crowdfunding public interest judicial reviews
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This is a repository copy of Crowdfunding Public Interest Judicial Reviews.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/150738/
Version: Accepted Version
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Tomlinson, Joe (2019) Crowdfunding Public Interest Judicial Reviews. Public Law. pp. 166-185. ISSN 0033-3565
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Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3257787
1
CrowdfundingPublicInterestJudicialReviews:ARiskyNew
ResourceandtheCaseforaPracticalEthics
JoeTomlinson*
Intheirclassicworkonpublicinterestlitigation(‘PIL’),HarlowandRawlingsdefine“pressure
throughlaw”asthe“useofthelawandlegaltechniquesasaninstrumentforobtainingwider
collectiveobjectives.”1Theyobservethattheuseofthecourtsbyorganisationsseekingpolicy
changewasnotjustanAmericantrend,itwashappeningintheUKandnorwasitnew.2The
quickly-growingliteratureonPILhasstudiedhowsomeorganisationsdeploythelawandlegal
techniques to pursue wider objectives.3 Much of the international debate around this
“mobilization of law”—from Vose’s early account of disadvantage theory in the 1950s4
throughtocurrentdebateson“legalopportunitystructures”5—hasaconsistentthread:the
availabilityoffinancialresourcesoftenhasaprofoundeffectonthefateofindividualPILcases
andthewiderpatternofPILindifferentjurisdictions.Thepropositionthatfundingisakey
variableindeterminingpatternsofPILisanutterlyuncontroversialone,andonewhichhas
sustained over time. In the context of judicial review in the UK, traditional funding for
*LecturerinPublicLaw,DicksonPoonSchoolofLaw,King’sCollegeLondon,andResearchDirector,PublicLaw
Project.ThisarticleiswritteninmypersonalcapacityanditdoesnotexpresstheviewsofthePublicLawProject.
IamverygratefulforexceptionalresearchassistancefromRaviLow-Beer,aswellasindirectsupportfromthe
UCL Grand Challenges Fund, Tom Hickman, and Lisa Vanhala. Carol Harlow, Jo Hickman, Richard Kirkham,
MauriceSunkin,andGrahamGeeprovidedhelpfulcommentsonvariousdrafts.Anearlierversionofthispaper
waspresentedattheUniversityofOxfordCentreforSocio-LegalStudies,whereseminarparticipantsoffered
manyusefulcomments.AlaterdraftwasalsogivenasalectureattheUniversityofEssex.Avisitingpositionat
MelbourneLawSchoolprovidedtheenvironmentforthisarticletobecompleted.Anyerrorsaremyown.1C.HarlowandR.Rawlings,PressureThroughLaw(London:Routledge,1992).
2Abovep.1.
3Seee.g.V.Bondy,L.Platt,andM.Sunkin,TheValueandEffectsofJudicialReview:TheNatureofClaims,their
OutcomesandConsequences (London:ThePublicLawProject,2015);C.Hilson,“Newsocialmovements:the
roleoflegalopportunity”(2002)9(2)JournalofEuropeanPublicPolicy238;ThePublicLawProject,ThirdParty
Interventions:APracticalGuide(London:PublicLawProject,2008);ThePublicLawProject,GuidetoStrategic
Litigation (London:PublicLawProject,2014). Iwillnotdiscuss the legitimacyof thisuseof thecourts, fora
criticalanalysissee:C.Harlow,“PublicLawandPopularJustice”(2002)65(1)M.L.R.1.4C.Vose,CaucasiansOnly(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1959),pp.119,240.
5e.g.C.Hilson,“Newsocialmovements:Theroleoflegalopportunity”(2002)9J.E.P.L238;E.A.Andersen,Out
oftheclosetsandintothecourts:Legalopportunitystructureandgayrightslitigation(AnnArbor:Universityof
MichiganPress,2006);L.Vanhala,“Legalopportunitystructuresandtheparadoxoflegalmobilizationbythe
environmentalmovementintheUK”(2012)45Law&SocietyReview523.Forearlier,similarwork,see.C.R.
Epp, The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists, and Supreme Courts in Comparative Perspective (Chicago:
UniversityofChicagoPress,1998).
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3257787
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litigationhasbecomelessavailableinrecentyears.6Whileitisimportanttorecognisethat
therelationshipbetweenmoneyandaccesstojudicialreviewisadenselycomplexone,many
nowclaimthatfundingajudicialreviewisincreasinglydifficult.Inthisspace,crowdfunding—
usinganonlineplatformtoraisethird-partyfunds—hasbecomeanincreasingly-usedtool,
withmanyPILchallengesnowbeingfundedbythismethod.7Therehas,however,beenno
systematicanalysisofthisphenomenonintheUK,andrelativelylittleinternationally.8
In this article, it is considered whether crowdfunding is a possible answer to the
increasingscarcityoftraditionalresourcesinthecontextofPILintheUK.Inotherwords,can
crowdfunding support reformthrough theprovisionof resources forPIL?Thequestionof
whetherthismodeoflitigationfundingoughttobeencouragedorwhetheritisproblematic
is also addressed. I argue that crowdfunding can—in certain cases—solve the resource
shortageand,ultimately,beusefulinprocuringreform.9However,itisfarfromafoolproof
solutionandtherearemultiplerisksinherentinitsuse.Thenatureandextentoftheserisks
aresuchthatthecrowdfundingofPILshouldbeapproachedwithgreatcaution.Itistherefore
suggestedherethatweneedtodevelopapracticalethicsofcrowdfundinginthiscontext.
The analysis in this article has fourmain parts. The first part explains the present
fundingcontextforjudicialreviewintheUK.Itisimperativethiscontextisunderstoodasit
provides the conditions inwhich crowdfundinghas grown.The secondpartof this article
introduceshowcrowdfundingworks,howithasbecomeincreasinglyrelied-uponasamethod
forfundingjudicialreviewcases,whothekeyactorsare,andexamplesofcrowdfundingin
action. The third part considers the main benefits and risks of the increased role that
crowdfundingisplayingintheUK.Thefinalpartofthisarticlesetsoutthecasefordeveloping
6PILdoesnotnecessarilyhavetotaketheformofjudicialreview.Seeforinstancetheactionsdocumentedin
G.Howells,TheTobaccoChallenge:LegalPolicyandConsumerProtection(Abingdon:Routledge,2011).Thereis
an argument that all cases have, in away, a public interest justification, as explained in R (UNISON) v Lord
Chancellor[2017]UKSC51;[2017]3W.L.R.409.Thefocushere,however,isjudicialreview,whichistheprimary
meansofPILintheUK.7Thisisaninternationaltrend.HereIfocusonprovidingadetailedstudyoftheUKexperience.
8SeeE.Hamman,“SavetheReef!Civiccrowdfundingandpublicinterestenvironmentallitigation”(2015)15(1)
Q.U.T.L.R.159;M.A.Gomez,“CrowdfundedJustice:OnthePotentialBenefitsandChallengesofCrowdfunding
asaLitigationFinancingTool”(2015)49U.S.F.L.R.307;M.Elliot,“TrialbySocial-Media:TheRiseofLitigation
Crowdfunding”(2016)84(2)U.C.L.R.529;R.Perry,“CrowdfundingCivilJustice”(2018)B.C.L.R.(forthcoming).9Thenotionof“publicinterest”litigationisfiercelycontested.Isimplyuseitheretomeantheuseofthelaw
and legal techniquesasan instrument forobtainingwider collectiveobjectives.Thismaysimply involve the
settleoflegalquestionsandneednotbeinformedbyanyideology.
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3257787
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apracticalethicsforcrowdfundingPILandsketchesouttheformthatsuchapracticalethics
maytake.
AccesstoJudicialReview,FinancialResources,andFunding
Thesuggestionthatlegalprocedurescostsignificantamountsofmoneyandthatthereshould
bepracticalmechanismsformanagingsuchexpensesisnotnew,norisitparticulartopublic
law.10Theconcernthatjudicialreviewistooexpensiveforordinarycitizenshasalsolongbeen
discussed.11Yet,thecomplexsocio-economicdimensionsofjudicialreviewlitigationhavenot
beensquarelyconfrontedbypubliclawresearchersintheUK.12Indeed,thetopicissolittle
discussedbyscholarsthatRawlingssuggestsitispartof“thesecrethistory”ofjudicialreview:
wherethewidely-observedexpansionofjudicialreviewgroundsinrecentdecadeshasbeen
quietly“engenderedonthebackoflarge-scaleexclusion”ofpeople.13
Inrecentyears,concernsabouttheexpenseofjudicialreviewhavebeenputunder
the spotlightby thegeneralprogrammeofausterity implementedby theUKgovernment
from2010onwards,14aswellasthereformsundertakenandattemptedconcerningjudicial
review specifically.15Notably,when theUKGovernmentproposed changes to the judicial
reviewsystemin2012,theconsultationprocesscitedthegrowingnumberof“weakorill-
foundedclaims”thatweretakingup“largeamountsof judicialtimeandcostingthecourt
systemmoney.”16Theimpactofthesechanges—andtheassociatedpoliticalrhetoricabout
thegovernment-sideexpenseofjudicialreview—hasledtogrowingconcernaboutaccessto
justiceandthelimitingofwhoisabletoholdpublicbodiestoaccountviatheprocess.The
positionnowisthatthecostsofjudicialreviewforbothclaimantsandpublicauthoritieshave
beenlargelywithoutempiricalstudybutthosesameissueshavebecomemorecentraltothe
10See,forexample,thehistoricaldebateinciviljusticetracedinJ.Sorbaji,EnglishCivilJusticeaftertheWoolf
andJacksonReforms:ACriticalAnalysis(Cambridge:CUP,2014).11Thisissuewasrecentlyraisedagaininaprominentblog,see:T.Hickman,“PublicLaw’sDisgrace”(February9
2017) UK Constitutional Law Blog, https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2017/02/09/tom-hickman-public-laws-
disgrace/[AccessedFebruary22,2018].12SeethediscussioninBondy,Platt,andSunkin,TheValueandEffectsofJudicialReview:TheNatureofClaims,
theirOutcomesandConsequences(2015),pp.47-58.13R.Rawlings,“ModellingJudicialReview”(2008)61(1)C.L.P.95,109.
