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BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 880

AN ACT ENSURING THE FREE EXERCISE BY THE PEOPLE OF THEIR RIGHTPEACEABLY TO ASSEMBLE AND PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR OTHER

PURPOSES

Section 1.Title - This Act shall be known as "The Public Assembly Act of 1985."

Section 2.Declaration of policy- The constitutional right of the people peaceably toassemble and petition the government for redress of grievances is essential and vitalto the strength and stability of the State. To this end, the State shall ensure the freeexercise of such right without prejudice to the rights of others to life, liberty and equalprotection of the law.

Section 3.Definition of terms - For purposes of this Act:

(a) "Public assembly" means any rally, demonstration, march, parade,procession or any other form of mass or concerted action held in a public

place for the purpose of presenting a lawful cause; or expressing an opinionto the general public on any particular issue; or protesting or influencing anystate of affairs whether political, economic or social; or petitioning thegovernment for redress of grievances.

The processions, rallies, parades, demonstrations, public meetings andassemblages for religious purposes shall be governed by local ordinances:Provided, however, That the declaration of policy as provided in Section 2 ofthis Act shall be faithfully observed.

The definition herein contained shall not include picketing and otherconcerted action in strike areas by workers and employees resulting from alabor dispute as defined by the Labor Code, its implementing rules andregulations, and by the Batas Pambansa Bilang 227.

(b) "Public place" shall include any highway, boulevard, avenue, road,street, bridge or other thoroughfare, park, plaza, square, and/or any openspace of public ownership where the people are allowed access.

(c) "Maximum tolerance" means the highest degree of restraint that themilitary, police and other peace keeping authorities shall observe during apublic assembly or in the dispersal of the same.

(d) "Modification of permit" shall include the change of the place and time ofthe public assembly, rerouting of the parade or street march, the volume ofloud-speakers or sound system and similar changes.

Section 4.Permit when required and when not required - A written permit shall berequired for any person or persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a publicplace. However, no permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done ormade in a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or in private property, inwhich case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession isrequired, or in the campus of a government-owned and operated educationalinstitution which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational

institution. Political meetings or rallies held during any election campaign period asprovided for by law are not covered by this Act.

Section 5.Application requirements - All applications for a permit shall comply withthe following guidelines:

(a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of theleaders or organizers; the purpose of such public assembly; the date, timeand duration thereof, and place or streets to be used for the intendedactivity; and the probable number of persons participating, the transport andthe public address systems to be used.

(b) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of applicant

under Section 8 hereof.

(c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city ormunicipality in whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held, at leastfive (5) working days before the scheduled public assembly.

(d) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged inwriting, the office of the city or municipal mayor shall cause the same toimmediately be posted at a conspicuous place in the city or municipalbuilding.

Section 6.Action to be taken on the application -

(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf toissue or grant a permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence thatthe public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order,public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health.

(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the applicationwithin two (2) working days from the date the application was filed, failingwhich, the permit shall be deemed granted. Should for any reason themayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application fora permit, said application shall be posted by the applicant on the premisesof the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed.

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(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of asubstantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shallimmediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter.

(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the applicationwithin twenty-four hours.

(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application ormodifies the terms thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest thedecision in an appropriate court of law.

(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the MunicipalTrial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or theIntermediate Appellate Court, its decisions may be appealed to theappropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the same. Noappeal bond and record on appeal shall be required. A decision grantingsuch permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall, beimmediately executory.

(g) All cases filed in court under this Section shall be decided within twenty-

four (24) hours from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall beimmediately endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or, in hisabsence, to the next in rank.

(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.

(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are herebyallowed.

Section 7.Use of public thoroughfare - Should the proposed public assembly involvethe use, for an appreciable length of time, of any public highway, boulevard, avenue,road or street, the mayor or any official acting in his behalf may, to prevent gravepublic inconvenience, designate the route thereof which is convenient to the

participants or reroute the vehicular traffic to another direction so that there will be noserious or undue interference with the free flow of commerce and trade.

Section 8.Responsibility of applicant- It shall be the duty and responsibility of theleaders and organizers of a public assembly to take all reasonable measures andsteps to the end that the intended public assembly shall be conducted peacefully inaccordance with the terms of the permit. These shall include but not be limited to thefollowing:

(a) To inform the participants of their responsibility under the permit;

(b) To police the ranks of the demonstrators in order to prevent non-demonstrators from disrupting the lawful activities of the public assembly;

(c) To confer with local government officials concerned and law enforcers tothe end that the public assembly may be held peacefully;

(d) To see to it that the public assembly undertaken shall not go beyond thetime stated in the permit; and

(e) To take positive steps that demonstrators do not molest any person ordo any act unduly interfering with the rights of other persons notparticipating in the public assembly.

Section 9.Non-interference by law enforcement authorities - Law enforcementagencies shall not interfere with the holding of a public assembly. However, toadequately ensure public safety, a law enforcement contingent under the command ofa responsible police officer may be detailed and stationed in a place at least onehundred (100) meter away from the area of activity ready to maintain peace and orderat all times.

Section 10.Police assistance when requested- It shall be imperative for lawenforcement agencies, when their assistance is requested by the leaders ororganizers, to perform their duties always mindful that their responsibility to provideproper protection to those exercising their right peaceably to assemble and thefreedom of expression is primordial. Towards this end, law enforcement agencies shallobserve the following guidelines:

(a) Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal with thedemonstrators shall be in complete uniform with their nameplates and unitsto which they belong displayed prominently on the front and dorsal parts oftheir uniform and must observe the policy of "maximum tolerance" as hereindefined;

(b) The members of the law enforcement contingent shall not carry any kindof firearms but may be equipped with baton or riot sticks, shields, crashhelmets with visor, gas masks, boots or ankle high shoes with shin guards;

(c) Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or any similar anti-riot deviceshall not be used unless the public assembly is attended by actual violenceor serious threats of violence, or deliberate destruction of property.

