losses reduced. The eaHurricane remained in front line ervice

with the FAA until mid-1944, having beensuper eded by the Supermarine Seahre.

Lacking sufficient suitable modernfighters, the Royal avy had to turn to thU A. The fir t of the American fighter tojoin the FAA was the Grumman Wildcat,known initially in British ervice as thMartlet. Featuring the short dumpy fu elageand retractable undercarriage that hadcharacterized Grumman' previous biplanefighter, the Martlet was a monoplane withfour wing-mounted 0.50in machine-guns.

valuable service and the type was creditedwith the destruction of 112 enemy aircraftbetween September 1940 and Augu t 1942.This repre ented nearly a third of the FleetAir Arm's total of air-to-air victoriethroughout the war.

Once the Hawker Nimrod was established in service it was common practice to keep the

emerging Fleet Air Arm equipped with naval versions of land-based equivalents. Pictured

here. Gloster Sea Gladiator N5567 displays the camouflage scheme adopted after war

was declared in September 1939. According to legend. three Sea Gladiators. named Faith.

Hope and Charity. played a vital role in the defence of Malta. Will Blunt Collection

considerably slower. The Roc saw limitedservice and the Skua's employment in thefighter role was also limited. But the Fulmarwas able to remain airborne on patrol forlong periods and saw extensive ervice.Despite its deficiencie the Fulmar rendered

Prior to the appearance of monoplanes. the fleet's main aerial workhorse was the Fairey IIiF. Here an

unidentified float-equipped example is launched by a capital ship's catapult. FAAM Yeovilton

kua had been conceived to combine therole of fighter and dive-bomber. With it900hp Bristol Per eu radial engine, it wasalso a two-seater and had a top speed of ju tn5mph (360km/h). Even so, the typescored th Fleet Air Arm's first aerial victoryof World War [[ and sank the cruiserKonigsbel-g during the Norwegian campaign.The Roc was based on the kua and had afour-gun power-operated turret behind thepilot, like the Boulton Paul Defiant but

Although the Admiralty was less than happy to have the Air Ministry controlling its air

assets. their lordships were content to accept the Hawker Nimrod for service aboard

their aircraft carriers. In essence it was a naval version of the land-based Hawker Fury

fighter. which retained the good looks of the entire family. BBA Collection

probably cam in 1940 during the defenceof Malta when a handful of fighters (inRAF hands) offered a heroic re i tance touperior Axis forces.

The Fairey Fulmar was a monoplanemounting eight machin gun and poweredby a Rolls Royce Merlin. But carrying anobserver as well as a pilot, the thick-wingedFulmar was underpowered. [n comparisonwith land-based opponents it lacked agilityand was a slow climber. Th Blackburn

Naval Aircraft Development

grown to 144 aircraft in twenty-four flights.When flight were replaced by squadronin 1932, 156 aircraft were in service withtwenty-six flights. Squadrons now comprised between nine and twelve aircraftconcentrated on aircraft carrier or landbases. A handful of ship's flights wasretained for aircraft operating from capitalships and cruisers. When hostilities resumedin eptember 1939 the Fleet Air Arm hadtwenty squadrons with 340 aircraft, ofwhich n5 were under squadron control, theremainder being dispersed among hip'sflights.

The aircraft delivered to the Admiraltyduring the inter-war period were a mixedbag. The Fairey Flycatcher biplane enteredservice in 1923. Designed as a fleet fighter,it was a ruggedly-built machine, which waseasy to fly, suitable for aerobatic and, mostimportantly, easy to land aboard an aircraftcarrier. It introduced many new features,including flap running along the entiretrailing edge of both wings with theirouter sections also acting as ailerons. Thusequipped the Flycatcher was able to achieveexceptionally short landing and take-offruns. Another innovation was the hydraulicwheel brake system u ed in conjunctionwith the fore and aft arrester wire that werefavoured by carriers of the time. TheFlycatcher served until 1934 when it wasr placed by the Hawker Nimro I, whichclosely resembled its land-based counterpart, the Fury. But there some were ignificant changes: wingspan wa bigger andflotation boxes were built into the wingsand fuselag . Thi made it slower than theFury but the Nimrod still repre ented aworthwhile advance on the Flycatcher. Thefirst production machine lacked arrestergear fitted, this omission being rectified inthe Mk II, which featured a hook under astrengthened fuselage.

The Glo ter ea Gladiator was to bethe naval fight r squadrons' last biplanefighter. Thi wa another land-ba ed designadapted for ship-board operations wi tha strengthened tructure to absorb thepuni hment of deck landings. Catapultlaunching hook were also featured and acollap ible dinghy was carried between theundercarriage legs. The Sea Gladiatorentered service in December 1938 and thetype remained in front-line servic until1941. The Sea Gladiator's finest hour

10 71

A Sea Hurricane IB of No. 800 Squadron prepares to leave the carrier HMS Indomitable. The type's major failing, and one it

shared with the first Seafires, was the lack of wing-folding, although a conversion was considered. Will Blunt Collection

of fourteen. In South Africa he did anumber of different jobs: bricklayer, tramconductor and mou'nted policeman. He waswounded during the Boer War. Returninghome, he opened a garage in Surrey andlater dev loped an inter st in aviation. By1904 he had built a glider. He was awardeda Royal Aero Club Aviator's Certificatein 1912. In October 1913, after a briefspell of buying and selling steam yachts,Pemberton Billing decided to enter theworld of aircraft manufacture, acquiringpremises at Woolston alongside the RiverItchen near Southampton to build flyingboats under the name of Supermarine, histelegraphic address.

Its value proved by its success in the Battle ofBritain, a naval version of the Hawker Hurricane

was gratefully accepted by the Admiralty for useaboard its carriers. While slowed by the addition

of naval equipment, the Sea Hurricane providedmuch-needed air defence for the vital convoys

supplying Britain. Will Blunt Collection

Supermarine AviationWorks

be purchased or returned to the USA. TheFAA was once again reliant on British-builtfighters. Against this background it is hardlysurprising that the Admiralty should pressfor the development of a naval version ofthe highly successful upermarine Spitfire.

Supermarine Aircraft, builder of the Spitfireand eafire, owed its existence to NoelPemberton Billing. The son of a Birmingham iron founder, he was a larger than lifecharacter who ran away to sea at the age

The type's folding wings were much appreciated aboard the smaller British carriersand replaced the Sea Gladiator fromSeptember 1940. The Marrlet shot downits first German aircraft on Christmas Day.

The next batch of aircraft supplied to theRoyal Navy were designated Mks IV andV and differed from the earlier machinesin that they were supplied under the LendLease arrangement, the earlier fighterhaving been purchased outright. Theseaircraft began entering service in July 1942.The Grumman Marrlet/Wildcats remainedin front-line service until the end of thewar, when, like the later Grumman Hellcatsand Chance-Vought Corsairs, they had to

The Blackburn Skua was designed to combine theroles of fighter and dive-bomber. A Skua did,

however, claim the honour of scoring the Fleet AirArm's first victory in World War II by shooting down

a Dornier flying boat. Will Blunt Collection

The Blackburn Roc represented an attempt by the Admiralty to introduce a turret fighter tothe Fleet Air Arm. The underlying premise was that the concentration of firepower from

one closely-grouped source would be enough to disable any enemy aircraft. Unfortunatelyfor all concerned, the Roc was too slow and the turret fighter concept was flawed, as theland-based Boulton Paul Defiant later proved. BBA Collection

Powered by an early version of the Rolls-Royce Merlin, the same engine used by the Spitfire and Seafire, theFairey Fulmar is probably best described as workmanlike. Based on the earlier Battle bomber, this two-seat

fighter had exceptionally good range and heavy firepower with eight wing-mounted Browning machine-guns.

It was let down by a top speed inferior to that of land-based opponents. Will Blunt Collection

12 13

Seen on the Calshot slipway, Supermarine S.6B S1596 awaits its next flight. In the final Schneider Trophy

race the British team secured the Trophy for all time. BBA Collection

HEARTS OF OAK

On a wet flight deck the ground crew await the pilot's signal that he is about to start his Sea Hurricane's engine. Although it is not possible to read the aircraft's

codes, it is highly likely that these are No. 800 Squadron machines preparing for a patrol aboard HMS Indomitable. BBA Collection

While the Sea Hurricane represented an acceptable stop-gap, the sheer lack of aircraft forced the Admiralty to look to the United States for

additional fighters like the tubby Grumman Martlet, later renamed Wildcat in line with US Navy convention. Wildcat AJ148 was on the strength of

No. 888 Squadron, which flew from HMS Formidable during operations in the Indian Ocean. United States Navy

Pemberton Billing's first de ign was theinnovative PB.l, which was exhibited at theOlympia Aero how in March 1914. Duringthe war, he produced the Nighthawkquadraplane, a cannon-armed, searchlightequipped 'Zeppelin killer' for the Admiralty.But in 1916 Pemberton Billing becameintere ted in politics and sold his intere tin the company to works managerHubert cott-Paine, who became managingdirector of the re-registered upermarineAviation Works. The year was significantfor the company for another reason:Reginald J. Mitchell joined its staff.

The Supermarine N.l B Baby representedthe kind of aircraft Pemberton Billing hadenvisaged although none had enteredservice before hostilities ended in 1918. Aswith other aircraft manufacturers, Supermarine was affected by the post-war slumpin the aviation market and was forced todiver ify into activitie ranging frombuilding bodies for Model T Fords to theproduction of lavatory seats. Yet Supermarine continued to design flying boats inanticipation of a burgeoning civil market.

The fir t fruit of these labour was theChannel Type, which emerged in 1919.Both crew and passengers were expo ed tothe elements, yet the aircraft saw servicein South America, Bermuda, hile, Japanand orway. Itwas al 0 operated by thefledgling airlines based in the south ofEngland and engaged on the cro s-channelpassenger run. During the 1920s, ScottPaine wa bought out and Supermarinebecame a limited company with James Birdas managing director and Mitchell as chiefdesigner. Further premises were acquired atHythe to facilitate the production of flyingboats.

Schneider Trophy Success

As the company's experience in de igningand manufacturing flying boats expanded,o the orders increased. To cater for varied

customer requirements Supermarine evolvedseveral separate ranges of aircraft. The firstcovered general-purpo e ingle-enginedamphibians, while the second and moreprofitable one included twin-engined flying boat, mainly aimed at fulfilling RAFcontracts. All these designs resulted ingraceful aircraft. The line began with the

outhampton of 1925 and ended in 1936with the Stranraer.

A complete contrast was provided by thecompany's production of aircraft to contest

HEARTS OF OAK

the Schneider Trophy races held betwe n1925 and 1931. uch competitions helpedaccelerate the pace of aircraft design. ForSupermarine this effort reached it climaxwith the .6B, which not only enabledBritain to hold the chneider Trophy inperpetuity but also to et a new world speedrecord. The fir t Supermarine design toachieve victory in the series was the eaLion II. In 1922 this aircraft wrested anoutright win from an Italian govemmentsponsored team which had already won tworaces and only needed a third to retain thetrophy.

The American team won the followingyear and it was not until 1925 that Supermarine unveiled its next contender, the

.4. Although it achieved a remarkable226.75mph (362.8km/h), it crashed on theeve of the race. Undaunted, Supermarineset about designing a succes or, helped bygovernment ca h.

The result of this extra finance was a teamof three S.5s, one of which won at anaverage speed of281.65mph (450.64kmjh).Another S.5 was second. In 1929 Supermarine joined forces with Rolls-Royce toproduce the .6 powered by the 1,900hp'R' engine. The leek seaplane averaged32 .63mph (525.81kmjh) to win a clearvictory over it Italian rival. On 12September 1929 an .6 reached 357.7mph(572.32kmh), although this was not ratifiedas a world speed record. Aft r two victorieSupermarine was confident of winning thefinal contest in 19 1, but with six monthto go the British Government withdrew itsfinancial support. All looked lost until LadyHuston offered the company £100,000 tocover the cost of equipping the team. The

result of their hurried efforts was theSupermarine S.6B powered by an upratedengine, which offered a guaranteed a shortsprint output of 2,300hp. Finding enougharea for cooling purposes on such a treamlined design was a major problem, however.The answer was the in tallation of doublekin radiators on the upper wing surfaces

and floats.Yet th is effort seemed to be wasted as the

Italian opposition was unable to field acandidate. As a result, th Supermarine

.6B merely had to complete the course towin, which it did, reaching a speed of340.08mph (544.13km/h). upermarinethen fitted the aircraft with a special sprintengine to enable it to set a new worldspeed record of 407.5mph (652km/h) on29 September 1931. These winning up rmarine seaplanes pioneered all-metal construction. Their design also involved use ofthe National Physical Laboratory's windtunnel at Teddington as well as the duplexwater tank for floar development at Vickers'St Alban works.

upermarine had become a divi ion ofVickers Armstrong in 192 . It was nowparr of a large conglomerate whose intere tincluded ship-building, locomotive andarmament manufacture. Yet upermarinewa able to maintain it ind pendence.While Vicker concentrated on bombers atits Weybridge factory, Supermarine continued to turn out flying boat. But this wasto change. The lessons learned during thequest for the Schneider Trophy were aboutto be put to a different use by Mitchell andhis team. The immortal Spitfire and itvarious offshoots, which includ d the

eafire fleet fighter, were on their way.

14 15

HEARTS OF OAK

The Spiteful/Seafang series of piston-engined fighters represented the final expression of the Spitfire-Seafire line.

This diagram illustrates the Spiteful. the Seafang being similar except for an arrester hook and folding wings. Eric Morgan collection

after the maiden flight in February 1934 itbecame obvious that the engine coolingsy tern was the aircraft's weak point. Beforethe Type 224, liquid cooled engines hadfound favour in biplane designs. There thecondensers had been mounted in the upperwing to provide a large surface for coolingthe steam, which then condensed into waterto be gravity-fed back to the engine tocontinue the cooling cycle.

To compensate for the lack of an upperwing, the Typ 224's condensers weremounted in the trouser fairing. Cooled andcondensed steam was pumped back up to aheader tank mounted above the engine.Unfortunately for Supermarine, the coolingsystem was inefficient. Steam was fed backto the engine, guaranteeing that it wouldoverheat. This could happen at any timeduring the flight test regime. The redwarning lights would illuminate, requiring

The Supermarine Type 224 was to prove a blind alley in fighter development but it was

still a monoplane without external bracing, which was then quite a novelty. The Type 224

was let down by its inefficient engine, cooling system and fixed trousered undercarriage,

which slowed the aircraft down considerably. Eric Morgan Collection

been selected to eliminate the externalbracing featured by earlier designs. Thewing itself was conservatively built. It wamuch thicker than was really necessary,reflecting fears about the flutter probl msthat had been evident with the seaplaneracers. The wing was deep enough to housethe radiators and condensers, which weremounted at the leading edges to cool the600hp Rolls-Royce Goshawk engine. Theundercarriage was fixed and each leg wasencased in massive 'trouser' fairings that alsohoused engine coolant tanks.

Students of aeronautical design willalready have noticed that the Type 224would not be able to fulfil its intended roleas a high speed interceptor. The engine andits associated cooling syst m, plus the thickwing and fixed undercarriage, produced anunacceptably high drag coefficient. Flighttesting revealed even more problems. Soon

The Type 224 that emerged in 1934 wasradical in many respects, yet overall itrepresented a dead-end. The most obviousdeparture from previous monoplane fighterconcepts was the cranked wing. This had

The Type 224

CHAPTER TWO

Seafire Heritage

In 1931 Supermarine responded to AirMinistry pecification F7j30, which calledfor the development of a single-seat fighterfor the Royal Air Force. Also known asOperational Requirement OR. 1, the specification had b en put out to tender inOctober 1930. It had been prompted by thebelated real ization that Britain was fallingbehind in the development of moderncombat aircraft and also that Europe wasdrifting towards war. The basic requirements of F7/30 included a high rate ofclimb, the best speed possible aboveIS,OOOft (4,600m), good all-round vision forthe pilot, excellent manoeuvrability, easeof maintenance and, importantly, ease ofconstruction for high-volume manufacture.It was intended that prototypes should beready for flight in 1934.

In many ways Supermarine could be seenas an outsider. Although well-known for itselegant flying boats, it was the SchneiderTrophy racers, plus the designing skill ofR.J. Mitchell, that prompted the companyto tender. This was an important contractand Supermarine was not alone in makinga submission. Blackburn, Parnell andWestland submitted biplane designs, whilemonoplane entrants included one fromBoulton Paul. After the usual eliminationprocess, the Air Mini try invited Supermarine to develop its submission into theType 224. The contract was completed inlate 1932. Although the company haddelivered a fairly comprehensive outlinedraft to the Air Ministry, it was only at thisstage that the client began to add fine detailsto its initial requirement. As a result, theType 224 was to feature wing-mount dmachine-guns and be able to carry four20lb bombs for ground attack.

N220 was the Supermarine S.5 racer built to

contest the Schneider Trophy race. Although not

successful. it did pave the way for the Supermarine

S.6B racer. BBA Collection

MAIN FUELTANKS

REAR FUELTANK

(J RUDDER/SEMBLY

~~\

16 17

SEAFIRE HERITAGE SEAFIRE HERITAGE

The start of it all: Supermarine Spitfire K5054. It seems hard to imagine that the evolution

of this aircraft through various phases would lead to the Scimitar. Eric Morgan Collection

The first production version of the Spitfire was the Mk I with production Merlin

engine and eight Browning machine-guns. BBA Collection

components at first. Eventually the factOryrefined its manufacturing processes to allowit to build other type including Seafires.

With the manufacturing drawingsbrought up to tandard, the rate ofmanufacture increased rapidly. The firstproduction aircraft, K97 7, made it maidenflight on 15 May 1938 flown by Quill. Hispo t-fl ight report mentioned the increasedtability provided by the bigger flap range

and also that he had discovered nosignificant handling deviations comparedwi th the protOtype. After completingcompany handling flights, the pitfire wentto RAE Farnborough for further flighttesting. This rev aled that it could not beflown above 400mph (640km/h) withoutthe ailerons locking up, which wa initiallyregarded as a benefit as it meant the airframewould be protected from overstre ing.

The Spitfire represented a quantum leapfrom the earlier biplane fighters. It wa alsofaster than the contemporary HawkerHurricane, but the Luftwaffe's newMesserschmitt Bf 109 had a slight handlingedge due to the locking-up of the pidire'sailerons. Inve tigation revealed that thefabric covering was ballooning at peed,dictating the need to replace it withlight alloy skinning. This modification,which improved the Spitfire's handlingimmea urably, wa applied to all new-build

Delivery Begins

Supermarine had originally promised to

begin delivery of production Spitfires withinfifteen months of the contract being placed.But the del ivery date of October 1937 waasking tOo much of the upermarineworkforce. The solution was for thecompany to take what was then theunprecedented step of subcontracting omeof the manufacture to another company.General Aircraft Ltd, which was to playasignificant role in the eafire productionprogramme, was contracted to manufacturetail units. This helped in the hort termbut th real answer was to di perse muchof the manufacture from Supermarine'sSouthampton base. This was to payoffhand omely when the Luftwaffe attackedthe town.

Once the war began in eptember 1939it wa obvious that the small productionfacilities available to upermarine wereinadequate for the task ahead, and a newmanufacturing facility wa establi hed atCastle Bromwich. Managed by MorriMotor, it was intended that the factorywould tum out aircraft ju t like car. Butthis was not car manufacture. onstructingaircraft that were undergoing continuousmodification meant that Castle Bromwichwas producing only aircraft sections and

The next flight came on 10 March. All ofthe ystems were operated, enabling thepilot to report that flaps and undercarriagefunctioned correctly. Another fl ight thefollowing day confirmed these results andenabled the handling to be explored further.Once the initial flights had been completedthe aircraft was grounded for painting.When flying was resumed, Jeffrey Quill wasthe pilot in charge and his main duty wato check the Type 300' top speed. On 27March Quill took it to 17,000ft (5,200m)and opened the throttle. The result was adisappointing 335mph (536km/h). Thecure was to re-work the propeller, whichenabled the speed to rise to 348m ph(547km/h), clo er to expectations. TheType 300 was then passed to MartleshamHeath, by which time the name 'Spitfire'had been bestowed upon it. This was notgreatly to Mitchell's taste. This phase offlight development highlighted a majordefect - one that would haunt both theSpitfire and the Seafire - a lack of forwardvisibility. Thi meant that while moving onthe ground the aircraft had to be snakedfrom side to side.

Even as the protOtype Spitfire wasundertaking this test programme the AirMinistry had placed an order for 310production Mk Is to pecification FI6/36.This document laid down the changesrequired to upgrade the protOtype to

production standard, which included astrengthened and stiffened wing. This notonly allowed for increase in top speed butalso permitted the fitment of the proposedarmament. Fuel capacity was increased from75 to 84gal (340 to 3 Oltr). Flap travelrange was raised from 57 to 85 degrees to

improve stability during landing.

Spitfire!

contributed by th Air Ministry and £7,500by Rolls Royce with the manufacturerproviding the balance. The aircraft hadbeen built at Woolston and assembled atEastleigh where taxying te ts wereundertaken. Thi first flight lasted abouttwenty minutes and the aircraft reached analtitude of no more than 5,000ft (1,500m).The undercarriage was locked down and

ummers was re tricted to gentlemanoeuvres. On landing he told waitingcompany officials what they wanted to hear:that the Type 300 handled well and thatit should be made ready for its next flightas soon as possible.

••••••

was initially proposed, but it was quicklyrealized that this could prove to be the newfighter' Achilles heel. The alternative wasto mount an air intake hou ing a coolingmatrix under one wing. A further intake,mailer and circular in shape and mounted

und r the other wing, would cool the engineoil system. Designed by Frederick Meredith,the radiator featured an intake that forcedair through the cooling matrix. Theexpelled air added a small amount offorward thrust, which overcame the induceddrag of the matrix and its fairing. Thecooling medium was switched to the moreefficient ethylene glycol, which enabledthe cooling system to be smaller and lighterthan a water-based one.

While the main design team was ironingout the finer points of the new fighter'sdesign, other were employed on extendingthe type' capabilities. The first idea was fora two- eat machine with a four-gun turret.This was abandoned as Boulton Paul wasworking on a similar design, which laterbecame the Defiant. Another projecteddevelopment was a two-seat trainer, whichreflected expectations that the mettle omenew fighter might be tricky to handle.While this was recognized by the AirMinistry, a trainer version of the Spitfirewas not to appear until the Mk IX, but theseaircraft were only ever deployed by air armsoutside Britain.

On 5 March 1936 the prototype Type300 made its first flight with Vickers testpilotJo eph 'Mutt' Summers at the controls.By that time £20,765 had been spent onthe project, of which £12,748 was

presentation to the Air Ministry. TheMinistry re ponded by issuing ContractAM. 361140/34 on 1 December 1934. Itcall d for one prototype to the revisedspecification F7/30, valu d at £10,000. Themain changes involved the enginemounting and also the wing leading edgesfrom which the radiators and associatedpipework were to be removed to make roomfor guns and their ammunition feeds.

The wing was also refined to produce thecharacteri tic elliptical hape. This was seena the best compromise between the lift anddrag coefficients required for a highlymanoeuvrable fighter. The wing nowfeatured a gentle taper from tip to root.There wa also a subtle twist, which meantthe root would stall before the tip to givepilot ample warning of an impending stall.The wing root also housed the retractedundercarriage. Unlike the then-normalboom and web de ign, the Type 300's wingderived its combination of strength andlightness from a spar comprising shapedhollow sections of different sizes placedin ide each other to create the taperedwing. Armament was initially to be fourwing-mounted machine-guns, two per wing,but it soon became apparent that this wouldbe ineffective against the all-metal bombersappearing in both Britain and Europe. Thesubsequent upgrade to eight Browningmachine-guns was covered by Specification10/ 5 issued in 1935.

Engine cooling continued to give causefor concern, especially as the Merlingenerated enormous quantities of heat whenrunning at full power. Evaporative cooling

The Type 300

the pilot to level out and allow the engineand cooling system to cool down.

While this wa ufficient cause for alarm,it was the aircraft's performance thatsounded its death knell. Having developedthe speedy'S' series of racer, Supermarinewa di appointed to discover that the Type224 could only achieve a top speed of238mph (380km/h) at 15,000ft (4,600m).Even reaching thi altitude was a struggle,because it could take up to eight minutes.Gloster won the contest to supply the RAF'snext fighter with its .37, later to becomebetter known as the Gladiator. The Type224 went for furth r testing to the MarineAircraft Experimental Establishment,Martlesham Heath. It was later pa sed tothe Royal Aircraft Establishment, Farnborough where it was temporarily named

pitfire. The aircraft ended its days as atarget on the Orfordness gunnery range.

While the Type 224 was failing to liveup to expectations, a team from upermarine was at the Air Ministry placingfresh propo als for a new design, owningmore of a debt to the racing seaplanes,before senior officials. Fortunately, in thelight of sub equent events, the Air Ministrywas sympathetic and Specification 425Awas issued to cover the new propo al. Onpap r the aircraft, de ignated the Type 300,was a vast improvement on it predecessor,havin a thinner wing of reduced span anda retractable undercarriage. The design waconsidered capable of reaching 300mph(4 Okm/h) in level flight, but the AirMini try was unhappy with the speCifiedGoshawk engine. Not only was it thoughtthat the cooling system would be unr liablebut also that the resulting aircraft would beunable to achieve the required top peedand manoeuvre adequately against enemyfighters.

Seeking a more suitable alternative,Mitchell and his team fir t considered the800hp apier Dagger. After careful studyby the upermarine board this engine wasrejected in favour of the PV XI I th n underdevelopment at Rolls-Royce. By November1934 this nltr engine had achieved a testbench rating of 625hp. In flight this waincreased first to 790hp at 12,00Oft(3,700m) and then to 1,000hp. The Merlinhad been born. Having chosen the engineto power the new airframe, Mitchell andhis team refined the Type 300 de ign for

18 19

With Walrus and Stranraer seaplanes in the background, the Spitfire production line gets under way. Until some of the work was subcontracted

out, the complicated wing construction meant that for a short period fuselages were stacked-up awaiting wings. BBA Collection

Originally destined to be a Mk I, this Spitfire was eventually completed as a Mk V

with wing-mounted cannon. BBA Collection

SEAFIRE HERITAGE

While the Fleet Air Arm was pushing for carrier-borne aircraft, the Air Ministry

came up with an alternative, a float-equipped Spitfire. Although the installation

was a neat one, the floats hampered the aircraft's performance. BBA Collection

AB200 was built for the high altitude interception role and introduced the four

bladed propeller unit as standard. BBA Collection

Under-wing bomb mounts were latercleared for operational use.

Following the Mk V in the standardfighter role, came the Mk VIIl and the MkIX. The former introduced a retractabletail wheel, wing leading edge fuel tanksand also the Merlin 60 engine. This requir dslightly longer engine cowlings, whichreduced the already marginal forward viewavailable for landing and ground manoeuvring. Rotol Airscrews Ltd provided theanswer with propeller assembly diameterreduced to the barest minimum. This alsohelped when the type went to sea. Likeother versions of the Spitfire, the Mk VIIIwas required to act as a fighter bomber. Butto carry a decent bomb load fuel had to becut to keep weight within operating limits.

The Mk IX

The Mk IX had been intended as a stopgap fighter pending mass production of theMk VIII. But as the latter was more complexto build, the Mk IX became the predominant version; production exceeded 11,000aircraft, not counting a further 1,100powered by the Packard-Merlin engine. Toassist in developing the Mk IX a pair of MkVs was despatched to the Rolls-Roycefacility at Hucknall where they receivedMerlin 61 engines. As this was a morepowerful and heavier powerplant theengine bay bulkhead and primary fuselagelongerons were strengthened to compensate. While this was adequate for the trialsaircraft, both the Air Ministry and Supermarine realized that the rest of the airframewould also need reinforcing. To absorb theextra power, a Rotol four-bladed propellerwas installed, the whole being tested at theAir Fighting Development Unit at Duxfordin April 1942. Reports from AFDU evaluators were positive in nature as the morepowerful engine and propeller improvedperformance throughout the speed andaltitude range.

Further airframes were also allotted to theMk IX development programme. Somewere used to test the four-cannon wingwhile others participated in Merlin 77engine development, which required theuse of a six-bladed contra-rotating propeller.Although these aircraft were eventually tochase high-flying junkers ju 86P bombers,whose attacks on the British mainland werelargely unchallenged, much of the development work would find an outlet in production Spitfires and Seafire . During its

the strengthened Universal wing and couldtherefore mount 'A'-type or 'B'-typearmament, although the latter was thepreferred option as it was a more flexible.

Once Fighter Command home-basedunits had been equipped with the Mk V itwas the turn of those in the Mediterraneanto rec ive the new fighter. But first therewere extensi ve trials to develop an air filtersystem that would protect the engine fromsand and dust. The result was the Aboukirsystem. Although it meant an 8mph03km/h) speed penalty, it proved effectiveon both Spitfires and Seafires. Furthermodifications, which featured in subsequentversions, included a carburettor capable ofcontinuous operation under all conditions.This was first applied to the Merlin 50,which appeared on the Mk V in late 1941.Successful trials resulted in a ground attackcapability with a centreline crutch pointcapable of carrying 250lb and 500lb bombs.

Browning machine-guns and 'B' with twocannon and four machine-guns.

Developing the Spitfire

After the Mk II came the Mk V, which wasto be one of the most numerous versions.First production aircraft were convertedMk Is and lis. The major change was theup-rated Merlin 45, although Frame 5needed to be strengthened to accommodatethe new engine. The first Mk V (X4922)flew for the first time on 20 February 1941with jeffrey Quill at the controls. Production was split between three manufacturers:

upermarine, Westland and the CastleBromwich factory. Two main versionswere built. The Mk VA was armed withmachine-guns only while the Mk VBmounted two cannon and four machineguns. There wa also the' ',which utilized

machines and retrospectively to earlierones. There was also concern about theengine's inability to petform under negative'g'. Rolls-Royce redesigned the carburettor;direct fuel injection had been consideredbut rejected because of a possible power loss.

Cannon armament was first tried on theSpitfire IB, but jamming of the breechmechanism rendered it ineffective. Furtherredesign work and extensive trials rectifiedthe problems, although it had been recognized by both Supermarine and the AirMinistry that adding machine-gun to thecannons would result in a more versatilefighter. Deliveries of the pitfire II to theRAF had started before a mixed armamentfighter appeared. The main changes fromthe first production version included theMerlin XII engine, which featured aCoffman cartridge starter, and a pressurizedwater-glycol cooling system. The Mk IIwas built in two versions: 'A' with eight

20 21

SEA FIRE HERITAGE S AFIRE HERITAGE

Although the first Griffon-pow red _pitfirewa not the all-round success that had beenintended, it did prove the concept ofinstalling a bigger engine in the airframe.The w ak spot, though, was the fir t versionof the Griffon. With its single stageupercharger it was an excellent performer

at low levels but struggled at altitude. Thimeant that interception above 15,000ft(4,600m) remained the province of Merlinpowered pitfire. Bench testing of a two-tag supercharged Griffon began in 1943

and upermarine upplied eight Mk VIIIairframes to act as test-beds. The new unitwas a revelation. It endowed the pitfirewith a spectacular turn of speed - 445 mph(712km/h) at 25,000ft (7,700m) - and arate of climb of 5,000ft (l,500m) perminut . One aircraft from this batch wasd spatched to Rotol at Staverton for contrarotating propeller development. These earlyunits suffered from problems with the pitchchange mechanism controlling the frontthree-blade unit, while the rear unit pitchwas altered by a transitional bearing. Thiswas another weak spot: the bearingexhibited a tendency to fail, accompaniedby a loud bang. The re ult was a very uddenreduction in peed and the need to land asquickly as possible.

The other aircraft in the developmentprogramme were fitted with Rotol fivebladed propeller units, being designated theMk XIV. In this initial form they wereoverpowered and unstable, rendering themunsuitabl for front-line service. Changesto the engine were limited to the throttlefriction damper and propeller controlmechanism. As the up-rated Griffon had agreater power output, the fin and rudderwere increased in both height and area tocompensate. This reworked version was

Two-Stage Supercharging

under positive or negative 'g' requiredextensive experimentation and flight testingto arrive at a suitable carburettor modification.

The Fleet Air Arm had its first ta te ofGriffon power with the Spitfire XII. Earlyairframes, however, were fitted with 'A'frame arrester hook borrowed from the

eafire III production line. Both types wereexten ively tested at Arbroath by the FAA

ervice Trials Unit. Although a navalversion of the Spitfire XII was not chosenfor service use, the experience gained wouldlead to the Seafire XV.

Pointed Rudder Introduced

The solution was a larger and more pointedrudder, which was fitted retro pectively toother Griffon-powered aircraft. This alsoeliminated the aircraft' tendency to swingstrongly on take-off, although the throttlestill required careful operation to maintaincorrect take-off peed. Even 0, the Griffon'sopposite direction of rotation could causethe aircraft to swing violently to the right.There were further changes. Instead of theMerlin' 12-volt ignition system, theGriffon used the Coffman cartridge starterto bring the engine to life. In squadronservice a tendency for the engine to cut out

machine-guns. Much of the airframe waborrowed from the Mk V, although theretractable tail wheel came from the MkVIII. The ize of the cooling matrix fairingwa increased too. The next productionbatch was based on the Mk VIII, whichmeant greater strength. Both versionfeatured clipped wingtip to improve rollcontrol at low level. DP845 was retainedas a te t-bed and it was used to tryout avariety of five-bladed propellers; such unitswere to feature in later versions of both theSpitfire and Seafire. It was also used to testthe Griffon IV, whose in reased powerrevealed that longitudinal stability wasalmost non-existent at full throttle.

The first version of the Spitfire to be equipped with the Griffon engine was the Mk XII. The first batch of

aircraft were based on the Spitfire V with the second based on the Mk VIII. MB878 was from the second

batch and carries a 500lb bomb on the centreline. BBA Collection

The Royal Air Force and Supermarine were also aware that the Spitfire lacked range. The first attempt to

cure this deficiency was through the addition of external tanks such as that shown here. The drawback

was that the aircraft turned more tightly on the tank side of the aircraft. BBA Collection

Griffon Spitfires

to avoid anti-aircraft defences while attacking ground targets. Further stres wa placedon the wing during the high 'g' pull-outsimmediately following low-level bombrelease to avoid blast damage. The initialfix wa external structural bracing appliedto the affected area, although the longterm solution wa found to be thicker stifferkins as the internal tructure wa un

affected by vigorous handling.

More significant changes to both aircraftstructure and engine were to follow. Theappearance of Luftwaffe fighters able to outperform the RAF's Spitfires meant that JoeSmith, who had succ eded R.J. Mitchell aschief designer, was seeking ways of improving perf rmance. The mo t obvious wouldbe through increased engine power. TheMerlin was close to the limit of its performance and Rolls-Royce was asked for areplacement. Fortunately for pitfire development, the company had started developing the 'R' cia s engine just before the war.The re ult was the Griffon. Although its36. 7ltr capacity represented a considerableincrea e over the Merlin, the new engine'sfrontal area increased marginally - from7.5 q ft (O.7sq m) to 7.9 q ft. OnceSupermarine and Roll Royce were urethat the Griffon could be installed into theSpitfire airframe the proposed new fighterwas presented to the Air Ministry underSpecification 466 in October 1939.

A Mk V airframe, then the main production variant, was selected to receive theGriffon - a single-staged superchargedGriffon RG2SM liB driving a four-bladedpropeller - and this became the first MkXII (DP845). The aircraft made its maidenflight from the Supermarine airfield atWorth y Down on 27 ovember 1941.Once again Quill was in command. Handling wa described as excellent, especiallyat low level, although it was noted that thethrottle needed careful handling. Quill did,however, expres concern about longitudinal tability because he found thatudden power applications re ulted in

corresponding trim changes. Had this beenpeacetime much time would have beenspent in orting out this defect. The cho enmethod was a warning entry in the pilot'notes.

Initial production Spitfire XIIs deliveredto the RAF featured the standard 'B' wingwith an armament of two cannon and four

the wings and on a centreline mount, whichwa also plumbed for a 90gal (410Itr) fueltank. Production innovations includedinfra-red drying lamps to peed up externalpaint curing time from hours to minute.

Mk IX flight testing wa carried outat the Air Fighting evelopment nit(AFDU), Duxford. Pilots were warnedabout a sudden nose-up pitch, which happened when bombs were rei a ed. Moreserious was wrinkling of the upper wingskins above the cannon and undercarriagebays. Interviews with pilots revealed thatthey had been putting the aircraft througha series of violent manoeuvres in an effort

The Spitfire IX was the most-prolific variant and used a four-bladed propeller plus a combined wing

mounted cannon and machine-gun armament. BBA Collection

The RAF wanted the Spitfire Mk VIII to be its standard fighter but production was complicated by its

retractable tail wheel and, as a result, most were employed in the Far East. BBA Collection

production life, the Mk IX airframe underwent various changes. The mo t obviouswas the replacement of the semicircularunder-wing oil cooler intake with a rectangular one. The Mk IX was initially fittedwith the 'B'-type wing, although this wasquickly changed to the Universal type.

The rudder became more pointed inshape, the increased area helping to counteract engine torque. A more obviouschange was a cut-down rear fuselage andthe replacement of the original canopyassembly by a bubble-shaped unit, whichimproved all-round pilot vision. The MkIX was also capable of carrying bombs under

22 23

The Spiteful represented Supermarine's last attempt to keep the Spitfire line alive. Although the fuselage

was familiar, the wings were completely redesigned in planform. BBA Collection

This later-build Spitfire F.21 is little different from the Seafire F.45, as it features the six-bladed contra

rotating propellers and the Spiteful tail unit also fitted the Seafire. Ray Sturtivant

The final series of Spitfires were the F.20s, which introduced further modifications to the aircraft. The most

obvious ones in this view are the slightly forward-raked undercarriage and the outer doors to the

undercarriage bays. BBA COllection

'Super Spitfires'

The final riffon-powered variant aresometimes referred to as' uper Spitfires',but as these three versions represented asignificant departure it was originallyintended to adopt the name 'Victor'. TheF.Zl appeared when Spitfire DP851 wafined with a Griffon 61 engine. It modifiedwing featured heavier- gauge kinning anda revised internal structure. Although thisdevelopment airframe paved the way for theF.21, test flying revealed that the wingstructure was too light for the task, as ittwi ted during combat manoeuvres. Thean weI' was a complete rede ign of the wingstructure to cope with the increased loading.This resulted in an altered shape with astraighter trailing edge, which not onlyincreased wing area but al 0 improved higha Iti tude performance.

The undercarriage bays had to be movedslightly outboard and were redesigned to

allow for outer fairing doors. Although thesize of the bays was basically unaltered, thelegs themselve were slightly longer, necessitating a series of levers and cranks, plus asequence of valves to contract the leg sothat it would fit the bay. Compl x it mayhave been, but this mechanism produced aclean under-wing surface and the resultingincrease in overall speed was consideredworth the effort. The lengthened undercarriage and increased undercarriage trackal 0 improved ground tability and providedgreater propeller tip clearance. The tandard

pitfire F.2 1 could have either the Griffon61 or 64, both driving a five-bladed propeller. The F.21 also received the Griffon

5 with a six-bladed contra-rotating unit.Additional small fuel tanks were fined intothe wing leading edges. Armament comprised four 20mm Hispano cannon with partof the belt feed system hidden under blisteron the upper wing surface.

Initial flight tests of the F.21 with thecontra-rotating unit showed that the Spitfirehad evolved into a very stable gun platform.

a broader chord and a new propeller unit.The arrester hook and RATOG were te tedagain but not adopted. There were twovel' ions of this variant, the most prolificbeing the reconnai sance aircraft. Thefighter-bomber was cleared for the availablerange of bombs and under-wing rockets.Two other versions of the Mk XVII I wereproposed: a two-seat trainer and a target tug.Neither I ft the drawing board.

the upper wing skins, Supermarine strengthened the ends of the pan-wise stringersunder the upper wing skins. Thi cured theproblem, although some aircraft did showsigns ofskin wrinkling; this was later tracedto over-exuberant flying overstressing theairframe. Despite the enlarged rudder tocounter engine torque, there were stillreports of longitudinal in tability. Inve tigation revealed the fabric-covered rudderto be stable throughout the flight regime,while a metal-covered assembly, completewith operating trim tab, caused much of thetrouble. Disconnecting the trim tab andlocking it in a fixed position removed theworst of the instability.

The pitfire XVIII that followed was al 0

based on the Mk VIII, although it requiredexten ive modification and strengtheningto cope with the proposed up-rated Griffonengine. Thi was the version of the pitfirein which the characteristic wing planformwas changed to a more elliptical shape. Themethod of construction also changed. Aolid main spar replaced the previou riveted

laminated square tubular booms, resultingin a stronger wing and one that wa quickerto manufacture. Although the undercarriageunits and their mounting were redesignedto cope with the increa ed weight, flighttesting of the aircraft and its fighterreconnaissance equipment revealed thatfurther strengthening would be requiredbefore service entry. Testing also revealedthat longitudinal instability had returned,now accompanied by propeller vibration.The remedy was an even larger rudder with

Spitfire XVIII

and Rocket-Assisted Take-Off Gear(RATOG) to the aircraft to facilitate usefrom unprepared airfi Ids in Europe after DDay. While neither feature was actuallyadopted for RAF use, both appeared onR aircraft. Supermarine also proposed abubble canopy version of the Mk XIV,which was approved for service. While useful in combat thi innovation had onedrawback: when jenisoned the heavycanopy assembly was likely to strike the rearfuselage and the leading edge of the fin,causing extensive damage. The solutionwas for pilots to avoid jeni oning thecanopy when abandoning the aircraft.

A the Griffon-powered aircraft was asagile as its Merlin-powered sibling it, too,was plagued by distortion of the upper wingskin surfaces caused by violent manoeuvring. Instead of riveting external supports to

later versions of the Spitfire XIV and XVIII introduced photographic reconnaissance capability and a

Spiteful tail unit to improve longitudinal stability. BBA Collection

The definitive Griffon-powered Spitfire was the Mk XIV, which introduced two-stage supercharging,

a slightly changed wing planform and a strengthened undercarriage. BBA Collection

SEA FIRE HERITAGE

sent to the various test establishments,whose report were positive especially whereperformance wa concerned.

Up to 25,000ft (7,700m) the Griffonpowered machine behaved like its Merlinengined counterpart, although the controlwere Iightly heavier. Above that heightthe Griffon-powered aircraft quickly out-tripped its rival. A&AEE's final report

recommended quantity production usingthe existing Mk VlII production line asthe ba i . To accommodate the Griffon 65engine the Mk VI II structure was strength ned to compensate for the weight of thepowerplant and that of the five-bladedRotol propeller. Fixed armament includedtwo cannon and a pair of 0.5in machineguns in place of the earlier OJ03in weapons.

The fighter reconnaissance version ofthe Mk XIV featured a full complement ofcamera just aft of the cockpit. There wasalso an additional rear-fuselage fuel tank,plus strengthened and improved undercarriage unit. Further developmentsincluded modifications to permit the carriage of external fuel tanks and bombs, whilesafety improvements saw the engine oiltank relocated behind the fireproof bulkhead. This not only facilitated enginechanges but also separated the oil tank froma potentially hot engine and the anendantfire risk. To cater for the bigger engine theunder-wing radiators were greatly enlarged.That under the starboard wing was I' placedby a box-like structure similar in ize andshape to that under the other wing.

Although the Royal Navy was greatlyinterested in the Griffon-powered Seafireit was the RAF that fined an arrester hook

24 25

R. J. Mitchell

SEAFIRE HERITAGE

This view of a final-build Spitfire shows the cannonarmament, the improved undercarriage and theSpiteful tail unit. BBA Collection

Reginald Joseph Mitchell was born in 1895 in Stoke-on-Trent. His parents were both teachers and he had three brothers and twosisters. At school Mitchell revealed a flair for both mathematics and art, which led to an interest in engineering. In 1911, his schoolingcompleted, Mitchell was apprenticed to a firm of locomotive manufacturers in his home town. This required attendance at nightschool classes where his flair for mathematics was commented upon. At the completion of his apprenticeship in 1917 Mitchell movedto Supermarine Aircraft, based in Southampton.

By 1918 Mitchell had met and married Florence Dayson, who was eleven years his senior and the headmistress of an infants' schoolin the Potteries. It was not long before he started making a favourable impression on his new employers, so favourable, in fact, thatby 1920 he had been appointed chief designer. He was just twenty-five. Between then and 1936 Mitchell was responsible for twentyfour different aircraft designs ranging from large flying boats to light aircraft. His method of working was to develop an idea into abasic design before passing it to a member of his team to progress it to completion.

Supermarine was acquired by Vickers in 1928 and it was a condition of the purchase that Mitchell should stay with the company forthe next five years. Initially, Vickers wanted him to work alongside its own chief designer, Barnes Wallis, but Mitchell was not keenand did not hide his feelings. Realizing that his genius would flower better without restriction, Vickers gave in.

Mitchell always showed great concern for safety and his only designs to raise concerns were the Supermarine SA racing aircraftthey revealed a wing flutter problem which proved difficult to cure - and the under-powered Air Yacht. While neither design sawMitchell at his best, his Southampton and Stranraer flying boats proved good sellers and helped see Supermarine through therecession of the early 1930s. Under Mitchell's guidance Supermarine produced a series of high-speed floatplanes to contest theSchneider Trophy races. The eventual winner was the RAF High Speed Flight equipped with the Supermarine S.6B, whose successenabled Britain to capture the Trophy for all time.

The racers offered glimpses of the future for high speed aircraft. Mitchell incorporated some of the lessons he had learned in theSupermarine Type 224. But the Rolls-Royce Goshawk engine, the cooling system and the fixed undercarriage enclosed in cumbersometrouser fairings created a machine that was less than the sum of its parts. As a result the Type 224 has passed into history as aninteresting oddity, having lost out to a Gloster-designed biplane later to be called Gladiator.

In the summer of 1933 Mitchell was diagnosed as suffering from rectal cancer and he underwent a colostomy that August. Evenwith today's medical techniques this procedure would result in a debilitating post-operative condition, but Mitchell was determined toreturn to work as soon as possible. In fact, such was the speed of his recovery and the depth of his determination that he startedflying lessons in December of the same year. By the following July he had completed the course and gained his licence.

Disappointed with the Type 224, Mitchell had already begun work on its successor, the Type 300. This evolved into the Spitfire. Thenew design was also intended to be Goshawk-powered, but a much better alternative became available in the same company's Merlin.A significant result of the change was that the Type 300 would lose its leading edge radiators but retain the box structure that gavethe aircraft considerable strength.

Although Mitchell was able to resume his career with Supermarine, his health was always a matter of concern. In 1936 the cancerreturned. There was a brief spell in hospital in February 1937 after which he was allowed home. This time, though, he was forced togive up work, but he often went to Eastleigh to watch Spitfire flight tests. A visit to a clinic in Vienna followed in April but he was backhome by the end of May, his condition deemed incurable. R.J. Mitchell died on 11 June 1937. He was forty-two.

Supermarine had lost its design genius but the Mitchell legacy was in safe hands. His successor, Joe Smith, for many years thecompany's chief draughtsman, proved more than capable of guiding the development of the Spitfire and its naval sibling throughoutthe war and into the following years. That the Spitfire remains an aviation icon symbolizing a nation's heroic defence at a critical timeoffers a fitting monument to Mitchell and all those involved in developing Supermarine's immortal fighter.

The naval equivalent of the Spiteful was the Seafang, which featured a contra-rotating propeller, foldingwings, an arrester hook and other naval fittings. BBA Collection

This side-on view of the Seafang 32 shows the clean lines of the type, plus the reconnaissanceinstallation. BBA Collection

The final versions of the Spitfire were the F.22/24 machines. Featuring a bubble canopy and a cannon-onlyarmament. they saw limited service. BBA Collection

Torque generated by the engine had beeneliminated but the increased complexity ofthe propeller unit resulted in some initialunreliability. Eventually this was cured, butas the RAF did not adopt it, the unit's usewas restricted to the Fleet Air Arm's SeafireFR,47. Without it, however, the F.21 wasregarded as an unstable gun platform,although not dangerous to fly, and the tailsurfaces were again increased in area toenable the F.21 to be cleared for service use.

Supermarine was also keen to I' fine thepi tfire's aerodynamic design and to increase

the range of powerplants available. In theoriginal wing the transonic centre of pressurewas just aft of the leading edge. A proposedrevamp would shift it closer to the centrelineto produc a high-speed laminar flow designwith a low drag coefficient. It also meantthat the wing exhibited a consistent taperon both fore and aft edges. Not only did thischange the shape of the wing but it alsoreduced its area from 242sq ft (22sq m) to2l0sq ft (20sq m).

A semi-modified Mk VIII undertooklimited initial flight trials at RAE, but asthe changes were not really representativeof Supermarine's intended new wingpermission was sought to use the prototypeF.21 as a test airframe. The resulting aircraftfeatured the new wing, complete with fourcannon, reworked tail surfaces and a newdesignation of F.23. It was provisionallynamed Valiant. But the new Spitfire wasnot to reach production status. With thewar in Europe drawing to a close the orderfor 438 aircraft was cancelled. The effortwas not wasted, however, as the F.23 wasused extensively in the Spiteful and Seafangdevelopment programme.

While the F.23 was a dead-end, Supermarine continued to push the F.ll designfurther. The result was the F.22, which wasv ry similar to its predecessor except for thecanopy and rear fuselage. The original highback construction was cut down with abubble canopy for the pilot. Internally theoriginal 12-volt electrical system wareplaced by a 24-volt one, which was to befeatured in the remaining pitfire andSeafire iterations. The F.22 with itsimproved tail surfaces was a much improvedaircraft; as a fighter bomber it offered astable bombing platform. The final Spitfirewas the F.24, which offered minimalimprovements over the F.22 apart from theability to carry under-wing rockets.

26 27

CHAPTER THREE

contract work at Eastl igh. They turned outforty-eight and 118 modified machinesrespectively. Once the aircraft had beencon verted they were gi ven new seria Inumbers, which had a tendency to conflictwith production numbers. ConfUSingly,these Seafires were aircraft allocated afterthe initial batch had b en agr ed. The firstforty-eight actually included three trialsaircraft plus forty-five further ones drawnfrom RAF stocks. They were transformedinto hooked Spitfires at RAF maintenanceunits. Although they featured the arrestorhook, radio and IFF equipment, they lackedslinging points and homing beacons.

They w re not fully equipped for combatcarrier operations either. As a result, theseaircraft were used mainly in the training role

lighters and ferried to the ship. Thremainder of the changes made were underthe skin and concerned what in modernparlance would b called the avionics suite.This comprised a naval high frequencyreceiver-transmitter, a naval frequencyIdentification Friend or Foe (IFF) transmitter, a Type 72 homing beacon, plus astandard naval radio fit. Overall, thechanges from the basic Spitfire onlyincreased all up weight by 5 per cent, whilethe few slight protrusions into the air streamreduced top speed by 5mph (8km/h).

The Seafire IBs were converted undercontract by Hamble-based Air ServiceTraining Ltd, also undertaking Spitfiremaintenance, and by unliffe-Owen Ltd,which was already involved in pitfire sub-

BL676. displaying the name Bondowoso. was used for a variety of trials including

those of the tropical filter. shown here under the nose. BBA Collection

BL676 was one of the original hooked Spitfire Vs used to train Seafire pilots in the art of deck landing. FAAM Yeovilton

These trials were considered successfulenough for production aircraft to be ordered.The first was the Seafire IB, based on theSpitfire VB with the 'B' wing, while theSeafire IlC was based on the Spitfire VCwith its heavier armament. The Seafire IBwas intended as an interim aircraft, whilethe IlC was to be the main productionversion. This first version represent d astraight adaptation of the productionSpitfire VB and some early Mk Is requiredan'A'-frame arrester hook on strengthenedmountings at the juncture of the fuselagebottom longerons and frame 15. This pointwas 10ft (3m) aft of the main undercarriageunits. The hook itself was some 6ft (1.8m)long and was attached to a hydraulic jack,which not only extended the frame into theairflow but also acted as a damper. As thiswas also a stress point, the local structurehad to be strengthened. In the retractedposition the frame was fa ired into the lowerfuselage; when extended, it projected nomore than 3ft (0.9m) below the aircraft'sground line.

With only the hook extending into theairflow this had little impact on the aircraft'stop speed. Release was via a pilot-operatedcontrol connected to the retention jawsvia a Bowden cable. Resetting the hookcould only be carried out by the ground crewafter landing. Further strengthening wasapplied to the port and starboard longeronsand to the rear of the canopy, these areasbeing selected for the slinging points. Evenso, it was not always possible for the Seafireto land-on. They had to be winched aboard

'Hooked Spitfire'

Ministry blamed each other for the FI etAir Arm's unsatisfactory equipment. Areview of the fleet's aircraft requirementswas completed by February 1943 with theresult that the Seafire was chosen as thepreferred fighter. The forthcoming Blackburn Firebrand was considered too large forus aboard current carriers, while theMerlin-powered Fairey Firefly was behindschedule. It wa , in any case, being seen asan attack aircraft. The final outcome wasthat the fixed-wing Seafire IB was to bedelivered as soon as possible for interimservice, to be followed by the definitivefolding-wing production machine. In themeantime, Spitfires were to be handed overfor use in the training and evaluation role.

On aircraft, BL676, was fitted with slingingpoints and an arrester hook, earning itselfthe name of 'Hooked Spitfire'. Deck landingtrials were carried out by Lt Cdr H.P.Bramwell DSC, commanding officer of theRN Fighter School. HM Illustrious wasselected as the trials vessel despite adamaged forward port hull and flight decksuffered during a collision with her sistership Fonnidable in December 1941. Landingand take-off trials were carried out successfully before Illustrious was moved to Birkenhead. Further sea trials were und rtaken offthe Orkneys aboard HMS Victorious duringMarch and April 1942. These trials,undertaken with a fully worked-up ship andexperienced pilots, were to have farreaching implications for future operations.The main complaint from the pilots was thelack of vision over the nos on approachas the line of sight below the horizontal was4 degrees. This meant that, while they weretrying to achieve a three-point landing,pilots were unable to see ahead. As this wasconsidered unacceptable, a continuouscurved final approach was adopted to enablepilots to keep the fl ight deck and the'batsman' in sight until the wings werelevelled out for touchdown.

classed, these few fighters managed to breakup numerous raids and shoot down some ofthe enemy aircraft without loss. RAFGladiators and Hurricanes were alsodeployed to Norway to bring some relief tothe hard-pressed carrier force.

By the end of May it was obvious thatthe Alii d Expeditionary Force could notprevail in orway and that evacuation wasneeded to save as many men as possible. Asaircraft had to be retained for home defenceit was proposed that as many of the RAFaircraft be recovered if possible. Althoughthe RAF fighters were not equipped witharrestor hooks the Hurricanes and theGladiators made successful landings aboardHMS Glorious. In a cruel twi t of fate thecarrier and her escorting destroyers encountered the German battle cruisers Scharnhorstand Gneisenau. All the aircraft and manyof the pilots as well as the carrier's crewmember went down with the ship.

Although the Sea Hurricane joined theGrumman Martlet in Fleet Air Arm service,it was obvious that neither type was capableof further development. Because theyoriginated from French and Greek contracts, the US-built machines were notequipped for carrier use and could onlyoperate from shore bases. This prompted theAdmiralty in late 1941 to pre s again forthe Sea Spitfire. The response was positive- up to a point. The Royal Navy receivedforty-eight Spitfire VBs and 202 V s, 50per cent of the original request. The AirMinistry wanted to maintain a sufficienttock of Spitfires and further aircraft were

required to meet Russian needs. In itsresponse, the Admiralty stressed the importance of a viable fleet defence as the principalfighter, the Fulmar, was too slow and theHurricane lacked wing folding capability.

Then, on 9 December 1941, the DefenceSupply Committee displayed its grasp of thesituation. It authorized production ofsufficient fighters and other aircraft to fullyequip RN carriers. Even though it wouldappear that the matter was settled, therewas an acrimonious exchange of correspondence as the Admiralty and Air

Shipboard Spitfires

Fighter Defects Exposed

The succ ss achiev d against the Luftwaffeby Royal Air Force Spitfire squadrons helpedto highlight the growing gap between thepetformance of the Royal avy's fighters andthose they opposed.

Although based on a successful landbased fighter, the Sea Hurricane was essentially a top-gap. The type served withdistinction on the CAM ships, thirty-fiveof which were converted with rocketpow red catapults, and also the MACs, thearmed merchant carriers, which werecargo vessels fitted with a flight deck. Butencumbered with the equipment needed fornaval operations and suitably strengthenedfor carrier operations, the Hurricane washardly a sparkling performer. It also lackedthe folding wings so neces ary for carrierstowage. Even so, it was superior - at leastin performance and agil ity - to the cumbersome Fairey Fulmar which sometimes haddifficulty catching the faster German andItal ian bombers.

In the early war years naval carrier forceswere employed on anti-submarine duties,chasing German raiders and interceptingblockade runners. It was against thisbackground that, in January 1940, theAdmiralty requested a 'Sea Spitfire' withfolding wings for service that October.Unfortunately for the Fleet Air Arm, theAdmiralty was unable to persuade the FirstLord, Winston Churchill, to push theproject forward. At his request it was abandoned in March. In hindsight, given theevents that began on 9 April, this was agross mistake. When German forces startedtheir invasion of Norway the defects of theFleet Air Arm's fighters were cruellyexposed.

