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3th edition (2020)

CRISIS

INTELLIGENCE

MANUAL

Bert Brugghemans Tim Van Achte

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Copyright © 2020 by Bert Brugghemans and Tim Van Achte

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying, recording, or other electronic or mechanical methods, without the prior written permission of the publisher, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical reviews and certain other noncommercial uses permitted by copyright law. For permission requests, write to the publisher:

Bert Brugghemans [email protected]

Printed in Belgium

mailto:[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]

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We are drowned in oceans of data, nevertheless, it seems as if we seldom have sufficient information.

— Elia Goldratt, The Haystack Syndrome

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Preface

"Communication could be better" is undoubtedly the most widely cited evaluation point following a crisis or a crisis exercise. In this manual, we examine how communication, information flows and exchange of information can be made better during a crisis. With the focus on information management and technical applications we have already learned a lot in recent years. But the classic ways, practices and theories of information management do not suffice in crisis situations. There is a need for a new doctrine in information management that is adapted to the rapidly evolving, unpredictable and almost intangible information flows that characterize a crisis. This manual aims to contribute to the evolution of information management to Crisis Intelligence.

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Content

Preface Content 6 About the authors 7 Outline 8

Introduction 9

Crisis Intelligence: definition and goals 12 What is a crisis 12 Information 14 Impact of information on decision making: situation awareness 15 Intelligence 16 Purpose of Crisis Intelligence 17

Crisis Intelligence Work Process 19 Work process 19 Four Steps 19 The relationship between the four steps 21

Dynamic Information Needs Assessment 22 Vision 22 Objective 24 Methods, Techniques and Application 24

By Whom 25 Tools 26

Satisficing Data Collection 28 Vision 28 The preparatory work 30 Methods, Techniques and Application 30 Limits 33 Validation and Verification 34

Content Curation 35 Vision 35 Activity 1: Enriching data 36 Activity 2: Analyze information 38

Information design Information design 43 Information dissemination 50

Conclusions 54

References 56

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About the authors

Bert Brugghemans is the chief fi re officer at the Antwerp Fire Brigade. He has several years of experience in coordinating large-scale incidents and disasters and is a driving force behind the professionalization of crisis governance, crisis information management and crisis communications in Belgium.

Tim Van Achte is member of Team D5 and partnership lead at the City of Ghent’s Foresight team. After several years of innovating crisis communication, sentiment analysis and crisis intelligence at PM Risk•Crisis•Change, he now specializes in future cities, foresight, and how society will use and be impacted by technologies.

We thank Hugo Marynissen and Stijn Pieters for the inspiration and cooperation that lead to this manual.

We thank Timothy Summers for the inspiration and the help translating the Crisis Intelligence Manual.

We also thank Bartel Van de Walle and Koen Milis for the help and inspiration during the first research we did on this subject.

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Outline

This manual is based on the Crisis Intelligence workflow. After a brief introduction follows a general explanation of this work process and the basics of crisis and crisis information management. To understand the model of Crisis Intelligence it is important that the reader starts with the introductory chapter.

In the next four chapters, we discuss each of the four parts of the model in detail. The four steps in the workflow form a process that transforms data into information and intelligence. The four steps, however, are not always followed step by step in a chronological order, because the whole process is constantly in action and moving. Therefore, it is not necessary to read these four chapters in the order given. Each part starts with our vision on the topic. We then discuss some methods and techniques. At the end of each chapter, there is also room for some concrete applications and tools.

To increase readability, we took no references in the text. However, it goes without saying that this book is not based solely on the views of the authors, but uses a lot of knowledge from books, article and blogs and lectures and

is inspired by other thinkers. We mention the texts that inspired us at the end of the book .

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Introduction

"Communication failure"

In after action reviews of crises and crisis exercises, there is one point of recurring evaluation. Reports repeatedly indicate that "communication" did not go smoothly. Information did not reach who had to be reached. The media are involved in extensive reporting on the lack of communication between the various competent organizations. This is very visible in the recent COVID-19 pandemic, but happens in every crisis. Policy makers promise that they have learned their lesson and will work on the exchange of information between databases, services, departments a n d u s e r s . Fro m p e o p l e w h o g e t i n v o l v e d unintentionally in a crisis, we always hear comments like "they're not telling us" or "we're not getting information”

As we see these findings coming back every time, you'd expect a fundamental solution to this problem has been found for a long time. However, inability to solve this problem may start with its definition.

Emergency serv ices, namely governments and organizations, but also leadership teams of companies and policy makers actually don’t really have a problem communicating. What is still going wrong to this date is that, in turbulent circumstances, we do not have enough high-quality information to accurately distract what exactly needs to happen. Due to the complexity of unexpected crises, we suddenly dump into large amounts of data. Or, due to the time pressure that we play by, we sometimes also have almost no data. We get in conflicting messages and it's very difficult to get accurate information. As a result, we do not have the specific information we need now to be able to make informed decisions.

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Thus, the ever-recurring problem can be described as an information and coordination problem and not a communication problem.

we do not have enough high-quality information to accurately distract what exactly needs to happen. By far all the solutions that have been provided in recent years to improve the functioning of crisis management are based on the wrong problem definition and, consequently, mainly technical. After a crisis, there is a lot of attention to technical solutions to improve communication. This often results in the purchase of new material and the introduction of new systems. Within this philosophy, technical means of communication receive a lot of attention: for example the introduction in Europe of Tetra communication systems seemed to be the integral solution for the communication problem for many responders and policy makers, but years later it did not appear to have solved the so called “communication problem”. In addition, there is also increasing awareness of information technology that supports staff and crisis teams, from

electronic logs and information management systems, instant messaging, decision-making systems to crisis management apps that provide emergency plans and task cards digitally.

However, anyone who is in crisis management for some time will notice that the introduction of technical resources does not in itself provide for more correct, substantive, personalized information. Tools are not miracles that we can use to coordinate better without improving the process and information management.

The process of collecting relevant data and sharing high-quality information is complex. To get really better in coordinated decisions, we also need to work on the organizational aspect.

It consists of:

- Managing and centralizing the information available;

- Structuring the many information lines;

- The content and form optimization (design) of information flows.

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Embracing new technology in the crisis organization remains essential, and in this manual we also expand to new and existing technical tools. But its introduction is not a magical formula for optimal information processes and for better decision making and more effective, targeted actions. Certainly not in the type of crisis we are confronted with most of the time in our region.

This manual answers the question of how we can better prepare ourselves to organize strategically with available information during a crisis. To do this, we use a workflow that helps us to transform data into intelligence.

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Crisis Intelligence: definition and goals

What is a Crisis?

The term crisis is used very often. Note how often the word appears in a news broadcast. Its definition can vary considerably and is subject of a lot of scholarly discussions. In the literature, there is some agreement on some key features of a crisis situation.

A crisis is a situation in which:

- There is a serious threat;

- T h e r e i s a h i g h l e v e l o f u n c e r t a i n t y a n d unpredictability;

- There is an urgent need to take action (time pressure);

- To get the situation back under control, coordination and organization is needed that differs from daily practice. This is the result of the three factors mentioned earlier.

