Crisis Coordinationand Communication During the 2010Eyjafjallajökull Eruption

Deanne K. Bird , Guðrún Jóhannesdóttir,Víðir Reynisson, Sigrún Karlsdóttir,Magnús T. Gudmundsson and Guðrún Gísladóttir

AbstractEyjafjallajökull became Iceland’s most infamous volcano in 2010 whenthe ash cloud from its summit eruption caused unprecedented disruption tothe international aviation industry and considerable challenges to localfarming communities and villages. The summit eruption, which began on14 April 2010, was preceded by a 24-day long effusive flank eruption thatproduced spectacular fire-fountain activity and lava flows. The 39-daylong summit eruption, however, was far more explosive and resulted inmedium-sized jökulhlaups to the north, small jökulhlaups and lahars to thesouth and considerable ash fall to the east and east-southeast of thevolcano. As in other crises in Iceland, the Department of Civil Protectionand Emergency Management (DCPEM) coordinated efforts and facilitatedcrisis communication, while collaborating with the Icelandic Meteorolog-ical Office, the Institute of Earth Sciences at the University of Iceland andthe National Crisis Coordination Centre. The DCPEM’s role includedproviding information to the government and its various agencies andfeeding information from scientists to local police officials, civil protectioncommittees and the public. Communication with local residents took placethrough agencies’ websites, the national media and frequent open townhall meetings where representatives of institutions responsible for eruption

The original version of this chapter was revised: Anaffiliation has been updated. The erratum to this chapteris available at 10.1007/11157_2017_22.

D.K. Bird (&) � G. GísladóttirInstitute of Life and Environmental Sciences,University of Iceland, Reykjavík, Icelande-mail: deanne.bird@gmail.com

G. JóhannesdóttirDepartment of Civil Protection and EmergencyManagement, National Commissioner of theIcelandic Police, Reykjavík, Iceland

V. ReynissonSouth Iceland Police, Reykjavík, Iceland

S. KarlsdóttirIcelandic Meteorological Office, Reykjavík, Iceland

M.T. Gudmundsson � G. GísladóttirNordvulk, Institute of Earth Sciences, University ofIceland, Reykjavík, Iceland

https://doi.org/10.1007/11157_2017_6© The Author(s) 2017Published Online: 22 June 2017

Advs in Volcanology (2018) 271–288

monitoring, health, safety and livestock handling provided advice. Theseface-to-face meetings with local residents were critical as ash fall had notaffected these areas for over 60 years and plans for dealing with thishazard were not established. This chapter explores these events and indoing so, provides a narrative of crisis coordination and communication inIceland. The narrative is based on multiple sources, including an analysisof community perspectives of the emergency response and their use andviews of the various forms of communication platforms. The chapter alsoconsiders the eruptions’ impacts at the local level. This exploration revealsthat the trust developed through close communication between allinvolved prior to and during the eruption increased the effectiveness ofcrisis communication. The experience gained from the Eyjafjallajökulleruption is important for volcanic crisis communication at a local andinternational level. While the immediate evacuation plans were effective,the ash fall problems illustrated the need for necessary precautions andbroadly defined preparedness strategies.

1 Introduction

The Eyjafjallajökull volcano (Fig. 1), which isoverlain by a 200 m thick ice-cap bearing thesame name, has produced three eruptions sincethe tenth century: in 1612, from 1821 to 1823,and the recent 2010 events. Past eruptions haveproduced very fined-grained ash deposits typi-cally found within a 10 km radius from theEyjafjallajökull crater (Larsen et al. 1999) andonly small to medium (3000–30,000 m3s−1) gla-cial outburst floods (jökulhlaups) (Guðmundssonet al. 2005).

Initial volcanic risk management plans,developed from as early as 1973 for southernIceland, did not include response to an Eyjafjal-lajökull eruption. These plans have, however,undergone revisions since 2002 to rectify thisomission due to the realised threat evidenced bycontinuing magma intrusions in Eyjafjallajökull.The most dangerous aspect of a sub-glacialeruption, based on historic eruptions not leastfrom Katla the volcano underlying Mýrdalsjökullglacier, are jökulhlaups, i.e. massive glacialoutburst floods carrying volcanic debris and iceas sub-glacial eruptions melt through the glacierice. Efforts made in 2003–2006 were therefore

aimed at understanding and mitigating the riskfrom eruptions in both Mýrdalsjökull (Katla) andEyjafjallajökull, in relation to reducing the like-lihood of accidents and fatalities to jökulhlaups(Guðmundsson and Gylfason 2005). A highdegree of volcanic risk awareness leading up tothe 2010 eruption and the semi-establishedcommunication lines between key stakeholderswere partly the outcome of this work.

As the work, however, had focussed on thismost dangerous and life-threatening aspect, rel-atively little attention had been paid to the soci-etal and health effects of weeks of repeated ashfallout on people and the agricultural industry,which is a critical component of the region’seconomy (Bird and Gísladóttir 2012). Moreover,as the plans were aimed at mitigating jökulhlauprisk, they were developed for a local responseonly; they did not consider international impactsof an ongoing eruption or a response to deal withthe overwhelming international interest in theevent (Heiðarsson et al. 2014).

