CRISIS RESPONSEVOL:12 | ISSUE:4 | AUGUST 2017 WWW.CRISIS-RESPONSE.COM J O U R N A L

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Fake news; Radicalisation in Central Asia; Ransomware & cybersecurity; Lindt Café siege; Treating Afghanistan’s victims of war; Emergency management & resilience;

Artifi cial Intelligence; 3D printing technology; Drones & EENA; Computer modelling in large scale incidents; The impact of NIMS; Robotics for good

SPACE TECHNOLOGYITS ROLE IN DISASTER MANAGEMENT TODAY

News .......................................................... 4

CommentThe fickle finger of fake ............................. 8Rob Shimmin examines the phenomenon of fake news and its role in crisis creation and management – how do we quieten the echo chamber?

Vehicles as terrorist weapons .................. 12David Stewart was Silver Command during the Glasgow Airport terrorist attack ten years ago. Here, he outlines how security measures have since deterred attacks using vehicles at airports

Terrorism & SecurityDisrupting the path of least resistance .... 14Since our last edition, there have been many high-profile terrorist attacks, says Roger Gomm. How can businesses, communities and governments improve their preparedness?

Radicalisation in Central Asia .................. 16Radicalised operatives from the ex-Soviet Union regions of Central Asia and the Russian Caucasus are increasingly carrying out attacks elsewhere, says Lina Kolesnikova

Lessons from the Lindt Café siege ........... 18Editorial Advisory Panel Member Andrew Brown, who served as an expert witness into the siege inquiry in Australia, provides an insight into some of the findings of the final report on the incident, which resulted in several fatalities

Explosive threat mitigation in Iraq ........... 22Major General Jonathan Shaw describes the scale of the explosive threat (ET) problems faced in Iraq, saying that mitigation is a vital precursor to stabilisation and reconstruction

Treating Afghanistan’s victims of war ...... 26Emily Hough speaks to Dejan Panic, of the Emergency Surgical Centre, which treats victims of war and landmines for the whole of Afghanistan

The Grenfell Tower tragedy ...................... 28The Grenfell Tower fire is an indication of the fragility of the crisis management frameworks upon which we so heavily rely, acccording to David Rubens

Ransomware: The trap within the trap ..... 30Very few of us know when an attacker owns our computer with malware, and that’s the real problem, writes Todd Rosenblum

Getting to grips with cyber security ......... 32There are fairly straightforward things your business can do to help avoid being a victim of ransomware or other cyber crime, says Gary Fairley

Emergency managementWhat does resilience mean in the UK? .... 34Sarah Ponesch interviewed five UK stakeholders with the aim of identifying the UK-specificity of resilience as a ‘culture’ in an ever-changing world

Organisational resilience ......................... 40Anticipation, assessment, prevention, preparation, response and recovery – these are the vital areas that any organisation should be looking at when considering its resilience, says Roger Gomm

Alternative community crisis paradigm ... 42Dennis Davis suggests that resilience should become more focused upon the citizen, with matters of vulnerability and consequence being considered at the planning stage

Workplace violence crises ....................... 48Richard Diston examines workplace violence, saying that it can often be an organisational crisis. But how to eliminate violent conduct and ensure a safe workplace for all employees? The starting point is leadership

Emergency management on islands ........ 50How do you undertake disaster management on one of the world’s most remote islands? Ian Johnson describes the particular challenges of protecting the island of St Helena in the South Atlantic

Editor in ChiefEmily Houghemily@crisis-response.com

Chief Scienti� c EditorIan Portelli, PhD, BCDMian@crisis-response.com

Sales & Marketing DirectorKirsty McKinlay-Stewartkirsty@crisis-response.com

Global Operations DirectorDavid Stewartdavid @crisis-response.com

Design & ProductionChris Petticanchris@crisis-response.com

Subscriptions & AdministrationThomas Morgansubs@crisis-response.com

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Published by Crisis Management Limited, Sondes Place Farm, Westcott Road, Dorking RH4 3EB, UKCOPYRIGHT Crisis Management Limited 2017. Articles published may not be reproduced in any form without prior written permission.Printed in England by Henry Stone, Banbury, UKISSN 1745-8633