Interestingly, for example the Belgian legislation adds the potential in the definition of a crisis. A potential crisis is a situation that has intrinsic characteristics to evolve into a crisis. We therefore consider a potential crisis as a crisis.

Crisismanagement is thus the management a company, an organization or a government has to undertake to deal with a crisis. ISO defines crisismanagement as “the holistic management process that identifies potential impacts that threaten an organization and provides a framework for building resilience, with the capability for an effective response that safeguards the interests of the organization's key stakeholders, reputation, brand, and value-creating activities, as well as effectively restoring operational capabilities”

In addition, the literature makes a distinction between some types of crises. We can make a clear subdivision based on two axes:

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- Speed of development of the crisis. This indicates whether the crisis suddenly appears or builds for a long time.

- Speed of cessation or termination of the crisis. This indicates whether a crisis has a long operational phase, or has a long aftermath after the operational phase.

This division results in four types of crises:

- Fast burning crisis: A crisis we are confronted with suddenly, but we can also handle a good response soon. Examples include burns, transport accidents and chemical leaks

- Cathartic crisis: A crisis that builds slowly, but once again, suddenly ends at a peak or culminates. An example is the search for a terrorist organization that places bombs and ends when the organization is rolled up;

- Slow burning crisis: a crisis that slowly builds and pose a long-term threat. However, the crisis usually does not reach a peak. Examples include global warming and aging.

- Long Shadow crisis: a crisis that suddenly pops up but has a very long, usually political or humanitarian outflow period. Examples include 9/11, the earthquake in Haiti, the Tsunami in Japan and the COVID-19 pandemic.

In this work, we mainly deal with the type of fast-burning crisis, so the crisis in which the end of the crisis operations also immediately reveals the end of the social and political impact of the crisis. This type of crisis is the most common in our region, but is also the most dynamic form of crisis at

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once. The high rate at which elements develop in this kind of crisis requires very dynamic, efficient and rapid crisis management.

- Dynamic and efficient because the crisis is inherently uncertain and unpredictable;

- Rapid because the crisis by definition causes a high time pressure: a reaction must be followed very quickly to avoid more damage or escalation.

In this turbulent context, the standard processes in our organizations to gather and analyze information are insufficient. A more flexible workflow process is needed here, which differs from how we usually address information management, for example in humanitarian crisis management or in the business world.

In this turbulent context, the standard processes in our organizations to gather and analyze information are insufficient.

In classical information management, there is much more time to gather data, strategically plan actions, and consider each decision carefully. However in other types of crisis the given lessons on crisis intelligence can be used, since other crisis also have turbulent moments and high amounts of uncertainty and complexity.

Information

Information is just like the word crisis, a very broad term and is in many used different contexts. Information can range from very rough data (wind speed, number of victims, ...) to very deep knowledge about a particular subject. The world annual report 2005 of the Red Cross suggests that there are four levels of information are as follows:

- Data: raw, unorganized, individual data;

- Information: organized data;

- K n o w l e d g e : i n f o r m a t i o n c o m b i n e d w i t h understanding and awareness of the specific situation, which allows us to make predictions;

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- Wisdom: knowledge combined with experience and observations, which allows us to make a value judgment.

In Crisis Intelligence, we recognize these levels and keep them always apart.

The prevailing modus operandi in response teams, is that information is often “raw” and unprocessed (data): typically, information is collected by individual team members who focus on their specific discipline or expertize (e.g., fire fighters, police, and medical care or their business operational counterparts). Information is also often not processed to higher levels of information quality (knowledge and wisdom).

This workflow makes it difficult for the other team members, for example on a strategic level, to process and interpret the information, impeding effective information sharing.

We will see later in this manual that the understanding of these information levels plays an important role in establishing the right decisions in crisis management and crisis communication.

Impact of information on decision making: the model of situation awareness

In an environment characterized by time pressure, complexity and uncertainty, the main challenge for a response team is to obtain as quickly as possible “situation awareness”, i.e., an assessment of the extent of the crisis they respond to. The teams’ situation awareness critically depends on the information that is acquired and shared within the team. Ideally, the information acquired by team members is easy to understand, fast to process and includes clear cues that trigger action. Moreover, the information is also efficiently shared within the team so that collectively the team can make decisions based on better situation awareness.

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This paragraph suggest a clear connection between information, situation awareness and decision making and even performance of an individual, team or organization. This connection is clearly outlined by the situation awareness model of Endsley:

Figure: Situation Awareness model that shows the relation between information management, situation awareness, decision making and performance level of an individual or team (source: Endsley, 1995)

Endsley defines situation awareness as “the perception of the elements in the environment [...], the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future”. This definition considers three levels of situation awareness: perception (level 1), comprehension (level 2)

and projection (level 3), with the success of the higher depending on the success of the lower levels.

When teams make decisions and act upon them, an overall team situation awareness can be conceived as the degree to which every team member possesses the situation awareness required for her or his responsibilities.

Intelligence

Intelligence in general is a term that is not yet well defined. We know intelligence from the business world (business intelligence), and mainly from the military intelligence. Crisis intelligence can therefore be seen as a civilian edition of military intelligence.

The CIA refers to a number of definitions of how they see intelligence: "Intelligence deals with all the things that should be known in advance of initiating a course of action." (Hoover Commission)

Intelligence is viewed here as a form of decision orientation, with intelligence being supportive and controlling to decision-making. The retrospective question of whether the intelligence had an impact on the decision

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is therefore a criterion for assessing the quality of the decision.

"Information in the absence of execution is overhead." (Ronald Griffin)

This definition makes clear that information is only relevant if it leads to action. That intelligence has a lot of value for the decision-maker is emphasized in the third definition used by the CIA:

"Knowledge has value, but intelligence has power" (Rothenberg & Erickson, 2005)

Wikipedia defines military intelligence as:

Military intelligence is a military discipline that exploits a number of information collection and analysis approaches to provide guidance and direction to commanders in support of their decisions. This is achieved by providing an assessment of available data from a wide range of sources, directed towards the commanders' mission requirements or responding to focused questions as part of the operational or campaign planning activity. In order to provide an informed analysis, the commander's information requirements are first identified. These information

requirements are then incorporated into a process of intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination.

From these various definitions, we can deduce the purpose of crisis intelligence.

Purpose of Crisis Intelligence

The purpose of crisis intelligence is to create an unambiguous and continuous stream of determinative information in a crisis organization to:

- Improve Situation Awareness and support decision-making processes, which prevent (further) damage and limit (potential) risks;

- Direct both the individual and collective thinking processes of decision makers;

- Eliminate (Potential) uncertainties.

However, this flow of information should not lead to too much information or ambiguity as it would undermine the goal. The following can help monitor this:

- Quantitatively: limit the amount of information which can be collected by identifying and leaving inaccurate data and non-priority information;

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- Qualitatively: analyze and process the information so that it is thought provoking.

Clearly such information flow can only be achieved when all concerned players are aware of the impact of information management and actively contribute to the reduction in ambiguity.

The difference between Information Management and Crisis Intelligence:

The following table shows the main differences between classical information management and Crisis Intelligence. This is an artificial division, but mainly shows the idea behind Crisis Intelligence and some explicit philosophical choices.