Understandably, local agencies faced signifi-cant challenges responding to the 2010 eruptions.Hence, the purpose of this chapter is to provide anarrative of crisis coordination and communica-tion in Iceland through the lens of the

272 D.K. Bird et al.

Eyjafjallajökull eruptions. This narrative isdeveloped using multiple sources, including ananalysis of community perspectives of the emer-gency response and their use and views of thevarious forms of crisis communication. Thechapter also considers the eruptions’ impacts atthe local level.

To provide context, the chapter first describesthe roles and responsibilities of local, key agen-cies involved in civil protection and emergencymanagement in Iceland. This is followed by adescription of contributing resources and datacollection methods used in this chapter.

2 Civil Protection and EmergencyManagement in Iceland

The Minister of the Interior is head of civil pro-tection and emergency management in Icelandwith the National Commissioner of Police (NCIP)responsible for all issues at the national level(Fig. 2). Sitting within the NCIP is the Depart-ment of Civil Protection and Emergency

Management (DCPEM), which is responsible forall daily matters including crisis communication,emergency coordination efforts and disasterrecovery in relation to all hazards affecting thenation (Almannavarnir 2016a). At the local level,Chiefs of Police (Municipal Authorities) andCivil Protection Committees are responsible forcivil protection activities and emergency responseplans within their jurisdictions (Johannesdottir2016).

Representatives from all these levels form theCivil Protection and Security Council, which setsstrategies relating to civil protection, security andemergency management for the nation for3-years at a time. This includes developing andimplementing strategies to prevent and/or miti-gate physical injury, impacts on public healthand damage to the environment and property, inaddition to providing emergency relief andassistance (Johannesdottir 2016).

The Civil Protection Act No. 82, 2008 statesthat NCIP is responsible for assigning alert levels(Text box 1), in collaboration with the relevantChief of Police, for all natural and man-made

Fig. 1 Eyjafjallajökull, Katla and the surrounding dis-tricts. The areas impacted by jökulhlaup (flood) inunda-tion and where cumulated ash fall exceeded 1 cm, areshown. Tephra fallout and flood inundation data derived

from Gudmundsson et al. (2012) and Þorkelsson (2012).Population data was sourced from Ísólfur Gylfi Pálmason,the head of the Rangárþing eystra municipality, andStatistics Iceland (2016)

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hazards (Ministry of the Interior 2008). Based ontheir real-time hydrological, meteorological andseismological assessments, notifications of animpending eruption usually come from the Ice-landic Meteorological Office (IMO). In thisinstance, DCPEM call a meeting with experts,such as those from IMO and the Institute of EarthSciences (IES) at the University of Iceland, toevaluate the risk and make recommendationswith respect to the alert levels.

Text Box 1: Alert Level Phases, asAssigned by the National Commis-sioner of the Icelandic Police (Alman-navarnir 2016b)

Uncertainty Phase (Óvissustig):Uncertainty phase/level is characterized byan event which has already started andcould lead to a threat to people, commu-nities or the environment. At this stage thecollaboration and coordination between theCivil Protection Authorities and stake-holders begins. Monitoring, assessment,research and evaluation of the situation isincreased. The event is defined and a haz-ard assessment is conducted regularly.Alert Phase (Hættustig):If a hazard assessment indicates increasedthreat, immediate measures must be takento ensure the safety and security of thosewho are exposed/in the area. This is doneby increasing preparedness of the emer-gency- and security services in the area andby taking preventive measures, such asrestrictions, closures, evacuations andrelocation of inhabitants. This level is alsocharacterized by public information,advice and warning messages.Emergency Phase (Neyðarstig):Emergency phase is characterized by anevent which has already begun and couldlead, or already has led to, harm to people,communities, properties or the environ-ment. At this stage, immediate measuresare taken to ensure security, save lives andprevent casualties, damage and or loss.

In addition to their advisory role withDCPEM, IMO is tasked with monitoring, fore-casting and disseminating natural hazard warn-ings to aviation service providers and the public(Karlsdóttir et al. 2010; Vogfjörd et al. 2005).During the Eyjafjallajökull eruption: hydrologicalsensors were used to monitor river runoff in termsof chemical composition and jökulhlaup risk;meteorological sensors and visual observationswere used to assess lightning hazards, behaviourof the eruption cloud and localised ash fall; and,seismic, strain and GPS sensors were used toassess the geophysical components (Gud-mundsson et al. 2010; Karlsdóttir et al. 2010).

The main role of IES is research in earthsciences, including a strong emphasis on vol-canology. The institute undertakes core researchin volcanic activity as well as the associatedhazards and environmental impacts. While IESresearch includes monitoring via GPS measure-ments, INSAR, glacier surface surveying andseismic measurements, real-time monitoringremains the responsibility of IMO. As such, IESdoes not have any statutory obligations withrespect to the monitoring and communication ofvolcanic activity. However, IES is called upon toprovide advice to DCPEM and other governmentagencies prior to and during times of volcaniccrises (Þorkelsson 2012).

Also sitting under the NCIP and managed byDCPEM is the National Crisis CoordinationCentre (NCCC), comprising staff from NCIP,Emergency Call Centre 112, Icelandic CoastGuard, Icelandic Red Cross, National HealthCare System, rescue teams (ICE-SAR), ISAVIA(national airport and air navigation service pro-vider of Iceland) and others (Heiðarsson et al.2015). Based in Reykjavik, NCCC is responsiblefor coordinating a national response when theevent affects several civil protection districtsacross the nation.