Section 11.Dispersal of public assembly with permit- No public assembly with apermit shall be dispersed. However, when an assembly becomes violent, the policemay disperse such public assembly as follows:

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(a) At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking officer of the lawenforcement contingent shall call the attention of the leaders of the publicassembly and ask the latter to prevent any possible disturbance;

(b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other harmful objectsfrom the participants are thrown at the police or at the non-participants, or at

any property causing damage to such property, the ranking officer of the lawenforcement contingent shall audibly warn the participants that if thedisturbance persists, the public assembly will be dispersed;

(c) If the violence or disturbances prevailing as stated in the precedingsubparagraph should not stop or abate, the ranking officer of the lawenforcement contingent shall audibly issue a warning to the participants ofthe public assembly, and after allowing a reasonable period of time to lapse,shall immediately order it to forthwith disperse;

(d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall also be madeduring the public assembly unless he violates during the assembly a law,statute, ordinance or any provision of this Act. Such arrest shall begoverned by Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended:

(e) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or branch of the peace during thepublic assembly shall not constitute a group for dispersal.

Section 12.Dispersal of public assembly without permit- When the public assemblyis held without a permit where a permit is required, the said public assembly may bepeacefully dispersed.

Section 13.Prohibited acts - The following shall constitute violations of this Act:

(a) The holding of any public assembly as defined in this Act by any leaderor organizer without having first secured that written permit where a permitis required from the office concerned, or the use of such permit for such

purposes in any place other than those set out in said permit: Provided,however, That no person can be punished or held criminally liable forparticipating in or attending an otherwise peaceful assembly;

(b) Arbitrary and unjustified denial or modification of a permit in violation ofthe provisions of this Act by the mayor or any other official acting in hisbehalf.

(c) The unjustified and arbitrary refusal to accept or acknowledge receipt ofthe application for a permit by the mayor or any official acting in his behalf;

(d) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise denying the exercise ofthe right to peaceful assembly;

(e) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law enforcementagency or any person to disperse the public assembly;

(f) Acts in violation of Section 10 hereof;

(g) Acts described hereunder if committed within one hundred (100) metersfrom the area of activity of the public assembly or on the occasion thereof;

1. the carrying of a deadly or offensive weapon or device such asfirearm, pillbox, bomb, and the like;

2. the carrying of a bladed weapon and the like;

3 the malicious burning of any object in the streets orthoroughfares;

4. the carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcementunit;

5. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of apublic assembly by the use of a motor vehicle, its horns and loudsound systems.

Section 14.Penalties - Any person found guilty and convicted of any of the prohibitedacts defined in the immediately preceding Section shall be punished as follows:

(a) violation of subparagraph (a) shall be punished by imprisonment of onemonth and one day to six months;

(b) violations of subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and item 4,subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six months and oneday to six years;

(c) violation of item 1, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonmentof six months and one day to six years without prejudice to prosecutionunder Presidential Decree No. 1866;

(d) violations of item 2, item 3, or item 5 of subparagraph (g) shall bepunished by imprisonment of one day to thirty days.

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Section 15.Freedom parks - Every city and municipality in the country shall within sixmonths after the effectivity of this Act establish or designate at least one suitable"freedom park" or mall in their respective jurisdictions which, as far as practicable,shall be centrally located within the poblacion where demonstrations and meetingsmay be held at any time without the need of any prior permit.

In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the respective mayors shallestablish the freedom parks within the period of six months from the effectivity of thisAct.

Section 16.Constitutionality- Should any provision of this Act be declared invalid orunconstitutional, the validity or constitutionality of the other provisions shall not beaffected thereby.

Section 17.Repealing clause - All laws, decrees, letters of instructions, resolutions,orders, ordinances or parts thereof which are inconsistent with the provisions of this

Act are hereby repealed, amended, or modified accordingly.

Section 18.Effectivity- This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved, October 22, 1985.

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FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 116488. May 31, 2001]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AARON FLORES @

RONITO, SULPECIO SILPAO y ORTEGA @ SULPING and EDGAR

VILLERAN y MAGBANUA, accused-appellants.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Sgt. Wennie Tampioc, Detachment Commander of the 7 th Infantry Brigade detailed atBarangay Tabu, Ilog, Negros Occidental, and three (3) members of the local Citizen ArmedForce Geographical Unit (CAFGU) under his supervision, namely, Aaron

Flores alias Ronito, Sulpecio Silpao y Ortega alias Sulping and Edgar Villeran yMagbanua, were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental,

Branch 61, with Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention. The Information charged asfollows:

That on or about the 29 th day of September, 1992, in the Municipality of Ilog, Province of

Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with high powered firearms con spiring, confederating and helping oneanother, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully

and feloniously take, kidnap, detain and keep under guard one SAMSON SAYAM yGEPANAO from Km 117, Hda. Shangrella (sic), Brgy. Tabu, of the above-named

municipality, and bring the latter to their detachment at Brgy. Tabu, under restraint and againsthis will, without proper authority thereof, thereby depriving said victim of his civil libertysince then up to the present.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]

All the four accused pleaded Not Guilty when arraigned. Trial ensued and, based onthe testimonial evidence presented, the trial court found the following antecedent facts to beundisputed.