All the available fleet carriers weredeployed to support naval and groundoperations. But the maximum number ofaircraft available for top cover was thirty,drawn from a pool of Skuas, Rocs and SeaGladiators. Yet although they were out-

28 29

Inside view of the pre-test flight shed at Westland showing Seafires being prepared for flight with Welkinhigh-altitude fighters in the background. BBA Collection

Castle Bromwich is the location and the scene is Spitfires undergoing final finishing. The managementinitially tried to build aircraft using car production methods but the growing number of modifications meantthat it was not feasible. Eventually. the difficulties were resolved and the facility became a vital part of theSpitfire and Seafire story. BBA Collection

This early Seafire was converted by Air Service Training at Hamble. Although similar tothe hooked Spitfires. there are obvious differences: the external strengthening strapsbelow the cockpit and similar plating on the lower aft fuselage. FAAM Yeovilton

NX890 was a Seafire IB allocated to No. 759 Squadron based at Yeovilton as partof the Naval Air Fighter School. Two other aircraft from the same unit are seenlined up in echelon. FAAM Collection

and the first Seafire IB was delivered on 15June 1942 by Air Service Training. Thecompany had been able to turn out theseconversions quite quickly, which meantthat their machines were delivered beforethose from Cunliffe-Owen. The first unitto be equipped with Seafires, No. 801 NavalAir Squadron, was a signed to HMSFurious. This vessel was unusual in that ithad 'T-shaped lifts, which meant that thelack of folding wings was not a hindrance;nor was the lack of a catapult for launchingsince the Seafire IBs lacked launch spools.

Further aircraft were requested by theAdmiralty in late 1942 for use duringOperation Torch, the landings in NorthAfrica. These were to be sixty-five pitfireVBs equipped with hooks but lackinglaunch spools, plus twenty retired Spitfiresfor flying training. All were required fordelivery during September 1943. [n caseHM Illustrious became available for thisoperation, the Admiralty increased itsrequirements by a further forty-eighthooked Spitfires with another eighteen fortraining. Sensing an opportunity for a majorincrease in its aircraft fleet, the Admiraltyrequested a meeting with the Ministry ofAircraft Production at which it demanded240 aircraft. This was whittled down to114, of which sixty-six were to be releasedfor FAA use in early 1943. It was a criticalperiod for British aircraft production assingle-seat fighters were heavily in demandand the industry was struggling to cope. Inaddition, the British Purchasing Mission inthe USA was struggling to obtain enoughaircraft to fulfil Britain's needs at a timewhen the USA was rapidly re-equipping itsforces. The situation was never fullyresolved during 1943, but production wasincreased sufficiently to give each RNfighter squadron, whether on land or sea,enough aircraft to meet its operationalneeds.

The Mk II Appears

While the first Seafires were re-workedsecond-hand pitfire Vs, the next version,the lIc and its low-level counterpart theL.Ilc, were built from the outset as navalfighters. Sup rmarine-manufactured aircraftwere based on new pitfire Vs taken fromthe production line and rebuilt. Brand-newaircraft were produced under ContractB124305/40 by Westland Aircraft, whichnow became responsible for Merlin Seafiredevelopment. Both the Supermarine factory Aline of Seafire IBs with NX908 at the front receiving attention to its Merlin engine. FAAM Collection

30 31

SH IPBOA RD SPITFI RES SHIPBOARD SPITFIRES

MA970 was originally constructed as a Seafire lie, being utilized for the trials

necessary to clear the type for naval service. Having completed this task, the

aircraft was re-built as the prototype Seafire III. BBA Collection

RATOG Trials

While the Seafire was being deliver d tooperational units, r ports highlighted acontinuing problem during carrier decklandings. This resulted in tiffer undercarriage units, while Supermarine insistedon a reduction in propell r diam ter withstocks of spare blades being retained toreplace those damaged during landing. Afurther difficulty was the lack of catapultscapable of launching a heavily-laden Seafirefrom some fleet and most of the escortcarriers. An alternative launch method wasprovided by RATOG, the Rocket AssistedTake-Off Gear, which comprised two Sin( 13cm) rockets. Each was 4lin (l04cm)long and weighed 661b OOkg), of which261b (l2kg) was cordite. RATOG mountings were fitted to the wing roots. Twoaircraft, MBI41 and MB307, were modifiedto test the rockets, initially at WorthyDown, before transfer to RAE Farnboroughon 14 January 1944 for pre-service trials.Use of this system required the enginethrottle be opened to full power, at whichpoint the RATOG was ignited. The rocketsburned for up to four seconds.

During the trials, various combinationsof two, four and eight tubes were tried.MB141 was deployed aboard HM Chaserbut it was badly damaged in a crash-landingwhich killed the pilot, K.J. Robetson. Thetests continued with the second aircraft,MB307, which had previou ly been used forthe trials at Farnborough. The tests werenot without incident. The rockets exhibiteda tendency to ignite the fabric covering therudder and elevators as well as the runwaysurface. Countering this required flash lesspowder for the rockets, flight controlsUlfaces re-skinned in alloy and fire resi tantrunway sUlfaces.

Having completed trials on dry land,MB307 was flown out to Chaser to continuethe development programme. Because ofthe RATOG system's inflammatory tendencies, personnel were warned never toinitiate firing over the hanger deck. AsChaser was required to act as a ferry carrierfor the British Pacific Fleet, the trials movedto HMS Slinger, which had been mined inthe River Medway in February 1944.

weighing of the airframe and determinationof the centre of gravity took place at WorthyDown on 14 July. The aircraft was foundto have a tare weight of 5,3101b (2,413kg)with an all-up weight of 7,043lb 0,201 kg).

While there was an increase in top speed,the reduction in wing area cut maximumaltitude to 20,000ft (6,150m). The loss ofthe wingtips also increased take-off andlanding runs, especially under full militaryloading.

A further consequence of the clippedwings was an increase in landing accidents;this was to lead to at least 30 per cent ofthe fleet being damaged. To counter this itwas proposed to fit a tail parachute to slowthe aircraft and stabilize it on landing. Thedesign and testing of the parachute and itshousing was undertaken at RAE Farnborough. During these trials the parachuteexerted a tensile load of 1,2001b (545kg)with a proof load of 3,0201b (l,3 70kg)while the maximum loading was 4,0401b(l,830kg). As the parachute unit wasrequired for use at sea, both it and itscontainer were designed to be removable,which meant it required fitting before flightand removal afterwards. Trials of the systemwere seen as successful, but minor parachutehook release failures meant that it wasshelved.

Only one other version of the Seafire lICwas produced. This was the photo-reconnaissance L.R.llC, which was fitted with apair of F.24 cameras, one a vertical 20in(5Icm) unit and the other a 14in (35cm)oblique unit. As this model was notdedicated to reconnaissance work, armament was retained. Conversion of the firstaircraft, MB194, was undertaken in July1943 by Heston Aircraft Ltd, which alsocompleted the remaining ones. As before,

were equipped with Merlin 45 engines,whose most efficient operating altitude was13,OOOft (4,OOOm). Fortunately, operatingexperience had shown that many interceptions took place at lower altitudes.Obviously, a more efficient powerplant waneeded for this kind of work and Spitfire ILl004 was fitted with a Merlin 32 enginerated at 1,645hp. Trials were undertakenduring December 1942 and their successresulted in an immediate Admiralty requestfor Seafires to be fitted with this engine,which conferred a maximum sea-levelspeed of 316mph (506km/h), increasing to335mph (536km/h) at 6,OOOft (l,850m).While this engine produced the requiredimprovements it also resulted in a conflictof interest; it had also been specified for theFairey Barracuda, but some were eventuallydiverted to Supermarine. In productionSeafires the unit drove a four-bladed propeller, which further improved the performance of an aircraft now designated theSeafire L.IIC.

Compared with the Merlin 32 the Merlin46 featured a supercharger wi th smallerdiameter blades, which enabled more powerto be delivered to the propeller rather thanbeing diverted to provide air for the engineat altitude. The Merlin 46 employed theCoffman cartridge-type starting system,which m ant it was no longer dependenton an external electrical power source. Asthe increased weight of the eafire hadslowed it down in comparison with theSpitfire, various methods were sought toincrease pelformance and manoeuvrability.

MA970 was also used to test the four-bladed propeller and the tropical filter unit

located under the nose. Somewhere along the way wrinkles have appeared in

the lower fuselage skins. BBA Collection.

Production Tempo Increases

While W stland worked up to productionstatus Supermarine delivered fifty Seafiresby October 1942, just enough to equip foursquadrons but with scant allowance forattrition. Westland's early build Seafire llCs

Westland's first eafir IIC, LR631, didnot appear until December 1942. Afterinitial test flying it was transferred toVickers' Worthy Down facility on 4 January1943 for weighing and determination of itscentre ofgravity. As delivered, the airframehad a tare weight of 5,322lb (2,419kg),which increased to 6,9781b 0,1 72kg) for anormal take-off, although this increased to7,272lb (3,305kg) with a 30gal (136Itr)overload tank. The aircraft was powered bya Rolls-Royce Merlin 46 driving a threebladed Rotol Jablo propeller unit. It alsofeatured a temperate climate air intake. Asit was a later-build aircraft, some fifty-threeSeafire and Spitfire modifications had beenapplied. During flight trials LR631 recordeda maximum speed of 363mph (581km/h)at 7,300ft (2,200m), which increased to398mph (63 7km/h) at 2l,OOOft (6,400m).Rate of climb was determined to be 4,900ft(l,500m) per min at 4,800ft (l,500m)altitude which decreased to 4,050ft(l,250m) p r min at 18,000ft (5,500m).

Seafire swung off the centreline and theradiator cowling was damaged.

After minor repairs a further nineteencatapult launches were undertaken beforeAD371 was returned to Worthy Down forinspection. The report was not promising.Buckling was found near the rear fuselagespools and there was more at frame 19 atthe tail unit attachment point. During thesetrials the tailplane had become deformed,resulting in a tendency for the aircraft totwist to starboard, which required theapplication of full rudder. The pilot'sheadrest was considered to be too far backand the engine exhibited a tendency to cutout on launching. All the defects wererectified, the major piece of remedial work- according to a Supermarine report ofNovember 1942 - being a 50 p r centstrengthening of the ailframe.

The first production Seafire llC ,MA970,- built by Supermarine and designated Type358 - made its first flight from High Po tairfield on 28 May 1942. It went to WorthyDown on 9 June for weighing, as the airframe now incorporated twenty eafire andSpitfire modifications. A variety of armament options was also considered but theone favoured by the Admiralty - four 20mmHispano cannons - was found to be tooheavy for the airframe. This obliged theirLordships to accept the 'B' wing combination of two cannons and four machine-guns.

and the Castle Bromwich productionfacility were fully occupied turning outSpitfires and the addition of the Seafire tothe production lines would have causedmajor disruption. Supermarine, however,delivered its small quota more quickly thanWestland because the Yeovil-based manufacturer had first to tool-up and establishits production line. Cunliffe-Owen becameits major subcontractor.

The major changes incorporated in theSeafire II series included arrester hookmounting spigots at fuselage frame 16 oneither side, with a further pair mountedunder the wing centre section for the launchspools. To strengthen the area aroundframe 16 an external fishplate was rivetedalong the mid-fuselage longeron from theforward cockpit bulkhead to the radio bayto compensate for the arrester hook. Furtherstrengthening was applied to frames 9, 10and 16, and to the fuselage longerons nearthe radio compartment. The forward pairof spools was mounted on braced framesriveted to the fuselage in line with thebottom longerons.

All of this extra strengthening wasneeded to counter the forces associatedwith carrier launches and landings. No lessthan 40,000 man hours were expended onredesigning the fuselage to accommodatethe arrester hook, its mounting and additional strengthening. The Universal 'C'wing with its additional 25lb (llkg) ofarmour plate and mounting points forunder-wing stores on the outer panels alsorequired beefing up. To compensate for theincreased weight, the undercarriage wasredesigned and strengthened. The undercarriage units were also raked forward by2in (Scm) in an attempt to reduce theaircraft's tendency to nose over.

The first prototype Supermarine Type357 Seafire llC, AD371, a converted Spitfire V, made its maiden flight in February1942. By 25 February the prototype was atRAE Farnborough for evaluation. Carriertrials began aboard HMS Illustrious on 5March. As delivered, the aircraft had an allup weight of 6,4901b (2,950 kg) Althoughthe Seafire initially performed well duringtake-offs and landings, problem becomeapparent later in the trials. During onecatapult launch the aircraft swung slightlyand the port wheel hit the deck coaming,causing the tyre to burst. The pilotcompleted the take-off and made a circuitof the carrier before landing, holding off theport wheel for as long as possible beforemaking contact with the deck. But the

32 33

elevators. It was still obvious, however,that further investigation was needed. Thefirst Cunliffe-Owen aircraft, NN333, wasfound to be suffering from exactly thesame problem. The tail units of both LR766and NN333 were given a thorough inspection but no fault was found. This directedthe investigation to the one major difference between the Seafire II and SeafireIll: the folding wings. Accordingly, a set offixed eafire II wings was installed on aSeafire Ill. This confirmed that there wasan airflow problem over the wing foldjoints. Seals at the wing fold joints filledthe gaps and helped stabilize the airflow,but never really smoothed the disturbedairflow over the wing. Before its diversion

Although lR765 was originally designated as the Seafire III prototype. its lack of

folding wings meant that it was later re-designated as a Mk lie. BBA Collection

Seafire III NF547 was allocated to No. 885 Squadron, based at Henstridge during

May 1944. This view shows the method and detail of wing folding. FAAM Yeovilton

(22.6cm) aft, just short of the r quiredminimum. Further trials saw both MA970and LR 766 being loaded with weights,which placed the C of G trim to therequired 9in (22.9cm) aft of the datum.MA970 behaved as before but LR766 wasstill slightly unstable. In a further effort to

rectify this imbalance, the radio equipmentwas moved further aft, while MA970donated its complete tail section to LR766to see if an item known to be serviceablewould make a difference.

Extensive test flying revealed that LR766was still showing signs of instability. Thefinal effort was to fit a 3.51b (l.6kg) inertiabalance weight to the elevator controlcircuit, which dampened the reaction of the

Instability Problems

and late-build Seafire lis was that of theType 'C'. This reduced the number ofcannon to two instead of the Admiralty'spreferred four. The chosen installation,developed by Martin Baker Ltd, resulted ina smaller upper wing-surface blister, whichincreased top speed by 5mph (8km/h).

Westland Aircraft was the primary contractor for Seafire III production. CunliffeOwen was again the main subcontractorwith many other smaller firms feeding intothe production line. While design workand prototyping were undertaken as quicklyas possible, establishing a production linewas delayed by the creation of manufacturing jigs and machine tools. Even afterthese vital items had been delivered therewere further delays in manufacturing thefolding wing sections accurately. As a result,the first thirty Westland-built aircraft, plusthe initial two from Cunliffe-Owen, weredelivered with standard, single-piece Seafire1I wings. They were eventually re-designated F.IlCs to reflect their down-gradedstatus. The second Westland-built aircraft,LR766, was delivered to Worthy Down forweighing and contractors flight trials on8 June 1943.

While there, its internal and exteriorpaint finishes were thoroughly examinedfollowing reports that those applied by thefactory were below the required standardsand left the airframe open to corrosion. Asthis type of finish was not confined to onemanufacturer an extensive series of photographs was taken with copies distributed toall those involved in applying final finishesto Seafire components. During its time atWorthy Down, LR766 was found to beunstable when the centre of gravity was 8in(20cm) aft of the datum. Thinking thisSeafire might simply be a 'rogue' aircraft,Boscombe Down was asked if its Seafire IIItrials aircraft, LR765, was exhibiting similartendencies.

As both aircraft were confirmed as unstablea solution had to be found before the typeenter d op rational service. Getting theaircraft balanced required ballast weights inthe rear fuselage. Initially, three weremounted in the no to give the aircraft anall-up weight of7,0761b (3,2l6kg) and a Cof G datum of 8.lin (20.6cm) aft. But itwas still out of limits. The next attempt sawweights fitted into the Seafire's tail, whichproduced an all-up weight of 7,218Ib(3,281kg) and a datum point of 8.9in

It had been intended to use the Merlin 55to power the Seafire Ill, which was designated the Supermarine Type 538. Thiengine was similar to the Merlin 45 exceptfor a barometrically-governed automaticboost control to operate the superchargeras the aircraft gained altitude and reducepilot workload. Absorbing the engine's1,470hp output wa a four-bladed RotolR12/4F5 propeller, although some earlybuild aircraft were fitted with three-bladedunits. Armament selected for the Seafire 1lI

hard-wearing felt pads were mounted oneach pipe face. When the wings were fullydeployed these pads made a joint tominimize air leaks. While the reduction inspan to 13ft 4in (4. 1m) meant that theSeafire III would fit comfortably on to thelifts proposed for the new carriers, eachaircraft required five personnel to strike itdown and prepare it for fl ight. Once thehandling crew had become experienced inworking the wing folding mechanism, theycould perform the task in 45sec. Spreadingthe wings took 5sec longer. Wing foldingreduced the torsiona I rigid ity facror to90 per cent of the original, although theSup rmarine Design and Stress Analysisteams and the Admiralty were preparedto accept this for the benefits gained.Obviously, power wing folding would havebeen better but development time, plus theweight of the hydraulic system and associated jacks, would have been unacceptable.

Seafire III Development

SHIPBOARD SPITFIRES

simpler one. Even so, Joseph Smith and theSupermarine design team faced a formidabletask in fitting the folding mechanism withinthe Spitfire's thin wing while retaining itsstructural integrity and armament. The firstproduction Seafire IIC, MA970, was flownto Worthy Down on 2 October 1942, whereits wings were removed for conversion.

Thi entailed stripping the structuredown to the basics before splitting it intothe designated sections. Once the hinges,systems and skinning had been fitted, eachwing mechanism was cycled before beingreturned to the aircraft. Further tests wereconducted to confirm that the folding andlocking units operated correctly. The hingeswere mounted on the top web of the boomon both the fron t and rear spars. Thelocking point for the inner sections waslocated on the lower section of the sparbooms, the locating pin featuring a gentletaper to facilitate insertion into the retaining lugs. When fitted, the folding wingtipswere also hinged and locked manually. Asthey left a gap in the wing upper surfaces,fairing doors were provided to restore aerodynamic integrity. peration of the innerhinge points and their locking mechanismswa undertaken using a locking levermounted in each main undercarriage bay.Each lever was attached to a cable, whichmoved the pins into their respective lugs.Tapered spigots located in reinforced lugshelped locate the inner wing sectionscorrectly.

Changes were also required to the gunheating ducting. To compensate for anyminor mismatches between wing sections,

While not the clearest of images, this illustration shows a Seafire III allocated to

No. 736 Squadron's '8' Flight. It was normally based at Speke, although

occasional trips were made to various carriers as part of the training process.

Ray Sturtivant

Folding Wings Proposed

Repairs had been carried during that month,the carrier returning to service in Octoberwhen it arrived in the Clyde for trainingand work-up as well as RATOG trials. Bothfour and eight cluster units were tested.Use of the former reduced the take-offrun with the ship's bow into wind to 270ft(83m), while the latter cut it to 230ft(7001). Aircraft weight was 7,2501b(3,295kg). Further Seafire trials concernedthe Fleet Air Arm's need to rapidly re-armthe aircraft. Supermarine used a standardSeafire wing into which a modified hingedunder-wing access door retained by quickrelease fasteners was installed. Afterstress analysis and practical trials this ideawas rejected as the wing was structurallyweakened and the door fastenings wouldhave failed under load.

The final Seafire IIC, LR764, wasdelivered to Worthy Down for weighing andC of G checks on 18 October 1943. Thismachine differed considerably from the firstexample because it was powered by a RollsRoyce Merlin 55 driving a five-bladed RotolJablo propeller unit. The aircraft recordeda tare weight of 5,219Ib (l,145kg) and anall-up weight of 6,8751b (3,125kg). Thisaircraft was not to enter regular service asit was retained for trials, which includedtests of the Seafire III tail unit at BoscombeDown.

The fixed-wing Seafires proved valuablebut it was obvious that the next pha e ofdevelopment should be foldable wings.This would enable the aircraft to operateaboard the new fleet carriers, whose decklifts were of the smallest possible size toreduce damage from enemy action. Thefirst indication of the Admiralty's desire fora folding wing Spitfire had come when theDirector of Air Material met Vickersrepresentatives in November 1939. A fullblown proposal followed at the beginningof 1940 at a time when it was not considereddesirable to divert airframes from the RAF.

When the idea was resurrected, the Supermarine team made some minor revisions tothe original drawings. At the same time,General Aircraft Ltd also put forward aproposal for folding Spitfire wings backwardsinstead of the concertina type favoured bythe Admiralty and Supermarine. The ideawas rejected due to the folding mechanismbeing heavier than that proposed bySupermarine, although the concept was a

34 35

Further development work saw the introduction of under-wing bomb carriers.

although they were limited to carrying a 2501b load. BBA Collection

Various aircraft were used for testing.PR314, for example, went to BoscombeDown in March 1945 for weapons loadingand handling trials, which included the useof200lb Mk II Smoke floats, 45gal (205Itr)slipper ranks, Mine A Mk Vlll, 30lb MkIe bombs, 250lb Mk I I I bombs and 500lbAN-M64 bombs. A centreline mountingpoint was also tried. Another BoscombeDown trials aircraft was NN500, whicharrived in November 1944. It was used tomeasure the leakage of carbon monoxidethrough the firewall access points into thecockpit and to find ways of reducing oreliminating it.

Having missed the arrester hook. Seafire III of No. 749 Squadron rolls at high

speed into the safety barrier aboard the carrier HMS Theseus in June 1946. Such

was the force of the final impact that the aircraft was written-off. BBA Collection

Seafire III PR265 is pictured outside the hangar at Henstridge. It ended up in

French Navy service. Ray Sturtivant

w re constant concerns about longitudinalstability and pilot training was designed toreflect this. But it was not enough to stoppilots complaining that the Seafire IIIsuffered from lateral trim change as speedchanged. They also continued to point outthat the ai lerons remained heavy throughout the speed range, while the rate of rolldeclined as the speed rose. After extensivetesting the only cure considered possible wasto raise torsional stiffness of the wingstructure with extra stiffness provided byplating over the outer machine-gun bays.Roll rate improvements involved wingtipremoval and aileron balance tabs.

Indefatigable. Investigation showed that theSeafire had drifted slightly on landing,putting heavy and unexpected stress on theundercarriage mounting. This had shearedoff, forcing the undercarriage leg inwards.Strengthening was undertaken as part ofModification 279. A tronger locking headlug was installed to helped counter sideloads induced by the rolling of an aircraftcarrier at sea.

As with the Seafire ll, there was also areconnaissance version of the Mk 1lI, thefirst being MBI94. Again, one vertical F24 and an oblique F 24 camera wereinstalled in the rear fuselage. The formercould be fitted with either 5,8 or 14in (13,20 or 36cm) len es, while the latter wasrestricted to an 8in (20cm) lens. Althoughthe aircraft were built by Cunliffe-Owen,conversion work on the final 149 airframeswas carried out by Heston Aircraft Ltd.The first, MBI94, was despatched toWorthy Down on 14 July 1943 for weighingand C of G checks. This aircraft was littedwith a Merlin 32 engine driving a RotolJablo four-blade propeller, a temperatecowling, one F24 20in (51cm) verticalcamera, plus a 14in (36cm) F24 obliquecamera. The Seafire was found to weigh5,3101b (2,4l4kg) rare, while fully loadedthe figure rose to 7,0431b (3,201kg).

The Seafire LF.lII came next with aMerlin SSM for improved low-level performance. The first aircraft, NF545, was flownto High Post from Westland's Yeovil plantfor weighing and C of G checks, arrivingon 31 March 1944. The checks revealed atare weight of 5,4571b (2,480kg) and anall-up weight of 7, 1331b (3,242kg) A laterexample of this variant, PP986, wasdespatched to High Post on 17 October forsimilar checks, weighing in at 5,4491b(2,477kg) tare, with a maximum of7,2211b(3,282kg). Some of the extra weight wasdue to the gyro gun-sight fitted for trialsalongside the standard reflector sight. Togive an increased measure ofquality control,three further Cunliffe-Owen Seafire Illswent to High Post for weighing and C ofG checks, these being NN390 (5,443Ibor 2,474kg tare and 7,18llb or 3,264kgmaximum), NN409 (5,443Ib or 2,474kgtare and 7,172lb or 3,260kg maximum) andNN500 (5,5171b or 2,508kg tare, 7,2011bor 3,273kg maximum). The light variationwere due to the modifications that hadbeen made to the airframes as productioncontinued.

Overall, the Seafire III was reported tobe a better performer than the Mk II. There

make contact between the propeller anddeck inevitable. It was clear that a tail hookdamper that would not throw the nose overwas required. After much trial and error asuitable unit was available for manufacture.Further undercarriage modifications wererequired when the port undercarriage legof Seafire 1lI, LR840, collapsed on 24 March1944 during its first landing aboard HMS

Strenuous efforts were made to improve both the Spitfire and the Seafire. One

focus of these efforts was the fuselage centre-line bomb and fuel tank carrier.

seen here with a 500lb bomb in position. Eric Morgan Collection

SHIPBOARD SPITFIRES

Three propeller units were destroyed inlanding accidents during the trials, but filmof the incidents revealed the cause. It wasobvious that as the arrester hook madecontact with the wire, the softness of thedamper allowed the aircraft to gain a smallamount of height before tensioning of thewire slowed it down. This forced it back onto the deck with the tail raised slightly to

to these investigations, NN333 had goneto Worthy Down on 25 October 1943 forweighing and C of G checks. This Seafirewas fitted with a Merlin 55 with standardtemperate-type lower engine cowling andnose ballast weights. Tare weight was5,5411b (2,519kg), while fully loaded theaircraft weighed in at 7,197lb (3,271kg).

Major Modifications

While these investigations were in progress,Seafire III production was continuing andmajor modifications were incorporated asnecessary. One of the first was the substitution of the Hispano Mk [[ cannon for thelight r Mk V. Wing strengthening wasapplied at a later stage and this permittedthe carriage of four rockets with either 25lbor 60lb warheads, two per wing, or a single250lb bomb under each wing. In additiona single 500lb bomb could be carried underthe centre section. Further modificationswere required to the gun heating system aspilots had complained of overheating. Thiswas especially worrying as the highesttemperatures were being recorded closeto the ammunition boxes. The first attemptat a cure involved asbestos lagging. Thisproved in ffective; baffles in the ductinghelped cool the air but the temperaturesremained too high. The solution was toincrease the cooling airflow to reduce thetemperature to a safer level.

To enable the eafire to operate in dustyconditions, some were fitted with theoriginal bulky type of Spitfire tropical fi Iter,which reduced performance. The VokesAero Vee unit was introduced at the 130thproduction aircraft and installed retro-pectively. The plumbing and fitments

needed for the carriage of external overloadfuel tanks to increase range and patrol timewere also featured on this aircraft. Modifications were also made to the main undercarriage legs as they showed a tendency tofail under extreme loads. Tests aboard thetrials and training carrier HMS PretoriaCastle started on 12 February 1944 whilethe ship was cruising off the Clyde followingrepairs to damage sustained in a collisionwith HMS Ravager. The opportunity wasalso taken to eliminate arrester-hookbounce, which was causing some aircraft tomiss the cables. Both spline and link oleomodifications were undertaken, with thespline-type p rforming slightly better.

36 37

The Royal Navy had great hopes of the Blackburn Firebrand, which was intended

to be its next fleet fighter, butthe type encountered numerous engine and stability

problems. BBA Collection

Carrier Cruisers

As the Seafire gained extra range withadditional internal and external fuel tanks,further ideas were put forward to increasits usefulness. Central to this was anincrease in the number of ship equippedwith homing beacons to help pilots findtheir way home and reduce navigationworkload. This innovation led to theproposed carrier-cruiser, intended to provide additional air defence. The vesselwould be based on a standard heavy cruiserwith a 300ft (92m) flight deck completewith eight arrester wires. It would also retainits main armament.

As ever, when their Lordships came upwith a new scheme, the Director of avalConstruction and his staff were asked toprepare the necessary outline drawings.At the same time, there were ideas fordestroyer-sized carriers plus a redesign of theforthcoming Vanguard battleship. Whilethe Fleet Air Arm accepted that more flightdecks were needed, all three designs fellfar short of the requirements for fighteroperations, especially those by Seafires.Fortunately, further fleet carriers wereon the stock, while escort carriers were inquantity production in the USA to supplement those already in ervice.

Concerned about a possible shortage ofpilots, the Admiralty asked the RAF totrain pitfire pilots for carrier operationsshould they be needed. The RAF respondedby pledging up to 532 aircraft to be equippedfor sea-going operations, together with apool of 252 trained pilots. Eight squadrons- 64,131,141,401,402,403,412 and 416- were selected. The chosen pilots wereinitially trained at their home bases usingstretches of the runway painted to representan aircraft carrier. Once this had beencompleted each unit was sent to Arbroath,which acted as the home base while decklanding training was conducted. While thepilots displayed the required proficiency, itwa reported that they exhibited a tendencyto land too fast. They al 0 ignored the batsman's signals, preferring to rely on their ownjudgement. The programme progressedsatisfactorily, but by the end of summer1943 the tide of war was starting to movein the Allies' favour. The Admiralty oughtcancellation of the programme, but theRAF decided to continue in case furthersea-borne units were needed for attacksagainst the Japanese homeland. In theevent, the Allied forces' overwhelmingstrength, together with the difficulty of

SHIPBOARD SPITFIRES

transporting so many fixed wing aircraft tothe theatre, put paid to the idea.

Sea Typhoon?

Although the Admiralty was generallypleased with the Seafire, it was still seekingother types to supplement it. Their Lordships were also aware that at the end of thewar all Lend-Lease aircraft would eitherhave to be returned or bought. Purchase wasnot consider d a viable option as supportcosts would exceed those of British-builtaircraft even if the airframes wer offer d atadvantageous rates. The Admiralty's choiceswere Hawker's Typhoon and Tempest. Onlythe former was available for trials work asthe latter type existed only in prototypeform. The manufacturer was asked to preparea preliminary design for sea-going versionswith folding wings having greater area toimprove handling at sea. Further fuselagemodification would be needed to absorb theforces involved in carrier operations.

A the Typhoon was a roomy aircraft,Hawker was able to convince the Admiraltythat a naval version would be able to sustaina four-hour loiter or a ix-hour enduranceflight. To follow this up, the Admiraltyrequested the loan of a few aircraft to enablethe idea to be developed. Accordingly,Typhoon DN419, the only aircraft available, was released to the naval station at

Arbroath where it arrived on 8 February1943. It did not last long. A crash-landingfollowing an engine malfunction on takeoff resulted in the aircraft being burnt out.The unexpected result of this accident wasthe cancellation of the entire programmeby the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet.Denied the Typhoon's roomy cockpit, someFranks flying suits were requisitioned tohelp improve Seafire pilots' comfort,especially during long flights. Trials beganin August 1943 with No. 807 Squadronaboard HMS Fonniclabl.e. Although the suitswer found to reduce fatigue, pilotcomplained that movement was difficultand that they could not enter their cockpitsunaided. The suit was found to improvecomfort during long periods in the air butit did not see widespread u e.

Overall, some 1,220 Seafire llls werebuilt, 870 of which came from Westland,while the remainder were manufactured byCunliffe-Owen. First deliveries to the FleetAir Arm began on 27 November 1943when No. 894 Squadron received the type.Seafire Ills were then delivered to Nos887,889,801 and 880 quadrons. Furtherunits were equipped with the type, manyof which saw service with the British PacificFleet, which was then fighting Japan incompany with United States Navy ta kforces. This version remained in serviceuntil March 1946 when 887 and 894Squadrons disbanded.

SHIPBOARD SPITFIRES

Seafire lie Specification

The official specification for the Seafire IIC was issued on 15 August 1942 and signed by J.E. Serby on behalf of the Director ofTechnical Development. This reference document covered the manufacture of Research Aircraft No.3665, while the initial specificationcovered the conversion of Spitfire V airframes to Seafire IIC standard.

Each aircraft was to be constructed in strict accordance with the drawings and specifications listed in the construction schedule of 2June 1942, except where they had been modified for the proposed naval role. There were two other specifications. DTD 1000 coveredaircraft fittings and DTD 1003 the marking of aeroplanes and their individual items. The final camouflage was to be applied inaccordance with ADM 332 and DTD Technical Order 144.

An extensive range of modifications, which had already appeared on the Spitfire list. was to be embodied. As the aircraft wasrequired for naval duties, catapult spools and deck landing gear had to be added. Provision also had to be made for slinging andstructural strengthening for catapulting purposes. Other modifications covered the provision of external 50gal (227Itr) fuel tanks,together with jettisoning arrangements as part of Mod. 436. Modification No. 438 also covered jettisonable external under-wing fueltanks. Also included were an immersed oil heater, an Rl147 radio, an R3108 instead of an R3002 radio, installation of a TRl196A radio(after the first thirty aircraft instead of the original radio set-up). deletion of the rear oxygen bottle and re-positioning of theeconomiser, deletion of the flare chute and associated controls, introduction of a free pistol mounting in the cockpit, plus thereplacement of the original Mk IXF airspeed indicator by the Mk IXF* unit when it became available.

Items to be introduced when time and circumstances permitted included:

tropicalization equipmentprovision for ballast on the port engine bearerprovision for lashing points on the wings and undercarriagefuel tank strengthening attachmentsmodified radiator shutter controlstrengthened seat to withstand the loading of a catapult launchadjustable headrestdeletion of the tail mounting and ballaststrengthening of the tail wheel oleo anchoragearrester release control improvementmodified wheel fairings to clear loading chocks.

Extra equipment was also to be fitted for slinging gear, aircraft hold-down gear.All alterations and modifications, except those issued under Special Order Only instructions, were to be applied to both the Spitfire

V and the Seafire IIC, as applicable. After manufacture each aircraft had to undertake a test flight even though the early-build ones hadalready undergone a full flight test.

Before delivery the designated manufacturer or subcontractor had to furnish the Director of Technical Development (DTD) or hisdesignated representative with certain details concerning the aircraft at least one week before delivery. These were applicable to thefirst, fiftieth and every 100th aircraft and included the tare weight, the weight when fully loaded and the location of the centre ofgravity. If any aircraft was delivered without all equipment installed, an initial centre of gravity position was to be indicated while acorrect datum point was required to be determined as soon as possible.

A subsequent DTD document dated 25 January 1943 amplified details of the requirements for Seafire IIC production by subsidiarycompanies or by subcontractors like Cunliffe-Owen and Westland. The aircraft were to be constructed in accordance with Seafire IICdrawings and schedules supplied via Ministry of Aircraft Production instructions dated 4 January. Outside of the basic airframe,engines, propellers, exhaust manifolds and other items, as specified, were to be supplied by the Ministry of Aircraft Production underembodiment loan terms.

Specifically highlighted was the interchangability of aircraft parts and structure sub-components. All were to be constructed usingjigs to ensure accuracy. As well as manufacturing the initial run of components, the subcontractors were also to supply furtheradditional parts to the Director General of Equipment's (DGE) office to enable them to be added to the Seafire spares schedule. Toensure component interoperability, the contractors were required to provide gauges, jig references and other agreed items to the DGE.As the subcontractors were not the designated design authority, any suggested changes to the components would be investigated;only the designers could authorize changes. Any proposed changes had to take into account interchangeability, operationalconsiderations, safety and cost or date of delivery. As with the original specification, the contractors, on reaching their first, fiftieth and100th aircraft, were to send the DTD a master schedule covering the equipment fitted to the aircraft, although there was a provisorequiring a conformity certificate should there be a lack of time to create a master schedule.

Flight testing of contractors' aircraft was required to be done by personnel from Vickers Armstrong (Supermarine) Ltd of HursleyPark, Winchester, the arrangements being controlled by the Ministry of Aircraft Production (MAP). Certain aircraft had to be deliveredto A&AEE, as requested by the MAP. During the test flights the aircraft had be fully loaded with their centres of gravity fully aft. Theexternal flight requirement was applicable only to designated point aircraft, the remainder being flown by the contractor's pilots. Oncompleting the tests satisfactorily each aircraft received a certificate of general airworthiness (Form AM838). Every tenth machine hadto be dived at full speed to check handling and behaviour, although this could be curtailed if the weather was unsuitable.

During flight testing, the Inspector in Charge of the Airworthiness Inspection Department (AID). in co-operation with other officials,could authorize extra segments of the full flight test, but not if it would delay delivery. This part of the schedule included at least onetake-off at maximum boost; should more than one landing be made the undercarriage had to cycled fully. After take-off a full-throttleclimb was to be maintained until boost started to drop off. Three minutes of level flight at full throttle was to be followed by five atmaximum cruise and at maximum weak mixture. During these phases, the pilot was to exercise the controls, note all gauge readingsand check the canopy and windscreen for optical clarity. Once all checks and testing had been completed the contractors were toprovide facilities for the final in-depth examination of the first contract aircraft, as requested by the DTD or representative.

38 39

The landings at Salerno in southern Italyin September 1943 provided the Allies withtheir first major foothold on the Europeanmainland to enable them to bring WorldWar II to a conclusion. The operation alsorepresented the first big test for the RoyalNavy's Supermarine Seafires. About 100aircraft from eleven Fleet Air Arm quadrons were deployed to provide air cover forthe first four critical day of the operation.

But the Seafire had been blooded wellbefore then. The type first saw action inNovember 1942 during Operation Torch,the Allied invasion of Vichy French-h IdNorth Africa. eafires were again deployedin July 1943 for Operation Husky, thelandings in icily.

It was at Lee on Solent on 23 June 1942that No. 807 Squadron finally disposed ofits outdated Fairey Fulmars and began reequipping with the upermarine Seafire.Originally a handful of Seafire IBs (including AB857 and AD926 together withBL514, BL858, BR561 and BR567) andhooked pitfire VBs (W3967 and ADS 13 )were taken on charge. Under the commandof Lt A.B. Fraser Harris DSC RN, thesquadron undertook a full work-up beforemoving to Yeovilton on 12 July 1942 forintensive flying training. This was followedby a move to Machrihanish on 24 Augustfor weapons and air combat training combined with air patrol duties in support offorces operating in the Faroes gap. Workingup completed, the unit acquired newaircraft, which included MB343, MB357and NX952. They were flown out to jointhe carrier HMS Furious, which had justcompleted a refit in the Clyde shipyards inApril.

In July the carrier was declared ready forservice with the Home Fleet. Her air wingcomprised Nos. 801 and 807 Squadronswith Seafires, together with a flight of FaireyAlbacores contributed by No. 822 Squadron. With this restricted air wing, Furiouswas involved in ferrying much-neededaircraft and supplies to Malta, two suchtrips being undertaken during August. No.807 Squadron then prepared to accept more

CHAPTER FOUR

Into Action

aircraft to bring it up to full strength, thenewcomers including MB372, MB374,NX898, NX903 and NX947.

Operation Torch

With the first Seafire squadron fullyequipped, No. 801 Squadron traded in itsSea Hurricanes for twelve unmodifiedSpitfires. The switch came on 7 September1942, which is regarded as the unit's officialformation date, although a cadre of pilotsoperating under that unit designation hadalready acquired sea duty time plus valuableexperience aboard Furious the previousmonth. The Spitfires were used purely inthe training role at Stretton and includedR6722, R7132, R7305, R7909, W3136,W3522, W3916, X4846, AA905, AD426,ADS83 and AD584. The Seafire IBs, whichincluded MB342, MB345, MB347, MB352,MB353, MB358, MB359, MB363 andMB364, arrived before the end of themonth. Lt Cdr R. McD. Hall RN wasappointed the squadron's CO and heremained in command while Furious andher air wing prepared for Operation Torch.

Originally named Operation Gymnast,Torch had resulted from Stalin's pressure onthe Western Allies to open a second frontto relieve his forces. U commandersinitially favoured opening the second frontin Europe, code-named Operation Sledgehammer, but Churchill and his GeneralStaff finally persuaded President Rooseveltthat uch a course of action would bedisastrous. An assault on mainland Europemight have forced the Germans to divertresources from the Russian front but anybenefits would probably have been shortterm ones. An attack on French NorthAfrica, on the other hand, would not onlytie up the Germans but also give the Alliesa chance to gain control of the Mediterranean and neutralize the Italian fleet aswell as that of Vichy France tied up atToulon.

In mid-October 1942 Furious departedBritish waters in company with HMS Argus

40

and headed for the Mediterranean. There,both ships were to form the Central NavalTask Group. In charge of the entire operation was General Dwight D. Ei enhower,with his headquarters in Gibraltar, whilethe naval commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force was Admiral Sir AndrewCunningham. The force was divided intothree elements. The western assault fleet,which comprised American units, hadCasablanca as its objective, while the mixedBritish and American ea tern force wa tohead for Algiers. The entirely British centretask force was directed to attack Oran.Robert Murphy, the American consul inAlgiers, had given advice on the mood ofthe Vichy French forces and consequentlyit was considered advisable for the Britishforces to wear American Combined TaskForce badges. imilarly, participating Britishaircraft were ordered to display Americanstars in place of their usual roundels. Thiswould not only help avoid misidentificationby trigger-happy US pilots but also concealthe aircrafts' nationality from Vichy personnel still bitter at the British attack onthe French fleet at Oran in 1940.

While the task forc s operated as threeseparate groups, the air assets were dividedinto two. One was commanded by AirMarshal Sir William Welsh and covered thearea east of Cape T enez, Algeria, whi Ie theother covered the area to the west and wascommanded by US Army Air Force MajorGeneral Jame Doolittle. Torch began on 8November and Seafires operating fromArgus and Furious were ordered to provideair cover for the centre task force landingseast and west of Oran. Furious' Albacores,supported by Seafires, were to attack theFrench airfield at La Senia with 500lbbombs at first light, while Sea Hurricanesfrom the Escort arrier HMS Biter provid dtop cover. After the attack, the Seafires wereto turn their attentions to the civil airportat Tafaroui, where Dewoitine 520 fighterswere based.

Furth r out to sea, the fleet carriersFormidable and Victorious were to providean air umbrella over the fleet, while their

The arrester hook fitted to Spitfire Bl818 has failed to deploy. causing its undercarriage to collapse on landing. HMS Furious'

deck landing party are shown taking the aircraft down to the lower aircraft deck, BBA Collection

As the nose tilts down, Bl818's arrester hook finally lowers while the deck landing crews strain to control the aircraft's weight.

BBA Collection

Roaring off the deck of an escort carrier, this Seafire IB already has its tail wheel up. As recommended in

the Pilot's Notes, the canopy is fully open, being stopped from moving forward by the half-cocked access

door. FAAM Veovilton

With a fleet carrier, possibly HMS Victorious, and battleships of the King George V and Queen Elizabeth classes in the

background, pilots discuss their next mission while their aircraft are prepared for flight aboard a light fleet carrier. Ray Sturtivant

securing Oran harbour to prevent theFrench neet from interfering with thelandings. The two destroyers carrying thetroops involved were hit by multiple shells,forcing them to withdraw. This allowedthe French fleet to clear the harbour andattempt to disrupt the landings; however,sufficient naval power had been madeavailable to prevent this from beingeffective.

After two days of resistance by thedefender, French forces in the Oran areasurrendered on 9 November after a bombardment by British battleships. But anunintended con equence of the NorthAfrican invasion was that French force inTunisia pulled back to the Algerian borderon the 10th, leaving the country open toGerman occupation. At first the Frenchremained confined to camp, determinednot to fight, but later they were orderedto attack the Germans. Despite outdat dequipment, the French-led Tunisiansoldier put up such a spirited fight that theywere rewarded with more modern Britishsupplied weapons. Once the Frenchadmini tered territory had been secured theBritish pushed on towards Tunisia, being

HMS Furious began life in 1917 as a heavy cruiser. Converted into an aircraft carrier in 1925, the vessel

served with distinction until being withdrawn from use, totally worn out, in October 1944. SSA Collection

With a battleship of the King George V class in the background, the deck handling party move this

unidentified Seafire into position for take-off. As this view was taken before the take-off flap setting

modification was introduced, wooden blocks have been inserted between the flaps and the wings. SSA

Collection

The Swordfish remained in the front line throughout the Battle of the Atlantic. It carried a variety of

weapons including torpedoes, depth charges, bombs and rockets. SSA Collection

First Seafire Victory

two accompanying battleships prepared tobombard the shore with their heavy gunsand deter any hostile intervention. In theevent the French scuttled th ir hips toprevent them falling into German hands,while the Italian vessels remained inharbour. The fleet also included a small linerconverted to act as a command ship.Intended to control the landings and todirect aerial resources as required, this vesselhad a full range of radio, radar and antiaircraft guns, together with a completecommand staff.

The forecast weather was clear overheadwith some cloud out to sea. Accordingly,the first trike sorties were launched atunrise. Pilots were fully briefed on the

location of anti-aircraft guns along the coastand around the strategic targets. It wahoped that what light there was at that hourwould favour the attackers and keepdefending aircraft on the ground. But theAlbacores' slow pace meant that the Frenchairfields were alerted, although the escortingfighters were able to take care of thedefending fighters. The strike was succe sful,although at least one aircraft was shot downin flames. Seafires from No. 880 Squadronmade amends for thi loss by shooting downa Junk rs Ju 88. But Sub Lt G.c. BaldwinR ,flying Seafire lie MA986, had alreadybecome the first Seafire pilot to score avictory when he shot down a Dewotine0.520 near Oran. For this feat he wasawarded the 0 . Although the centralgroup landing were uccessful, post-attackdebrief r vealed some ineffective management of aerial resources, resulting in crewsand aircraft either hanging around fruitlesslywaiting for employment or flying repeatedsorties without adequate rest.

The landings on the western beach weredelayed by the appearance of a Frenchconvoy, which disrupted the mine weepingoperations n cessary to clear the way to thebeach. Unlike later amphibious landings,Operation Torch suffered from inadequatepre-landing reconnaissance, as a result ofwhich the landing craft were hampered byuncharted sand bars, which caused somedamage. Despite this, the troop werelanded safely and they secured the beachhead and the surrounding area in the faceof slight resistance.

The same cannot, however, be saidof Operation Reservist, which involved

42 43

INTO ACflON INTO ACfION

Unusually, the pilot of this Seafire has not set his flaps to the take-off position, although the aircraft seems

to be managing without difficulty. The photographer was obviously being cautious: the photograph was

taken from the safety of the flight deck catwalk. FAAM Yeovilton

Salerno Landings

Winston Churchill had been keen on theSalerno landings becau e he was well awarethat any invasion of northern Europe in1943 would not succeed. Th PrimeMinister also wanted to build on theSicilian invasion and also the growingItalian dissatisfaction for th war in generaland Mussolini in particular. Churchillargued that an invasion of Italy would forcethe Germans to move more forces to thatarea and that it would lift the Italian threatto Allied Mediterranean convoys. This, hepointed out, would also allow supply convoys to sail to southern Russia and reducethe need for risky Arctic convoys.

Operation Baytown formed the openingmove on 3 September. Units of the British8th Army were shipped directly across theStraits of Mes ina from Mes ina to Calabriaon the toe of Italy. They were unopposed.Montgomery called ita waste of timebecause his forces then had to hurry to

alerno to add their weight to the maininvasion force. Meanwhile, the US 82nd

of surprise and ensure that the British forceswere largely unopposed. The Americansmet some opposition but achieved theirgoals with less trouble than exp credo Theentire campaign was completed by 17August, being hailed as an emphatic Alliedvictory. It did, how ver, rev al a lack of airsupport, which allowed the Ax is towithdraw substantial numbers of men,vehicles and stores almost unopposed.

To divert Axis attention from theMediterranean theatre, the Royal Navy hadlaunched Operation Camera, a sweep off theNorwegian coast, on 8 July. HMS Furiousparticipated with the Seafires of No. 801Squadron. eafires were also involved in asimilar operation on the 28th, code-namedGovernor. No. 894 Squadron was aboardlUustrious, while No. 887 Squadron flewfrom Unicorn. Another war-only front-lineunit, No. 894 had been formed withMartlets in August 1942. Seafire conversiontraining began the following March atHatston before the unit, under thecommand of Lt Cdr F.R.A. Turnbull oscRN, went aboardlUustrious. Its complementof nine Seafire IICs included MB257,MB258, MB264, MB269, MB277, MB294and MB303. After a quick trip to Icelandto give the air wing some cold weatherexperience, the carrier turned south to joinup with Unicorn.Operation Husky

the unit, commanded by Lt Cdr (A)Wiggington OSC RNYR, had moved toHa tston, a Ithough it had transferredto Machrihanish for final working up thefollowing month. On completing thesecond Gibraltar mission, the squadron landed back in the UK, reachingMachrihanish in October.

When Convoy KMS.16 departed forGibraltar on 4 June 1943, the escort carrierHMS Battler was assigned to provide combatair patrols with the Seafire L.IlCs of No.808 Sqdn commanded by Lt Cdr(A)Wallace R YR. Before receiving theSeafires, the squadron had been equippedwith Fairey Fulmars. They were swapped inNovember 1942 for a selection of pitfires- both with and without hooks - forconversion purposes. The first nine Seafiresarrived the following month and includedMB302/3F, MB312/3D and NM970/3A.While supporting Convoy KMS.16, Sub LtA.G. Penney RN, flying MB302, and Lt P.Constable RN, flying NM970, shot down aFocke-Wulf Fw 200 Condor on 24 June.At the completion of this escort duty,Battler returned to Britain, while No. 808Squadron was detached for a rest, joiningthe escort carrier Hunter on 17 September.

Having established th mselves in orthAfrica, the Allies turned their attention tothe invasion of Sicily, cod -named Operation Husky. The British carriers assigned tothe operation were Formidable andlndomitable, which formed part of Force 'H'. AboardFormidable was the Seafire-equipped No.885 quadron, while the remainder of theair wing comprised Nos 888 and 893 Squadrons with Martlets with No. 820 Squadron'sAlbacores providing a strike element. Bycontrast, Indomitable had a full complementof Seafires with an air wing comprisingNos 807, 80 and 899 Squadrons and theAlbacore-equipped No. 817. Formed atHatston, the hostilities-only No. 899 beganits training under the command of LtCdr(A) R.F. Walker RNYR. like other unitsconverting to the Seafire, No. 899 hadpreviously operated Spitfires, both with andwithout hooks. Re-equipment with SeafireIICs (including MB244/6-Q) started inDecember 1942.

Husky opened on the night of 9/10 July1943. Strong winds caused many of theairborne troops to land in the wrong places.This, however, helped to create an element

Performance Concerns

Gibraltar Convoys

deck and parked on outriggers. Each vesselalso carried a further half dozen aircraft incrates and these were off-loaded at NorthFront, Gibraltar. Further crated eafireswere also carried aboard the escort carrierDasher.

Seafires provided air cover for two criticalmission - starting on 19 April and 11 July- by HM Unicorn to ferry aircraft toGibraltar. Unicorn was an unusual vessel.She looked like an aircraft carrier butinternally had been reconfigured to supporta full range of aircraft maintenance services.This rendered the vessel incapable ofsupporting a fully operational air wing. Onboth trips, therefore, air cover was providedby one squadron, No. 887. This unit hadoriginally been equipped with Fulmarsbefore moving to Lee-on-Solent to acquireSpitfire VAs and Seafire IBs for typeconversion. The operational complementof eafire II s, which included MA975/L,had arrived in March 1943. By this time,

Although the early Seafires participated inTorch, their petformance gave rise to someconcern. Just befor the operation waslaunched, Furious had off-loaded some ofher air wing to make way for thirty-oneSpitfires VCs bound for Malta to reinforcethe island's defence. Returning to Gibraltarthe ship was attacked by a Junkers Ju 88,whose appearance wrong-footed the standing fighter patrol. Its leader, Lt Hall RN,

was in the landing circuit while his wingman, ub Lt Blanchard R YR, had actuallylanded. After the Ju 88 had dropped itsbombs - which missed the carrier - Hallgave chase but was unable to jettison his30gal (136Itr) ventral tank. This reducedthe aircraft's top speed to 310mph(l94km/h), too slow to bring the attackercomfortably within range. Even so, Hall'sfire caused some damage to the Junker'sfuselage. Later in the day, another Ju 88 wasable to escape a eafire patrol comprisinga IB and a IlC; the older aircraft provedthe faster. uch engagements highlighteda major failing of the early Seafires: lack ofspeed, reducing the aircraft's ffectivenessagainst the faster enemy bombers. Theobvious answer was to press on with development of the more powerful Seafire L.IlC.

poses before moving on 25 eptember toSkeabrae to receive Seafire IlCs including MA972, MA974, MA979, MA981,MA982, MA983 and MBl2l. When ready,the squadron, commanded by Lt dr T.B.Winstanley RN, went aboard Victorious. Asboth of these carriers were more recentthan Furious and Argus, thei r access liftswere smaller so, lacking a wing foldingfacility, the Seafires had to be ranged on

The pilot of this No. 768 Squadron Seafire lie is receiving deck landing training aboard HMS Argus and,

under the guidance of the deck landing control officer ('batsman'), his aircraft is prepared for another

launch. Rick Harding Collection

deployed aboard Formidable on 28 October.Victorious' air wing comprisedNo. 809 Squadron (Fulmars), No. 882(Martlets), Nos 818 and 832 Squadron(Albacores) and th Seafire-equipped No.884 quadron. This unit had previouslyoperated Fulmars until its move, on 21August 1943, to Lee-on-Solent. There itacquired pitfires (including P7316, P7902,AD135 and BL253) for training pur-

After working up at sea with its new fightersthe squadron was declared ready for operations by the time the ship reached theMediterranean. During Operation TorchHMS Argus was hit by a 500lb bomb andnear-misses had exploded close to the ship.Although the vessel was still able to operate,the damage sustained resulted in her returnto the Clyde for repairs, but not beforeparticipation in Operation Perpecual on 11November. This minor operation requiredthe hip's fighters to provide combat airpatrols in support of the assault on Bougie,Algeria.

Fonnidable and Victorious each deployedSeafire units. No. 885 quadron's aircraftshared deck space aboard Formidable withtwo Martlet units and one operatingAlbacores. No. 885 had swapped its eaHurricanes for Spitfires at Machrihanish, ahandful of hooked Spitfires being employedfor deck training. They were replacedby Seafire IICs, examples being MB126,MBl46 and MB156. Under the commandof Lt Cdr (A) R. Carver OSC, RN, the unit

Operation Perpetual

finally stopped by German forces, whichwere later reinforced by others retreatingwestwards from libya under the commandof General Erwin Rommel, pursued by GenBernard Montgomery's Eighth Army.Under Operation Vulcan both the First andEighth Armies combined in a massiveassault against their German opponents.Once the air and naval support lines hadbeen severed, thi attack, tog ther with theAmerican capture of Bizerte on 6 May,forced the German forces to surrender onthe 13th.

While eafires operated from the fleetcarriers involved in this action, the twoparticipating escort carriers, Biter andDa5her, still had Hawker Sea Hurricanesaboard. Meanwhile, the unit allocated toHMS Argus, No. 880 Squadron, had di embarked its Sea Hurricanes at Stretton atthe end of August 1942. The unit thenreceived some Spitfire VBs, includingW3756, for conversion training. With theinitial work-up completed, the unit receivedSeafire IICs the following month, MB236,MB240, MB250, MB253, MB265, MB275and MB297 being accepted. Havingcompleted final training at Machrihanish,the unit, commanded by Lt Cdr R.J. CorkOSO, OFC, RN, was embarked aboard Arguson 16 October.

44 45

INTO ACTIO INTO ACTION

No. 879 Squadron suffered its share of landing accidents during its service on HMS Attacker. In this case,

the aircraft has missed the aircraft ranged on the flight deck for take-off. Rick Harding Collection disappointed. Having intercepted manyenemy aircraft, they had not been abl toshoot down or even damage any of them.But they would have another opportunity.The original plan had called for carrierborne aircraft to houlder the burden ofproviding air support for the Allied groundforces for just one day. But Axis groundforces had put up a stiffer resistance thanexpected and one of the primary targets,Montecorvino airfield, was still the ceneof intensive fighting. As this had beenintended to form a key element in theAllied air support, the carrier fleet warequired for further air support missions. Asthi possibility had been foreseen, extrasuppl ies and stores for another day ofintensive operations had been provided forthe fleet.

The carrier force was now briefed to flynearly 200 additional sortie. But with 0

many eafires sustaining damage on the firstday of operations, the force was now downfrom over 100 to sixty-five. Yet the carrierstill managed to mount 232 orties on 10September. On that day the Seafires deterredat least forty attacks, forcing the intrudersto jettison their bombs before reaching theirtarget. While the speed of the ermanfighter-bombers was reduced by their bombs,once free of their loads they were easi Iy able

Seafire lie MB156 of No. 885 Squadron is seen preparing to leave HMS Formidable for its next sortie.

Members of the deck party are stationed at the tail and wing tips. FAAM Yeovilton

47

At the end of a frantic day, carrier Force'V' had completed 265 sorties. This was acreditable outcome but the pilots were

came just after dawn. Both were unsuccessful. The handful of Junkers Ju 88s wasintercepted by a eafire patrol, forcingthem to jettison their bomb without a shotbeing fired. Mo t of the Luftwaffe attacks,however, were mounted by bomb-carryingFw 190s and Bf 109s. One of the biggestraids came close to midday when at least adozen aircraft were spotted coming in fromthe north. Patrolling S afires pounced andcha ed them away.

But while the Seafires were helping tokeep Axis aircraft at bay, the situation wascomplicated by geography. At the rear ofthe beaches, and to the north, high groundcreated extreme clutter on the fleet's radarscreens. This made both detection of attacking aircraft and the direction of fightersextremely difficult. The fir t indications ofan attack often came when the attackingaircraft appeared above the beach. In aneffort to counter this, some eafire L.IICs,originally intended for duty over Capri, werediverted to act a airborne warning aircraft.

Seafire Success

the e cort carriers with their only opportunity for deck landing practice. WhileForce 'H' was intended to provide generalair cover for the British fleet off the Salernobeache , Force 'V' was expected to giveclose-in air support at both low and mediumlevels. The two fleets sailed separately fromMalta on eptember. On the way, Force'H' was attacked by German torpedobomber during the night of8-9 eptember.They missed their targets but during theattack one of 0.885 quadron's Seafires,parked on an outrigger, wa so badlydamaged by blast from the anti-aircraft gunsthat it had to be written off.