3 Methods

Multiple sources of data were used to developthis narrative of crisis coordination and commu-nication during the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull

274 D.K. Bird et al.

eruptions. Firstly, published reports and aca-demic articles were critically reviewed with ref-erence to the events as they unfolded, with aparticular focus on the activities, challenges andachievements of DCPEM, IMO and IES at thelocal level. Secondly, personal experience of theauthors (Jóhannesdóttir, Reynisson, Karlsdóttir,Gudmundsson) who were heavily involved inresponse and recovery efforts through theirpositions within DCPEM, IMO and IES providedadded detail to that generated from the publishedreports and academic articles. Thirdly, surveydata collected by Gísladóttir and Bird in August2010 was used to enhance understanding from acommunity perspective.

The survey incorporated 15 semi-structuredinterviews with officials and residents alongside aquestionnaire disseminated to households livingwithin the vicinity of the Eyjafjallajökull and

Katla volcanoes. Out of 61 households, 58completed the survey giving a response rate of95%. This included 19 households fromVestur-Eyjafjöll, 26 from Austur-Eyjaföll, sevenfrom Sólheimar and six from Álftaver (seeFig. 1), covering approximately 141 adults and38 children. These communities were targeteddue to their exposure to volcanic hazards (ash,debris-flows, jökulhlaup, lahars, etc.) during the2010 eruptions. Every permanent householdexposed to volcanic hazards during the 2010Eyjafjallajökull eruptions was approached inthese communities.

The questionnaire and semi-structured inter-views asked respondents to detail their: personalexperience prior to and during 20 March and 14April eruptions; affects of the eruptions on indi-viduals, family, property and businesses(agriculture/tourism); and, use of various media

Fig. 2 Iceland’s currentCivil Protection Structure, asof November 2016 (fromAlmannavarnir 2016a)

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sources to access information on Eyjafjallajökulland Katla. Katla was included here as earlierresponse plans were centred on a Katla eruptionrather than a response to an Eyjafjallajökulleruption.

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to pre-sent all survey data (some results have beenpresented by Bird et al. 2011, Bird and Gísla-dóttir 2012). However, some pertinent points areraised here as they directly relate to crisis coor-dination and communication during the 2010events. These points, identified as ‘survey’ data,are interspersed throughout the following sec-tions. All published reports and academic articlesare cited accordingly.

Bringing these sources of information toge-ther, the following sections detail the events asthey unfolded, with a particular focus on theactivities, challenges and achievements of thekey agencies and local residents’ views of andresponses to crisis coordination andcommunication.

4 Crisis Coordinationand Communication Duringthe Eyjafjallajökull Eruptions

4.1 20 March 2010 Events

In light of increased seismic rates in and aroundEyjafjallajökull at the start of 2010 (Gud-mundsson et al. 2010), the regional Chief ofPolice and the DCPEM organised emergencymanagement meetings with scientists, localpolice and rescue teams. These meetings beganin February 2010 and included 10 communitymeetings with residents living in the expectedhazard zone around Eyjafjallajökull up to oneweek prior to 20 March 2010 flank eruption.Evacuation plans in case of jökulhlaup from anEyjafjallajökull eruption were finalised duringthis period (Bird et al. 2011).

The initial stages of 20 March 2010 eruptionwere of very modest magnitude and despitecomprehensive monitoring systems, it was firstobserved that evening by farmers who reported

“a fire on top of the mountain” to local police(Bird et al. 2011). Hence, it is not surprising thatthe survey revealed the majority (50%) ofrespondents heard about the commencement ofthe eruption via a family member, friend orneighbour. A further 17% heard from DCPEMwhile 14% heard of the news over the radio.

As observer reports were received of the ini-tial eruption on 20 March 2010, DCPEM andother authorities began rapid response effortswhile IMO and IES scientists monitoredreal-time data to assess the situation (Þorkelsson2012). The pre-defined plans for evacuation,based on the hazard assessment from 2005 (seeGuðmundsson and Gylfason 2005) were imple-mented for the first time in the early hours of 21March. The first evacuation orders were dis-seminated via an automated phone alert system,supervised by the local Chief of Police (Gud-mundsson et al. 2010). This was critical, giventhat a jökulhlaup from an Eyjafjallajökull erup-tion has the potential to impact inhabited areaswithin 1 h (Sigurðsson et al. 2011).

However, some survey respondents indicatedthat they did not receive the SMS or call toevacuate while others who did receive it chose toignore it.

We did not evacuate our home, in these farms here,because there was no risk that the flood wouldreach the farms, but there was a possibility that wewould be cut off. Everyone in this home waspleased with the decision, because it is better to becut off being at home than to evacuate and unableto return home and attend the livestock.

…we did not receive any message, neither on thelandline nor to the GSM phone. Everyone shouldhave received a message that an eruption hadstarted but we did not receive any for the Fimm-vörðuháls eruption or the Eyjafjallajökull eruption.

Nevertheless, approximately 700 residentsconformed during the early hours of 21 Marchand in general, survey respondents were morepositive than negative about the coordination ofthe evacuation (Fig. 3).

The main criticism towards the coordinationwas in relation to lack of planning, with someresidents stating that they were confused aboutwho was to go where.

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In our area the planning for the evacuation and theevacuation centre was not good, it should havebeen planned better.

As soon as the eruption site was located in theearly morning on the flank of Eyjafjallajökull andnot under the ice-cap, residents were allowed toreturn to their homes.