On the night of September 29, 1992, the victim, Samson Sayam, was drinking beer atthe store owned by Terry Cabrillos located at Barangay Tabu, Ilog, Negros Occidental. Sgt.Wennie Tampioc, Aaron Flores, Sulpecio Silpao and Edgar Villeran were at the same store

drinking beer. Sayam joined the four accused at their table. Sometime later, all the accusedand the victim left the store and walked towards the direction of the military detachment

headquarters. After the accused left the store with Samson Sayam, witnesses heard a single

gunshot followed by rapid firing coming from the direction of the detachmentheadquarters.[2]That was the last time Samson Sayam was seen, and despite diligent efforts ofSayams mother and relatives, he has not been found.

It was the prosecutions contention that on that fateful evening, all four accused hatched

a conspiracy to kidnap the victim and thereafter detain him at the detachmentheadquarters. They allegedly succeeded in their plot and, the prosecution avers, to this day the

accused have not released Samson Sayam. All the accused, however, vehemently deniedcommitting the acts charged.

The trial court held that the testimonial evidence failed to prove beyond reasonabledoubt the existence of a conspiracy among the four accused. More specifically, the

prosecution failed to show an apparent common design by and among the accused to kidnapand detain Samson Sayam against his will. Thus, the trial court proceeded to determine the

individual liabilities of the four accused based on the degree of their participation in thecommission of the offense charged.

The trial court gave credence to the prosecutions evidence that Samson Sayam was

seen being forcibly dragged out of the store and pulled towards the direction of the detachmentheadquarters by accused Aaron Flores, Sulpecio Silpao and Edgar Villeran. Since SamsonSayam had not been seen nor heard from since then, the trial court held that the three accused

were responsible for the formers disappearance.

As regards Wennie Tampioc, the trial court found that he left the store ahead of the three(3) co-accused and, thus, had nothing to do with the disappearance of SamsonSayam. Notably, none of the prosecution witnesses specifically or categorically mentioned

Tampioc as among those who actively participated in bringing Samson Sayam by force to theirheadquarters. Unlike his co-accused who are natives of the place of the incident, WennieTampioc was newly assigned as Detachment Commander and did not know Samson Sayam,

such that no ill-motive was attributed to him by the trial court. Likewise, the testimonies ofprosecution witnesses Nelson Golez, on the one hand, and that of Carlos Manlangit, on the

other hand, conflict as to the kind of firearm allegedly carried by Tampioc. While Golez statedthat he was armed with an Armalite rifle,[3]Manlangit testified that Tampioc was armed with ashort firearm.[4]

More importantly, the trial court found that the identity of Sgt. Tampioc as one of theperpetrators of the crime was doubtful, because notwithstanding the fact that Nelson Golezknew Wennie Tampioc even before September 29, 1992,[5]the original complaint filed before

the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Ilog Candoni, dated October 21, 1992, which was basedon the affidavits of Golez and Carlito Manlingit, did not mention Wennie Tampioc as one ofthe respondents. The said affidavits merely mentioned an unidentified member of the 7 th IB,

Philippine Army, assigned at Brgy. Tabu, detachment. At the time of the execution of theaffidavits, the witnesses could have known that Wennie Tampioc was a sergeant, and that he

was the commander of the detachment. Finally, the straightforward and emphatic manner inwhich Wennie Tampioc testified inspired belief in the trial courts mind.[6]

On December 8, 1993, the trial court rendered the assailed judgment, the dispositive

portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused Aaron Flores, EdgarVilleran and Sulpecio Silpao GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping

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and serious illegal detention as defined and penalized in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Codeand are each sentenced to suffer the penalty ofReclusion Perpetua; and there being no proofthat Samson Sayam is dead, they are ordered to pay him jointly and severally, or, in the

alternative, his heirs the sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as damages, without

subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of this suit.

The accused Wennie Tampioc is ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable d oubt.

The bail bonds of the said accused are ordered cancelled and the convicted accused ordered

confined pending appeal if they so file an appeal, in accordance with Administrative Circular

No. 2-92, dated January 20, 1992 of the Supreme Court.

SO ORDERED.[7]

Two (2) separate appeals were brought before us. Accused-appellant Sulpecio Silpaoraised the following errors:

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTSULPECIO SILPAO OF THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUSILLEGAL DETENTION, UNDER ARTICLE 267, REVISED PENAL

CODE.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT CAFGU SULPECIO SILPAO, AS AMONG THOSE WHO

FORCIBLY BROUGHT SAMSON SAYAM TO THEIRHEADQUARTERS IN THE EVENING OF 29 SEPTEMBER 1992 AND

RESPONSIBLE FOR SAMSON SAYAMS DISAPPEARANCE.

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANTCAFGU SULPECIO SILPAO GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE

DOUBT OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED.

On the other hand, accused-appellants Aaron Flores and Edgar Villeran interposed ajoint appeal based on the sole error that:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS AARONFLORES AND EDGAR VILLERAN GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

OF THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTIONBASED ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL AND INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.

After a thorough review of the facts and evidence adduced b efore the trial court, we findthat accused-appellants should be acquitted of the offense charged against them.

The crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention is defined and penalized underArticle 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. The elementsof the offense are:

1. That the offender is aprivate individual.

2. That he kidnaps ordetains another, or in any other mannerdeprives the latterof his liberty.

3. That the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal.

4. That in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances are

present:

(a) That the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days;

(b) That it is committed simulating public authority;

(c) That any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnappedor detained or threats to kill him are made; or

(d) That the person kidnapped is a minor, female or public officer.[8]

Clearly, accused-appellants cannot be charged with or convicted of the crime ofKidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, since the first element of the said crime is that the

offender must be a private individual. In the case at bar, accused-appellants were members ofthe local CAFGU at the time the alleged crime was committed.

