SEXUAL PREDATOR CIVIL

COMMITMENT ACT

Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002) and Selig v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001)

GROUP 5: Operation order

EXAMPLE ONE:KANSAS V. CRANE, 534 U.S. 407 (2002) The defendant cannot control his

dangerous behavior–even if (as provided by Kansas law) problems of emotional, and not volitional, capacity prove the source of behavior warranting commitment. (the trial court had made no such finding)

EXAMPLE TWO:SELIG V. YOUNG, 531 U.S. 250 (2001) Commitment was challenged in state

court, arguing that the conditions of his commitment were punitive and that he was, in effect, serving a second criminal sentence.

the Court dismissed the challenge to the law as the act in question was entirely 'civil'

WHY DID THE COURT DECIDE IN THESE CASES THAT THE SEXUAL PREDATOR CIVIL COMMITMENT LAWS ARE CONSTITUTIONAL?Example One The required standard of proof had to be sufficient

to make the distinction between a dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness or abnormality, made him eligible for civil commitment from the "dangerous but typical recidivist" offender convicted in an ordinary criminal case. 

Example Two Young's contention that the law was 'punitive' was

functionally a full "facial challenge” A facial challenge takes issue with the entire law, and such challenges had already been dismissed by the Supreme Court.

DIFFERENCES IN THE LEGISLATION Civil commitment laws allow a judge or

jury to determine whether a sex offender who appears to meet the definition of a sexually violent predator should be released to the community following their confinement period or whether they should be placed in a secure DSHS-operated facility for control, care, and treatment.

HISTORY

Following two violent sexual assault cases in the 1980s, a special task force was created to examine various aspects of Washington law that permitted the release of dangerous sex offenders. The Community Protection Act of 1990 was subsequently passed.

THE END…