Although this eruption was relatively small,its impressiveness attracted thousands ofonlookers that hiked the 16 km one-way trekwith over 1000 m elevation to witness theeruption (Þorkelsson 2012). Continuing for24 days, this ‘tourist eruption’ produced spec-tacular fire fountains and lava flows. As reportedby survey interviewees and Þorkelsson (2012),the main task of DCPEM, the police and rescueteams during this time was managing crowdcontrol on site; a task that was made all the moredifficult due to the extreme conditions and oftenvery ill-prepared onlookers who lacked suitableclothing for the cold, were exhausted, andsometimes needed assistance with broken downvehicles. Tragically, two people lost their liveswhile trying to access a suitable viewing pointfrom the north of Eyjafjallajökull. Although tra-gic, it is surprising that these were the onlyfatalities considering the adverse conditions andthousands of keen spectators trying to access theeruption site (Donovan and Oppenheimer 2010).

4.2 14 April 2010 Events

On 14 April 2010, after 1–2 days lull in activ-ity, the explosive summit eruption began in the

ice-filled caldera of Eyjafjallajökull (Þorkelsson2012), creating with it new vents under theice-cap (Sigmundsson et al. 2010). Preparationdone in the years prior to the eruption provedcrucial to the execution of monitoring, in par-ticular relating to the life-threatening floodhazard. Direct and rapid communicationbetween monitoring scientists at IMO and IESwith DCPEM and local police promptedresponse such as road closures and evacuationsin line with the hazard assessment-basedpre-defined plans.

Evacuation orders were again disseminatedvia the automated phone alert system withapproximately 800 residents complying beforedaybreak on 14 April (Gudmundsson et al.2010). The need for evacuating the region wasrealised with the impact of jökulhlaups chargedwith volcanic debris and icebergs, travelling atvery high velocities (<20 km/h) (Sigurðssonet al. 2011). These floods destroyed farmlandsand caused some damage to roads and infras-tructure but no lives were lost (Gislason et al.2011).

In comparison to the 20 March eruption, thegreatest proportion of survey respondents indi-cated they heard about the possibility of Eyjaf-jallajökull erupting for a second time from theChief of Police/police (40%) but received newsof the start of the 14 April eruption over the radio(36%). A further 21% stated they heard about thecommencement of the eruption via a familymember, friend or neighbour. Survey respon-dents were more positive about the coordinationof the evacuations (see Fig. 3), stating that the

20th March

14th April

Negative Positive

Fig. 3 Respondents’ feelingstowards the management ofthe evacuations in relation tothe 20 March and 14 Aprileruptions

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planning was much improved from the 20 Marcheruption with better information.

The evacuation went better because of the expe-rience from previous eruption.

You never know what will happen and it is goodthat people are together if something happens.

However, criticism still ensued in relation tothe choice of evacuation centre for people livingin Vestur-Eyjafjöll. Here, residents were requiredto evacuate to Heimaland, which is low-lyingand considered to be vulnerable to jökulhlaup.

The planning was in general OK especially forLandeyjar. But the evacuation for Vestur-Eyjafjöllwas not OK. It was a terrible mistake to evacuateto Heimaland, that place is not safe.

The potentially life threatening flood hazardsubsided after 4–5 days. After that, the ash hazardand possible changes to the activity became morecentral to emergency response efforts. The erup-tion was producing very fine-grained ash ejectedalmost 10 km into the atmosphere (Gud-mundsson et al. 2010) with extremely sharp andhard particles, justifying grave concerns for air-craft, as the ash had the ability to cause windowand body abrasions as well as melt jet engines(Gislason et al. 2011). The summit eruption alsoproduced lightning with a total of 790 strikesdetected (Bennett et al. 2010), gas emissions,heavy sound blasts and lava flows reaching over3 km down the slopes on the north side (Gud-mundsson et al. 2012; Veðurstofa Íslands 2010).Linked to the thick ash layers deposited on theglacier and its foot hills, post-eruptive lahars anddebris-flows repeatedly impacted rivers to thesouth of the crater (Jensen et al. 2013).

Already established communication links,which had been tested through regular exerciseswith London Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre(VAAC), ISAVIA, EUROCONTROL (EuropeanOrganisation for the Safety of Air Navigation)and Toulouse VAAC, ensured IMO were betterprepared to effectively communicate plumeinformation to relevant international stakehold-ers. Nonetheless, improvements were made,including 3-hourly reports detailing plumeactivity for the use of international institutes andorganisations and, joint daily reports from IMO

and IES (Karlsdóttir et al. 2010; Þorkelsson2012), which served the use of DCPEM, themedia and general public (see http://en.vedur.is/earthquakes-and-volcanism/articles/nr/1884).

Other improvements included modificationsto the IMO website, in order to enhance com-munication with the broader population. Laun-ched on the second day of the summit eruption,additional pages containing relevant backgroundand overview information were added to thewebsite, alongside IMOs real-time monitoringdata (Þorkelsson 2012). These were done ‘inorder to achieve the goal of being more flexibleand communicative to the public, so guarantee-ing its considerable educational value andensuring the public trust in the IMO services’(Heiðarsson et al. 2014, p. 62).

Similarly, IES developed a designated web-page for the Eyjafjallajökull eruption as part oftheir website (see http://earthice.hi.is/eruption_eyjafjallajokull_2010). Here, the general publicalongwith government officials and agencies wereable to access timely data including status reports,satellite images and maps, GPS time series data,chemical composition analyses of rocks and ash,grain size distribution of ash, photos of the erup-tion, lahar reports and related academic publica-tions. IES considered it essential to make thisunpublished primary scientific data open to thepublic as soon as it was available, due to theinternational extent of Eyjafjallajökull’s impacts(Þorkelsson 2012).