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Crisis Intelligence work process Work Process

To achieve the goal of Crisis Intelligence (creating a uniform and continuous flow of actionable information), we focus on four specific activities:

- Information needs

- Information collection

- Information analysis

- Information design

These are the four basic activities of information management, that we will bring together in a new way and that will be approached in a new way.

Each of these four activities play a role in the process to go from raw data to actionable information.

The four steps

1. Dynamic information needs assessment (Information Needs)

Information needs depend on the particular intervention and the particular decision maker. Information should be directly related to the decision and help to improve situation awareness and to prevent overload.

As the decision-making process in the fast-burning crisis is very dynamic and largely subconscious, we need to dynamically determine information needs. To do this, custom techniques and tools are required. In the chapter on Dynamic Information Needs Assessment, we can see how methods from Dynamic Risk Analysis can be useful to determine the information needs.

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2. Satisficing data collection (Information Collection)

Once the information needs are known, we can proceed to data collection. Often, decision makers wait for long enough to collect "all the data" before they proceed to making a decision. Under crisis circumstances, informed decisions are not based on all available information, this would take too much time to come to a decision. In contrast we seek the satisficing amount of data to make a n acceptable decision.

Under crisis circumstances, informed decisions are not based on a l l ava i lable information, this would take too much time to come to a decision. In other words, in crisis management we are often pleased with a quick decision that meets the needs, but is not necessarily the best. Here plays the “Pareto principle", or the 80-20 rule that says that you could get 80% of the results with only 20% of the effort. We use this as an

important rule of thumb. Thus, when collecting information, we cannot gather all available data, but we should limit ourselves to just enough information to reach a satisficing decision.

3. Content curation (Information Analysis)

After we have collected the data, we have raw information. This is not enough to make a decision. We need to quickly and efficiently analyze and evaluate collected raw data; only then can we create intelligence. For this we use some methods and techniques we place under the heading Content Curation. Under curating we mean to organize, categorize and enrich information in a way that meets the needs of those who must carry out the analysis.

4. Design and dissemination of information (Information Design)

Information may be collected but if the presentation and dissemination of the information does not occur in a way that matches the end user's specific needs, the information will be ineffective. The way we display and distribute information, the design of our information products, must therefore match the goals and needs of the decision-maker.

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In addition to structuring the information product itself, we also look for methods to make important information efficiently accessible to users. Thus, spreading (dissemination) contains also the question "Who do we consider as the user of the information product?".

We often tend to send information to too many people and then assume that everybody is aware and knowledgeable of this information. Compare this to sending mails in the daily context: Too low selection of senders means that the information does not flow well to all people who need the information, but an overly wide selection means again that the overflow of mails causes people to miss information because they do not see the essence of the data in the huge pile of data.

The relationship between the steps

We do not represent the workflow as a series of consecutive steps or as a cyclical process. Due to the time pressure in a crisis, it is not possible to execute all the steps one by one extensively and equally. It is true that as we go through the steps to a greater extent, the usefulness of the end result increases. The figure below makes it clear that we need to spread our efforts over the four steps to provide information with a higher intelligence value. So

crisis intelligence is an agile process. With every iteration more value is added to the crisis management. This makes crisis intelligence very resilient, flexible and versatile, as is needed in a high turbulence crisis:

When we consider the crisis intelligence process as a roadmap or as a cyclic model, we would spend too much time on each step and not reach a high level of intelligence within the constraints of time and capacity. In a crisis, the four pillars therefore enter into force simultaneously. We prefer small initiatives that have a large impact on several levels, over an all-out solution that takes too much time to achieve.

In the manual however, we represent the process as four steps for pedagogical reasons.

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Dynamic Information Need Assessment Vision

During crises and disasters, there is no time to calmly analyze the information needs and evaluate all the users needs. However, to get useful information to improve decision making, it is essential to know and more importantly, understand the needs of the decision makers and understand what decision makers on the field need to improve decisions and performance. In this chapter, we discuss the analysis of the information needs as a continuous and dynamic process. This method is comparable to the concepts used by industry or the UK firefighters on risk analysis: Dynamic Risk Analysis is a work model in which dynamic and operational conditions are analyzed quickly and continuously, to assess whether there is an acceptable level of safety and whether better safety can be achieved or restored through certain control measures.

We translate this idea coming from the safety-field into a Crisis Intelligence concept of dynamic analysis of information needs.

In the dynamic conditions of an incident, we can quickly analyze and continuously monitor whether current flow of information is sufficiently in line with the information needs and what new information sources or levels needs to arise to achieve intelligence.

The main questions we constantly reconsider at this Dynamic Information Need Assessment (DINA) are:

- What information is needed to make decisions and to provoke thinking about the action?

- What is the required intelligence value against the available capacity to process information?

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The intelligence value is a concept that represents the extent to which information provides thought provoking leads. Thought provoking leads can be seen at as information products that help achieve high level situation awareness, i.e information products that help the user get a projection of the state of the environment in the near future.

Thought provoking leads can be seen at as information products that help achieve h i g h l e v e l s i t u a t i o n awareness The extent one needs high or low intelligence value depends on several factors. If there is very little time, the decision maker has little experience with the current situation and the decisions are very important, information with a high intelligence value is needed to make good decisions. On the other hand, if there is more time for the information to be processed by the decision maker himself, the decision maker is very experienced and the stakes are lower, a lower level of intelligence is acceptable. The

desired intelligence level is thus determined by the time pressure, the knowledge and experience with the type of incident and what is "at stake" in the decisions to be taken. The whole context of the crisis, crisis management and the leader has to be taken into account when determining the desired intelligence value.

For example, the figure below shows how the same information can be represented in a tabular form, or on a map. In the table, we find much more detail, but it also costs us more time to analyze these details. The card makes the message more quickly apparent. For a decision maker who must decide in a very short time where resources should be used, the map is an information product with much higher intelligence value.

Source: Conny White

As discussed, crisis intelligence does not arise by maximizing the use of one step of the work process, but by

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spreading the available capacity as best as possible across all steps. Within the limitations of crisis conditions (including time, people, resources and accessibility), that is not an easy task.

Objective

The overall objective of Crisis Intelligence in a dynamic situation is to support decisions and to elicit thinking.

Often we do not attach importance to the latter, and we collect information only as "input" blindly following proposed plans and procedures or following the information flow as it comes. Decisions then become more automatic, without further consideration, and the question becomes thus whether the plans and procedures are entirely applicable in the given circumstances.

Organizational expert Mintzberg proposes in 1994 that plans and procedures have a negative impact on the flexibility and commitment of employees. After drawing up a plan, we think we can relax and we do not need to think again, and that attitude keeps us further in implementing the plan. Karl Weick also argues that the blind follow-up of plans leads to a lack of anticipation.

With this in mind, we understand under DINA that we continuously review the information needs before and after incidents, but especially during incidents, so that we avoid blind following of procedures and routines and continuously anticipate the next steps of the crisis management.

The objective of this chapter is thus to stimulate thinking about the information needs. Information management techniques and methods are less important than the mere fact that the one dealing with information management from time to time thinks about the bigger picture at hand and anticipates the needs of decision makers.