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Ground search and rescue ....................... 54Martin Boyle speaks to Chris Boyer of the US-based National Association for Search and Rescue (Nasar)

Artifi cial IntelligenceLeveraging AI for good ............................. 56AI has enormous potential for social good, says Houlin Zhao of the ITU, but we need paths forward for safe, trusted, ethical solutions

Shaping Artificial Intelligence’s future ..... 58How we instill ethical principles during AI’s infancy could have positive or negative repercussions for decades, if not centuries. Emily Hough talks to Sherif Elsayed-Ali of Amnesty International to find out more

Space technology We are the Space Race............................ 60Laurence Marzell says the 1950s Space Race still pays dividends today, as we rely on information from space for services to keep us safe, secure and resilient

A view from above: Earth observation ..... 64Dalia Kirschbaum and colleagues outline how NASA, working with partners, is helping to harness the scope and range of Earth observations for disaster response and risk reduction teams on the ground

Space and the Sendai Framework ........... 68Space-based technology and Earth observation help in disaster risk reduction, say Joachim Post, Juan-Carlos Villagran and Luc St Pierre. But more effort is needed to make this data usable by developing countries

Governance and ICT solutions ................. 72Davide Miozzo and Davide Poletto describe some projects that aim to embed ICT and space technology in the daily work of first responders

The threat of orbital debris ...................... 74Humanity relies on space technology, but this could stall if the issue of space junk is not addressed. Emily Hough speaks to Nobu Okada of Astroscale, which aims to secure long-term space flight safety

R&D/Technology3D printing in healthcare ......................... 763D printing has become a versatile and progressively cost-effective technology, permeating a variety of fields, say our R&D writers, led by Ian Portelli

Drones for emergencies ........................... 78Petros Kremonas of EENA says that perhaps, in a few years, having drones available within an emergency rescue organisation will be as routine as having a telephone line

Computer modelling in large incidents .... 80Friedrich Steinhäusler examines how 3D modelling of people, vehicles, weapons, explosions and the release of toxic materials can help first responders

In DepthWhat is the impact NIMS? ....................... 84Nicholas B Hambridge, Arnold M Howitt and David W Giles examine how successful the diffusion of the National Incident Command System has been across the US

Robotics for Good: Part III ....................... 86Andrew Schroeder says that social automation is an issue of what kinds of conjoined human and technological systems are most likely to produce the ethical outcomes that we are able to agree on

Firefighting in tunnels: Part IV ................. 88Christian Brauner discusses the limits of respiratory protection in underground transport systems

Early warning on small islands: Part II .... 91Marlon Clarke and Danielle Evanson examine how vulnerability and capacity assessments are such a vital part of the process to enhance understanding of risks and reducing vulnerability

RegularsEvents ...................................................... 94Looking back ........................................... 97Frontline ................................................... 98

Few places have been safe from the reach of the vicious tendrils of terrorism

in the short time since our last edition was published. We have seen attacks involving major loss of life in Pakistan, China, South Sudan, Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Egypt, Sweden, Russia and the UK. Sadly, this list is by no means exhaustive.

We also witnessed the truly shocking pictures of people trapped in a high-rise tower in one of the world’s wealthiest capital cities (see p28 for Grenfell Tower analysis). On pages 30 and 32 we report on other human-caused crises, those of malware and cyber crime.

Whether motivated by human malice or criminality, justified by ideological reasons, or exacerbated by poor or lackadaisical emergency planning, vulnerabilities and weaknesses are still repeatedly exposed.

As CRJ and its authors have consistently stated over the years, the challenges presented by such incidents are dwarfed in terms of the possible human loss caused by climate disruption. And we have also examined what happens when security and climate issues collide.