14Theeffectsofausterityhaveaffectedmanypartsoftheadministrativejusticesystem,notjustthejudicial
review system. For an overview and analysis, see R. Thomas and J. Tomlinson, “Mapping current issues in
administrativejustice:austerityandthe‘morebureaucraticrationality’approach”(2017)39(3)J.S.W.F.L.380.15MinistryofJustice,JudicialReview:Proposalsforfurtherreform(London:Cm8703,2014).
16 Ministry of Justice, “Judicial review consultation–Press Release” (13 December 2012),
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/judicial-review-consultation[AccessedFebruary22,2018].
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shapingofgovernmentpolicy—andthepublicdebate—onjudicialreview.Thoughthisarticle
isnottheplacetoprovideit,thereiscertainlyanurgentneedforathoroughandwide-ranging
assessmentofthe“economy”ofthemodernjudicialreviewsystem.
Thecoreconcernofthisarticle—crowdfunding—relatesspecificallytothefundingof
judicialreviewcases.17Inrespectoffundingacase,twoissuesneedtobeconsideredbyany
prospectivejudicialreviewclaimantattheoutset:payingtheirownlegalfeesandexpenses,
andbudgetingtopaytheotherside’scostsiftheclaimfails.Therearethreemainwaysfor
claimants to pay their own lawyer costs: paying from existing funds; entering into a
conditionalfeeagreement(a“CFA”)withsolicitorsand/orcounsel;orobtainingagrantof
legalaid.18
Forthosepayingfromtheirownpockets,solicitorstypicallybilltheirtimeathourly
ratesdependingontheseniorityofthefeeearner,oratafixedfee(forthewholecaseorfor
stages of it), or a combination of both. The level of funds needed for lawyer fees and
disbursementsvarieswidelypercase.Itisclear,however,thecostofbringingajudicialreview
claimthatgoestoafullhearingmaybeconsiderable(lessenediftheclaimantwantstobring
aclaimasalitigantinperson).A2007estimateplacedthecostsintheregionof£10,000to
£20,000forastraightforwardcase,possiblymuchhigherforamorecomplexmatter.19This
has likely increasedinthedecadesincetheestimatewasmade.Hickman,writingin2017,
estimatesthata“verysimpletwohour judicial reviewagainstagovernmentdepartment”
wouldcostaround£8,000to£10,000.20A“moderatelycomplexclaimlastingadayandnot
broughtagainstacentralgovernmentdepartment”wouldruninexcessof£40,000,plusVAT.
Fora“substantialtwodayjudicialreview,”Hickmanestimatescostswillrunto£80,000and
£200,000.Whilethereisanabsenceofrecentsystematicdata,legalfeesareclearlysignificant
amounts.Itmustalsobenotedthatifaclaimantisunsuccessful,theyarelikelytobeliable
forthedefendant’scostsaswellastheirown.Theyaretherefore lookingata legalbillof
17Otherkeyaspectsofthe“economy”ofjudicialreviewincludecourtfees,costsrules,etc.
18 Legal aid grants comewith a level of costs protection too. Before the event insurance policies (typically
included in home and motor insurance policies) fund various types of litigation, but are ill-suited to non-
monetaryclaimswhereremediesarediscretionary,andsoarenotgenerallyavailabletocoverjudicialreview
proceedings.19ThePublicLawProject,Howtofundajudicialreviewclaimwhenpublicfundingisnotavailable(London:The
PublicLawProject,2007),para.1,whichwas informedbydiscussionwhichpractitioners.Furtherandsimilar
estimates are available in a response to aMinistryof JusticeConsultationmadeavailable via a Freedomof
InformationAct2000(FOIA)request,seeFOIARequestNo.171204020.20Hickman,“PublicLaw’sDisgrace”.
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3257787
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upwardsof£30,000iftheylose,andtheymustbepreparedforthiseventuality,whileallthe
timebearinginmindthegeneralunpredictabilityofjudicialreviewproceedings,adjudication,
andcostsorders.
CFAsare sometimes referred to as “nowinno feeagreements.” In judicial review
cases,theyareagreementsbetweenclaimantsandtheirlawyersthatrequirethelawyersto
agreetoactinacaseonthebasisthattheywillonlybepaidifthecaseissuccessful.Lawyers
areabletochargeasuccessfeeofupto100%ifthecaseiswontocompensatethemforthe
riskofbeingpaidnothing.However,sinceApril2013,successfeesarenolongerrecoverable
from the defendant, butmust instead be paid by the claimant. Given the non-monetary
natureofjudicialreview,theprospectofpayingasuccessfeeoftenmakesaCFAexpensive
andunattractive.Forthisreason,manyjudicialreviewclaimantswillonlybeabletoproceed
if they can agree a particular type of CFA commonly known as a “CFA-Lite”. This is an
agreementwhichlimitsthecostspayabletothesolicitortotheamountofcoststhatmaybe
recovered fromtheother side (which theclaimanthas toagree topursue),anddoesnot
requiretheclaimanttopaythelawyersasuccessfee.Ifthecaseissuccessfulandan inter
partescostsorder isobtained,theclaimant’s lawyerscanrecovertheir full fees.CFA-Lites
maybeusedinconjunctionwithfixedfees.
Afixedfeecanbeagreedwithlawyerstoperhapsgetaroundsomeofthedifficulties
facedwithhighfees.However,agreeingfixedfeesattheoutsetisriskyforlawyerssincethey
willnotgenerallyhavehadanopportunitytofullyengagewiththecasepapers,andjudicial
reviewlitigationisoftenunpredictableevenifwellprepared.Assuch,fixedfeesareoften
chargedinconjunctionwithaCFA,asameansofreducingthelawyers’exposure,withfull
feespayableintheeventthataninterpartescostsorderisobtained—thisiscommonlycalled
aDiscountedFeeAgreement.
Legalaidisanotherkeysourceoffunding.Thespecificprovisionsgoverningthegrant
oflegalaidinjudicialreviewhaveabyzantinecomplexity.Broadlyspeaking,therearetwo
typesoflegalaidrelevanttojudicialreview.ThereisLegalHelp,whichcoversinitialadvice
andassistance.ThereisalsoLegalRepresentation.LegalHelpisatypeof“controlledwork,”
whichsolicitorshavecontractualrightstoself-grant.Lawyersarepaidafixedfee,currently
£259,regardlessoftheamountofworkcarriedout,unlessactualcostsexceedthefixedfee
byafactorofthreeormore,inwhichcase,anhourlyratecanbeclaimedinthefullamount
(thisassessedonacasebycasebasisby theLegalAidAgency).TheLegalRepresentation
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categoryitself involvestwotypesoflegalaid:InvestigativeRepresentation,whichtypically
coversworktobedonetoestablishthemeritsofapotentialclaim;andFullRepresentation,
which covers work to be done from the issuing of proceedings. Investigative and Full
Representationarecategoriesofworkknownas“licensedwork”forwhich,saveincertain
prescribedexceptionalcircumstances,permissionneedstobesought inadvancefromthe
LegalAidAgency.Lawyersarepaidperhouratratesfixedbyregulation.21Solicitorsprepare
abillattheendofacase,includingallthedisbursementsincurredsuchascounsels’,experts’,
andcourtfees.EachbillisassessedeitherbytheLegalAidAgency(ifeitherthebillislessthan
£2500,orifproceedingswerenotissued),orbythecourt.Ifanorderisobtainedthatanother
partymustpaythelegallyaidedperson’scosts,thesolicitorssendthebilltothepayingparty
forpayment. Ifagreementon thesizeof thebill cannotbe reached, thesolicitors for the
receivingpartycancommenceassessmentproceedingstogetthebillassessedbythecourt.