Methods, Techniques and Applications

Following questions give an idea about how we would perform dynamic information needs assessment. Working on Crisis Intelligence with these questions in mind leads to a better understanding of the required information and the required intelligence value of that information.

The following questions help to make an estimate of the required intelligence value

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a) Make an assessment of the individuals involved, their tasks and the context;

Who needs it?

- Leadership

- Personality

- Experience

What tasks should the information serve?

- Operations or communication?

- Source area, or drop zone impact area?

Context: What are the characteristics of the situation / event?

- Which are the risks and dangers that can be traced from the situation?

- Dynamics: how quickly can the situation change?

- Level: severity of impact or threat?

b) Evaluate the dynamics of the incident;

- Did the incident have a fast or slow start?

- Did the incident have a fast or slow momentum?

- Did the incident have a fast or slow end?

c) Evaluate the decision-making need.

- What is the importance of the decisions?

- How complex are the decisions?

d) Evaluate the availability of information

- Is available information easily or not easily accessible?

- Is new information available quickly or slowly?

- What is the quality of information available?

By whom?

The task of executing the DINA is initially the responsibility of information management or the information analyst. In minor incidents, this function is not necessarily required as a full-fledged role. In such cases, DINA's responsibility lies with the crisis manager. The crisis manager must also

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manage his own information flow when there is no organized information management.

Even though there is a roadmap and the approach seems straightforward, evaluating the information needs requires a high level of insight into both operational and information issues. For example, the DINA can also be at different levels, with the different services or disciplines making their own dynamic analysis (content management), based on a methodology provided by a central information manager (process management).

Tools

Since DINA is a dynamic process, tools should not be restrictive of flexibility. In most cases, the DINA will be an implicit and subconscious mental process for dynamic interventions. Therefore, we may well learn DINA mainly through frequent exercises based on case studies and simulations. Regularly and deliberately walking through the roadmap also makes the subconscious process better.

When DINA is executed in a less acute phase or at a higher level, simple tools can help. We will discuss a useful Matrix- tool below.

Matrix: Intelligence Value vs. Availability

A matrix of the contribution of an information product relative to the required effort can provide insight into the priority setting of information management.

For example, in an escalating industrial fire, a time-related map may stimulate thinking, but if the competence is not available to create this map or if providing this type of map takes too much time, then we should consider whether there are no other means that can help. For example, with much less effort, we can find a standard map (easily available) that we complement with a solid radio sketching (easily available) to provide 80% of the information needs. In a next iteration this product can be improved gradually.

On the other hand, the standard available information (for example, an extensive list of all dangerous and other goods present in the facilities) can lead to overload of information and wrong priorities during the first few minutes. This data is available by default but has no intelligence value and is therefore not interesting at that stage.

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We prefer the green zone, where we find information products that are available as standard or with little effort and that also score high in intelligence value. Initiatives in the yellow zone can be considered. Initiatives in the red or black zone have little or no effect.

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Satisficing Data collection Vision

Today data is relatively free and easily available in huge quantities. We can find information from various sources and use it for analysis. There are major challenges in dealing with this sea of data. On the one hand, processing of large amounts of data is an art in itself (see chapter content curation) and on the other hand we often look for very specific data, the so-called needle in the haystack. Then it appears that the data we need exactly is not as easy to access or readily available.

In this chapter we discuss the sources of data without going too much into details as this matter is subject to rapid evolution. We also discuss search strategies. In addition, we put the emphasis on stopping the search for data. This chapter is namely not just about collecting data, but above all about finding just the right amount of content and the data that actually contributes to decisions.

Satisficing is a term that was introduced by Herbert A. Simon in the 1950s. The term stems from the idea that people are not looking for the perfect decision, but for a decision that meets their needs. So, we do not constantly evaluate all options, but stop when we find an option that seems to satisfy.

A good example is the purchase of a computer. After a brief and superficial process without comparing all possible models, and all the properties of all the models. We usually make a decision about purchasing a computer based on very limited information. In real life, we decide when we are satisfied with the information we have. We do not constantly evaluate all options, but stop when we find an option that seems to satisfy.

Research on decision making in crisis situations by Gary Klein also confirmed that people do not investigate an infinite number of options, but immediately choose the first

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option that meets the needs. So, we also strive to extend the concept of satisficing results to crisis management, crisis intelligence and data collection for the several reasons:

1. We are under pressure: the pressure is not only high due to the information needs for our own decision-making process, but also with all other parties involved. We are under pressure to fill this need for information as soon as possible with information.

2. The next meeting is in quick succession: In a crisis situation, consultation sessions and crisis meetings are in quick successions to each other. So we have a very small window of opportunity in regards to time to gather new information and in terms of preparations for the next team meeting. The planning is most of the time not ours to

make, so the creation and improvement of information products has a harsh deadline.

3. Crisis can only be solved by acting: Just informing yourself solves no crisis. The team must also be able to make quick decisions. In order to make the decisions, they need regular data collection and information gathering. But sometimes also a “freeze” in the data gathering process is needed, in order te make decisions. Otherwise, the decision-maker cannot make timely decisions on the necessary actions. This means information will never be perfect but has to be improved step by step.

So in our search strategy we will put the emphasis on stopping. We stop searching and collecting as soon as we have enough information to make our decision. Our goal is not to form a completely correct image, but to support and provoke thinking.

The preparatory work

Most crises come unexpectedly. Nevertheless, we can do a lot of preparatory work beforehand. It is about the following:

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- An agreement on the data collection process;

- Making the data that likely will be part of the data collection easily accessible;

- Teaching and practicing methods and techniques;

- Experiment and learn to work with tools that make data collection easier and more efficient.

In addition, it is also important that we look very carefully at new opportunities for data collection during a crisis. In case of unexpected crisis situations, very useful information is often available in specific places that were not immediately considered in the preparation of plans and procedures.


Think about what sources of data you know? And what relevant sources we currently do not know? Actively working on these issues during data collection, allows for better imaging. But how to do that?

1. Improve balance between internal and external sources

In crisis management, we often rely (only) on information systems internally provided to share information. However, many situations have already shown that external data sources may contain useful information that can confirm, expand or even conceal the traditional information flow for operational decisions. A good example is to monitor "accident tweets" and photos of eyewitnesses on Twitter, rather than solely depending on the classical call taking.

In terms of crisis communication, the situation is reversed. Here, we often focus exclusively on external sources, while also internally there is circulating a lot of information that is important for a clear picture of what is happening in the communication landscape. An example of this is a spokesman. Unlike most members of the crisis team, this person is in direct contact with the outside world most of the time. The spokesman can thus supplement the environmental image of a crisis team with very relevant questions. By extension, this applies to any employee of the organization, and even one who is physically located in the area or in the vicinity of the incident. Anyone who is on or near the facts has a different perspective than one who is in a meeting room. The crisis team can take advantage of all possible "extra eyes" aimed at the incident.

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2. Dynamic integration of resources specific to the crisis (region, scenario, ...)