On the CRJ website, we noted recently how climate related issues can ripple out and trigger wider global security crises, as highlighted by a report that names 12 significant climate and security epicentres, all of which present extremely serious risks.

As we go to press, Europe is in the grip of a heatwave dubbed ‘Lucifer’, and wildfires are raging in many parts of the world, while catastrophic flooding devastates other areas.

Yet there is still profound resistance, lack of engagement or willful detachment – whether politically, economically, or institutionally – to acknowledge the potential impact of climate risks. How to embed resilience, prevention and mitigation in an effective and meaningful way, so as to engage governments, businesses, communities and individuals?

A vital first step has to be discarding some of the entrenched and unproductive institutional or organisational terminology, definitions and doctrines that many organisations seem to adhere to so doggedly. Interminable pontification about pointless semantics and pushing narrow, short-term, self-interested motivations are simply dodging pressing crisis issues. It is time to set agendas aside and truly think in global human terms, eschewing treacherous tunnel vision and joining up the dots – we need to see the whole picture for it really is. Emily Hough

August 2017 | vol:12 | issue:4

contents comment

Stabilisation & reconstruction p22 Treating the victims of war p26 Space technologies p60 3D printing p76

CRISISRESPONSE

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Cover story: Space technology for humanitarian and disaster applications

Cover illustration: Elisanth | Alamy

Optima Emergency Sergey Nivens | 123rf Boston Children’s Hospital

Modern society increasingly faces major crisis situations related to natural disasters, pandemics, failures

of sociotechnical systems or terrorist attacks. Such crises have widespread socioeconomic consequences and resist unilateral responses. � ey may also span di� erent countries and their transboundary e� ects can a� ect a whole continent. Due to the increasing complexity and rapidly advancing integration of large industrial processes, � rst responders will have to master industrial catastrophes, possibly

coinciding with natural disasters, of a hitherto unprecedented scale, such as a strong earthquake, followed by a tsunami, triggering core melt in several units of a nuclear power plant – such as occurred in the 2011 triple disaster in Japan.

Many security experts concur that � rst responders are more likely than not to be exposed to novel, large-scale terrorist threats, possibly involving chemical, biological, radiological, or even nuclear attacks.

Such large-scale incidents represent extreme operational challenges for � rst responders in

A 2D geo-referenced dispersion model of toxic plume using Incident Analyst; the plume can be displayed as a function of time after release; colour-coded atmospheric concentration based on maximum permissible regulatory limit: Red: exceeding limit value; Amber: close to limit; Green: safe zoneComputer modelling in

large-scale incidentsIn this look at computer modelling in crisis response training, Friedrich Steinhäusler examines how 3D modelling of people, vehicles, weapons, explosions and the release of toxic materials can help fi rst responders – both in training and during actual events

modelling used as input for decision support systems improves risk assessment in this context.

In incidents involving a large number of victims, � rst responders will require an e� cient triage system, identifying and categorising victims with low-error rates. � ey have to know where to � nd these victims and prepare for the di� erent kinds of injuries they will have to attend to. All of this data can be derived from 3D modelling of the e� ect of harmful agents on humans.

Large piles of rubble and debris hamper access by emergency response vehicles; � rst responders may have to crawl over piles of rubble up to several metres high, which can lead to injuries. Transporting victims from the incident site will have to be carried out largely by using stretchers, until designated vehicles can be reached. 3D modelling assists in identifying impassable roads and blocked access routes.

� e large extent of damage to the site of a catastrophe usually makes it di� cult to conduct search and rescue, � re suppression, shoring and stabilisation processes. � e scale of the disaster can force � rst responders into a defensive status, ie extinguishing � res in some locations, but having to let them burn in others. 3D information of the a� ected area provides essential information about the extent of the threat from damaged structures and areas of increased safety risk.

Such scenarios are di� cult, if not impossible, to train for with a reasonable amount of funds and manpower. However, it is possible to simulate such catastrophic conditions by using computer models in training programmes. And, in real-life catastrophic conditions, computer-generated models can help in improving situation awareness for crisis managers and responders.