Eligibility for legal aid is governedby legislation, theprovisions and applicationsofwhich
determines:whether a claim if of a kind that is ‘within scope’ andeligible for legal aid;22
whethertheapplicantforlegalaidsatisfiesthe‘meanstest’;23andwhetherthemeritsofthe
claimaresufficienttosatisfythemeritstest.24
Recentreformstolegalaidhavecausedwidespreadconcerninthelegalcommunity.25
In the contextof judicial review,Hickmanhasarguedpowerfully that theyarepartof an
accessto justicecrisis that is“public law’sdisgrace.”26Hearguesthatthemost important
componentoflegalaid,atleastasitappliesinthefieldofpubliclaw,isnotthatitprovidesa
sourceof funding foraperson’s lawyersbutbecause it comeswithprotectionagainstan
adversecostsorder.Heobservesthat“todayveryfewpeoplenowqualifyforlegalaid.”27This
is, in large part, because of substantial restrictions on the scope of legal aid and the
applicationof themeanstest.28ForHickman, theground-level reality is that“peoplewho
have£169.15ormoreperweekforthemselvesandtheirfamilytoliveoff,orwhohaveany
21CivilLegalAid(Remuneration)Regulations2013(SI2013/422)Sch.1para.3.
22LegalAidSentencingandPunishmentofOffendersAct2012s.9ands.10.
23CivilLegalAid(FinancialResourcesandPaymentforServices)Regulations2013(SI2013/480)(asamended).
24CivilLegalAid(MeritsCriteria)Regulations2013(SI2013/104)(asamended).
25ThestatutorylynchpinofthesereformswastheLegalAid,SentencingandPunishmentofOffendersAct2012.
Suchconcernwas,forinstance,well-documentedinthediscussionaroundtheBachCommission,seeTheBach
Commission,TheRighttoJustice(London:FabienSociety,2017).26Hickman,“PublicLaw’sDisgrace”.
27Above.
28LegalAidAgency,MeansAssessmentGuidance(April2015).Seefurther:D.Hirsch,PricedoutofJustice?Means
testinglegalaidandmakingendsmeet(LawSociety:London,2018).
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significant assets, do not qualify for legal aid.”29 Added to this, the government also
introduceda"nopermission,nofee"arrangement,whererepresentativesonlygetfeesfor
legal aid work at permission stage if the application is granted.30 The effect of these
arrangementswaschallengedviajudicialreviewand,asaresult,paymentisnowavailablein
caseswherethedefendantwithdrawsthedecisionunderchallenge,thecourtordersanoral
hearing,orthecourtordersarolled-uphearingofboththepermissionandsubstantiveissues
atthesametime.31Thegeneralprincipleofthearrangement,however,stillremainsinforce.
Hickman’s analysis—and its characterisationof access to judicial reviewas a “disgrace”—
struckachordwithpractitioners,bothinportrayingtheroleoflegalaidinjudicialreviewand
highlighting thewider issueof costs.Assessing theprecise sizeof theproblem is difficult
without clear empirical data.32 A limited amount of administrative data is, however,
available.33Table1showsthetotalamountofapplicationsforlegalaidmadeinjudicialreview
cases from2006 to2017.Table2 showsdata taken from theAdministrativeCourtCOINS
databaseonhowmanymay judicial reviewsare recordedasbeingsupportedby legalaid
from2000to2016.Theoverallupshotwhichcanbetakenfromthesetwodatasetsisthat
legalaidisnowalsomoredifficulttosecureforcaseswithaclearpublicinterestdimension.
Table1:totalamountofapplicationsforlegalaidmadeinjudicialreviewcasesoverthelasttenyears
Year Granted NotGranted
2006-07 5,085 758
2007-08 4,925 730
2008-09 5,605 724
2009-10 6,589 875
2010-11 5,484 914
2011-12 5,491 1,128
2012-13 6,298 1,103
2013-14 5,313 2,008
2014-15 3,718 1,311
29Hickman,“PublicLaw’sDisgrace”.
30CivilLegalAid(Remuneration)(Amendment)(No3)Regulations2014(SI2014/607).
31R.(ontheapplicationofBenHoareBellSolicitors&Ors)vTheLordChancellor[2015]EWHC523(Admin);The
CivilLegalAid(Remuneration)(Amendment)Regulations2015(SI2015/898).32Much helpful data is kept by the government.Much of it is published butmuch ofwhat is available on
governmentsystemsmaybegenuinelyoutsideoftheprovisionsofFOIA.33ThiswasmadeavailableviaanFOIArequestbytheauthor,seeFOIARequestNo.171020004.
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2015-16 3,842 1,560
2016-17 3,131 970
Table2:amountofjudicialreviewcasesrecordedasbeingsupportedbylegalaidontheAdministrative
CourtCOINSdatabase
Year Numberofjudicialreviews Numberofjudicialreviewswithlegalaid Asa%
2000 4238 1163 27.44%
2001 4722 1733 36.70%
2002 5372 1586 29.52%
2003 5938 1938 32.64%
2004 4200 913 21.74%
2005 5356 930 17.36%
2006 6421 1077 16.77%
2007 6684 921 13.78%
2008 7093 1024 14.44%
2009 9098 1440 15.83%
2010 10553 1340 12.70%
2011 11360 799 7.03%
2012 12429 1246 10.02%
2013 15594 933 5.98%
2014 4065 240 5.90%
2015 4679 205 4.38%
2016 4300 195 4.53%
Overall,thegeneralpictureofjudicialreviewfundingintheUK,atleastintermsof
thesourcesoffundingthathavebeenavailableinrecentyears,isoneofincreasingscarcity.
Feesarestillhigh,legalaidgrantsaredecreasing,andotherkindsofagreements—suchas
CFAs—arefarfromidealinjudicialreview.Inthiscontext,PILfindsitselfinanew,evenmore
hostile environment thanbefore; the key funding variables are shifting.Certainly, various
third-party funders—such as charitable trusts or the Equality and Human Rights
Commission—stillsometimesbackjudicialreviews,buttheoverallfundinglandscaperemains
morebaronthanitwasintherecentpast.34
34Thelongerhistoryoffundingforjudicialreviewsis,ofcourse,amorecomplexstory.
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CrowdfundingandJudicialReview
Arelatively recentphenomenon is thepossibilityof raisingmoney for litigationviaonline
crowdfunding platforms. Crowdfunding in general has risen in prominence across theUK
economy—a trend often attributed to the failure of banks and other traditional funding
sourcestomeetdemand—andthecrowdfundingmarkethasgrownmassivelyinsize,seeing
hugeyear-on-yeargrowth.In2013,£666millionwasraisedthroughcrowdfundingplatforms,
whichroseto£1.74billionand£3.2billionin2014and2015respectively.35AreviewbyNesta
adopted the view that crowdfunding is now a key aspect of the “alternative finance
economy,”andanindustrywhich“isquicklybecominganimportantpartoftheUKeconomy,”
onewherean“innovative,technologyledapproachhasimprovedaccesstofinancefor[small
andmediumenterprises]andseemstobehavingapositiveimpactonsocialandcharitable
enterprises.”36Themovetowardthisnewalternativefinanceindustrywassupportedbythe
government,andsowas theuseofcrowdfundingspecifically. In2012, todemonstrate its
support, the Coalition Government invested £20 million in businesses via crowdfunding
platformsandmadeafurther£40millioninvestmentin2014.37Atthesametime,therehave
beengrowingconcernsaboutthegeneralregulationofcrowdfundingactivitiesandincreased
regulationislikelytodevelopinthecomingyears.38
Inthelitigationcontext,crowdfundingis,inessence,aformofthirdpartylitigation
fundingarrangement.ThiswasdefinedbyJacksonLJasfundingbya“partywhohasnopre-
existinginterestinthelitigation,usuallyonthebasisthat(i)thefunderwillbepaidoutofthe
proceedsofanyamountsrecoveredasaconsequenceofthelitigation,oftenasapercentage
35B.Zhang,P.Baeck,T.Ziegler,J.BoneandK.Garvey,PushingBoundaries:The2015UKAlternativeFinance
IndustryReport(Nesta:London,2015).36Abovep.5.
37DepartmentforBusiness,Innovation&Skills,"New£40millioninvestmentbyBritishBusinessBanktosupport
£450million of lending to smaller businesses—Press" (25 February 2014),
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-40-million-investment-by-british-business-bank-to-support-450-
million-of-lending-to-smaller-businesses[AccessedFebruary22,2018].38 J. Armour and L. Enriques, “The Promise and Perils of Crowdfunding: Between Corporate Finance and
ConsumerContracts”(2018)81(1)M.L.R.51.TheFinancialConductAuthorityarealsonowtakingvarioussteps
inrespectofcrowdfundingplatforms.Forinstance,theyconsidercertainformsofcrowdfunding—loan-based
crowdfunding and investment-based crowdfunding—as regulated activities under the Financial Services and
MarketsAct2000.