Each situation involves a number of specific sources. By applying DINA during a crisis, a team will also be attentive to specific locations where data is generated and for specific methods for collecting this data. Some of these sources already exist before the crisis (for example, a local information network) is released. Others originate spontaneously as a result of the crisis itself (for example, citizen initiatives). A team must therefore train to keep an eye on these sources.

The inventory of these sources also fits well in preparing for certain scenarios. For example, we can link geographic resources to certain zones and areas of territory.

3. Good estimate of the proportion of traditional media vs. Social media

Crisis teams that actively monitor for information can easily be misled by the very easily accessible nature of social media. However, traditional media and alternative sources often play an important role, but they are often more difficult to monitor systematically. For example radio news gives other information to a crisis communications team

than social media, but is more difficult to monitor and summarize.

4. Combining sources and standardization of data

This involves creating a workflow in which we want to combine the data from all identified sources into one dataset on which further analysis can take place. Individuals with an IT or process management background often want to transform this into a centralized system, but the more we try to address this challenge in one and only one software solution, the less flexible and viable data collection workflow is during crises. The aim of uniformity in the data collection can be useful, to some extend, but the initiatives to achieve uniformity have much more effect as they focus on the last two steps of the crisis intelligence work process, namely content curation and design & dissemination of information. In practice this means you can work with different databases and sources of information. There is less need for uniformization of data sources. It is more important to build layers on top that combine the data and make it into a useful image for the user. We look at that challenge in the next step of the process.

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5. Optimizing data accessibility

Most data in crisis situation is very difficult to access. For example paper and pen are used to collect information about people visiting an emergency shelter or a drawing bord is used to make a shared image of the situation by a crisis team. To create a data stream from the identified sources that comes in real time (instantaneously), data sources can be optimized in advance to improve data accessibility. For example the collection of information in a shelter can be digitalized in an electronic form or the drawing bord can be made in a shared digital document. This allows to access information with a minimum of human consultation. Available capacity can then be used to focus on sources that are not easily digitizable, and need human attention, like radio communications.

6. Targeted utilization of tools and human capacity according to sources

When setting up a data collection workflow, we want to combine different sources, but this also means we run the risk of getting lost in many tools and sources. A good approach is therefore to choose one tool or a limited set of tools to be considered as the central monitoring tool, and then select a number of tools that each fill a certain

shortcoming of this central tool. Additional tools enable us to add additional specific resources, to show just a certain type of data (e.g., photos), … For example the crisis situation can be scanned by following the radio communications between different actors. This is supported by adding pictures that are shared in a Whatsapp group and the external view comes from analyzing social media. The combination of these tools give a much broader view on the situation than rather following the one central source.

Even with some additional tools, a number of sources are often not accessed optimally (for example, the radio news). For this we necessarily fall back on human capacity. As mentioned earlier, good process agreements are crucial for a good flow of information, because usually we also give these people other tasks.

Limits

In many incidents, the flow of information is continuous. A decision-maker, information manager or information analyst can infinitely follow and collect the incoming data, but at the expense of other necessary activities. So we must interrupt the work regularly to draw conclusions. It depends on the dynamics of the incident and the data

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stream itself to determine this moment of stopping. Hereafter we discuss some advices and principles for dealing with this continuous flow of information. We are looking for the best combination of timely decisions and still working with relevant, non-aging information.

It depends on the dynamics of the incident and the data stream itself to determine this moment of stopping

1. Iterative process with small steps: The collection of information must be done in a fast-moving circle. Instead of determining the picture of the incident at one time, it is better to collect small amounts of data repeatedly, to test it down to the decision-making process and then to modify it. In this way, we do not run the risk that the dynamic situation has changed completely compared with the information we base ourselves on.

2. Continuous improvement: It is not possible to fully control a complex process like managing a crisis from the first moment. Thus, the iterative process must be

conducted in such a way that it leads to continuous improvement through adjustment. We build on the lessons of the previous cycle. Crisis intelligence must follow this principle by following the iterative process and continually building information on the basis of previous cycles.

3. Pareto Rule: This rule of thumb assumes that we already achieve 80% of the results by doing 20% of the effort. The remaining 20% of the results thus require 80% of our efforts. In data collection, it is therefore unwise to strive for 100% of the information and the optimum is much closer to 80%.

Validation and verification

Whether we include data in the decision flow depends on the reliability of that data. Data must therefore be validated before we can consider it useful. This process of validation is also called verification. Verification can be done by some very simple principles. These are similar to how a

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good journalist checks her information and sources. These principles can be formally introduced in crisis management, and even systems are available to monitor information at large incidents, but in dynamic circumstances verification is often a subconscious process.

Upon verification, we need to apply and apply the following steps:

Start from the assumption that the information is incorrect or incomplete and do not use it until verification has been made. Use your common sense: if it seems too good to be true then it's probably not true.

Follow these steps for verification:

1. Identify the source and check the reliability and credibility. Look at the distance to the incident, previous messages, reputation, ... (example: an eyewitness report on social media through a profi le created during the incident is less reliable than a report by an account that has existed for a long time and has a respectable history );

2. Triangulate: Search for other sources that confirm or deny the information. If three independent sources say the same, the information is very reliable.

3. Contact the source and ask for more information. A reliable source usually has more interesting information than what it shares.

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Content curation

The data that we collect through satisficing data collection is still raw. Simply bundling and delivering this data will not lead to the right insights about a situation. Once we have a collection of data, we have to do content curation to achieve more intelligence.

Vision

A curator of an exhibition or museum wants to choose the right pieces of art from a broad collection or artworks. Taking into account the limitations (space, time, capacity and budget), a curator of an exhibition also wants to arrive at a number of works that accurately depict the intended “story” of the exhibition and that provokes our fascination for a particular artist or period.

Just like the curator of an exhibition or museum, we want to arrive at a limited number of pieces of information from a large amount of available data that yield a relevant

image. This image must match the information needs and provoke thought.

In crisis management, content curation is necessary to achieve good results in the context of the same limitations. Making an interpretation based on a bundle of data takes time and mental capacity. Submitting a bundle of raw data to a team member is actually asking that person to plunge themselves into this data in order to extract the relevant information. So in crisis operations, where every second and every minute counts, we gain valuable time by relying on individuals to analyze the raw data beforehand and apply the principles of content curation to it.

Content curation consists of two activities: enrichment and analysis. This is followed by the design and distribution of the resulting information (the next and last step in the work process Crisis Intelligence). In most practical examples it is difficult to separate the enrichment, analysis, presentation,

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and dissemination of information. In this manual we still divide this into separate processes, for educational purposes.

Activity 1: Enriching data

Media richness theory, also referred to as information richness theory, states that communication media vary in their “richness” or their ability to help users understand a problem. Adequate information richness depends on the time available, the skills of the decision-makers and the novelty of the problem: rich information by itself is not sufficient for achieving understanding, but it helps in certain conditions.

While information can be enriched in various ways, we define “enriched information” as information that Combines information from different sources and is represented in a format with which professional crisis responders are familiar. Information that is not aggregated nor represented in a specific format is considered “raw” or non-enriched. As an illustration of the difference between raw and enriched information, consider the example of a train accident: raw information is the information about the carriages that comes in (via the responders in the field) at irregular times. Enriched

information consists of a summary the crisis coordinator provides to the team with an overview of all the carriages and what is known about them at that moment. Our own research has shown that enrichment of information in its own can lead to higher situation awareness, however the effect also depends on the dissemination of information, something we talk about in the final step of the work process.