In addition to sharing information via theirwebsites and through frequent meetings, IMO,IES and other institutions, e.g. DCPEM, ISA-VIA, the Environmental Agency, HealthAuthorities, and ministries and embassies, com-municated with external agencies and institutesvia informal means such as phone conversationsand emails (Þorkelsson 2012).

Based on the joint daily reports from IMO andIES, the NCCC media team produced daily (andsometimes multiple daily) reports in Icelandicand English on the eruption and conditionsacross the nation (Þorkelsson 2012). The firstdaily report was disseminated on 14 April 2010,with a standardised form of the joint reportsadopted some days later, and continuing every

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day during the summit eruption, after which theless frequently issued reports continued until 9December 2010 (see http://www.sst.is/displayer.asp?cat_id=413).

In addition to posting on the DCPEM website,the reports were disseminated to governmentcabinets and ministries, foreign embassies loca-ted in Iceland, NGOs including the tourism sec-tor and the Icelandic Red Cross, and media(Þorkelsson 2012). As well as detailing thephysical status of the eruption, the reportsincluded impacts on the local environment,impacts on the Icelandic population, responsemeasures being implemented and recommenda-tions for effected populations to consider. Thesereports were openly discussed with local resi-dents at a Temporary Service Centre establishedin Heimaland to deal with the crisis, which is inclose proximity to Eyjafjallajökull. Residentswere encouraged to drop into the HeimalandTemporary Service Centre to attend meetings,ask for information or be provided a meal.

Some survey respondents and intervieweesreported that these services were very helpful andtrustworthy, while others who did not attend anymeetings believed they had missed out onaccessing some critical information. A branch ofthe Temporary Service Centre was later estab-lished in Vík in Mýrdal for the population east ofthe eruption since the main centre in Heimalandwas too far for many residents to travel, espe-cially in relation to the ongoing ash fall andresuspension. The DCPEM in conjunction withIMO and IES held meetings critical to localresidents in Vík, as well as Heimaland, whereconcerned citizens were given the opportunity todiscuss their worries associated with increasingactivity.

Despite the plans and strategies that had beendeveloped to deal with volcanic crises in Iceland,all agencies and organisations involved in dis-aster risk reduction were faced with an event thatthey had not previously experienced. Ad hocprocedures were therefore added to the processesalready in place in order to deal with unantici-pated events as they occurred. One resident sta-ted “[The regional police chief] has done some

very good work in trying to make better planswith the residents.” Part of the developing plansincluded detailed site visits and close collabora-tions with the tourism industry.

In consideration of the impact the continuingeruption was having on the tourism industry, aspecial response team was established. Led bythe Ministry of Industry and Tourism (now theMinistry of the Interior), this team met everymorning during the eruption, and included peo-ple from the DCPEM, IMO, IES, tourism oper-ators, airlines and public relations people fromthe ministries and municipalities. This groupplayed an active role in crisis communicationwith the responsibility of disseminating infor-mation to tourists stranded in Iceland and offer-ing alternative activities to them while they werewaiting for flights out of the country.

The role of this group continued well after theeruption was over, with responsibility shiftingfrom crisis communication to the promotion ofIceland through an advertisement campaignentitled ‘Inspired by Iceland’ in an effort toattract tourists back in the wake of the Eyjafjal-lajökull eruption. The special response team hasalso been active during other volcanic crises suchas the 2011 Grímsvötn and 2014–15 Bárðar-bunga-Holuhraun eruptions.

4.3 Impact on Local Residents

While the evacuation was effective in preventingloss of life and serious injury due to jökulhlaup,there were no immediate plans in place withrespect to mitigating the impacts of ash (Bird andGísladóttir 2012; Heiðarsson et al. 2014). And ofall the various volcanogenic hazards impactinglocal communities, survey respondents andinterviewees declared the ash caused the greatestconcern. A considerable amount of ash wasejected during the eruption, with large amountsdeposited and resuspended causing high levels oflocalised pollution (Gudmundsson et al. 2012;Thorsteinsson et al. 2012). Many surveyrespondents and interviewees commented on theresuspended ash, with one stating:

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The impacts of the eruption are significant on myfarm and at my neighbouring farms. It is verymisleading and wrong description that the impactswere confined to Eyjafjöll…We still live with ashstorm when the wind is blowing.

Air quality in Iceland, measured against themost commonly used health limit, was exceededby orders of magnitude in local farming com-munities and villages during and after theEyjafjallajökull eruption (Thorsteinsson et al.2012). The health concerns among local resi-dents (Bird and Gísladóttir 2012) were thereforejustified, with resuspended ash proving to be ofequal importance to that emitted from the vol-cano (Thorsteinsson et al. 2012). A study con-ducted by Carlsen et al. (2012) revealed thatresidents living in affected communities pre-sented a highly increased prevalence of physicalhealth conditions including tightness in thechest, coughing, phlegm, eye irritations andother respiratory problems.