The CAFGU was created pursuant to Executive Order No. 264 for the purpose of

complementing the operations of the regular force formations in a locality.[9]It was composed

of civilian volunteers who were tasked to maintain peace and order in their localities, as well asto respond to threats to national security. As such, they were provided with weapons, and

given the authority to detain or order detention of individuals.[10]

The Solicitor General recognizes the error of charging and convicting accused-appellants of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention for the reason that the appellants arenot private individuals, but public officers. As such, the Solicitor General submits that, under

the facts alleged, accused-appellants can only be liable for the crime of Arbitrary Detention,defined and penalized in Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code. The prosecution maintainsthat inasmuch as all the other elements of Arbitrary Detention were alleged in the criminal

information filed against the accused-appellants, they may still be convicted of said crime.

Arbitrary detention is committed by any public officer or employee who, without legal

grounds, detains a person.[11]Since it is settled that accused-appellants are public officers, thequestion that remains to be resolved is whether or not the evidence adduced before the trial

court proved that Samson Sayam was arbitrarily detained by accused-appellants.

As far back as the case ofU.S. v. Cabanag,[12]it was held that in the crime of illegal orarbitrary detention, it is essential that there is actual confinement or restriction of the person ofthe offended party. The deprivation of liberty must be proved ,[13]just as the intent of the

accused to deprive the victim of his liberty must also be established by indubitable proof.[14]1 Inthe more recent case ofPeople v. Fajardo,[15]this Court reiterated the ruling in U.S. v.

Cabanag, i.e., there must be uncontroverted proof of both intent to deprive the victim of hisliberty, as well as actual confinement or restriction.

Detention is defined as the actual confinement of a person in an enclosure, or in any

manner detaining and depriving him of his liberty.[16]A careful review of the records of theinstant case shows no evidence sufficient to prove that Samson Sayam was detained arbitrarily

by accused-appellants. While the prosecution witnesses testified that accused-appellants were

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seen walking with Samson Sayam toward the direction of the detachment headquarters, there isno shred of evidence that he was actually confined there or anywhere else. The fact thatSamson Sayam has not been seen or heard from since he was last seen with accused -appellants

does not prove that he was detained and deprived of his liberty. The prosecution, however,

argues that Samson Sayam was deprived of his liberty when accused-appellants forced him togo with them when they left the store of Jerry Cabrillos and brought him to the detachmentheadquarters.

We assayed the testimonies of the prosecutions main witnesses, namely, CarlitoManlangit and his son Jerry Manlangit. Carlito Manlangits testimony was offered to provethat Samson Sayam was forcibly taken from the store and that the latter tried his best to free

himself from his abductors. And yet, all that Carlito testified to was that he saw SamsonSayam crossing the street alone from the store of a certain Moleng; that the four accused, who

were armed, followed Sayam and asked for his residence certificate; that the four accusedapprehended Samson Sayam and brought him to the detachment headquarters; and that he wenthome after he saw Samson Sayam talking to the accused.[17]

It is readily apparent that Carlito Manlangits testimony failed to prove the statedpurpose thereof, i.e., that Samson Sayam was taken forcibly to the detachmentheadquarters. To be sure, the witness did not state that Samson Sayam was pulled, dragged, or

coerced to go with accused-appellants. Neither did he say that Samson Sayam was taken at

gunpoint. There is also no relevant testimony to the effect that Samson Sayam tried his best to

free himself from the clutches of accused-appellants. For if that were the truth, the reactions ofCarlito Manlangit do not conform to human experience. If he really witnessed Samson Sayam

being apprehended, forcibly taken, and trying to free himself, it cannot be logically explainedwhy Carlito Manlangit just went home,[18]instead of doing anything to help SamsonSayam. He admitted that he did not immediately report the incident to the authorities.[19]More

telling is the absence of testimony to the effect that Samson Sayam was being taken to thedetachment headquarters against his will, that he was protesting his apprehension, or that he

was asking for help, considering that there were other people within hearing and seeingdistance. Most damaging is Carlito Manlangits statement that he did not see Samson Sayamin the detachment headquarters with any or all of the accused.[20]In fine, Carlito Manlangits

testimony failed to prove that Samson Sayam was arbitrarily detained or deprived of hisliberty.

Jerry Manlangit, son of Carlito, also testified for the proseuction. According to him, he

and Samson Sayam went to Barangay Tabu to have a sack of palay milled on September 29,1992. At around six in the evening, while on their way home, they passed by the store of Terry

Cabrillos to buy kerosene. There, he saw the four accused drinking beer. Samson Sayam toldhim to go home because he had to show his residence certificate and barangay clearance toaccused-appellant Aaron Flores. Jerry Manlangit then proceeded to his residence in Hacienda

Shangrila, located about half a kilometer away from the center of Barangay Tabu. Later, hetold his father that Samson Sayam stayed behind and asked him to fetch Samson. He alsotestified that he heard gunshots coming from the direction of the detachment headquarters.[21]

The testimony of Jerry Manlangit does not prove any of the elements of the crime of

arbitrary detention. Neither does it support nor corroborate the testimony of his father, Carlito,for they dealt on a different set of facts. Jerry Manlangit did not see any of accused-appellantapprehend or detain Samson Sayam. He did not even see if accused-appellant Flores really

inspected the residence certificate and barangay clearance of Samson Sayam. The rest of histestimony comprised of hearsay evidence,[22]which has no probative value.[23]In summary,

Jerry Manlangits testimony failed to establish that accused -appellants were guilty of arbitrarydetention.