Some techniques to enrich raw data:

1. Add and organize context: Geo location, metadata, ...

Placing data in the right context ensures great enrichment. Suppose we collect a series of reports of complaints of citizens about a bad smell in the air. We can then collect a number of photos off a large cloud of smoke on social media, where municipalities or street names are mentioned or where geo-coordinates are available in other ways (for example, by location on smartphones). As raw data, these various types of information have low richness, but when we add them together and use the pictures and geodata as context, we can greatly enrich the reports of complaints and improve the response to the problem.

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We can also add metadata ourselves to enrich information. For example by combining each social media post with certain scores that are related to different social parameters:

- A Conversation Score: An indication of the size of the online conversation to which the message belongs;

- An impact score: An indication of the impact and / or impact of the social media profile used;

By doing so it is more easy to filter out the more and less important posts. We can do the same with for example chat messages in a crisis management conversation tool or with written logs of radio communication.

Metadata helps information management to separate more and less relevant data from each other while analyzing. When we view large amounts of data in tools, sorting by relevance (the results ordered by "most conversation" or "most influence”) this gives a more interesting result than when the results are sorted chronologically (the results ordered by time).

2. Categorize or label

By categorizing, we put together similar data, so that certain headings are created. Breaking the data into different categories creates much more clarity about what the data can tell us. In unstructured form, the data confuses us and we are unable to keep an overview.

The categorization used is always linked to the information needs. Every crisis is different, and the information needs are also different. Therefore, such a layout must be sufficiently flexible and adapted to the application. Some examples from practice:

- Actor: Fire - Medical - Pol ice - Logist ics - Communication

- Victims - Damage - Traffic - Cause - Politics

- Information - behavior - sensemaking

- Question - rumor - impact - behavior - emotion - complaint - compliment

The choice for a particular approach depends on the needs as determined by the DINA. There are several ways to get started with categorization:

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- Provide the chosen format as an empty table (for example, on a whiteboard) and then fill in with relevant information;

- Labeling separate pieces of data and regularly reviewing a report where labeled information is placed together.

3. Summarize and determine patterns

By doing summarization and pattern usage, we extract extensive descriptions and data about the same theme into simple, short wording. This gives us a compact overview of what is in the dataset. By defining summaries and patterns, it is possible to reduce tens of thousands of data pieces to an overview that fits one display. It goes without saying that such an overview is a very powerful tool for decision makers.

4. Filter by leaving out certain data

We deliberately delete data by evaluating data critically against information needs. For example in social media monitoring we could consider "the questions of the population" as the desired information. In our example, after doing the DINA and satisficing data collection we have a data set of 1,000 messages. We can further filter

these messages in several steps by deliberately deleting certain data.

First, we can select messages that explicitly contain the question mark character '?'. We filter out the other messages from this data. The result is probably incomplete as we only filter out explicit questions and not implicit. But the result is a fairly pure dataset, which makes it easy to find authentic messages with important questions. Our filtered data still consists of 100 messages.

We can go one step further by specifying the desired information as "questions of the population that we are not aware of". Thus we further filter the data by deliberately removing all the questions that are known. Of the 1,000 messages, only 10 messages remain in our example. The dataset now consists entirely of relevant material. We have created intelligence.

Activity 2: Analyze information

There are some possibilities for further analyzing enriched data. Some examples:

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1. Text / content analysis

We process the collected text material in a certain form so that we can see the context and meaning much better even when the text is in rough form. A good example is the word cloud that is already available in many tools.

Figure: A word cloud shows words in a larger font according to their frequency in the dataset. This allows us to uncover patterns or striking words. The data for this example is all feedback from attendees of a conference on risk and crisis management. Tool used is www.wordle.net

This can help us in a number of ways:

- We quickly get a global view of the word usage and the word choice. For example, the terminology teaches us a lot about how an involved event precipitates;

- The terms used by those involved often differ from the terms that we ourselves use as an involved party ( ex a m p l e : a c a r b ra n d s t i c ks t o t h e t e r m "concessionaire" while almost all concerned are talking about a "garage");

- We can find information and signals that we were not aware of by analyzing word usage. Example: An emotionally loaded hashtag or a particular image about the event that occurs on social media;

- We can analyze large amounts of text quickly and in depth to understand the context and meaning.

2. Spatial analysis

In a spatial analysis we convert data into locations using map material. By using different layers and visual elements, we can present data on map very clearly, vigorously, illustratively and in a spoken manner.

A map also has disadvantages. For example, a map often gives an image of a certain moment and thus no evolution in time. By the same force, which promotes the map for imaging, it can also draw attention to other important information elements.

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In the example below, two data sets were recorded on a map of the city of Antwerp (Belgium) during a storm. It concerns the open (red) and the closed (green) interventions for water pollution and storm for the fire department. At rapid analysis, it appears at a glance in which areas the fire department still has work.

However, if we look further, we see that this analysis is not entirely correct. By using the filter properly, we see that the red areas are still present much more than thought at first sight and that there are still some areas where there has been no aid. Maps should therefore be used well, because

they can create a correct image, but also an erroneous image.

3. Object relationships

To view and analyze the relationship (network) between events or parts of organizations, we can create object-based analysis. A simple example of an object-relationship analysis is an organizational chart of a (crisis) organization. We can often not display complex structures and processes, such as the coherence between certain aid organizations or the way people interact with each other through communication in straightforward models. All objects in a process are interconnected and affect each other. To view these relationships we can show object relationships visually. For example, the relationship

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between users on social media can be displayed in a clear graph to determine which users (spheres) influence each other (lines) and in what way (size of spheres).

Figure: Network analysis of one social media user

Network analysis is done more and more to evaluate the work of a crisis team. Managing networks and even networks of networks is an assignment of a modern working crisis management team. During the COVID-19 crisis our team analyzed the network management of different organization like the fire service and the port authorities. Results of this research can be read in the

paper, and explaining them would lead us too far, but the network analysis is also represented as another form of object relationship:

Source: Van den Oord, 2020

4. Time/trend analysis

Analyzes that show trends and evolutions over time are available in many shapes and sizes. For example, we can

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make a timeline of the course of an event, but we can also display keyword lists and analyze based on categorization on that same timeline. The following example shows a selection of online pictures before and during the (imminent) storm on Pinkpop in June 2014. Some relevant contextual data are combined in this timeline:

- Weather alarm code;

- Crisis scaling;

Some striking differences in perception: at the top are the kind of pictures that parents and friends place at home on social media and at the bottom are the kind of pictures that visitors put themselves.

Source: Online Media Analysis Pinkpop 2014 by How About You

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Information design and disseminationINFORMATION DESIGN

Vision: What does design do in a crisis?

It seems strange to have a "design" issue during a crisis. Of the four phases described in this manual, this is the phase where overall the least attention is paid to in the preparation and operations. However, the way we design an information product and spread it, plays an underestimated important role in the process. Therefore, in this chapter we look critically at design and dissemination. We will see that there is plenty of room for optimization. We can provide end users with information products that require relatively little effort to get them and get started with designing quickly and efficiently.