As Sicilian bases were at least 200 miles(320km) from the beach-head, thire tricted the on-station avai labil ity of landbased aircraft to thirty-six at anyone time.Thi meant that sea-born air power wasvital to success. The first fighter patrolsover the landing beaches were launchedfrom Unicom at 06.15hr on 9 September.Their task was to provide high-level coverin the absence of land-based fighters. Morefighters took offas the sun rose, to patrol thearea at low level in upport of AAF

orth American A-36A Apaches (theground-attack version of the P-51 Mu tang),which were under the control of the fighterdirection ship USS Palomares. The last

eafire returned to it carrier at dusk,thirteen hours after the first had taken off.

During this phase, each Seafire sortielasted between eighty and eighty-fiveminute, of which ixty minutes were pentin the combat zone with the r mainingtime being occupied by transit to and fromthe carrier. Due to their size only four

eafires could be launched from the escortcarrier; Unicom could launch eight at atime. Because of the tight timing involved,it required some slick handling to land-onan incoming patrol and launch its replacement. There were many landing accidentsduring the e change-overs, many of whichwere attributed to a lack of pilot training.Eventually, seventy eafires became inoperable. The main cau es were colli ion withthe barrier after missing the wire - exces ivebraking causing the aircraft's no e to tip over- and undercarriage failure on landing.

Losses su tained during the Tunisian andSicil ian campaigns, together wi th thecontinuing cost of operations in Russia,had apped Axi air strength. Even 0, theLuftwaffe threw all its available resourcesinto repelling the invaders. As a result,Force 'H' experienced a torpedo attack onthe night of 9 September. Another attack

July, by which time Lt Cdr{A) W.e. impon DSC RN had assumed command. Many

of the units aboard the escort carrier wereal 0 new to the Seafire. Attacker's o. 79

quadron had flown the Fulmar beforetran fer to Stretton in March 1943 for

eafire conversion, which was completedin June. The unit was aboard Attacker thefollowing month under the command ofLt Cdr{A) R.J.H. Grose R YR. No. 86Squadron had also been a Fulmar unit butits conver ion to eafires had been completed at Turnhouse in June 1943 when itwa commanded by Lt dr{A) R.H.

liphant RN, who handed over to Lt CdrP. Bailey RN in October.

Having departed the Iyde, Attacker,Battler, Humer and Stalker arrived offGibraltar on 9 August to embark theirfighter. After joining up with Unicom, theforce participated in training exerci e offGibraltar, following which it sailed forMalta via Oran. It was during this periodthat doubts were raised about the standardof pilot training, the tran it voyage havingpresented the squadrons embarked aboard

quadron, while Fonnidable had embarkedo. 85 quadron with 0 09, 887 and

97 quadrons aboard Unicom. Other unitswere embarked as follow: Attacker - 0

79 and 8 6 quadrons; Bartler - os 07and 08 Squadrons; Hunter - No. 899Squadron, plus 834 Fighter FI ight; Stalker

o. 0 Squadron with 833 Fighter Flight.The carrier fleet wa divided into twodi tinct groups, the fleet carriers formingForce 'H' commanded by Rear Admiral e.Moody, while Force 'V' was under thecommand of Rear Admiral Sir Philip Vian,flying his flag in the anti-aircraft cruiserHMS Euryalus.

No. 809 had been a Fulmar unit beforearriving at Stretton in March 1943 forconversion to eafires. This culminated inthe unit joining Unicom in August withMajor A.J. Wight RM in command. Alsoaboard was o. 97 quadron, whose first

eafire experience had come in late 1942.Its main batch of aircraft arrived thefollowing March when the unit transferredto Lee-on- olent. It was finally declaredready with its Seafire L.IICs at the end of

Airborne Division's Operation Giant 11, aplanned drop close to Rome, wa cancelledwhen it became clear that the German hadadded two front-line regiments to thedefence of the city.

The alerno landings - OperationAvalanche - began on 9 Septemb r. But theopening phases had been badly planned andlacked a preliminary naval bombardment tooften up the defences. The Germans under

Generalfeldmarschall Albert Ke Iringput up uch a stout resi tance that at onetage the Allies were almost pushed back

into the sea. The Italian surrender th daybefore was seen as a bonus, but it would besome time before any Italian forces wouldbe avai labl to support the Allied cause.

It was against this background that thbiggest Seafire operation of the war in theMediterranean took place. Two Royal avyfleet carrier were deployed to provide aircover b tween 9-12 September. The forcecomprised Illustrious and F01111idable, theaircraft support vessel Unicom, plus theescort carriers Attacker, Bartler, Hunter andStalker. A board Illustrious was o. 894

INTO ACTION

48

regular fleet carriers. Thi resulting airflowinduced turbulence across the flight deckand led to twenty-one eafire being badlydamaged in landing accidents. Air currentforced the aircraft across the deck once thearrester wire had been engaged. In manyca es, undercarriages collap ed withconsequent rear fuselage buckling.

Another factor highlighted in thereport was that the carriers were concentrated in too small an area close to theshore. Even in favourable over-the-deck

Seafire LR.IIC LR691 of No. 807 Squadron has just crash-landed on HMS Hunters

deck. Damage appears to have been restricted to the engine and propeller but the

centreline fuel tank has been torn from its mountings. Rick Harding Collection

This No. 807 Squadron Seafire III is pictured from the flight deck catwalk of HMS

Hunter as it leaves for another patrol. Rick Harding Colleclion

49

the escort carrier, which had decks 30 percent smaller than that of the fleet carriersand operated at lea t 10 knots slower.Hunter's pilots, howev r, had been drilledin the art of successful deck landings bythe CO of 34 Fighter Flight, Lt F.A.J.Pennington R ZVR. As a re ult, few ofthem suffered 'deck pecks' during OperationAvalanche and the entire flight remainedserviceable. The other carrier involved withthe escort force wa Unicorn, whosestructure differed slightly from that of the

Salerno - the Reckoning

responsibility for fighter patrols. The nextday the eafires rejoined their carriers, flyingvia Falcone and Bizerta. During their timeon dry land, the eafire had flown fifty-sixmissions without loss to enemy action. Butif their pilots thought their part in the

alerno operations had come to an endthey were mistaken. German forces werestill threatening to pu h the Allie fromtheir beach-head. trong resistance, pluseffective air support, finally repulsed theGermans and resulted in final break-out.Until this was confirmed the escort carrierforce was warned that operation might haveto be resumed. In the event, the exhaustednaval pilots and aircraft were pared furtheraction and Force 'V' was disbanded. The

eafire's first major operation was over.

When all the reports were pieced togetherit wa apparent that the Seafire force hadshot down two enemy aircraft and damagedfour others. The cost had been high: fortytwo eafires written off in accid nts. Theforce had flown 713 orties during whichthirty-two aircraft had been totally wreckedupon landing. A further eventeen hadsustained undercarriage failure, whileanother rwenty-four had experienced severewrinkling of the rear fu elage, a problemthat would dog the type throughout itscareer. A further four aircraft were lost toengine failure with the remainder beinglost to other causes, which included piloterror. Of the aircraft that returned to theirparent carriers, man y were r nderedtcmporarily unusable due to the eafire'spropensity for propeller damage caused byhitting the flight deck on trapping thearrester wire. Although som pares wereavailable aboard HMS Unico11l, they weresoon expended and the carrier for e had tofind another way of keeping its aircraftflying. The an wer was supplied by Hunter'scaptain, apt H.H. McWilliam R . Aftercon ultation with the carrier's engineeringstaff, it wa suggested that each propellerblade be trimmed by 2 inches. Thisreduced the unit's 10ft3in (3.2m) diameterby 4in (IOcm). This change dra ticallyreduced propeller damage without 10 ofperformance.

The accident and write-off rate waattributed to a combination of the operatingconditions and pilot inexperience. Manyaccidents had been suffered by pilots fromIndomitable who had been sent to reinforce

One suffered brake failure, which was soonrepaired despite the primitive conditions.Refuelling involved the u e of 5gal (Dltr)drum and hand pumps, while the pilotsmucked in to ervice their own aircraft. The

eafires did not have to operate long inthese conditions, as the du ty atmospherewas playing havoc with the unfilteredMerlin engines.

The fi rst operation was conducted on 12September, all aircraft being involved in atactical reconnaissance sweep followingreport - which proved to be false - of aGerman counter attack. The following day,twelve aircraft took off at dawn on mediumaltitude patrol supported by another fourflying top cover. During the e ortie theSeafires were bounced by a pair of U AAFA-36As, one of which was promptly shotdown before the other was identified asfriendly. The next sortie was undertaken inthe early afternoon and involved twenty ofthe available eafires. By the time theyreturned to Paestum nearly 100 urti P40 Warhawks had parked around theair trip, prompting a move to A a wherethe eafire joined No. 324 Wing RAF andits Spitfire. Only one further patrol wasflown that day. It was only eight aircraftstrong, a the others were receiving muchneeded attention from the RAF per onnel.

The naval contingent flew only one moresortie from Paestum, on 14 September,when eight aircraft took off at dawn. Ontheir return they were stood down fortwenty-four hour while the RAF a umed

This overview of the Attacker class escort carrier HMS Stalker. shows its short flight deck and the

location of the deck lifts. Stalker was commissioned in December 1942 and participated in operations in

the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Returned to the USN in December 1945. the carrier was rebuilt as a

merchant ship. remaining in use until scrapped in 1975. BBA Collection

At du k on 11 September, Force 'H' waswithdrawn. Its primary purpose had beendeterrence of the Italian fleet with aecondary role of supplementing the air

support provided by the escort carriers. Atotal of sixteen fighters were provided forsupport purposes, these patrols beingundertaken from dawn to dusk. Only oneinterception wa madc whcn a patrol ofMartlet downed a Fiat RS.14 floatplane.As concerns grew about the vulnerabilityof the large carriers to both U-boat and airattack, their departure wa seen as vital.They did not, however, take all of theiraircraft with them. Eight Seafires and asimilar number of Martlets were flown toUnicorn as the two fleet carriers departed.This brought the ship's air complement upto twenty-five, of which seventeen wereSeafires.

Operational flying resumed at day-breakon 12 September. Patrol activity was limitedto three sorties as the emergency strip atPaestum was declared ready from midday.With all patrolling aircraft safely backaboard their calTiers, the engineering partiesworked flat out to prepare as many aircraftas pos ible for use a hore because landbased fighters from icily were not due forseveral days. A total of twenty-six Seafires,led by Stalker's air wing commander, LtCdr J.e. Cockburn R ,was sent to Paestum.His force comprised two L.IlCs from hisown carrier, four from Attacker, plus fiveeach from Battler and Hunter, with a furtherten from Unicorn. All aircraft landed safely.

to outrun the eafire. This was empha izedby the attempt by ub Lt E.J. Davies R VR

of o. 3 Fighter Flight to aid a patrol ofU AAF Lockheed P-38 Lightnings underattack by Luftwaffe Bf 109s. The Germanfighters departed at high speed and Davieswas unable to get within range. reaterucce wa achieved by the commanding

officer of No. 897 Squadron, Lt Cdr W.e.imp on RNVR. Leading a patrol of foureafires, he spotted a patrol of Bf 109s flying

at 12,OOOft (3,700m) north of alerno. Inthe ensuing battle, Simpson de troyed twoGerman fighters, while his wing-mandamaged another. One Seafire ufferedminor damage.

By nightfall on the 10 September,Montecorvino airfield was in Allied hand.It remained dangerous to use, however, asartillery shell from both sides werescreaming overhead. Even so, two eafireswere able to make diver ionary landingsthere. The e aircraft had been part of agroup of four replacements from Sicily butunable to find their carrier in the haze.Montecorvino remained virtually unusablebut US Army engineers had managed tolay a 1,000yd (920m) runway on a tomatogrowing estate near Pae tum. It would,however, not be until 12 eptember beforeit was ready for daytime use. Admiral Vianconceded that the sea-borne fighter forcewould have to remain in operation eventhough stores and ammunition wererunning low. Even more worrying was thelack of eafires: losses to landing accidentswere continuing. While the engineersworked around the clock to repair as manyaircraft as possible, the fighter force was nowat its credible minimum.

This meant that Force 'V' had just thirtynine Seafires ready for a third day ofoperations. They were scheduled to fly 130missions but in the event the day's final totalwas 160. During these sorties the Seafirepilot reported fewer encounter withGerman fighters, although they did meet anew foe: KG 100's Domier Do 217 bombersarmed with radio-guided bombs. Theprimary mission of the e aircraft was toattack the hip shelling German po ition .Flown by experienced crews, the Dorniermanaged to evade the defending fighterslong enough to launch their bombs. Someships were damaged but not badly enoughto divert them from their purpose. Earlierin the month, though, KG 100 had sunk theItalian battleship Roma with a radio-guidedbomb just after it had surrendered to theAllies.

INTO ACTION

Watched by a crowd of 'goofers', a Seafire of No. 867 Squadron is taken down to

the hangar of the escort carrier HMS Hunter. Rick Harding Collection

50

wind conditions, the carriers were left withlittle room to manoeuvre. But when thewind speed dropped to almost zero thecombination of emergency landings due tofuel shortage and restricted manoeuvringroom increa ed the chances of accidents.Yet while the accident rate was alarming,the number of sorties flown by the force,even allowing for attrition, was impressive.A maximum sortie rate of 4.1 per aircraftwas the highest achieved and was wellabove the expected rate of two per aircraft.Combat success, how vel', was disappointing. Although the Seahres were responsiblefor many of the attacking aircraft jettisoningtheir bombs prematurely, their lack ofperformance meant that only three enemyaircraft were shot down. During AvalancheSeahre air patrols were defensive in nature,wherea in Operation T01'ch the force wasengaged in sorties that involved tacticalreconnais ance and attacks on targets ofopportunity.

While the escort carriers were achievinga high sortie rate close inshore, the twofleet carriers standing further out to seawere launching fewer air patrols as their taskwa high-level protection. As the earlySeahres lacked folding wings, they had tobe ranged on deck. This meant that the twocarriers had to manoeuvre parked aircraftto clear the appropriate part of the deck forlandings and take-offs. For Fonnidable thiproblem was soon reduced when manySeafi res were flown off to reinforce theescort carriers, but Illustrious retained a fullcomplement of ten aircraft. The continualshuffling around, plus the requirement fora standing patrol of two Seafires duringdaylight hours, meant that the deck crewswere worked to the maximum. Overall, onelesson learned from Operation Avalanchewas that while it had helped to developfuture tactics, it had shown that relianceon a single aircraft type, even though itsimplihed maintenance and eased the sparesposition, was not a viable option. Duringthis time, Illustrious' pilots tested a prototype 'g' suit, which was said to be like apersonally tailored hot water bottle in thehigh Mediterranean temperature.

Another day, another crash-landing: Seafire L.IIC

lR642 of No. 807 Squadron ends up in a most

undignified position opposite Hunters island. Close

study of this picture reveals that the hook had

failed to lower, which indicates that the pilot has

actually made a good landing on such a short deck.

Rick Harding Collection

Convoy Support

Although the Seahres had played a majorrole in both Torch and Avalanche, they didhave more mundane task to perform duringthe Avalanche period. Nos 833 and 834Squadrons formed the air componentaboard escort carriers involved in convoyoperations. The former squadron had lostmost of its Seahres, however, which resultedin its pilots being absorbed into No. 880Squadron whose Swordfish were moved toanother unit. No. 834 Squadron transferredfrom Hunter to Battler, which then proceeded through the Suez Canal en route tothe Indian Ocean and convoy escort duties.

In the Atlantic one of the hrst escortcarriers to operate Seafires was HM Trackerwhose resident unit, o. 816 Squadron,operated nine Swordhsh and six Seafires.The squadron had received its first Seahresin June 1942 at Fearn when its CO was LtCdr P.e. Nottingham DSC RAfterworking up it traded its Seafire L.IlCs forIBs, although its strength was increased tonine aircraft just before the move to Tracker.The ship accompanied three convoys duringAugust, October and November 1943. FewSeahre sorties were flown and no U-boatswere sighted.

HMS Fencer was similarly employed.She embarked a mixed unit, No. 842 Squadron, which had received Seahre lICs during July and August 1943 while based atMachrihanish. The e aircraft were soontraded for six Seahre IBs, which were addedto the nine Swordhsh already on strength.With Lt Cdr L.R. Tivy RN in commandthe unit went aboard the carrier in Octoberand its hrst duty was to escort the linerFranconia from the Clyde to the Azores,where an RAF transit base was to be e tablished. The liner and her escort arrived onthe 8th after an uneventful voyage and theairheld at Lagen was declared ready foroperations two days later. Bad weatherdelayed the arrival of the RAF CoastalCommand Hudsons and B-17 FlyingFortresses which had been intended toprovide anti-submarine cover for ships inthe area, so Fencer's entire complement ofSwordfish, plus two Seahres, were detachedto undertake escort duties as an interimmeasure. The Seahres flew dawn and duskpatrols to escort the Swordfish. By 23October the detachment had rejoined thecarrier, which then set course for the Clyde.The additional work-up time afforded theSeafire pilots during this voyage had paiddividends, only one aircraft being damaged

tNTO ACTION

in landing accidents in more than fiftysorties.

Because they were considered moresui table for such operations, Martlets beganto supplement Seafires for convoy escortduties in November 1943. The hrst of theGrumman aircraft arrived aboard Fencer inNovember and the ship wa employed onout-and-back Atlantic crossings between27 November and Christmas Eve. Duringth s operations the American aircraft flewthe standing air patrols, while Seahres wereheld on deck-readiness. Yet it would be aSeafire which would see action with anenemy aircraft. On 11 December Sub Lt A.Sakhnov ky RNVR, piloting PAlOOjD ofNo. 842 Squadron, was scrambled fromFencer to intercept a shadowing aircraftthat had been glimpsed through the mistand drizzle. Soon after take-off, the aircraft'sradio system failed due to a lack of weath I'protection. Yet despite operating in limitedvisibility, Sakhnovsky managed to sight themarauding ondor through the clouds some800yd (740m) ahead He hI' d two shortcannon bursts at extreme range and thefour-engined German aircraft turned awayfrom the convoy, Sakhnovsky was now leftwith the difficult task of locating andlanding aboard Fencer, which he managedsuccessfu 11y.

Indian Ocean Operations

Tracker's employment on escort dutiesrepresented the Seafire's final Atlanticconvoy. The ship's last eahr d parted atthe end of December, although Fencer wouldretain her aircraft until March. Both hipswere re-equipped with Wildcats, the RNhaving adopted the type's U name. Thisleft Battler, now operating in the IndianOcean, as the last escort carrier stilloperating Seahres as the primary hghter.This vessel spent the period between 16October 1943 and 21 March 1944 on escortduties, with Bombay as home ba e. Operating a mixed complement of Swordfish,Seafires and Martlets, the carrier coveredconvoys AB18A, AB20, AB24A and AB27between Aden and Bombay. These dutiesended in January 1944. On the 16th Battlerwas involved in anti-submarine operationsoff East Africa and Madagascar. It was duringthis operation that a U-boat supply ship waencountered. But instead of applying thetactic developed in the Atlantic of launching hghters to uppress anti-aircraft defences,the carrier just launched a pair ofSwordhsh.

51

Although they damaged the support ship,two U-boats managed to escape. Thisrepresented the Seahres' hnal Indian Oceantrade protection operation. The aircraftdisembarked from the carrier and flew to theSouth African Air Force base at StamfordHill, while Fencer entered the dockyard atDurban for a much-needed reht.

By the end of 1943 American-builtaircraft had largely replaced the Seahre.No. 801 Squadron aboard Furious was theonly operational Seahre unit still in frontline service. The forthcoming Normandyinvasion, combined with the desire for aRoyal Navy presence in US-dominatedPacific operations against the Japanese,prompted the Admiralty to re-evaluate theSeafire's future role. The Ie ons of Torchand Avalanche were also taken into accountin what emerged as two distinct plans. Thehrst concerned the escort carriers, whosemaximum complement of aircraft was set ataround twenty. Embarking just one squadron aboard these vessels would simplifyoperations and reduce the number ofpersonnel required to support the aircraft.The fleet carriers were to have smallersquadrons but the lines were not to be rigidlydrawn to enable personnel and aircraft tobe moved between units as required. Thetraining regime was also to be expanded. Aswell as standard air defence duties, pilotswere to be trained in tactical bombing andalso ground strahng as the 20mm cannonhad been found to be effective againstground targets.

Pilots specially trained in tactical reconnaissance were to join the carrier wings.They would be equipped with the cameraequipped Seafire LR.Il . Training wasundertaken by No. 718 quadron, whichhad be n re-formed on 5 June 1944 as thArmy Co-operation Training Unit (later renamed the Army o-operation NavalOperational Training Unit) at Henstridge.Thi unit had originally received nineSeahre Ills, supplemented by six pithrPR.XIlls for reconnaissance training duties.As well as schooling pilots in tactical airreconnaissance duties, the unit also providedair combat training, enabling pilots to

graduate in a dual role. The result was notonly better quality intelligence but also anability to undertake attack sortie.

Enter the Mk III

It was also recognized that a faster, moreflexible version of the Seahre was needed.

INTO ACTION INTO ACTION

By 2 August 1944 the force was workingup off Malta before departing to the

American fighter had longer range, theSeafire units performed the less glamorousrole of providing air defence patrols overthe fleet from Furious. The Seafir 'n xtventure into Norwegian waters on 26 Aprilinvolved a Dornier Do 18 flying boat beingchased away, whil another radar contactresulted in the Seafire patrol chasingshadows.

April 1944 saw No.4 Fighter Wing,plus the carriers Attacker, Hunter and Stalkertogether with sixty eafire L.IlCs andLR.IICs being declared ready for combatservice. In mid-May the force sailed for theMediterranean, arriving in time to takepart in Operation Dragoon, the invasion ofsouthern France. For this operation theforce was divided in two. Task Force 88.1comprised the assault carriers Attacker andKhedive, already in-theatre, plus the fightercarriers Emperor, Pursuer and Searcher. TaskForce 88.2 compri ed the a sault carrierStalker together with the fighter carri rHunter plus the American fighter carrierTulagi and Kasaan Bay. The force commander was Rear Adm Sir ThomasTroubridge, flying hi flag aboard thecommand cruiser HM Royalist.

Dragoon and After

The primary strike aircraft during the Battle of the Atlantic was the Fairey

Barracuda, but being difficult to handle it was not particularly popular with its

crews. This example has suffered a tail-wheel failure on landing, leaving the

handling crews with a clear-up job. FAAM Yeovilton

Attack on the Tirpitz

broken away from his leader. Wilkinsonshot down the other Bf 109 and then divedafter the other. Clearly realizing that theSeafires meant business and fearing thatothers might be in the vicinity, the Luftwaffe contingent broke away and headedfor home. It was a wise choice. AnotherSeafire flight did indeed arrived to reinforcetheir squadron mates, who were now almostout of ammunition.

Meanwhile, the focus of the action, theEns land , was hit by eight bombs from theBarracudas and broke in half. The Barracuda force returned safely and was followedhome by the remaining eafires. Furious'other Seafire squadron had not been idle.Its role had been to fly continuous combatair patrols to protect the naval force andto give warning of any enemy counterattack. FUTious and her escorts were able towithdraw without encountering furtheropposition.

Seafires were also involved in OperationTungsten, the Fleet Air Arm attack on theGerman battleship Tirpitz on 3 April. Alarge force of Barracudas armed with bombsand torpedoes was escorted by Corsairs,Hellcat and Wildcats, whose role was tokeep defending German fighters at bay andto suppress anti-aircraft defences. As the

Norwegian Operations

the force commander and his staff. Inparallel with these conversions, Nos 3 and4 Fighter Wings were also undergoingtraining for their new role.

During December 1943, and throughoutthe opening weeks of 1944, only a few ofthe Royal Navy's aircraft carrier were atsea protecting convoys. The remaining shipswere undergoing refitting and training fortheir projected roles in the invasion ofnorthern Europe. A a practice run for therevamped carrier force, a dres rehearsalagainst German forces on the Norwegiancoast was plann d. Taking a central role wasthe veteran Furious, which sailed fromScapa Flow on 9 February 1944 escorted bytwo fast battleships, two cruisers and s vendestroyers to participate in OperationPosthorn. Furious' trike component wasprovided by No.8 Torpedo Bomber Wing,which comprised Nos 827 and 830Squadrons, both with Fairey Barracuda.Fighter support consisted of fifteen SeafireIBs of No. 801 Squadron plus a further tenSeafire UICs of No. 880. The Barracudaslanded-on first followed by the Seafires. Butthe fighter complement dropped by onewhen it was discovered that there was noroom for the final aircraft, which had toreturn to Hatston.

Posthorn was intended to be a series ofswift and decisive strikes against shippingin the vicinity of Stadlandet. As it was notpossible to launch Seafires for night defence,the RAF was charged with providing nightfighter cover. No nemy hipping wasspotted during the pa sage until themerchantman Ensland was encounteredoff Vaagso. In response Furious launchedten Barracudas and twelve Seafires fromNo. 801 Squadron. As the Barracudasapproached the merchantman a mixed forceof Bf 109s and Fw 190s was spottedapproaching from the rear.

Unfortunately for ub Lt W.L. HornerR , a radio malfunction combined withmisty conditions meant that he was too lateturning towards the enemy fighters and wasshot down. Sub Lt Durrant RNZNVR

engaged a pair of Fw 190s, while the flightleader, Lt L.D. Wilkinson RNVR, engagedtwo of the Messerschmitts. A fifth aircraftwas engaged by Sub Lt G.W. Falcon RNVR.

In the en uing mel e, Durrant managed todamage both of the Fw 190s before he wasattacked by one of the Bf 109s that had

limited space available meant smalleraviation weapon magazines. It also meantthat these carriers could no longer supportanti-submarine or strike missions by typeslike the Swordfish and Grumman Avenger.

While the carriers were undergoing thisconver ion, the Dido class cruiser HMSRoyalist was returned to dock after workingup to be fitted-out as a command ship.Changes included improved communications and extensive radar equipment,together with suitable accommodation for

from escort to a sault carriers. In theiroriginal role these ships had been configuredpurely for fighter operations with xtensivefighter direction and support for on-deckfighter operations. In their new role theships would be working with amphibiousforces and army units already ashore. Theprincipal technical changes, therefore,involved improving ship-to-ship and shipto-shore communications, complementedby better briefing and command facilities.Installing additional equipment in the

This is one of those pictures which have given the Seafire a bad name. Seafire III LR856 of

No. 899 Squadron noses over and proceeds to destroy its propeller. This kind of accident

was more prevalent aboard escort carriers. Pictured here is HMS Khedive. FAAM Yeovilton

Caught just before touch-down, this Seafire III has its hook and flaps lowered

while the pilot has throttled fully back in accordance with the instructions of the

deck landing control officer, the ·batsman'. FAAM Yeovilton

The Seafire III featured a more powerfulengine as well as the much-desired wingfolding facility This would at last allowmore aircraft to be carried aboard ship, asunused machines ould be struck downbelow for storage and servicing. The resultof all this reorganization was the creationof three carrier wings, Nos 3, 4 and 24. Thefirst two units were designated for deployment aboard assault carriers and consistedof Nos 808, 886 plus 97 Squadrons andNos 807, 09 and 879 Squadrons respectively, all operating Seafir L.llC andLR.lIC aircraft. No. 24 Wing was intendedto be a fleet carrier wing and only two unitswere allocated to it, Nos 887 and 894Squadrons, both with Seafire llls as theirmain equipment.

Three further units were still equippedwith various Seafire versions, these beingNos 801 and 880 quadrons. The formerstill operated Seafire IBs, while the latterwas equipped with lICs. Both were intendedto form a carrier wing when enough SeafireIlls became available. In October 1944these squadrons finally received the lateraircraft and joined HMS Implacable to formthe 30th Naval Fighter Wing. No. 899

quad ron had originally been intended toequip with Seafire Ills and becom part ofthe wing. A change of plan resulted in theunit landing at Ballyherbert to swap itsSeafires for a mix of hooked and standardSpitfire Vs. The unit's land-based sojournended in February 1944 when twenty

eafire Ills were delivered and the unitembarked aboard HMS Khedive in April forservice in the Mediterranean.

The vessel arrived inJuly. The followingmonth, the squadron flew over 200 ortiesin support of the landings in the south ofFrance, code-named Operation Dragoon.Further sortie were flown in eptemberagainst shore targets and shipping in thevicinity of Crete and Rhodes. At thecompletion of these operations, Khedivereturned home for rest and recuperation.No. 899 Sqn resumed training until January1945, when it was embarked in HMSChaser. With her strength increased totwenty-four aircraft the ship departed forCeylon. With no operations to performthere Chaser sailed to Australia. No. 899

qn disembarked at Scofields to became aSeafire training and reinforcement pool.During this period the squadron saw noactive service, its pilots being graduallyposted to operational in-theatre units.

Meanwhile, in October 1943 Attacker,Hunter, Khedive and Stalker were undergoingextensive modification to convert them

52 53

With another escort carrier in the background, HMS Stalker passes through the Suez Canal to join the British Pacific

Fleet (BPFI with the Seafires of No. 809 Squadron on deck. BBA Collection

HMS Atheling was a member of the Ruler class of escort carriers. which entered service in October 1943. being

allocated to the BPF as a fleet train carrier and spare flight deck. The vessel was returned to the USN in 1946, being

sold on for conversion as a merchantman. a role it maintained until scrapped in 1967. BBA Collection

to the pool's aircraft on 3 june. The firstsorties were undertaken in the arly hoursof the 6th when the first pair of Seafires tookoff to spot for the naval force engaged inOperation Overload/ eptune. The muchanticipated invasion of northern Europehad begun.

The two aircraft had di tinct roles toplay. One acted as potter for the big gunof the battleships and monitors, whose shellscould reach up to 15 miles (24km) inland,while the second provided cover for the first.The spotting aircraft operated between4,000 and 8,000ft 0,200 to 2,400m), withthe covering fighter some 2,000ft (600m)above it. During the first day of the invasionthe spotting pool flew 153 sortie. Three

eafires and a naval Spitfire were hot down,while the RAF and VC -7 each lost anaircraft. The econd day of the invasion sawthe Luftwaffe taking such an interest in thepotters that its fighters made strenuous

efforts to break through the top cover ofpitfires and P-47 Thunderbolts. ome were

successful and Lt Cdr Devonald R cameunder attack from eight Fw 190s. Havingfought them off, Devonald was then facedwith nursing hi damaged aircraft back tobase. Its engine eventually seized and heditched alongside a tank-carrying shipwhose crew rescued him.

The potting teams continued to beharassed by the Luftwaffe, but the Seafiredid achieve some success. On D-Day-plustwo Lt H. Lang R ZVNR shot down a Bf109. Other pilots managed to damage at

and Avenger units this meant that eventytwo Seafires and eighteen Hellcats, pluseighteen Spitfire LF.VBs manned by FAApilots, were now available. Thi force wasformed into eight squadrons, five operating

eafires, one Hellcats, four wordfish andsix Avengers. Many were stationed alongthe outh coa t of England.

Seafire l.1II NF521 was allocated to No. 728 Squadron based at Hal Far. Malta for

fleet requirements duties. BBA Collection

54

D-Day Support

To support D-Day operations in june 1944No. 885 Sqn, based at Lee-on- olent,became part of the Air Spotting Pool ofNo.34 Reconnaissance Wing, 2nd Tactical AirForce. Equipped with Seafire L.llIs, the unitundertook bombardment spotting, fleetescort, offensive anti-fighter sweeps andanti-submarine patrols. Operating alongside, o. 80 quad ron provided similarservices, although both units would returnto naval control a few weeks later with No.885 joining HM Ruler, while the latterwent aboard HMS Khedive. The spottingpool Seafires for Op ration Ne/Jtune wereunder the command of Commodore E.Thornton R. 0 26 and 63 SquadronRAF, equipped with Spitfires, and the onlyU avy unit to operate Spitfires, VCS-7,also joined hi force. The two naval andRAF squadrons were as igned to providesupport for Royal Navy vessels, while VC 7 provided air cover for the Western avalTask Force, which was mainly Americanin composition. D-Day stripes were applied

designated attack positions for Operation Dragoon, which opened on the 15th.After its completion, the force arrived atAlexandria at the beginning of Septemberfor refitting and revictualing. On 25 Augustthe entire Bri tish force departed foroperations in the Aegean ea, the targetbeing German shipping and gatTi ons on theGreek i land . The attack , code-namedOuting, Cablegram and Contempt, were completed on 22 October and the fleet returnedto Alexandria. Shortly afterwards, the bulkof the fleet departed for Britain via

ibraltar. Attacker, however, wa retainedto provide air support for Operation Manna,the re-occupation of Athens. It was not,therefore, until 10 Novemb I' that the shiparrived in Devonport for repairs. DuringDecember 1944 all of the vessel involvedin these operations were in various shipyardsbeing prepared for their next task. This wato be in the Indian Ocean where they wereto form part of 21 Aircraft arrierSquadron, East Indies Fleet. From April1945 the various carriers involved arrivedto take part in the war again t the japane e.

In May 1944 the two squadron aboardHM Furious, Nos 801 and 880, began tore-equip with the eafire Ill, which permitted a larger number of fight rs to becarried in addition to the trike complement of Barracudas. By this ti me the HomeFleet had acquired another carrier. HMIndefatigable's air wing con isted of the

eafire-equipped o. 94 Sqn, plus No.1770 Sqn with Fairey Fireflys and 0 820and 826 Sqn with Barracudas. OperationMascot, a further assault on the Tirpitz injuly1944, wa the force's first task. It was un uccessful because the German smoke screencompletely hid the ship from its attackers.

Operation Turbine off Norway in Augustwas followed a few days later by OperationOffspring, which involved the carrier airgroup providing cover for minelayingaircraft from abob and Trumpeter. A hortrespite for revictualing ended on 22 Augustwith further attacks on the Tirpitz. On 19

eptember Indefatigable undertook its lastAtlantic operation, this being code-namedDivan, off the Lofoten I land . The carrierthen joined the First Aircraft Carrier

quadron of the British Pacific Fleet.While many Royal avy carrier were

leparting for points east, not all theavailable squadrons went with them. Theremaining units were quickly integratedinto the Air Defence of Great Britain aswell as preparing for the forthcominginvasion of Europe. In addition to Swordfish

After a heavy landing aboard HMS Ocean, this Seafire of No. 805 Squadron exhibits one of the type's main

failings: structural failure between the tail unit and fuselage. Ray Sturtivant

ACCUMULATOR

canopy's aft fixed porrion, whil th radiobay acce s panel was located at frame 15with the accumulatOr acce panel at frame16. Between frames 17 and 18 in Merlinpowered aircraft was the em rgency signaldischarger.

AIRCRAFT RADIO

This close-up of the lower section of frame 5, plus the wing attachment points, reveals a substantial

section. BBA Collection

ide, the leading edge of the pilot's accessdoor. Frame 11 also incorporated the pilot'headrest and protective armour plate. Italso marked the rearmo t extem of thecockpit canopy's travel on high-backedaircrafr. B tween frames 11 and 12 was the

SLIDING CANOPYUPPER FUEL TANK (EARLY TYPE) INSTA lATlON

7"""LJC::LOCATION

//1Iff !J

.-/ #'\ ~ I II

I II "f---j

FUSELAGE •DATUM

~ /1 I--LINE - I..-

J=- - TAllPLANE

SPAR

AnatoDly of the Seafire

CHAPTER FIVE

As the eafire was based on the pitfire itwas inevitable that its construction wouldbe similar to that of it coumerpart.

The fuselage consisted of three sectionseach incorporating monocoque tructures.The forward section housed the powerplant and engine bearers and terminated atframe 5, which acted a the main firewall.From there the main section of the fu elageextended aft [0 frame 19. This al 0 providedthe imerface between the fu elage and thetail unit, which included the fin andtail plane mouming .

The primary frame ( o. 5) wa a olidstructure comprising two aluminiumskins with an asbestOs lining in between.Arrached [0 this were the forward wing sparmoumings, the upper and lower moumingfor the engine - Merlin or Griffon - andthe auxiliary gearbox moums. Ju taft wathe next vertical frame, o. 8, to whichframe 7 was attached at a point two-thirdsof the way up the frame, which was angledforward.

The space between frame 5 and 8accommodated the two main fuselage fueltank with frame 7 acting as a flameproofbulkhead. AI 0 mounted on frame 8 wasthe lower windscreen arrachmenr. Furtheraft on frame 10 were the mountings for therear wing spar and, furrher up, on th porr

This side-on diagram illustrates the basic structure of the Spitfire and Seafire. Eric Morgan Collection

Firefly of No. 1771 Sqn sank twO hipand severely damaged four oth rs. The nextday, 28 November, the carrier was badlydamaged by heavy seas, forcing it to return[0 capa Flow for repairs. Implacable wouldundertake it final Home Fleet mis ion inDecem bel' 1944 before en teri ng Rosythdockyard for a refit [0 enable the ship to

join the British Pacific Fleet, by March1945.

The ucce ful invasion of Europe fromthe north and south, the growing offensivebeing mounted by the Russian Army on theEa tern front, plus the cominued arrack onGerman shipping now meam that the Alliescould turn their arremions to defeating theJapanese in the Far East.

During the D-Day operations, Fleet Air Arm pilots flew photo-reconnaissance sorties over the beaches and

the gradually expanding battle fronts. Most sorties involved the Spitfire PR.XIII, the prototype of which,

11004, is seen here. Will Blunt Collection

Lodings, during which 27 tOns of bombswere dropped in forty Barracuda sortie.Two days later the strike aircraft carried outthe Fleet Air Arm' final airborne tOrpedosorries. They sunk six merchant ship,damaged one and drove ashore and wreckeda -boar. On the carrier's return to ScapaFlow at the end of the momh the NavalFighter Wing wa di embarked.

Replenished, lm/)lacable returned to seaon 8 ovember, having mbarked o. 38Naval Air Wing - which comprised Nos801 and 880 Squadrons with eafires - enroute. After carrying out air supporr dutiesfor minelaying operations off the orwegiancoast, the carrier und rtook strikes off theAI tel' Islands. The Barracudas and the

lea tone Fw 190. By 27 June the spottingpool was no longer required and its twonaval units were allocated [0 other tasks.These included arracking midget ubmarine arrempting [0 arrack Allied shipsanchored off the ormandy coasr. On 15July the econd Tactical Air Force relea edthe naval units back [0 Fleet Air Armcomrol. During their supporr of the D-Daylandings, six Seafire had been lost [0 amiaircraft fire, three [0 enemy fighters, whiletwo others were obliged [0 cra h-Iand aftersuffering serious damage.

Back to Norway

While much of the world's arremion wasfocused on the beaches of ormandy, thecominued existence of the Tirpitz and thmercham hipping supporring the Germanforces in orway was keeping e1emem ofthe Home Fleet occupied. On 1 June 1944HM Furious launched a strike force ofeighteen Barracudas, supporred by twelve

eafire and ten F4U Corsairs from HMVictorious [0 arrack a convoy off Aalesund.

uch was the ferocity of the arrack thatseven of the armed escorrs were renderedunusable while three of the cargo ve elwere sunk. This was to be the last operationin Norwegian waters for HM Victorious asthe carrier was kept on standby at ScapaFlow during the opening stages of D-Daybefore departing for the Far East on 12June. Furious made one final arrack onthe Tirpitz on 22 August 1944. Under thecode-name Operation Goodwood, thearrack involved the complete wing makinganother unsuccessful arrempt [0 sink theGerman battleship. This thom in the Alliedside was finally dealt with by aircraft fromNo. 9 quad ron RAF whose Lancasterdropped Tallboy bombs on the ship, causingit to turn turrle. Furious undertOok onemol' mi sion off the orwegian coa t insupporr of mining operations. On 15

eptember 1944 this venerable ship withsuch a di tinguished histOry wa finally paidoff; her machinery and structure were wornour.

Furious was replaced off orway byImplacable. Her fir t mission with eafiresaboard was undertaken on 26 OctOber 1944.The units aboard were os 887 and 849

quadron , which tOgether formed No. 24Naval Fighter Wing, and the Barracudaequipped No 82 and 841 Squadrons asNo. 2 TBR Wing. Operation Athleticentailed strikes on Rorvik, Bodo and

56 57

This view shows the layout of the frames, longerons and stringers that made up the

Seafire's fuselage. Compared with the Spitfire, the Seafire featured additional

strengthening of the longerons below the cockpit. Chris Michel

Cockpit Section

During production the cockpit sectionbetween frames 6 and 10 was built as aseparate unit. Assembling the main fuselage

ANATOMY OFTHE SEAFIRE

section required frame 5 and the cockpitsection to be mounted in assembly jigswhere they were joined together usingthe two bottom 'V' -section lower mainlongerons running from frame 5 to frame

14. The top engine bearer pick-ups werebolted to the ends of the side longerons,while the bottom pick-ups were bolted tothe wing stub spar and bottom longerons.Once all these major items had beenmounted into the assembly jig they wereheld rigidly in place to enable the intercostal stringers and plating to be rivetedinto position and complete the fuselagestructure.

Fuselage Skinning

The thickness of fuselage skin plating variedbetween 24,20 and 18 gauge, the thinnestmaterial being towards the rear. At variouspoints around the cockpit and engine bay,sections of armour plate protected the pilotand vital y tems. Flush riveting wasemployed between frames 5 and 14; beyondthat snap-head rivets were used. The skinplating up to the rear of the cockpit wasjoggled to present a flush surface. Furtheraft the skins were lapped to help speedproduction.

ARMOUR PROTECTIONPILOT'S SEAT BACKREST

ARMOUR PROTECTIONPILOT'S SEAT LOWER

ARMOUR PROTECTIONAMMUNITION BOXES

ARMOUR PROTECTIONUPPER FUEL TANK

ARMOUR PROTECTIONAMMUNITION BOXES

ARMOUR PROTECTIONWINDSCREEN

ARMOUR PROTECTIONUPPER FUEL TANK PILOT'S SEAT HEAD-RESTCOWLING PANEL

ARMOUR PROTECTIONHEADER TANK FRONT

REINFORCINGPLATE

DATUMLONGERON

AFTSLINGING

PIVOT

-.<"""""- --

8

FORWARDSLINGING

PIVOTFUSELAGE SKIN

5

REINFORCING SKIN

PLATES~~~~~~j=~~DOUBLERS

FRAME 5

Mounted on to frame 5 was the Merlin engine with its accessories exposed. Also visible here is the light

engine support frame and the cowling panel mounting framework. Chris Michel

Installing the Griffon engine into the Seafire required a much stronger structure and reworked frame

5 engine supports. This diagram illustrates the Seafire XVII, although the main features, apart from the

bubble cockpit canopy, were common to the Seafire XV. Eric Morgan Collection

Armour plating was deemed a necessity for such aircrah as the Seafire to protect its vital components. This diagram illustrates the

Seafire's protective armour. Eric Morgan Collection

58 59

ANATOMY OFTHE SEAFIRE ANATOMY OFTHE SEAFIRE

FR19

ACCUMULATORACCESS PANEL

SIGNALDISCHARGER

1 LEADING EDGE FUEL TANK2 HISPANO GUN BAY3 MAIN SPAR4 BROWNING GUN BAYS5 WING TIP JOINT6 AILERON HINGE7 .303 AMMUNITION BOXES8 20mm AMMUNITION BOX9 WING FOLD JOINT10 WHEEL WELL11 RADIATOR HOUSING12 AUXILIARY SPAR13 SPLIT FLAP

..... ..

RADIO BAYACCESS PANEL

'.

The main structural components of the Seafire

fuselage are exposed, together with the layout of

the skin plating. Chris Michel

........................ -

MAINPLANE REARATTACHMENT POINTS

PILOT'SACCESS

DOOR

FLAMEPROOFBULHEADS

FR7

:'.I;··

~ ·r····· .. ····· ; .·;~;;7!;;:·~:;··~·:·;~: ~._ _. ....

~~....~~..~...~ ..; ... ~

: • • • r '..' • • t' '1 ...--.-..,.. . FR16

• If • • I ;..... ""1 ~ 1/......__... ... " FR14 FR15

,~~~~~~~~}l J .::.:: ..•..i$' FR13..J,o·3:_ ··: . FR12.•;~. !f I ,.. "····71 ··· FR11~ .'~ l.,'

fif:;-;=::;;;'~

AUXILIARYGEARBOX

ATTACHMENTPOINTS

POWERPLANT LOWER MAINPLANE FRONT SPARATTACHMENT POINT ATTACHMENT POINTS

The Seafire Ill's folding wing

arrangement was complex even

though it was unpowered. Visible here

are the leading edge fuel tanks, the

cannon, the space for the radiator

housing and the undercarriage bay.

FAAM Yeovilton

REJECTOR LEVER

CATCH PLATES

The components that comprised the main spar in

early Spitfires and Seafires are illustrated here.

This type of spar was later replaced by one made

from aluminium booms and webs. Chris Michel

PLUNGER

BELL CRANK LEVER

HOOK

SNAP GEARDETAIL

The early Seafires,

including the first

Griffon-powered

machines, were fitted

with an 'A'-frame

arrester hook under the

fuselage. This diagram

also shows the

mountings, damper and

uplock. FAAM Yeovilton

One of the pri mary su bcon tractorsheavily involved in Spitfire and Seafireproduction was inger Motors. The company diverted part of its vehicle manufacturing capability to producing themounting framework for the aircraft'sengines. These were constructed mainlyfrom tubular steel sections str ngthened bya large rigid frame forming the centraltransverse member. This frame was built asa eparate ub-assembly with its mainbearers, which can i ted of two crankedtubes, extending to the front mountingblock. This then passed through the transverse frame, being attached to the bottommounting fittings on frame 5. This was alsoassembled in a jig but in the upside-downposition.

Fuselage Finishing

Once the fuselage had been a sembled itwas removed from the jig and placed inanother to enable the wing root attachmentpoints to be reamed out to the correct sizeto accept the mounting bushes. It was atthis point that the wing root fillet panelswere cut to shape and altered as requiredto fit the airframe. Once these actions hadbeen completed the entire airframe wasthoroughly cleaned to remove any extraneous material for the Quality Inspector'sclearance. In the paint shop a layer ofprotective primer was applied, followed bythe required camouflage finish.

Tail Unit

The tail unit was assembled as a separatesection beginning at the interface withframe 19. This wa connected to frame 20by an 'L'-section former. Frame 21 form dthe forward fin po t, while frame 23 actedas the rear fin post. The intermediate frame,No. 22, provided the forward face ofthe tail-wheel bay on aircraft fitted witha retractable unit. On fixed tail-wheelmachines, frame 22 formed the assembly'smounting point. Frame 23 doubled a therudder mounting. A special jig was used toassemble the tail. The frames were placedinto it first and then connected by aeriesof eight fin formers riveted in place. Oncethey were secured, longerons were rivetedbetween frames 19 and 20, the wholesection then being skinned with 22-gaugealloy.

60 61

ANATOMY OFTH - SEAFJRE

LOCKING PINCABLES

AIRFRAMECENTRE LINE

UNDERCARRIAGEMECHANICAL

OPERATING LEVER

MECHANICALDDWNLOCKINDICATOR

LOCKING PINLOCATING LUG

MAINPLANE SPAR_~:J~~~~~:~~~~~;::]}a

The undercarriage of the Merlin'powered Seafire was fairly simple

as the leg was the only item that required powering. BBA Collection

RUDDER ASSEMBLYTO POST MOO 429

RIB 6

TAB ACTUATING

ROO~~ll~

ANTI BALANCETAB

METAL SKIN

W~~~~~::~~'-.----ANGLE PLATES

LOWER RUDDERHINGE

/

/

The development of the Griffon-powered Seafire resulted in the

re-Iocation of the arrester hook. The sting-type hook was housed

in a fairing under the rudder. FAAM Yeovilton

\TAIL

NAVIGATIONLIGHT

UPPERHINGE

BALANCE TABOPERATING ROO

CUTOUT

MASS BALANCEWEIGHT

The tail unit was built as a separate component and incorporated

the fin. together with the rudder and tail-plane mountings.

Eric Morgan Collection

Although this view shows the rudder of Griffon-powered aircraft. it should

be noted that. apart from the tail navigation light. the layout and assembly

was similar to that of all variants. BBA Collection

View of the wing showing the undercarriage bay. radiator mounting space. flaps and

aileron hinge points. Chris Michel

An excellent view of a tubular main spar

under construction at Airframe Assemblies

on the Isle of Wight. Chris Michel

The original spar con isted of extrudedsquare-section booms of different sizes,each being fitted inside the other toform a tapered section. As there wermany sections within this spar, the rootwa almost solid. At the tip the fivetubes were reduced to one. As the boomsmoved Out towards the wingtip theection wer haped to help create

the taper. This required part to be cutaway to form a simple angle ection. Athese sections were precision items, theirmanufacture was undertaken by theR ynolds Tube Company. Reynold notonly assembled the entire spar but alsoadded the required crank to create thespecified dihedral angle, the unit beingdelivered ready for a embly. A singleweb plate, flanged top and bottom toform a channel section, was riveted to therear of the boom.

Wing Construction

while the elevators had the torque tubeattachment forks added to their inner faces.

Early-build Seafire wings were particularlycomplicated because at their core wa themulti-section leading edge torsion box.With the leading edge ribs in place theentire section was 'D'-shaped and formedmost of the wing's strength. In later aircraftthe multi- ection spar wa replaced by amachined multi-section a sembly. Thisaided manufacturing. Aft of the main sparwas a secondary one, which, in the earlieraircraft, was of a lighter construction. It wasbeefed up in later-build machine, not onlyto improve ov rail wing strength, but alsoto permit a greater variety of externalweapons to be carried.

Tailplane

The tailplane comprised two spars joined byribs. On the forward face of the front sparwere attached the former ribs that definedthe leading edge. The rest of it aerodynamicshape was determined by shaped woodenformer crewed to the intermediate rib.The whole assembly wa kinned with 24gauge alloy. Once tailplane assembly hadbeen completed, it was attached to the rearfuselage tail section. The complete as emblywas then fitted to the fuselage. The rearflight control surfaces - the rudder andelevators - comprised a single spar to whichnose rib were riveted on one side with thetrailing ribs on the other. All were built injigs to provide a uniform shape and skinnedmainly with alloy a fabric wa prone toballooning. Once the structure had beencompleted the hinge mountings were fitted,

62 63

A ATOMY OFTI-IE SEAFIREA ATOMY OF THE SEA FIRE

FWD HINGEPOINT

Fuselage Fixtures

To facilitate installation of its internalfixtures, the fuselage was mounted on twojacking points at frame 5. During thisoperation, upport was provided by theforward wing attachment points and ashaped trestle placed at frame 18. As the

._~\{:::::::::2:::t_""""'r~__SPRUNG SLIDINGWINGTIP COVER

A set of elevators minus their covering alloy skins reveals the underlying structure. Also visible are the

hinge points and trim tabs. Chris Michel

This diagram shows the wing fold arrangement and its major components, as

fitted to the production Seafire III. FAAM Yeovilton

WHEEL-WELLOUTER FACE

protective coverings. The final componentsto be fitted were the wingtip fairings andthe remaining access panels. At this pointthe entire external surface was thoroughlycleaned and the wings passed for painting.Once they were ready for mating it wastime for the fuselage to have its internalequipment fitted.

The leading edge skins were manufactured in two sections, butted together andjoined by a nosing strip riveted under theinner faces. Spanwise strengthening wasprovided by intercostal 'Z'-section stringersto which the skins were riveted. The twentyone nose ribs were of lattice and open girderconstruction. They not only provided amounting for the nose skins but also formedpart of the chordwise strengthening. Theleading edge skin sections were manufactured from a single billet of 14-gauge alloy,which had been put through a stretchingpress to form it to the correct shape. As thewing required a completely smooth surface,countersunk holes were drilled in theseskins. Solid rivets were then inserted intothe holes and then milled down.

Once the cut-outs for the gunports hadbeen made, the I ading edge sections andrear spar could be placed in a jig for finalwing structure assembly. With the structureframework in place the 2in (Scm) diameterundercarriage pintle pin was installedaft of the spar web. As the Seafires werecannon-armed, this eased wing manufacturebecause the gun bay was built as a separatestructure in its own jig before being offeredup to the wing structure. With the leadingedge, undercarriage pintles and cannon bayin position, wing ribs Nos 1 to 21 wereaffixed to the rear face of the front spar. Therear spar could then be riveted in place insections. With the rear spar in place thetrailing edge ribs were riveted to the aft faceof the rear spar and joined together at theirouter tips by all. alloy strip. The final itemsto be fitted before wing skinning were theradiator and wheel bays. Being the easiestto apply, the upper skins were riveted intoplace first, although the lower ones requiredgreater preparation due to the awkward

• shape of the wing's inner sections. Tomaintain a sense of balance, Seafire wingswere built in pairs by the same team andmounted in the jigs with the leading edgesfacing downwards.

With each primary section completed, itwas time to install the internal systems.These included the electrical looms andtheir protective conduits, the aileron, rudderand elevator control cables, piping for thecompressed air that operated flaps, gunsand brakes, plus the landing lamps. Nextcame the lamps themselves, the aileronshroud panels and the main undercarriagelegs. The last remaining internal installationwas that of the gun heating system pipes.All connections intended to pass into thefuselage were left loose with temporary

As shown here. the

Seafire F.47's wing

folding mechanism was

far more complicated

than the original manual

system as a result of the

power folding units.

FAAM Yeovilton

1A CENTRE RIBNOS.

1

2A3A

4A

TRAILINGRIB 11A

6ASA

REAR SPARHINGE DETAIL

This extended diagram of the Seafire F.47 wing

shows the location of each wing rib, the

attachment points and the cavities in the wing for

various services. FAAM Yeovilton

7A

SA

DETAIL 'A',.~---:::o.r---=

REAR SPARHINGE POINT

OUTBOARDFLAP SECTION

"'C:=::;::::;i!l%:..- -..,;ACCELERATORNOSE RIB NOS. 1 HOOK

WING LOCKINGMECHANISM

13A 118

1615

LOCKING LEVER

AMMUNITION SAV$19

MAIN SPARHINGE

21 20

LOCKING MECHANISMACCESS DOOR

GUN MOUNTINGCASTINGS

R.P. MOUNTINGS .....,==------~r_c

REAR SPAR

LIFTING RINGHOUSING

64 65

ANATOMY OFTHE SEA FIRE ANATOMY OFTHE SEAFIRE

ELEVATORTAB CONTROL

,/I 'I 7

ELEVATORlTlCONNECTING ROD

ELEVATOR FORWARDOPERATING LEVER

AND CABLES

and were either three- or four-bladed unit,depending on the engine and 1'01 . Internalfuel was housed in two tanks in the forwardfu elage, the top one containing 4 gal(218Itr), while the bottom one had acapacity of37gal (l68Itr). The fuel y temwas so arranged that the upper tank fed intothe lower one and then the engine. Bothtanks' fuel cocks were mounted under theinstrument panel. The engine oil tank hada capacity of 5.8gal (26Itr) and was located

This diagram illustrates the control layout for the elevator and the rudder and their relation to the spar

under the cockpit floor. FAAM Yeovilton

final item to be checked before the aircraftwas weighed and cleared for flight testing.That was the final step leading to theaircraft being declared ready for operationaluse.

The Seafire Mk.IB, II and III weredescribed as single-seat low-wing monoplane fight I' fined with Rolls Royce Merlin32, 45, 46, 50, or SSM engines dependingon the variant and its role. Propellers couldbe of de Havilland or Rotol manufacture

airframe was nose-heavy, a counter-balanceweight in a canvas sleeve was hung overthe tail. The first items fitted were theengine mounts. They were attached to thefront face of frame 5, after wh ich thecockpit fixtures and fittings could beinstalled. Once the cockpit was complete,the framework for the armoured glasswind creen and the screen itself could befitted, together with the canopy. Armourplate was also installed to protect the upperfuel tank and around the pilot's eat wh reit joined that already around the ammunition boxes.

Before the seat was installed the flightcontrol cable were connected to the rudderbar and control column, being h Id underlight tension before fitting the flight controlsurfaces. The engine oil tank and the fuellines were next, followed by the engineitself and the main fuselage fuel tank. Oncein place they could be connected up tu

complete fuselage system installation. Thewings were now moved to the fuselage.Wheeled tre ties not only provided supportbut also ensured that were offered up at thecorrect angle to the fuselage spar points.With the wings and their retaining pin inplace and locked, the various system couldbe connected and the flight control urfacefitted.

To maintain a smooth aerodynamicflow, the wing fillet panels were fined, theupper ones being bolted into captive nutsmounted on the support ribs locatedbetween the fuselage and the wing uppersUlface. The forward fairing wrapped aroundthe leading edge, while fairing pan I 2 and3 were bolted to their matching ribs. Thefinal two fairings, os 4 and5, were treatedas a single assembly and riveted togetherinternally using a bun trap.

A Thorough Work-Out

Before being removed from it upport,the eafire and its systems were given athorough work-out. This enabled the undercarriage retraction sequence to be observedand the hydraulics, pneumatics and electricto be tested. With everything checked,adjusted and inspected, the eafire wastaken from the assembly hop for fuel y temleak checks before engine running. Whereapplicable, the wing folding mechanismwas fully tested to ensure the mountingpin moved correctly and that there wa nodistortion or mismatch between ections.The operation of the arrester hook wa the

View looking back towards

the rear fuselage frame

showing the flight control

runs, the trim cables and

the batteries. Chris Michel

REAR FUSELAGEACCESS PANEL

TOP lONGERDN

BOTTOMlONGERQN

CAMERA WINDOWPOST MOD.445

AIRCRAFT

REAR FUELTANK SUPPORT

PORT WING SPARFRONT ATTACHMENT

POINTS

later Seafires utilized a similar structure to earlier variants but incorporated additional strengthening

under the skin to absorb increased power and weapon loads. FAAM Yeovilton

66 67

The left-hand

side of the

cockpit.

showing the

gauges on the

main pilot's

panel. the

engine control

and some of

the pipework.