The prosecution also presented the testimony of Nelson Golez, who identified the four

accused as the persons with Samson Sayam, drinking inside the store of Terry Cabrillos. He

also stated that following a heated argument, the accused and Samson Sayam left the store andwent towards the direction of the detachment headquarters. He said that the accused were

holding and pulling Samson Sayam towards the road. Ten minutes later, Nelson Golezheard a single gunshot followed by rapid firing.[24]

On cross-examination, however, Nelson Golez did not affirm his earlier statement thatthe accused and Samson Sayam were engaged in a heated argument. Rather, he said he did not

hear them arguing as they were leaving the store. Although Nelson Golez attested that SamsonSayam was protesting while the accused were dragging him, he did not do anything to help

Samson Sayam, who happened to be his cousin.[25]

Again, no conclusion of guilt can be inferred from Nelson Golezs testimony. First ofall, he was unsure of his assertion that there was an argument. The mere fact that Samson

Sayam was being dragged towards the road does not constitute arbitrary detention. There is noshowing that Samson Sayam was completely deprived of his liberty such that he could not freehimself from the grip of the accused, if he was indeed being held against his will. The incident

transpired in a public place, where there were people milling about, many of whom were his

friends. It is puzzling that Samson Sayam did not cry out for help. Nobody bothered to reportthe incident, if indeed it happened, to the barangay authorities. No one else came forward tocorroborate the testimony of Nelson Golez.

The testimony of Nelson Golez, by itself, lacks credibility. He wavered on materialpoints, even as the prosecution failed to substantiate by direct or corroborative evidence thebare testimony of Nelson Golez.

It is basic and elemental that in criminal prosecutions, before the accused may beconvicted of a crime, his guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Although the findings

of fact made by trial courts are generally not disturbed on appeal, if there are substantial factswhich were overlooked but which may alter the results of the case in favor of the accused, suchfacts should be taken into account by the appellate court .[26]And where it appears that the trial

court erred in the appreciation of the evidence on record or the lack of it, the factual findings ofthe trial court may be reversed.[27]

After thoroughly reviewing the records of this case and weighing the testimonialevidence on the scale of creditworthiness and materiality, this Court finds the evidence of theprosecution grossly insufficient to sustain a conviction. Again, the fact of detention, whetherillegal or arbitrary, was not clearly established by credible evidence. There was no showing

that Samson Sayam was locked up, restrained of his freedom, or prevented fromcommunicating with anyone. Likewise, there was no proof that there was actual intent on the

part of accused-appellants to arbitrarily deprive Samson Sayam of his liberty. It is necessarythat there must be a purposeful or knowing action by accused-appellants to restrain the victim

by or with force, because taking coupled with intent completes the crime of illegal or arbitrary

detention.[28]

The prosecution, however, maintains that the evidence, even though circumstantial,sufficiently establishes the guilt of the accused-appellants. It cites the followingcircumstances:

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1. On September 29, 1992, at about 6:00 oclock in the evening, accused-appellants, togetherwith their companions Sergeant Tampioc and fellow CAFGU Sulpecio Silpao, were seen withSamson at the store of Terry Cabrillos. Accused-appellants were having a drinking

spree. Later, they were seen engaged in a heated argument.

2. Thereafter, Samson was forcibly brought out of the store by accused-appellants by holding

and pulling him towards the road. From another angle, another prosecution witness sawaccused-appellants on the road arresting Samson.

3. Accused-appellants brought Samson towards the direction of the detachment of Brgy. Tabu.

4. Ten (10) minutes later, a gunshot was heard coming from the direction of the detachment

followed by rapid firing.

5. After the incident, Samson was never seen again or heard from.[29]

As already discussed, the above-enumerated circumstances were not established by clearand convincing evidence. And even if these acts were proven to be true, the combination of all

these circumstances would still not be able to produce a conviction beyond reasonable

doubt. To our mind, the totality of these circumstantial evidence do not constitute an unbrokenchain pointing to the fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused-appellants are guilty of

the crime charged.

For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all thecircumstances must be consistent with the hypothesis that the accused-appellants are guilty,

and inconsistent with the possibility that they are innocent.[30]Thus:

Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficientfor conviction if:

a) There is more than one circumstance;

b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a convictionbeyond reasonable doubt.[31]

The rule is clear that there must be at least two proven circumstances which in completesequence leads to no other logical conclusion than that of the guilt of the accused.[32]It is

admitted that Samson Sayam was seen drinking with accused-appellants on that fateful

night. However, the circumstances that there was a heated argument among them, and that theaccused-appellants held and pulled Samson Sayam to the road and brought him towards thedirection of the detachment headquarters was not sufficiently proven by material or relevant

testimony.

Moreover, the circumstance that gunshots were heard on that night have no relevancy tothe case. Even if it were, it cannot be concluded that the gunshots came from the direction of

the detachment headquarters. The witnesses who testified that they heard the gunshots were at

least half a kilometer away from the center of the barangay, while the detachment headquartersitself was also some distance from the barangay. At night, especially in the rural areas whenall is quiet, loud sounds such as gunshots reverberate and would seem to come from every

direction. An ordinary person a kilometer away cannot, with certainty, point to the exact

location where the gunshots would be coming from. That would otherwise be attributingexpertise on such matters to the prosecution witnesses.