The purpose of this final phase is to get the collected and secured information in such a way to the end user that this person can maximize the use of the information offered.

In information design we look at the relationship between the purpose of the information offered and the (cognitive) efforts that it takes to achieve that goal. We must look at the idea of an information product in a special way to structure this product so that it helps others to make good interpretations with minimal effort (design). The product must also be efficiently delivered to the end user (dissemination).

In information design we look at the relationship between the purpose of the information offered and the (cognitive) efforts that it takes to achieve that goal. The example below

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shows this very clearly. The goal in this example is to make good decisions about the priority of aid for a particular geographical area. On the left side, we will see a table that we have to study for a few minutes before we get a clear picture. In the figure on the right side, we see that the same data recorded on a map gives us a picture of the priorities a lot faster and moreover, with less effort. Conclusion: the red zones have the biggest needs.

source: Connie M. White

This phase is at the end of the work process, which is why it is very often missed. However the work process can not be looked at as a cyclic model or as steps to be followed in a specific order. Design has to be in mind from the first moment. Often we see that products are offered without thinking too much about the design. Another common mistake is that the design is based on the information provider's perspective and not from the user’s perspective.

A tool, structure or reporting system that works easily for the information administrator is usually less suitable for the end user. While compiling the information product, the information manager must also consult the end user and take into account their roles and needs when designing.

Methods, techniques and applications

Human centered design

In order to put the end user at the heart of the process, we take into account:

- The information flow;

- The analysis;

- The reality of the user.

This kind of design is also called Human Centered Design (HCD). This is a form of design in which the user is central and products are designed starting from the end user's perspective. Particularly when using digital systems, this is a major task because computer systems handle data differently than people.

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With Human Centered Design we choose explicitly what information we show the users and how. Note the difference with DINA (Dynamic information needs assessment) where we determine what information can contribute to decision-making. The focus of DINA is therefore mainly on the data itself. In the design phase we determine how we propose information and to whom we offer the information. The focus is not on content but on the user experience.

As a result of the previous process of DINA, data collection and content curation, there is usually a lot of information available to show. However, an end user needs only part of this information for proper execution of his or her own tasks. Therefore, we need to make a good estimate of the

end user's needs. This concept is called operational empathy. Operational empathy can be seen as a form of empathy, not focused on engaging in the feelings of others but engaging in the operational context and reality in which they must do their work and the information nodes they experience.

Operational empathy can be seen as a form of empathy, not focused on engaging in the feelings of others but engaging in the operational context and reality in which they must do their work and the information nodes they experience. Experience in the context of users also helps us to match the design to the effective user experience. Often there is a gap between design and user experience, as illustrated below perfectly. By mentally placing us in the mind of an

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end user, we can design a better information product and improve our user experience. The field in which we strive for optimal user experience (UX) is also known as usability.

The Human Centered Design concept is very important for information managers who work in support of operational units in the field or for commanders. By assuming a good operational experience, information managers can shape information in such a way that it answers the needs of the operational units and commanders at the time.

Whether or not a product has high intelligence value depends on the knowledge and capabilities of both the information manager and the end user. For example, we can create very good dynamic maps with high potential

intelligence value with Google Maps, but end users with little Google Maps experience are unable to convert this potential because of lack of technical knowledge or simply because they are afraid to use a new tool amidst an ongoing crisis.

Figure: An experienced user can build maps with high intelligence value with Google Maps. This example contains two data sets, each shown in a time block. Decision makers who can work well with the tool have a dynamic image of time-related evolution. The evolution shown in this example is a move from north to south during the evening.

Common Operational Picture

In this part we go into detail of one product that is very important in cr is is management: the Common Operational Picture (COP). We also want to show that the

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design process is certainly not always complex and technical. But even in the design of low-tech solutions (example: the layout of a drawing bord), attention to good design and user experience is very important.

A team that strives for a good COP seeks to achieve shared situational awareness. If a team does not aim for a COP, then all team members will evaluate situations only from their own perspective and this is suboptimal. Their individual image of the situation is after all very limited and distorted. Following elements are needed to avoid this and to achieve shared situational awareness:

- Perception: Observation of what happens;

- Comprehension: common understanding of what is happening;

- Projection: joint understanding of the consequences, how the situation will continue to evolve.

The classic application for creating a COP is the whiteboard in the crisis room. Below we will explain how to optimally structure such a whiteboard.

- Showing the status of an incident: designing a COP

The purpose of a status statement (part of a COP) is to show the current situation of the incident. A good status statement should be:

- clear;

- up to date;

- relevant.

These three requirements are in stark contrast to the system of a logbook in which notes are written and presented in chronological order. Chronology is an inappropriate design to create a COP. The logging does not take into account the difference between up-to-date and outdated information: older log lines that are chronologically deeply hidden in the log can still contain very relevant information about the situation. Newer log lines that are chronologically very prominent can contain less important or irrelevant information. The log is a useful tool, but for purposes other than achieving a common picture: evaluation, analysis, accountability, …

The general structure of a workable status statement can always be done in the same uniform way:

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- General (constant) data: This is useful information that remains constant throughout the incident and is of a general or practical nature. Examples include start hours, general description of the incident, timing of a subsequent consultation, but also Wi-Fi information, ...

- Facts: These are the data that are known about the incident and may change as more information becomes known. Examples include the number of victims, product names, metadata, ...

- Decisions: The decisions taken by the consultative body;

- Questions / To Do: topics to be treated like, such as

- Outstanding questions in the consultation body;

- Outstanding questions for which another consultative body should be consulted;

- Information to pass to another consultative body;

- Actions that the team members will perform and follow.

"Omission" as a design principle

"Leave away what's less important", it's a basic principle within user experience that companies like Apple and Google have made gigantically popular. The apparent sacrifice of all kinds of data, links and buttons ensures that the most important information and features are optimized and the product works much better.

We must also apply this design principle when compiling an information product in crisis management. The question is then, of course, what can we leave now and what not? Thanks to dynamic information needs assessment (DINA),

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we continuously determine each element, whether it is sufficiently relevant to the information product we want to provide.

In addition, "omitted" does not always have to be associated with removal. By building layers in information structures, we build different degrees of visibility and accessibility of information, for the benefit of the user experience. For example, think of a website: not everything is directly available on the homepage. With a good information design, the layout of a website is as follows:

- The main tasks and information for the users are directly on the homepage (first layer);

- For minor tasks there are other web pages (2nd-3rd layer, ...);

Insufficient relevant tasks or unnecessary data are removed as much as possible in favor of the clarity of the relevant matters.

This idea translates into an information product in crisis, for example, the analysis of the perception of the population. This is an important tool for determining a communication strategy. An interesting tool to build this analysis product is Trello. But the same can be achieved with an offline

application on paper, with a “Zettelkasten”-system that is now very popular to structure very complex data sets, but can also be used in an offline form. In the Trello interactive tool, we can build the idea of layered ness as follows:

Each Card in Trello stands for a subject that is strong in the population. Card titles are visible on the overview page, so we create as a map title a synthesis of what has already been collected about this topic (1st layer);

A Card also has a "back". The backside is not immediately visible on the overview page, but appears when the user clicks on the map. This makes the backside suitable as the second layer in our information model. We can provide detailed information about the subject and collect single fragments we find on different sources.