� rough its H2020 project, Target, the European Commission is supporting the development of a pan-European platform for the use of augmented and virtual reality (AVR) and serious gaming techniques for training and competence assessment of security critical agents (SCA), including � rst responders (police, � re, emergency medical services), counter terrorism units, border guards and critical infrastructure operators.

Mixed-reality experiences will immerse trainees at task, tactical and strategic command levels with scenarios such as: Tactical � rearms events, asset protection, mass demonstrations, cyberattacks and CBRN incidents. Trainees can use real training weaponry, radio equipment, command and control software, decision support tools, and real command centres and vehicles.

In Target, the algorithm selected for describing the impact of explosives is based on the industrial version of the high explosive damage assessment model, using ExDAM software. ExDAM is a component of the Breeze

modelling software that is used to evaluate the damage to structures, as well as injuries to people that have been caused by explosions.

ExDAM enables the rapid evaluation of damage experienced by each structure within a facility as a result of a primary explosion and accompanying secondary explosions. Users can model – down to small geometric details – the Ground Zero and the target area around it that is a� ected by the explosion. Target’s primary application is to evaluate terrorism and sabotage threats to a facility and persons.

One of ExDAM’s special features is the parametric analysis of single structure (PASS) capability. PASS allows the user to determine the in� uence of various important independent variables on pressure and damage experienced by an individual structure within a facility. ExDAM utilises widely accepted dynamic pressure and overpressure curves to predict the pressure level at each structure/person location. Structure shielding and secondary explosion e� ects are calculated, and damage and injury levels are determined for each structure or person in the blast-a� ected area.

� e following input data are required: Location data; description of materials subjected to the blast; geometric dimensions of objects (length, width, height); population density in target area;

that they may involve the uncontrolled release of toxic substances. Primary or secondary e� ects (multiple explosions) can lead to leaks in tanks or reservoirs, resulting in an uncontrolled release of toxic substances into the environment, frequently followed by a multi-agent dispersion in the atmosphere. 3D modelling of the areas at risk from such releases improves the forecasting capability of crisis management, for example by de� ning areas to be evacuated.

Uncontrolled release� e sheer scale of an incident can make it di� cult to obtain information about the health and safety risks present, and hazmat specialists increasingly require monitors and other assessment technologies to carry out a risk assessment. However a wide disaster area makes it di� cult to collect representative data in a short time, and large amount of smoke and dust have been known to cause false readings from detectors, contributing to erroneous risk assessment. 3D

position end strength of explosives (if known, if not, a � rst approximation is su� cient); and other surrogate data, such as the dimension of crater caused by the explosion. ExDAM’s output is in the form of damage/injury tables, before and after blast displays, pressure and damage/injury contour plots, and damage/injury-versus-distance graphs, all in colour. Advanced graphical features include three-dimensional graphics in the form of oblique projections, as well as two-dimensional horizontal and vertical cross sections for both pressure contour and damage/injury contour plots.

Such models enable the trainer to describe to the trainee the impact of explosives on:

� Di� erent types of structures, such as dwelling, o� ce building, airport terminal, train station, subway station, police station, � nancial centre, hospital, LNG terminal, power plant, pipeline, chemical facility, sport stadium, shopping centre. � e application for this is to allow visualisation of physical damage to buildings and structures;

� Di� erent types of injuries, ranging from burst eardrums and inner organ damage to loss of limb and lethality. � is helps to determine triage categories for victims; and

� Di� erent types of vehicles, such as passenger car, bus, truck, boat, aircraft,

It is possible to simulate catastrophic conditions by using computer models in training programmes

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in depthComputer modelling: Part I

‘The most successful people in life are generally those who have the best information.’ Benjamin Disraeli, 1804-1881

For further information of the initiatives in which Serco participates and in the services and capabilities we have that support better informed decision making, please contact:

moses-project.eu I auggmed-project.eu I unity-project.eu

space.enquiriesl@serco.com

Today, if you tweet, travel, transact, text, taste or talk, space data is already helping you with these everyday activities.