That Samson Sayam was never seen or heard from again cannot be the basis for the trialcourt to render judgment convicting the accused-appellants. In fact, it has no bearing in thiscase because it is not one of the elements of the crime of arbitrary detention. Consequently,only one relevant circumstance was proved, i.e., that accused-appellants were the last persons

seen with Samson Sayam. However, said circumstance does not necessarily prove that theyfeloniously abducted him, then arbitrarily detained him.[33]

Moreover, mere suspicion that the disappearance of Samson Sayam was a result ofaccused-appellants alleged criminal acts and intentions is insufficient to convi ct them. Proof

beyond reasonable doubt is the required quantum of evidence.[34]An uncorroborated

circumstantial evidence is certainly not sufficient for conviction when the evidence itself is inserious doubt.[35]The prosecution was not able to prove a possible motive why accused-appellants would arbitrarily detain Samson Sayam. In sum, there is no unbroken chain of

circumstances leading to the conclusion that accused-appellants are guilty. Since the pieces of

circumstantial evidence do not fulfill the test of moral certainty that is sufficient to support a

judgment or conviction, the Court must acquit the accused.

[36]

In the recent case ofPeople v. Comesario,[37]3 we had occasion to rule that:

Accused-appellants conviction by the trial court hinged on circumstantial evidence. Tovalidly invoke circumstantial evidence, it must be shown that there is more than onecircumstance and the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven. The combinationof all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The

circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain of events that can lead reasonably to theconclusion pointing to the accused to the exclusion of a ll others as the author of thecrime. Logically, it is where the evidence is purely circumstantial that there should be an even

greater need than usual to apply with vigor the rule that the prosecution cannot depend on theweakness of the defense and that any conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral

certainty of guilt of the accused. Like a tapestry made of strands which create a pattern wheninterwoven, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if

the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonableconclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, a s the guilty person.

Accused-appellants enjoy the presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved. Inthe case at bar, the pieces of testimonial evidence relied on by the prosecution and the trial

court to support a conviction have failed to overcome the constitutional precept of thepresumed innocence of accused-appellants. Among other grounds, not only is there a lot of

room for reasonable doubt in regard to their guilt, there is a virtual dearth of convincingevidence to prove that a crime had been committed.

There is no need even to assess the evidence of the defense, for the prosecution bears the

onus to distinctly and indubitably prove that a crime had been committed by accused-appellants.[38]It is incumbent upon the prosecution to establish its case with that degree of

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proof which leads to no other conclusion but conviction in an unprejudiced mind. Theevidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits for it cannot be allowed todraw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[39]Clearly, the prosecution in

this case has failed to prove the guilt of accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt. In

similar cases, this Court has often and consistently ruled that it is better to acquit a guiltyperson than to convict an innocent one.[40]

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. Accused-appellants are ACQUITTED. Unless being held or detained for some lawful reason, accused-appellants are ORDERED RELEASED immediately. The Director of Prisons isDIRECTEDto inform this Court, within five (5) days from notice, of the date and time when

accused-appellants are released pursuant to this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

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THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 113511-12. July 11, 1997]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANILO SINOC, ySUMAYLO, accused-appel lant.

D E C I S I O N

NARVASA, C.J.:

In a decision handed down on October 7, 1993 by Branch 30 of the RegionalTrial Court of Surigao City, Danilo Sinoc was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt intwo cases jointly tried:

[1]one, of the special complex crime of kidnapping with murder

(under Article 267 in relation to Articles 248[2]

and 48[3]

of the Revised Penal Code) --

in Criminal Case No. 3564; and the other, of the complex crime of kidnapping withfrustrated murder (under Articles 267, 248, 6,[4]

and 48 of the same Code) -- inCriminal Case No. 3565. In each case, the penalty of reclusion perpetua wasimposed on him.

[5]

The amended informations under which Sinoc was tried and convicted, bothdated January 23, 1992, included five (5) other accused, namely: Vicente Salon @Dodong, Benjamin Espinosa @ Benji, Jaime Jornales @ James, VictorinoDelegencia @ Jun-Gren, and one Roger Doe @ Ram (at-large).

[6]However, only

Sinoc and Vicente Salon were arraigned, on July 14, 1992, the other accused beingthen at large, as they still appear to be to this day. Assisted by their respectivecounsel, both Sinoc and Salon entered pleas of not guilty and were thereafter jointlytried. The joint trial resulted in Salons acquittal in both cases. The court agreed withhim that none of the witnesses presented by the prosecution remotely implicate**(him in) the crimes charged, and that (i)ndeed, the only piece of evidence pointing to** (him[Salon]) as the mastermind is contained in the affidavit of confession ofaccused Danilo Sinoc, hence, conspiracy not having been proved, the case againstSalon has to be dismissed. Only Sinoc, therefore, is concerned in the appeal at bar.

Respecting the essential facts constituting the corpus delicti, there appears tobe no serious dispute. It appears that on September 20, 1991, at about 6 oclock inthe morning, Isidoro Viacrusis, manager of Taganito Mining Corporation, was motoringfrom the company compound (at Taganito, Claver, Surigao del Norte) to SurigaoCity. He was riding on a company vehicle, a Mitsubishi Pajero (with Plate No. DFX-397), driven by Tarcisio Guijapon. As Viacrusis and Guijapon were approaching thepublic cemetery of Claver, they were stopped by several armed men. The latter,identifying themselves as members of the New Peoples Army (NPA), boarded thePajero and ordered Guijapon to proceed. When they reached Barobo, Surigao delNorte, the armed men ordered Viacrusis and Guijapon to alight, led them, their hands

bound behind their back, to a coconut grove some six meters from the road, and aftermaking them lie face down on the ground, shot them several times. Viacrusismiraculously survived. The driver, Guijapon, was not as lucky; he died on the spot.

These facts set forth in, among others, a sworn statement given to the police bySinoc, infra, and an affidavit executed and sworn to by Viacrusis on October 17, 1991,about a month later.