Chris Michel

This view. looking down into the cockpit. reveals the rudder pedals. the compass

and the control column. Chris Michel

The undercarriage was raised and loweredby an engine-driven hydraulic pump. Anengine-driven air compressor fed by a pairof storage cylinders provided power forbrake and flap operation. This system alsodrove the gun loading and breech mechanisms as well as movement of the landinglamps. The air cylinders were connected inseries and held a maximum pressure of200p i (l4bar). Merlin-powered Seafireswere fitted with a 12-volt electrical systemcharged by an engine-driven generatorcontrolled by a switch above the instrumentpanel. In operation, the generator replenished an accumulator, which in turnpowered the entire electrical system. Avoltmeter placed to the left of the generatorswitch helped the pilot monitor the powersupply.

Cockpit Controls

below the ngine mountings. The oilcoolers were mounted in tandem in anexternal fairing under the port wing.

Undercarriage Operation

The Seafire inherited its spade grip controlcolumn from the Spitfire. On it weremounted the brake lever and the gun firingcontrols. The instrument panel, incorporating the basic blind flying panel,featured an airspeed indicator, altimeter,directional gyro, artificial horizon, rate ofclimb and descent indicator, plus theturn-and-bank indicator. A warning hornsounded when the undercarriage was lockedup and the engine throttled back, althoughthis could be cancelled by pushing a buttonon top of the throttle lever. It was also cancelled by advancing the throttle, althoughit would sound again once the control waspulled back. Initially there were only twoflap positions: up or down. This renderedthem unusable for take-offs, althoughcareful use of shaped wooden blocks between the inner wing surface and the topflap skin could create an intermediateposition for assisting departures. Enginestarting could be either by the preferredcartridge method or, on earli I' aircraft, bymeans of a hand crank whose handle wasstowed behind the pilot's seat. The aperturefor the crank was located in the starboardengine cowling panel.

The pilot's seat could be raised or loweredby a lever on the right-hand side. This was

CONNECTING BUTTSTRAP

~ PANELS 4 AND 5

3..~............'. 5 .

'. 4 .

/""...............,....,.......=-

.'

ANATOMY OF THE SEAFIRE

This diagram illustrates the interior of the Rolls-Royce Merlin engine. The Griffon was similar but had a larger capacity. Rolls-Royce Derby

To ensure a smooth airflow between the fuselage and wings. a series of fairing panels was fitted.

Their installation required specially shaped support brackets. Eric Morgan Collection

6869

ANATOMY OFTHE SEAFIRE ANATOMY OF THE SEA FIRE

Another view of the port side of the cockpit showing the various trim wheels,

engine controls and that famous spade-grip. Chris Michel

ARRESTOR HOOKIN RETRACTED

POSITION

ARRESTOR HOOKIN DEPLOYED

POSITION

needle valve below the undercarriageemergency lowering lever. The fluid itselfwa pumped to a nozzle from which it waprayed upwards over the screen' front

panel. The pump plunger returned to theextended position by itself. When the deicing facility was no longer required thecock could be turned off.

Redesigned Fuel System

The appearance of the final Seafire versionsbrought a redesigned fuel system. In theFA5 fuel was contained in two fuselagemounted tanks and two interconnectedwing leading edge tanks. The lower fuselagetank and those in the wings were selfsealing. In flight fuel from the upper fuselagtank was fed to the lower one while thatin the wing tanks went via the upperfuselage tank, driven by air pressure andcontrolled by the pilot via a tran fer cock.Fuel from the lower fuselage tank wentdirectly to the engine through the main feed

CENTRE LINEFUEL TANK

\

CENTRE LINESTORES CARRIER

GUN BAY HEATING

~~~~f;--t---- PIPEWORK

UNOERWINGRADIATOR

A brand-new upper fuselage fuel tank awaiting installation. Fuel from the upper

tank fed into the lower and thence to the engine. Chris Michel

The location of the Seafire F.45's slinging points, essential items in lifting the aircraft aboard ship, are shown here. BBA COllection

hand side of the seat. Many componentand connections were common to theTR.1133 and the TR.9D but the Typemechanical controller was replaced by apush-button electrical control unit.

Other equipment consuming electricalpower included the navigation light andthe upper and lower identification light,all controlled by the signalling switchboxmount d on the right-hand side of thecockpit. Besides the power switches, theswitchbox also incorporated a Morse key.This meant that the lights could be set to'Morse', 'off and 'steady'. A landing lightwas located beneath each wing andcontrolled by a switch below the instrumentpan I. To en ure that at least on light waoperable there were independent powercircuit. With the control switch in thecentral position both lamps were in the uppo ition and not illuminated. Moving it toeither left or right controlled the port orstarboard lamps respectively. Both lightwere lowered pneumatically. A separatelever dipped their beam. To ensure that theairspeed indicator's pressure head did notfreeze at altitude it was fitted with a heatercontrolled via a switch mounted clo e tothe trim wheels. Once the aircraft was inthe landing circuit the heater had to beswi tched off to conserve the battery'scharge. A toggle control mounted on theleft-hand side of the cockpit could be usedto fire a signal cartridge from the top of thefuselage just aft of the cockpi t.

Emergency Equipment andDe-Icing Systems

The Seafire featured a variety of emergencyequipment. This included the hood jettisonmechanism, actuated by pulling a levermounted in ide the top of the hood. Whenmoved forwards and downwards, the hoodwa di engaged from the rail and the pilotcould force it clear of the aircraft with hielbows. For tho e aircraft not having thisfacility a crowbar was provided in tead. Aforced-landing flare was carried in a tubefixed inside the fuselage and operated viaa ring grip mounted to the left of the seat.A first-aid kit was stowed aft of the wirelessequipment and was accessible via a hingedpanel on the port side of the fuselage.

Th tank for the Seafire's de-icing systemwas mounted on the left-hand side of thecockpit directly above the bottom longeron.The fluid flow was controlled by a cockabove the tank connected to a pump and

wattage bulb used for the night position wascontrollable.

A GA2B cine camera was mounted inthe port wing leading edge. Operation wasvia the gun firing button on the pade grip,but pilots had to remember to activate thesystem using a switch on the left-hand sideof the cockpit. A footage indicator andaperture control switch w re mounted ona plate near the throttle lever. The apertureswitch allowed two position to be selected,the smaller one being used for brightconditions.

Radio and ElectricalEquipment

A combined radio transmitter-receiver wasfitted, either the Type TR.9D or the TypeTR.1133 transmitter used in conjunctionwith an R.3002 receiver. When the TypeTR.9D wa in tailed a Type C mechanicalcontroller was fitted on the port ide of thecockpit above the throttle lever. A remotecontactor was located on the right-handside with the master contactor mountedbehind the pilot's headre t. A heatingelement was controlled by a cockpit switch,which was left in the 'off position whenthe aircraft was on the ground and thecockpit unoccupied. The microphonetelephone socket for connecting to thepilot's face mask was mounted on the right-

Gun Controls

The eafire was fitted with a reflector gunight mounted on a bracket above the

instrument panel. Two switches below thebracket controlled both the ight and thedimmer switch, which had three positions:'off, 'night' and 'day'. Spare bulbs werecarried in a holder on the right-hand sideof the cockpit. The dimmer was normallyset to day mode to provide full targetillumination. Should the target backgroundbe too bright, a sun screen could be movedbehind the wind creen to help and definthe target with greater clarity. The low

close to the release catch, which allowedthe pilot to move within his harness withoutdi connecting it from the seat. To permitnocturnal operations the cockpit wa fittedwith light, one each side, which illuminated the instrument panel and controls.A mall adjustable flap on the starboardcoaming above the instrument panelprovided ventilation. The internal oxygensystem was connected to a standard regulator mounted on the left-hand side of thecockpi t and supplied the pi lot's oxygenmask via a bayonet connector. An isolationcock was fitted to permit maintenance. Amap case was mounted on the left-handside. An external mirror provided rearwardvision for the pilot.

70 71

ANATOMY OFTHE SEAFIRE A ATOMY OFTHE SEAFIRE

FUEL/AIRCONNECTIONS

: II I

I II

,! I

I

I

'<:

REAR ATTACHMENTFITTING

FRONT MOUNTING

____-FRONT SPARRIB 13

."~'

RADIATORASSEMBLY

HEATING PIPE

AT RIB SA \_---.....

Fighter gun-bays needed heat to stop the gun operating mechanism freezing at high altitudes and causing the guns to jam. FAAM Yeovilton

The wing combat tanks could hold 22.5gal (1031trl of fuel and were faired into the wing undersurface. being held in place by an

aft-mounted hook and t1lll0 front attachments. FAAM Yeovilton

line. To stop the fuel boiling off at altitudesabove 15,000ft (4,600m) in warm weather,the fuselage tanks could be pressuriz d.Pilots had to be aware if the self-sealingfunction was impaired, so this option couldonly be used when the fuel pressure warninglight was illuminated. The upper fuselagetank held 36gal (l631tr) and the lower one48gal (218Itr), while one pair of wing tankscontained 12.5gal (57Itr) and the otherpair 5.5gal (25Itr) for a total of 120gal(545Itr). The Seafire 45 could carry acentreline mounted external50gal (227ltr)tank. Fuel was fed directly to the main feedline and controlled by a cock, which keptthe tank isolated until required for use.

The internal fuel capacity of the SeafireFA6 and FA 7 was similar to that of the FA5except that an extra 32gal (145Itr) tank wascarried in the rear fuselage aft of the pilot'seat. The external tank carried by these

two variants were combat tanks, eachcapable of holding n.5gal (l021tr), whichfed into the main fuel feed line via anindividual control cock. Fuel from thecombat tanks was transferred to the upper

fuselage tank using air pressure from theexhaust side of the vacuum pump. Toprevent overfilling, the upper fuselage tankhad a control float to allow the transfercocks to select wing or combat tanks irrespective of the contents.

The lower fuselage tank fuel cock waslocated just below the centre of the instrument panel. That for the external tanks waspositioned on the right-hand side of thecockpit and was interconnected with thetank jettison lever. This meant that whenth tanks were to be dropped, operation ofthe lever also ensured that the cock movedto the closed position. As Mk 46s and Mk47s had rear fuselage tanks, a further controlcock was located on the floor just forwardand to the left of the pi lot's seat.

The Seafire 45's fuel transfer cock waslocated near the throttle quadrant and italso regulated the supply of pressurized airto the external fuel tanks. Once the xternaltanks were empty the control had to bereturned to the normal position to ensureeffective pressurization of the internal tanks.By contrast, neither the Mk 46 nor the

Mk 47 had a main fuel system pressurizationcock. This enabled the selector for externalpressurization to be left open. Fuel transferwas effected by an electric booster pumplocated in the bottom of the lower fuselagetank and controlled by a cockpit switch. Inlater ver ions a second booster pump wasfitted to the rear tanks, the controllingswitch being marked 'main', 'off' and 'rear'.To confirm operation, there were press-totest buttons.

A further priming pump was fitted tothese final Seafire variants. There was alsoa control cock, the operating switches beinglocated on the right-hand side of thecockpit below the instrument panel. Itoffered three selections: 'all off', 'main' and'ground'. In the latter position the cockpermitted high volatile fuel to be introducedinto the fuel system for cold starting. When'main' was selected the fuel was drawn fromthe bottom fuselage tank for engine starting,while 'all off' was only when priming theengine cylinders for starting. A fuel contentsgauge on the right-hand side of the instrument panel displayed the combined total

of both upper and lower fuselage tanks. Asecond gauge was installed in the Seafire46 and 47 to enable the rear fuselage tankto be monitored. All gauges requiredelectrical power to function but none wasfitted to display the contents of the internalwing tanks and the external tanks. Warninglights illuminated when pressure droppedbelow operating minima. A low contentswarning light came on only when there waenough fuel for thirty minutes' economicalcruising flight. Both lights were located onthe instrument panel.

The 9gal (41Itr) engine oil tank waslocated between the upper fuselage tank andthe fireproof bulkhead. To reduce any riskof contaminants passing into the enginethere wa a filter in the feeder system. Oilleaving the engine was cooled by passing itthrough a matrix housed in the starboardunder-wing radiator fairing. Gauges indicating oil pressure and temperature weremounted on the right-hand side of theinstrument panel. Engine coolant was

supplied from a tank located above thereduction gear and fitted with a pressurerelief valve. The radiator shutters were fullyautomatic and designed to open when thecoolant temperature reached 115°C.Initially, a push button was mounted onthe electrical panel for testing purposes,but on post-Modification 736 aircraft it wasreplaced by a two-position switch. Thisallowed the radiator shutters to be openedfor taxiing, ground running and airfielddeck-landing practice. Mounted on theright-hand ide of the instrument panel wasa temperature gauge to enable the pilot tomonitor the temperature.

Hydraulic, Pneumatic andElectrical Systems

Seafire 40 series aircraft were fitted withhydraulic, pneumatic and electrical systems.Th hydraulic system power d the mainand tail wheels. Oil was carried in a reservoir

mounted on the fireproof bulkhead andpassed around the system by an enginedriven hydraulic pump. A pipeline-mountedfilter ensured isolation of possible contaminants. The pneumatic sy tem was alsopowered by an engine-driven compressor.It supplied two reservoirs, which providedpressure to operate wing flap, radiator flaps,air intake shutter, supercharger gear changeand brakes. The reservoirs were pressurizedto 300psi (21 bar) and passed through avalve to reduce pressure to nOpsi (l5bar).Operating pre ure for the braking ystemwas reduced to between 80 and 90psi (5.5and 6.2bar). On po t-Modification 489aircraft, brake operating pressure wasincreased to 140psi (9.7bar).

The eafire 45's electrical system wasrated at 12 volts DC, while that installedin the final two version was re-rated to 24volts DC. Power for both systems wassupplied by an engine-driven generator,which charged th batteries. For use withan external power supply, a ground power

72 73


cockpit. This had a gate at each end, plusan automatic cut-out coupled to the selectorlever, which moved it to the idle positionon completion of a retraction cycle. Theselector lever was also coupled via chainsand prockets to the und rcarriage locks,which were disengaged by direct action ofthe lever. This also closed the automaticcut-out. Before selecting undercarriage up

turning the wheel counter-clockwise wouldmove the aircraft to starboard.

Undercarriage Operation

The inner and outer view of the tail-plane; that on the right shows the trim tab access panel. Chris Michel

Seen from overhead are the tail-plane, elevator, the rudder and its deflected tab, plus the castoring tail

wheel. BBA Collection

The undercarriage wa operated by aselector lever moving in a quadrantmounted on the right-hand side of the

Controls for Later Aircraft

As with the earlier versions, the Seafire 40utilized a spade-grip control column. Itincorporated controls for the brakes, gunfiring, bomb and rocket projectile relea e,cine camera and gyro caging. The radiotransmit push-button was also located onthe grip. The rudder pedals had two footpositions, while the rudder bar itself wasadjustable for different leg lengths via a tarshaped wheel on a sliding tube. Leaving thecontrols unlocked, particularly in gustyweather, could result in damage to both thesurfaces and airframe. To prevent thishappening the Seafire inherit d the Spitfire's locking system. For the best re ults, thepilot's seat had to be placed in the highestposition, after which two struts located onthe right-hand side of the cockpit justbehind the seat could be deployed. Thelonger one was used to lock the controlcolumn to the seat and to the starboarddatum longeron, while the shorter one wasconnected to both the long strut and therudder pedals to lock everything in place.

Trim tabs were mounted on the elevatorsand rudder. That for the elevator wascontrolled by a control wheel on the lefthand ide of the cockpit. It moved intuitively and there was an indicator on theleft-hand side of the instrument panel.Control of the rudder trim tab was exercisedvia a small hand-wheel just aft of theelevator trim control. Unlike the elevator,there was no indicator for the amount oftrim in u e but pilots were reminded that

socket was located on the port side of thefuselage just below and behind the cockpit.In the Seafire 45 the electrical mastercontrol was interconnected with the engineignition switches. It needed to be selectedto 'on' befor the ignition switch could beselected to 'on'. On later aircraft the masterswitch was marked with 'ground' and 'flight'selections and mounted on the left-handside of the cockpit together with most ofthe other electrical control switche andpush-buttons. When the master switch wasmoved to the 'ground' position, all theelectrical services could be operated andtested using an external power supply. In'flight' mode the power was drawn frominternal sources, so that the position hadto be selected before engine start. Shouldthere be a problem with the supply generator a red warning light illuminated to showthat the batteries were not being charged.

o 0

ROCKETPROJECTILES

1 BROWNINGMACHINE GUNINSTALLATION

/l

CAMER BAY\ ACCESS \ANEL

F.24 14" MODIFIED TOSUIT PR 19

MOUt.VING FOR E~ECTRICALHEATER SOCKETS AND MOTOR

'-"""~ \" .•...-._--) (

AIRFRAMESLINGING

POINTS

20mm HISPANOCANNON

F.24-8" OR 14"VERTICAL CAMERA

DRAUGHTEXCLUDER

WING FOLDJOINTS

RATOG SYSTEMLOCATION POINTS

(PT & STBD)

OBLIQUE CAMERASWITCH

TYPE35CAMERACONTROL

Close-up diagram showing the photo-reconnaissance equipment and cameras installed in the Seafire. BBA Collection

The Seafire FR.47 was equipped with cameras, their locations being shown in this diagram. Also visible are the rocket mountings. BBA Collection

74 75

ANATOMY OFTHE SEAFIREANATOMY OFTHE SEAFIRE

When the Seafire 40 series was developed it was decided to add fairing doors to cover the wheels,

resulting in a more complex undercarriage operating system. FAAM Yeovilton

FAIRINGDOOR

LATCH LOCK

SECTION THROUGHPINTLE AND STRUT

BEARING

CONTACTOR

LOCKING PINASSEMBLY

LOCKING EYEUNDERCARRIAGE

RETRACTED POSITION

MAIN UNITJACK

SHUTILEVALVE

/

The undercarriage unit of a Merlin-powered Spitfire, which was very

similar to that of early-build Seafires. Chris Michel

When the Griffon engine was installed, the Seafire required structural

strengthening. together with a stronger undercarriage. 88A Collection

or down it was imperative that the hydraulicsystem was delivering the required pressureto relieve the locks of the weight of undercarriage legs. If not, the locks could bedifficult to withdraw, causing the selectorlever to jam. Raising the undercarriagerequired the lever to be moved downwardsto disengage it from the slot. It was thenmoved inward and through the gate toallowed full movement through the quadrant. At the end of its travel the lever hadto move outwards through the upper gate.

When the undercarriage was up andlocked the lever would automatically springback into the upper lor. Lowering theundercarriage required the lever to be heldforward for two seconds after which it couldbe moved through the upper gate thenbackward in one mooth movement. Thelever then needed to be moved outwardthrough the lower gate. When it wasrelea ed, and the undercarriage was down

and locked, the lever automatically spranginto the lower slot. An indicator in thequadrant howed whether the undercalTiagewas in the down, idle or up position,depending on the position of the hydraulicvalve. 'Up' or 'Down' was only shown whenthe undercarriage was making the appropriare movement; 'idle' wa hown when thelever was in either slot at the end of thequadrant. When the aircraft was parked, itwas possible for the indicator to show'down', although once the engine wasstarred the lever would return to 'idle'.Should this not happen it was possible thatthe engine-driven hydraulic pump hadfailed.

Should difficulty be encountered inlowering the undercarriage in flight, theSeafire pilot could operate CO2 botrles toblow it down. Semi-transparent windows,marked 'up' on a red background, and'down' on a green one, provided an indi-

cation of undercarriage position. On theSeafire 45 this indicator could be switchedon and off by the master switch. In otherversions the indicator was energized by useof the ground flight switch. On all threevariants there was a secondary indicatorlight to indicate the position of the tailwheel, although this was restricted to greenfor down and locked and out when the tailwheel was up and locked. On many variantsthere was a secondary indicator system,consisting of indicator rods that protrudedthrough the wings when the undercarriagewas fully down.

Operating Flaps andArrester HOOK

The split flaps had just two positions, upor down, although they could be set to18 degr es by spring-loaded pins. Early

The inside and outside faces of the aircraft's main undercarriage doors,

which were attached to the undercarriage legs. Chris Michel

Both fixed and retractable tail-wheel legs shared one characteristic: the fork

was designed to castor on the ground for easier manoeuvring. Chris Michel

76 77


automatically via an altitude sensor. Thealternate switch position for the pilot'sswitch was 'MS', which kept the supercharger in low g ar at all altitudes. Thesystem was also fitted with a test button onthe electrical panel. This allowed high gearto be selected during engine run-up; inflight a red warning light illuminated toindicate high gear engagement. The testbutton only functioned when the supercharger switch was set to 'auto normal'.

A close-up view of the exhaust stubs of the Griffon engine, plus the fastenings for

the cowling panels. BBA Collection

As the Griffon engine was larger, heavier and more powerful it needed a much stronger support beam, as

shown here. BBA Collection

rant. This was spring-loaded and had to beset forward to allow the carburettor todeliver fuel to the engine. Cutting the fuelsupply required the lever to be pulled fullyback and through the gate to hold the valveshut.

The supercharger was controlled by aswitch, which had to be set to 'auto- normal'.The supercharger change gear control wasoperated by an electro-pneumatic ram,which engaged and disengaged high gear

Griffon Engine Controls

The Griffon erlgine required numerouscontrols to manage its performance andbehaviour. The combined throttle andmixture control lever operated in a quadrant. Mixture control was fully automatic,which reduced pilot workload. A frictionadjusted lever on the inboard side of thequadrant held the lever in position. Pullingthe lever backwards reduced friction but asudden pull could have the opposite effect.Engine speed was managed via a throttlequadrant-mounted lever, which governedthe rang betwe nth maximum of 2,750rpm down to 1,800rpm. A fuel cut-off, usedto stop and start the engine, wa mountedon the outboard side of the throttle quad-

machines utilized the wooden blocks firstseen on Merlin-powered Seafires. The flapswere controlled by a three-position leverlocated on the instrument panel's top lefthand side. This lever was marked 'up', 'airoff' and 'down'. After the flaps were loweredthe pilot select d 'air off' to cut power tothe circuit.

Control of the sting-type arrester hookwas via a release handle to the right of thepilot' eat. This had to be pulled upwardsby approximately 1.5in (3.8cm) to releasethe hook. Before ground operation, personnel nearby had to be warned to stayclear as the hook moved with great speed.A green light on the I ft-hand side of theinstrument panel illuminated when thehook was deployed. Pilots, were, however,warned that it might not light up even withthe hook out and down until speed wasreduced to 1l0mph (l76km/h).

On the Seafire 46 and 47 there wasprovision for Rocket-A isted Take-OffGear (RATOG) with a cockpit-locatedmaster switch and push-button. The masterswitch, fitted with a sliding lock and nut,was located at the bottom of the left-handside of the instrument panel, while theigniting button was on top of the throttlelever. A 'T'-handle had to be pulled outfully to jettison the RATOG units. Wheelbrakes were operated by a control columnmounted lever, which was retained in the'on' position for parking by a locking clip.A triple pressure gauge fitted to theinstrument panel indicated air pre surebetween z 1'0 and the maximum of 300psi(20.6bar). Normal operating pressure was80psi (5.5bar) and 140psi (9.7bar) afterModification 489.

PLUG END(REVERSE FOR

OPPOSITE HAND FIT)

JETTISONCATCHNOTCH

VENTURI LOCKINGCLAMP

ELASTIC CORDAGE

SPLITPINS

ELECT CONNECTPIGTAILS

RUBBIt!"PLATE

JETTISON CATCHNOTC SPLIT PIN

The Rocket-Assisted Take-Off Gear (RATOGI system was developed to lift heavily loaded aircraft off the deck of an aircraft carrier without catapults or for

use in cases of catapult failure. Although tested by France's Aeronavale, it was not adopted as it was considered unreliable. FAAM Yeovilton

78 79

ANATOMY OF THE SEAFIRE ANATOMY OFTI-IE SEAFIRE

OUTER GUN110 ROUNDS

INNER GUN120 ROUNDS

Both Supermarine and the

operators were aware that the

Spitfire and Seafire needed

increased capability.

Centreline and under-wing

bomb mountings were

developed as a result. The

centreline mounting also

featured plumbing for an

external fuel tank, which

increased the type's range.

FAAM Yeovilton

ELECTRCAL LEADSFIRING MECHANISM

AMMUNITIONINNER GUN

REAR MOUNTINGANCHORAGE TRUNNION

\II

J

TAll FUSINGUNIT

,,

REAR MOUNTINGANCHORAGE

EYEBOLT

FRONT MOUNTING UNIT OUTERECCENTRIC CLAMPING BOl15

FRONT MOUNTINGUNIT

~ '.

MAGAZINE CARRIER TIE-ROO SHACKLE PIN

FRAME 6

TYPE/AA.RKIlIUNDERFU5ELAGE80MB CARRIER

4SS0'OlY

FORWARD

This diagram illustrates the layout of the wing cannon, together with ammunition feeds and ejectors in the wings of later Seafire variants. FAAM Yeovilton

Canopy Operation

Weapons Operation

On th S afir 45 the cockpit hood wasoperated by a hand-grip on the canopyitself, while that on the Mks 46 and 47 wasopened by a crank handle on the right-handcockpit wall. This crank had to be pulledtowards the pilot before it could be operated.It allowed for intermediate positions becausereleasing the handle permitted the ratchetto engage the drive mechanism. Should thehandle fail to engage it had to be rockedbackwards and forwards until themechanism engaged. Before take-off andlanding the canopy handle had to be in thelocked position to prevent inadvertentmovement of what was a heavy assembly.Opening the canopy from outside was donevia a push-button mounted just under thestarboard hood rail. Thi di engaged thelock and allowed the canopy to run freely.

On all three variants the cockpit accessdoor had a two-position catch, which setit partly open and prevented the canopyfrom closing completely. This was operatedas a safety measure for take-off and landing.As the Seafire 46 and 47 featured a drivemechanism, care had to be taken whenwinding the canopy shut to ensure that theaccess door was properly shut. If not, thecanopy could become jammed or evenderailed. Keeping the door in the interimposition was highly recommended foremergency landings, to enable the pilot toleave the aircraft as quickly as possible.

Final-build Seafires included a windscreen de-icer with a fluid reservoir locatedon the lower right-hand side of the cockpit.This system also required a control cock,pump and needle valve to control theflow of the fluid, which was pumped as aspray to the base of the windscreen, evendistribution relying on the passing airflow.To prevent inadvertent operation, theplunger was locked down by a catch, withthe operating cock returned to the offposition.

The Seafire's guns were fired pneumaticallyby a selective push-button mounted on thecontrol column spade grip. On the Seafire45, pressing the upper section of this buttonfired the outboard guns, pressure on thelower section selected th inboard guns,while pressing the centre resulted in thedischarge of all four. With the introductionof the Seafire 46 and 47 the upper section

The starter button was mounted just abovethe main fuel cock and was shielded to prevent inadvertent operation. When pressed,this button not only ignited th startercartridge but also energized the booster coil.Five starter cartridges were provided andselecting a fresh one requ ired carefuloperation of the re-indexing control at thebottom right-hand corner of the instrumentpanel. There was one cockpit light on eitherside, controlled by dimmer switches in thecentre of the instrument panel.

lJbJ~~;;;~~=--------lLUBRICATION POINTS

The sting hook and its rudder fairing shown in the fully-down position. In an attempt to reduce the damage

caused to aircraft with 'A'-frame hooks, the sting-type was given some lateral movement. SSA Collection

Supercharger cooling was achieved by anintercooler radiator mounted ahead of thecoolant radiator under the port wing. Thecarburettor air intake filter prevented theengine from ingesting foreign objects andwas operated by a lever with two positions:'nonnal intake' and 'filter intake'. This leverwas mounted on the left-hand side of thecockpit forward of the elevator trim tabcontrol. The 'filter' selection was for groundrunning, take-off and landing and whenoperating in sandy or dust-laden conditions.

80 81

ANATOMY OFTHE SEAFIRE ANATOMY OF THE SEA FIRE

• at C: relegate to ground instruction• Cat E: write off• Cat E2: suitable for scrapping.

Repairing DamagedAirframes

Further categories were:

• Cat A: capable of being repaired byoperating unit

• Cat AC: beyond local repair• Cat B: requires transfer to repair unit.

As the Seafire displayed a propensity fornose-down crash-landings on carrier flightdecks, there had to be a procedure fordealing with damaged aircraft. Airframesthat could be reclaimed were assigned arepair category as follows:

At sea, aircraft in the last category weresummarily dealt with. The remains weresimply manhandled to the side of the shipand dumped overboard.

the bottom left-hand corner of the instrument panel, while the gunsight dimmerswitch was on the right-hand cockpit wall.On the Seafi re 46 and 47, the con trol toenable the sight to be used for aiming therockets was mounted just ahead of the bombcontrol panel. The push-button for cagingthe gunsight during violent manoeuvreslikely to cause toppling was mounted on thecontrol column spade grip.

A cine camera was mounted in theleading edge of the starboard wing. Onsome Seafire 45s it was operated by pressingeither the top or bottom of the gun firingpush-button. On later aircraft control wasvia a separate spade-grip mounted pushbutton. On the Mk 46 and Mk 47 aircraftthe cine camera was operated either bypressing the top half of the gun-firing buttonor by a control panel push-button. Toenable them to operate in the photoreconnaissance role, both the Seafire 46 and47 could be equipped with vertical andoblique cameras. Operating switches werelocated on the forward part of the bombcontrol panel. The vertical camera wasprotected against mud splashes by a panelthat could be jettisoned after take-off.

fired all four guns, while the lower sectioneither released bombs or fired the rocketprojectiles. Bomb controls included thedistributor, fusing and selector switches,which were mounted on the left-hand sideof the cockpit, just forward of the door. Inthe Seafire 45, bomb release was achievedby pressing a button mounted on the topof the throttle lever.

[n the Seafire 46 and 47 the throttlebutton was used for RATOG ignition, whilethe bomb release was moved to the spadegrip. The rocket projectile controls al 0

released the bombs. There was a masterswitch with others for auto selection, pairssalvo and firing control. When the masterswitch was set to 'RP' and the pair salvoset to 'pairs', operation of the firing switchlaunched the rockets in pairs. When theswitch was set to 'salvo' and the selectorset to '1' or '3', pressing the switch fired thebottom rack of rockets. With the selectorthen et to '2' or '4', the top tier of rocketscould be fired.

Weapons were aimed by a ranging gyrogunsight, the control for which was incorporated into the top of the throttle lever.The gunsight master switch was located on

STING HOOKINSTALLATION

OUTER WINGSTORES MOUNTING

later Seafires were able to carry

rockets. This diagram shows the

mounts and their location in relation

to the wing. FAAM Yeovilton

o

WING JURYSTRUTS

UNDERWINGCOMBAT

FUEL TANK

WING DEPLOYEDPOSITION

~

~I /r:'\ .

'A' FRAME HOOKINSTALLATION

AIRFRAMESLINGING

POINTS

RATOGMOUNTS

WING FOLDPOINTS

SHEARPLATE

FRONTMOUNTING~

PACKING WEDGE I~

~I 1

FRONT STRUT 1 • IMOUNTING e

This diagram illustrates the Seafire XV's wing fold arrangement. supporting struts. arrester hooks. fuel tank locations and RATOG mounts. BBA Collection

82 83

CHAPTER SIX

Flying the Seafire

As the earliest versions of the SupermarineSeafire were based on the same company'sSpitfire Mk V, the aircraft were hardlyunknown quantities when they enteredservice with the Fleet Air Arm. As a resultof the early development, the Merlinpowered Seafires were considered to begenerally stable in flight about all axes.

These variants, the Mk IB, Mk llC andthe Mk Ill, were powered by versions of theRolls-Royce Merlin, which included the 45,45M, 46, 50, 50A, 50M.55 and SSM, all ofwhich burned 100 octane fuel. Performancewas similar whatever the powerplant.This meant that the maximum take-offpower-setting to climb to I,OOOft (300m)was 3,000rpm with boost set at plus-12psi(0.8bar). This was reduced to plus-9psi(0.6bar) and 2,850rpm at maximum climbrate, while a further reduction to plus-7(0.5bar) and 2,650rpm was available atmaximum rich continuous setting. Shouldthe engine be run at the weak setting, theboost was reduced to plus-4psi (0.3bar).Combat settings, limited to five-minutebursts, allowed for a maximum of 3,000rpmat plus-I6psi (l.Ibar), which was rai ed toplus-I8psi (l.2bar) for 'M'-suffixed powerplants. The lower limit for combat boost was2,850rpm.

Engine oil temperatures had to bemonitored throughout the flight envelope.The average of 90°C increased to 105°in combat. Coolant temperatures alsovaried. At maximum climb it reached125°C, falling to 105°C at continuoussettings, although this could rise to 115°for short periods. In combat mode itincreased again to 135°e. Before take-off,engine oil temperature had to be at least15°C with coolant at 60°e. The normalrange for engine oil pressure was between60 and 80psi (4.1 to 5.5bar), with aminimum for safe flying of 45psi (3.1bar).

Fuel System Management

Fuel system pressure had to between 8 and10psi (0.6 and 0 7bar) Other systemrequirements included maintaining straight

This view of the cockpit through the entrance door shows the compass. gunsight and seat straps wrapped

around the control column. Chris Michel

84

and level flight with a 90gal (409Itr)external tank attached. This restriction didnot apply to the 30gal (l36Itr) tank. TheSeafire could also carry 170gal (773Itr)tanks as well as smaller ones containing just29gal (l32Itr), one of which could be slungunder each wing. In ei ther case, straigh t andlevel flight had to be maintained when theywere attached.

Pilots were warned nor to select the rearfuselage tank and the external tank to 'on'simultan ously because this could allow airto be drawn into the fuel system. Thisrestriction applied even after the externaltank had been jettisoned as, when left open,the external connection could act as anefficient fuel venting system. The bulky170gal container could only be jettisonedin straight and level flight, but there wasno such restriction covering the smallerunder-wing tanks. With external tanks ofany size fitted, the aircraft had to be started,warmed up and lifted off to a safe height ofapproximately 2,000ft (600m) before themain tanks could be switched off and theexternal ones elected. With the 170galtank, the Seafire was limited to an indicatedairspeed (lAS) of 185mph (296km(h) levelflight, which decreased to 170mph(272km(h) when it was empty.

Once the external tanks were empty theengine would start cutting out, at whichpoin t the rear fuselage tank had to beselected. At this point the pilot facedtwo choices. Should maximum range berequired, the external tank had to bejettisoned at once, but if needed for furtheruse the pilot had to be aware that still-airrange was reduced by 120 miles (l90km).Under certain circumstances the externaltank had to be jettisoned before it was fullyempty. The drill then was to select main

I tanks 'on' before switching the externalone to 'off' and jettisoning it. The rear fueltank could be selected when needed. Onceit was empty the ngine would coughslightly, at which point the pilot was advisedto switch to the main fuel system.

The tank contents and fuel consumptionhad to be carefully monitor d to wring themost out of the limited capacity. Internalfuel capacity was 75gal (340Itr), 48gal(218Itr) in the top tank and 37gal (l681tr)in the bottom one. This could be increasedto 175gal (796Itr). Additional internal(90gal/409Itr) and external (30gal/136Itrand 170gal/773Itr) tanks took the total to284gal (l,290Itr). Varying the fuel loadsalso meant changes to the quantity ofengine lubricant carried. With the two

FLYING THE SEAFIRE

normal internal tanks full, 5.8gal (26Itr) ofoil was usually sufficient. This was raised to8.5gal (39Itr) with an additional 90gal(409Itr) offuel or 14.5gal (66ltr) of oil withmaximum fuel.

Fuel consumption varied depending onmixture settings. Rich mixture at 3,000rpmwith boost at plus-9psi (0.6bar) resulted ina rate of 88gal (400Itr) per hour With thepower reduced to 2,850 rpm at the sameboost setting, it dropped to 84gal (382Itr)per hour. At 2,650rpm with plus-7psi(0.5bar) boost, consumption fell to 67gal(305Itr) per hour Pilots were warned thatthese values applied to straight and levelflying. Where appropriate, weak mixturesetting covered the range between plusand minus 4psi (0.28bar) at heights from6,000 to 20,000ft (l,850 and 6, 150m).When flying at minus 4psi boo t at 650,2,400, 2,200, 2,000 and 1,800rpm, consumption was 39, 36, 34, 31 and 26gal (177,164, 155, 141 and 118Itr) per hour respectively. At minus 2psi (O.lbar) boost atthe same rpm boo t settings, fuel consumption rose to 43,40,38,35 and 31gal (l95,182,173,159 and 141ltr) respectively Atzero boost settings using the ame rpmsettings, consumption rose to 47, 44, 42,39 and 35gal (214,200, 191,177,159 and141Itr), while at plus-2psi boost it increasedto 51, 48, 46, 43 and 39gal (232,218,209,195 and 177ltr). The final setting of plus4psi at the same power took consumptionto 56, 53, 51, 47 and 43gal (255,241,232,214 and 1951tr) per hour

Having been initiated into the complexity of the fuel system, the novice pilotthen had to master engine handling andmanagement. Before starting, the fuel cocklevers had to be set to 'on', the throttle to0.5in (l.3cm) open, the propeller speedcontrol to 'fully back' if a de Havilland unitwas fitted or 'fully forward' for Rotol or deHavilland Hydromatic units. Radiatorshutter setting was 'open'.

Starting the Engine

[n very cold weather, pilots wer recommended to use high volatility fuel forpriming. The hand-operated primer had tobe pumped until an increase in resistancewas felt. This confirmed that the suctionand delivery pipelines were full offuel. Theignition and starting magneto, if fitted, wereturned on before the starter and coi Ibuttons, again if fitted, wer pressed. Eachstarting cycle was to last no more than

85

twenty seconds, with an interval of thirtyseconds between each attempt.

During the starting cycle the pilot wasexpected to work the priming pump asrapidly and as vigorously as possible. Therecommended number of strokes was fourat a temperature of O°C with high volatility fuel or twelve for normal high octanefuel. Standard fuel could not be used atminus 10°C and below. As the temperaturedropped, th number of priming strokesincreased. [n low temperatures it was recommended that the pump be operated untilfuel reached the carburettor. Once theengine was running the booster coil b n- or the starting magneto Itch asappropriate - was released and e primingpump screwed down. The en ne was runas slowly as possible for half a llinute, afterwhich power could be set to ast tick-overto warm it up. With aircraft tted with deHavilland 20-degree propeller units, thepropeller speed control had to be pushedfully forward after a minute's running.

During ground running, the canopyalways had to be locked fully open with theaccess door handl set at half cocked andthe brakes applied with pressure maintainedat 120psi (8.3bar). After warm-up wascomplete it was recommended that theaircraft's tail be held down by two menbefore the throttle was advanced. The firstoperational engine test required the boostsetting be at 'weak', after which thepropeller pitch-change mechani m could becycled and the throttle opened fully tocheck take-off boost and rpm. With richmixture selected it was time to check eachmagneto in turn. Magneto drop should notexceed 150rpm.

To ensure maximum rang, the boostsetting in climb had to be at plus-9psi(0.6bar) at 2,850rpm with the mixture setto rich, if appropriate. To attain maximumrange, pilots were instructed to balan eheight and speed, so that below 8,000ft(2,500m) indicated a.ir peed should be closeto 160kt (l80mph or 288km(h). Fromth re to 15,000ft (4,600m) speed droppedto 142kt (l60mph or 255km(h), whileabove this height speed declined to 133kt(l50mph or 240kph). At low altitudes thespeed could be raised to 178kt (200mphor 320kph) without detriment to fuelconsumption. Where a mixture control wasfitted, a weak setting was recommendedwith boost at plus-4psi (0.28bar), as richnessincreased automatically. Engine speed couldbe reduced to around 1,800rpm to maintainthe desired velocity, although pilots wereinstructed to ensure the generator was

FLYING THE SEAFIRE FLYING THE SEAFIRE

RUDDER BARAND PEDALS

In normal flight it was recommendedthat the radiator shutter b kept in thminimum drag position. When the aircraftwas prepared for landing with undercarriageand flaps down, there was a markedly nosedown trim change. During the landingphase at a loading of 6,4001b (2,900kg) thestalling peed with everything retracted was65kt (73mph or Il7km/h); with everything out and down, speed dropped to 57ke(64mph or 102km/h). hould the pilot bforced to make a power-off landing, thepropeller speed control had to be pulledright back and the radiator flap set to thminimum drag position. Both actions wererequired to increase gliding distance. Duringcombat manoeuvres, on the other hand,pilots were advised to use climb rpm tocover any sudden power requirements. TheSeafire's maximum diving sp ed was 400kt(450mph or 720km/h), while at the otherend of the range, speed with undercarriagelowered was limited to l40ke (160mph or

AILERONTURNBUCKLES

REAR RUDDER ANDELEVATOR PULLEYS

AND GUIDES

ELEVATOR TRIM CONTROLAND INDICATOR

ELEVATOR TRIM"- -,;.--TAB JACKS

PULLEYS ATFRAME 21

MB141 took part in RATOG trials at Farnborough. These tests cleared the system for ship-board use and

MB141 participated in further trials. FAAM Yeovilton

This diagram shows the flight controls and their associated runs, together with the turnbuckles and

supporting fairleads. Eric Morgan Collection

charging correctly. Should speed increasebeyond I,SOOrpm, they were advised toreduce boost and cut speed to the desiredlimit.

If speed decayed drastically the aircraftwould stall. At this point, one wingdropped, irrespective of flap position. If thepilot attempted to recover by pulling thecontrol column back, the Seafire wouldspin. Stalling could also occur during asteep climb or during a looping manoeuvre;a high-speed stall could be induced as aresult of elevator sensitivity. When thishappened the ntire aircraft would shudderviolently and there would be a clatteringnoise. This would be followed by a lateralflick. Should the pilot not instantly put thecontrol column fully forward, the aircraftwould enter a rapid roll from which a spincould I' suit.

Pilots had to remember a set pre-takeoff drill: 'TMP'. 'T' stood for trimming tabs,which required the elevator to be set to onedivision down with the rudder trimmed tostarboard. 'M' meant mixture control: rich,if appropriate. 'P' stood for propeller speedcontrol: fully forward. For take-offs fromland, the flaps were to be 'up' and theradiator flap 'fully open'. At the end of therunway, or on the flight-deck, the pilot hadto open the throttle slowly to the ratedboost position.

After brake release any tendency for theSea~re to swing was countered by application of coarse rudder. Should the aircraftbe leaving a short runway, or with a fullload of fuel and weapons, the throttle hadto be pushed through the gate to take-offboost. Once airborne, the undercarriagewas raised using the selector lever. Pilotswere instructed to hold it hard against thequadrant until the indicators confirmedthat the undercarriage was up and locked.Until the aircraft had reached 124kt(140mph or 224km/h) the Seafire wasallowed to ascend lowly before entering anyperiod of sustained climb.

During climb from sea level to lO,OOOft,(3,00001), Merlin Seafires were not toexce d 150ke (170mph or 272km!h), whilebetween there and 16,000ft (5,00001) thenot-to-exceed speed was l40kt (160mph or250km/h) Between 16,000 and 21 ,000ft(6,50001) this value reduced to UOkt(J50mph or 240km/h). From that altitudeto 37 ,000ft (11,00001) the speed teducedby 9kt (lOmph or l6km/h) per 5,000ft(1,50001) increment. Above 37,000ft maximum climb speed wa not to exceed lOOkt(J l5mph or IS0km/h).

The pilot's seat was mounted on frame 11, as were the restraining straps and

release mechanism. FAAM Yeovilton

With the canopy open and the door set at the recommended half-cocked position,

this Seafire IB leaves for another sortie. Will Blunt Collection

86 87

The deck parties are working flat out to spread the wings of these Seafires before a sortie. Note the

support struts still lying on the wings. BBA Collection

FLYING THE EAFIRE

Ditching

down and locked, 'P' for propeller control- fully forward - hook down and greenlight illuminated, and flaps down. Approachspeed wa 70kt ( Omph or 1 Okm/h),reducing to 65kt (75mph or 120km~) onfinal approach. The nose had to be kepthigh and, to keep the flight deck in ight,the aircraft had to be crabbed slightly fromside to side. Just before touch-down it wastraightened up to avoid excessive train onthe main undercarriage mountings.

For catapult launche the cockpit canopyhad to be locked open and pi lots wereadvised to hold their heads firmly backagainst the headrest. The vital drill were'T' for trim tabs, elevator neutral and rudderfully to starboard; 'P' for propeller control- fully forward - fuel cock lev r 'on' andbottom tank content checked; the flapsfully up and radiator flap fully open. Thcontrol column then had to be heldc ntrally and the rudder bar moved aboutone-third of the way to tarboard. Tocounter any tendency to wing, coarserudder was recommended.

In the event of major trouble, pilot wereadvised to take to their parachutes. If thiswas not po sible and ditching was inevitable, the first action was to jettison longrange fuel tanks, which had to be done

Having made a successful trap. this Seafire XVII will run out to the end of its

landing before being disconnected from the arrester wire. FAAM Yeovilton

cut-out was pulled and held until the enginestopped. The fuel cock and ignition werethen turned off.

After ground school and OperationalTraining Unit, novice pilot were thenrequired to undergo flying training from atraining carrier. Here an additional set ofactions was required. Before take-off pilotswere instructed to avoid warming theengine up for prolonged periods as radiatortemperature was not allowed to exceed100°C. Once lined up for take-off, pilotswere instruct d to lower the flaps to1 degrees, if the eafire had been subjectto Modification 63, or otherwise fully.Ground crew then had to insert shapedwooden blocks between the wing and theflap, after which the flaps were raised to gripthe block. When the aircraft was safely inlevel flight, the flap were fully lowered torelease the blocks, then raised fully up.

Before landing-on, pilots were instructedto reduce peed to 125kt (140mph or225km~) and deploy the arrester hook. Atthis point the radiator light indicator hadto be checked for a green light. With aircraftflying with others, pilots were asked tocheck that their formation mates had alsodeployed their hooks. With all checkscompleted the cockpit canopy had to belocked open, the access door handle set topartly cocked wi th brake pressure at aminimum of 120p i (8.3bar). Vital prelanding drills involved 'U' for und rcarriage

from the locking pins. This would allowthem to turn freely when the lever wapulled back - smartly to the down positionand left th re - to select 'undercarriageJown'. The lever was not to be forcedthrough the gate because, when it hadcompleted its full range of travel, theundercarriage would spring the leverthrough the gate. The hydraulic valve indicator would then return to the idle position.

If the undercarriage lever would not goall the way through the gate, it had to bepu hed forward for two seconds, which wasnormally enough to relea e the locking pins.A smart blow u ually freed a jammed lever.If not, more drastic action was needed andpilots were recommended to put the aircraftinto a dive and invert it. It was possible forth undercarriage to appear down andlocked but without the green indicator lightbeing illuminated. In uch ca e the recommended action was to hold the lever fullyback for a few second. Should this actionfail, the undercarriage had to be cycledagain. The la t resort was the emergencyblow-down system. Thi required theselector lever to be in the 'down' positionwith the aircraft in a nose-down attitude oreven inverted to free the locking pins.

Pilots were warned that lowering theundercarriage too late during the approachcould result in insufficient engine sp ed todrive the hydraulic operating pump. Thiswould prevent the lever moving throughthe gate into the fully down and lockedposition. With the lever outside the gate,there was a risk that the undercarriagewould collapse on landing. If the lever hadnot passed through the gate, it was necessaryto go-around and attempt another landing,the required speed being 105kt (l20mphor 190km~). This wa al a the peed forlanding in low vi ibility with flaps lowered.The radiator shutter was to be fully opento keep engine coolant temperature at100°C, while the propeller speed had to beset to cruising rpm.

Flaps were raised before the aircraft wastaxied to its designated parking spot. Withtho e fitted with the de Havilland 20-degreepropeller unit, the speed control had to bepulled fully back while the engine wasrevved sufficiently to change pitch to coarse.With the aircraft parked the engine was tobe run at 800 to 900rpm for approximatelytwo minutes, after which the slow running

Lowering the Undercarriage

cockpit canopy fully and setting the handleon the cockpit side door to half cocked.Pilots were recommended never to put theirarms out of the cockpit and into the airflow.With early airframes speed had to bereduced to 120kt (l40mph or 220km/h),after which the landing mnemonic had tobe appli d. First came 'U' for undercarriage,which had to be selected 'down' and confirmed in the locked position via the indicator and green lights. This was followedby 'M' for mixture control: et to 'rich', butonly if the appropriate control was fitted.'P' indicated that the propeller control hadto be placed fully forward. The final actionin thi equence wa to select flaps 'down'.

During the approach with flaps down andthe engine running, the minimum speed was120kt ( 5mph or 136km~).Thi increa edto 85kt (95mph or 150km~1) with flaps up.In a glide approach, speed was to be heldbetween Okt (95mph or 144km~) and90kt (lOOmph or 160km~) with flaps up.When the pilot was ready, the undercarriagecould be lowered, the operating lever havingbeen pu hed fully forward for about twoseconds to allow the weight to be ea ed

Diving

Approach and Landing

Because the Seafire became tail-heavy in adive as speed increased, th aircraft had tobe trimmed before the nose wa pushedover to avoid any risk of excessive speed inrecovery. Once the dive had been completed and speed was decaying after pullout, forward trim wa wound back. As theaircraft exhibited a tendency to yaw to theright, colTection had to be applied by application of the rudder trim tab.

speed had to be kept between 280kt(320mph or 51Okm~) and 310kt (350mphor 560km~). An increase to 400mph wasrequired for an upward roll, but pilots werewarned that fl ick manoeuvres were not tobe undertaken under any circumstances.

The approach and landing called for seriousthought by eafire pilots. The first actionsduring the approach involved opening the

Performing Aerobatics

250km~1). This was similar to the flapsdown limit, although it fell by 1 kt (20mphor l3km/h) if landing lights were extended.

Spinning was permitted with writtenpermission from the squadron commanderor chief flying in tructor. Pilots were warnednot to tart a pin below 10,000ft (3,000m)and that recovery had to begin above5,000ft (l,500m). peed had to be aboveUOkt (150mph or 240km/h) beforerecovery was initiated. Aerobatic limitations included looping, which required anentry speed of 260~t (300mph or 480km~)for inexperienced pilot. Thi could fall to220kt (250mph or 400km/h) for thosemore experienced. Rolling could be undertaken between 200kt (180mph or 290km~)and 260kt (300mph or 480km~). Duringrolls the no e had to be kept at approximately 30 degrees above the horizon. Themanoeuvre itself required the roll to bebalTeiled to keep the engine running. Whenundertaking a half roll off a loop, the entry

88 89


during rraighr and level flighr. Flaps wereser fully down ro reduce speed, bur pilotswere warned not to attempt a ditchingunless the undercarriage was fully retracted.If the engine was still running, power waro be applied ro help force the tail down,while keeping speed as low as possible. Thecanopy had ro be jetti oned and pilots werestrongly advised ro adjust their straps astightly as po sible ro minimize impactinjuries. Finally, it was recommended thatthe aircraft be set down along the swell. Inthe case of Mk III Seafires, the only Merlinpowered variants with folding wings, therewere additional pre-ditching checks. Pilotshad ro ensure that the wings were properlyspread and locked and that the small accessdoors under each wingtip were similarlysecured. The round red indicaror rodmounted just inboard of the main wing foldjoint had ro be checked ro ensure it wasflu h with the wing upper surface.

With a fully-raised tail trestle in position. BL68Ts arrester hook can be fully extended. It was

recommended that all personnel stay well clear during this operation. FAAM Yeovilton

Griffon Seafires

Although they shared the same parentageas the M rlin-powered aircraft, the GriffonSeafires differed considerably. Only threeversions of the final Seafire family werebuilt and each differed from the others inmany ways. The Mk 45, powered by aGriffon 61 driving a five-bladed Rorolpropeller, had a high-backed fuselage, nonfolding wings and a 12-volt DC electricalsystem. The F.46 and FR.46 had a Griffon87 driving a six-bladed contra-rotating unit,a modified fuel system with added plumbingfor external fuel tanks, and an electricalsystem up-rated ro 24-volts DC. The rearfuselage was cut down for better pilot vision,while an enlarged tail unit improv dstability and handling. The F.4 7 and FR.4 7were similar ro the F.46 except that theirwings could be folded for carri.er srowage.In the first batch of aircraft, the wings hadro be folded manually, but most featured ahydraulically powered mechanism. Thefinal two variants were capable of using

RATOG gear and, although only the Seafire 47 was designed for carri r operation,all had sting-type arrester hooks.

With 40-series Seafires, pilots wereadvised ro take great care in managing thefuel system. For the F.45 the tank usesequence began with the pilot ensuring thatthe engine was started using the lower tank.The fuel transfer cock had ro be set at'normal' ro ensure that the contents of theupper tank would feed inro the lower one.This was the preferred selection for takeoff and the initial climb-out. During thisphase the booster pump had ro be switchedon for take-off and landing. This also hadro be done during tank switch-over, whenthe fuel pressure warning light illuminatedor when there were signs of fuel starvation.The booster pump also had ro selected ro'on' when the aircraft was climbing rohigher altitude. It was not ro be operatedon the ground unless the fuel cut-off witchwas in the 'cut off' position, because therewas a risk of the engine being flooded andeven of fire.

Fuel System Management

Once the upper fuel tank contents haddropped inro the red it had ro be switchedoff and wing tanks selected. After fiveminutes the selecror had ro be returned rothe normal position, and the next pair ofwing tank selected for another five minute.The selecror could then be returned ronormal. If these actions were not taken themain wing tanks would not pressurizecorrectly. When an external fuel tank wascarried, change-over from the lower fuselagetank was ro be done at a safe height. Atthat point, th drop tank cock had ro beelected ro 'on' with all other fuel cocks and

the booster pump set to 'off. There wa apossibility of delay in fuel reaching theengine as the external tank emptied, andthis required the lower fuselage tank cockro be turned on before the external tankcock was switched off.

Fuel system management in the Seafire46 and 47 required the engine ro be startedusing fuel from the lower fuselage tank.

PRIMING PUMP

H.V. FUEL INLET

------+TO CYLINDERS

ENGINEPUMP

PRIMINGCOCK

~------:O"""~TOENGINE

: ....

PRESSURE RELEASE COCK

LOWERMAIN TANK48 GALLS

AUXILIARYDROP TANK

FUEL .-;:::======{:=:~TRANSFER ((COCK

AUTOMATIC VALVE

___ PRIMING SYSTEM

___ MAIN SYSTEM

• • - AUXILIARY SYSTEM

=== PRESSURE SYSTEM

()) FUEL COCK

a NON RETURN VALVE

--C:- BOOSTER PUMP

SECTION 'A-A'

BURGESS TYPEMICRO SWITCH

FUSEBOX

PRE-MODHOOK

INDICATORliGHT

RELEASETOGGLE

1 SNAP GEAR2 JACK HINGE POINTS3 ARRESTER HOOK4 JACK END BEARING5 HOOK UNIT HINGE POINTS

POST-MODHOOK

THROTTLE BLOCKTERMINAL

CONTACTOR

_---"'----"'-----------'1/.1~ff==-...=::::::;:::t=====:JJ--__I_____I

The 'A'-Frame arrester hook. together with the operating switch and mechanism. BBA Collection

Layout of a late-build Seafire. As this included extra wing tanks and. later. a rear fuselage tank. pilots had

to be aware of the need to manage their fuel with care. BBA Collection

90 91


later-build Seafires featured alternate control runs for the elevator system, as shown here. BBA Collection

DETAIL 'A'

Handling in the Air

Handling of later Seafires varied. They weredescrib d as being stable around all axes,although when climbing at low airspeedslongitudinal stability decreased in the Mk4S. During landing and take-off, changesin trim affected behaviour. Undercarriageretraction prompted the no e to rise andthe reverse happened when it wa lowered.Flap movement was similarly accompaniedby a trim change in the same direction ofmovement. The radiator shutter also hadan effect, with closure bringing the nose up.Handling was described as generally lightand effective throughout the speed range,all trim tabs being effective. There wa oneexception: udden application of the rudderor trim tab in a high speed dive caused theaircraft to skid violently.

Stall warning limits were 80 knots(90mph or l40km/h), with everythingretracted and operating at a normal serviceload, and 8Skt (9Smph or lSOkm/h) atfull load. As the undercarriage and flapsincreased drag, the tailing speeds came

AILERON DRUM

DETAIL 'A'

46 and 47 could take off under full poweras there was no swing, but pilots wererecommended to hold boost at plus-l2psi.After take-off, a quick dab on the brakes wasrequired to stop the wheels spinning beforeretracting the undercarriage. At l,OOOft(300m) the carburettor air intake controlwas set to 'normal intake' - unless conditions were dusty - with the radiator shuttersmoved to 'closed'. This set the system toautomatic. On the Seafire 46 and 47, therear fuel tank could be selected once theaircraft had reached 2,000ft (600m).

With the aircraft cleaned up, it could beclimbed from ea level to 2S,000ft (7,700m)at a constant speed of lSOkt (l70mph or270km!h), although above this height thespeed had to be cut by 3kt (4mph or Skm/h)per l,OOOfr. If the aircraft was in a combatclimb the supercharger would automaticallychange to high gear at 11,000ft (3,400m).Under normal conditions - 2,600rpm atplus-9psi (0.6bar) boo 1'- the maximum rateof climb was best obtained by delaying thegear change until boost had dropped to plus6psi (O.4bar).

AILERONCONTROL CABLES

--_.-. TURNBUCKLES

RUDDER OPERATINGCABLES

~~~31&~" ALTERNATECABLE RUNS

TURNBUCKLES

Take-Off

On take-off the throttle was opened slowlyto plus-7psi (O.Sbar) boo r. With the Seafire4S, a sudden power incr ase could exacerbate its tendency to swing strongly to theright. This could lead to exce ive tyre wearon paved surfaces. Once airborne, boostcould be increased to plus 12psi (0.8bar),although the lower setting was more thanadequate for the take-off run. The eafire

contra-rotating propeller, the rudder tabswere set to neutral. Now correctly trimmed,the rpm I vel' could be set fully forward.