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oftherecoverysum;and(ii)thefunderisnotentitledtopaymentshouldtheclaimfail.”39
Longprohibitedundertheancientprinciples40ofbarretry,maintenance,andchamperty,the
past century sawa gradual liberalisationon third-party funding for litigation.41 Jackson LJ
considered that third party funding is in principle “beneficial and should be supported,”
because,amongstotherbenefits,it“providesanadditionalmeansoffundinglitigationand,
forsomeparties,theonlymeansoffundinglitigation[andthus]promotesaccesstojustice.”42
Inacrowdfundingarrangement,onlinedonationsaremadetoacollectivepot.Thepotof
fundsthenessentiallyisthethird-partyfund,withthedonorsthefunders.Adistinctioncan
be drawn between “investment-based” crowdfunding models, where investors have a
financial stake in a monetary claim, and “non-investment based” crowdfunding models,
wheretheinvestors’rewardisnon-monetaryornon-existent.43
TwoorganisationsintheUKcurrentlyofferbespokecrowdfundingservicesforjudicial
review claims and are particularly prominent: CrowdJustice and the Good Law Project.
CrowdJustice offers a platform for case owners (those seeking funding) to publicise and
fundraiseforaprospectivecase.Caseowners,withsupport fromCrowdJustice,developa
webpagesettingoutdetailsofthecaseforwhichfundingissought,atargetamount,anda
deadline for raising it. The page is typically publicised through social media and online
donationsareaccepted.Ifthetargetismet,thenfundsaretransferredintothecaseowner’s
solicitors’clientaccount.CrowdJusticetakesa6%“platformfee,”plusVAT,fromtheoverall
totalraised.Thepaymentprocessalsohasachargeof1.7%plus20pperpledge.Ifthecase
owner’stargetisnotmet,CrowdJusticedonottakeafee,pledgesarecancelled,andbackers’
cardsarenotcharged.Ifthecaseproceeds,anyfundsthatareunusedattheconclusionof
thecasearereturnedbythesolicitorstoCrowdJustice.Thecaseownercanelecttoputsuch
unusedfundstowardsanothercaseonCrowdJustice,orfailingthat,theyaredonatedtothe
AccesstoJusticeFoundation.Thosewhodonateover£1,000aregiventheoptionofapro
39LordJusticeJackson,ReviewofCivilCosts:FinalReport(2009),p.xv.However,JacksonLJrecognisedthatthird
partyfundingis“notusuallyfeasiblewherenon-monetaryrelief,suchasaninjunctionordeclaration,isthemain
remedysought.”40M.Radin,‘MaintenancebyChamperty’(1935)24CaliforniaLawReview48,49;GilesvThompson[1994]1
AC142,p.153(LordMustill).41Foranoverview,seeLordNeuberger,“FromBarretry,MaintenanceandChampertytoLitigationFunding”
(HarbourLitigationFundingLecture,2013).42AboveCh.11,para.1.2.
43Perry,“CrowdfundingCivilJustice”(2018)B.C.L.R.(forthcoming).
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11
rata refund. CrowdJustice does not offer any legal advice. All information about the case
comesfromthecaseownersandtheirlawyers.
TheGoodLawProjectwasfoundedbyitsDirector,JolyonMaughamQC—asuccessful
tax barrister. It is not itself a crowdfunding platform—it uses CrowdJustice—but
crowdfundingisakeypartofitsoperation.Itisanexpresslypoliticalproject,whoseaimsare
touselitigationtodrivethedemandforchange.Ithasparticularareasofinterest,including
tax,workers’rights,andBrexit.ThegeneralwayinwhichtheGoodLawProjectworkswasset
outinalecturebyitsDirector.44Inessence,theDirectorseekspotentialcaseswhichmeet
the Project’s case selection criteria, secures pro bono advice from counsel, and seeks
solicitorsandcounselwillingtoactontermsconsistentwiththecrowdfundingexerciseat
Governmentlawyerrates,andthencrowdfundsattheletterbeforeclaimstage.Thefirstcase
theGoodLawProjectrelatedtotheargumentultimatelydecidedbytheSupremeCourtin
Miller.45AftertheArticle50argumentwasfloatedinanonlineblog,Maughamcrowdfunded
initialadvice(thoughthiseffortwasoneofmultipleeffortsandtheGoodLawProjectdidnot
takepartinthelitigation).46Sincethen,ithascrowdfundedachallengetoUber’sallegedVAT
avoidance (valued at around £1bn) and a challenge to the Electoral Commission’s
investigation into Vote Leave’s spending returns, the latter arguing that the Electoral
Commission’sinvestigationappliedthewrongtestoflawandwasinadequateonthefacts.
Both CrowdJustice and the Good Law Project have taken a different approach to
vetting prospective claims, to try to ensure that they are supporting meritorious cases.
CrowdJustice requires that every individualor group takinga caseeitherhaveaqualified
solicitororbarristerwhohasbeeninstructed,orthatthecaseisbeingtakenbyanon-profit,
andthenleavesitto“campaign”topersuadedonorsofthemeritofthecase.TheGoodLaw
ProjectusestheresourcesofitsDirectorforthispurpose,whichplacesalimitonthenumber
ofcasesitcansupport.
Itisimportanttonotethatthoseengagedwithcrowdfundingjudicialreviewsarea
muchmorediversegroupthanthetwoorganisationshighlightedhere.Manycharities,for
44J.MaughamQC,“TheLawyerasPoliticalActor”(AnnualQueenMaryUniversityofLondonLawandSociety
Lecture,2017).45R(Miller)vSecretaryofStateforExitingtheEuropeanUnion[2017]UKSC5;[2017]2W.L.R.583.
46 The legal argument was outlined in N. Barber, T. Hickman and J. King, “Pulling the Article 50 ‘Trigger’:
Parliament’s Indispensable Role” (June 27 2016) UK Constitutional Law Blog,
https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/06/27/nick-barber-tom-hickman-and-jeff-king-pulling-the-article-50-
trigger-parliaments-indispensable-role/[AccessedFebruary22,2018].
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12
instance, who bring litigation to pursue their aims rely upon crowdfunding. So too do
individualslackingsufficientmeanstobringacase.However,thecrowdfundingmodelisopen
tousebyawidevarietyofactorsandthereforepotentiallyabuseofvariouskindsbyboththe
malevolentormisguided.Therehavebeennomajorscandalsyetthatrelatetocrowdfunded
litigation, but there are anecdotal reports of dubious crowdfunding propositions being
circulatedandmuchofcrowdfundingactivity,despitebeingonline,maynotbeparticularly
visible.47 The landscape being effectively devoid of tailored regulation does not assist in
ensuringproblemsaredetected.Atpresent,thecrowdfunding“community”isanambiguous
entity.
OneexampleofacrowdfundedjudicialreviewintheUKisthejuniordoctors’case.48
Theclaimantgroup,JusticeforHealth,arguedthatanewcontractimposedbytheSecretary
ofStatewas“unsafeandunsustainable”andthattheSecretaryofStateforHealth—Jeremy
HuntMP—didnothavethelegalpowertoimposeit.Putsimply,thenewcontractchanged
the way doctors were to be reimbursed for weekend working. Instead of Saturdays and
Sundaysbeingdividedupbetween“normal”and“unsocial”hours,supplementsweretobe
paidwhichdependedonhowmanyweekendsadoctorworks.Healthministersarguedthat
thecontractwasnecessaryto improvemedicalcoveratweekends.49Theargument ledto
variousstrikesby juniordoctorsand ledtothefirstall-outstrike inNHShistory.GreenJ.,
sitting in the High Court, concluded thatMr. Hunt had acted “squarely” within his legal
powers.TheclaimantsalsoarguedthatMrHunt’sapproachlackedclarityandtransparency,
andthatitwasirrationaltocontendthatimposingthecontractwouldimproveweekendcare.
Green J. rejected all of these arguments, finding that the Secretary of State was legally
entitledtoadopttheviewthatchangingstaffingatweekendswouldhave“some,material”
impactonmedicalcover.Whatissignificantforthepurposesofthisarticleisthattheclaimant
inthiscase,JusticeforHealth,wasacompanyformedofjuniordoctorswhowere“directly
affected by the introduction of the contract.”50 They raised money—£300,000—via
CrowdJustice,basedondonationsbymorethan5,000donors.51Thelitigationwasledbyan
47Thisareaisripeforfurtherinvestigation.
48JusticeforHealthvSecretaryofStateforHealth[2016]EWHC2338;[2016]Med.L.R.599.
49Thereweredisputesabouttheevidenceusedbythegovernmenttosupportitscase.
50JusticeforHealth[2016]EWHC2338;[2016]Med.L.R.599[15].
51C.Dyer,“Juniordoctors'HighCourtchallengetoJeremyHunt”(13September2016)BritishMedicalJournal,
http://www.bmj.com/content/354/bmj.i4975[AccessedFebruary22,2018].