Gissurardóttir (2015) found that residents withdirect experience of and exposure to the Eyjaf-jallajökull eruption were also at greater risk ofpsychological morbidity in relation to mentaldistress and post-traumatic stress disorder. Sur-vey respondents and interviewees noted theongoing psychological impacts of the eruptionand lack of crisis communication regardinghealth issues:

The ash seems to impact people a lot. They getclaustrophobic and become confused and many arenot able to make logical decisions.

The individual authorities’ approach, such as thoseconcerning health of residents, is reprehensible.Not enough consultation. No understanding on thepsychological state of people [who were livingunder] ash fall and later ash storms for months.During the eruption, the area should have beenevacuated – because it was sometimes uninhabit-able there – but all tried to survive – many in astate of shock.

Supporting these comments, Gissurardóttir(2015) revealed the following factors as causes ofpsychological distress:

• Damage to personal property• Feelings of insecurity during the eruption

• Being required to use protective equipmentwhen working outside during the eruption

• Spending time outdoors in ash fall during theeruption due to work commitments or otherduties

• Living in view of the eruption site

The impacted region was, and still is, animportant agricultural region, with 15% of allcattle, 6% of all sheep, 17% of all horses and12% of all dairy production in Iceland in 2010(Farmers Association of Iceland 2010). Consid-ering that animals are at a great risk of short andlong-term mortality when they inhale or ingestfine ash particles (Lebon 2009; Wilson 2009;Wilson et al. 2011), it was understandable thatthe agricultural industry (Farmers Association ofIceland 2010) and local residents were gravelyconcerned about the health and wellbeing of theirlivestock (Bird and Gísladóttir 2012). Moreover,survey interviewees revealed that post-eruptivelahars and debris-flows also caused significantconcern to farmers living south of the crater,where sediments were destroying infrastructureand agricultural land.

Thus, accurate, detailed and timely crisiscommunication was imperative in the lead up toand during the ongoing eruption, not only inrelation to jökulhlaup risk but also covering thebroad spectrum of impacts and well into therecovery phase.

4.4 Demand for Accurate and TimelyInformation

The demand for information during the Eyjafjal-lajökull eruption was unprecedented in Iceland,with communication and media relations suddenlyevolving into a major component of the crisisoperation (Guðmundsdóttir 2016). Without adoubt, the Eyjafjallajökull eruption dominatedinternationalmediawith the closure of transatlanticandEuropean airspace causing tens of thousands offlights to be cancelled (Harris et al. 2012).

At the local level, the survey data shows thatresidents were actively using the IMO (Fig. 4)

280 D.K. Bird et al.

and DCPEM (Fig. 5) websites up to severaltimes per day during the Eyjafjallajökull erup-tion. The IES website, which was mostly inEnglish but not streaming real-time data, was notused as actively by survey respondents (Fig. 6);however, it was considered a valuable resource atan international level. In the initial stages, theseagencies were not prepared to meet this demand(Heiðarsson et al. 2014).

As Þorkelsson (2012) points out, IMO did notand still does not have a designated press office

that can deal with a huge demand for crisisinformation yet they were faced with an enor-mous influx of requests, fielding calls fromaround 100 international reporters on just daytwo of the summit eruption. IES and DCPEMdesignated around 5–7 fulltime staff to workexclusively on dealing with the demand frominternational media (Þorkelsson 2012).

Due to the demand for information, two mediacentres were opened under the supervision ofDCPEM—one at NCCC in Reykjavík and a

Fig. 4 Respondents’ use of the IMO website before, during and after the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull eruptions

Fig. 5 Respondents’ use of the DCPEM website before, during and after the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull eruptions

Crisis Coordination and Communication … 281

Local Crisis Coordination Centre in Hvolsvöllur(Þorkelsson 2012), which is the closest townshipto Eyjafjallajökull. With an overall aim to pro-vide information with ‘one voice’, the teamsbased at each centre consisted of experts fromDCPEM, ISAVIA, the Icelandic Coast Guard,Red Cross, the Icelandic Transport Authority, the

Icelandic Ministry for the Environment (cur-rently entitled the Icelandic Ministry for theEnvironment and Natural Resources), the Ice-landic Road and Coastal Administration,ICE-SAR and others. Overall, survey respon-dents agreed that the information provided by thevarious agencies was reliable (Fig. 7).

Fig. 6 Respondents’ use of the IES website before, during and after the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull eruptions

IMO

IES

DCPEM

Police

Rescue teams

Strongly disagree Strongly agree

Fig. 7 Respondents views towards the statements ‘information released by IMO/IES/DCPEM/police/rescue teams isreliable’

282 D.K. Bird et al.

Press conferences were held at both locationsto help deal with the enormous interest in theevent (Guðmundsdóttir 2016). In addition todistributing status reports, IMO and IES scien-tists were interviewed about facts and predictionsof the continuing eruption, taking valuable timeaway from research and monitoring.Guðmundsdóttir (2016) reports, however, thatmany recognised this as an important part of theirrole as a scientist because media personnel willalways be at the heart of the action and if anexpert is not available for interview the mediawill seek information from anyone who isavailable and willing.

The National Broadcasting Service, ‘RÚV’established a crisis-broadcasting studio in theNCCC media centre in Reykjavik enabling themto provide vital information to the Icelandicpopulation (Heiðarsson et al. 2015). Other localnews media, such as the ‘Fréttablaðið’ and‘Morgunblaðið’ newspapers and the Englishnewspaper ‘The Reykjavik Grapevine’ andmagazine ‘Iceland Review’ also broadcastednews of the event via their traditional and onlineplatforms.