With the eafire 4S, the lower fuel tankcock was set to 'on', with the transfer cockat 'normal'. The drop tank cock and boosterpump were 'off and 'on', respectively. Inaddition to these actions, the rear tankcock in the Seafire 46 and 47 was to be at'off with the boo tel' pump set to 'main'.Flaps were at 'up', the lever being at 'airoff, while the air intake control was to beset at 'in operation'.

engine had to be allowed to warm up untilthe oil pressure steadied, after which itcould be opened up to 1,200 to 1,400rpmand held there un til everything wasthoroughly warmed up. During thi procespressures and temperatures had to bchecked before the pneumatic systems weretested by raising and lowering flaps andrad ia tor sh utters.

Magnetos were tested before the enginewas run at a faster rate. Once the oi 1temperature had reached lSoC with thecoolant temperature at 40°C, the propellerunit could be cycled through it completerange by pushing and pulling the operatinglever twice through its quadrant. With thelever fully forward, the rpm had to bechecked to ensure that it was within SOrpmof the normal value. With the enginerunning correctly the supercharger could betested to check that rpm dropped in highgear and boost rose in low gear. After thetest, original ratings were to be restored.

When at static boost, the electricalgenerator was checked for correct functioning, the visual indication being that thewarning light went out. Next on the checklist were the magnetos. Should one show adrop exceeding lOOrpm without vibrationthe test was to be done again at a higherpower to see if that cleared the problem.But if the engine still misbehaved it wa tobe shut down for further investigation. Afterrectification of a magneto problem theaircraft would require full-power engineruns. Given the Griffon engine's power thetail had to be securely tied down, althoughat sea further tie-downs could be used.Under these conditions the throttle had tobe opened fully, during which the take-offboost and rpm were checked as quickly aspossible. At take-off power each magnetowas tested in turn. Should either exhibit alOOrpm drop, the engine had to be shutdown for further investigation.

Once the aircraft has been confirmed asfit for flight, the pilot then had to en urethat the brake pressure readings were correctand that pneumatic system pressures werewithin limits. With the brakes confirmedas operable the pilot could proceed to therunway, although he had to be aware thaton the ground the Seafire was distinctlynose heavy. This required care with thebrakes. Pre-take-off checks includedensuring that elevator trim tabs were set atneutral for the Mk 4S and at two divi ionsnose-up for Mks 46 and 47 aircraft. Therudder had to be set fully left with theSeafire 4S. With aircraft equipped with

light - showing 'down'. The fuel contentsgauge had to be checked, with the reartank and external tank cocks 'off and thetran fer cock set at 'normal'. The boosterpump had to be 'off. With initial checkcompleted the hood jettison control waschecked for correct stowage and the canopytested for free movement. On the Mk 4Sthe overhead handle had to be deployed,while on the Mks 46 and 47 the windinghandle was to be tested. The canopy wasto be stopped just short of the closedpo ition, at which point the pilot warequired to push the lower forward edgesoutwards to ensure the canopy's correctengagement with its rails. The canopy wasthen returned to the fully open position.

Engine starting required the lower fuselagetank fuel cock be set to 'on' and the throttleopened by 1in. The rpm lever was placedfully forward, the supercharger change gearswitch set to 'auto normal', the air intakefilter selector set to 'filter in operation',while, if fitted, the radiator shutter switchwa to b et to 'open'. The Coffman starterhad to be indexed to bring the nextcartridge into position. As these cartridgewere temperature- ensitive, the No.4 Mk1 was normally used in temperatures aboveSoC, with the No. S Mk 1 being preferredfor lower values.

The fuel cut-off lever was then set at 'cutoff' for ten to fifteen seconds, after whichthe booster pump was set to 'off and fuelcut-off lever pushed fully forward. At thispoint, the priming selector cock had to beset to 'main' before the priming pump wasoperated, until fuel reached the primingnozzles. This was indicated by an increasein resistance. Use of the priming pump wasneeded when the engine was cold.

For engine starting the appropriatebutton was pressed and held to energize thebooster coil. Should the engine fail to startwith the first cartridge, the engine had tobe re-primed, although this would not berequired if the initial priming had beenoverly generous. Under normal circumstances, no further priming was neededexcept when a new cartridge was selectedor when temperatures were high. In lowertemperatures, the opposite action wasrequired. Continuous priming was thereforenecessary even after engine starr. Once theengine was running smoothly the buttonscould be released, the primer screwed downand the selector cock set to 'all off. The

Starting the Engine

Caution was needed when the rear fuselagetank booster pump was selected to 'on' asthe lower fuselage tank cock had to be 'off.It was possible for fuel from the rear tankto be pumped into the lower one, whichcould cause excess fuel to be vented. Pilotshad to be aware that fuel in the rear tankhad to be used as soon as possible to avoidadverse movement of the aircraft's centreof gravity. Despite this warning, use of thelower fuselage tank for starting and takeoff was mandatory to cope with carburettorpill-back in the upper tank.

Should the rear fuse lag tank not be inuse, the fuel transfer cock had to be set to'wing tanks' to allow fuel from the wingsto feed into the upper fuselage tank. Thiselection sequence wa supposed to continue until the main fuel contents gaugeindicated 70gal (3l8Itr), which meant thewing tanks were drained of usable fuel. Thepilot then switched the selector cock to'normal'. When th rear fuselage tank wasfull, the start and take-off sequence wasnormal. Once a safe height had beenreached, the rear tank cock was set to 'on'with that for the lower one set to 'off. Toensure that fuel from the rear tank was fedto the engine, the booster switch had to beset to 'on'. When the fuel tank was virtuallyempty, the process had to be reversed toallow fuel to flow from the wing and fuselagetanks as normal. When the aircraft wasfitted with wing combat tanks and full wingand fuselage tanks, the operating sequencewas to use the rear one first, then theexternal tanks, followed by the upper andlower fuselage tanks.

Before entering the cockpit, pilots wererequired to make the usual external checks,paying pecial attention to the arresterhook, which had to be fully retracted. OnSeafire 4S aircraft only the hood jettisonpins had to be fully home. In the cockpit,pilots had to check that the gun firingbutton wa set to 'safe', the bomb ma tel'switch wa 'off and, on Seafire 46 and 47aircraft, the RATOG switch was also at 'off.Engine ignition switches had to be 'off, theundercarriage lever at 'down', flap selectorat 'air-off' and fuel cut-off at 'cut off'.Pneumatic y tem pressure was to be at themaximum of 300psi (20.7bar), while flyingcontrols had to display full and free range.

After all the switches had checked asbeing correctly set, engine power wasapplied and all gauges and indicatorsmonitored to ensure correct operation.These included the undercarriage indicator- green and 'down' - and the tail-wheel

92 93

FLYING THE SEAFIRE FLYI GTHESEAFIRE

With the flaps fully down, this Seafire XV has drifted upwards after catching the

wire. Note the flap split under the centreline. FAAM Yeovilton

Unhappily for the deck party, the starboard undercarriage unit on this Seafire has

collapsed under the aircraft's fuselage after a misaligned landing had strained

the undercarriage leg mountings. Will Blunt Collection

Having become misaligned with the deck centreline, the pilot of this Seafire XV aborts his landing,

although everything is still out and down. FAAM Yeovilton

starboard. Under most circumstances control could be re-established using oppositerudder and ail ron. Should the aircraft notrespond, however, a crash could follow,especially at low altitude.

With the aircraft on the deck the flapwere raised, the propeller speed controllever was pushed fully forward and the fuelbooster pump witched off. Before taxiingto dispersal the brake pressure had to bechecked. When the aircraft had reached itsparking position the engine had to be idledat 1,200rpm for a short period to check forpossible magneto problems. When satisfied,the pilot could shut the engine down bymoving the fuel cut-off control fully back.Once the engine had stopped the ignitionswitches were moved to 'off', the radiatorshutters closed, the electrical switches setat 'off' and the fu I cocks closed.

hould the undercarriage lever jam andbe impossible to move to the fully downposition after moving from the gat , pilotswere recommended to return it to the fully

or 18 to 27km/h) to the recommendedspeeds. The only other variation to finalapproach speeds was a reduction by 5kt(6mph or 9km/h) when much of the fueland ammunition had been expended. Itwas possible to undertake flapless landingsbut pilots had to note that a longer landingrun would be required and operation ofthe brakes would require care to avoid theaircraft nosing over. Recommendedapproach speed to a carrier deck was 75kt(85mph or 135km/h).

After a missed landing the aircraft wouldclimb away quite easily with undercarriageand flaps lowered. At such time, full takeoff power was not recommended with theSeafire 45 as this would cau e major changesin directional trim. In contrast, only a slighttrim change would be experienced with theSeafire 46 and 47. When recovering from amis ed landing the throttle had to be openedto plus-9psi (0.6bar) boost, the undercarriagehad to be raised and the aircraft re-trimmedfor normal flight. Climb-away speed wasincreased to 115kt (130mph or 207km~1)

with flaps down. At an altitude of 300ft(90m) the flaps were to be raised and theaircraft re-trimmed to compensate.

The Seafire 46 and 47 would put up witha sudden application of power but the Mk45 was not so forgiving. Near the stall andwith the application of power there was atendency to roll strongly to starboardfollowed by a strong inclination to turn to

Should the aircraft be about to land on acarrier deck, the arrester hook had to belowered and the indicator light checked,although it would not illuminate untilspeed had fallen below 110kt (124mph or200km/h). At this point the pneumaticpressure had to be confirmed at 300psi(21bar), while the brake indicator pressurewas supposed to read l40psi (9.7bar) or80psi (95.5bar) on pre-Modification 489aircraft. The fuel system had to be checkedfor content and the booster pump switchedon in the selected tank.

Once the supercharger, air intake filtercontrol and radiator flaps had been selectedto the correct positions, the undercarriagecould be lower d. Should the aircraft bepost-Modifications 498 and 519, thiscould be accomplished at a speed of 170kt(190mph or 305km/h) instead of 1l0kt(l24mph or 198km/h). The undercarriageindicator lights were then checked and therpm lever set to 2,600, after which the flapscould be placed in the down position andthe pneumatic system re-checked.

With the aircraft under power and atmaximum weight, approach speeds were85kt (95mph or 150km/h) with flaps downand 90kt (100mph or 160km/h) with themup. Should the aircraft be landing withoutengine power, the recommended glide speedwas lOOkt (l15mph or 180km/h) with flapsup or down. Less experienced pilots wererequired to add 10 to 15kt (11 to 17mph

Preparing to Land

down so that at normal service loading thelimit was nkt (81mph or130km/h) and76kt (86mph or 137km/h). Stall warningwas fir t noted at approximately 10kt(11mph or 18km/h) above the given speed,the obvious signs being buffeting andaileron snatch. Once the stall had beenentered, either a wing or the nose dropped.Recovery required the pilot to centralize thecontrols. The signs of a stall became morepronounced at speed and the aircraft wasinclined to flick left or right. Recovery wasstraight-forward, requiring the pilot to dono more than relax the controls until theaircraft had recovered.

Deliberate spinning was forbidden. Ifit happened inadvertently immediaterecovery action was necessary. Pilot werealso warned about handling in a dive,particularly as speed increased. As a result,the aircraft needed trimming into the diveto counteract a tendency to become tailheavy. Although use of the elevator trimtab was the recommended method ofbalancing the aircraft, pilots were warnedto take care as incorrect use could have apowerful effect. As the eafire 45 was fittedwith a single-plane propeller unit, care wasalso needed to counter the aircraft'stendency to yaw. This was achieved throughaccurate use of the rudder trim tab. As theywere equipped with contra-rotating propeller units, such action was not requiredwith Mk 46 and Mk 47 aircraft.

Aerobatics required certain entry spe dsto be obs rved. For a roll it was between180 and 220kt (200 and 250mph or 325and 360km/h), while a loop required anentry speed of between 320 to 340kt (360and 380mph or 650 and 685km/h). A rolloff a loop could only be undertaken between330 and 350kt (370 and 415mph or 595and 665km/h), while an upward rollrequired a range between 360 and 400kt(405 and 450mph or 648 and nOkm/h).Flick manoeuvre were strictly prohibited.Inverted flight was permitted but only forthe execution of other manoeuvres, becausprolonged inversion caused a rapid oilpressure drop.

Having put the eafire through its paces thepilot then had to prepare the aircraft forlanding. The first action was to reduce thepeed to below l40kt (157mph/252km/h)

after which the canopy was opened and theaccess door set to its intermediate position.

94 95

forward po ition for a few seconds to takethe weight off the undercarriage lockingpins. This allowed them to move freely,after which the lever could be moved tothe down position. An alternative procedure was to put the no e down harply orto invert the aircraft. Even after loweringthe undercarriage the indicator would notalways show the gear as locked down fully.The recommended remedial action was toretract the undercarriage and lower it again.

hould this fail to produce the desiredeffect, the emergency lever was pushedforward and rotated through 110 degrees torelea e the contents of a O 2 cylinder. Thisblew the gear down. Once it had been u edthe undercarriage could not be raised againunti I the gas had been bled from the system,the emergency lever reset and the cylinderreplaced.

hould the tail wheel not lower, pilotsneeded to be aware that the tail hook fairingmight be forced upward, jamming therudder and preventing the aircraft fromgoing around again. hould the emergencylowering system be activated with theundercarriage lever in the 'up' position thegear would not lower unless the CO2pipeline wa fir t broken and the ga allowedto escape. Later build aircraft were fitted withan emergency flap-lowering system, whileearlier variants had this system fItted byModification 600 action. Should the flapfail to lower to the down position, or apneumatic system leak occur, the flap leverhad to be placed in the 'up' position beforethe emerg ncy CO2 lever wa operated toblow the flaps down. A with the undercarriage system, the flaps were not to beoperated until the CO2 had been bled fromthe system and any defects rectified.

If a pilot had to abandon the aircraft itwas possible to jettison the canopy bypulling a rubber knob inside the top of thecanopy forward and downward and pushingthe lower edge of the canopy outwardswith his elbows. A this was to be donebefore ditching, the airframe had to becleaned up to facilitate a safe landing onwater. To clear the combat tanks from theirposition beneath the wings on the Seafire46 and 47, the relea e lever on the lefthand side of the pilot's seat had to be pulledas far back as they would go. The centrelineexternal tank could also be jettisoned butthe drop tank cock had to be in the 'offposition before the release handle waspulled.

FLYI G THE SEAFIRE

Emergency Action

Abandoning by parachute was preferred toa landing on water since the aircraft'sditching characteristics were considered tobe poor. It such a landing was unavoidable,the external fuel tanks and canopy had tobe jettisoned. The undercarriage then hadto be confirmed a retracted, the pilot'safety harness tightened as much as possibleand the R/T plug disconnected. If theengine was still running, it wa recommended to use its power to keep the taildown before landing along the swell. In agentle swell the aircraft could come downinto the wind. Pilot were warned that the

eafire had a tendency to ink quickly dueto the weight of the engine.

Before making a forced landing afterengine failure, the first action was to dropext mal fu I tanks, after which the fuel cutoff control had to pulled fully back and theboo ter pump switched off. With the fuelsystem set to 'off the canopy either had tobe jettisoned or fully opened and the accessdoor catch set to th intermediate position.The flaps were to remain retracted until thepilot was sure the elected landing area wascapable of accommodating the aircraftand wa within gliding range. Once it hadbeen selected, the undercarriage and flapcould be lowered with the approach speedmaintained at 95kt (107mph or 170km/h).If there was still some oil pressure left inthe y tem the glide length could belengthened conSiderably by setting the rpmcontrol lever fully back past the stop on itsquadrant.

Inspection and Repair

Keeping the Seafire flying required theattentions of the ground crew, who also hadpre-flight routines to perform. Any hoarfrost deposits had to be removed, the tailoleo checked for correct exten ion, thearre ter hook latched up and a generalcheck made of the airframe for damage. Thede-icing fluid reservoir had to be topped upand the jets examined. Other items to bech cked at thi tage included the winglocks and indicators, pneumatic ystempressure, that the flaps were set to the takeoff position and that external covers andlocks had been removed. The ground crewcould then report the aircraft a ready forflight.

96

Following on from the daily pre-flightroutine, the lubricant reservoir had to betopped up a required. In-depth inspectionincluded checking the hydraulic systemcontents and filter, the CO2 bottle and flapoperating system. Flight control runs including the cable, pulley, chain, hinge,torque tubes, locking plates and screw jacks- al 0 required detailed in pection. Whilethe aircraft was in the hangar to enablthese checks to be made, the rest of theairframe wa given a thorough going-overfor such things as damage, loose fa tenerand, the bane of all ea-going operation,corrosion, which could affect magnesiumalloy even more than aluminium.

Given the wear and tear uffered duringcarrier operations by the undercarriage andarrestor hook, both were subjected toextensive scrutiny. The undercarriageleg, both main and tail, required inspection for corrosion, damage and excessiveplay in their mountings. The arrester hook'smountings and tructure were al 0 checkedfor defect. hould the assembly be preModification 351, the actual hook was tohav its retaining nuts and bolts removedto enable the bolt holes to be checked forw ar and elongation. Any defective itemshad to be replaced.

The propeller a embly could only beinspected with the spinner removed; thialso had to be checked. The unit could thenbe generally inspected for damage, wearand leaks. pecial attention was paid to thethrust race and bearing for tightne andfreedom of movement. A general ngineinspection covered tappet clearances andcylinder rockers and springs for compressionand damage. hould the Merlin be a preModification 297 unit, the auxiliary drivelocking nuts had to be checked for tightness.In addition to a general inspection of theignition system, the spark plugs had to bereplaced at regular intervals, the contactbreaker points had to be cleaned should anyroughnes be discovered and the gaps reset.

With the starting system the key area ofconcern wa that the cartridge safetyindicators were intact. Being liquid cooledengines, both the Merlin and Griffonr quired regular coolant sy tem flu hing tomaintain efficiency and remove any foreignobjects. With the fuel ystem the mostimportant check was for water contamination, this being accompli hed by drainingoff some of the fuel. If it wa found to be

FLYI G THE SEAFI RE

WING SUPPORTJURY STRUTS

STARBOARD SIDEACCESS PANELS

Shown here are the locations for the wing fold struts, as utilized by the Seafire XV and XVII. BBA Collection

97

TAIL WHEELGUARD

At the end of their lives many

Seafires ended up as instructional

airframes, which is why one of this

example's wingtips is drooping and

the engine cowlings have been

removed. CP Russell Smith


JURY STRUTLOCKED POSITION

DETAIL 'A'

7STRUT HANDINGIDENTIFICATION

PORT

JURY STRUT INWING SUPPORT

POSITION

JURY STRUT INPRE FOLDPOSITION

Ground crew members work on a Seafire XV's engine. When they have finished, the wingtips will belocked in place and the aircraft cleared for flight. FAAM Yeovilton

(97-,---I_$'~~NBOARO

2~§§§§§~ew'!~========Si*1'~jmPLUG

MAIN JURY STRUT ~IN CLOSED POSITION

MAIN JURY STRUTIN FULLY EXTENDED

POSITION

99

checking access panels and the cleanlinessof the gun barrels. The external bombcarriers, rocket mountings and fuel tankmounts had to be inspected together withthe appropriate connections and the firecontrol mechanisms. There were alsochecks to be made of the gun ight andits screen, the signal pi tol, pn umaticoperating gear, the cine camera and itsmountings, plus the RATOG jettisoncontrol.

With the aircraft inspected, replenishedand repaired a nece ary, and the pilotfully trained, both were ready for combat.

This diagram illustrates the wing support struts and their method of operation. BBA Collection

The FAA policy of employing WRENS to service

aircraft did not extend to working on aircraft

carriers. These artificers are carrying outmaintenance on the engine and propeller of a

Seafire. BBA Collection

Electrical SystemMaintenance

Before any electrical components werechanged the entire system was ubjected to

an insulation te t, followed by clo erinspection of the fuel tank potentiometer,starter breech circuit, oil dilution valve,undercarriage indicator witches andpressure head. External and internal lightswere then tested for serviceability andpower supplies checked for correct operation together with the security of batterymounting. Special attention was paid to

electrical connections that could be damaged by exposure to a salty atmosphere.

Gauges on th main cockpit panel werein pected for cleanliness, damage, legibilityand security of mounting. Many wereconnected to items out ide the cockpit,such a the pitot head, fuel pressure warningunit, vacuum pump and boost gauge. Onlyone other system required in pection, thisbeing the oxygen system, which includedthe cylinder, the pipework and the gauges.These checks were followed by a te t toensure correct operation.

The final ground inspections concernedthe aircraft's armament and includedrepleni hing the ammunition as required,

contaminated the system had to be flushedand, if necessary, stripped for cleaning.

SI ightly easier but no less messy wasattending to the engine's lubrication system.It was recommended that servicing becarried out before the engine wa fullycooled a it was easier to drain the oil whenit was hot. The old oil and the filters wereinspected for debris. Inspection of engineoperating controls concentrated on checking for play in each linkage run, defectivecomponent being replaced as nece sary.

WRENS, members of the Women's Royal Naval

Service, carry out aircraft maintenance.

BBA Collection

GRIFFON POWER

CHAPTER SEVEN

NS490 was a prototype Seafire xv and was dedicated to testing both the 'A'

Frame and sting-type arrester hooks. FAAM Yeovilton

RNAS Arbroath for further test flying.These flights were, however, curtailed whenthe rear fuselage and tail unit were damagedon landing. Flying resumed on 19 july aftera complete new tail unit had been fitted.

Westland's first production ai rcraft,SR446, was delivered to High Post on 2October 1944 for weighing and centre ofgravity determination. Basic weight was6,2741b (2,852kg), while the all-up weightwas 8,0211b (3,646kg). Cunliffe Owen'first production aircraft arrived on 23 March1945, where it was found to weigh 6,245Ib(2,839kg) basic and 8,0181b (3,645kg) atmaximum load. Although both were fromdifferent manufacturers, the weight variation was reassuringly small. This indicatedthat the rigorous quality control procedureinstituted early in the Seafire build programme was working correctly.

Carrier operating trials were carried outusing the prototype, PK245, the chosenvessel being the trials and training carrierHMS Pretoria Castle. Flight trials began injuly 1945. onventional techniques wereused at first, being followed by a series oftail-down launches. During the firstsequence of nine departures the aircraft waslaunched at an all-up weight of 7,9801b(3,62 7kg), while for later acceleratedlaunches the aircraft wa fitted with a 50gal(223Itr) fuel tank and supplied with waterballast. After this PK245 was returned toSupermarine for the repair of structuraldamage sustained during use of the holdback gear. Trials aboard Pretoria Castleresumed on 30 July. Out of a total of fiftynine launches, fourteen were undertaken inthe tail-down attitude. All were consideredsatisfactory. In between the assistedlaunches, forty-fiv unassisted ones wereundertaken with the aircraft carrying avariety of under-wing and fuselage loads.

The first load carried was the 50galexternal tank, which resulted in a maximumweight of 8,3801b (3,810kg) and a C of Gpoint aft of 8.1 in (20.6cm). With two empty22.5gal (100ltr) tanks added, weightincreased to ,5651b (3,893kg) and trimmoved to 8.15in (20.7cm) aft. When thesetanks were removed and replaced by a pairof empty external 22.5gal (l02ltr) tanks,plu a 500lb bomb and its carrier, thetotal launch weigh t rose to 8,5301b(3,877kg), while trim returned to 8.lin.All-up weight increased to 8,8901b(4,041 kg) and the trim point shifted to theoptimum in (20cm) point with full tanks.With the 45gal (200ltr) under-fuselageblister tank, all up-weight was 8,3801b

was released from the wire, the extenderretracted and the whole assembly relocatedmanually.

T rials of the sti ng-type hook wereundertaken during October 1944 atBoscombe Down using the prototype,NS487, after which the Seafire was ent toFarnborough for pre-service release trials.One of the first modifications to follow wasthe in tallation of a tail-wheel guard, as thehook's relocation to the rear left the wheelvulnerable to tangling with the arrestercables. While the trials organizations pass dthe sting hook for service use, they commented that the 'A'-frame assembly wasbetter for stopping the aircraft. Moving thehook aft did, however, improve the centreof gravity. The cable guard was incorporatedin production aircraft and retrofitted toearl ier machines as they entered the servicing cycle.

Although the Seafire XV was capable ofcatapult or rocket-assisted take-offs, theFleet Air Arm sought a way of launchingmore aircraft more quickly. The answer wastail-down acceleration, which precededintroduction of the steam catapult. Theaircraft wa fitted with reinforced pick-uppoints each side of the fu elage to whichcable were attached. These cables wereconnected to a central launch shoemounted on the catapult. The aircraft washeld in place by a cable that was releasedwhen the catapult launch was initiated.Trials wer undertaken at Boscombe Downwith NS490 in eptember 1943 but theywere considered unsuccessful becau e theundercarriage legs were unable to take thestresses involved.

Pre-Service Trials

The aircraft was sent on 14 january 1944to Farnborough. There the undercarriagelegs were replaced by link-type units but thelaunch loading had to be held at 2.75g toprevent leg failure. In june RAE was ableto report favourably on tail-down acceleration and this prompted Supermarine tosend a technical team to ob erve the trials.A total of twenty-two launches was made,during which the Seafire was loaded to anall-up weight of 7,8501b (3,568kg). At thisweight there was orne compression of themain-wheel tyres, although there was noevidence ofdamage with acceleration loadsvarying between 2.8 and 3.lg. As bothparties were satisfied with the trials it wasagr ed that NS490 should be flown to

confusion with the RAF's Spitfire XII therevised designation of Seafire XV becameofficial from 15 July.

The fi rst prototype, NS487, was rolledout in late November 1943 and, havingsuccessfully completed initial test flights,moved to the experimental hangar atHursley Park. There it was found to weigh6,013lb (2,733kg) tare, with an all-upweight of 7,861lb (3,573kg). Catapultspools had not yet been fitted. Althoughthe prototypes had been built by Supermarine, orders for 503 production aircraftwere placed with Westland Aircraft andCunliffe Owen. These production machinesdiffer d from the prototypes in havingslightly larger oil cooler hou ings under theport wing, larger spinners and longer enginecowling.

Enthusiasm for the new variant was notuniversal within the Fleet Air Arm. Atleast one senior officer was so unimpressedby it that he composed a passionate andstrongly worded objection in which hecompared the Seafire XV unfavourably withthe Chance Vought F4U Corsair and theGrumman F6F Hellcat. Obviou ly suchviews could not be allowed to pass unchallenged. The Directorate of Air Warfare andFlying Training explained in the strongestpossible terms that in the Seafire XV theFAA would have the best possible interceptor. It was not only faster than the twoUS types but its deployment would also beinvaluable in the forthcoming invasion ofEurope and operations in the Far East.

Sting-Type Arrester Hook

Construction of th eafire XV began inlate 1944 with first deliveries beginning thefollowing March. ome 384 airframes, thebulk of the production run, were equippedwith 'A'-frame arrester hooks stressed for aloading of 10,500lb (4,800kg) rather thanthe 7,000lb (3,100kg) of the Merlinvariants. The final batch of Mk XVs wasfitted with the sting-type arrester hook,located in the lower part of the rudder.When released, the lower rudder sectiondropped down and the spring retainer wasreleased, allowing the hook to extend to alength of 18in (44cm). Unlike the 'A'frame hook, the sting-type had a built-inlateral movement of 30 degrees either sideof the centreline. As before, there was anoleo pneumatic damper to stop reboundingafter hard contact with the carrier deck.Once the landing was completed the hook

As the Admiralty was still not fully incontrol of ordering its own aircraft, the AirMinistry issued Specification NA/43 tocover the six prototypes of what was nowdesignated the Supermarine Type 377.Serial numbers for these machines wereNS487, NS490, NS491, PK240, PK243 andPK245. Initially they were to be calledSeafir Xlls, but as this would have caused

Prototypes Ordered

be carried in external wing tanks forwhich a complex but workable systemwa installed. Proposed armament wastwo 20mm cannon augmented by four.303in Browning machine-guns. Structuralmodifications enabled external weaponscarriers to be mounted. A 500lb bombscould be loaded on to the centrelinepoint, while 250lb bombs or rocketprojectiles could be carried beneath thewings.

Ill's, while the wing was borrowed from theSpitfire VC, complete with universalweapons fitments, although the structurewould be modified for folding wing operation. The rear fu elage section was ba edupon that of the Mk VIII, with a broaderchord rudder to help counter the torque ofthe more powerful engine. Also borrowedfrom the Mk VIII were the rear sparattachments, the retractable tail wheel andthe main undercarriage units, which had tobe strengthened for carrier operations.

The specified powerplant was the RollsRoyce Griffon VI, al 0 known as the RG14SM. Rated at l,750hp, the engine drovea 10ft 5in (3.2m) four-bladed RotolR22/4F5/8 propeller unit. This combinationendowed the new variant with a maximumspeed of 383mph (240km/h) at 13,OOOft(4,OOOm). An altitude of 10,000ft (3,OOOm)could be reached in approximately twominute. A total of 100gal (455Itr) of fuelcould be contained internally in Marengtype tanks. A further 60gal (270Itr) could

Griffon Power

Although the Fleet Air Arm had no realinterest in adapting the Mk VIll for navalu e, it was interested in the type's performance as it featured a retractable tailwheel, which increased speed. In fact, theAdmiralty was sufficiently impressed by thetype's behaviour to issue Specification 471covering a naval version of the Griffonpowered Spitfire XII, although the resultingaircraft was a mixture of Spitfire and Seafirevariants already in service.

But this method of development allowedSupermarine, and to a lesser degree We tland, to speed up creation and constructionof the next version. The engine and itmountings were to be based on the SpitfireXII, which retained the original Mk Vbased cooling system, while the oil coolingsystem was borrowed from the Mk IX. Thismeant that the larger quare-shaped fairingwas fitted under the other wing, this beingrequired to enable the aircraft to operatein any theatre.

The airframe was based upon the Seafire

Naval Interest Grows

With the Merlin-powered Seafires enteringservice, the Admiralty turned its attentionto the next stage of the type's development.Initial approaches were made to the AirMinistry to supply conversions of theSpitfire Vlll, which was intended for servicein the Far Ea t, or the variant preferred forEuropean operations, the Mk IX.

The Air Ministry handed over eight MkVIlIs for trials on 9 january 1944. Theyincluded JG661, jG662 and jG663,although the first differed in featuring asting-type arrester hook in place of thearlier 'A'-frame hook. After modificationsat Chalgrove, the fighters were flown toCrail in April where they were assigned to

o. 778 Squadron commanded by Lt CdrP.B. Schonfield RN. Over the next fewmonths the modified Spitfires underwent afull range of performance and handlingtrials together with extensive deck landingtrials.

100 101

GRIFFON POWER GRIFFON POWER

declared it unfit for service u e and it wastherefore recommended that the propellerpitch angle be altered to increase drag.Although this was not adopted, Quillcontinued to complain about propellerpitch. He considered it too coar e, meaningthat in its current form the eafire XV,unlike the Mk Ill, would be difficult to landon a carrier deck. A new windscreen,however, improved pilot vi ion.

In March 1945 PK240 was atAlderma ton for undercarriage trials. Thetest units featur d improved rebound-typeleg, which it was hoped would improvelanding characteristics. Landing with thenew units were made at Aldermaston,Gosport and High Post and passed assatisfactory. The aircraft was next fittedwith We tland-built metal elevators, whichhad been found to cause instability. A inmany of the e ca e , the cure was fairlysimple: fitting a strip of beading to thetrailing edge of each surface. Thi broughta mark d improvement in stability throughout the flight envelope but did not top thesearch for further ways of improving inflight behaviour. Test were, for example,conducted to inve tigate behaviour with aflap stuck in the down position. The edetermined that although the aircraft hadan obviou tendency to pull in the directionof the affected flap, it remained flyablethroughout the take-off and landingsequence.

Once problems involving its ailerons andgyro had been corrected and the throttlepropeller linkage adju ted, PK243 was flownto Arbroath for deck landing trials. A five-

A Seafire XV reveals its four-bladed propeller unit and IFF aerials under the

starboard wing. BBA Collection

recovery wa effected by use of ailerons andengine power. uch wa the stress, however,that the built-in weak link had failed totrigger automatic release of the parachute.The aircraft's wide-chord rudder and stinghook were then replaced and the aircraftflown again. With the larger rudder itbehaved as expected, being completelystable about all axes and throughout theflight envelope.

The prototype was also employed to testthe automatic deck landing system. ButSupermarine's ch ief test pilot, Jeffery Qui II,

A pair of No. 803 Squadron Seafire XVs pose for the camera. Eventually their Royal Navy

titles would be replaced by those of the Royal Canadian Navy. FAAM Yeovilton

Development work of the type continuedwith the prototypes. S487 was used forwork on the long-chord ting hook a wella the interconnected throttle and propellerlinkage, although test pilots recommendedagainst thi system's adoption on productionaircraft. 490 was also employed on stingtype arrester-hook tests. These te t confirmed the results obtained with 487,although the addition of a protectivetail-wheel guard was recommended. Thebroader chord rudder was also found to bebeneficial to longitudinal stability, thisbeing confirmed by spin te t at BoscombeDown at altitudes up to 29,000ft (8,900m).The aircraft was also u ed to test the metalelevators. It was after these fl ight that thepilot recommended the elevator range tobe interlocked with the ting hook whenextended. The premise behind this was thatcombining the e component would limitelevator movement during deck approachesand prevent pilots from over-controlling theaircraft.

Equipped with a smaller rudder, 490was ubjected to a full range of spinningtrials. These involved taking the aircraft to20,000ft (6, 150m) and pushing the controlcolumn forward, at which point the Seafire entered a flat spin. Variou recoverymethods were tried, including opening thethrottle wide, but the spin continued untilthe tail-mounted anti-spin parachute wasdeployed. This stopped the pin and put theaircraft into a steep dive from which

had failed. Other damage included theshearing of the elevator horns, while thecomplete rear fu elage wa howing ignsof distres . At the other end of the ailframe,the propeller blades had been pushed totheir str ss limits with the wooden laminations forced apart. It was only the Seafire'sautomatic recovery behaviour that hadpr vented it from plunging into the groundat high speed.

102

Seafire XV SR449 was utilized by Rolls-Royce at Hucknall for engine trials. after which it

went to Rotol for propeller trials. It was withdrawn in December 1951. FAAM Yeovilton

This three-quarter rear view of SR449 clearly shows that the external

strengthening of earlier aircraft had been incorporated internally. FAAM Yeovilton

(350mph or 560km/h), equivalent to a trueair peed of 472kt (531 mph, Mach O. 0 or850km/h) and been subjected to a maximum of llg.

tructural investigation of the airframerevealed that the lower wing-fold lockingpins were showing signs of shearing, whilethe lower skin plating aft of the main wingspar had be n distort d to such an extentthat it had buckled and some of the rivets

(3,810kg) and the trim point moved to.05in (20Acm). The final trials configu

ration involved the addition of a pair ofn.5gal combat fuel tanks added to thenormal loading. Thi produced a maximumweight of 8,340lb (3,791 kg) with a trimposition of 7.75in (l9.7cm). The onlydeficiency noted during these trials was theaircraft's inability to be flown with rocketprojectiles and external combat fuel tankstogether.

The first production S afire XV, SR446,was delivered in August 1944, beingaccepted for service trials the followingmonth. Pre-service trials were undertakenat Bo combe Down in Nov mber and werefollowed in February by tests of the Identification Friend or Foe system and aircrafthandling. Later tests of the dif~ rent finpitch settings required for deck landingwer undertaken as it was felt that thoriginal settings were not inducing enoughdrag during landing. It was eventually concluded the propo ed changes did notwarrant application throughout the fleet.

Together with the prototype, 490,the third eafire XV, R448, was involvedin trials of a new propeller as embly, C ofG aft datum etting ,carbon monox ide leakchecks and use of metal-covered elevators.Both machine were then allocated todropping trials involving the Mk Xl depthcharge a well as investigation of oil coolerand radiator y tem improvements. Smokefloat were also tested, a were the radioand th IFF system. SR448 was then sentto Boscombe Down for spinning trials,during which a Spitfire XII fin and rudderwere fitted.

Severe Buffeting

The first main batch of production aircraftwas delivered to 0.802 Squadron in May1945, but the last Seafire Ills were notwithdrawn from service until June 1946.Five months after the type had enteredservice, the pilot of Mk XV R4 3encountered buffeting so evere that he lostcontrol and became unconscious. He hadtaken the aircraft up to 35,000ft (4,500m),at which point he made a slow peel-offwith the engine rpm setting at low and thesupercharger gear changed to 'MS' when thebuffeting started. By the time the pilotregained consciousness, the aircraft ha Idropped to 6,000ft (1 ,850m). After landing,some clever mathematics revealed that theai rcraft had reached a peed of 10kt

bladed propeller unit was fitted in anattempt to increase drag and facilitatecontrolled deck landings but tests revealedno obvious gains. PK243 then began tomisbehave. The starboard aileron driftedupwards by 2in (Scm) in a dive of 380kt(430mph or 608km/h), causing a reversalof trim from right to left. Thi airframe wasalso fitted with the original type of Westlandmetal ailerons and displayed a completelack of stability throughout the flightenvelope. To correct the aileron float, thestarboard wing incidence was decreased by15min of angle, but this did not improvelateral control. In fact, it exacerbated theproblem. The port ai leron drooped by0.25in (6.3mm), while the starboard onefloated upwards by 2in at 400kt (450mphor 640km/h). This made the aircraft almostuncontrollable in straight and level flightas the left wing exhibited a tendency to dropand it took all the pilot's strength tomaintain control.

Further pilot observations reveal d thatthe tarboard wing' upper surface waspanting at high speeds. This, coupled withthe aileron drift problem, meant that theaircraft was becoming dangerous to fly andPK243 was unable to undertake type flighttrials until these problems were corrected.The port wing incidence was increased,while that of the starboard one wasdecreased. While this produced someimprovem nt, the starboard aileron stillfloated excessively. As a last resort, the trimtab was fixed 0.125in (3.2mm) above thedatum. This resulted in an improvementthat was considered sufficient to allow theaircraft to undertake its share of the trialswork.

First flown on 22 February 1945, PK245was used for evaluation of the Mk XV'sengine and fuel systems with Rolls-Roycebefore it was returned to Supermarine forgeneral handling trials with wing combatfuel tanks. These tests were completedsuccessfully, after which the aircraft wasfitted with hinged ailerons. Trials with theailerons in variou drooped positionsrevealed that during flight testing there wasno appreciable deterioration in handling upto 360kt (405mph or 648km/h). It was adifferent story at 370kt (415mph or666km/h) when control reversal occurred,inducing a left wing low attitude and a yawto the left. At the same time, the propellerbegan to vibrate beyond acceptable limits,although full control was regained whenspeed was reduced. At the conclusion of thehandling trials, PK245 resumed flight tests

GRIFFO POWER

with the combat fuel tanks in May 1945.Throughout these trials the tanks werereleased at various angles of attack; in eachcase th tanks cleared the airframe withoutinterference.

Aileron Problems

CunliffOwen's first production Seafire XV,PR338, was also allocated to flight-testing,which concentrated on the Westlandmanufactured metal elevators. upermarine's D puty Chi f Test Pilot, Patrick

hea-Simmonds, reported that althoughthese ailerons behaved well, they wereunsatisfactory as lateral trim reversed withan increase in peed. At the same time, thestarboard aileron showed an excessivetendency to float upwards when the Seafirewas put into a dive. After these faults hadbeen rectified, PR338 was retained forgeneral flight trials before being retired inApril 1945.

Aileron problems continued to plaguethe Seafire XV, as SR446 exhibited thesame instability when test-flown duringOctober 1944. Modifications to the wingswere made to improve lateral control, whilea bigger rudder brought longitudinal handling within acceptable limits. Flight trials ofSR446 in this condition were undertakenand indicated that handling was muchbett r. Further improvements resulted fromfitting stiffer ailerons and Castle Bromwichmade elevators. Better controlled landingswere a bonus.

In June 1945, SR459 wa prepared fordespatch to the USA and a series of flighttrials at the Naval Air tation, PatuxentRiver, Maryland. But its d parture wasdelayed by the discovery of several defects.The major one was the tendency of thedoor covering th port wing joints toremain stuck in the up position duringflight. Stronger springs and a beading stripfitted to the trailing edge of each elevatorcorrected this problem. Thi enabled theaircraft to r main in the USA for severalyears for comparison trials. N 487 andNS490 were both employed on sting-typearrester hook trials. In June, NS490's tailwheel and rear fuselage were damaged whileit was at Arbroath. After repairs, whichinvolved a modified tail-wheel guard, theaircraft was sent in August 1944 toFarnborough where it was found to weigh7,8501b (3,568kg) before flight trials.Succe ful carrier clearance trials aboardHM Illustrious followed.

104

Meanwhile, NS487 was fitted with amodified welded-type sting arrester hook,together with experimental launch hooks.Trials aboard the Pretoria Castle duringOctober 1944 were considered successfuleven though the deck barrier was engagedat least once and on one occasion bothmain-wheel tyres bur t on touchdown.NS487 was then returned to High Post formodification work, which included astronger 'A'-frame stressed to 2g, alteredundercarriage fairings, a finer-pitchedpropeller and different radiator flaps. Boththe sting and arrester hooks were testedsucce sfully aboard HMS Im[Jlacable.

Tail-Down Launching

Although most shipboard take-offs wereaccomplished using the Seafire's own power,it had been realized that as the aircraft'sweight increased a launch system wasrequired which would avoid the use of aspecial cradle. The Rocket-Assisted TakeOff Gear (RATOG) system offered an alternative, albeit one that wa complicated andwhich would reduce take-off rates. A moreworkable method was, however, underd velopment. This was the tail-downlaunching system allied to trials already inprogress of the team catapult. Seafire XVPK245 was, therefore, allocated to anotherround of trials aboard the Pretoria Castleduring July and August 1945. The Seafirehad already been fitted with prototypecatapult hook tested at Farnborough usingthe establishment's cartridge-poweredcatapult.

It was during these launches that certainnot-too-exceed parameters were laid downfor the carrier trials. These included anormal service weight of 7,9851b (3 ,630kg)and a launch loading of 2.9g. With a 30gal(1341tr) fuel tank installed, all-up weightrose to 8,2581b (3,754kg) at 2.75g, valuewhich changed to 8,3471b (3,794kg) and2.7g with a pair of 22.5gal (100Itr) combatfuel tanks. A similar loading restrictionapplied when 45gal (200Itr) and 50gal(223Itr) tanks were fitted, weights rising to8,3891b (3,813kg) and 8,4001b (3,818kg)respectively. A further decrease to 2.6gcame when a 500lb bomb was mounted,accompanied by a rise in weight to 8,5401b(3,841kg). The loading dropped to 2.45gwhen a pair of combat tanks and 500lbbombs were mounted under the wings andcentre fuselage. Weight rose to 8,9021b(4,046kg). The only restriction placed upon

landing was that the maximum wightshould not exceed 8,073lb (3,670kg).

Aboard the Pretoria Castle the only majorproblem encountered during the first seriesof launches was that the launch bridlebecame caught up on the centreline fueltank. At the conclu ion, the rear tie-downwas attached to the sting hook and thecentreline fuel tank filled with water. Toensure that there was no adverse effect onlanding, rip patches attached by cords tothe undercarriage released the water as thegear retracted. In later launches a 500lbtrials bomb was mounted on the centreline,while a pair of combat tanks, this time filledwith fuel, were mounted beneath the wings.Before landing the bomb was dropped andthe fuel transferred to the main system. Atthe conclusion of these trials, the SeafireXV was cleared for tail-down launches,which was a bonus as the aircraft was nowcompatible with the catapults fitted toAmerican-built escort carriers.

Other trials were conducted by themanufacturers and the RAE to test the MkXV's ability to carry the range of externaltanks available. A contemporary weaponsreport warned that rockets should not becarried togeth r with under-wing combattanks. It added that, although launchingwith tanks and bombs had not been tested,there was no reason to proh ibi t such acombination in service. But some restrictions involving the carriage of externalstores were introduced. No tanks or weapons were to be attached to centrelinemounts during a four-point catapult launchas the store would obstruct the fuel-tankventing system. Also banned under thesame conditions was the carriage of bombs.While manoeuvring was unrestricted up to8,5001b (3,860kg), it was recommendedthat all external tanks be jettisoned beforecombat or dive bombing.

Although first production Mk XVsstarted to come off the assembly line in

eptember 1944 the type was not relea edfor service until the following April.Deliveries to front-line units began inAugust, the fir t to receive the type beingNo.802 quadron at Abbotsinch, No. 803Squadron at Arbroath and No. 805 atMachrihanish. No. 802 Squadron, commanded by Lt Cdr R. E. Hargreaves DSC

RN, was the first to take the variant to seawhen it spent six days aboard HMS Premierfor deck landing training from 23 October.Both No. 802 and No. 803 had beenintended to join the British Pacific Fleetbut the war against Japan ended first.

GRIFFON POWER

In August 1946 a fault with the supercharger clutch led to the Seafire XV beingconfined to operations from land bases. Theclutch had shown a tendency to slip whenhigh power and boo t settings were appliedfor take-off, which was considered dangerous in carrier operations. Rolls-Royceundertook ren.edial work and carrier operations resumed in 1947.

Cold Weather Testing

That year two Seafire XVs, PR494 andPR499, were involved in cold weather trials.The aircraft were sent to Fort Nelson nearEdmonton, Canada in January for intensivewinter trials. They were not uneventful.PR494 sustained undercarriage leg andpropeller damage when landing on roughterrain. Initially, some problems wereexperienced with engine starts caused byunder-priming and then over-priming afterfiring-up. Adjustments to the throttlecontrols improved starting. Ground handling was possible in winter conditions,although more manpower was required tomove the aircraft. Wing folding was considered satisfactory but there were warningsabout undertaking this operation in highwinds. Pilots also stressed the need forcockpit heating during operations in coldconditions.

The Mk XVII Appears

The development of what was to emergeas the next eafire variant, the Mk XVII,began when the sixth prototype Mk XV,NS493, was delivered to Westland Aircraftfor a programme of alteration. This involvedthe installation of a bubble canopy with acut-down rear fuselage. It was then discovered that, as with similarly-modifiedRAF machines, this new version of theSeafire was also unstable when the rearfuselage fuel tanks were full. The improvedvision wa much appreciated by the pilots,however. Despite this instability the aircraftwa passed fit for service during flight trialsat Boscombe Down. To speed introductionof this new version, the final batch of thirtySeafire XVs under construction byWestland were diverted to cover the startof the new contract.

During re-manufacture of the firstaircraft, a stronger main spar was incorporated. An improved and strengthenedundercarriage increased its stroke from 4.9in

105

(12.5cm) to 8in (20cm), which helped keepthe propeller clear of the ground during hardlandings. These changes enabled the eafireXVII to carry a heavier weapons load, whilestability was improved with a larger fin andrudder. The type was al 0 capable ofmounting two F.24 camera, and latermodels had a 33gal (1471tr) rear fuselagefuel tank. The variant's overall fuel capacitywas 145gal (6461tr), carried in two fuselagetanks ahead of the pilot, with the remainderin bag tanks in the wing forward section.The fuel system had to be managed carefullythroughout the flight envelope to maintainstability. This meant that the contents ofthe rear fuselage tank had to be used first.

Westland's first aircraft, SW987, wasdelivered to High Post on 16 May 1945 forweighing and C ofG d termination. Fittedwith a Griffon VI engine and a four-bladedRotol wooden propeller, th aircraft's basicweight was found to be 6,2431b (2,837kg)and the maximum all-up weight 8,0171b(3,644kg). The first Supermarine-builtmachine, SX232, which had arrived at HighPost on 3 April with the same engine andpropeller combination, weighed in at6,3851b (2,906kg) and 8,148 lb (3,704kg).While both aircraft performed as expected,the test pilots did complain about glarereflected around the cockpit from thebubble canopy. As a result, the surroundingarea was painted black.

Deck landing trials were undertakenusing SX311 and SX314 aboard HMSTrium[Jh starting in late 1945. Over 100landing and eight assisted tak -off weremade. SX311 undertook the first seventake-offs and nineteen landings, whichconfirmed that the longer-stroke undercarriage legs not only better absorbedlanding shocks but also eliminat d theprevious tend ncy of rebound ing ontouchdown. This good behaviour was notto last. On one occasion, the aircraftapproached the carrier at too Iowan angle,its port main wheel and hook hitting theround-down. The resulting landing saw the

eafire hooking the fifth wire and slewingacross the deck to end up in the port catwalk. Inspection revealed that the rudder,arrester hook, port wing skins, radiator andpropeller were damaged. The undercarriage,however, was completely undamaged.

The next Seafire XVII to arrive at HighPost for weighing and trim checks wasSX334, which, unlike earlier machines, hadalready undergone many modifications. Themost obvious was in tallation of a curvedwindscreen assembly. Together with other

NS493 was originally built as a Seafire XV, although, as seen here, it was rebuilt as a Seafire XVII prototype. FAAM Yeovilton

Towards the F.20 Series

In the event, therefore, the next stage ofSeafire development was rather more radicalbecause it involved a change in wing planform. The first aircraft to receive themodified wing was pitfire Mk VIII, JF319,which was also fined with the Griffon 60engine. This fighter was to enter RAFservice as the Spitfire F.21, the use ofRoman numerals in aircraft designationhaving ended. Although interested, theAdmiralty decided to await flight trialresults before placing an order. Meantime,two versions were initially schemed, a highspeed interceptor able to meet land-basedcounterparts on equal terms, and a fighterable to accompany a carrier-launched strikeforce to its target, deal with any airborneopposition and scort its charges.

To get the aircraft into service theAdmiralty was prepared to accept SpitfireF.21s with the minimum amount of modification necessary for naval operations: anarrester hook, catapult launch gear and asome localized strengthening to cope withthe altered stress path. Supermarine'sresponse was designated Typ 474. It wasto be powered by a two-stage supercharged

GRIFFON POWER

for rocket launching required a differentaiming point to the wing guns, ights withswitchable graticules were tried. A total of104 rockets with 60lb warheads was alsofired.

Like the Mk XV, the Seafire XVIIntered Fleet A ir Arm service after the war

had ended. The first recipient of the variantwas No. 883 Squadron. Front-line servicewas brief, the majority of aircraft beingrelegated to re erve or training unit untilretirement in late 1954. It had beenintended that the Mk XVIl would befollowed in production by the Mk XVIII.Designated by Supermarine as the Type395, this was planned as a reconnaissanceversion of the Mk XVII, powered by theGriffon 36, an example of which was sentto the manufacturer for installation in thefirst airframe. Wing armament was to havecomprised four Browning 0.303 in machineguns and the airframe was to have plumbingfor under-wing combat fuel tanks. But evenas this specification was being developed,the Fleet Air Arm decided to combine allthe fighter reconnaissance roles, which itbelieved would increa e the flexibility of itsair wings.

internal modifications, this resulted in a tareweight of 6,4201b (2,836kg), while themaximum weight was 8,2451b (3,748kg).Thi aircraft wa one of the first Mk XVllsto be fitted with the reconnaissance packagefrom the start, resulting in a change ofdesignation to FR XVII. It was also one ofthe few to be fined with a vibrograph unit- installed in the port side of the cockpit- to measure engine vibrations and recordtheir effects on the airframe and the guncamera.

While most Seafire XVIIs were passed asfit for flight, SW987 was reported to beunstable around the pitch axi , but handingimproved markedly after beading had beenapplied to the elevator trailing edges. Thestarboard aileron also exhibited a tendencyto float upwards outside limits but theaircraft was eventually re-trimmed successfully. SX297 went to Boscombe Downin July 1946 for trials involving the Type3A rocket projectile, but it was replaced on13 November by SX360 after sustainingdamage during high-speed firings. Duringthese tests, rockets were launched with theaircraft carrying several different combinations of external stores. On some flightcentreline tanks were fitted. As sighting

Seafire XVII SX156 displays its re-painted fin and rudder after transfer from No. 767 Squadron at Milltown to Yeovilton. Although the

aircraft was refurbished in February 1951. it went straight into storage and was scrapped in 1956. Ray Sturtivant

SX334 seen from the other side, showing the

camera window, the under-wing pitot head, tail

wheel guard and sting-type arrester hook.

BBA Collection

This side-on view of Seafire XVII SX334 shows off

the type's sleek lines and the location of the

reconnaissance camera windows. The aircraft

spent some time as a general trials machine before

joining No. 1832 Squadron at Culham. BBA Collection

106 107

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Seafire XVII SX358 of No. 800 Squadron pictured on the ground at Hal Far. Malta.

while its parent carrier HMS Triumph is in Valetta harbour. Prominent in this

view are the under-wing combat tanks. Ray Sturtivant

Seafire XVII SX345 of No. 800 Squadron is pictured here with under-fuselage fuel

tanks. Its service life was short as it entered service in May 1946 and was

written-off in a crash aboard HMS Triumph in January 1949. FAAM Yeovilton

TM379 was the first Seafire F.45

prototype. having been ordered

as a Spitfire F.21. Originally fitted

with a standard engine and

propeller. as shown. the aircraft

was later fitted with a Griffon 85

and contra-rotating propeller.

BBA Collection

Seafire XVII SX277 of No. 741 Squadron is pictured in the hangar at St Merryn. In April 1950 the aircraft was transferred

to No. 1831 Squadron at Bramcote and written-off in a crash on Illustrious in September 1950. FAAM Yeovilton

stalling speed with a full military load of88kt (99mph or 158km/h). Initial rate ofclimb was estimated to be 4,900ft (l,500m)per minute. Service ceiling was set at41,750ft (l2,850m).

To cover this proposal the Admiraltyissued Specification N7/44 for what wasbasically a navalized Spitfire F 21. The taskof adapting the drawings to meet the newspecification was allocated to CunliffeOwen. This version of the Seafire would bedesignated Mk 45. From the outset it wasregarded as being an interim phase-onedesign; phase two would be the Mk 46 andphase three the Mk 47. The programmestarted on 15 August 1944 when theMinistry of Aircraft Production directedVickers to remove two Spitfire F 21s fromthe production line and send them toHursley Park for conversion to Seafire Mk45 prototypes under Contract Acft/4425/C.23c.

Three machines had originally beenordered for conversion but one was latercancelled, leaving the first convertedaircraft, erial TM379, to shoulder the development burden, together with TM383.TM379 was delivered to High Post forweighing and C of G checking on 24October 1944. Although not fully converted to naval standard, it featured a stinghook installation, which increased itlength to 33ft 4in (l0.2m). It also featuredslinging points, main undercarriage legdoors modified to clear arrester wires andre-profiled outboard doors. TM379 waspowered by a Griffon 61 engine rated at2,035hp and driving a five-bladed Rotolpropeller with laminated wooden blades.Tare weight was 7,121lb (3,237kg).

A few days later, TM379 was atBoscombe Down for flight, handling anddeck suitability trials. It was during thisperiod that it maximum weight wasdetermined to be 9,4101b (4,277kg), whilethe of G aft datum point was given as4.9in (l2.5cm) aft. From the out et thSeafire 45 was fitted with a larger fin andrudder, but even then the power of theGriffon engine meant that full left rudderwas required on take-off to compensate forthe torque. Once airborne the Seafireexhibited a tendency to slight starboardwing drop, which wa easily correctable.During the glide approach phase of thenight trials, speed wa held at 90kt(lOlmph or 162km/h) with naps andundercarriage down. Stability and controlrespons during this phase was reported tobe excellent.

set at 116gal (517Itr) with a further 45gal(200Itr) available in external tanks. Theaircraft had a span of 35ft (11.8m) withwings spread and 17ft (5.2m) with themfolded. Fuselage length was 32ft 3in (9.9m)and propeller diameter would be 11 ft(3Am). Basic wight wa e timated to be6,5601b (2,981kg) to which would be added200lb (90kg) of armour and 395lb (l80kg)of military equipment. Oth r un pecified items lifted tare weight to 7, 1551b(3,252kg). Total operating weight was estimated at 9,0601b (4,118kg), the differencebeing made up of 9601b (436kg) of otherconsumables, 8351b (380kg) of fuel and80lb (36kg) of engine oil. With a Griffin61 engine, top speed was 424mph(678km/h) at 26,000ft ( ,000m), with a

Griffon engine driving a contra-rotatingpropeller assembly and mounted in a SeafireXVI XVIll fuselage. It wa also to have thelaminar-now wings developed for theSpitfire F 21 with a fold just outboard ofthe undercarriage bays. The undercarriageit elf had the much-requested wider track,which, it was hoped, would improve tability on a pitching carrier deck. Great effortwas al 0 made to improve the view over thenose, especially during ground manoeuvring.

A bubble cockpit canopy was featuredwith a cut-down rear fuselage. Armamentwas to be four 20mm cannon with 150rounds per gun. From th outset the aircraftwas to be capable of accelerated launchingand arrested tops. Intental fuel capacity was

708 109

Seafire F.45 LA543 was used for type trials from January 1946 to September 1949, when the aircraft was transferred

to No. 1832 Squadron at Culham. It remained there until its withdrawal from service in January 1950. FAAM Yeovilton

Side-on view of Seafire F.46, LA541. The differences between this variant and the later

F.47 were few. the main one being the lack of folding wings. LA541 was employed on

trials work. which ended in 1950 when the aircraft was sold. FAAM Yeovilton

flights, TM383 was reconfigured torepresent production airframes and it wasconsidered to be even better than theSeafire Xv. Deliveries of the Mk 46 hadbeen completed by March 1947. Butbecause there were so few, and with the Mk47 about to emerge, most of the airframeswere utilized in the later variant's test andtrials programme.

fitted for subs qu nt flights, but despitestrenuous efforts this tendency was neverfully cured. TM383 was also used to test amodified sting hook and metal elevators,both of which introduced directionalinstability. During subsequent spinningtrials it was discovered that in right-handspin, the aircraft recovered without anypilot input. At the completion of these

the grass at the side. Further destructivetrials involved this small batch of aircraftin testing the steam catapults that were tosoon to enter service with the Royal Navy'saircraft carriers. The outer wing panels wereremoved, the reasoning being that withreduced wing area the aircraft would ploughinto the sea soon after launch. But this didnot happen. After launch the aircraft notonly continued to fly but also orbited thecarrier in ever-decreasing circuits, eventually crashing into the sea.