But decision makers need more if they are to meet today’s risks and threats.

Charged with keeping society safe, secure and resilient, they need the right information, integrated from different organisations and quickly presented to them in a usable and digestible way.

Serco helps make this happen.

Working behind the scenes, our expertise and experience across civilian and military space programmes helps give decision makers the informa-tion and intelligence they need, when they need it.

And around the world we are quietly working with our partners to help Governments, their armed forces and their agencies to manage critical national infrastructure and deliver essential public services.

If you want to know more about the work we do and how we do it, please contact us and we will happily discuss it with you. Quietly.

so as to visualise physical damage;Security organisations’ training programmes

can use these models to identify vital areas, ie those re� ecting enhanced vulnerability in components of national critical infrastructure. � ey can also use them to assess damage potential after deployment of a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), such as a car or truck bomb, or a person-borne improvised explosive device (PBIED) in the form of a suicide bomber. In addition, models enable the trainee to visualise the blast e� ect of a gas explosion, such as that caused by overpressure in a tank in a chemical facility.

A wide range of models is available to model hazardous chemical releases – from empirical and phenomenological, to those based on computational � uid dynamics (CFD). CFD models are more accurate, but require large resources in set-up, computational power and in scienti� c know-how to interpret the modelling results. As a compromise between these two extremes, the Target project selected the Incident Analyst software to model the uncontrolled release of hazardous chemicals.

Incident Analyst covers a wide spectrum of applications, from modelling for facility design and safety improvement purposes or risk management consequence analysis, to real-time assessment of hazards in emergency situations and reconstructions of past incidents. � e software incorporates proven models developed by US organisations, including the Environmental Protection Agency, US military, US Coast Guard and the chemical industry. It includes an algorithm for 3D visualisation of results and export to Google Earth.

Input data for calculating the blast overpressure created by a vapour cloud explosion are: Chemical speci� cs; proximity to ground level (ground re� ection); density of obstacles; and vapour cloud � ame speed. In cases where limited data are available, TNT equivalency models developed by the US Army and UK Health are incorporated in the algorithm. For more sophisticated modelling, the TNO multi-energy model or the Baker-Strehlow-Tang model, enable modelling of an explosive vapour, which is characterised as one or multiple sub-clouds. Output visualisation

encompasses models of dense gas plumes, evaporating chemical pools and model neutrally-buoyant gas plumes, including moving sources.

An output plume example is shown on the previous page. � e user can predict thermal radiation exposure and temperature rise with the uncon� ned pool � re, con� ned pool � re and vertical jet � re (� are).

Modelling of uncontrolled exposure to radioactive materials needs to describe the impact of uncontrolled exposure to radioactivity for the following scenarios: Uncontrolled exposure to a strong radioactive source on persons in its vicinity, such as a radiological terror attack with radiation exposure device; and uncontrolled release of radioactivity into the atmosphere, resulting in a radiation dose to persons and contamination of the environment downwind. Modelling can forecast activity concentration and radiation doses in a certain location at a de� ned moment in time.

Downwind protection Such models can be applied for planning protective actions against radiation exposure for � rst responders, including personal protective equipment, as well as for protecting members of the public downwind, whether in terms of sheltering or evacuation. HotSpot software meets these objectives. � is software enables emergency response personnel to evaluate incidents involving radioactive material and carry out safety analyses of facilities handling nuclear material.

Atmospheric dispersion models are designed for near-surface releases, short-range (less than 10 km) dispersion, and short-term (less than 24 hours) release durations in unobstructed terrain and simple meteorological conditions. However, the program cannot handle complex weather patterns or terrain features.