Overall, the survey data suggests that resi-dents’ more frequently turned to the variousmedia platforms for information (Fig. 8) withtelevision, radio and Internet as the preferredplatforms, respectively. However, some respon-dents also indicated that they accessed

information from newspapers, books and infor-mation brochures. Once again, increased usageoccurred during the eruption with many respon-dents accessing media sources several times perday (Fig. 9).

Even though survey respondents and inter-viewees indicated they trusted information fromRÚV, they were overall critical of the mediaduring the 2010 eruptions. When local residentswere evacuated on 20 March 2010, the mediawere permitted to access and report from theevacuation zone. This incensed many surveyrespondents housed in the evacuation centres,where they watched live broadcasts from theirevacuated farms, and in some instances, theyhadn’t had time to lock their front doors. Onesurvey interviewee summed up many people’ssentiment with the statement:

Scientists and media people receive a pass to gointo the risk area on their own responsibility. Whyare they allowed to go into the risk area whenothers are not?

Survey interviewees also found it disturbingwhen the international media portrayed them ashelpless victims, dramatizing the summit erup-tion without any consideration of how peoplewere living their day-to-day lives through theevent. For impact, the media sought farmers whowere in a state of shock at the realisation of thedestructiveness of the heavy ash fall and thisangered neighbouring residents.

DCPEM, 52.8%

IES, 24.1%

IMO, 71.2%

Media, 87.7%

Fig. 8 Respondents usage ofvarious sources for hazardinformation

Crisis Coordination and Communication … 283

I also found that the media exaggerated when theywere broadcasting news from the area. Theydescribed it as such that everything here wascovered in ash, and the situation in the area dis-astrous, but it was absolutely not so. A bit “over-dramatizing” if I use slang. And we heard aboutfarmers that were tired of the continuous pressurefrom the media.

[The media] said that the situation was more severethan it was. The situation was worse in a specificarea but not elsewhere. And sometimes the newswas erroneous. Media people were too aggressiveto the residents, soon after the eruption started.

Residents were also frustrated with the mediastating that the Eyjafjallajökull eruptions were “ashow and nothing in comparison to what Katlacan do”. Residents living in close proximity arewell aware of the potential hazards from a Katlaeruption. However, this was the last thing theywanted to be reminded of while being impactedby ash fall, lightning, lahars and heavy soundblasts from Eyjafjallajökull’s summit eruption(Bird and Gísladóttir 2012). To the detriment ofthe overall aim of DCPEM, IMO and IES toprovide ‘one voice’, Iceland’s president publiclystated: “you ain’t seen nothing yet” in relation toa Katla eruption (see http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/8631343.stm).

5 Beyond Eyjafjallajökull2010—Lessons Learntand Improvements Madein an Unpredictable,Multi-hazard Environment

The enormous workload generated by theEyjafjallajökull eruptions cannot be denied.Considering Iceland’s limited size in terms ofmanpower and resources, these events placedtremendous pressure on all those working involcanic crisis management (Guðmundsdóttir2016; Þorkelsson 2012). Nevertheless, officialsand scientists involved in the response madesome great achievements under the circum-stances, including:

• Pre-eruption risk communication, in particu-lar at the town hall meetings, enabled trust todevelop between emergency managementofficials and the general public, whichincreased the effectiveness of communicationduring the crisis.

• Timely evacuation advice and pre-existingtrust led to the smooth evacuation of vulner-able populations during the summit eruption.

Fig. 9 Respondents’ use of media before, during and after the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull eruption

284 D.K. Bird et al.

• Ad hoc modifications to the IMO, IES andDCPEM websites enhanced the availability ofinformation to key stakeholders including thepublic.

• Good collaborations were maintained withexternal partners based on already establishedcommunication links.

• Establishment of a crisis information centreenabled local residents to access moredetailed information and support.

• Establishment of two media centres, with onebeing in close proximity to the eruption site,met the enormous demands from local andinternational media and thus relieved pressureon agencies and institutes involved in theresponse.

• IMO and IES increased the dissemination ofprimary scientific data on the physical statusof the eruption to meet the growing demand.

However, not all of these initiatives workedwell for all those involved. While it was con-sidered essential that unpublished primary sci-entific data was publicly open and accessible foroperational use, some foreign researchers viewedthis an as opportunity to use the data for theirown research agendas and publications(Þorkelsson 2012).

Furthermore, there was some criticismregarding the fact that before the 2010 events,response plans were only in place for jökulhlauprisk while other volcanogenic hazards had notbeen addressed accordingly (Bird and Gísladóttir2012). During the eruption, residents were callingfor more information about the ash impacts andwhat these meant to human and animal health inaddition to advice on how to mitigate the adverseaffects. The need to adopt an all-hazards approachwas again apparent during the 2014–15 Bárðar-bunga-Holuhraun eruption when poisonous gaseswere the main cause of health concerns. Since the2014–15 Bárðarbunga-Holuhraun eruption,NCIP and DCPEM for south Iceland are engagingwith local communities in the development ofall-hazards crisis management plans. Suchengagement invites opportunities to enhancecollaboration and communication prior to unre-alised events occurring.

Despite these efforts to improve communica-tions and instil learnings internally and externallywith key stakeholders (Heiðarsson et al. 2015),more work is needed at the local and nationallevel. For example, as formal guidelines forvolcanic crisis communication were not in placeprior to March 2010, officials were forced todevelop ad hoc strategies during the Eyjafjal-lajökull eruption. Despite this experience, formalguidelines have not been established.