There were several significant differencesbetween the Seafi re 46 and its pred cessor.It featured a contra-rotating propellerassembly and the original pitfire/Seafiretail unit was replaced by that developed forthe forthcoming Spiteful. Mi sing from thisversion was the wing-folding capability,which limited carrier deployment. As aresult, only twenty-four of the 200 aircraftoriginally ordered were delivered. Before itsdiversion to Cunliffe-Owen for conversion,the prototype Mk 46, TM383, had originally been intended to be the third Mk 45.In it new gui e, TM3 3 made its first flighton 8 September 1944 and the flight testprogramme began in earnest by the end ofthe year.

Although the aircraft was reported to bemore table in flight, early tests revealed thatthe flaps had a tendency to drop downduring a dive. Indicators and a camera were

fuel tanks for comparison trials with theMk 45s.

The eafire XV made nine launches,operating at weights of between 7,9801b(3,627kg) and 8,3361b (3,789kg). Both theMk 45s undertook a similar series oflaunches, but LA440 dropped out followingan impact with the protective barrier riggedacross the deck. On its eighth landing theoverstressed arrester hook was pulled fromits mountings. The impact was such thatthe front section of the fuselage forwardof the firewall was totally wrecked, althoughthe cockpit remained intact. The remainswere later returned to High Post forin pection, leaving LA441 to complete theprogramme without further incident. Afurther two Mk 45s, LA454 and LA480,were allocated for deck landing trials aboardthe Pretoria Castle during October 1945.Together the pair made 200 deck landingswhich helped clear the type for service use.

The Seafire 45 production run beganwith LA428 and ended with LA499, a totalof fifty being delivered to the Fleet AirArm. This variant's time in the front-linewas short-lived, however, as it was soonreplaced by the Seafire 46 and 47. But thiswas not the end of its u efulness. In late1951 three aircraft, LA439, LA442 andLA445, fitted with contra-rotating propellers, were handed over to RAE MeadowGate for crash-barrier testing. The purposewas to clear the Westland Wyvern - alsofeaturing a contra-rotating propeller unitfor safe barrier entry. In the fir t trialLA439's engine was set to run at 800rpmwith its tail raised. Additional propulsivepower from sixteen 3in rocket bodiespushed the peed up to 60kt (l08km/h).With the airframe accelerated to flightspeed, the Seafire flew on its own until itengaged the barrier. LA442, however,suffered some propeller damage, as didLA450 on its first trial launch. The secondseries of launches and short flights sawLA439 overturning after engaging thebarrier, while LA450 was badly damagedbeyond economic repair after its finallaunch.

The facility at Meadow Gate was alsoused for testing the proposed Seafangcontra-rotating propellers to see how theytood up to a crash landing. Mounted tail

up on the launch cradle, and with itsundercaniage in the up position, LA448 waslaunched at 56kt (63mph or 100km/h).The pilotless Seafire travelled no more than90ft (28m) before hitting the concrete. Itskidded off the runway and ploughed across

Contract Placed

GRIFFON POWER

larger control surfaces to the rear of theaircraft. Beading applied to the rudder'strailing edge and a bigger balance hornproduced improvements considered Justacceptable for service use, but a split trimtab had no significant effect.

With the stability problems now undercontrol, and TM379 cleared by RAEFarnborough for arrested landings up to 3g,it was time for deck landing trials aboardthe Pretoria Castle. These began inNovember 1945. The aircraft had also beenfitted with an S.32 forged steel hook insteadof the previous welded assembly. Theprimary purpose of these trials was toexamine handling up to a maximum weightof 9,4001b (4,273kg) at deck wind speedsof 20, 25 and 30kt (36, 45 and 54km/h).Approach speed was between 85 and90 kt (l53 and 162km/h) with touch-downand wire engagement speeds averaging 60kt(108kmjh). For the tests, wind speeds variedbetween 27 and 35kt (49 and 63kmjh). Atotal of four arrested landings was made,the sequence being terminated when theaircraft was damaged on landing. Thisfollowed a stall that caused the wing to drop,resulting in damage to the wing andpropeller tips.

Regrettable though this incident was it didnot prevent the Ministry of AircraftProduction from i suing on 26 February1945 Contract B.981687/39/c.23(c) tocover the manufacture of 600 Seafire45/46/47s to Sp cification N7/44. Thisstipulated that delivery was to start in earlyAugust. Initially, five Mk 45s were to beproduced each month until a total of twentyhad been manufactured, after which 200Mk 46 aircraft were to be delivered. Theprogramme wa scheduled to end in June1946. Seafire 47 production was to start inSeptember 1945 and be completed inDecember 1946.

Seafire Mk 45 LA436 undertook manufacturer's flight trials on 10 and 11 May1945, before being flown to High Post aweek later for the obligatory weight and Cof G testing. Tare weight was determinedto be 7,0501b (3,205kg) with maximumweight at 9,3581b (4,254kg). Further carriertrials covering the behaviour of the SeafireMk 45 continued with LA440 and LA441operating together with Seafire XV PK245,the latter being configured for tail-downlaunches. It also had under-wing combat

There was some cause for concern,however. At 25,000ft (7,700m), to whichaltitude the aircraft was limited, longitudinal stability at maximum speed wasmarginal. The Admiralty was less willingthan the RAF to accept this limitation inthe short term. Supermari n propo edvarious rudder and trim-tab modificationsbut there was also concern that installationof a contra-rotating propeller might alsoinduce instability. Should correction provenecessary a fin extension was proposed.TM379 returned to the manufacturer foran extension to the leading edge of its fin.After the usual post-manufacturer's checksat High Post the aircraft was flown bySupermarine test pilots Quill and heaSimmonds.

Testing Starts

Quill was the first to fly the aircraft in itsmodified form during October 1944 whenhe found that it showed a tendency for theleft wing to drop in a dive. Although overalldirectional tability was assessed as poor,Quill considered that the rudder with thesting hook fitted provided adequate controlfor carrier operations. Further flightsreinforced Quill's initial thoughts. He alsocommented that without protective armour,the C of G was further forward thanpreferred. Work continued on finding ananswer to the lack of stability. Eventually,in late January 1946, the Rotol contrarotating propeller was replaced by a deHavilland unit. Quill reported that thismade stability fore and aft far more positivebut still not good enough for service use.He also commented on the unit's vibration,which became noticeably worse as speedincreased.

Shea-Simmonds got his hands on TM379in April 1946 and his first commentconcerned a restrictor wire across thethrottle, which restricted boost to plu 12psi (0.8bar); this was a temporarymeasure. On completion of the test fl ightsit was intended to remove the wire to allowthe throttle to deliver maximum boost ofplus-18psi (1.24bar). He also commentedon the directional instability, which wasespecially noticeable around the pitch andyaw axes above 360kt (405mph or648km/h). As the Spitfire F 21 and SeafireMk 45 were similarly afflicted, thisbehaviour was considered unacceptable forgeneral service use. Temporary fixes wereproposed but the only real cure was to fit

110 111

GRIFFON POWER

Seafire F.46 LA550 was originally delivered to No. 778 Squadron in July 1946. The aircraft remained inservice until it was withdrawn in March 1949. FAAM Yeovilton

Contrasting beautifully with the lighter countryside below is this Seafire F.47, which reveals the clean lines of this variant. FAAM Yeovilton

Final Variant: the F.47

As rhe final varianr co enrer service, rheMk 47 showed how far rhe eafire hadcome since rhe original Mk lB, which hadjoined rhe Fleer Air Arm jusr a few yearsearlier. The only fearure rhe rwo had incommon be ides rhe name was ourwardrerracring undercarriage, alrhough rhar onrhe Mk 47 operared ar a differenr angle andwas capable of bearing grearer weighrs.There were some differences berween rheMk 47 and irs immediare predecessor; somewere more obvious rhan orhers. Asrandard, rhe Mk 47 fearured rhe larger

pireful rail, an exrended ram airsupercharger inrake under rhe ngine andfinings for rail-down launches, plus manualand power-operared wing-folding.

Becau e 0 much u eful dara had beengarn red from rhe Mks 45 and 46, rherewas no procorype for rhe Mk 47. The firsrrwo producrion aircrafr, P 944 and P 945,were used for rype clearance. Con rrucredar ourh Marscon, rhe fir r made ir maidenflighr on 25 April 1946 wirh rhe orherfollowing on 12 Occober. Borh werepow red by rhe Griffon 87 driving a ixbladed conrra-roraring propeller unir, aswere rhe following rwelve aircraft. The finalsevenry-rhree aircrafr from serial VP428

were fined wirh rhe Griffon 88, whichfearured a Mk LI combined injeccor and fuelpump. This unir improved rhe aircrafr's 'g'performance bur ar rhe cosr of an addirional70lb (32kg) weighr. nly rhe firsr fouraircrafr fearured manual wing folding, whichrequired srrms co supporr rhem in rheposirion. The orher machines all had powerfolding using a dedicared hydraulic sysrem.In borh cases rhe fold point was justourboard of the cannon bays.

PS944 was delivered CO Boscombe Downin November 1946 for handling trials. Inan effort co improve stability, the Mk 47swere fitted with spring rab elevacor , a largeinertia weight mounted in the elevacorcontrol run and beading strip on theelevacor trailing edge. With these featuresthe limiting Mach number rose from 0.77co 0.82 at which poinr pitching becameobvious. Inrernal fuel tankage was 2 7gal(l,2791tr). Range could be extended co1,250mile (2,000km) with a 170gal(758Itr) ferry tank. Although these trialswere considered succe ful, the re t pilotsdid comment on the effort needed co putthe aircraft inco a sideslip and co cenrralizethe rudder in the climb. None of the initialremedial anempts was fully effective andthe evenrual consen u of opinion favoureda short dorsal. In the evenr, the difficulty

of introducing such a modification inco aproducrion run meant that the eafire Mk47 enrered service almost unchanged.

Performance trial were undertaken usingPS945, the results being compared withthose from the earlier Mk 46. These compari on revealed that the Mk 47 was some15mph (24km/h) slower, the differencebeing traced CO the carburenor intake, thaton the later aircraft being longer becauseit ended ju t behind the pinner base. Thethird production aircraft, P 946, had beencompleted as an FRA 7 and it was used coprove the varianr's range and endurance.

Air-Sea Rescue?

Air- ea rescue duties would not normallyhave been performed by a high-performancefighrer, bur Seafire 47 VP463 was us I cotest the Type GAR conrainer mountedon a bomb carrier under the porr wing.Dropping it required the eafire co fly levelat an altitude of 4,000ft (l,200m) at150mph (240km/h). Inirially, the containerhit the wing when it was released a rheairflow pulled the front section down. Aminor alteration co its shape improved itsaerodynamic performance and cured theproblem.

PS944 was the first folding-wing Seafire F.47. It wasfitted with a Griffon 87 engine and contra-rotatingpropeller, being used mainly for clearing the typefor flight. FAAM Yeovilton

This three-quarter rear view of a Seafire FR.47clearly shows the Spiteful tail unit fitted to thisvariant. The larger tail improved the type'slongitudinal stability. BBA Collection

112 113

GRIFFO POWER GRIFFON POWER

aileron which gave it a rate of roll of 270ft(83m) per second at 500mph (800km/h).In ovember 1947 VG747 was equippedwith a Lockheed Servodyne power-operatedcontrol unit and one of it fuselage fueltanks had to be removed to make room forit. Wh i1e pi lots appreciated the powerassi tance, the lack of feel and fine sen itivity meant that the aircraft needed carefulhandling.

eafang VG475 was used to determinethe wing's drag coefficient, for which purpose a pitot comb was fitted to the trailingedge to measure the wake turbulencebleeding from it. John Derry, later tobecome a de Havilland test pilot, wasassigned to these flights, which were

RB520 was originally built as a Spiteful before being transformed into the

prototype Seafang. although its naval features were limited to an arrester hook.

BBA Collection

the release equence was imilar to theSeafire's. There were two versions - containing 90 and 170 gal (400 and 760 Itr)respectively - wh ich were released at speedsup to 255kt (2 7mph or 460kmn.) and fewproblems were encountered. The ixthproduction Seafang F 32, VG741, actuallymade its first fl ight before the prototypeaircraft and was accordingly downgraded toMk 31 standard. Thi meant that it lackedfolding wings and featured a standard fivebladed Rotol propeller in place of a contrarotating unit. The aircraft joined VB895 inthe development programme alongsideVG474 whose ta k was to investigate lateralcontrol behaviour. The Seafang was initiallyfitted with standard slotted tab-balanced

The work on the Spiteful/Seafang was not completely wasted as their laminar

flow wings were later used on the jet-powered Attacker. BBA Collection

eafang. The Jet eafang did appear, butby then its name had been changed toAttacker; from it would evolve the wiftand cimitar. Meanwhile, the navy orderwa finally settled at ISO aircraft and thiwas confirmed by letter on 7 May 1945. A

piteful F XV, RB520, was fitted with asting-type arrester hook for t sts. Itremained at High Post for two year beforebeing accepted on behalf of the Royal Navy,which then scrapped it.

The programme eventually got back onschedule. The Griffon 89 engine deliveredto Hursley Park in October 1945 wasinstalled in VB895 to drive a contrarotating propeller unit and enable it tomake its maiden flight at the beginning of1946. It was then called Seafang XXX II andequipped with power-operated foldingwings. After an extensive manufacturer'ste t-f1ying programme, the aircraft wasdelivered to RAE Farnborough for preservice trials. During these flights the rudderhorn balance kept failing when tressed bythe deceleration of arrested landings. Theoriginal aluminium balance was laterreplaced by a high tensile unit but this didnot provide a remedy. The rudder assemblyhad to be removed and completely re-kinned and strengthened.

Landing trials followed at hilboltonand Ford during June 1947. During thesef1i hts the flap etting for landings wasdetermined to be 76 degree, while the takeoff- etting wa optimised adO degrees. Thebest landing speed with flaps at 76 degreeswas found to be 95kt (107mph or 170kmn.).In hi report on the trials, Supermarine testpilot Mike Lithgow prai ed the S afang forit good landing behaviour. He noted thatthe forward view wa better than theSeafire's and also that there was notendency to float when the throttle wa cutjust before touch-down. Thi programmerepresented a follow-up to flights alreadyundertaken aboard HMS Illustrious in May1946.

Such was the report' enthusiasm that thepilots at the ervice Trial Unit, formed atR AS Ford, were anxiou to get their handon the aircraft. The Royal avy wouldhave to wait, however, as VB895 was lentto the manufacturer to enable it to bedemonstrated to the Dutch Air Force atValkenburg on 19 August 1946. The ameweek it was also shown to representativesof the US, French and etherlands navies.

On return to Britain the Seafang becameinvolved in the development of externalfuel tanks. These were new items although

mountings to be altered to permit a troublefree re Iease.

Accelerated launch trials were held atRAE Farnborough during July 1949 usingVP437. These te ts involved catapultlaunches and arrested landings. RATOGunits were al 0 used. During these flightsthe Seafire carried various combinations ofrocket carriers, combat tanks, overloadtanks and bomb. Maximum all-up launchweight wa set at 12,9001b (5, 64kg).Maximum speed with two empty combattanks was 450mph (720kmn.). Carrier trialwere undertaken aboard HMS Illustriousduring May 1947 using aircraft P 945,PS948 and P 949. The pilots involved werecontent with their aircrafts' behaviour andparticularly prai ed the larger flaps, whichmade the Seafire easier to control duringcarrier landings.

Like most of th late-build Seafire , theMk 47 had a hort career. It was no longerused for front-line operations after completing its Korean War service in 1950.Reserve use ended some two years later.Supermarine made one last attempt tomaintain the pitfire/Seafire line throughthe development of the Spiteful andSeafang. Designated the Type 382 by thmanufacturers, the naval ver ion of the

piteful, the eafang, was first mentionedin the piteful specification, released inFebruary 1943. This was followed inOctober 1943 by that for the Seafang. Itenvisaged an aircraft that was essentially acarrier-based fighter based on the eafireXV, p wered by a Griffon 61 engine andfeaturing laminar flow wings. Contrarotating propellers were also specifi d andarmament was to comprise a pair of 20mmcannon in each wing with ISO rounds pergun. Internal fuel capacity was to be 116gal(517kg) with a further 45gal (200Itr) inexternal tanks. Initially, the Royal avyshowed little interest in the speCification;getting the eafire into front-line ervicetook priority. It was not until 21 April 1945that the Air Ministry issued on the navy'sbehalf pecification N.5/45 for a singleseat naval fighter. Two prototypes wereordered and were allocated the serialsVB893 and VB895.

Even though the Seafang was on orderfor the Admiralty, their Lordship' enthusiasm for the type was beginning to cool athe Sea Fury and Sea Hornet were cominginto ervice. In any ca e, there was nochance of the Seafang entering servicebefore 1947. Their conclusion wa that ahandful might be useful for training pendingthe arrival of the proposed Jet Spit full

occa ional tendency to hit the aircraft'sfuselage. A camera wa installed to provideevidence that separation was not alwaysclean. A papier mache rear section designedto crumple on reI ase was later fitted.While the 90gal tank wa being modified,VP463 was used for te ts of the 50gal(223Itr) tank. This required the crutch

PS944, the Seafire F.47 development prototype. shows its wings in the folded

position. Of note is the changed wing planform featured by this variant.

BBA Collection

Seafire FR47 VP482 banks towards the camera. After serving with No. 800

Squadron aboard HMS Triumph. the aircraft was transferred to No. 1833 Squadron

at Bramcote. being withdrawn in September 1953. FAAM Yeovilton

The ame aircraft was then employed ondrop trials involving the 90gal (401Itr)overload tank. Incorporating lessons learnedfrom the ASR container release andclearance difficulties, the tank was configured to release from the rear mounting,after which it fell away cleanly. Furthertrials revealed that the tank had an

114 115

GRIFFON POWER

When Specification NO.7/44/P1/SU was issued on 1 October 1944 it covered production of the navalized version of the Spitfire F.21,later to be known as the Seafire F 45. It covered the production aircraft but not the first two prototypes. The basis of the new variantwas its Spitfire equivalent, except where changes were required for naval operations. While most of the specifications in the NavalOperational Requirements schedule had to be adhered to, for some unstated reason the pilot's headrest was not required to bemoved.

As this was a new Seafire variant, the third aircraft would be regarded as the first production machine, all of which were to be fittedwith the Rolls-Royce Griffon RG4SM series engine. If available, a contra-rotating propeller unit was to be installed. Although notintended as a reconnaissance aircraft, the Seafire F.45 was to incorporate mountings for one oblique and one vertical camera to befitted at a later date in early-build machines. Production machines would feature them as soon as possible.

The Admiralty requirement for the Seafire F.45 was covered by Specification N7/44. This called for the aircraft to operate world-widefrom the decks of the Royal Navy's aircraft carriers. It demanded that the aircraft be capable of remaining under full control duringdeck landing approaches at a speed of approximately 85kt (96mph or 153km/h) without the application of more than two-thirds enginepower. Other required qualities included good fore and aft stability, good longitudinal, lateral and directional control and ease ofthrottle operation. Also required was adequate drag to ensure rapid deceleration after throttle closure to prevent unnecessary float.

When making take-offs without catapult assistance into a 27kt (49km/h) head wind, the Seafire F.45 was required use no more than500ft (154m) of the deck. In flight excellent rolling characteristics were expected, together with the smallest possible turning circle. Thearrester hook was to be of the sting type and the aircraft had to be capable of tail-down take-offs using Rocket-Assisted Take-Off Gear(RATOG). The Seafire had to capable of being winched aboard ship with wings folded or spread. Unlike its land-based counterpart, ithad to incorporate extra lashing-down points for bad weather securing on deck or below in the hangar.

Although the Admiralty accepted the standard fuel tank capacity as adequate, the specification called for the capability to carry 50gal(223Itr) or 90gal (400Itr) external fuel tanks. Provision also had to be made for two semi-permanent under-wing tanks able to hold25gal (111Itr) each. They had to be jettisonable or capable of being quickly removed on the ground. Provision for an external ferry tankcapable of being jettisoned was also required.

Although the Admiralty was prepared to accept the standard armour plate fitting, a special request was made for additionalprotection for the Type 2BX beacon if possible. A variety of radio fits was also specified, including the SCR 522, although the TR 1196was acceptable. Also required was a Beacon Receiver Type ZBX, an IFF Mk 3 or 3GR, plus a tail warning radar Type AN/APS 13.Although this equipment would not necessarily be available at the time of manufacture, cabling was required to be planned into theproduction run.

Flight testing required the aircraft to be fully equipped to military delivery standards, but as the first examples were to be also testflown at the Aircraft and Armament Experimental Establishment (A&AEEl, a full set of distant reading oil thermometers had to beinstalled, plus gauges to measure the scavenge oil pressure at the cooler inlets. Another provision for the A&AEE test flights was a tailparachute for spin testing.

During the experimental test flights the aircraft had to be capable of inverted flight up to a maximum of minus-2.75g. In high-speedflight, wing lift reversal without reference to any compressibility effects had to exceed 625mph (1,000km/h). The ailerons and wingstructure had to be of a strength and stiffness that allowed maximum rolling performance to be safely utilized. Spinning was to belimited to two turns, at which point the aircraft should automatically recover. As the arrester hook was to be of the sting type, thespecification called for a maximum deceleration loading of 2g. The undercarriage was to be capable of withstanding a vertical velocityof 11.5ft (3.5m) per second. When fitted with wing folding systems, the wing mountings had to be capable of remaining undamaged inthe face of a 35kt (63km/h) wind, whether the wings were folded or spread.

Before delivery to A&AEE a contractor's flight trial had to be undertaken, which was then certified for the OTO. During these flightsthe Seafire was to be spun both left and right and all details noted.

CHAPTER EIGHT

was decided that the ship and her air groupshould be re-assigned. Both Atheling andNo. 889 had seen the last of the Seafire:the ship was to act as a ferry carriersupporting the British elem nt of the U led Task Force 57, while No. 889 was to bere-equipped with Hellcats.

Atheling's replacement was the fleetcarrier HM Indefatigable. Having been.assigned to the British Pacific Fleet, she leftPortsmouth on 19 Novemb I' for the FarEast. On board was No. 24 Fighter Wing,comprising Nos 887 and 894 Squadronsequipped with Seafires together with a strikeelement provided by No. 1770 Squadron'sFireflies and o. 820's Grumman Avengers.The carrier arrived at Colombo on 10D cember to form part of No.1 AircraftCarrier quadron (l ACS), British Pacific

wa Sabang, Sumatra. The Japanese werenot fooled and the British ships wereignored.

On 23 june, Atheling's aircraft providedair cover for Illustrious, which had justrefuelled, before fifty-one aircraft werelaunched for attack on Port Blair in theAndaman Islands. it was during thisoperation that tragedy struck. The Seafiresquadron's CO, Lt Cdr F.A.j. PenningtonRNZVNR, collided with his wingman andboth were killed. Th re wa a furtheraccident six days later when a landingSeafire completely missed the arrester wiresand ploughed into another aircraft. Twopilots and three deck party members werekilled. No. 889 was now down to six pilotsand five aircraft and, as Atheling had b entoo slow to keep up with the main fleet, it

Against the Rising Sun

Escorted by Chance Vought F4U Cosairs, this Barracuda heads for its next target. While the Fairey type was not particularlypopular it did fulfil its intended role, although it was replaced in the BPF by the Grumman Avenger. FAAM Yeovilton

When the escort carrier HMS Athelingem barked No. 889 Squadron in April 1944this marked the first deployment outside theUK for the Supermarine Seafire Ill. Theaircraft, from the first production batch,were joined by No. 890's Wildcats and bypilots from No. 834 Fighter Flight who hadflown Mk IICs from HMS Battler during itsforay into the Indian Ocean earlier in theyear.

After a period of working up, Athelingjoin d the fleet carrier HMS Illustrious, nowwith Corsairs and Fairey Barracudas aboard,for Operation Councillor, which wasintended to provide a distraction while USforces attacked japanese positions in theMarianas. The British vessels formed atwenty-four-ship task force together withthe US carrier Saratoga, whose objective

Designated the Type 391 by themanufacturer, this design was intended tobe powered by the Rolls-Royce 46H Eagledriving contra-rotating propellers. Therewere to be radiator cooling intakes in thewing leading edges and, as with the Seafang,the undercarriage units would retractinwardly with the wheels rotating forvertical stowage in the fuselage. Proposedarmament was four 20mm cannon with 150rounds per gun and top speed was estimatedat 500mph (800kmjh). Although thisdesign n vel' got off the drawing board,many of its main features found their wayinto the Attacker. R.J. Mitchell's immortaldesign had moved into the jet age.

The Griffon Seafire Specification

was returned to the manufacturers in June1948 for the installation of improved gunbay ventilation following an explosionduring acceptance trials of the HispanoMk.5* 20mm cannon at Boscombe Downin April 1947. Thi in tallation comprisedtwo small scoops per bay, with a pair of ventsin the wing's upper surface. This avoidedthe build-up of dangerous gasses and allowedthe trial to be completed successfully.

Eventually, only nine Seafangs, VG741to VG479, were del ivered from the orderedtotal of 150 aircraft, although seven morewere delivered in kit form. One last attemptwas made to maintain Supermarine'sproduction of prop II r-driven aircraft.

undertaken on 23 June 1947. During thefirst flight, the aircraft reached Mach 0.69in a dive from 24,000ft (7,385m) withoutincident. in the second dive, duringwhich Mach 0.77 was ach ieved, Derryencountered severe pitching. This continued to 6,000ft (1 ,800m) even though theengine had been throttled back. The causewas suspected to be disturbed airflow overthe wing's trailing edge generated by thete t equipment and interfering with elevatoroperation. Although a fairing was fittedover the pitot comb to smooth out theairflow, the programme was abandoned aftera few further flights.

The hardest worked Seafang, VB895,

776 777

Flying them aboard was the quickest way of transferring replacement aircraft, but the

preferred method was to ferry them to the carrier in a lighter and then winch them up

to the deck. Both these machines are destined for HMS Atheling. Rick Harding Collection

With wheels and debris scattered everywhere, a Seafire III heads for HMS Indefatigable's barrier. Rick Harding Collection

The sea is calm, the weather is bright as a Seafire II roars off the deck of an escort carrier complete with a 2501b bomb on the

centreline. In the background ground crew swarm like bees around further aircraft all carrying bombs. Once the strike has been

completed the Seafires will start looking for other business. Rick Harding Collection

headline-grabbing than assaults on japanesemilitary forces, such attacks were identifiedby the strategic planners as crucial to theenemy's defeat. This was the role assignedto 1 ACS, which now comprised the fleetcarriers Illustrious, Indefatigable, Indomitableand Victorious. It was commanded by RearAdmiral Sir Philip Vian flying his flag inIndomitable. The first sorties were launchedon 24 january 1945 as part of OperationMeridian, a further attack on aviation fuelrefineries and storage depots at Pladjoe,Sumatra. As these strikes were to blaunched off the island's south-west coast,the time in tran it was used for air defenceexercises, during which Seafires played theroles of both defend ing and attackingfighters. Changeable weather, however,resulted in the inevitable landing accidents.There were three on the 17th as the shipwas pitching in a heavy sea and rain wassweeping accross the decks. The heavy rainwas also responsible for frequent cases ofradio failure.

Indefatigable launched Seafires at 06.30hron the 24th to provide cover and antisubmarine patrols over the fleet. Thetwenty-two Seafire Ills and sixteen L.lIlsof No. 24 aval Air Wing were employedon providing sev n hours of patrol. Despitethe sea state remaining rough, with carrierdecks pitching quite violently at times,Seafire losses in landing accidents wereminimized. One Seafire L.llI, though, hadto be abandoned by its pilot when theundercarriage failed to lower, but he wasquickly rescued by the guard destroyer. Twoof Indefatigable's Seafires - one of eachvariant - were damaged beyond repairas the No. 7 wire was malfunctioning,presenting a bottomed wire to arrester hooksand leading to overstressed rear fuselages.Another pair of Seafires suffered bucklingand a fifth aircraft was overstressed when atyre burst on landing.

Pitching combined with a slightcorkscrewing effect caus d the deck landingcontrol officer (the 'batsman') to wave-offmany approaching aircraft. The resultingdelay in the landing rate caused someconcern among command staff. Many hadmad no secret of their distrust of the Seafirenor their preference for its Americancounterparts. The attack, however, was asuccess. The strike destroyed the refineryat Pladjoe and depleted japanese fuelsupplies. Five days later the carrier group'saircraft were in action again. This time thetarget was the refinery at Soengi Gerong,which formed the second refinery complex

118

marine armament might seem to renderthem unfit for anti-submarine work, butthe mere presence of cannon-armed fighterswas considered sufficient to deter anyjapanese submarine and force it to submerge. No submarines were spotted duringthe e sorties and no submarine attacks wereever made on British aircraft carrier by theImperial japanese Navy.

Attacks on Oil Refineries

Although cutting supply lines and chokingoff fuel supplies might have been less

Fleet (BPF). After acclimatization training,th carrier was declared fit for service andready for Operation Lentil, together withHMS Victorious. Accordingly, the airwings mounted strikes on oil refineries atPangkalan, Brandan and Sumatra. Duringthis operation the Seafire III not onlymounted combat air patrols but werealso required to fly early morning reconnaissance flights and fleet anti-submarinepatrols.

This latter role was one previou Iyundertaken by multi-seat aircraft, but thesewere now required for strike duties. On theface of it, the Seafires' lack of anti-sub-

Surrounded by crew members and the rescue party, and covered in fire suppressant foam, this Seafire has just

crash-landed aboard HMS Indefatigable. Rick Harding Collection

in the Palembang group. It had beenintended to follow up the first strike againstPladjoe but the weather was unfavourable.Heavy swells, sweeping rain and problemswith replenishment equipment meant thatthe fleet was unable to launch attacks assoon as planned. Even 0, Indefatigable'sfighter pilots were in the air at first-lightfor their normal patrolling duties, thirtythree Seafires being available.

With a refinery and storage complex nowdestroyed the japane e counterattack cameas no surprise, and the British carrier forcewas shadowed by the japanese. Ship-borneradar detected an incoming aircraft at07AOhr and, although Seafires werevectored toward it, they failed to engage.Having completed their patrol, this groupof Seanres landed at 08.25hr having beenreplaced by a similar number of aircraft. At09.13hr a fast-moving incoming contactwas reported. A section led by Sub Lt j.H.Kernahan R of No. 887 quad ron wasdirected to the area but failed to makecontact. Thirty minutes later, Kernahan'ssection spotted a Mitsubishi Ki 46 recon-

AGAINSTTHE RISI G SUN

naissance aircraft (Allied reporting name'Dinah') travelling fast 15,000ft (4,600m)above the fleet.

Seafires Against 'Dinah'

Under normal circumstances the Seafirewould struggle to catch an aircraft a fastas the Ki 46. But in this case the 'Dinah'spilot made an error of judgement by makinga shallow turn just as the Seafires reach dhis altitude. Kernahan fired a long burst,sending the 'Dinah' spiralling down inflames. It was the wing's first aerial 'kill'.As an additional precaution, it had beenintended to increa e the number of aircraftin the day's third patrol to twelve but twosuffered defects just before launch. Thesefighters spent much of their time duringtheir patrol chasing targets that turned outto be strike force aircraft returning to theircarriers. These fruitless diversions meant theneed to conserve fuel towards the end ofthe patrol. Four more Seafires werelaunched to provide a reinforcement.

Although they increased the aerial strengthto seventeen, ix fighter were de peratelyshort of fuel while two others wereexperiencing radio faults. Into this situationat llA7hr flew a mixed force of M itsu bish iKi 21 'Sally' and Kawasaki Ki 48 'Lily'bombers on their way to attack the fleet.

A flight of No. 887 Squadron Seafires ledby Lt j.W. Hayes R VR was the first toattack the intruders. A Ki 21 was shot downbut the bomber's defensive fire severelydamaged the attacking fighter's engine,leaving its pilot with no option but to baleout. By the time the rest of the flight hadjoined in, the japanese force had enteredthe fleet's defence zone, which meant thatthe fighter pilots were cha ing them througha hail of anti-aircraft fire. Despite this,another bomber was shot down by a Hellcat.The next Seafire pilot to achieve a successwas Lt Cdr j. Crossman RNVR, CO ofNo. 894 Squadron, who shared his first killwith a Corsair pilot. His second was a soloachievement when he downed a Ki 48 closeto Indefatigable. Two Ki 21s were shot downby Sub Lt K. Ward RNVR.

Draped unceremoniously over Indefatigable's side is this Seafire III of No. 894 Squadron. Such was the force of the

impact that the starboard wing has been torn off and fuel and oil dribbles down the other. Rick Harding Collection

120

With bombs already exploding in the background, this BPF Avenger turns toward its target. The Avenger

was a popular aircraft as it was a typical solidly built Grumman product. FAAM Yeovilton

121

Pictured just as it hits the barrier, this Seafire III of the Third Naval Fighter Wing has started to shred its

propeller. The landing has obviously been a hard one as the tail wheel has been sheared off and the hook

forced back into its recess. Ray Sturtivant

AGAI STTt-IE RISING SU

once the wreckage had been cleared a pairof eafires was placed on immediate reacliness. They wer scrambled late in theafternoon when an incoming aircraft wasdetected, but the target turned out to be aConsolidated B-24 Liberator who eIdentification Friend or Foe (IFF) equipment had been incorrectly set.

On 6 May the carrier group launchedanother trike of bomb-carrying Hellcatsescorted by eafires. Their target was PorrVictoria. While the Hellcats dropped theirbombs on the port facilitie and sank abarge, the eafire pilots strafed targets inthe area. The afternoon's sorties wereperformed by No. 809 Squadron, the pilots'mission being to attack enemy shipping. Butthe monsoon had followed the carrier force

carriers oon had combat air patrols in theair and an additional flight of six SeafireL.lll wa launched from Stalker to seekinshore shipping target. On their way backthey passed a dozen of Hunter's Seafireengaged on the same ta k but carryingcentreline-mounted bomb.

Having swept the area and found notarget, the eafire had to jettison theirbombs. There wa one sign of resistance,however, a a No. 07 Squadron eafireustained slight damage from anti-aircraft

fire while pas ing the coast. The only otherincidents were a barrier engagement,resulting in minor damage, while an aircraftfrom No. 809 quadron landed too fast,bounced into the barrier and ripped off itsundercarriage. There were no casualties and

With the debris from its recent dramatic landing scattered around. a Seafire III of No. 807 Sqn settles in the

classic nose-over pose seen aboard many an escort carrier. Wisely the crew of HMS Hunter are staying clear

until the drama is completed Rick Harding Collection

• int rest. As the Seafires recovered fromtheir sortie, a heavy swell and persi tentdrizzle following a monsoon storm meantseveral deck landing accidents aboardHunter. Only two aircraft were written-offbut three others had to be struck downbelow to await repair in port.

The monsoon conditions rerurned tokeep all aircraft on their carriers. A hortbreak in the weather allowed a few mi ionsto be flown the following day, but themonsoon rerurned and an adverse foreca tprompted the force's withdrawal. In anycase, the carrier group had completed itsta k on the first day. The carriers wereredeployed off the coast of Tenasserim tosearch for better weather and for target.Arriving during the morning of 5 May, the

patrol of the day. A the operation wasbeing carri d out under a total radio blackout, it wa not po sible to contact the Uaircraft by radio, nor was the flight leaderconfident the American pilots would beable to read light signal. The only alternative was to fire a warning burst acro s thenose of the leading P-38, action whichsucceeded in diverting the Americanfighters away from the ships. The same daya Seafire of No. 809 Squadron, returningto Stalker, missed the arrester wire, bouncedover the for -d ck barrier and ploughedinto two parked aircraft. Such was the forceof the impact that one aircraft was pushedover th sid and the second was wrecked.

obody was injured. It was the only decklanding accident of the voyage.

Operation Dracula was launched in theearly hour of the following morning. Poisedto trike a deci ive blow again t thjapane e, the pilots were disappointed toencounter negligible resistance aroundRangoon as the japanese were in the processof pulling out. For the eafire pilots thismeant unopposed bomb run against theremaining anti-aircraft guns and coastaldefence batteries near Thakutpin. All eightbombs dropped hit their targets. Supportingthe four fighter-bomber attacks were thirtysix air patrols and tactical reconnaissancesorties. These drew no enemy fighters andreconnai sance failed to reveal anything of

Operations in Burma

with o. 79 Squadron and it eafire. Butnow, like four of the six carriers, she was aHellcat operator. Only Hunter, with o.07 quadron, and talker, with o. 09

Squadron, had the Supermarine fightersaboard.

After a photo-reconnaissance mission toPort Swettenham and a strike onEmmahaven by Hellcats and Avengers,Seafire participated in Operation Dracula- strikes on Rangoon and the T nasserimcoast - during May. The force, nowcommanded by Rear Admiral A.W. Ie T.Bisset, flying his flag in the cruiser Royalist,had a total fighter strength of forty-fourHellcat and fifty-four S afire L.IlIs andLR.IIls. Spare aircraft were carried aboardStalker. Further replacements were held bythe Ruler class carrier Shah, which wasoperating with HM Ameer to provide abackup covering force betw en Rangoonand Sumatra.

During the approach to Burma, theeafires undertook thirty- ix combat air

patrol during which there wa only oneminor incident. On 1 May, just as the sunwas setting, a flight of Lockheed P-38Lightnings was spotted hea ling towards thetask force at low level by the final Seafire

British losses were one eafire afterengine failure, the pilot being rescued, whileCrossman' radiator was hit, which meanta hasty return to his carrier. A Hellcat wasdamaged by anti-aircraft fire from thebattleship HMS King George V. Defensivegunfire caused further damage whenIllustrious uffered casualties and the loss oftwo parked aircraft. A eafire uffered tyrefailure while landing on Indefatigable.Overall it had been a successful day for No.24 NAWas everything had gone accordingto plan. Two attacks on other targets in theNetherlands Ea t Indies had been plannedbut, due to the shortage of fuel combinedwith a lack of fleet oilers, the oil refinerieswer left alone for the time being. The fleettherefore headed for Fremantle, WesternAustralia, for repleni hment before continuing to Sydney to prepare for operationswith Ta k Force 57 in the Pacific.

While the fleet carriers were inAustralian waters to make ready for strikesagainst japan, another carrier force wapreparing for war in the Indian Ocean. Thevessels chosen to form this task for e wereHMS Attacker, Emperor, Empress, Hunter,Khedive and Stalker, which were assignedNo. 21 Aircraft arrier Squadron of the Ea tIndian Fleet, commanded by CommodoreG.. Oliver. Attacker had completed arefit at Taranto in December 1944 beforeleaving for Trincomalee on 1 April 1945

122 123

and the accompanying thunderstorms weremore violent than before. As the Seafireswere incapable of flying over the thunderclouds, it was decided to rejoin the mainfleet.

Sink the Haguro!

While Stalker's aircraft were busy with theroving strike, Hunter's were providing acombat air patrol over the can'iers. But theywere diverted later in the day to search forthe japanese cruiser HaguTO, which wasreported to be en route to the AndamanIslands to a sist in evacuating the garrisonthere. The search was fru itless as thejapanese had got wind of the search andordered the cruiser back to port. By the timethe two searching Seafires returned to theircarrier the light had almost gone and theyhad to land in near-darkness. The flightleader touched down on Hunter andpromptly wrote off his Seafire, while his No.2 headed for Stalker. The landing wassucces ful even though the aircraft snaggedthe last arrester wire and hi t the barriers.As its engine had b n throttled back thedamage to the propeller tips was minimal.While Stalker ploughed through the roughsea, her ground crew carefully trimmed thedamaged blade, enabling the aircraft toreturn to Hunter the following day as thefleet headed for Trincomalee. The shipsarri ved on 9 May for repair and revictualling.

The post-operation report from the flyingsquadrons made for mixed reading. TheSeafire unit commander complained thattheir roles during Dracula had been far lessinteresting than those of their Hellcatcounterparts. The nying commandersagreed that little of value had beenachieved, mainly due to bad weather.Another cause for concern was the rise inlanding accidents, although it was pointedout that many pilots were inexperienced inoperating from escort carriers. Against thi ,146 sorties had been flown over the fivedays.

With Rangoon now in Allied hands, theJapanese High Command decided towithdraw from the Andaman Islands. Mostof the long-range nying boats that hadoperated reconnaissance missions fromthere had ei ther been destroyed or damagedbeyond repair. As the garri on would bemuch bett I' employed in defending otherparts of the Empire, further efforts wouldbe made to evacuate it. On 9 May 1945 the

Royal Navy launched Operation Dukedomin response to a sighting of the HaguTO,which had left Singapore in company withthe destroyer Kamikaze bound for Port Blair.They were spotted by reconnaissancesubmarines in the Malacca trait on 10 Mayand a British force under the command ofVice Admiral Sir Arthur Power was assembled to hunt them down. This included thecarriers Hunter, Khedive, Emperor and hah.Aboard Hunter was the Seafire-equippedNo. 807 Squadron with No. 809 aboard Shah.

De ignated Task Force 61, this fleet hadput to sea as soon a the HaguTO had beenighted. The japanese d tected the British

ship the following day and Haguro and herconsort promptly reversed course andheaded back to Singapor . On the 14th,Haguro, now flying the flag of Vice AdmiralHa himoto, again departed for Port Blair.Task Force 61 had remained in the area andShah launched reconnaissance eafires ofNo. 809 at first light. By mid-morning theseaircraft had spotted the Japanese hips anda trike package of Avengers was assembledwith Seafires flying combat air patrol overthe neet. The Avengers' attack wasun uccessful, and an unserviceable catapulton board Shah meant that they were unableto return for another attempt. HaguTOremained under surveillance and bymidnight on 16 May the heavy cruiser waswithin torpedo range of the 26th DestroyerFlotilla. Although the smaller hip wereoutgunned by the heavy crui er's ten 8inweapons, they did get close enough tolaunch torpedoes. Mortally damaged,Haguro started a 30-d gree list and sank bythe bow in the early hours of 17 May.Kamikaze escaped but returned to rescue 320of the cruiser's crew.

The Japanese reacted to the loss of theHaguTO immediately by despatchingreconnaissance aircraft to shadow theBritish fleet, but low cloud prevented thecombat air patrol aircraft from interceptingthem. D spite cloud reaching up to 20,000ft(6,150m), a combat patrol from No. 807Squadron was vectored towards a large radarblip which turned out to be four NakajimaKi 43 'Oscars' travelling at high speedtowards the neet some 500ft (l,500m)below. [n the event the Seafire pilots'eagerness prompted them to open fire tooearly, although they did manage to damagetwo and drive the rest away.

A further pair of 'Oscars' was spotted bythe next patrol and all four Seafires divedto the attack. On of the japanese aircraftwas damaged but both escaped after violent

124

manoeuvres. These encounters representedthe only two a rial engagements betweenthe fighters of No.4 Naval Fighter Wingand the japanese Army Air Force in theBay of Bengal region. The post-operationdebrief focused on the Seafire pilots' lackof air combat experience. En route toTrincomalee, the neet maintained antishipping patrols. Although no enemyvessels were spotted, one air interceptionwas made: a Consolidated PBY Catalina nottransmitting an IFF signal. On 19 MayKhedive and Shah arrived in port followedtwo days later by Hunter and Em/JeTO,.,

While the carriers headed for harbour,No.4 Fighter Wing's aircraft flew a horeto T rincomalee. The Seafire squadronsI' mained there because sufficient Hellcatswere avai lable to provide fighter cover forcontinuing carrier operations, although No.809 Squadron was aboard HMS Stalker on18 june for Operation Balsam. Theobjective was a photograph ic reconnaissance of the airfields in southern Malaya,followed by an attack on those on Sumatra.Shah sailed in company with Ameer andKhedive. The reconnaissance sorties werecompleted on 20 june and, while bombcarrying Hellcats attacked Medan andBindjai airfields, the Seafire L.ll! of No.809 Squadron trafed Lhokseumawe airfield.During the attack a Ki 43 was destroyed anda Ki 21 damaged, while airfield buildingswere damaged. During the return trip atleast one train was destroyed and a secondseverely damaged. This was one of theSeafires' most successful sorties as no aircraftweI' lost during the attack and all wouldreturn to Stalker without incident.

Japanese Surrender Malaya

On her returning to Ceylon Stalker joinedEmpeTOr, Hunter and Khedive in exercisesto pI' pare for Operation Zipper, thereoccupation of Malaya and Singapore. Itbegan on 10 September but without RAFair cover and bombardment support fromthe Royal Navy. The targets were PortDickson and Port Swettenham and the fourcarriers formed part of a much larger force,along with Archer, Pursuer and Trumpeter.No. 807 Squadron flew four sorties on 8September and another twenty-nine thefollowing day. But further offensive actionwas cancelled at lunchtime as the japanesehad surrendered. Over 100,000 Britishtroop were landed at various points alongthe coast to be met with light resistance.

At the completion of Zi/Jper the neetentered Singapore harbour in triumph on11 eptember to accept the officialjapanesesurrender.

Meanwhile, HMS Attacker becameinvolved in plans for landings at Penangcode-named Operation Jurist, for whichpurpose No. 879 Squadron's Seafires hadbeen embarked. On 17 August 1945Attacker and Hunter sailed for Penang wherethey arri ved on 28 August. Both shipsremained offshore until 3 eptember,although calls for their service werelimited. Royal Marines landed withoutopposition. Hunter sailed to join Op rationZipper, while Attacker joined the rest of thefleet in Singapore Roads on 11 September.After the japanese surrender the operational service of No. 21 Aircraft CarrierSquadron a well as that of No.4 NavalAir Wing had been completed. By the endof 1945 all the escort carrier had returnedto Britain for return to th US avy.

When the BPF was assembled for theassault on japan it represented the largestgathering of British warships since theGrand Fleet sailed to fight the High SeasFleet at what became known as the Battleof jutland. Operations in the Atlantic andthe Mediterranean had kept the Royal Navyfully occupied and it would be much laterin the war before Britain could turn itsattentions to recapturing territory lost tothe Japanese in 1942. The first operationshad been undertaken in the Indian Oceanbefore the fleet carriers split off and headedfor Australia. Some US commanders hadopposed the British participation in theiroperations against japan. But WinstonChurchill's pressure on President Rooseveltobliged them to accept the Royal Navy'scontribution to the Pacific war.

The Fleet Train

The next task was to arrange for the fleet'slogistical support. In two years of fightingthe japanese in the Pacific, the US Navyhad brought its operations there to anunmatched I vel of efficiency. A keydevelopment had been a highly sophisticated organization called the fleet train tokeep the fighting hip fuelled and supplied.The US Navy was concemed that the RoyalNavy might be obliged to d pend on thislogistical organization at some point. TheBritish, however, were determined to

AGAINST THE RISING SUN

remain indep ndent. To learn from USexperience, a British mission headed byRear Admiral C.S. Daniel went to the USAand visited the Pacific theatre. But althoughgreat efforts were made there were neverenough oilers, t rry carriers or supply ships.

Operating bases represented a furtherheadache: they would have to be createdvirtually from scratch. The chosen locationfor the main base was ydney, although thenecessary work took longer than expected.Plans were also laid to create intermediatebas s along the proj eted attack route butin the event these were not needed as theAmericans allowed the Royal Navy to sharetheir base at Manus. This was fortunatebecause, lacking an organization like the UNavy's eabee construction units to developbases in a short time, a British intermediatebase would not have been ready beforeOctober 1945. Meanwhile, the Torres Straitb tween the northern Australian coast andNew Guinea was deepened to allow thepassage of large warships and facili tate theirtransit to and from the Indian Ocean.

The BPF's actual deployment in thePacific was strongly innuenced by theBattle of the Philippine Sea in june 1944.Although the japanese committed much oftheir remaining ships and aircraft to thisconfrontation, overwhelming Americanstrength obliged them to pull back theirforces to protect bases in Malaya and thehome islands and protect vital oil supplies.Initially the Americans had planned towork their way up the chain of japaneseheld islands to the Philippines, but AdmiralWilliam F. Halsey j 1', commander of the USThird Fleet, changed the plans at the lastmoment. Ma ive air trike were thereforeundertaken again t air bases on Formosa andOkinawa in the Ryuku Islands as well asminor one in between.

Not only was massive damage done tothese facilities but 50,000 ton of enemyshipping was sunk. Allied losses wereminimal. The twelve-strong carrier forcewas surrounded by battle hips and cruisers,all of which formed a highly-effective antiaircraft umbrella that attacking aircraftfound almost impossible to penetrate.During mid-October the strikes continued,culminating in a heavy attack on japanesebases at Luzon in the Philippines. This wasthe moment the Americans had beenwaiting for. A massive assault was launchedon the Philippines as land, sea and air forcespiled into the attack.

125

Action in the Philippines

The japanese forces were caught off guard.The lack of effective air power meant thatthe American fleet was virtually untouchable. On 20 October General DouglasMacArthur, the U Commander, SouthWest Pacific, waded ashore at Luzon tokeep a promise he made two years earlierto return to the Philippines. Meanwhile,between the 23rd and 26th as ries of navalbattles was fought in the seas around thePhilippines, which have come to beknown collectively as the Battle of Leyte.MacArthur declared that Japan had ufferedits most crushing defeat of the war. Indeed,it had been the biggest naval battle inhistory. In response the japanese turned toa weapon of desperation, the 'Kamikaze' or'Divine Wind' suicide missions, the tempoof which would increase as the Allied fleetsdrew closer to the horne islands.

The British Pacific Fleet comprised themost modern ships available to the EastIndies Fleet in 1944. It was commanded byAdmiral Sir james omerville. Its firstoperation in concert with US force hadcome early in 1944, with the fleet carri I'Illustrious, together with the battleshipsQueen Elizabeth and Valiant, plus screeningcruisers and destroyers under the commandof Admiral Sir Arthur Power, the BPF'ssecond-in-command, flying his flag in thebattlecruiser Renown. Aboard Illustriouswere Cor airs and Barracudas. The fleetcarriers Formidable, Indefatigable, Indomitableand Victorious were scheduled to join theneet within weeks. The repair carrierUnicorn, plus the escort carriers Begum andShah, formed part of the supply train to ferryreplacement aircraft to the bigger carriersand provide emergency flight decks.

The first attack was mounted on 16 April1944 in company with the US Navy carrierUSS Saratoga against targets at Sabang,Sumatra. The fleet numbered twenty-sixve sel , which included the French battleship Richelieu and the Dutch cruiser Tromp.The first sorties were flown off in the earlyhours of 19 April, when the fleet was 100miles (l60km) south-west of Sabang. Thestrike force comprised forry bomber, mainlyAvengers, and forty US-made escort fighters.The refinelY suffered extensive damage. Twomerchantmen were sunk and the harbourand airfield facilities were damaged. One USNavy fighter was lost, although the pilot warescued by a submarine.

AGAINST THE RISING SUN AGAINST THE RISING SUN

Seafire FR.47 VP455 was assigned to No. 804 Squadron in December 1948. It was badly damaged in this

accident, which resulted in it being written off. FAAM Yeovilton

Seafire F.45 LA488 displays the codes of No. 771 Squadron based at Lee-on

Solen!. After later service with No. 773 Squadron, the aircraft was damaged in a

crash-landing in May 1950. FAAM Yeovillon

Organizational Changes

Having withdrawn from the area, thBritish vessels refuelled en route toFremantle, where they arrived on 4 February.

ix day later the Fleet arrived atWoolloomooloo near ydney, this beingthe BPF's permanent base in Australia.Illustrious had to go into dock for attentionto her centre propeller shaft, which hadbeen thrown out of alignment during abomb attack in january 1941. A n itherthe facilitates nor the time were availablefor uch a major repair, the only answer wasto remove the shaft. Although thi reducedthe carrier's top speed to 24kt (43km/h), itdid mean that the carrier was still availablto the squadron.

A it wa clearly impractical for a navalstrike force to withdraw to it main ba eafter every attack, the BPF was able to usethe facilitie at the S avy base at Manus.Other importanr decisions were made toensure that the all-important logisticalarrangements were in place. Forward of thibase an area of ocean was designated theOperating Area, which IVa to be close tothe targets but far enough away to keep thevulnerable tankers and stores vessels safefrom attack. The fleet train, comprisingoiler, upply and ammunition ships, plusescort vessels, were to operate between

were completely wrecked, resulting in amassive and permanent reduction injapanese oil supplies, sapping their abilityto fight. On 16 january, the squadron ailedfor Australia to prepare for their participation in the final assault on japan.

Sailing as Task Force 63 on 24 january,all four available carriers, Indomitable, illustrious, Indefatigable and VictOrious weredeployed to attack the Pladjoe refinery.Indefatigable was th only carrier equippedwith Seafires. Assigned to the strike wereforry-three Avengers carryi ng a total of 172500lb bombs, twelve Fireflies and fiftyfighter drawn from all four carriers. Whilethe American-suppli d fighters providedan escort for the Avengers and Fireflies, theSeafires from Indefatigable performed airpatrol duties over the fle t. The mission washighly succe ful and five day later thegroup struck the Soengi Gerong refinery.This time, however, sixteen aircraft wereshot down, but the defender paid a highprice: thirty japanese fighters were shotdown while a furrher thirty-eight weredestroyed on the ground. This group ofrefinerie had originally been operated by

tandard Oil and Royal Dutch hell. Itprocessed at least 50 per cent of all the oilused by japan and, even more importantly,75 per cent of its total aviation fuel. Theattacks again caused ma ive amounts ofdamage to add to the steady toll of oiltankers being taken by Allied submarines.

Command Changes

By comparison, the Briti h attack represenred little more than an annoyance to thejapane e, who e main attenrion was focusedon the activities of the US task force.

The operation would, however, mark aparting of the ways for Fra er and Power,who had been appointed to command theEast Indi s Fleet. Fraser was joined byAdmiral ir Phillip Vian who took over the1st Aircraft Carrier Squadron, with ViceAdmiral Sir harles Daniel in charge ofadministration. Actually, Daniel's role wasa highly important one, which entailedmore than mere paper shuffling, for itincluded the provision of logistic supportand planning as well as the allocation ofmanpower. But while Fraser was incommand of the BPF, its ubordination tothe US Navy meanr that to avoid possibleembarras ment Vice-Admiral Sir BernardRawlings assumed command of the fleet atea. Thi arrangemenr meant that Fraser was

based initially in Australia, moving hisheadquarters northwards towards japan asthe war progressed.

Before joining the rest of the BPF, thecarrier ~ rce under Vian's command wasordered to undertake Operation Outflank.In company with Illustrious and Indefatigablewere three anti-aircraft cruisers plus fivescreening de troyers. Having left port on 17December, the fleet arrived at it launchpoint in the Malacca Strait on the 20th.The original target was Pangkalan Brandon,but as it was completely obscured by badweather the econdary one at Belewan Deliwa attacked inst ad. Oil refineries and portinstallations were badly damaged. No aerial

• re i tance wa encountered and no aircraftwere lost to the light anti-aircraft fireencounrered.

On I january 1945 the carrier wereofficially assigned to the BPF's Jst AircraftCarrier quadron. The ame day, Fraserflew to Pearl Harbor for a meeting with thecommander-in-chiefof the U Pacific Fleet,Admiral hester W. imitz. Together withhis senior subordinate commanders, imitzexpress d his ati faction at being able tocount the BPF as part of the total trength.Meanwhile, the fleet under Vian sailed on4 january to attack the oil productionfacilities at Pangkalan Brandon under thecode-name of Operation Lentil. Such wasthe accuracy and power of this a sault thatthe refinery and associated storage facilities

the ground. The heavy ships duly carriedout their bombardmenr and the only losswas a single aircraft whose pilar wa pickedup by the cruiser igeria. At the completionof Operation Crimson, Illustrious wadetached for a much-needed refit in Durban,South Africa. omerville also left to takeup a post in the SA, being succeeded byAdmiral Sir Bruce Fraser, who hadcommanded the Royal avy force thatsank the German battle-crui er Scharnhorstin December 1943.

In the absence of Illustrious it would fallto the other two fleet carriers to carry thefight to the enemy. n 29 August theiraircraft struck targets in the vicinity ofEmmehaven and Indaroeng. OperationLight - a seri s of attacks on the icobarIslands - followed on 18 October. WithFraser' second-in-command, AdmiralPower, in charge, the fleet left Ceylon on15 October to provide a diversion forAmerican attacks elsewhere in the region.

At the end of this mission the carriergroup withdrew to Ceylon for rest andreplenishmenr. Indomitable and VictOriousarrived at the beginning of july, and asbarh ships were new to tropical waters,both vessels undertook an extensive workup. VictOrious' first strike, made in companywith Illustrious, was undertaken on 25 julyin an Operation code-named rimson.Their role was to provide air cover forbattleship bombarding abang as part ofthe process of softening up japanese forcesin the area.

The air strike, launched a usual in theearly morning, comprised eighty Corsairsand nine Barracudas. Eight of the fighterswere to spar for the gun of the fle 1', a dozenwere to form a combat air patrol role whilethe remainder were briefed to attack theairfield at Koetaradja. The weather was notenrirely favourable but there were enoughclear patches to allow the airfield attack toproceed, keeping the japanese fighters on

With the Barracudas now replaced byAvengers, anarher attack wa undertakenon 17 May against oil refineries atSoerabaya, java. Again the SaratOga wainvolved in the operation, which improvedits chances of succe . One of the attackingaircraft was lost to anti-aircraft fire. Afterthi strike the aratOga returned to U Navyconrro!. Even though the force was nowmaller, omervi lie's operations staff were

planning another raid. The cho en targetwas Port Blair in the Andaman Islands. Asit was intended to launch the strike closerto the target, the Barracudas replaced theAvengers. Of Illustrious' complement offifty-seven aircraft all but six were launchedfor the operation. While little damage wasachieved due to the lack of suitable targetto attack, it was now clear to japane ecommanders that they now had to contendnot only with the American advancethrough the chains of Pacific islands but alsowith Briti h attacks on their fuel supplies.