The major advantage of layered architecture in the information structure is therefore that additional information on the second, third, ... layer does not compromise the clarity of the central first layer.

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INFORMATION DISSEMINATION

Vision

Once the information has been prepared for the user, we must also get the product to the user effectively. This part is called Information Dissemination. There are a lot of resources available to share information, both classical and technical. Choosing what information to share and with whom happens consciously or unconsciously. We need to actively ask ourselves whether that choice increases or decreases the intelligence value of the distribution process. Often the dissemination of information is based on habits, preferences in the organization or individual team preferences. In this area, we also notice a lot of room for improvement by choosing diffusion methods that better fit the context.


Centralisation vs decentralization

The first question on dissemination of information is how the information enters the crisis management team. One solution can be to give the information to all group members, another is to centralize the information flow and send the information to the leader or a designated

information manager. We have seen that group discussion is a poor means of exchanging information that is not commonly shared by all members of the group. Groups do not exchange information efficiently yet focus on information that is known and common to all group members. Decision quality suffers as a result. This problem is referred to as “Common Information Bias”. Several researchers have attempted to reduce this bias, for instance by designating group members as experts in a specific domain or by appointing team leaders. But even with these measures in place, groups still share more common than uncommon information.

As much as there is the need for sharing relevant information during a crisis, it is as crucial to achieve rapid and coherent coordination among those responding to a crisis. Clearly, coordinating the different response organizations brings an additional cost of attention and effort, and coordination breakdowns during a crisis are well documented.

In our own research we haven seen that centralizing the information is a good way to improve situation awareness among the team members. But when information is more enriched, probably the information flow becomes more complexe and then centralization is not the best solution.

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This shows us that much attention has to go to the information flow and that it needs to be optimized for the situation and the team at hand.

Classical Synchronous Techniques

When we think of the resources available to disseminate information, first and foremost, we think about one-to-one physical consultation, telephone, radio communication or joint consultation (meetings). We also call these resources the synchronous means, because all the participants at the same time participate synchronously in the exchange of information.

The great power of these means is the possibility of free human interaction and expression. For example, if we want to get together with multiple people together on a complex situation, then these kinds of resources will help us very well. If we want absolute certainty that each team member gets some crucial information, we are also looking forward to these resources.

But at the same time, classic human interaction and the resources based there are also some major weaknesses:

- It takes a lot of the available capacity. Persons participating in the exchange must sacrifice valuable

time and cognitive capacity (their concentration) to the consultation activity;

- It does not produce a tangible or distributable information product. The product is nothing more than a temporary and mutually created "floating insight" between the participants. If we want to share the information with others, we need to completely reconstruct and repeat the conversation (or possibly take a picture).

New and digital asynchronous techniques

Thanks to information technology, we also have a lot of new techniques for exchanging information. It is also possible to exchange information with very limited technical means. By simply taking a picture with a smartphone and sending this picture by email or via an app, we can often share a lot of relevant information. The information product is not editable, but gives sufficient insight into the reality in the field or in the image that prevails in another location.

What distinguishes these kinds of techniques is that they work asynchronously. Team members put the information unilaterally on a common medium. Participants in the

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exchange of information are then free to determine when and where they consult the information. This way of working therefore introduced a completely different form of work in crisis management. Asynchronous methods have some strengths over the classic techniques:

- The spreading process is no longer "floating" but very prolonged and moreover tangible, documented and easily reproducible;

- Adding and receiving information does not have to happen at the same time. This is an enormous added value in turbulent circumstances where people do not easily manage the time available;

- The exchange process requires less concentration of team members, it is not necessary to drop individual tasks during the exchange. There is more than one chance to be aware of the latest developments. The mental capacity that this allows can be used in other matters.

A good example is the increasing use of Instant Messaging in crisis management. Crisis teams put popular apps like Telegram, Whatsapp or internal tools such as MS Teams to

contact team members who are out of the crisis area via short text messages (often also pictures).

There also exists more advanced techniques to share a common image and supporting information. For example, teams can quickly set up a common Teams, Dropbox or Google Drive folder, where team members or coordinating bodies share documents with each other.

Working directly with online tools as opposed to sending attachments makes sharing information and managing different versions much easier and more efficient. These tools allow the ownership of documents to be shifted from a single user to a group of users. This collaborative design principle provides a lot of support for jointly creating an image.

Another step further is the idea of an online linking document. This document itself does not contain information, but is a central overview of all links to the relevant available information. The linking document is a central referral page where team members collect relevant web links. This can be done, for example, by using an online spreadsheet, or an internal website

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Crisis intelligence is developing. There is still much work to evolve from classical information management (focused on the administrative management of a crisis) to information management that focuses on the full support and improve operational decisions.

This guide focuses on the content in the field, concepts, methods, techniques and tools of intelligence crisis. However, there are still some issues that may threaten further development.

In crisis management we are always facing the problem of a large but unexpected peak stress . Few organizations can plan to have enough people available in the short term for crisis management, as it would be economically irresponsible.

Staffing for functions such as information management or crisis communication often provides sufficient operational power at the time of the emergency but comes at an expense. For improving the quality of crisis intelligence in the long run, organizations need to look for better solutions. This can be done by investing extra in staff, but also by working with crisis partners.

Crises do not stop at administrative boundaries, so why should crisis teams do that? Collaborations in the area of crisis communication and emergency planning are in progress and there is no reason not to set up such collaborations in the area of crisis

• Crisis Intelligence is a developing field

• This manual is intended to set the scene and to introduce concepts and methods

• But challenges remain.

Conclusions

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Finally, the knowledge and skills needed for crisis intelligence are a lot more complex than those for classical information management. This will have an impact on education and strategic choices. The scarce resources in Crisis Intelligence will require regions and organizations to work together and support each other.

Ultimately, this will also mean that nobody will have all the specific knowledge and skills needed to manage the complexity of crises. In these circumstances, the crisis leader must evolve from a crisis manager to a director, someone who keeps the ropes tight, just like the conductor of an "orchestra": a leader who can lead the whole process without playing any instruments.

intelligence. Such collaborations can even be extended to unusual partners like media. As a result the media can become a very important partner in the future when it comes to data collection. Cooperation with global voluntary organizations is also necessary to fully develop crisis intelligence.

A negative effect of the increased professionalization of crisis management is that the roles of people get more and more separated. For example, many colleagues find it unclear whether crisis intelligence needs to be further developed within the communication discipline (which is already professionalizing in environmental analysis, application of crisis intelligence for communication purposes) or within integrated multidisciplinary information management.

In our opinion, supporting operational decisions through good information must be incorporated into the entire management system of a crisis management team, but also within a management team of any organization dealing with a crisis. In any case, it is clear that integration of crisis intelligence throughout the system is in line with the inherent chaotic and the "fuzzy" characteristics of a crisis.

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