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establishedpubliclawfirm.GreenJ.observedthatthecasewas“financedbyalargenumber
ofindividualswhohavecontributedonacrowd-fundingbasisallofwhomitissaidoppose
theintroductionofthenewcontract”andhowsupporthadbeen“forthcomingfrommany
sources,includingseniormembersofthemedicalprofession.”52Earlyoninthecase,acap
wasplacedonhowmuchcostscouldberecovered.53Itisunclearwhetherthiscase—though
itultimatelyfailed—wouldhavebeenpossiblewithoutcrowdfunding.Ifithadsucceeded,the
reformwouldhaveessentiallybeencrowdfunded.
Another example of a case supported by crowdfunding—a less well-managed
instance—isWebster.54Thiscaseformedpartofastringofcases,broughtaftertheMiller
litigation,whichsoughttochallengethenoticeofwithdrawalsentbytheUKtotheEU.After
theclaimwasbroughtconsiderablyoutoftime,permissionwasrejectedonthepapersby
SupperstoneJas ‘unarguable.’Theclaimantsrenewedtheirapplicationatanoralrenewal
hearing.Thesecondtimearound,GrossLJandGreenJfoundtheapplicationtobetotally
withoutmerit:“[p]utbluntly,thedebatewhichtheclaimantseekstopromotebelongsfirmly
inthepoliticalarena,notthecourts.”55Remarkably,despitethemeritsofthecasealways
beingweak,theunderlyingcrowdfundingcampaignraised£190,000.Itwasalsoacampaign
not conducted with much transparency—unlike some other examples of successful
crowdfunding,detailsoftheargumentstobeputandthekeylitigationdocumentswerenot
madepublic.
Awordofwarningaboutexamplessuchasthetwooutlinedaboveisneeded.Justas
thereareexamplesofsuccessfulcrowdfundingattempts,therearemanymoreexamplesof
cases that gather hardly any support. In many respects, these failed attempts are more
interestingthantheheadline-grabbingcasesastheymayexposesomeoftheground-level
fundinggapsinthejusticesystemand,morebroadly,failuresofthestate.Thesearenotthe
cases,however,thatgetmuchattentioninthediscussionaroundcrowdfunding.Greatcare
must be taken to ensure that focus is now directed only on high-profile, successful
crowdfundingcampaignswhichmay,inreality,thebeexceptiontotheusualresult.
52JusticeforHealth[2016]EWHC2338;[2016]Med.L.R.599[15].
53CostcappingwasagreedtobytheSecretaryofState.Costcappingreceivedseminaljudicialconsiderationby
theCourtofAppealinR(CornerHouseResearch)vSecretaryofStateforTradeandIndustry[2005]EWCACiv
192;[2005]1W.L.R.2600.Seefurther:CriminalJusticeandCourtsAct2015s.88.54R(Webster)vSecretaryofStateforExitingtheEU[2018]EWHC1543(Admin).
55Above[10];[24].
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Finally,itshouldbenotethatcostcappingappearstobe]animportantpartofthe
evolving practice around crowdfunding. Costs capping orders (and their judge-made
predecessors, protective costs orders) are sought and made at an early stage in the
proceedings, conferring costs protection on a party regardless of the outcome of the
proceedings.56Thelawrelatingtoprotectivecostsorderswascodified,withsomechanges,
in theCriminal JusticeandCourtsAct2015,which introducedcosts cappingorders.57 The
conditionsthathavetobemetbeforethecourtcanmakeacostscappingorderarethat:
permission to apply for judicial review has been granted; the court is satisfied that the
proceedingsarepublicinterestproceedings;andthecourtissatisfiedthat,withoutacosts
capping order, the applicant would be acting reasonably by withdrawing or ceasing to
participateintheproceedings.Proceedingsareconsidered“publicinterestproceedings”only
if:anissuethatisthesubjectoftheproceedingsisofgeneralpublicimportance;thepublic
interest requires the issue to be resolved; and the proceedings are likely to provide an
appropriatemeansofresolvingit.Anumberoffactorsmustbetakenintoaccountbyjudges
consideringanapplication, including:thenumberofpeople likelytobedirectlyaffectedif
reliefisgrantedtotheapplicantforjudicialreview;howsignificanttheeffectonthosepeople
islikelytobe;andwhethertheproceedingsinvolveconsiderationofapointoflawofgeneral
publicimportance.58Ifanorderismade,areciprocalcapmustalsobeimposed,restricting
thecoststhebeneficiaryofthecostscappingorder isabletorecover.59Furthermore, it is
required that any application for a costs capping order is supported by evidence of the
applicant's financial resources, including “the financial resources of the parties to the
proceedings,includingthefinancialresourcesofanypersonwhoprovides,ormayprovide,
financialsupporttotheparties.”60Costcappingmaybehelpfultocrowdfundersoflimited
means and its appears to be the case that crowdfunded claimants do seek such orders
routinely. Recently, Cheema-Grubb J granted a cost capping order for a judicial review
broughtbyfiveclaimants,includingProfessorStephenHawking,challengingthelawfulness
56R(CornerHouseResearch)vSecretaryofStateforTradeandIndustry[2005]1W.L.R.2600.
57Sections88-90,CriminalJusticeandCourtsAct2015.ACostsCappingOrderisdefinedinsection88(2)as‘an
orderlimitingorremovingtheliabilityofapartytojudicialreviewproceedingstopayanotherparty’scostsin
connectionwithanystageoftheproceedings.’58Section88(8),CriminalJusticeandCourtsAct2015.
59Section89(2),CriminalJusticeandCourtsAct2015.
60Section89(1)(a),CriminalJusticeandCourtsAct2015.
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ofthegovernment’spolicytocreateaccountablecareorganisations.61Thatparticularruling
demonstratedapositivejudicialattitudetocrowdfundedclaimsinrespectofcostcapping
orders.Cheema-GrubbJobservedthatwhereajudicialreviewapplicationiscrowdfunded,
the public is funding both sides: the government by tax payers and the claimants by
crowdfunding.Itwasalsonotedthatcrowdfundingisinherentlyuncertainandthecertainty
providedbyacostscappingorderwashelpfultoenableindividualstotakeapublicinterest
caseforward.Cheema-GrubbJorderedacapof£160,000intotalfordefendants’costs(two
wereinvolved)andareciprocalcapof£115,000inrespectoftheclaimant’scosts.Thiswas
againstabackdropof the claimants raisingnearly£265,000via crowdfundingandprivate
donations,meaningtherulingenabledrelativelysubstantialfundstomeetthecostsofthe
claimants’ lawyers. We are, with cases such as this, witnessing the start of practices
developingand little iscertain,but it is likelythatapplicationsforcostcappingordersare
likelytobeacommonfeatureofcrowdfundingjudicialreviewlitigationinthecomingyears.
SolvingtheResourceProblemthroughCrowdfunding?
Connectingthepointssetoutabove,animportantquestionarises:iscrowdfundingapossible
answertotheissueoflackofresourcesinthecontextofPIL?Canit,inotherwords,provide
newfuelforreformthroughPIL?Itisarguedherethatcrowdfundingcan—incertaincases—
solve the resource dilemma. There are, however, many risks that are attached to
crowdfundinginthiscontext.Myaiminthispartofthearticleis,therefore,toelaboratethe
mainpossiblebenefitsandrisks.62
At the outset, it must be observed that it is clear that crowdfunding models do
possesses thepotential toquickly raise the sums required for judicial reviews. The junior
doctorscaseisagoodexampleofthis,raisingover£300,000.Butsuchsuccessis,ofcourse,
notguaranteedandfailedattemptsappeartobemuchmorecommon.63Theproposedcase
ultimatelyneedstofindfavourwithsomewillingdonors.Unlessanissueintheproposedcase
alreadyhasa strongplacewithin thepublic consciousness,gainsmedia traction,orhasa
specialist(andpreferablynotpoor)setofsupporters,itmaybethecasethatsomelevelof
61 R. (on the application of Hawking) v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care (22 February 2018,
unreported).AcostscapwasinitiallyrefusedbyMrJusticePeterWalker,whenhegrantedpermission. 62 The analysis provided in this section—exceptwhere explicitly stated—is general and not targeted at any
particularplatformororganisation.63Thereisnocleardatapublishedonthis.
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investmentisneededtopromotedonationsviathecrowdfundingplatform.Putsimply,itmay
costmoneytodrumupacrowdinthefirstplace.Inpractice,thiscouldprovetobeaserious
barrier to crowdfunding having wide-ranging impact on PIL. It could also have particular
implicationsfortheviabilityofcrowdfundingforgenuinelyunpopularclaimantsbriningpublic
lawchallenges.
Therearesometoughquestionsaroundthepracticalmanagementofcrowdfunding,
whichgivesrisetosomeethicalquandaries.First,whenshouldthefundingbesought?Too
early, and the action seems speculative. Too late, and delays—which can be fatal in the
judicialreviewcontext—mayarise.Second,howmuchshouldbecrowdfundedateachstage?