126 127

With its chocks lying on the leading edge of the wing, this Fairey Firefly is moved to another part of the deck by Indefatigable's

handling party. Rick Harding Collection

AGAINST THE RISING S N

On April the Americans requested theBPF to turn its attention to the airfield onFormosa a it was considered that the Britishcrews were now sufficiently experienced totake on the battle-hardened Japane e basedthe I' . Accordingly, two days later the BPF

Zero Shot Down

Invasion of Okinawa

At 06.00hr on 1 April American forcesstormed ashore and quickly e tabli hed awide bridg -head. But the Japanesedefenders were well prepared, having survived a massive bombardment. Kamikazeswere also up in force. BPF fighter patrolswere flown off a u ual, being quicklydiverted to intercept any unidentifiedincoming aircraft. On one occasion theywere reinforced by further fighters but ahandful of Japanese aircraft managed tobreak through even after four of theirnumber had been shot down.

They strafed Indomitable and King GeorgeV to provide a diversion for a Kamikazeaircraft to hit Indefarigable at the base of thei land. Fourteen men were killed andsixteen injured but this toll would havebeen greater had not avoiding action beentak n. The suicide attacker was engaged byBofors gun crews and the resulting hail ofhell hit one of Indefatigable's eafires,

killing the pilot. Unlike their Americancounterparts with their wooden fI ight deck,the Briti h carriers had armoured de ks,enabling them to be ready for action afteran attack in the minimum amount of time.This factor was much-appreciated by aSeafire pilot whose engin was malfunctioning and threatening to fail.

The same day, US Task Force 58 wasattacked by 700 aircraft of which 50 percent w I' deemed to be Kamikazes.Although over 300 were destroyed, omepicket hips were lost and other vesselsdamaged. Meanwhile, on 7 March the US

avy avenged the Pearl Harbor attack bysinking the Japane e super-battleshipYamato despite its 18in gun. The hugewarship had been heading for the tran port fle t off Okinawa when she waoverwhelmed by 3 a torpedo and divebombers.

again, 10 ses were light, being confined toa single Avenger whose crew wa I' scuedby a US ubmarine.

fly over the target zone, select the besttargets and pa s the information to thestrike force while it wa en route. The aircommanders then co-ordinated the strikes,switching target as needed. At the completion of the fir t attack, the fleetwithdrew as a 'Dinah' reconnaissanceaircraft had b en spotted. It continued toshadow the fleet, despite fire from one ofthe escorting anti-aircraft cruiser and anear-interception by a Hellcat. On 27March, the BPF returned to within 100miles of [shigaki to launch a fighter sweepin an attempt to draw up defending fighters.As before, thi was followed by a strike.A vengers attacked targets missed theprevious day, while others were diverted toattack coastal hipping. Two were lostalthough both crews were rescued.

The next pha e of the attack was to havebeen a bombardment, but as some shipswere running low on fuel and a typhoonwas menacing the refuelling area, theoperation was cancelled. As the assault onOkinawa \Va scheduled to begin on 31March it wa more important that all vesselswere ready for air strikes on the BPF'sde ignated targets during the next threedays. [n the early hours of 31 March, TaskForce 57 was in po ition. [t fir t aerialreconnaissance mis ions were launchedsoon afterwards. Again, the airfields on[shigaki and Miyako were the targets and

Slow and ungainly it might have been, but the Supermarine Walrus was a

welcome sight to ditched airmen when the alternative was sharks or the

Japanese. Ray Thomas Collection

orsairs, fourteen Avengers and twoSupermarine Walru for air- ea re cueduties. This fleet was screened by five lightcruisers and eleven de troyers.

The intention was for the force'sAmerican-built aircraft to form the strikecomponent while the Seafires with theirlimited range would provide combat airpatrols above the fleet. During the voyagto the combat zone all the vessels wererefuelled, after which there were antiaircraft exerci e with a Martin B-26Marauder unit providing towed targetdrogues. [n the early hours of 26 March,command of the fleet passed to AdmiralVian in line with the policy of the aircraftcarriers and their op rations being thecontrolling influence during combat.

The fir t fighter weeps were launchedwhen the carriers were 100 miles (160km)due south of Miyako Jima, their targetsbeing the airfields at Ishigaki and Miyako,which were heavily defended by antiaircraft batteries. Only one aircraft was lostduring the first sweep, the pilot beingrescued by one of the Walru amphibians.For the econd attack a full strik packagewas launched from all four carriers with alarge fighter escort. The result was heavilycratered runways - soon repaired - andseveral aircraft destroyed on the ground.

An American technique adopted for thisop ration was for air group commanders to

damage to the carriers US Intrepid andEnterpl'ise, but given the size of the force,it striking power was barely dented. Fivedays later the Americans again struckOkinawa. The surrounding sea wa weptclear of mines to enable the battleships toclose in and deliver the heaviest-ever navalbombardment. This commenced on 24March and two days later the neighbouringisland of K rama Retto was captured,enabl ing the Americans to establish a baseand repair facility.

Task Force 57 had ailed from Manu on14 March. [t comprised the 1st BattleSquadron, the I t AC , the 4th CruiserSquadron plus three flotilla of destroyers.By the following day the fleet train,designated Task Force 112, was also on themove. Ta k Force 57 wa divided into taskun it, I [2/2/ I formed around the e cortcarrier Stalker, TU 112/2/5 consisted ofthree oilers with air defence provided bythe ferry carrier Speaker. Task Force 57compri ed: the battleship King George Vand Howe; the fleet carriers Indomitable,flying Vian's flag and carrying twenty-nineHellcats and fifteen Avengers; Illustrious(thirty- ix orsairs and sixteen Avengers);Indefatigable (forty eafires and twentyAvengers); and Victorious with thirty-seven

Task Force 57

While the US avy maintained four largetask forces and upporting fleet trains, theBPF's periodic withdrawal meant no Britishin-theatre presence for days at a time. RearAdmiral Fisher managed to keep the BPFsupplied with its needs at all times. He was,however, helped considerably by theestablishment of forward bases at Ulithiand Leyte. While the Allies had eitherdriven the Japanese out of many capturedterritories or else neutralized them, it wasquickly realized that a decisive attack on akey base could shorten the war. Planningtherefore began for a massive assault onOkinawa code-nam d Operation Iceberg.The BPF's ta k wa to control the arearound the akishima Gunto Island andblock the flow of aircraft and suppliefrom either the Japane e home island orFormo a.

ow designated Ta k Force 57, theBritish fleet operated in conjunction withthe US avy' Ta k Force 58 to form a1,200-strong armada converging onOkinawa. The Am rican fleet began itoperations on 14 March by triking airfieldsin the south of the islands. A Japanesecounterattack four days later resulted in

these area. Within the Operating Area,refuelling operations were to take place atdawn and it was planned that the hips ofthe ta k force would arrive in the peratingArea to find their respective oiler teamingin the ame direction. Each combat shipwould come alongside its designated oiler,refuel and th n make way for another.

After refuelling, ships requiring store orammunition were to go alongside therelevant upply vessel. A the BPF fI ettrain had been assembled in a hurry, someof it atTangements were not as sophisticatedas those of the US Navy who e fleet traincon i ted of specially-de igned shipsourfitted with the best handling equipm ntavailable. Al 0 included were the escortcarrier, whose role was to supply replacement aircraft and ferry repairable machineto the BPF' repair facilities. [nitially,refuelling and repleni hment after eachtrike took at least three days. Slicker

handling procedures and the u e ofbattle hip and fleet carrier to refuel smallerships reduced this to two days. The entireforce and the fleet train remained at eafor up to four weeks unless there wereca e of damage or major mechanicaldefects.

128 129

AGAINST THE RJ ING SUN

A Seafire III of No. 894 Squadron shudders to a halt aboard Indefatigable. The aircraft has been stopped by

the barrier, although this was not purely the result of a landing accident, as the hole in the wing caused by

anti-aircraft fire indicates. Rick Harding Collection

ju t hort of the ship, while the other aimedfor the starboard bow. But the ship wasturning away and the attacker, riddled withshell hits, slammed into the flight deck ara shallow angle, skidded across the deck andplunged inro the sea. Other atrackers werehot down by rhe air patrols before they

even reached the fleet. Evenrually, the firesaboard Formidable were quenched, the deckwas repaired and carrier declared ready foroperations.

The battleship, meanwhile, were inposition to begin their bombardment of rheairfields and orher installations, spottingbeing undertaken by escorting fighters. Thebombardment lasted nearly an hour and

HMS Implacable seen from above. Note the extensive anti-aircraft

armament installed in Illustrious-class carriers. BBA COllection

Kamikaze Attacks

Formidable was singled out and she twistedand turned in an attempt to rhrow off rheattackers' aim. Bur on managed to drop abomb close to the hip before crashing onto the flight deck. The resultant conflagration ser fire to many aircraft in thedeck park. It also tore a large hole in rhearmoured deck, killed eight crew, woundedforty- even other and rendered mosr ofthe radar equipment usele . A Fonnidable'sdamage control partie truggled to bringrhe fires under control, Indomitable wasselected as the next target for a pair ofattackers. One was chopped our of the sky

Sakishima Gunto

further strikes on the airfields on Ishigakiand Myako Islands rhe following day. TheTask Force rhen left the area, arriving inSan Pedro Roads, Leyte, on 23 April.

While the Brirish fleet was away therempo of japanese attacks on shipsincreased and many vessels were damaged.But the war on land had tailed and it wasnor until 11 May that U force pu hedforward in strength to fight from bunker tobunker in an effort to clear the enemy out.The japanese showed no inclination tosurrender and Kamikaze raid increased inviolence and strengrh. Even ar thi tagein the a ault on Okinawa, the AmericanHigh ommand wanted the BPF divertedto attack Borneo, but Admiral Nimitzpersuaded them otherwis .

Soitwasrharon 1 MayTa k Force 57 sailedto begin attacks on akishima Gunro. Thisrime rhe fleet compri ed the battleshipsKing George V and Howe, the carriersFormidable, Indefatigable, Indomitable andVictorious, plus four cruiser and fourteendestroyers. After further refuelling rhe fleetarrived at its attack station on the 4th.Drawing on previous experience, rhedefensive fighter parrols were launched justbefore dawn, being quickly called intoaction to inrercept a small incoming raid.The fight rs hot down one aircraft anddi p rsed the others. While the fighterswere covering the fleet the strike packageshad departed to attack the airfields atI higaki and Miyako, where, it was noted,the intensity of anti-aircraft fire hadincrea ed.

The japanese use of high-flying reconnaissance aircraft wa a continual worry tothe BPF as its patrolling fighters were unableto reach rheir alritudes. Even the heavy gunsof the battle hips failed to deter rheshadowers and Rawlings detached thebartleships to bombard their ba es. As themailer ships gathered around the carriers

to make up for rhe 10 s of rhe bigger vessel'sdefen ive power, incoming raid werereported. It was clear that the bartleships' departure had been reported by theshadowing aircraft. One group angled southof the carriers to draw the defending fightersaway, while the others dropped low to avoidradar detection, popping up to carch rhefleet unaware. When they were potted thejapane e aircraft began to dive-bomb thecarriers.

the airfield devastated. One Avenger waforced to ditch off the coast and the crewof a Walru rescue aircraft undertook adaring rescue to pick up the crew. At theclose of rhe day's operarions the fleerwithdrew to peration Area Mosquito forrefuelling and replenishing, returning for

Circling its carrier, this Firefly prepares to enter the landing pattern. Although not

as speedy as the Seafire, the Firefly combined reasonable load-carrying capacity

with better range, which gave it an edge over the Seafire. FAAM Yeoviiton

one being killed. By this time the carrierswere running short of fighrers, nor only forescort duties but also for combat air patrols.Vian advised Rawlings to wirhdraw, but theUS commander reque ted one more artack.

On the morning of 17 April a strike forcewas despatched to attack Miyako, which left

altered course towards Sakishima, reachinga po ition some 30 miles (4 km) offYonakumi hima on 1 April to begin asequence of rrikes on Matsuyama airfield.As usual, the first launches were scheduledfor dawn, but they were hurriedly broughrforward a incoming aircraft were detectedby the radar pickets. The Seafires on patrolquickly dived into the fray, shooting downone out oHour Mitsubishi A6M 'Zekes' anddamaging another.

Meanwhile, the strike aircraft and th irescorting fighters were heading forShinchiku and Matsuyama airfields. Butbad weather over the latter meanr that thiselement of the attacking force was divertedto attack Kiiran harbour, an adjacentchemical plant, shipping, a railway station,a factory and a bridge. Enemy aircraft wereintercepted by a pair of Fairey Fireflies overYonakumi hima. As they had droppedtheir bomb rhey were able to become longrange fighter and shoot down fourMitsubishi Ki-51 ' onia ' and damage afifth. By mid-afrernoon the attackingaircraft had returned to their carriers,refuelled and re-armed and were able toinrercept a large formation of japaneseaircraft. All four carrier launched their onguard fighrers, while other were quicklybrought to readine and launched. TheBPF pilots tore into the attacker, downingeight before the attack fizzled out. The BPFsuffered a ingl 10 s when a Hellcat crashedon landing, killing rhe pilot.

Th next day began with further dawnattacks on the fleet. Fighter rose to attackwhile rhe strike aircraft left to hit theairfield again. This time the weather wasclear and borh airfields were attacked withvigour, the bombers hitting its infrastructure while the escorting fighters strafedaircraft on the ground. All aircraft returnedsafely to rheir carriers, which then withdrewto the south to take up rheir night position.They wirhdrew to the operations area forrefuelling on 14 April. There F01midable waswaiting to replace Illustrious, which sailedfor ydney for repairs.

Two day later rhe BPF was back onstation to resume operations. Strike packages plu escorting fighters were launchedagainst the airfields at Ishigaki and Miyakoas well as the radar station at the latt rlocation. All the attacking aircraft returnedsafely, although Indefatigable 10 t three in adeck accidenr. A Seafire making a fastlanding bounced over the barrier andploughed into an Avenger and a Firefly.Two crewmen were knocked into the sea,

130 131

proved highly effective. Shells from thebattleships' big turrets marched up anddown the runways and other areas of theairfields, causing great damage. At thecompletion of the shelling, the battleshipsand their escorts hurried back to the carriersto reinforce their defences - just in time torepel the latest round of attacks. Most ofthe attacking aircraft were shot down byIndefatigable's Seafires and fighter fromother carriers. The BPF then withdrew toOperating Area Cootie for refuelling andto enable replace men t aircraft to betranshipped. While there the Reet heardthat the war in Europe had end d withGermany's surrender.

The Reet returned to the combat area on8 May but increasingly bad weather resultedin all attacks being delayed for a day. Thechosen target was Hirara airfield, whichthe reconnaissance aircraft had reported asbeing fully u able. But that was changed bythe four strik packages launched to attackit. The Avengers and their escorts sufferedno casualties. On their way back they passedthe Seafires, which had spent much of theday chasing japanese reconnaissanceaircraft away. By late afternoon the enemyretaliated. The attackers came in fast andlow. Stand-by fighter were launched, whilethose already airborne were vectored to theattack. eafires intercepted them 15 miles(24km) out. They shot down at least one,although the others were able to evade thefighters. They also evaded the second groupof defenders and lined up on the carriers,now twisting and turning below. Even so,at I ast one attacker, burning and slowlydisintegrating, hit Victorious' flight deckand exploded. Damage control partiesquickly brought the fires under control buta second aircraft hit the deck, de troyingfour fighters in the deck park before slidingoff into the sea.

Formidable was the next carrier to receivethe attention of a Kamikaze. The carrier andescorting war hips put up a hail of steel butthe battered attacker continued towardsthe carrier to plough into a crowded deckpark. The resulting explosion destroyedeven aircraft but the armoured deck was

not penetrated. To assi t the fire crew infighting the conflagration, the carrier wasslowed down. As they continued to fightthe fires, fuel leaking from the damagedaircraft seeped into the hanger below to starta second fire. The ship's fire suppressionsystem and dividing doors kept theconsequent loss down to eighteen aircraft.Formidable was soon able to resume limited

AGAINSTTI-IE RISING SUN

operations but the task force left forOperating Area Cootie for replenishmentand damage repair at night-fall.

During this lull both the damaged carri rswere inspected and cleared for furtherservice, although one of Victorious' aircraftlifts was still causing concern. D spite this,the BPF was back on station by 12 Mayready to resume operations against lshigakiand Miyako. Casualties were light and noKamikazes approached the fleet. Operationscontinued ov I' the next few days, finallyending on 25 May when the fleet withdrew.After sixty-two days at sea on OperationIceberg, the BPF staged via Manus toAustralia to prepare for the next s ries ofoperations.

Of the four carriers Indomitable was foundto be in a far worse condition than previously thought and her place in the taskforce was taken by Implacable. While shehad used the transit time to train her aircraftcrews, they had no recent combat experience and the ship was tasked with an attackon Truk. Once the main japanese base inthe area, it had been subjected to a massiveUS strike in 1943, which rendered itvirtually useless especially as most of itsremaining aircraft and ships had beendispersed to the Philippine and Malaya.The BPF ships selected for this attack werede ignated Task Force 111/2 and placedunder the command of Rear Admiral E.j .P.Baird. The nucleus of his force comprisedImplacable, with the forty-eight Seafires ofNo. 38 Naval Fighter Wing and twenty-oneA vengers of No. 828 Squadron, and theescort carrier Ruler with No. 885 Squadron,a composite unit equipped with Avengersand Hellcats. Avengers and Seafires dulysavaged Truk on 16 june, after which thefleet returned to Manu unscathed.

On 16 july the BPF, now designatedTask Force 37, joined the US naval force.The British ships were the carriersFormidable - Admiral Vian's flagship Implacable and Victorious, together withKing George V, six cruisers and fifteendestroyers. Howe was still being re-fitted atDurban, while Indefatigable was at Manusto repair defective air compressors.

ommand ship of the US Third Fleet wasthe USS Missouri, Rying the flag of AdmiralHalsey, and it was there that Rawlingscorlsulted the US admiral about his Reet'sfuture role. From these discussions itemerged that one option wa for TF37 tobecome part of the Third Fleet and becomefully integrated in future US operations. Itcould also operate semi-independently and

132

work on its own against softer japanesetargets. Rawlings decided that the firstoption was best for TF3 7, his decision beingmuch welcomed by Halsey.

Target: Tokyo

On 17 july 1945 the final assault on thejapanese horne islands began. As thecountry was being heavily pounded byU AAF Boeing B-29 Superforrresses, itwas clear to the japanese that an Alliedinvasion was only a matter of time. As partof the softening-up process, TF37 wasassigned targets in the Tokyo Plain. Allthree carriers launched strike aircraft andfighters to attack airfields, factories andother worthwhile targets. But bad weathermeant that only eight days of flying werepossible in the first twenty-five days ofoperations, during which 1,000 sorties wereRown.

Operations in the Hiroshima areascheduled for 3 August were abruptly cancelled by signal the previous evening andthe fleet was ordered to withdraw fromjapanese coastal areas. The reason becameclear later. That day a B-29 Superforrressof the USAAF's 509th Composite Grouppiloted by Col Paul Tibbets had droppedthe first atomic bomb on the city. Operations by the British force resumed on9 August when shipping anchored inOnagawa Wan were attacked. It was duringthis attack that Lt R.H. Gray DSC RNVR

of No. 1841 Squadron was awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross for attacking ajapanese destroyer whose anti-aircraft firewas threatening his cQmrades. The same dayTF37 attacked airfields and other targets inthe Honshu area. Much damage was doneand 250 aircraft were destroyed on theground without loss to the attackers.

That day, too, a further atomic bomb wasdropped, this time on Nagasaki. Peacenegotiations started the following day, andthe aggressive Halsey proposed to encouragethem with further heavy attacks on theremaining military and industrial targets. Bythis time TF37 was running short of almosteverything, exposing the inadequacy of itsfleet train. To retain a British navalpresence in the area, TF38/5 was formedaround Indefatigable and King George V,plus two cruisers and nine destroyers. Theremainder of the Reet returned to Manusfor refuelling and much-needed repairs.

Despite the two atomic bombs, the japanese fought on pending the outcom of

AGAINSTTHE RISING SUN

S-114 is the clearest visible aircraft in this line-up

of Seafires aboard HMS Indefatigable as the ship

enters Wellington Harbour. Rick Harding Collection

With the escort carrier HMS Stalker in the background, HMS Hunter prepares to anchor off Singapore. The leading aircraft, NN300, D5-dash zero, is that of It Cdr

Baldwin. Its camouflage paint had been removed and the aircraft now has silver finish with black SEAC recognition bands and anti-dazzle panel. FAAM Yeovilton

AGAINSTTI-IE RISI, G SU

HMS Indomitable served in both the Atlantic and the Pacific theatres. She was sold for scrap in 1955. BBA Collection

The hills of Hong Kong form the background to this view of a Seafire XV in BPF markings as its engine is run-up before it takes off on its

next sortie. This aircraft was operated by No. 806 Squadron aboard HMS Glory. CP Russell Smith Collection

surrender negotiation. By this time Kamikaze attacks represented their major weaponagainst the Allied fleet. But few penetratedthe hips' defensive fire. The final mis ionfor Indefatigable was undertaken on 15Augu t when a force of Avengers and eafires were attacked by a dozen Zeros. Duringthe en uing melee eight Japane e fighterswere shot down for the loss of one eafire.

AGAINSTTI-IE RISING SUN

At 07.00 hours the following day Nimitzsignalled that all offen lve operations wereto be placed on hold until further notice.It would appear that the Japanese hadnot read this order, however, as at lea tone aircraft managed to get close enoughto Indefatigable to drop two bombs along-ide the carrier before being shot down

by the orbiting eafires. This action brought

to an end the series of action fought bywhat had now become the most modemelement of the Royal avy. Yet de pitefighting its way across two oceans, facinggreat dangers and being in at the end,the exploits of this force are till largelyignored. No wonder the survivors refer to

themselves a the Forgotten Fleet.

Not the normal backdrop

for a portrait, but the

ground crew of Squadron

Seafire XV SW786 seem

quite happy with it. FAAM

Yeovilton

HMS Indefatigable enters Portsmouth in 1946 after

war service. The carrier entered long-term reserve

before being scrapped. BBA Collection

CHAPTER NINE

One More War

805 Squadron's Seafire XV . Al 0 aboardwere No. 16 Squadron, equipped withFireflies, and a detachment of No. 784Squadron with Hellcat night fighters, thelatter being aboard for night flying trial.After working up, the air group participatedin flying exercises before disembarking atRNAS, Hal Far, Malta, in june 1946 a thecarrier was needed for trooping duties.

No. 805 was temporarily equipped withFireflies but the Seafires returned inDecember. During this period the carrier'saircraft provided cover for the withdrawalof British forces from Palestine, the RAFhaving departed. In August 1948 the airgroup now comprised No. 804 Squadronwith Seafire XVs and No. 812 with Fireflies.After four trooping assignments, whichincluded two trips to ferry reinforcementsand equipment for the United Nationsforces operating in Korea, the air group reembarked and stayed aboard until thecarrier returned home for a r fit. Wh n shewas re-commissioned, the ship's fightercomponent comprised Hawker Sea Furiesin place of the eafires.

New Carriers

At least one Seafire remained behind in New Zealand after the visit of

Indefatigable. As it was not repaired the RNZAF utilized the airframe for ground

training purposes. CP Russell Smith Collection

New vessels replaced the e wartimestalwarts. Seven Colossus-class Iight fleetcarriers were built to operate aircraft, an

ighth being delivered as a maintenancevessel. The name ship was commis ioned inDecember 1944, being followed into serviceby Venemble and Vengeance injanuary 1945,Glory in April, Ocean in November, Theseusthe following February and Triumph in May1946. The first four ship form d No. 11Aircraft arrier Squadron under thecommand of Rear Admiral C.H.j. Harcourt.Departing home waters in May 1945 withunits operating orsairs and Barracudas,the squadron arrived off Ceylon in july. Ofthe Colossus class only Glory, Theseus andTriumph were to operate Seafires.

Glory was commissioned in August 1945and after modification work the ship wasallocated to Rosyth Command for flyingtrials involving the Sea Hornet and amodified Vampire. At the beginning ofD cember Glory was re-assigned to theMediterranean Fleet, having embarked No.

In the early hours of 25 june 1950 NorthKorean troops crossed the 38th parallel oflatitude to begin an invasion of SouthKorea, which would touch off a war lastingthree years. British forces joined theAmericans to fight under United Nationsauspices in an attempt to eject the invaders.Extensive naval operations involved RoyalNavy aircraft carriers joining their US Navycounterparts in strikes on North Koreanpositions. The Seafire was at war again.

The end of the war against japan resultedin the dispersal of the British Pacific Fleet,which had been built up into one of thebiggest RN fleets seen since the end ofWorld War I. Most of the ships werereturned to hom waters to await furtherorders, although many were to be decommissioned. The first to go were theescort carriers, which had to be returned tothe USA under the terms of the LendLease agreement. Of the fleet carriers, HMSFormidable spent the final months of 1945and the early part of 1946 ferrying I' leasedAllied prisoners from japan to Au tralia, theship having dis mbarked her air wing.Following two round trips to the UK, thecarrier paid off at Portsmouth in November1946 and was placed in reserve. She wassent for scrapping in 1953.

Having disembarked her air wing at Leytein the Philippines in May 1945, HMSIllustrious sailed to Sydney for repairs. Shearrived at Rosyth the following month fora complete refit. The end of the war meantthat a refit that had been planned to lastfour months stretched to twelve. During thisperiod the flight deck was improved,together with the radar and communications installations. Over the followingten years the carrier was employed on avariety of tasks before being sold for scrapin November 1956. Other members of herclass, Implacable, Indefatigable and Indomitable, were also the subject of po t-war refit.They were eventually laid-up in 1955 andscrapped. HMS Victorious, however, wouldhave a longer career, retiring in 1967.

HMS Indefatigable manoeuvres carefully into New Zealand's Wellington Harbour with her crew lining the

sides and Seafires along the deck. Note the array of anti-aircraft weapons. Rick Harding Collection

A Seafire III is lowered to the deck of the escort carrier HMS Atheling in 1945. Rick Harding Collection

136 137

Seafire F.47 PS946 was used as a trials aircraft. In between tests, it was flown by No. 787 Squadron pilots for comparison purposes. FAAM Yeovilton

PS951 was built as a Seafire F.47 and features the early-type tail unit. FAAM Collection Seafire FR.47 VP431 is

pictured on HMS Ocean's

lift. The aircraft was later

transferred to Triumphwhere it was damaged in

a landing accident. After

returning home aboard

HMS Unicorn, it went to

Eastleigh for repairs, but

the aircraft never

re-entered service, being

scrapped in July 1951.

CP Russell Smith

VP436 is hauled out of the sea after going over the side of HMS Ocean. The Seafire had lost its canopy on

take-off, causing the pilot to lose control. FAAM Yeovilton

the type' main weaknesses. At least fouraircraft were damaged when they landedslightly off-centre, causing severe wrinklingand distortion at the point where the tailunit joined the fus lage. This was similarto the damage caused by the aircraft stallingon to th deck, placing such a load on thetail wheel and its mounting structure thatthe upper skin surface became wrinkled.

ot so vi ible was the tensile separation of

By this time No. 800 quadran had beenre-equipped with the eafire FR.47 andthese exercises served to highlight one of

The Seafire 47 Arrives

T orle se DSO R , and her escorts werein Japanese water for flying trainingexercises.

Theseus did not embark her air groupunti I February 1947, when it comprised o.

04 quad ron with Seafire XVs and o.12's Fireflies. As the iwation in the Far

East remained uneasy the hip was sent tojoin o. 1 Aircraft Carrier Squadron,returning at the end of the year. The aircraftwere flown off to RNA Ford while thecarrier entered Rosyth for a refit. By the timethe ship was re-commissioned early thefollowing year the Sea Fury had started to

replace the eafire.Triwnph wa the longest serving post-war

eafire operator. She was employed as atraining and trials carrier before becomingthe flag hip of the Commander-in- hief,Home Fleet, Lord Fraser. In May 1947 heformed part of the escort force for HMVanguard, which was conveying KingGeorge VI home after a visit to SouthAfrica. The air group comprised No. 800

quad ron equipped with Seafire XVs andcommanded by Lt Cdr D.G. Parker DSO

DSC R . The unit shared deck and hangarpace with the Firefly-equipped o. 27quadron. By June the carrier had bec m

the flagship of the Mediterranean Fleet andit was during thi period of service that thevessel was vi ited by King Paull of Greece,who watched the air group in action.Following a po t-refit shakedown in early1949, the carrier re-embarked the sameunits, which formed 13 Carrier Air Group,to join the Far East Fleet for strikes againstCommunist guerrillas in Malaya as part ofOperati n Firedog. By June 1950 the carrier,under the command of Captain A.D.

138 139

o E MORE WAR

Having survived its service with No. 800 Squadron. VP455 was re-assigned to

No. 1833 Squadron at Bramcote. remaining there until it was withdrawn from

service in 1953. FAAM Yeovilton

with the cruisers Jamaica and Consort.While it was not known if orth Koreapossessed submarines, no chances weretaken and the Fireflies w re sent on antisubmarine patrol. The force arrived at

kinawa on 1 July and refuelled soonafterwards. When they joined the U

Having proved itself in the Pacific War. the Fairey Firefly also undertook combat missions during the

Korean conflict. Here the crew climb aboard their aircraft for another sortie. FAAM Yeovilton

movement was practised throughout theperiod of the Korean conflict. .

In the early hours of 29 June Triumph,still with Cossack in attendance, left Kureto join Admiral Andrewes flying his flagaboard the cruiser HMS Belfast, which wassteaming toward Okinawa in company

countrie to 'furnish such a sistance to theRepubliC of Korea as may be necessary tomeet the armed attacks.' Eventually sixteennation, including the UK, sent force tofight the Communist invaders under UNauspice with their operations placed underU control.

Aboard Trium/Jh, meanwhile, a flight ofSeafires had been placed on deck-alert theday after the invasion. At Kure bothTriumph and the de troyer Cossack wererefuelled, after which the carrier was securedalongside the jetty to enable damagedSeafires to be off-loaded. By 29 June theAdmiralty had placed all Royal Navy assetsunder US naval command. Vice Admiralc.T. Joy, the U avy's commander ofoperations in Korean waters, decided thatthe British and Commonwealth shipsshould form the Western Korean upport

roup, operating' under the designationCTG 96.8, under the command of RearAdmiral W.G. Andrewes. Coverage of theea t coast wa the re pon ibility of the U

avy's CTG 96.5. Although Vice AdmiralJoy i ued orders to the flag officercommanding each task group, each wasresponsible for day-to-day operations, whichincluded the inter-theatre hip transfersthat were occasionally required to maintainthe balance off each coast. This freedom of

Seafire FR.47 VP458. complete with wing-root RATOG packs. roars down the flight deck of HMS Triumph. Having joined No. 800

Squadron in July 1949. the aircraft was lost in a crash in December after the engine failed. FAAM Yeovilton

The origins of the Korean war can be tracedback to 1905 when the country became aJapanese colony. Under th Pot damDeclaration of 1945, however, Britain,China and the USA declared that Korea,once a Chinese province, should becomean independent country at the end ofhostilities. The U SR had declared war onJapan in the dying day and Soviet forcesentered Kor a, moving to the 3 th Parallelto face U forces on the other ide of thisunofficial demarcation line. The ovietsestablished Kim l\ Sung, a ruthless andunpredictable ommuni t functionary whohad spent the war in Moscow, as presidentof what wa proclaimed to be the Peoples'Republic of Korea. The American withdrew in 1948. Kim, who was dedicated tore-uniting the two halves under his control,bided his time.

In January 1950, US Secretary of tate,Dean Acheson, made a speech in which helisted the countrie America was preparedto defend against Communi t aggre ion.South Korea was not on the list. Years laterAche on admitted that the omission hadbeen an inadvertent one. But the damagewa done. In Pyongyang it was treated asthe green light for invasion. Accordingly,in the early hours of Sunday 25 June 1950,in darkne and driving rain, 90,000 NorthKorean troops, supported by hundreds ofRussian-made T 4 tank, warmed acrosthe 38th Parallel in half a dozen places.

Initially, U concerns were mainly forAmerican national in outh Korea. Thisdeepened after report that North Koreanaircraft had attacked eoul's Kimpo airfield.On 26 June, Presiden t Truman offeredmilitary aid to South Korea and Briti hPrime Mini t r Clement Arlee called theinva ion 'naked aggression' which 'must bech cked.' The United ations pas ed aresolution calling on the North Koreans towithdraw their force from the south. Onlythe Soviet abstain d. A second resolutionpassed on the next day called on member

War In Korea

prompted the double lashing of all aircraftin the hangar, but the storm blew itself outbefore hitting the ship. This allow d thecarrier to reverse course the following dayas Rear Admiral W.G. Andrewes, Secondin-Command Far Ea tern Fleet, had orderedher to return to Japanese waters where newof orth Korea's invasion of the south hadbeen received.

upermarine had recognized this defect andhad prescribed a range oflimit that wouldallow the eafire to continue flying. Oncethey had been exceeded, the aircraft hadto be grounded and returned to the manufacturer for repairs.

On 24 June Triumph depart d Ominato,Japan, bound for Hong Kong. A warningabout the imminence of Typhoon Elsie

Seafire FR.47 VP465 was assigned to No. 804 Squadron aboard HMS Ocean.

although it is pictured here while ashore at Hal Far. The aircraft was struck off

charge in November 1949. Will Blunt Collection

the skin from the frames. This could onlybe det eted by inserting a feeler gaugebetween frame and skin.

The damage caused by an off-centrelanding, exacerbated by the decelerationloading, forced the rear fuselage to whipfrom side to side. The re ult was kinwrinkling on one side, while the frames onthe other were separated from their skins.

140 141

a E MORE WAR o E MORE WAR

Complete with Korean War stripes and RATOG units. this No. 800 Squadron Seafire

FR.47. VP479, departs from HMS Triumph. The aircraft was badly damaged in a

landing accident in April 1950. Although returned to the UK for repairs. it saw no

further service and was scrapped in 1956 after a period in storage. FAAM Yeovilton

The classic landing pose: a Seafire FR.47 of No. 800 Squadron prepares to land on HMS Triumph with everything out and down. FAAM Yeovilton

six Seafires and six Fireflie from attackingshipping in the Taedong estuary. Threeve sels wer heavily damaged by 60lbrockets and cannon fire.

On 15 August, the normal AI and CAPduties were resumed as well as an armedreconnais ance mission to Inchon and theurrounding coast. Triumph then left forasebo, returning to the Korean west coast

after three days to concentrate onpatrolling the Inchon-Kunsan area wherethey operated alongside unit of the USeventh Fleet. No. 800 quad ron ent aflight of Seafires up the coast towards theNorth Korean capital of Pyonyang. Notargets were spotted, although the aircraftwere ubjected to heavy anti-aircraft fire.Seafire strength had now dropped to nineaircraft as a furth r three had uffered rearfuselage damage following off-centrelandings.

On 23 August HMS TriumJ)h arrived atSasebo for rest and repair, leaving three dayslater for another four days of operation.

deck landing. This resulted in anotherSeafire being damaged in an off-centrelanding. The following day TriumJ)hembarked Admiral Andrewes and hi staffand headed for the west coast of Korea toenforce a blockade of the inl ts and islandsthat were unsuitable for warships.

When a eafire flight wa launched fora reconnai ance mis ion over Mokpo andKunsan airfields on 13 August, the pilotfound both deserted following air and seabombardment. They took the opportunityto rake some mall junks with 20mmcannon fire. That afternoon, the Seafiresvisited the port ofInchon, which wa foundto have been badly damaged by US force.The following day, aircraft from Triumphattacked target at the key orth Koreannaval ba e of Chinnampo, following anearly-morning photo reconnaissance runby the ship's eafires. The photographs hadrevealed little shipping in the harbour butthe attacking aircraft still encounteredheavy anti-aircraft fire. This did not prevent

for flight, although No. 800 lost another onthe 28th. A AP was vectored to investigate a radar trace, which turned out to bea flight of Boeing B-29 uperfortres es.Having confirmed that the aircraft werefriendly, the eafires pas ed to the rear ofthe formation only to be engaged by oneof the bomber's gunners. One of the eafirewas hit in the rear fuel tank, which promptlyburst into flames. The pilot rolled thaircraft on it back and bailed out, beingrescued by the destroyer U Eversole.

On 29 july, the carrier returned to Kurefor aircraft maintenance and ship repair.The two damaged eafires were off-loaded,but no replacements were forthcoming andthe squadron's complement of aircraft wasreduced to fourteen. Triumph departed for

asebo on 9 August. During the voyagethree Seafires were catapulted off the calTier,bound for the airfield at Iwakuni. There theyunderwent compas swinging, returning tothe carrier later in the day. While theywere away, the remaining aircraft practised

aircraft's transfer to Unicom for repair.There were more Seafire and Firefly

sorties the following day when anothereafire wa damaged. Its exhau ted pilot

caught the last arrester wire, which sent theaircraft drifting slowly into the barrier. Aonly its propeller assembly was damaged, theaircraft was available for flying the next day.Triumph, on the other hand, was forced towithdraw as the packing in her starboardpropeller shaft gland had been cau ingtrouble. The carrier left on 21 july havingcompleted 140 hours of flying. Repairs weremade at Sasebo where Unicorn transferredseven replacement Seafires and acceptedtwo for repair. Triumph was ready threeday later and departed with her escorts fora position north of Quelpart Island to formpart of TF.77. A before, the Seafires andFireflies undertook CAP aQd antisubmarine patrols, although two Seafireswere damaged during recovery. One landedoff-centre, causing exce sive skin wrinkling,wh ile a second suffered damage 'when thedeck handling party pushed the tail wheelover the edge of the flight deck.

On 26 july TriumJ)h's area of operationsshifted to the east coast, although lack offlyable Seafires meant that o. 827

quadron's Fireflies had to perform bothtasks. After many hours of diligent work,the majority of Seafires were declared ready

that both types resembled the Russian-builtYak-9.

This was the last time that the Britishfleet used Okinawa, as the facilities at

asebo were considered more uitable forthe largest ves Is. Although the repaircarrier HMS Unicom was in-theatre, it wasdecided that her facilitie should be broughtashore to HM Simbang, cmbawang,

ingapore while the hip her elf was to beu ed for replenishment duties to reduce thelogistical strain on the front-line fleet.

On 13 july Triumph ailed from Okinawafor a training programme that concentratedon practising talk-down procedures so thataircraft returning from sorties as dusk fellwould not have to rely on visual signals fromthe deck control officer. The carrierreturned to harbour for a briefing on theproposed US landing at Pohang. It wasintended that the Fireflies would carry outanti-submarine patrols with eafiresproviding patrols over the fleet. But bothtypes were excluded from the strikes as theysuffered from a lack of range. The landingstook place on 18 july. No. 800 Squadron'sstrength was reduced to ten aircraft whenone of its Seafire su tained xtensiveaccidental damage. Landing aboard Tl'iumJ)hlate in the afternoon, the aircraft engagedthe arrester wire off-centre. This causedthe port wing to drop and resulted in the

On 3 july the ships arrived at theirappointed tation and prepared to launchaircraft. The strike group departed in theearly hour of the morning and comprisedtwelve Seafires and nine Fireflies after asterling effort by No. 800 Squadron. Theirtarget was Kaishu, Haeju, airfield, 120 miles(l92km) away. The Seafires were dividedinto three flights numbered 71, 72 and 73.The intention was for 71 Flight to approachfrom the west, closely followed by 73 Flight,then the Fireflie with 72 Fli ht bringingup the rear. As none of the aircraft formingthe primary target were found, the attackersfollowed the usual practice of strafing,bombing and rocketing airfield facilitie .Before launch the pilots had be n warnednot to fly below 600ft (185m) due to thepossibility of debris being thrown up. Butat lea tone Seafire pilot misjudged hisheight and suffered engine damage. Thepilot managed to get his ailing aircraft backto the carrier where he made an emergencylanding, the engine failing completely ontouch-down. Once all the aircraft hadreturned those remaining serviceable wererefuelled and re-armed to enable a series ofcombat air patrols to be mounted in theafternoon.

The following day's strike forcecomprised twelve Fireflies escorted by seven

eafires, an eighth having been forced toreturn to the carrier. Their brief was toattack target of opportunity, whichincluded army bases, trategic buildingsrailway faciliti s and military vehicles in thevicinity of Haeju, Ongkin and Yonan.Coastal anti-aircraft batterie al 0 receivedattention. No aircraft were lost but a Fireflylanded with one undercarriage leg retracted,while a Seafire arrived with fuel streamingfrom a damaged tank. With all aircraftsafely recovered the fleet headed outh, thecrui er and de troyers making for asebo,while Triumph was bound for Okinawa andrefuelling. The carrier stayed in port forrepairs and aircraft maintenance until 9july. It was during thi time that the Seafireand Fireflies received black and white stripesas the Americans had convinced themselves

First Attack on Korea

Navy's Seventh Fleet, TriumJ)h and herconsorts were re-designated a Task Force77.5. During the voyage the carrier flew offsome eafire and Fireflie to enable USp rsonnel to b come familiar with theappearance of the aircraft.

142 143

ONE MORE WAR ONE MORE WAR

The Supermarine Type 224 was to prove a blind alley in fighter development. but it was

still a monoplane without external bracing. which was then quite a novelty. The Type 224

was let down by its inefficient engine. cooling system and fixed trousered undercarriage.

which slowed the aircraft down considerably. Eric Morgan Collection

Seafire xv SW847 displays the early post-war external finish as it awaits its pilot.

The centreline fuel tank is worthy of note. FAAM Yeovilton

estuary, during which a barge was badlydamaged.

As the carrier' aircraft complement hadnow fallen to eleven serviceable aircraft,Admiral Andrewes decided to withdraw asher replacement, HMS Theseus, was duewithin the week. Triumph therefore reached

asebo on 21 eptem ber for temporaryrepairs before returning to Britain. he wasemployed on trooping duties from ovember 1952, a role she would retain untildi posal in 1981. o. 800 quadron wasdisbanded on 10 November 1950 and didnot reform until August 1951, when it wasre-equipped with another Supermarineproduct, the jet-powered Attacker.

Although the squadron had b n themain front-line Seafire operator, there w re

ther units still flying the type includingRoyal Navy Volunteer Reserve quad ron .The first was No. 1830 Squadron, whichformed at Abbot inch on 15 August 1947.Initially equipped with three eafire XVIIsand three Firefly I , it was assigned toundertake fighter and anti- ubmarinemi ions, although the eafires weredispen ed with in 1948. o. 1 31 quad ron

Displaying the markings of No. 1832 Squadron. a reserve unit. this Seafire XVII was based at St Merryn. After service with

another reserve unit. No. 1833 Squadron at Bramcote. the aircraft was scrapped in 1956. FAAM Yeovilton

Landings at Inchon

longer viable, it was decided that Triumphshould be withdrawn and she arrived atSasebo the following day. The carrierremained in harbour for the next three daysto enable the eafires to be repaired inpr paration for the vital US landings atInchon.

TF91, still commanded by AdmiralAndrewe , was a igned to maintain thewest coast blockade, to carry out reconnaissanc mi sions before the landing,provide air cover for units in transit to theInchon area and to carry out interdictionmissions during the operation. Operation

hromite began on 12/13 September witha bombardment of North Korean positionsby US and British warships and massive airsupport from USN carriers. Triumphlaunched her first sortie on the morning of13 September, the objective being Haeju.

o worthwhile targets were found and theSeafire and Fireflies turned their attentionto Chinnampo where junks and barge werestrafed and attacked with rockets. An antiaircraft position was also de troyed a theaircraft prepared to leave the area. Althoughreturned safely to the carrier, a further

eafire wa badly damaged after a heavylanding. verall, the landings at Inchonwere ucces ful. The orth Korean weretaken completely by surprise and subsequ ntly driven back beyond the 38thParallel. Over the following few daysTriumph's aircraft flew armed reconnaissance orties in the Haeju area duringwhich gun positions and junks weredestroyed.

In the early hours of 17 September a pairof North Korean aircraft attacked UNshipping off the coa t at Wolmi-do. Thecruiser Rochester was struck by a bomband HMS Jamaica was hit by cannon fir ,although the ship's anti-aircraft guns shotdown one of the attacker. Triumph'standing flight was later scrambled twice butboth alerts proved to be fal e alarm. Overthe following two days the eafire flewfurther armed reconnai sance orties duringwhich they attacked shipping. But it wasnot without co t. One aircraft required anew propeller unit despite a gentle impactwith the afety barrier, while a econd wabadly damaged when it too hit the barrier.On 20 September two of the remainingoperational Seafire undertook an armedreconnaissance mission over Chinnampo

free of its mounts, cau ing exten ive lowerfuselage damage. After launch the aircraftlanded-on safely, although it was no longerfit for operations. On 5 September, Triumphailed for the east coast to relieve U

Seventh Fleet carriers that had beenwithdrawn for re t and refitting. Three dayslater the ta k force wa 50 miles ( Okm)from the North Korean port of Wonsan.The fir t trike group of ix Seafires and asimilar number of Fireflies strafed androcketed the port and its surroundingfacilities, cau ing evere damage to railfacilities. Another six eafires and fourFir flies attacked the marshalling yards atKowon and Yonghung and destroyednumerous boxcar. ne Seafire was badlydamaged when its port undercarriage failedto lower on landing, while another had tobe abandoned by its pilot when the arresterhook failed to lower. These losses reducedthe squadron's strength to ten aircraft.

Bad weather on 9 September reducedthe number of mis ion to one. A pair ofSeafires and two Fireflies attacked Koryoairfield with rocket and cannon fire,cau ing considerable damage. Duringmaintenance in preparation for the nextday's flying, a further four eafires werefound to have been damaged beyond flyablelimits. As this made o. 00 Squadron no

During the voyage there was deck landingtraining for three new eafire pilots andthree others returning to the type. Yetanother eafire was damaged on landing byone of the tyros, resulting in all thenewcomers being ent for further trainingashore. nce on station the Seafires wereback on AP duty to prevent a sneak attackby Korean torp do boats, while the Firefliesundertook reconnaissance and attackmissions over the harbour areas.

It was while the strike force was returningat the completion of a mission that a Fireflylanded with a faulty arrester hook, whi hled to an impact with the crash barrier. Thiscaused one of its propeller blades to breakoff and fly into the operation room, killing

o. 800 quadron's CO, It dr I.M.Maclachlan R . He was buried at sea withfull military honours that evening, beingsucceeded by Lt T. D. Handley R . Back inSasebo th following day Triumph was ableto replenish her air group with six eafir sand eight Fireflies, transferred from Unicorn,which had arrived from Pusan a few hoursearlier.

Anoth r round of AP and armedreconnaissance mi sions began on 3September. Two armed junk were destroyed, but during the CAP's launch thebelly fuel tank on one of the Seafires pulled

144 145

ONE MORE WAR

France Buys Griffon-Seafir

The los of 0 many Seafir m ant tho l

Arromanches had no air wing. t thbeginning of 1949, therefor, L'Aeronauciqu

avale purchased Seafire XVs to enabl Icarrier participate in a planned Texercise at the end of the year. A b f, r I

the aircraft were as embled at Lee- n- I ntand all were d livered during June. ingGriffon-powered, these replacement ir r l

presented different problem to their il l.

The engine torque wa in the pp itdirection to that of the Merlin-p w r JSeafires and several were damag d d Iringthe first few week of p rati n. During lhearly months of 1950, France' oth r rrithe Di:xmunde, was de patched t thto collect Grumman Hellcats and H Iklias part of a Mutual A sistanc P k gMeanwhile, 0 12Fparticipat da pial n Jin Exerci e Symphony. This repre nt Jone of the last appearance of thunder Western Union- AT au ithe number of accident involving thmeant that the last flyabl air r ft \withdrawn by the end of 1951.

While in French Navy servi e thfires equipped two main unit, No iF no

o 12F. The former had be n r f, rmed inOctober 1945 at Cuer . Before receiving itaircraft, some of its pilots took part in a Fie tAir AnTI-run experience programme, whichenabled them to fly both the eafir andthe Firefly. The unit was initially quippedwith C.900s, French-built Focke-WulfFw 190s. A move to Hyeres in Decemb r1945 was undertaken to prepare for thefirst batch of Spitfires, which were u ed fortraining purpo es from the beginning of1946. By April 1948 the Florille received itcomplement of Seafire and was then ableto begin deck landing training on theairfi Id. Some pitfire were retained forgeneral flying training and to act asadversari s in combat flight training. Theuse of Rocket-Assisted Take-Off Gear,which had also been practised, was quicklydi continued as the French regarded it asunreliable and hazardous. No IF wasd c1ared ready for operations at the end of1946, having completed a full range offlying training exercise, including 306 decklandings at Hyeres.

By 1947 the unit was operating twentyfour eafires, the last remaining Spitfireshaving been retired. The quad ron beganoperation aboard An-omanches in Spring1948. While the ship was cruising in the

option impossible and the air group proceeded to lose aircraft at a faster rate thanexpected. To make these losses good theFrench bought a further sixty-five eafireIlIs at a knock-down price of £80 each.Thirty were to be delivered as completeaircraft with the others hipped as pares,being marked 'Usable by the French avyOnly'. The first batch came complete withdocumentation, while the remainder, beingundocumented, were supposed to have beenshipped in crates. But as the time and costinvolved was considered too great theFrench decided to fly them home. Airframesand engine, which had been intended forspares only, were determined as being fullyfit for further ervice.

Du to the number of eafire accident ,Admiral Jozan appointed a committee ofinve tigation. Starting work in January1949, it determined that the airframes werebasically tired, that the engines needed afull overhaul and that the systems shouldbe replaced or ov rhauJed. These were,however, aircraft that had been destined forwartime service and were expected to havea life of 240 flying hour. These aircraft hadcomfortably exceeded thi . The admiraltherefore called for each surviving airframeto be fully stripped down and rebuilt,incorporating repair and strengthening asrequired. The en ines were to be similarlyoverhauled to re-life them.

Seafire XV PR497 is surrounded by rescuers after crash landing aboard HMS

Illustrious. The aircraft was on the strength of No. 767 Squadron. normally based

at Milltown. It was withdrawn from service after this accident. FAAM Yeovilton

Mureaux, which had been cho en as thereception point due to the location thereof orth American Aircraft workshops.The ailframes were reconditioned, cameraequipment mounts were in tailed and theaircraft test flown before the appropriatecolour cheme was applied.

The aircraft were deployed to Florille 1.F,o 4S, Escad,-illes de Servitude, No 10 ,the

test centre at t Raphael, 0 54 , theschool of aircraft embarkation at Hyeres,together with the aval School atRochefort. Some Spitfires were retained foruse as target tugs, being operated byNos is and 3S. The French Navy collectedArromanches from Port mouth in August1946. The loan was subject to restrictionson the carrier's use in Indo-China whereFrance was desperately trying to reclaim itscolonial territories in what i now Vietnam.En route to France the carrier - nowdesignated avale Aeronaurique Group o.2 - and her escorts undertook a erie oftraining exercises.

The French pilot encountered similarproblems with the eafire to those experienced by their Fleet Air Arm counterparts.

ose-over were a continuous hazard aftera hard and fast landing. Unlike the RoyalNavy, which a igned aircraft to pilot onan availability basis, the French avypreferred to allocate an aircraft to a pecificpilot. But a urplu of pilots rendered thisMany post-war Seafires ended their lives in storage at Stretton. which is where this

Seafire XVII. SX358. is pictured awaiting disposal. CP Russell Smith

These aircraft of No. 807 Squadron await inspection. The leading Seafire XVII. SX200.

later moved to No. 767 Squadron. in whose service it crashed on landing in March 1948.

BBA Collection

Seafire F.45 LA488 displays the codes of No. 771 Squadron based at Lee-on-Solent. After

later service with No. 773 Squadron. the aircraft was damaged in a crash-landing in May

1950. FAAM Yeovilton

French Seafires Delivered

Foreign Seafire Operators

The Fleet Air Arm was not the only eafireoperator, for many urplu airframes foundtheir way to other air arms. Among themwas France's L'Aeronaucique avale, whichwas in it infancy during November 1942.Having no aircraft carriers and little equipment, crews and aircraft were concentratedin Morocco. During the fight againstGermany these units flew Spitfire along idetheir air force counterparts. Experience ofthe Spi tfire during the war led to theacquisition of Mk Vs immediately afterwards and a contract for the supply of

pitfire IXs was agreed in November 1945.These were seen as r presenting an interimmove as the French Navy wanted an aircraftcarrier and the aircraft to operate from it.

The former need would be ati fied by thearrival of HM Colossus, which wastransferred on a five-year loan to the French

avy a the Anomanches in August 1946.The aircraft came from Royal avy stocks,the first batch of fifty Seafire IlIs beingecur d in February 1946, although forty

eight would actually be delivered. Groupsof avale pilots arrived at L e-on- olentto collect their aircraft in batches of six,although thi number varied according toserviceability. The first batch departed on15 March 1946 with the remainderfollowing at five day intervals. Lt Cdr P.J.Hutton RN flew some of the aircraft to

formed as an RNVR unit in June 1947. Ithad seen active service in World War IIand in its new guise at Stretton it operateda mix of Seafire XVs and XVlIs, whichwere later replaced by ea Furies andAttackers. Another wartime veteran wasNo. 1832 Squadron, which reformed atCulham in July 1947 with Seafire Ills,although these were soon replaced by sixSeafire F. 46s, and six Seafire XVs with MkXVlls replacing the F,46s in 1950. Latercame Sea Furies and Attackers. o. 18 3Squadron reformed at Bramcote in August1947 with six Seafire XVlIs, these beingsupplemented by five eafire XVs. The

eafires were replaced in tum by the eaFury an I the Attacker. All RNVR unitwere disbanded on 10 March 1957 as partof that year's defence cuts, which alsoaffected the RAF's auxiliary squadrons.

146 147

Atlantic and Mediterranean the eafiresundertook combat exercises against variousFrench Air Force unit. At least threeaircraft were damaged in landing mishapsbut then, on 28 June 1948, came a moreserious accident when a Seafire and pilotwere lost during a mock diving attack on aSunderland flying boat of No 7F. TheSeafire's engine failed and uch was thespeed of the dive that the pilot was unableto escape. Arromanches completed her firstcruise in July 1948 when the Seafirereturned to their land base of Hyeres.

As part of all. expansion plan, No IF wasdivided in two in August, with the secondpart becoming No 12F, also Seafireequipped. During that month No 1F lostanother three aircraft. In one accident, thepilot was lucky to escape after anotherengine failed in a dive. This time there wasenough height available for the aircraft topull out and enable the pilot to bail out.At the end of October Arromanches leftToulon for Indo-China, dropping anchorin the Saigon river on 29 November.Aboard were the Seafires of No IF andDouglas Dauntless dive-bombers of No 4F.

Indo-China Operations

The air group undertook strike missions inthe Tonkin area, but the number of aircraftavailable dropped steadily due to accidentsand lack of spares. This forced the carrierto return home in January. By mid-June1949, the Seafire 1Il was considered nolonger viable and the unit was re-equippedwith Mk XVs. The older aircraft wererelegated to training duties, initially in theair and later for ground use only. The arrivalof the newer Seafires allowed Arromanchesto take part in Exerci e Verity in July.Further exercises in October and ovember1949 (Primagas) and December (Tenragas)kept the carrier and crew fully occupied. Butthese exercises also marked the end ofSeafire operations for the Arromanches.Many of pilots had gone to the USA fortraining on the Grumman Hellcat. No IFbegan to run down its operations yet it stillmanaged to lose a Seafire in a landingaccident at Toulon on 2 March 1950.

Although No 12F had gained a cadre ofexperienced Seafire pilots on its creationin August 1948, four aircraft were lostduring its first four months of operation,reducing its strength to twelve. Theinventory changed in June 1949 when sixSeafire XVs were added. This, however, did

ONE MORE WAR

not spell the end of the Seafire III as twelvewere retained for conversion and trainingpurposes. 0 12F also served aboardArromanches, gaining the dubious honourof suffering the last crash of the type aboardship when a Seafire XV was written off on8 March 1950. Given the overall lossessuffered by L' Aeronautique Navale, it washardly surprising that the Seafire waswithdrawn from service to be replaced bysurplus US Navy aircraft like the Hellcatand Corsair.

Burmese Seafires

Like many other countries in the regionformerly occupied by the Japanese, Burmawas beset by insurgents determined toundermine and topple the government.Ranged against the incumbent administration were groups from the ChineseNationalists, the Burma Separatist Movement, various Russian-inspired Communistorganizations, to say nothing of variousbandit groups active in the hilly regions ofthe country. Desperate to acquire air powerto support its frequently beleagu r d groundforces, Burma looked to Britain. As thecountry's finances were under pressure,Burma could only afford refurbished secondhand aircraft. The fir t were SupermarineSpitfire XVllls, whi h were followed by abatch of twenty Seafire XVs. Thesemachines, like the Spitfires before them,were refurbished by Airwork Ltd at Gatwick. As their naval features were notrequired, the arrester hooks, catapult spoolsand folding wings were removed, the latterbeing replaced by spare components fromredundant Spitfire XVllls. Delivered viaMalta in 1951, the Seafires were usedextensively in the ground-attack role,operating with both rockets and bombsagainst targets often hidden by the junglecanopy. The Seafires remained in serviceuntil they withdrawn in 1954. They werer placed by Hawker Sea Furies.

Seafires for Canada

The Royal Canadian Navy's use of theSeafire came almost by default. On 15 June1945 No. 803 quad ron formed at Arbroathwith twenty-five Seafire Ills, being intendedfor service as part of the 19th Carrier AirGroup aboard all. Implacable class aircraftcarrier. The Japane e urrender curtailedthese plans and the squadron remained at

148

Arbroath to exchange it Merlin-poweredaircraft for Seafire XVs in August. Althoughstill operating under RN auspices, the RoyalCanadian Navy assumed control over theunit on 24 January 1946 when the Colossusclass fleet carrier HMCS Warrior wacommissioned. HMC Wan-ior had beenlaunched in May 1945, although completion was delayed by the war's end.Instead of being left with another carrierswinging at anchor th Admiralty approvedthe Warrior's loan to the RCN. With No.803 Squadron, together with the Fireflyequipped No. 825, aboard, the carrier leftPort mouth for Halifax on 23 March. Eightdays later she arrived in Canadian waters,where the squadrons undertook all. intensivework-up. Th group reappeared in May1947 when the Warrior's air wing was redesignated, but this newly-renamed organization did not stay long as the carrier sailedfor Belfast in January to deliver stores andmanpower for HMC Magnificent, whichwas soon to be commissioned. On 1 March1948, Warrior arrived in Portsmouth to beformally returned to the Royal avy threeweeks later.