However, Guðmundsdóttir (2016) postulates atentative guideline for best practice volcaniccrisis communication based on officials’ per-spectives of the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull, 2011Grímsvötn and 2014–15 Bárðarbunga-Holuhrauneruptions. These are:

1. Integrating communication into the manage-ment process

2. Cooperating at an institutional level3. Coordinating messages4. Providing truthful, honest and transparent

information5. Communicating in a proactive way6. Being accessible and having a good rela-

tionship with the media7. Understanding, informing and cooperating

with the audience8. Improvising if necessary9. Planning, preparing, documenting the crisis

communication

A key underlying theme here is that all offi-cials worked together through mutual respect andunderstanding, so as to provide crisis communi-cation via ‘one voice’. To achieve this, Donovanand Oppenheimer (2012) highlight the impor-tance of building and maintaining relationshipswell before a volcanic crisis ensues. The hazardand risk assessments, development of responseplans and engagement of locals in these efforts inthe years prior to the 2010 eruption are anexcellent example of that approach.

Heiðarsson et al. (2014) also highlights theimportance of the science sector providing clearand consistent messaging that is backed up by allgovernment and non-government stakeholders.This is one of many key lessons that have been

Crisis Coordination and Communication … 285

documented and investigated through theFUTUREVOLC project. FUTUREVOLC (http://futurevolc.hi.is/), financed by the EuropeanUnion’s Seventh Programme for Research,Technological Development and Demonstrationunder grant agreement No 308377, was estab-lished following the Eyjafjallajökull eruption andhas continued while other events and volcaniccrises have taken place, e.g. seismic unrest inBárðarbunga throughout 2014 and the 2014–15Bárðarbunga-Holuhraun eruption (Heiðarssonet al. 2015).

After the Eyjafjallajökull eruption, IMO andIES began collaborating on a catalogue of Ice-landic volcanoes, financed by ICAO. The workwas then linked to the FUTUREVOLC project.The aim was to gather all the information elec-tronically in an online catalogue, now available at(http://icelandicvolcanoes.is/), to improve publicand official understanding of the current state ofIceland’s volcanoes. The catalogue providesdescriptions of the geological and tectonic settingof each volcano along with eruption history,characteristics and associated hazards, activitystatus, monitoring, and possible eruption scenar-ios. The catalogue has a strong emphasis on ashhazards and impacts, as it is designed with theneeds of aviation for rapid information at times ofpotential crises. It is therefore not comprehensivewhen it comes to other hazards; e.g. informationon flood hazards or air pollution is not extensive,and at present it does not contain information onresponse or disaster risk reduction plans. Thecatalogue is written in English, somewhatreducing its potential usefulness for local popu-lations. The aim, however, is to develop an Ice-landic version and to include all information andresults from the ongoing long-term volcanic riskassessment program for Iceland.

While local residents are, in general, aware ofthe risks and emergency response proceduresassociated with a volcanic eruption in southernIceland (Bird et al. 2009, 2011; Jóhannesdóttir2005; Jóhannesdóttir and Gísladóttir 2010),tourists are not (Bird et al. 2010; Bird andGísladóttir 2014). Although volcanic riskawareness among tourists appeared heightenedduring the Eyjafjallajökull eruption, it did not

result in them seeking more information onsafety strategies (Lund et al. 2010).

Since the Eyjafjallajökull eruption, tourismhas rapidly grown in all regions across Iceland.Tourism currently accounts for more foreignexchange income than any other industry inIceland, with employment in tourism-relatedindustries increasing more than in any othersector of the economy (Óladóttir 2015). Thisgrowth is expected to continue in the comingyears.

Increased tourism, however, ultimately leadsto increases in the number of tourists exposed torisks associated with volcanic eruptions. Initia-tives like the Catalogue of Icelandic Volcanoesand the introduction of real-time alerts in Englishusing social media and text messaging are aimedat enhancing awareness among internationalvisitors to Iceland (Heiðarsson et al. 2015).However, there is currently little evidence as towhether or not these initiatives are successfullyinciting risk reduction behaviours.

The experience gained from the Eyjafjal-lajökull eruption is important and the immediatecrisis communication strategies were effective inpromoting the successful evacuation of local res-idents. However, the ash fall problems illustratedthe need for necessary precautions and broadlydefined preparedness strategies in order toincrease the resilience of affected communities.This need for resilience is not confined to thelocal population, but also includes theever-increasing number of tourists who visitIceland and who engage in activities aroundIceland’s active volcanoes.

Acknowledgements All interviewees and respondentsare graciously thanked for their willingness to participatein the survey. Contributions from the Ash Fall ImpactsWorking Group, Katharine Haynes, Carolina GarciaLondoño and Guðrún Pétursdóttir are appreciated inrelation to the development of the questionnaire. The twoanonymous reviewers are also thanked for providinginvaluable recommendations that helped improve themanuscript from the original. The preparation of thispaper has been supported by the Nordic Centre ofExcellence for Resilience and Societal Security—NOR-DRESS, which is funded by the Nordic Societal SecurityProgramme. Þórdís Högnadóttir helped with the prepara-tion of Fig. 1 and Ísólfur Gylfi Pálmason prepared pop-ulation data for Rangárþing eystra.

286 D.K. Bird et al.

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