Thisinvolvesdeterminingwhatamountisrequiredandwhen.Somecrowdfundingcampaigns
seizeuponany initial“buzz”andraiseasmuchaspossibleat thestart.Thismaybegood
litigationstrategyinmanyrespects,butitalsohasproblems.Areputationmaybedamaged
byhavingtoreturnfunds(somethingwhichmaynotbelogisticallyeasy).Theremayalsobe
a“usefuldiscipline” in“puttingyourself inapositionwhereyouhavetomakeanongoing
caseforpeopletosupportthelitigation.”64Third,thereistheissueofwhatcrowdfundingis
soughtfor,i.e.whatshouldbepitchedtothepublic.Somecrowdfundingattemptsonlygive
veryboardoverviewsofthecasetheyintendtobring.Atthesametime,the“crowd”willbe
asectionofthepublicandapublic-facingpitchwillbenecessary.Furthermore,casesdevelop
andchangewhen,forinstance,moreinformationisdisclosedduringthecourseoflitigation;
whileanaccurate labelmaybeprintedwhenfundsaresought,there isachancethatthe
contentsofthetinmaychange.
There is also the question of the terms of the crowdfunding arrangement, and
particularlytheoperationofsections85and86oftheCriminalJusticeandCourtsAct2015.
Section85(1)providesthatnoapplicationforjudicialreviewwillbegrantedleaveunlessthe
applicanthas“providedthecourtwithanyinformationaboutthefinancingoftheapplication
thatisspecifiedinrulesofcourtforthepurposesofthisparagraph.”65Thecleareffectofthis
provisionistoeliminatethediscretionoftheHighCourttograntpermissionunlesscertain
financialinformationisprovided.Section86placesarequirementontheCourttohaveregard
to information provided under section 85when it is “determining bywhomand towhat
64J.MaughamQC,“TheLawyerasPoliticalActor”(AnnualQueenMaryUniversityofLondonLawandSociety
Lecture,2017).65ThisamendstheSeniorCourtsAct1981s31(3).
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extentcostsofandincidentaltojudicialreviewproceedingsaretobepaid.”66Thecourtmust
“consider whether to order costs to be paid by a person, other the proceedings, who is
identified in [the information referred to in section 86(3)] as someone who is providing
financialsupportforthepurposesoftheproceedingsorislikelyorabletodoso.”67Sections
85 and 86 sections are not yet in force, but are alluded to in CrowdJustice’s terms and
conditions,undertheheading“RisksofFundingLitigation”:
“In our viewUK case law indicates that pure funders – Backerswhodon’t have a
personal interest in theCase, don't stand tobenefit from it anddon’t control the
courseoftheCase–willnottypicallyhaveanyliabilitybeyondtheirinitialPledge…We
makenowarrantiesorrepresentationsastocostsorotherrisksofdonatingtoany
particularCase…NewlegislationthatcameintoeffectintheUKinApril2015indicates
thatinjudicialreviewcases,peoplewhodonateoveracertainamountmayhaveto
be identified to thecourts.Thatamounthasbeensetat£3,000.This requirement
couldexposebackerswhogiveover£3,000tojudicialreviewsincertaininstancesto
furthercostsrisks.Therequirementbroughtinbythislegislationwillexistwhether
youdonatetoacaseonlineoroffline.”
Inaddition,itisstipulatedthatbackers“acknowledgeandagreethat[they]donothave,and
[their] contribution (whether financial or otherwise) does not entitle [them] to have, any
rightsinortoanyCase,includinganyownership,controlorrightstoadviseontheconduct
orlegalstrategyofaCase.”Thepurposeofthisclauseappearstobetominimisetheriskthat
backers are held liable for in costs orders, since the exercise of some control over case
managementisoneofthefeaturesthatdistinguishesanon-partywhomaybesubjecttoa
non-partycostsorder,fromapurefunder(whoisnotnormallysosubject).Ifcrowdfunding
growsinthissphereandthesectionsarebroughtintoforce,theextenttowhichdonorsare
exposedtocourtordersmaybecomeakeyfactorindeterminingthevolumeofdonations
andtheiramount,andwillbringfurtherethicalconsiderationsintoplay.
Lookingmorebroadly,itisdifficulttoseeatwhatpointacrowdfundingprojectwill
be consideredauthentic. Inotherwords,howmanydonorsareneeded for there tobea
66CriminalJusticeandCourtsAct2015s86(1).
67CriminalJusticeandCourtsAct2015s86(3).
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genuine “crowd” and not just a few private backers? One of themain distinctions often
observedbetweencrowdfundingandothertypesofonlinedonationmethodsisthat,with
crowdfunding,donorsbecomeawareofeachotherthroughthe“campaign.”This,ithasbeen
argued,producesa“collectiveenergy”andhastheeffectofinformingdonors.68Thejunior
doctorscase,forinstance,attracted5,000donors.69Thiscouldbesaidtostandasevidence
ofbroad-basedparticipation—agoodnumberofthecommunitywaswillingtoputmoneyto
thecauseinthecase.Thiscouldallowcasestomakeclaimstosomekindofpopularapproval.
However,wherethenumberofdonorsislimitedoracrowdfundingattemptfails,thatcould
standasevidence that thecrowdfundingattempt iseitheragimmickor lacks community
support.70Thesuggestionthatpopularitymatterstowhetheracaseisbroughtornotalsosits
particularlyuncomfortablywiththenatureofpubliclawandjudicialreview,whichisoften
observedtoprovide—atleastinpart—thefunctionofprotectingtheindividualandoftenthat
protectionisfrommajorityorpopularviews.Itwouldcertainlyrubupagainstmuchliberal
constitutional thought if the ability to fundraise from the community became somehow
conflatedwithwhethertherewasapublicinterestinacasebeingbrought.71
Another important question is how the distinction between “investment-based”
crowdfundingmodels,whereinvestorshaveafinancialstakeinamonetaryclaim,and“non-
investmentbased”crowdfundingmodels,wherethe investors’reward isnon-monetaryor
intangibleishandled.72Perryarguesthatthatuseoftheformershouldbeencouraged,but
thelatterconstrained.Thisisbecauseininvestment-basedcrowdfundingmodels,investors
havean interest in theproperevaluationof themeritsofaclaim,so the fundingprocess
facilitatesclaimsthatwouldnototherwisebebroughtbutminimisestheriskthattheclaims
willbeunmeritorious.Innon-investmentbasedcrowdfundingmodels,Perryconcludesthat
thelackofanyfinancialinterestinaclaimreducestheincentiveforinvestorstovetthemerits
ofthecase,legalorotherwise(indeed,investorsinthiscontextmaybebetterunderstoodas
“donors” or “backers”). Perry therefore recommends that in non-investment based
crowdfundingmodels,claimsshouldbesubjecttoaprofessionalvettingprocesstominimise
68R.Davies,CivicCrowdfunding:ParticipatoryCommunities,EntrepreneursandthePoliticalEconomyofPlace
(MasterofScienceThesis,MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology,2014),p.26.69C.Dyer,“Juniordoctors'HighCourtchallengetoJeremyHunt”.
70This,ofcourse,maynotbefair,butitisapossibility.
71Thespecifictenetsthatmaybeintensionincludethenotionthatthelawcanprotectindividualsfromthe
“tyrannyofthemajority”andtheresponsivenessofdemocraticpoliticstoshort-terminterestsetc.72Perry,“CrowdfundingCivilJustice”(2018)B.C.L.R.(forthcoming).
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the risk of generating unmeritorious claims. Different organisations involved with
crowdfundingtakedifferentapproachestovetting.Asoutlinedabove,CrowdJusticerequires
thateveryindividualorgrouptakingacaseeitherhaveaqualifiedsolicitororbarristerwho
hasbeeninstructed,orthatthecaseisbeingtakenbyanon-profit,TheGoodLawProject
usestheresourcesof itsDirectorforthispurpose. It isunclearwhatvettingstandardsare
operatingacrossthecrowdfunding“community”asawhole.
Generally speaking, the possible change in the vetting processes used raises the
prospectof a verydifferentbreedof PIL to thatwhich theUK is familiarwith,which are
typically brought by organisations with expertise in public law litigation (e.g. Liberty or
JUSTICE) or some specialist policy area (e.g.Greenpeace). Traditionally, litigation—being
perceivedascomplexandrisky—hasbeenapproachedcarefullybymanyorganisations.One
upshotisthatthesamefeworganisationsappearagainandagainontheheadnotesofjudicial
reviews—in recent history, UK public interest judicial reviews have often involved
organisationswithsimilarbundlesofcorebeliefs.73AsRawlingsobserves:“[a]schiefrepeat
players,LibertyandJUSTICEmaynotyethavebeenassignedofficesinthe…SupremeCourt
buildingbuttheymightaswellbe.”74Theimplicationsofcrowdfundinginthisrespectmay
bediverse.Onepossibleoutcome is thatwe could seemorePIL.Of course, anyonewith
moneycouldhavealwayssetupsomekindoforganisationorsimplybroughtcases.75But
crowdfundingpotentiallyopensupthispossibilitytothosecauseswhereconcentratedfunds
havenotbeenreadilyavailablepreviously,anditcouldalsobeseenasremovingthebarrier
ofthosewithfundshavingtoputtheirownmoneyin.