The Majestic class light fleet carrierMagnificent was based on the successful

olossus class but featured numerousimprovements, the most significant ofwhich was the ability of the lifts to acceptheavier aircraft. As the ships were beingcompleted ju t a the war was ending, theAdmiralty had no use for them, preferringinstead to lend or sell them to allied navies.HMCS Magnificent was launched inNovember 1944, although she was notcommissioned until April 1948 whenCommodore H.G. de Wolf CBE DSO DSC

RCN transferr d his broad pennant fromWarrior to his new command. Sea-goingacceptance trial were undertaken duringMay with aircraft loaned by the Fleet AirArm to exercise the arre ting and launchingequipment and help train deck-handlingpersonnel. At the completion of these trialsthe Magnificent tied up alongside the jettyat RNA Sydenham where the aircraft ofthe 19th CAG were winched aboard, aswere No. 806 Squadron's mixedcomplement of Sea Vampires, Sea Hornetsand ea Furie . They were bound for theU A where they were scheduled to takepart in a series of air displays. The carriersailed for Canada on 25 May.

A few days later the aircraft and excessstores were landed at Halifax before thecarrier began a short shake-down cruisedesigned to reveal any outstanding defects.

ONE MORE WAR

Seafire XV SW909 was assigned to No.1 Training Air Group. It was badly

damaged in a landing accident in February 1948. although it was later repaired

and re-assigned to No. 803 Squadron. CP Russell Smith

PR458 pictured while serving with No. 803 Squadron. After service with Nos 803

and 883 Squadrons. the Seafire was withdrawn in January 1950. CP Russell Smith

Seafire PR479 served with both Nos 803 and 883 Squadrons before being struck

off charge in June 1949. CP Russell Smith

149

Back at sea on 10 August, Magnificent reembarked the 19th CAG for a period ofintensive flying, during which 171 decklandings were made. Two aircraft were lost.Magnificent was then tasked with carryingout a eries of simulated strikes on theMagdalan Islands at the beginning ofSeptember. By the middle of the month theaircraft had flown to RCNAS Shearwaterwhile the vessel herself docked at St John,N w Brunswick.

The aircraft returned at the end of themonth, enabling the carrier to join thedestroyers Nootka, Haida and Swanseato form Task Group 211.2 at the beginning of October. The subsequent cruisetook the group to Quebec, Seven Islands,

harlottetown and Sydney, Au traliafor exercises with ships from otherCommonwealth navie . Returning home intime for Christmas, the Magnificent was atsea again in early February 1949 to ferryRCN Firefly Mk 4 aircraft to Britain to beexchanged for a similar number of Mk 5splus eafire to replace 10 es. During thereturn voyage Magnificent ran into roughweather, which resulted in some damagerequiring dockyard attention. After repairsat Halifax the carrier, accompanied byNootka and Haida, ailed on 5 March asTask Group 215.8. Its mission was to carryout exercises in the Caribbean, thehighlight being a simulated long-rangeattack on the cruiser HMS]amaica. At thecompletion of these ex rcis s, Magnificentreturned to anada and the air wingdeparted for Shearwater on 7 April, whilethe vessel docked at Halifax the next day.

Sea-going operations resumed at thebeginning of May, the air wing rejoiningthe carrier soon after departure fromHalifax. These manoeuvres came to all.abrupt halt when Magnificent ran agroundoff Port Mouton, Nova Scotia, on 4 June.Aided by escorting destroyers, the carrierwas pulled off and proceeded to St Johnsfor repairs. As they were quite extensive, arefit was also undertaken, keepingMagnificent in dock until October. Then,accompanied by Haida and Swansea, thecarrier undertook a full work-up off NovaScotia during which the fleet was divertedto help find the crew of a crashed USAF8-29. No trace was found despite all.extensive search. During this time, the hipspaid goodwill visits to Cuba and Puerto Ricobefore returning to Halifax in December.En route, the 19th CAG flew off toShearwater.

ONE MORE WAR

The lAC also purchased a handful of Spitfire TR.9s for

conversion and refresher purposes. Fortunately, at least

one of these machines has survived. CP Russell Smith

Irish Air Corps Seafires

Enough to make a preservationist weep! Retired Irish Air

Corps (lAC) Seafire Ills await scrapping after spares

recovery. CP Russell Smith

The order covering the delivery of twelve Seafire Ills for the Irish Air Corps was confirmed on 31 August 1946. As the aircraft wereIntended for land operations, arrester hooks were removed together with other naval equipment. The aircraft were therefore similar toSpitfire Mk Vs. Serialled 146 to 157, the first examples were accepted by an Irish Department of Defence official at South Marston on24 January 1947. Delivery took place on 17 February. The final aircraft arrived at Baladonnel on 27 September. These machines,together with a handful of Spitfire TR.9s, remained in Irish service until their withdrawal in 1955.

VP464 displays the codes of Bramcote-based No. 1833 Squadron, having previously served with No. 800

Squadron. The aircraft was sold for scrap in August 1956. FAAM Yeovilton

Another Canadian Seafire III operatorwas No. 883 Squadron, which receivedsixteen aircraft at Arbroath on 18September 1945. This unit had previouslybeen designated to join the 10th CarrierAir Group for operations with the BritishPacific Fleet. With the surrender of Japanand the consequent difficulty of retainingsufficient Canadian personnel, it wasdisbanded at Machrihanish on 23 February1946. A second attempt to activate theunit as part of the RCN was undertaken on15 May 1947 at Dartmouth when itreceived twelve of the thirty-five eafireXVs delivered to the service. No. 883 actedas the alternate operating unit aboardHMCS Warrior, while No. 803 Squadronwas ashore. Assigned to the 18th CAG onits formation, the squadron retained itsSeafires until September 1948 whenHawker ea Furies arrived. The last SeafireXV was struck off charge in April 1954.

Considering its distinguished heritage,the Supermarin afire promised motethan it actually delivered. But then it hadnever been designed to endure the roughand tumble of operations from aircraftcarriers, and weaknesses that were nevercompletely eliminated meant that morew re lost to deck accidents than enemyaction.

Even so, the aircraft had its moments ofglory such as its participation in the Alliedinvasion of North Africa, the Salernolandings and providing combat air patrolsfor the British Pacific Fleet in its prosecutionof the war against Japan. After the war,Seafires filled the gap between the departureof US aircraft supplied under the LendLease arrangement and the arrival of thehighly capable Hawker Sea Fury and thefirst of the jets. As this included supportingBritish naval operations in the openingmonths of the Korean war, the Seafire wasable to go out in style. Indeed, the Mk 47took the Spitfire family to its ultimateexpression.

HMCS Magnificent prepares to leave harbour. BBA Collection.

Two No. 803 Squadron Seafire XVs - PR470, nearest the camera, and PR461 - are

captured on camera at lee-on-Solent during the unit's working-up period.

BBA Collection

As the original scheme applied to Royal Canadian Navy IRCN) aircraft was rather

dark, the titling was not particularly visible, so the RCN applied a large maple

leaf marking to the fin of PS470 to confirm its ownership. BBA Collection

750 757

APPENDIX I

Seafire Production and Contracts

Spitfire I, Admiralty trainers, two aircraftSpitfire I, two aircraft fitted with 'A'-frameSpitfire II, two aircraft

pitfir VB, forty-four aircraftpitfire lIB, three aircraft fitted with 'A'

frameSpitfire VB, fifty-five aircraft fitted with'A'-frame

Contract B9 1687/39, Type340 Seafire IB:LMB328 to MB375, converted by Airervice TrainingX 79 to X989

PAlOO to PAI29

Contract BI9713/39, towl of 202 Type357/375 eafire II airframes to be built by

upermarine:MA970 to MA999MBI13 to MB15MB178 to MB222MB235 to MB281MB29 to MB326

on tract B124305/40 and Contract Acft/2605/C23(c),ord red 25 November 1942,total of 110 Type 357/375/358 Seafire II /III airframe to be built by Westland Aircraft:

LR631 to LR667LR6 0 to LR 712LR725 to LR764

Contract Acft/2605/C23(c), ordered 25November 1942, total of 204 Type 358

eafire III airframes to be built by We t1andAircraft:

F514 to F455F4 0 to F526F531 to F570F575 to F607F624 to F665

Contract B124305/40 and Contract Acft/2605/ .23(c), ordered 25 November 1942,total of 90 Type 358 eafire 1Il airframesto be built by Westland Aircraft:

LR765 to LR769LR783 to LR820LR835 to LR881

ontract B124305/40 and Contract Acft/2605/C23(c), ordered 5 January 1943, totalof60Type357/375 eafire Mk II airframesto be built by upermarine:

NM910 to NM949NM963 to NM982

ormaet B124305/40 and Contract Acft/2605/C23(c), ordered 5 January 1943, totalof 200 Type 358 Seafire LIII airframes tobe built Westland Aircraft:

M984 to M999112to 157169 to 214227 to 2702 3 to 330

Contract Acft/2777/C23(c), ordered 15January 1943, 250 Type 358 eafire III airframes to be built by Cunliffe-Owen:

N333 to 367N379 to N 418N431 to N 476N488 to N 528N542 to NN586

NN599toN 641

Contract Acft/2901/ .23(c), ordered 8March 1943, three Type 377 Seafire XVairframes to be built by Supermarine:

NS487NS490

493

ontract Acft/2901/C23(c), ordered 24May 1943, three Type 377 eafire XV airframes to be built by upermarine:

PK240PK243PK245

ontract Acft/2605/C23(c), ordered 17July 1943, 250 Type358 eafire III/LI II airframe to be built by We t1and Aircraft:

PP921 to PP957PP969 to PP999PR115 to PR156PR170 to PR215PR228 to PR271PR285 to PR344

152

Contract Acft/2777/C23(c), ordered 17July 1943, 150 Type 377 Seafire XV airframes to be built by Cunliffe-Owen:

PR33 to PR379PR391 to PR436PR449 to PR479PR492 to PR522

Contract Acft/2777/CB.23(c), ordered 14August 1943, fifty Type 358 Seafire Llllairframes to be built by Cunliffe-Owen:

PX913 to PX 962

Contract Acft/2605/C23(c), ordered 18January 1944, 300 Type 358 Seafire IIIairframes to be built by Westland Aircraft:

RX156 to RX194RX210 to RX256RX26 to RX313RX326 to RX358RX373 to RX415RX42 to RX469RX481 to RX530

Contract Acft/2777/C23(c), ordered 12February 1944, 270 Type 358 Seafire IIIairframe to be built by Cunliffe-Owen:

SP116 to SP168SP181 to P223SP236 to SP279SP293 to P327SP341 to SP 80SP393 to P438SP453 to P461; built a Mk XVII fromSP323

Contract B124305/40 and ContractAcft/2605/ .23(c), ordered 23 February1944, 202 Type 77 Seafire XV airframeto be built by Westland Aircraft:

SR446 to R493R516 to R547R568 to R611R56 to R645

Contract Acft/2605/C23 (c), ordered 3April 1944, 500 Type 377 Seafire XV airframes to be built by Westland Aircraft:

SW781 to SW828W844 to SW879

W896 to SW936SW951 to SW993

Xl11 to X139SX152 to X201

X220 to X256SX271 toSX316

X332 to SX370X386 to X432

SX451 to SX490SX503 to SX546; aircraft completed asF.XVll from SW986 - see below forcontract detail

Contract Air/3853/C23(c), ordered 3 April1944, 213 Type 395 Seafire XVII airframesto be built by Westland Aircraft

ontraet cancelled

ontract B981687/39, ordered 15 July 1944,three Type 388 Seafire F. 45 airframe tobe built by Vickers Armstrong:

TM379TM383TM389

SEAFIRE PRODUCTION AND CONTRACTS

Contract Acft/5176/C23(c), ordered 12March 1945, two Type396 Seafang Mk 32airframes to be built by upermarine:

VB893VB895

Contract Acft/5794/C23 (c) and ContractAcft/5794/CB.5(c), ordered 3 April 1946,sixty-four Type 388 Seafire FR. 47 airframesto be built by Supermarine:

VP427 to VP465VP471 to VP495

Contract 6/Acft/636/CB.5(b), ordered 25September 1946, ninety-two Type 388 eafire FA7 airframes to be built by Supermarine

VR961 to VR998VSI07 to V 146VS152 to V 165; cancelled from VR973

153

Contract B981687/39 and Contract Acft/1951/ .23(c), total of seventy-five Type388 eafire FA5 airframes to be built byVickers Armstrong:

LA428 to LA457LA480 to LA519LA536 to LA540

ontract B981687/39 and Contract Acft/1951/ .23(c), total of twenty-four Type3 8 Seafire FA6/FR. 46 airframe to be builtby Vickers Armstrong:

LA541 to LA564

on tract Acft/5794/C23 (c), total of fiftyType 388 Seafire FA7 airframes to be builtby Vickers Armstrong:

PS93 to P 9 7; only PS944 to PS957built

FLEET AIR ARM SEAFIRE UNITS

APPENDIX II

Fleet Air ArDl Seafire Units

Squadron Variant Code Dates Example Remarks

700 Seafire IB 9/45 NX957Seafire IIC 11/45-12/45 NM942Seafire III 2/45-2/46 NN514

Seafire F.45 -/45-/45 No. 736 Squadron based at St Merryn was the operator of Seafire XVII SX311. Under tow: Seafire XVII SX137 is currently preserved at the Fleet Air Arm

Seafire XV LOZ 3/46-7/46 SR458 The aircraft later served with Nos 799,1832 and 1833 Squadrons before its Museum at Yeovilton. It served with Nos 1831, 759 and 764 Squadrons before

Seafire XVII 9/45-11/45 SX125 retirement in July 1952. FAAM Yeovilton retiring in 1959. FAAM Yeovilton

703 Seafire XVII 011/LP 8/47-8/49 SX360 Service trials unitSeafire F.45 12/45-46 LA496

706 Seafire III 3/45-11/45 LR789 BPF conversion schoolSeafire XV 1/46-7/46 Squadron Variant Code Dates Example Remarks

708 Seafire 1B 5/45-6/45 MB357 Firebrand tactical trials unitSeafire IIC 5/45-6/45 MB264 Seafire XVII 112/GN 4/49-5/50 SX163

Seafire III 5/45-8/45 NN575 738 Seafire XVII 164/CW 5/50-9/51 SP341 52nd training air group

709 Seafire III S5N 9/44-8/45 NF493 Ground attack school Seafire F.46 5/50-8/50 LA564

Seafire XV 11/45-1/46 SR604 741 Seafire III 2/47-11/47 NN241 Operational flying school

Seafire F.45 S5A -/45-1/46 LA449 744 Seafire III 5/46-5/46 RX335 Joint A/S school

715 Seafire IB 8/44-/45 PAllS School of air combat 746 Seafire XVII 12/45-12/45 SX164 Night fighter dev Sqdn

Seafire III S4B 8/44-12/45 NF551 748 Spitfire I 10/42-4/43 X4270 Fighter pool squadron

Seafire XVII S4H 8/44-12/45 SX125 Spitfire VA 2/43-7/44 R7305

718 Seafire IIC G3C 7/45-10/45 NM924 School of air reconnaissance Spitfire VB 3/45-2/46 P8708 Hooked

Seafire III G3R 6/44-10/45 NF634 Seafire IB 6/43-2/46 NX918

Spitfire PR.XIII G3K 6/44-10/45 R7333 Seafire IIC SlG 3/43-2/46 MA977

Seafire III 8/46-9/46 RX300 Seafire conversion squadron Seafire III S7A 11/45-2/46 RX217

Seafire XV -/46-3/47 LR876 751 Seafire XV 7/47-8/47 PR401 Radar trials unit

719 Seafire IB 6/44-12/44 NX891 School of air combat 757 Seafire IIC 6/44-6/44 LR750 Operational training unit

Seafire IIC -/44-12/44 NM918 Seafire III P40 5/45-1/46 NN200

Spitfire VB 6/44-8/44 BM371 759 Spitfire I J 6/40-8/44 X4337 NO.1 Naval Air Fighter School

Spitfire VB 6/44-12/44 BL628 Hooked Spitfire II 8/43-10/43 P7786

721 Seafire III -/46-/47 General service unit Spitfire VA 5/43-10/44 X4987

Seafire XV 11/46-11/47 SW854 Spitfire VB 5/43-10/44 AD536

727 Seafire XVII 12/46-2/47 SX365 Fleet requirements unit Seafire IB 8/43-1/45 MB328

728 Seafire LlIC M8A 1/45-1/46 MB281 Fleet requirements unit Seafire IIC 5/44-2/45 MB303

Seafire III M8L 7/45-7/46 NF521 Seafire III Y6F 12/45-2/46 PP999

Seafire XV 9/46-9/48 PR495 Seafire XV 2/46-2/46

Seafire XVII 504/HF 5/48-3/52 SP327 Seafire XVII 179/CW 8/51-7/54 SX250

731 Seafire IB E3Y 5/44-2/45 MB335 Deck landing training school Seafire F.47 162/CU 8/52-11/53 VP493

Seafire IIC -/45-2/45 MB312 760 Seafire III S 10/45-1/46 PP929 No.2 Naval Air Fighter School

733 Seafire III 10/46-12/46 Fleet requirements unit 761 Spitfire I F 9/42-7/44 AR238 NO.2 Naval Air Fighter School

Seafire XV 1/47-12/47 SW878 Spitfire VA 4/43-1/45 N3281

736 Seafire IB AC-E 5/43-8/44 NX942 School of air combat Spitfire VB G1U 4/43-1/45 AB201

Seafire III 8/44-2/46 NN511 Spitfire VB 11/43-2/45 AA904 Hooked

Spitfire VA 3/44-8/44 R7202 Spitfire PR.XIII 3/44-6/44 W3831

Seafire XV 162/JB 4/46-6/48 SW852 Seafire IB G1A 4/43-3/45 NX597

Seafire XVII 197/JB 1/46-4/51 SX237 Seafire IIC 7/44-8/45 LR647

Seafire F.46 S5A 1/46-12/46 LA449 Seafire III G3C 4/44-1/46 RX288

Seafire III YOH 3/45-5/45 NF586 'B' Flight [bar the zero] Seafire XV 7/45-1/46 PR339

Seafire XV 7/45-8/45 Seafire XVII 11/45-1/46 SX125

737 Seafire XV 4/49-1/50 SR603 52nd training air group Spitfire F.16 7/45-7/45 RW376

154 155

FLEET AIR ARM SEAFIRE NITS FLEET AIR ARM SEAFIRE UNITS

Squadron Variant Code Dates Example Remarks

762 Spitfire I 2/43-6/43 X4657 Advanced flying training school764 Seafire XVII -/45-8/45 User trials unit766 Seafire III 16J 8/46-9/47 NN497 Operational flying school

Seafire XV 109/MV 6/47-11/51 PR497Seafire XVII 122/LM 7/47-11/52 SW989

767 Seafire III IT3E 3/46-6/47 PR317 Deck landing training schoolSeafire XV 109/MV 5/46-2/52 PR497Seafire F.46 129NL 3/50-7/50 LA561

768 Spitfire VA 7/43-2/44 X4846 Deck landing training schoolSpitfire VB 10/42-2/45 X4172 HookedSeafire IB 7/43-2/45 PA124Seafire IIC 1/44-4/46 LR647Seafire III L2T 6/44-4/46 NN172 No. 736 Squadron based at St Merryn was the operator of Seafire XVII SX311. Under tow: Seafire XVII SX137 is currently preserved at the Fleet Air ArmSeafire XV 12/48-3/49 SW795 The aircraft later served with Nos 799.1832 and 1833 Squadrons before its Museum at Yeovilton. It served with Nos 1831. 759 and 764 Squadrons before

770 Seafire IIC 9/43-9/43 LR692 Target tow unit retirement in July 1952. FAAM Yeovilton retiring in 1959. FAAM YeoviltonSeafire IIC D8R 5/45-10/45 MA970Spitfire 5/45-7/45

771 Seafire III GP9L 3/46-1/47 NN545 Fighter direction school Squadron Variant Code Dates Example RemarksSeafire XV GP9K 11/46-1/51 PR402Seafire F.45 560/LP 12/47-9/50 LA438 Seafire XV 9/44-6/46 SR447Seafire F.46 5/47-12/47 Seafire XVII 4/45-1/48 SP348

772 Seafire III 09A 3/46-8/46 NF450 Fleet requirements unit Seafire F.45 3/46-2/48 LA442773 Seafire XV 510/LP 1/5G-3/50 PR368 Fleet requirements unit Seafire F.47 5/47-9/49 VP428775 Spitfire I 6/43-6/43 P9311 Fleet requirements unit Seafire IB 6/44-10/44 NX885 'X' Flight

Spitfire VC 6/43-6/43 JK163 Seafire IIC 6/44-10/44 LR651Seafire IIC 8/44-11/45 LR696 Seafire III 6/44-2/45 NF601

776 Seafire IIC 5/45-10/45 NM973 Fleet requirements unit 790 Spitfire VB 2/45-2/45 AD426 Fighter direction school777 Seafire XV 5/45-7/45 PK245 Fleet requirements unit Seafire IB 3/45-3/45 NX907

Seafire XVII 12/45-3/46 SX161 Seafire IIC 3/45-3/45 NM982Seafire F.45 5/45-6/45 Seafire III 11/46-2/47 NN123Seafire F.46 5/45-6/45 Seafire XV 152/CW 5/47-1/49 PR424Seafire F.47 5/45-6/45 791 Spitfire I 10/42-5/43 R7155 Fleet requirements unit

778 Spitfire VB 11/41-11/41 AB968 Service trials unit Seafire XV 12/46-6/47 SR633Spitfire IX 4/44-5/45 NH582 794 Spitfire I 4/43-11/43 R6835Spitfire XII 2/43-3/43 EN226 Spitfire VA 9/42-12/42 R6759Seafire 1B 1/42-2/45 MB361 Spitfire VB 11/43-11/43 P8708 HookedSeafire IIC 7/42-4/44 MA995 Seafire IIC 2/45-2/45 LR661Seafire III FD9R 6/43-3/47 RX173 Spitfire VB 1/45-5/45 W3846 HookedSeafire XV FD9M 3/44-8/46 SW862 Seafire III A5G 6/46-2/47 RX248Seafire XVII 016/LP 7/45-7/48 SX283 798 Spitfire VB 4/45-6/45 W3370 Flying training unitSeafire F.45 012/LP 6/45-10/47 LA450 Spitfire IX 12/44-2/45 BS390Seafire F.46 7/46-1/48 LA550 Seafire IB 6/45-7/45 NX894Seafire F.47 12/46-3/47 PS947 Seafire IIC 6/45-6/45 MB117Seafang F.32 5/47-5/47 VB895 799 Seafire IIC 8/45-8/45 MB299 50th Training Air Group

779 Seafire IB Z 5/43-10/44 MB348 Fleet requirements unit Seafire III 769/LP 8/45-7/47 PP928780 Seafire XV U1E 7/46-10/46 SW902 Advanced flying training unit Seafire XV 772/LP 10/45-11/51 PR377

Seafire F.45 11/46-11/46 LA489 Seafire XVII 107/VL 12/47-6/52 SX134781 Seafire IB 7/43-7/43 NX963 Fleet requirements unit 800 Seafire XV 8/46-2/47

Seafire III 8/44-8/44 Seafire XVII M 1/47-4/49 SX112Seafire XV 12/49-2/50 SW818 Seafire F.47 179/P 4/49-11/50 VP459Seafire XVII 166/LP 5/49-10/49 801 Spitfire VA 9/42-10/42 P7664Seafire F.46 3/47-12/47 LA560 Spitfire VB W 9/42-10/42 AD513 Hooked

782 Seafire III 5/47-1/48 NN189 Flag Officer Flying Training HO Seafire IB R 9/42-6/44 MB348Seafire XVII 12/47-10/48 SX238 Seafire IIC 10/42-5/43 MB151

787 Seafire IB 7/42-8/44 NX962 Air fighting development unit Seafire IIC 4/44-6/44 NF582Seafire IIC 11/42-3/45 LR729 Seafire III P80 5/44-11/45 PP994Seafire III 12/43-6/46 PR332 Seafire XV 125/N 9/45-4/46 SR596

156 157

FLEET AIR ARM SEAFIRE UNITS FLEET AIR ARM SEAFIRE U ITS

Seafire FR.47 VP458 pictured ashore at Hal Far, Malta, was on the strength of Seafire FR.47 VP441 is pictured at Culdrose where it was preserved. The LA561 was a Seafire F.46 assigned to No. 1832 Squadron at Culham. The Seafire XVII SR572 of Culham-based No. 1832 Squadron starts its take-off run.No. 804 Squadron. FAAM Yeovilton aircraft has since been restored by Ezell Aviation, Texas, where it made its aircraft later served with No. 767 Squadron before withdrawal from service FAAM Yeovilton

first flight in April 2004 displaying the markings of its first operator, No. 804 in 1951. FAAM Yeovilton

Squadron. FAAM Yeovilton

Squadron Variant Code Dates Example Remarks Squadron Variant Code Dates Example Remarks

802 Seafire III 5/45-8/45 RX345 Seafire IIC AE 6/43-11/45 MB317Seafire XV 102/a 8/45-4/48 PR407 Seafire III D4Y 3/44-11/45 PR292

803 Seafire III 6/45-12/45 RX218 Seafire XVII 11/45-1/46 SX363Seafire XV F 8/45-7/47 PR470 Royal Canadian Navy 880 Spitfire VB 8/42-2/43 W3756

804 Seafire XV 133fT 10/46-3/48 SW853 Seafire IIC 7B 9/42-8/43 MB240Seafire FA7 139/0 1/48-8/49 VP483 Seafire IIC 8/43-3/44 LR691

805 Seafire III 7/45-8/45 RX162 Spitfire I 11/43-1/44 R6716Seafire XV 05G 8/45-8/46 SW846 Seafire III 3/44-2/45 LR858Seafire XVII 117/0 4/47-6/48 SX196 Seafire III 115/N 2/45-9/45 NN621

806 Seafire III 8/45-9/45 NF578 883 Seafire III Y 9/45-11/45 RX162Seafire XV 5H 10/45-10/47 PR362 Seafire XV 11/45-2/46 SW872

807 Seafire IB 6/42-8/42 MB357 Seafire XV AAY 5/47-9/48 SW815 Royal Canadian NavySeafire IIC HL 6/42-10/44 LR753 884 Spitfire VA 9/42-10/42 P8246

807 Seafire III D5P 6/44-12/45 PP984 Spitfire VB 9/42-10/42 AA866Seafire XVII D 12/45-9/47 SX129 Spitfire VB 9/42-10/42 BL253 HookedSeafire III 9/46-10/46 PX960 Seafire IIC 9/42-7/43 MB237

808 Spitfire VB 12/42-4/43 BM453 Hooked 885 Spitfire VA 9/42-10/42 R6722Seafire IIC 3D 12/42-5/44 MB312 Spitfire VB 9/42-10/42 BL343 HookedSpitfire PR.XIII 3/44-3/44 BM591 Seafire 1B 10/42-8/43 MB346Spitfire VB 2/44-5/44 BL613 Seafire IIC 06L 9/42-11/43 MB318Spitfire VB lH 5/44-7/44 EN964 LF Seafire III 2A 2/44-11/44 NF426Seafire III 3A 6/44-10/44 NN341 Seafire III 2/44-11/44 LR853

809 Spitfire VA 3/43-6/43 Ll096 Seafire IIC 8/44-11/44 MB257Seafire IB 4/43-8/43 NX919 886 Spitfire VB 2/43-3/43 AB190 HookedSeafire IIC SS 3/43-10/44 MB133 Seafire IIC B 3/43-2/44 LR641Seafire III D6M 7/44-12/45 PP972 Spitfire VB 2/44-3/44 AA964 HookedSeafire XV 11/45-12/45 Spitfire PR.XIII 3/44-3/44 P8784Seafire XVII 11/45-1/46 SX138 Seafire III 3/44-7/44 NF537

816 Seafire IIC 6/43-8/43 889 Seafire IIC 4/44-7/44 MB179Seafire IB 8/43-12/43 NX988 Seafire IIC 4/44-7/44 LR699

833 Seafire IIC 6/43-9/43 MB326 Seafire III 4/44-7/44 LR807834 Seafire IIC a 6/43-8/44 NM972 894 Spitfire VB 3/43-4/43 X4172842 Seafire IIC 7/43-8/43 NM921 Seafire IB 2/43-3/43 MB358

Seafire IB D 7/43-3/44 PA120 Seafire IIC 3/43-11/43 MB257879 Spitfire VA 3/43-3/43 P7694 Seafire IIC 3/43-11/43 MB306

Spitfire VB 3/43-3/43 W3846 Hooked Seafire III 1G 11/43-11/44 LR859Seafire IB 3/43-6/43 NX889 Seafire III H6Z 11/44-3/46 NN460

158 159

FLEET AIR ARM SEAFIRE IT

Seafire XVII SX194 was on the strength of No. 1832 Squadron, which was

based at Culham when this portrait was taken. CP Russell Smith

APPENDIX III

Seafires Sold Overseas

Burma

Seafire xvIdentity Date delivered Date withdrawn

UB-401, was SR451 1952 1957/58UB-402, was SW799 1952 1957/58UB-403, was SR642 1952 1957/58UB-404, was SW863 1952 1957/58UB-405, was SR471 1952 1957/58UB-406, was PR355 1952 1957/58UB-407, was SR534 1952 1957/58UB-408, was PR455 1952 1957/58UB-409, was PR376 1952 PreservedUB-410, was PR400 1952 1957/58UB-411, was PR423 1952 1957/58UB-412, was SW818 1952 1957/58UB-413, was PR453 1952 1957/58UB-414, was SR462 1952 Sold to USAUB-415, was PR422 1952 PreservedUB-416, was PR454 1952 1957/58UB-417, was SR470 1952 1957/58UB-418, was PR407 1952 1957/58UB-419, was PR462 1952 1957/58UB-420, was SW899 1952 1957/58

Canada

Seafire xvIdentity Operator Date delivered Date withdrawn

PR375 803, 1 TAG June 1946 January 1950PR410 803, lTAG June 1946 April 1954PR425 883, 1TAG November 1946 June 1949PR428 803 November 1946 July 1947PR434 803 January 1946 February 1949PR451 803, 883 February 1946 May 1949PR458 803 February 1946 January 1950PR460 803, lTAG February 1946 June 1949PR461 803, 883 February 1946 crashed August 1949PR470 803, lTAG February 1946 January 1950PR471 803 June 1946 July 1949PR479 803,883 March 1946 June 1949PR494 803 February 1946 June 1952PR496 803 June 1946 January 1950PR498 803 February 1946 February 1950PR499 Winter test aircraft February 1946 March 1952PR500 802,803 February 1946 crashed December 1948PR501 803, lTAG February 1946 February 1950PR502 803, lTAG February 1946 crashed August 1949PR503 803, lTAG February 1946 June 1952

161

Remarks

Hooked

Hooked

Pictured at Bramcote displaying the codes of No. 1833 Squadron, Seafire XVIISX282 was lost in a crash in December 1949. FAAM Yeovilton

160

Dates Example

3/43-6/43 MB316

8/42-9/42 MA981

3/43-3/43 X4337

3/43-7/43 NX892

3/43-12/43 EP762

8/43-5/44 MA982

3/44-7/44 BL89512/42-1/44 MB244

12/43-3/44 AB867

12/43-3/44 AD187

2/44-9/45 NN599

8/47-5/48 SX245

6/47-8/51 SW8006/47-8/51 SX168

7/47-11/47 RX158

8/47-1/50 LA555

6/48-5/53 SX198

4/49-8/51 SW8568/47-7/52 SX279

7/49--8/51 SW786

6/52-5/54 VP474

KP

Code

109/JA108/JA

105/CH

101/CH116/CH156/BR

164/BR

156/BR

60

Seafire IIC

Seafire IICSpitfire ISeafire IB

Spitfire VB

Seafire IICSpitfire VB

Seafire IICSpitfire VB

Spitfire VB

Seafire IIISeafire XVII

Seafire XVSeafire XVII

Seafire III

Seafire F.46Seafire XVII

Seafire XVSeafire XVII

Seafire XVSeafire F.47

VariantSquadron

1833

895897

899

1830

1831

1832

SEAFIRES SOLD OVERSEAS SEAFIRES SOLD OVERSEAS

Seafire XV Seafire IIIIdentity Operator Date delivered Date withdrawn Identity Operator Date delivered

PR504 803, February 1946 February 1950 PR333 1948PR505 803, February 1946 crashed September 1948 PX932 1F.22 June 1946PR506 lTAG February 1946 November 1950 SP136 IF.16 June 1948SR464 802, 803 February 1946 June 1949 SP137 May 1948SR491 803 February 1946 March 1952 SP143 1F.19 June 1946SR530 803, 883 March 1946 January 1949 SP144 June 1946SR545 803 March 1946 April1947 SP147 June 1946SW793 803, 883 February 1946 January1950 SP148 1F.l March 1946SW802 803, 883 March 1946 May 1951 SP150 IF.10 March 1946SW809 803, lTAG February 1946 June 1949 SP156 March 1946SW815 803, 883 February 1946 July 1947 SP163 1948SW860 803, lTAG March 1946 June 1949 SP166 1F.5 1948SW869 803, lTAG March 1946 January 1950 SP167 IF.6 1948SW870 803, lTAG March 1946 January 1950 SP182 February 1947SW909 883, lTAG March 1946 January 1950 SP183 January 1948

SP190 IF.12 1948France SP192 1948

SR519 1F June 1949Seafire III SR520 IF.23 June 1949Identity Operator Date delivered

Seafire XVLR793 June 1946

Identity Operator Date deliveredLR815 June 1946

NF454 January 1947 PR347 12F.15 June 1949NF482 June 1946 PR360 IF.22 June 1949NF507 September 1949 PR397 54S.22 June 1949NF561 54S.9 April 1948 PR405 1F.27 Jun 1949NN136 April 1948 PR414 1F.27 June 1949NN149 June 1946 PR429 June 1949NN157 June 1946 PX916 Jun 1949NN188 54S.28 June 1946 PX919 1 49NN235 June 1947 PX931 Jun 1949NN267 June 1946 PX932 IF.22 Jun 1948NN303 September 1946 PX933 1F.23 Jun 1949NN391 June 1946 PX951 June 1949NN396 June 1946 PX954 INN456 54S.24 June 1946 PX962 JunNN467 June 1946 RX165 54S.12 JunNN546 June 1946 RX166 IF.3 JunNN604 June 1947 RX183 Jun 1NN620 June 1946 RX192 1F.2 rch 1NN623 spares use June 1948 RX216 rch 1NN641 June 1946 RX223 1F.25 rch 1PP972 IF.9 then 12F.2 1947 RX224PP990 June 1946 RX226 1F.6PR132 April 1948 RX229PR146 54S.14 June 1946 RX231PR170 June 1946 RX240 IF.24PR249 IF.ll June 1946 RX242 1F.23PR257 1946 RX244PR265 June 1946 RX247PR266 June 1946 RX253PR293 54S.6 June 1946 RX254PR304 June 1946 RX255PR322 June 1946 RX271PR329 1F.3 June 1946 RX278

162

SEAFIRES SOLD OVERSEAS

Seafire Technical Details

APPENDIX IV

Merlin-powered aircraft

Armament: Two 20mm Hispano cannon and four 0.303in Browning machine-guns

Internal fuel capacity: 48gal (218Itr, fuselage top tank), 37gal (168Itr, fuselage lower)

External fuel capacity: 30 or 45gal (136 or 205Itr); 90gal (4091tr, Mk III/FR.111)

Engine oil capacity: 5.8gal (26ltrl. 8.5gal (39Itr, late production variants)

Weights: Ib (kg)

Mk L.1I1

7,640 13,472)

With 500lb bomb

7,543 (3,429)

7,546 (3,430)

With 90gal tank

7,950 (3,4771

7,950 (3,47718,130 (3,695)

With 45gal tank

7,122 (3,23717,414 (3,37017,420 (3,373)

7,550 13,412)

7,508 13,41317,508 13,41317,590 13,450)

Loaded

6,718 (3,054)7,004 (3,184)

7,006 (3,185)7,146 (3,248)

7,104 (3,230)

7,104 (3,230)

7,186 (3,266)

Mk lB

5,910 (2,686)6,103 (2,774)

6,106 (2,775)6,245 (2,839)

6,204 (2,820)

6,204 (2,820)

6,286 (2,857)

Empty

Mk lBMk IIC

Mk L.IIC

Mk LR.IICMk III

Mk L.III

Mk FR.1I1

Level Speed: mph (km/h)

Wingspan: 36ft lOin (11.3m) full span, 32ft 7in (10m) clipped

Length: 30ft 2.5in 19.3m)

Height: 8ft (2.5ml over cowling, 13ft (4ml over propeller

Wing area: 242sq ft 132sq m) full span, 234sq ft (31 sq m) clipped

Powerplant: Rolls Royce Merlin 45 (Mks IB and IIC)46 (IIC)

50A (IIC)

32 (Mks L.IIC LRIIC)55 (Mk III)

55M (Mks L.II1 and FR.III)

Height

Seafire XVIdentity Operator Date delivered

RX279 April 1948

RX281 12F.3 1948

RX283 54S.3 1948

RX286 3S.10 1948

RX290 IF.9 1946

RX293 IF.5 1946

RX296 1948

RX298 1946

RX301 IF.27 1946

RX305 IF.3 1946

RX309 1946

RX327 1948

RX333 1948

RX338 IF.l0 1946

RX342 1948

SR452 June 1949

SR455 June 1949

SR460 IF.24 June 1949

SR474 IF.21 June 1949

SR520 54S.26 then 1F.23 June 1949

SR522 June 1949

SR526 June 1949

SR529 54S.26 June 1949

Ireland

Variant Identity Date delivered Date withdrawn

LF.1I1 lAC 146 was PR302 17 Feb 1947 June 1954

LF.1I1 lAC 147 was PR315 17 Feb 1947 written off 5 Sept 1947

LF.1I1 lAC 148 was PP950 17 Feb 1947 written off 22 May 1953

LF.III lAC 149 was PP948 17 Feb 1947 June 1954

LF.III lAC 150 was RX210 11 July 1947 1950

LF.III lAC 151 was PP941 11 July 1947 written off 29 June 1951

LF.1I1 lAC 152 was PP929 11 July 1947 written off 1 Sept 1949

LF. II I lAC 153 was PP924 11 July 1947 June 1954

LF.1I1 lAC 154 was PP915 27 Sept1947 written off 28 May 1951

LF.1I1 lAC 155 was PR236 27 Sept1947 Aug 1954

LF.1I1 lAC 156 was PP936 27 Sept1947 June 1954

LF.III lAC 157 was RX168 27 Sept1947 Oct 1953

sea level

6,000ft (1 ,850mI11 ,500ft (3,500m)13,000ft (4,000m)

15,000ft (4,600m)

19,000ft (5,800m)

295 (472)

355 (568)

341 (547)

331 (530)

358 (593)

331 (530)

Griffon-powered aircraft

Mk XV MkXVIl Fo45, Fo46 and Fo47

Wingspan 36ft lOin (11m) 36ft lOin (11.3m) 36ft 11 in (l104m)

Length 32ft 3in (9.9m) 32ft 3in (9.9m) 34ft 4in (10.7m)

Height 11ft 134m) 11ft (304m) 12ft 9in (39m)

Wing Area 242sq ft (32.2sq ml 242sq ft (32.2sq m) 243.6sq ft (3204sq m)

164 165

SEAFIRE TECHNICAL DETAILS

Powerplant: Rolls Royce Griffon VllMk XV and Mk XVIII; Griffon 61 (Mk 451; Griffon 85 (Mk 46); Griffon 87/881Mk 47)

Armament: two 20mm Hispano cannon and four 0.303in Browning machine-guns (Mks XV and XVIII; four 20mm Hispano cannon (Mks 45, 46 and 47)

Internal fuel capacity (Mks XV and XVIII: fuselage tanks - 80.5gaI1366Itr); wing root tanks -19.5gaI189Itrl

(Mk 47): fuselage tanks - 84gaI1374Itr); rear fuselage tank 32gal (145Itr); wing root tanks - 11 gaI150Itr); wing tanks - 25gal (114Itr)

External fuel capacity (Mks XV and XVII): jetlisonable 30/45 (136/205Itr) or 50gal (227Itr) or two 22.5 gal102ltr) under-wing tanks (Mk XVII)

(Mk 471: 50 or 90gal1227 or 4091tr) centre-line tanks; 45ga112051tr) under-wing tanks

Engine oil capacity (Mks XV and XVII):10.5gal (48Itr)

(Mk 47): 9gal (401trl

Weights: Ib (kg)

APPENDIX V

Technical Details ofRoyal Navy Aircraft Carriers

Level speed: mph (km/hl

R8J Illustrious, R92 Indomitable, R38 Victorious

Illustrious Class fleet carrierMk xvMk XVII

F. 45

F. 46

F. 47

Sea level

5,000ft (1,500m)

9,500ft (3,000m)

13,500ft 14,000ml

23,000ft 17,000ml

24,250ft (7,500ml

Mk xv

352 (5631371 (594)

368 (5891

383 (6131

378 (605)

Empty Loaded With max fuel With one 500lb bomb

6,965 (3,166) 7,960 (3,619) 8,370 13,805) 8,515 (3,870)

7,015 (3,189) 8,010 (3,6411 8,781 (3,991) 8,565 (3,89318,090 (3,677) 9,357 (4,253

8,530 (3,877) 10,078 (4,581) 11 ,236 (5,1071 10,628 (4,831)

8,680 (3,9451 10,700 (4,864) 11,480 (5,2181 10,778

Builder

Machinery

Displacement

Dimensions

Armament

Endurance

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Aircraft

Harland and Wolff

Three-shaft Parsons geared turbines; six Admira Ity boilers 111 ,000shp, 30.5kt (55km/h)

23,207 tons (23,578 tonnes) standard; 28,619 tons (29,077 tonnes) deep load

740ft 9in (228m) long overall; 106ft 9in (32.8m) max beam; 28ft (8.6ml deep draught

Eight twin 4in; six octuple 2pdr Pom-Pom; twenty twin Oerlikon; fourteen single Oerlikon

14,000 miles (22,400km) @ 12kt (22km/h)

740ft (228m) long; 95ft 9in (29.5m) wide, armoured steel

Seven 11,0001b (5,000kgl@ 55kt (99km/hl plus two 20,0001b 19,000kg) @60kt(108km/h)

456ft (140m) by 62ft (19ml by 16ft (5m)

One hydraulic 14,0001b 16,000kg) rated @ 66kt (119km/h)

Fifty-four operational

Modified Illustrious Class fleet carrier

R86 Implacable, R70 Indefatigable

166

Builder

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Argus fleet carrier

/49 Argus

Builder

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Displacement

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Flight deck

Arrester wires

Fairchild Shipbuilding and Engineering Co

Four-shaft Parsons geared turbines; eight Admiralty boilers, 148,000shp; 32kt (58km/h)

23,450 tons 123,825 tonnes) standard; 32,110 tons (32,624 tonnes) deep load

766ft (236m) long overall, 131ft 3in (40.4m) max beam, 29ft (9m) max draught

Eight 4.5in, five octuple 2pdr Bofors; twenty-one 20mm Oerlikon; nineteen 20mm Oerlikon

12,000 miles 119,200km) @ 10kt (18km/h)

760ft (234m) long, 90ft 128m) wide, armoured steel

Nine 20,0001b (9,000kg) @60kt 1108km/h), three 20,0001b (9,000kgl @ 60kt (108km/h)

Upper: 456ft 1140m) by 62ft (l9ml by 14ft (4.3m)

Lower: 208ft (64m) by 62ft (19ml by 14ft 14.3m)

One hydraulic 20,0001b 19,000kg) rated @ 56kt (101km/h)

Eighty-one operational

Beardmores

Four-shaft Parsons geared turbines, twelve boilers 20,000shp; 20.2kt (40km/h)

14,000 tons 114,224 tonnes) standard, 16,500 tons (16,764 tonnes) deep load

560ft (172m) long overall, 79ft 6in 124.5m) beam, 22ft 6in (6.9m) max draught

Six 4in, four 3pdr, thirteen 20mm Oerlikon

5,200 miles (8,320km) @12kt (22km/h)

470ft (145m) long, 85ft (26m) wide, steel; later 548ft (169mllong, 85 ft 126m) wide

Four 11,0001b (5,000kgl rated @ 53 kt (95km/h)

167

TECHNICAL DETAILS OF ROYAL NA VY AIRCRAFT CARRIERS TECH ICAL DETAILS OF ROYAL A VY AIRCRAFT CARRIER

Hangar

CatapultsAircraft

350ft (106m) by 68ft (21m)One hydraulic 12,OOOIb (5,500kg) rated @66kt (119km/h)

Max twenty; normal fifteen

Ruler Class assault escort carrier

031 Arbiter, 051 Atheling, 098 Emperor, 042 Empress, 062 Khedive, 021 Shah, 026 Slinger

Colossus Class light fleet carrier

Majestic Class light fleet carrier

15 Colossus (later Arromanches), R68 Ocean, R51 Perseus, R76 Pioneer, R64 Theseus,R16 Triumph, R31 Warrior

Attacker Class assault carrier

Harland and Wolff, conversion carried out by Swan HunterTwo-shaft diesels, 16,OOOshp; 18kt (32km/h)

19,650 tons (19,960 tonnes! standard, 23,450 tons (23,800 tonnes) deep load592ft (182m! long overall, 76ft 4in (23.4m) max beam, 29ft lOin (9.2m) max draught

Two 4in, ten twin 20mm Derlikon, two quad Porn-Porn

16,000 miles (25,OOkm) @ 16kt (29km/hl550ft (169m) long, 76ft (23.4m) wide, steel

Six 15,OOOIb (6,800kg) rated @ 60kt (119km/h)354ft (109m) by 46ft (14ml by 17ft (5.2m)

One hydraulic 14,OOOIb (6,400kg) rated @66kt (1 19km/h)

Twenty-one operational

Western Pipe and Steel Corp, USASingle-shaft General Electric geared turbine, two Foster Wheeler boilers, 8,500shp; 18kt (32km/h)

10,200 tons (10,400 tonnes) standard, 14,400 tons (14,600 tonnes) deep load491ft (151m) long overall, 105ft (32m) max beam, 21ft (6.5m) max draught

Two 4in, four twin Bofors, eight twin Derlikon, four single Derlikon27,000 miles (43,200km) @ 11kt (20km/h)

442ft (136m) long, 88ft (27m) wide, steel covered wood

Nine 19,8001b (9,OOOkg) rated @ 55kt (99km/h)262ft (80m) by 62ft (l9m) by 18ft (5.5m)

One hydraulic 7,OOOIb (3,180kg) rated @61kt(110km/h)

Twenty operational, ninety ferry

Seattle-Tacoma Shipbuilding Corp, USA

One-shaft General Electric Geared turbine, two Foster Wheeler boilers, 8,500shp; 18.5kt (33km/h)11,200 tons (11,400 tonnes) standard, 15,400 tons (15,650 tonnes) deep load

492ft (151m) long overall, 108ft 6in (33m) beam, 25ft 5in p.8m) draught

Two 5in US Mk 12, eight twin 40mm Bofors, four twin Derlikon, twenty-five single Derlikon27,500 miles (44,OOkm) @ 11 kt (20km/h)

450ft (138m) long, 80ft (25m) wide, wood covered by steelNine 19,800lb (9,OOOkg) rated @ 55kt (99km/h)

260ft (80m) by 62ft (19m) by 18ft (5.5m)

One H4C 16,OOOIb (7,200kg) rated @74kt (133km/h!Thirty operational, ninety ferry

Builder

MachineryDisplacement

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ArmamentEndurance

Flight deckArrester wires

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CatapultsAircraft

BuilderMachinery

Displacement

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EnduranceFlight deck

Arrester wiresHangar

Catapults

Aircraft

Pretoria Castle trials and training carrier

F61 Pretoria Castle

002 Attacker, 018 Battler, 032 Chaser, 064 Fencer, 080 Hunter, 091 Stalker, 012 Striker, 024 Tracker

BuilderMachinery

Displacement

DimensionsArmament


Arrester wires

HangarCatapults

Aircraft

Harland and Wolff

Two-shaft Parsons geared turbines, four Admiralty boilers, 40,OOOshp; 24.5kt (44km/h)15,700 tons (15,950 tonnes) standard, 19,550 tons (19,860 tonnes) deep load

698ft (215m) long overall, 112ft 6in (35m) max beam, 25ft (7.7m) max draught

Eight twin 40mm Bofors, fourteen 40mm Bofors8,300 miles (13,280km) @ 20kt (36km/h)

690ft (212m)long,106ft (32.6m) wide, steelNine 20,OOOIb (9,OOOkg) rated @ 87kt (1 57km/h)

275ft (846m) by 75ft (23m) by 52ft (16m) by 17ft 6in (5Am)

One hydraulic 20,OOOIb (9,OOOkg) rated @ 56kt (101km/h)

Thirty-seven operational

Vickers ArmstrongTwo-shaft Parsons geared turbines, four Admiralty boilers, 40,OOOshp; 25kt (45km/h)

13,190 tons (13,400 tonnes) standard displacement, 18,400 tons (18,700 tonnes) deep load

695ft (214m) long overall, 112ft 6in (34.6m) max beam, 23ft 5in p.2m) max draught

Six quad 2pdr Porn-Porn, eleven twin Derlikon, ten Derlikon8,300 miles (13,280km) @ 20kt (36km/h)

690ft (212m) long, 80ft (25m) wide, steelEight 15,0001b (6,800kg) rated @60kt (108km/h)

275ft (85m) by 75ft (23m) by 52ft (16m) by 17ft 6in (5Am)

One hydraulic 16,OOOIb P,300kg) rated @66kt (119km/h)Forty-two operational

Armstrong WhitworthFour-shaft Brown Curtis geared turbines, eighteen Yarrow boilers, 90,820shp; 30kt (54km/h)

22,450 tons (22,800 tonnes) standard, 27,165 tons (27,600 tonnes) deep load

786ft 5in (242m) long overall, 90ft (28m) max beam, 29ft 11 in (9.2m) deep draught

Six twin 4in, four octuple 2pdr Porn-Porn, four 20mm Derlikon, seven 20mm Derlikon3,700 miles 15,920km) @ 20kt (36km/h)

596ft (182m) x 91ft 6in 128m) steelFour l1,OOOlb (5,OOOkg) rated @ 60kt 1108km/h)

Upper: 520ft (160m) by 50ft (15m) by 15ft 146m)

Lower: 550ft (169m) by 50ft (15m) by 15ft (46m)None

Thirty-three operational

CVL -21 Magnificent

Builder

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Catapults

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Furious fleet carrier

Builder

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CatapultsAircraft

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47 Furious

168 169

TECHNICAL DETAILS OF ROYAL NAVY AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

Unicorn aircraft repair ship

R72 Unicorn

Builder


Dimensions

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Aircraft

Harland and WolffTwo-shaft Parsons geared turbines, four Admiralty boilers, 40,000shp; 24kt 143km/h)

14,750 tons (15,000 tonnes) standard, 20,300 tons (20,625 tonnes) deep load640ft (197m) long overall, 90ft (27.7m) max beam, 24ft lOin (7.6m) max draught

Four twin 4in, four quad 2pdr Pom-Pom, five twin 20mm Oerlikon, six single Oerlikon7,500 miles (4,700km) @ 20kt (36km/hl

640ft (197m) long, 90ft 127.7m) wide, armoured steel

Six 20,0001b (9,000kg) rated @ 60kt (108km/h)Upper: 324ft (997m) by 65ft (20m) by 16ft 6in (5m)

Lower: 360ft (111m) by 62ft 119m) by 16ft 6in (5m)One hydraulic l2,5001b (5,700kg) rated @ 66kt (119km/h)

Thirty-five operational, twenty under repair

170

Andrews, CF and Morgan, EB, SU/JermarineAiTCraft since 1914 (Putnam, 1981)

Brown, Capt Eric CBE 0 C AF RN, Wingsof t~e Navy (Airlife, 1987)

Crossley, Cdr Rose RN, They gave me aSeafire (Airlife, 1986)

Bibliography

Frelaut, Jean and Pierquet, Claude-A, LesSeafire dans I' Aeronatique Navale Francais(Oe t France, 1983)

Hobbs, Cdr David MBE R ,Aircraft Can-iersof the Royal Navy and Commonwealth Navies(Greenhill Books, 1996)

171

kl dy, clward,ubli hing, 1 7)

Sturtivant, R y od urr w L Howard,Mick, Fleet ir rm i ed Wing ircraftsince 1945 (Air Brit in, 2004)

A&AEE 24Aeronavale 146-148AFDU 21-22Air Service Training 30aircraft

Blackburn Firebrand 28Blackburn Roc 10, 28Blackburn Skua 10, 28Chance Vought F4U Corsair 13,

56, 101, 129Fairey Barracuda 33Fairey Campania 7Fairey Firefly 28Fairey Flycatcher 10Fairey Fulmar 10Gloster Sea Gladiator 10, 28Grumman Avenger 129Grumman Hellcat 100, 129Grumman Wildcat il, 48, 117Hawker imrod 10Hawker Sea Hurricane IISopwith Camel 9Sopwith Pup 9Sopwith One-and-a-Half-Strutter 9

upermarine Channel Type 15Supermarine NIB Baby l5Supermarine Seafang 27, 115,

116Supermarine Spiteful 27, 115Supermarine Type 224 13Supermarine Walrus 129see also Supermarine Seanre,

Supermarine pitfireaircraft carriers

Ameer 122Argus 40Atheling 117Atwcker 46,52, 122, 125Battler 45, 46-48Biter 40Chaser 33, 52Colossus 13 7Courageous 7Eagle 7Emperor 122Empress 122Fencer 51Formidnble 28, 40, 45, 46, 130-132,

137Furious 7, 30, 40, 45, 52, 54, 56

Index

Glorious 7, 28Hunter 45,46,52, 122, 124125Illustrious 7, 28,32,45,46,117,118,

122,125-128, 130, 131, 137Implacable 52, 56Indefatigable 54, 117,118,122Indomiwble 45,109,118,126,127, 128,

130-132Khedive 52, 54, 122Ocean 137Pretoria Castle 36Ruler 54

hah 122Slinger 33Swlker 48, 52, 122, 124Theseus 137-138, 145Tracker 51Triumph 137, 140-145Unicorn 45, 46, 48, 49Venerable 13 7Vengeance 13 7Victorious 7, 28, 40, 45, 46, 127,

130-132aircraft engine

Napier Dagger 18Rolls-Royce Goshawk 17Roll -Royce Griffon 22-25, 100Rolls-Royce Merlin 18, 23,33

Bird, James 15Burmese Air Force 148

Calshot 7Castle Bromwich 19,52Crimson, Operation 126Cromarty 7Cunliffe-Owen Ltd 30, 35Cunningham, Admiral Sir Andrew 40

Donibristle 9Dracula, Operation 122Dragoon, Operation 52

Eastchurch 9Eastleigh 9, 19Evanton 9

Felixstowe 7Fisher, Admiral Lord 7Ford 9

173

General Aircraft Ltd 19Goodwood, Operation 56Great Yarmouth 7

Hatston 9Heston Aircraft Ltd 33Husky, Operation 40,45-47Hythe 15

Iceberg, Operation 132Irish Army Air Corps 151lsi of Grain 7

Jurist, Operation 125

Lee-on-Solem 9, 54Lentil, Operation 118

Marine Aircraft ExperimentalEstablishment 18

Martlesham Heath 18, 19Mitchell, R.J. 15, 16,22

Naval Air Squadrons800 AS 141-145801 NAS 30, 40, 45, 51-54, 56804 NA 137805 NAS 137807 NAS 40, 45, 52, 122808 NAS 45, 52, 54809 NAS 46, 122816 NA 51833 NAS 51834 NAS 51842 NAS 51849 NAS 56879 NA 46,52, 122, 125880 NAS 42, 45, 46, 52, 54, 56885 NAS 46, 54886 NA 46,52887 NAS 45,56, 117, 121889 NAS 117894 NAS 41, 11 7, 121897 NAS 46, 48, 52899 NAS 45, 521830 NAS 145l831 NAS 1451832 NAS 1461833 NAS 146

Neptune, Operation 54-56

Overlord, Operation 54-56

Pemberton Billing, oel 13, 15Postholll, peration 53

Quill, Jeffrey n

RAE 19Royal anadian avy 148-150

ampson, Lt C.R. 7Schneider Trophy 15-16Scofields 52Scott-Paine, Hubert 15

euter, apt Murray 7Smith, Joe nSt Merryn 9Stretton 40Summers, Joseph 'Mutt' 18Specifications

Spec 10/35 18

INDEX

pee 425A 18pee 471 100pee F16/36 19pee F7/30 17-1pee 7/44 107

upermarine SeafireMk lB 2 ,29,40,51Mk IIC 30, 32, 35, 45, 51Mk LIIC 33,51Mk III 34, 35, 37, 39, 52Mk LIlI InMk LRII lZ2Mk XV 101-105Mk XVII 105-107F,45 107-110F,46 107-111F,47 107, 112-114,116,

138upermarine SpitfireHooked 28Mk IB 20

174

Mk II 20Mk V 20, 28, 100Mk VIII 21, 23, 100Mk IX 21, n, 100Mk XII n, 100Mk XIV 23Mk XVIII 24F.21 25, 107F.n 26F.Z3 26F.24 26

Torch, Operation 30, 40-45

Vian, Admiral ir Philip 40,IZ7

Wool ton 19Worthy Down 9, 32, 35

Zip/Jer, Operation 124

[crowood press] [aviation series] supermarine seafire

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