HotSpot contains a comprehensive radionuclide library, dose conversion factors (DCFs) for inhalation, submersion, and ground shine. Fifty-year committed e� ective dose equivalent DCFs and acute DCFs (one, four and 30 days) are available for estimating deterministic e� ects associated with high-acute radiation doses. Additionally, the HotSpot software has been designed with a quality control feature, which veri� es that the codes are functioning properly.

Input data needed are: Type of radionuclide to be used; its chemical and physical form; the mass of the material containing the radionuclide; nature of the incident; and meteorological conditions.

Output provides 2D models for describing the impact of an uncontrolled dispersion of a radioactive plume. � is enables the trainee to estimate downwind radiological e� ects caused by continuous or pu� release, explosive release, fuel � re, or an area contamination event.

In Target, science-based modelling results obtained with the modelling software described above are used as templates for photorealistic models. Developers selected 3ds MAX for this photorealistic modelling; this software provides a comprehensive 3D modelling, animation, rendering, and compositing solution for games, � lm, and motion graphics programmers. It also has tools for animation and perspective matching. � is approach creates a photorealistic 3D model of a person, building, vehicle or landscape from quantitative results of the science-based calculations. An example of template-based 3D modelling using 3dsMAX is shown on the left.

Commercially available software enables trainers of specialists in crisis management to enlarge the spectrum of training scenarios in a highly cost-e� ective and safe manner, when compared to current methods.

� ese 3D and 2D models can be used in virtual reality training scenarios, ranging from 3D models of persons, weapons, vehicles and buildings, to 3D or 2D models of the impact of explosives on structures and persons, as well as plume models of toxic chemical and radioactive substances and their impact on humans and the environment. In future, e� orts will be made towards enhanced end-user friendliness by further reducing the current levels of scienti� c and technological requirements for modelling. For example, Target plans to introduce a geometry store, for authorised end users. � is cloud-based platform will contain ready-to-use 3D and 2D models, which can be combined by the end-user to create a tailor-made virtual reality training scenario.

� In the next issue, Part II will cover drone-based photogrammetry and how it can be used to create models of landscapes and buildings.

� � is work was carried out within the framework of the European Union Horizon2020 programme www.target-h2020.eu

An example of template-based 3D modelling using 3dsMAX

AuthorFRIEDRICH STEINHÄUSLER is Emeritus Professor of Physics and Biophysics at the University of Salzburg and Technical Director of the

International Security Competence Centre Inc (Austria). He is responsible for risk assessment and crisis management in several EU and NATO research activities (www.bridgeproject.eu; www.cato-project.eu; www.castproject.eu). Dr Steinhäusler is Work Package Leader in the Target Project

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align the hostage-taker’s expectations. Misinterpretation of the restrictions not to make concessions to terrorists, imposed under the National Counter Terrorism plan, may have contributed to this decision.

Monis’s demand seeking an on air debate could have been explored through asking him to provide a written statement as to his purpose and motivation behind the incident, allowing him to express himself, while at the same time permitting negotiators to understand what had brought him to this point. Such understanding would have made negotiators better placed to enter into productive dialogue. � e refusal only increased the hostages’ frustration and sense of abandonment.

� e hostage-taker’s demand for an IS � ag was quite rightly met with refusal, but negotiators did not explore why he wanted the � ag, nor did they explain why it would not be provided. � is was counterproductive and again increased the anguish among the hostages.

Moving police and parked vehicles out of Phillip Street in response to demands by Monis was reasonable and appropriate, although it should have been used as a positive police action to pursue some reciprocation.

His demand for the lights in Martin Place to be extinguished appeared to have been mismanaged by both the negotiators and command. � is could have been granted and might have provided yet another opportunity to engage in direct dialogue with Monis. Instead, the prolonged failure not only agitated his anger, but also exacerbated the sense of frustration experienced by the hostages.

To measure the e� ectiveness of any strategy you must be able to measure your progress towards your ultimate goal. Unfortunately, no progress towards a negotiated settlement of the siege was made at any stage.