[7]In that affidavit, Viacrusis described the armed men who had

kidnapped and shot him and Guijapon. The only malefactor he was able to identify byname, however, was Danilo Sinoc who, he said, had curly hair, (was) known asColot (Danilo Sinoc), (and was known to ) driver Tarcing **.

Two prosecution witnesses gave germane testimony at the trial of theconsolidated cases: Marlyn Legaspi a resident of San Vicente, Barobo, Surigao delSur; and Barangay Captain Terencio Jamero, also of Barangay San Vicente.

Marlyn testified that she was startled by the sound of gunshots that morning ofSeptember 20, 1991. She ran towards the direction of the gunfire and as she nearedthe place, heard the moaning of a man. She moved quickly to the highway and saw ablue Pajero parked at the barangay road, its engine idling; and moments later, shesaw the same vehicle running fast towards San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. She lostno time in reporting the incident to Brangay Councilor Terencio Jamero.

Jamero testified that on receiving Marlyn's report, he and another Councilor,

Alberto Saliling, at once proceeded to the place indicated. There they came upon theslain driver, and Isidoro Viacrusis, lying on the ground, sorely wounded, crying out forhelp. With the assistance of policemen of Barobo, they brought Viacrusis to the

Agusan del Sur Provincial Hospital at Patin-ay. Timely medical attention enabledViacrusis to recover from his grievous wounds.

The evidence of the prosecution further establishes that in the morning of thefollowing day, September 21, 1991, at about 7 oclock, a secret informant (known as acivilian asset) named Boyet reported to the Police Station at Monkayo, Davao delNorte that the stolen (carnapped) Pajero was parked behind the apartment of acertain Paulino Overa at the Bliss Housing Project at Poblacion, Monkayo. Oninstructions of the Station Commander, a police team

[8]went to the place. They saw

the Pajero and, their initial inquiries having yielded the information that the man whohad brought it there would return that morning, posted themselves in such a manneras to keep it in view. Some three hours later, at about 10:30 oclock, they saw a man

approach the Pajero who, on seeing them, tried to run away. They stoppedhim. They found out that the man, identified as Danilo Sinoc, of Surigao delNorte,

[9]had the key of the Pajero, and was acting under instruction of certain

companions who were waiting for him at the Star Lodge at Tagum, Davao delNorte. Riding on the recovered Pajero, the police officers brought Sinoc to the StarLodge only to discover that his companions were no longer there. They later turnedover Sinoc to the 459(th) Mobile Force, together with the Pajero.

Four months afterwards, in the afternoon of January 21, 1993, SPO1 Roger A.Basadre and two other officers (of the CIS) brought Danilo Sinoc to the Public

Attorneys Office at Curato Street Butuan City. They asked one of the attorneys there,Atty. Alfredo Jalad, for permission to take Sinocs statement in writing in hisoffice. Sinoc asked Jalad to assist him because he wished to make an affidavit ofconfession.

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Atty. Jalad told Sinoc that he had the right to choose his own counsel, and toremain silent. Sinoc said he wanted to make the affidavit nonetheless, and beassisted by Jalad in doing so. The latter then had Sinoc narrate the occurrence inquestion in Cebuano/Visayan, a dialect with which Sinoc was familiar. That done,Jalad asked Sinoc if the CIS had promised him anything for the affidavit he wouldexecute. Sinoc said no. Only then did the CIS officers commence to take Sinocsstatement, typing their questions and Sinocs answer-- as well as the initial appraisal

of his constitutional rights -- on a typewriter in Atty. Jalads office.

In his sworn statement,[10]

Sinoc declared that he knew the victims, IsidoroViacrusis and Tarcisio Guijapon because he was formerly working at Taganito MiningCompany (TAMICO); that in June, 1991, he learned that Benjamin Espinosa (@Benji), Jaime Jornales (@ James), Victorino Delegencio (@ Jun-Gren), and a certainRam had been monitoring the activities of TAMICO Manager Viacrusis whom theyplanned to kidnap and rob of his Pajero, and make it appear to be an act of the NPA;that the criminal undertaking was planned by a certain Vicente Salon (@ Dodong),who made available the needed funds and two (2) hand guns; that in September,1991, at a meeting of the group at the boarding house of Jun -Gren to which he(Sinoc) was invi ted, Sinoc was of fered P20,000.00 to join in the kidnapping andcarnapping operation; that he agreed because of poverty; that in the morning ofSeptember 20, 1991, at about 6:30 oclock, he, Ram and Benjamin Espinosastopped the Pajero driven by Tarcisio Guijapon in which Viacrusis was riding,

brandishing two .35 caliber revolvers, and a piece of wood shaped like a rifle; that theyboarded the vehicle, identifying themselves as NPA (soldiers of the New PeoplesArmy) and had the driver proceed towards Surigao City; that at the bridge of Tres deMayor, they had the Pajero stop to pick-up two other companions, James (JaimeJornales) and Jun-Gren (Victor Delegencia); that Ram took over the wheel anddrove towards Butuan City; that at San Vicente, Barobo, Ram turned into a feederroad and stopped about seven (7) meters from the highway; that there, Viacrusis andGuijapon, whose hands had been tied behind their back, were made to get down; thatJames Jornales shot Viacrusis four times after which Jun -Gren Delegencia, Jr. firedat Guijapon four times , too; that when Sinoc remonstrated at the shootings, he wastold it was on Dodong Salons orders; that the malefactors then proceeded to theBliss Housing Project at Monkayo where they left the Pajero, this being the placewhere the mastermind, Vicente Salon, was supposed to get the vehicle and pay Sinocthe promised sum of P20,000.00; that they then all went to Tagum; that on thefollowing day, Sinoc was instructed by Jun-gren and James to return to Monkayo with

the key of the Pajero and deliver it to Ram, and that when he arrived at the place a tabout 9 o clock in the morning, he was apprehended by soldiers and brought to the459(th) PNP Mobile Company.

