Cross-National Public Opinion on Democratization:

The paradox of democratic dominance and dissatisfied democrats &some methodological problems of comparing cross-national/regional surveys

Dr. Renske DoorenspleetAssociate Professor in Comparative Politics

Director Centre for Studies in DemocratizationDepartment of Politics and International Studies

University of Warwick, UKwww2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/staff/doorenspleet/

www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/csd/e-mail: renske.doorenspleet@warwick.ac.uk

Basic ArgumentThe world-wide paradox for democratization:

democratic dominance and dissatisfied democrats

A. The Good News: the dominance of democracy1 high number of democracies2 not only minimal, but also liberal democracies3 huge support for ideal of democracy in new democracies

B. The Big Challenge: dissatisfied democrats1 not much satisfaction of democracy (and gap between support and satisfaction)2 does it matter? implications for new democracies3 dissatisfied democrats: their number and profile

C. Comparing Public Opinion Surveys: some methodological problems

A. world-wide dominance of democracy

1. high number of (minimal) democracies

Waves of democratization, i.e. after 1989 many transitions to democracy

This worldwide change ‘is probably as close to a truly global turning point as we’ve ever seen. The world is becoming more unified than ever before, and democracy has become a strong, possibly irresistible force. This is the first time in history there is no legitimate alternative to democracy.’(Dankwart Rustow 1991)

A. world-wide dominance of democracy

1. high number of (minimal) democracies

* What is the definition of (Minimal) Democracy ? Competition: competitive struggle for votesInclusiveness: right to vote

(Dahl 1971)

* What is the actual measurement of (Minimal) Democracy ?Focus on competitionInclusiveness ignored

So… New classification with two dimensions, worldwide in scope,1800 until 2000

(Doorenspleet 2005)

A. world-wide dominance of democracy

1. high number of (minimal) democracies

Percentage 'Competitive Systems' by year

0%

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Percentage Democracies (by year)

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cies

• Increasing number of minimal democracies• Waves of democratization over time

A. world-wide dominance of democracy

2. not only minimal, but also liberal democracies

What is the definition of (Liberal) Democracy ?* Competition: competitive struggle for votes* Inclusiveness: right to vote* Freedom: civil liberties and political rights

(see Zakaria 1997)

What is the measurement of (Liberal) Democracy ?Political freedom and civil liberties

(see www.freedomhouse.org)

A. world-wide dominance of democracy

2. not only minimal, but also liberal democracies

-Zakaria (1997): problem of illiberal democracies-But world-wide spread of freedom over time-Recently, stagnation of freedom but still 90 countries are classified as free (almost half of world population)-Minimal democracy has positive impact on freedom; Illiberal democracies are not common anymore (e.g. 8% in 2005; see Moller 2007)

A. world-wide dominance of democracy

3. huge support for ideal of democracy in new democracies

Country (Year)

‘Democracy is Always

Preferable’(in %)

‘Sometimes Authoritarianism

is Preferable’(in %)

‘It Doesn’t Matter to People

Like Me’ (in %)

Mongolia (2001) 56 28 16

Mozambique (2002) 68 20 13

Namibia (1999) 71 14 15

Nicaragua (1996) 64 15 21

Panama (1996) 77 10 12

Paraguay (1996) 61 26 13

Poland (1992) 50 18 32

Romania (1992) NA NA NA

Senegal (2002) 87 5 8

Slovakia (1992) 66 11 24

Slovenia (1992) NA NA NA

South Africa (2000) 64 14 23

Ukraine (1992) NA NA NA

Taiwan (2001) 47 27 26

Thailand (2001) 84 11 5

Average 66 16 19

Country (Year) ‘Democracy is Always

Preferable’(in %)

‘Sometimes Authoritarianism

is Preferable’(in %)

‘It Doesn’t Matter to People

Like Me’ (in %)

Benin (2005) 82 7 11

Bulgaria (1992) NA NA NA

Chile (1996) 57 20 24

Croatia (1992) NA NA NA

Czech Republic (1992) 73 10 18

Guatemala (1996) 56 23 21

Hungary (1992) 72 8 20

Kenya (2005) 85 6 9

Lesotho (2000) 53 15 32

Lithuania (2001) NA NA NA

Madagascar (2005) 52 9 40

Malawi (1999) 67 22 11

Mali (2001) 61 16 23

Mexico (1996) 57 25 18

B. The Big Challenge: dissatisfied democrats

1. not much satisfaction of democracy

and gap between support and satisfaction

A paradox of our present time is that on the one hand democracy is the dominant type of government in the world, while on the other hand there is considerable disenchantment with politics within the democracies. People like the idea of democracy and they support this type of regime, but they are not satisfied with how democracy is working.

B. The Big Challenge: dissatisfied democrats

1. not much satisfaction of democracy

and gap between support and satisfaction

Paradoxical pattern, and the challenge for democracy

‘comes from democracy’s own citizens, who have grown distrustful of politicians, sceptical about democratic institutions, and disillusioned about how the democratic process functions’

(Dalton 2004: 1).

B. The Big Challenge: dissatisfied democrats

2. does it matter? implications for new democracies

•Dominant view 1960s-1990s: yes, people’s support and satisfaction are crucial for democracy (cf. Almond and Verba 1963; Easton 1965; Lipset 1981)

•In the 1990s: idea of ‘critical citizens’ (see e.g. Norris 1999; Nye 1999; Inglehart 1997).

‘Dissatisfied democrats can be viewed as a force for reform and improvement of democratic processes and structures’ (Klingemann 1999: 32).

B. The Big Challenge: dissatisfied democrats

2. does it matter? implications for new democracies

•Recent studies: dissatisfied democrats are not confident or more assertive about politics, but simply more alienated and confused. Dissatisfied people living in democracies do not have enough knowledge about how politics is actually working, and their expectations about politics and the way democracy should work are ‘hopelessly and spectacularly unrealistic’ (Stoker 2006: This is risk for democracy.

B. The Big Challenge: dissatisfied democrats

3. dissatisfied democrats: their number and profile

So, who are the dissatisfied democrats in new democracies? Can they been seen as critical or confused citizens? Are they a protection or a threat for democracy?

• high number of dissatisfied democrats (but cross-national variation)

• dissatisfied citizens are not necessarily critical citizens (cross-national variation)

• dissatisfied citizens may pose a danger for democracy (e.g. support for strong leadership and preference for immediate –instead of lawful- solutions)

B. The Big Challenge: Conclusion

•impressive world-wide waves of democratization

•minimal and liberal democracies

•high support for ideal of democracy

BUT…

•lower satisfaction with democracy gap

•high number of dissatisfied democrats

•dissatisfied citizens are not necessarily critical citizens

•dissatisfied citizens may pose a danger for democracy

C. However… some methodological problems

Comparing Public Opinion Surveys:

- The New Democracies Barometer

- The Afrobarometer

- The Asianbarometer

- The Latinobarometer

C. However… some methodological problems

1. Different types of questions to measure same concept

2. Similar questions but different response formats and/or formulations

3. Missing questions

4. Differences in time periods (see Table 2)

5. Missing new democracies (see Table 2)

Problems of (in)comparability

Conclusion

Homework week 19

1. Read required literature of week 18 and 19

2. Questions based on literature week 18?

3. Discuss in your own group:

- What are the main challenges facing comparative politics today? Make list. Use literature week 19, and previous weeks as well

- Your practical plans for presentations in week 20 (see handout)