CrowdfundingcouldalsoseelessexperiencedparticipantscomingtothePILscene.
JolyonMaughamQC—thoughprobablyconsideredpartofaliberal,metropolitaneliteoften
associatedwithPILintheUK—isagoodexampleofthepossibilityofcrowdfundingopening-
upwhoisinvolvedinPIL.Nodoubt,Maughamhasthecredentialsofawell-regardedtaxsilk.
But tax law is a very different beast to public interest judicial review. This is something
Maughamfreelyadmits,acknowledgingthat“organisationsintheUKthathaveafarlonger
historyofengagementinthecauselawyeringfield”thanhimselfandthatthismeans,inhis
73Theseareoftenobservedtobe“left-of-centre”or“liberal.”
74Rawlings,“ModellingJudicialReview”(2008)61(1)CLP95,p.103.
75Thespread-bettingtycoonStuartWheeler,whochallengedtheUK’sratificationoftheLisbonTreaty,isagood
example,see:R(Wheeler)vOfficeofthePrimeMinister[2008]EWHC1409(Admin);[2008]A.C.D.70.
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ownwords,thathesuffersthe“advantagesandsuffertheconsequencesofwho[heis].”76
ThisisnottosaythatMr.Maughamisnotsuitedtohisnewvocation,butdemonstrateshow
resources from crowdfunding can lead to an opening up of who can lead PIL. These
organisations, when considering and conducting PIL, have generally been responsive to
internal checks, governance systems (such as boards of trustees), and duties to wider
membership.Whilesuchorganisationscanofcourseusecrowdfunding,theplatformoffered
bycrowdfundingallowsforindividuallawyersandcampaignerstotranscendthetraditional
modelofPIL.The“causes”operatingbeyondsuchlitigationmaythereforebecomediversified
and, in the absence of traditional organisational structure, transfer more power to the
individuals bringing these cases and their lawyers. At the same time, there is also the
possibilitythatthe“craft”ofPIL—knowingwhentobringacase,knowingwhentoappeal,
knowingwhentogiveupetc.—maybediluted.Itmaybesaidthat,ultimately,vettingisdone
bythedonors.Afterall,“ifyouareaskingpeopletodiptheirhandsintotheirpocketstofund
acaseyouneedtobeabletojustifythatdecisiontoyourself–andtothem.”77But,again,
thisisadeparturefromconventionalvettingnorms—donorsareaverydifferentgroupthan
staffatcivilsocietyorganisations.
Thereisalsotheissueofhowthegovernmentmayrespondtoanyincreasedrolefor
crowdfundinginPIL.78Ifcrowdfunding(andotherprivatefundingmethods)canbeeffective
inpartiallyfillingtheresourcegap,governmentmaytakethisanindicatorthatpublicfunds
arenotnecessary.79Ithasbeenarguedthattheincreasedeffortsoftheprobonocommunity
inthewakeoflegalaidreformsstoppedthereformsfromfailingoutright,andthatthispro
bono work ultimately supports an ill-designed system through good deeds. If there are
crowdfundingsuccesses,governmentsinthefuturemightchoosetoleanonsuch“successes”
topromptotherwise restrictive reform in thearea.There is, tobeclear,notanounceof
systematicevidencethatcrowdfundingsomehowfillsthegapleftbyrecentreductionsinthe
76Maugham,“TheLawyerasPoliticalActor”(2017).
77Maugham,“TheLawyerasPoliticalActor”(2017).
78Thereismuchliteratureconsideringtheimpactofjudicialreview,seeP.Cane,“Understandingjudicialreview
anditsimpact”inM.HertoghandS.Halliday(eds.),JudicialReviewandBureaucraticImpact(Cambridge:CUP,
2004),p.16-17.79Someargue,though,thatpublicfundingmaynotbenecessaryinthewaymanyoftensuggest,seeA.Higgins,
“The Costs of Civil Justice andWho Pays” (2017) 37(3) O.J.L.S. 687. There is also a powerful argument for
consideringjudicialreviewcostsasdistinctfromstandardcivildisputes,seeM.Fordham,“RethinkingCostsin
JudicialReview” [2009] J.R.306;R (Davey)vAylesburyValeDistrictCouncil [2007]EWCACiv1166; [2008]1
W.L.R.878[18](SedleyLJ).
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availabilityoflegalaid.
Morebroadly,howgovernmentmayrespondtopoorly-managedPIL,orsimplytoa
possibleincreaseofactivityinPIL,duetocrowdfundingisanimportantquestion.Braibant,in
aseminalarticle,outlinedthreemainstrategiesthatgovernmentbodiescouldusetoavoid
implementing judgments:theycoulddelay,e.g.throughappeals;theycouldsimplyretake
procedurallyflaweddecision;ortheycouldlegislate.80Harlowaddedafourthpossibility,that
“government would simply disobey.”81 Harlow and Rawlings further highlighted how
governmentmayreactbytakingpre-emptiveactionstocurbfurtherlitigation,whichtheycall
“clampingdown.”82Thisisa“process”thatinvolves“structuralorproceduralchangetothe
judicialreviewprocessor,putdifferently,proceduralconstraintdesignedtobluntsubstantive
legalaction.”InPressureThroughLaw,HarlowandRawlingsalsomakeclearthatpre-emptive
“clamping down” does not have to be directed at the judiciary but can be aimed at
discouraging particular claimants or groups. In that text—published in 1992—it was
suggestedthattheUKgovernmentmightmovetoclampdownonjudicialreview.Amongthe
possibilitiesdiscussedthenwere:directstepstoexcludeclaims,e.g.throughousterclauses;
procedural changes to judicial review, e.g. amendments to standing criteria and the
permissiontest;increasingthecostofjudicialreviewbyreducinglegalaidorincreasingcourt
fees.83SincePressureThroughLaw,therehavebeenmultipleexamplesofclampingdown—
aside from the costs and funding issues discussed above, there have been many other
instances.84 Indeed, itcouldbesaid that therehasbeenaprotractedprocessofclamping
downonjudicialreviewinrecentdecades.Ifcrowdfundingiseffectiveinprovidingresources
forpublicinterestjudicialreviews,newreactions—whether“strikingback”inindividualcases
or“clampingdown”onthejudicialreviewsystemitself—maybeonthecards.Ifcrowdfunded
casesarepoorlymanaged,itisdifficulttoimagineaclampdownofsomekindnothappening.
Beyondthequestionofthegovernment’sreaction,thereisalsothequestionofhow
thejudiciarymayrespondtoanyincreasedroleforcrowdfundinginPIL.Judicialreviewisin
80G.Braibant,“Remarquessurl’efficacitédesannulationspourexcèsdepouvoir”[1961]E.D.C.E.53.
81C.Harlow,“AdministrativeReactiontoJudicialReview”[1976]P.L.116.
82 C. Harlow and R. Rawlings, “'Striking Back' and 'Clamping Down': An Alternative Perspective on Judicial
Review”inJ.Bell,M.Elliott,J.N.E.Varuhas,P,Murray(eds)PublicLawAdjudicationinCommonLawSystems:
ProcessandSubstance(Oxford:Hart,2016).83HarlowandRawlings,PressureThroughLaw(1992).
84Fordiscussionofonesuchepisode,see:R.Rawlings,“Review,RevengeandRetreat”(2005)68(3)M.L.R.378;
R.Thomas,“Aftertheouster:reviewandreconsiderationinasingletiertribunal”[2006]P.L.674.
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22
many respects a discretionary jurisdiction, providing lots of scope for judicial attitudes
(whetherhostilityorembrace)tohavepracticalconsequences.Intheeventthatthereismore
poorly-managed,orsimplyagreatervolumeof,PILduetocrowdfunding,judicialdiscretion
maycometobepresumedtooperateagainstcrowdfundedcases.Itmayevenbethecase
that common lawprincipleswithbaked-inhostility follow.Themerepresenceanduseof
crowdfunding platform may also generate a—possibly very unhelpful and unrealistic—
expectationthatclaimantsseektofundraise independently.Ofcourse,theoppositecould
happentoo.Thereareexamplesof the judiciary liberalisinggateways forPIL funding.The
rulingonprotectivecostsorderinCornerHouseisafamousinstance85andtherehavebeen
somecaseswherejudgesappeartotakethepresenceofcrowdfundingaspositivefeatureof
aclaimant’scase.86Theconductofcrowdfundedcasesmaybeakeyfactorinthisrespect.