Negotiators failed to undertake robust evaluation and assessment of where they were in the negotiations and what they had not achieved in line with their strategy, nor was there a system or process in place that allowed them to do so. � is a� ected tactical negotiator advice to the various levels of command, which saw no change to the ‘contain and negotiate’ strategy.

While not de� nitive, progress in negotiations may be measured through:

� Emotional outbursts are declining and conversations are getting longer;

� Hostages are released; � Weapons are surrendered; � Absence of physical injury to hostages; � � e incident is static; and � A routine has been established.� e role of a consultant psychiatrist or psychologist

in the response to a hostage siege is bene� cial and can provide an excellent clinical insight for negotiators on how to communicate e� ectively when dealing with a hostage-taker who is su� ering from a personality disorder.

� e consultant can also assess the hostages’ behaviour, which helps advise on how best to reassure them during their captivity.

A psychiatrist or psychologist may also be used to monitor the negotiation team to assess how they are managing under the high stress of an incident, and to o� er psychological support where required.

� eir advice, while invaluable, must be taken in the context of the cultural, religious and situational factors that give in� uence to a hostage-taker’s behaviour and

actions. It is from this, based on training and experience, that negotiators make informed judgments about their strategy, its e� ectiveness and to identify ways forward in dialogue, especially if a stalemate has been reached.

In this case the consultant psychiatrist was permitted to give advice about negotiation strategy and tactics, but made erroneous and unrealistic assessments about what was occurring in the stronghold, gave ambiguous advice about the nature of Monis’s behaviour, and was allowed to go beyond his area of expertise and give advice about Islamic terrorism. � is, combined with other factors, led to an underestimation of Monis’s capability and the danger he posed to the hostages.

In addition, a total of eight calls by hostages to a number they had been told would connect them with a negotiator went unanswered – four around 20:00hrs and another four between 24:30hrs and 01:00hrs. An unknown number of calls were also diverted to other telephones within the Police Forward Command Post.

Missed callsMissing these calls highlights a signi� cant failure in a basic component of siege management. It was likely that the calls between 24:30hrs and 01:00hrs were not answered because all the negotiators were involved in a handover brie� ng in a separate room.

Handovers between teams on long running sieges are commonplace and must be handled with care and diligence to continue to provide open communication and ensure a smooth transition to a fresh team.

Negotiators had not received adequate training in dealing with terrorists. � e training of negotiators focuses on dealing with the high incidence of domestic high-risk situations, but did not adequately equip them to engage e� ectively with terrorist/s in a siege. Negotiators should have at least a basic understanding of terrorist negotiations and a cadre should be developed that mirrors the counter terrorism command to ensure capability and capacity across all of the tactical options.

� ere was no policy requiring commanders or negotiators to record negotiation positions and tactics, the demands made by a hostage-taker, or any progress or lack of it in moving a high-risk situation towards resolution.

Recording negotiators’ observations on the stage and progress of negotiations allows them to make recommendations in further negotiation tactics, or ultimately declare to commanders that negotiations are not working to allow other tactical options.

� ere is a train of thought in legal circles that if it something is not recorded then it did not happen. Recording decisions, tactical advice, progress updates and negotiator dialogue can be viewed as hard work, but advancements in technology allow it all to be captured with ease.

� ankfully incidents of this nature are rare but, when they do occur, they present a signi� cant danger to innocent people caught up as hostages and pose complex challenges to the agencies that must be prepared to respond to such events.

History has taught us that successful resolution by force from law enforcement agencies or military requires exceptional training, planning and execution.

Globally, negotiators form a small community that willingly shares the challenges of the incidents so that others can learn from their experience; they will no doubt also learn the lessons from this incident.

AuthorChief Inspector ANDREW B BROWN is Partner at A Kain &

Partners LLP, and a hostage negotiation expert. He is a Member of CRJ’s Editorial Advisory Panel

The full report is available at: www.lindtinquest.justice.nsw.gov.au/Documents/findings-and-recommendations.pdf

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