Crowdfunding of PIL can perhaps avoid the “ethical arguments” that investment-
basedcrowdfundersoftenface,i.e.thattheyareinittogetrich.Injudicialreview,thereis
likelytobenoimmediate“potofgold”tobeseizedbytakingacase,therebyalleviatingany
concerns that crowd fundersmight be chasing a pecuniary end or that theremight be a
conflictofinterestwitheitherthelitigantorthelawyersinthecase.Thatsaid,lawyerswill
likelygetpaidoutofcrowdfundedpotsofmoney.TheimpressionthatPILisa“feedingtrough
forlawyers”ispotentiallyproblematic.87
Finally,itiscommontoheartheargumentthatcrowdfundingisnotagenuinelynew
practice,itjustputsonlinesomethingthatcommunitieshavedoneformanyyears:getting
togethertoraisemoneyforlitigation.Somemightsaythat,onthisbasis,therisksidentified
hereoughtnottobeofconcern.Thereis,nodoubt,anelementoftruthtothis.Indeed,many
judicialreviewclaimantsmaystill,informally,askfamily,friendsortheirlocalcommunityfor
help with funding a case. But crowdfunding is more than simply the digitalisation of an
existing practice. Though it may be able to claim its heritage is in informal community
fundraising initiatives, crowdfunding is qualitatively different in multiple respects. For
instance,thefactthefundraisingtakesplaceonlinemeansitismorewidelyaccessibleand
that fundraisingcampaignsare likely tobemorewidelycirculated.Similar, campaignsare
85R(CornerHouseResearch)vSecretaryofStateforTradeandIndustry[2005]EWCACiv192.
86e.g.StephenHawkingandothersvSecretaryofStateforHealth&SocialCareandNationalHealthService
CommissioningBoard(unreported)(22February2018).87TheGoodLawProject’sapproachistopayGovernmentratestolawyersituses,andexplainthatcertainthings
mayhavetobedoneprobonoduringthecase.
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23
perhaps more likely to become a national political issue or be connected to an existing
nationalissue.Thismaybebeneficialinmanyrespects,butitisstillasubstantialdifference.
Theuseofonlinesystemsalsocreatesanew,importantactor:theplatformthathoststhe
campaigns. Platforms such as CrowdJustice are now key players in this area and possess
powertoaffecthowfundraisingcampaignsoperate.Thecentralisationofthistasktherefore
represents a material change to the old practice. Crowdfunding could well be overall
beneficialbutweshouldcertainlyresistanysuggestionthatcrowdfundingcampaignsarethe
sameas,forinstance,afewmembersofalocalcommunitygettingtogethertochallengean
unwelcomeplanningdecision.
TowardsaPracticalEthics
Whattheaboveanalysisshowsisthatcrowdfundingisbestconsideredariskyresourceinthe
PILcontext.Itisriskyasitmayunsettlevariousestablishedpartsofthecurrentlandscapeand
havearangeofunforeseenconsequences.Atthesametime,crowdfundingisstillaresource
despite its possible flaws and consequences, and has the potential to provide litigation
fundingwhere thereotherwise isnone.Thenextchallenge isdevisinganapproachwhich
optimises itsbenefitswhileminimising risk. Inotherwords, tocreateapracticalethicsof
crowdfunding in the judicial review context.88 The demand for this is, in many ways,
exemplified by Jo Maugham QC’s reflections on his experiences of the practice of
crowdfunding PIL—which often can be read as a lawyer seeking to understand the
crowdfundingofPILwithintheframeworkhisownprofessionalethics.89Inthisfinalpartof
thearticle,IsketchtheshapeaspecificethicsofcrowdfundingPILcouldtake.
Thefirstkeyissueiswhooughttoberegulated.Thestoryoftheriseofcrowdfunding
isoneinvolvingnumerousactors:judges,lawyers,NGOs,crowdfundingplatformsetc.While
allof theseactorsought toactcarefullyandethically inrespectofcrowdfunding, lawyers
seemthebesttoorientateapracticalethicalcodeoncrowdfundingtowards. It is lawyers
whowieldthemostsignificantamountofpowerinthebringingandconductofcrowdfunded
PIL.Platformsoftenuselawyersasthevettingmechanismforcasestoo.Inaddition,lawyers
88Ofthebroadtypedescribed inP.Singer,PracticalEthics(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,3
rdEdn,
2011).89Maugham,“TheLawyerasPoliticalActor”(2017).
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arefamiliarwithdealingcloselywiththeethicsoftheirpracticeandthecomplexitiesthat
ariseoutofethicalcodes,andestablishedregulatorsarealreadyinplace.90
Thesecondandthirdissuesarehowlawyersoughttoberegulatedandhowweshould
reasonouttheprinciplesthatconstitutethepracticalethics.Instructiveguidanceonthese
questions can be found by looking at how solicitors’ and barristers’ ethics are presently
regulated.This isdoneprimarilythroughflexiblecodesenforcedbyestablishedregulatory
bodies.91 These codes—though often framed in the language of “duties”—are broad
principlesof ethical decision-makingwhich seek toprocurea rangeofoutcomes, suchas
accesstojustice,effectiverepresentation,fairhearingsetc.92Theyarenothardlegalrules
butsoft frameworkprinciplesthataredesignedtohelpthose involved in legalpracticeto
workthroughchallengeswhichariseinthecourseoftheirwork.Someoftheprinciples,such
as the cab-rank rule, have a longhistory butmanyprinciples shiftwith time and societal
development.Forinstance,inrecentyearstherulerelatingtowhatbarristerscansaytothe
presshavechanged.93Developments in theuseof technologyhavealsobeenacause for
revisitingtheethicalprinciplesregulatinglegalprofessionals.Recently,forexample,theBar
StandardsBoardissuednewguidanceontheuseofsocialmedia.94Thereisnoreasonwhy
the crowdfunding activities of legal professionals—or legal professionals involved in
crowdfundedlitigation—oughtnottobesubjecttoguidanceofthiskind.Itcouldbeargued
thatitisbesttoleavethisareaoflegalpracticeunregulatedandlawyersoughttobeableto
navigate their way through crowdfunding litigation themselves, relying out the general
principlesoflegalpracticeethics.However,suchaviewwouldfailtoproperlytakeaccount
oftheveryrealandparticularriskspresentedbycrowdfunding.Moreover,itisclear—merely
from examining common high-profile examples of crowdfunded PIL, such as the junior
doctors’case,Webster,andlitigationbytheGoodLawProject—thatlawyersaretakingvery
differentapproaches toconductingcases.For instance, theapproach to theextentwhich
skeletonargumentsandotherkeylitigationdocumentsaredisclosedviathecrowdfunding
90TheBarStandardsBoardandtheSolicitorsRegulationAuthorityarethetwokeyregulators.
91SeeBarStandardsBoard,Handbook(3
rdedn,2018);SolicitorsRegulationAuthority,SRAHandbook(Version
19,2017).92 See e.g. Bar Standards Board, Handbook (2018), p.22 (listing core duties demonstrative of a range of
underlyinggoals).93BarStandardsBoard,‘MediaCommentGuidance.’
94BarStandardsBoard,‘Guidanceforbarristersusingsocialmedia’(February2017).
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25
platformdiffersradically.Thereisnoneedtoplaceastraightjacketonlitigationstrategy,but
settingageneralethicalbaselineonissuessuchasthisisapracticalnecessity.
Finally,thereisaneedtoengagecloselywithallstakeholdersincreatinganethical
frameworkforcrowdfunding.Theunderstandingofcrowdfundinginpracticeisdeveloping
quicklybutitisstillforming.Assuch,itisvitalthatexperienceandinsightisdrawnfroma
range of actors involved. At minimum, it seems important to involve judges, lawyers
(especially those experienced with crowdfunding), regulators, charities (again, especially
those experienced with crowdfunding PIL), professional associations, and crowdfunding
platforms.Alloftheseactorshaveaninterestinensuringanappropriateethicalbaselineisin
place.
Conclusion
ThisarticlehasshowntherolethatcrowdfundingmayplayinPILintheUKandhowithas
developedinrecentyears.Nodoubt,crowdfundingcan—incertaincases—solvetheresource
shortageandbeakeypartofprocuringreformviaPIL.Atthesametime,manyaspectsofit
areproblematicorholdthepotentialtobecomeproblematic.Thenatureandextentofthe
possiblerisksaresuchthatthecrowdfundingofPILshouldbeapproachedwithgreatcaution.
Theperilhereisthatthisapparentlyempoweringmeansofprovidingresourcetomobilise
thelawmayultimatelyhaveconsequenceswhichunderminestheprojectofPILasawhole.
To this end, there is clear merit in considering the production of new guidelines for
crowdfundingPIL—principleswhichseektobalancetherisksandopportunitiesinthisarea.
Todothis,thereisaneedtodeviseacoherentpracticalethicsofcrowdfundinginthiscontext.
Here,Ihavesketchedoutboththekeyconcernswhichapracticalethicsmustbeinformedby
andtheshapethatsuchanethicscouldtake.Itishopedthissuggestionistakenforwardin
thecomingyearsbytheBarStandardsBoardandtheSolicitorsRegulationAuthority.Atthe
same time, it is hoped that all actors involved in crowdfunding judicial reviews consider
closelywhattheirresponsibilitiesare.