During the entire period of Sinocs interrogation, which commenced at about3:00 P.M., Atty. Jalad remained seated beside him; and at its conclusion, Jalad readto Sinoc the contents of his statement from beginning to end. The statement wasthereafter signed by Sinoc and by Jalad, the latter being described as witness tosignature.

[11]

Sinoc was next brought to the home of Butuan City Prosecutor Ernesto M.Brocoy so that he might take oath on his s tatement. This was about 7:00 P.M. Aftergoing over the statement, City Fiscal Brocoy told Sinoc that it was very damaging,briefly discussing the contents thereof in Cebuano. The latter stood by his answers,

however, averring that they have been voluntarily given. Evidently satisfied of theauthenticity and voluntariness of the statement, Brocoy administered the oath toSinoc, and signed the certification typed at the left hand margin of page 4 thereof,reading: SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 21

stday of January 1992, at

Butuan City, Philippines. I hereby certify that I personally examined the herein affiantand that I am satisfied that he voluntarily executed and understood his statement." Healso initialed every page of the statement.

[12]

While under detention at the Provincial Jail, awaiting trial, Sinoc wrote two (2)letters to the Trial Judge dated June and July, 1992, in both of which he asked that hebe transferred to the City Jail because he had heard that Vicente Salon, who had beenarrested on the strength of his sworn statement, had made plans to kill him. He sentthe Judge a third letter -- dated August 11, 1993, consisting of four (4) pages -- whichis described by His Honor as substantially a repetition of the contents of his affidavitof confession. All the letters were handwritten in block letters in the Cebuanodialect.

[13]

Sinoc proffered the defense of alibi. His claim, as summarized by his counsel,was that on September 19, 1991, he was in Sibagat, Agusan del Sur together with hiswife and prepared on that early morning to sell tableya (native chocolate) in Tagum,Davao del Norte. On the same day they reached Tagum and they sold tableya and onthe same day they were not able to sell the tableya; on September 20, 1991 they wereagain selling tableya in Tagum, Davao del Norte. It was while in Tagum that ** (theymet) a certain Darves, they did not know exactly the name, he offered to them themoney to accompany the said driver of Darves who is name(d) Ram. He was offered** money to accompany this Ram in prior (sic) to allegedly get the Pajero vehicle fromMoncayo together with Ram, and while in Moncayo he was first apprehended by thepolice and detained at Moncayo, first ** (by) the 459 Mobile Force of ** Moncayo andon January 14, 1992 to January 24, 1992 he was detained by the CIS authorities inButuan City.

Elaborating, Sinoc testified that he saw Darves with three companions at acertain restaurant in Tagum; that Darves introduced himself, and offered to givehim P1,000.00) if he would accompany his driver to get a vehicle at Moncayo; that heagreed, and at 6 o clock in the morning of September 21, 1991 he went to the StarLodge where Darves was staying; that there, he was introduced to the latters driver,Ram, given P1,000.00, and told to go with Ram; and that he went out of the StarLodge, gave his wife P800.00, and then went with Ram to Moncayo on board a bus.

In Moncayo, they went to where the Pajero was parked. Sinoc went towards thevehicle. Ram lagged behind, having paused to buy some cigarettes. When Sinocreached the Pajero, five persons suddenly pointed guns at him, searched him, andfound on him the key to the Pajero which Darves had given to him. The fivepersons, who were led by Sgt. Michael Aringgo of the PNP, brought him to theMoncayo police station where they investigated him without informing him of hisconstitutional rights.

In the afternoon of that day, September 21, 1991, he was surrendered to the459

thMobile Force Company which detained him until January 14, 1992. On this date

he was taken by CIS personnel and brought to the CIS Compound at Butuan City, atwhich place he was confined up to January 24, 1992, and subjected to interrogation

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without being informed that he had a right to remain silent. He was told, however, thathe had the right to counsel, but although he told the investigators that his lawyer was

Atty. Gavino Samontina, they never called the latter.

The investigators wish him to sign an affidavit. When he refused, theymaltreated him by repeatedly submerging his head in a toilet bowl full of excrement,as well as by tying him on a bed, raising the bed on one end so that his feet were up

and his head down, and keeping him in that position for hours.

On January 20, 1992, his wife and Efren Dak-ang came to see him at the CISCompound. He talked to them and revealed what was being done to him while underinvestigation.

On January 21, 1992, after having been interrogated the whole night, he finallyagreed to sign the affidavit because the CIS officers told him, (We) will kill you orsalvage you. In fact, the night before, police officers had brought him to anuninhabited place near the bridge and, with guns pointed at his head, commanded himto run. He refused, of course. So, in the afternoon of that day, at around 4 o clock,he was brought to the office of Public Attorney Jalad, where the police investigatorshurriedly typed his affidavit and made him sign it. He denied that Atty. Jalad informedhim of his constitutional rights. He asserted that when he told Jalad he had his ownlawyer, Jalad merely remarked, Never mind, all attorneys are just the same as longas it is attorney. He was next brought to Fiscal Brocoy who, without talking to him,

right away signed that document (his confession).

Sinoc also explained how he had come to write the letter of August 11, 1992 tothe judge some seven months after his confession. That letter -- it will be recalled andas is evident from a comparison of both documents -- was described by the latter assubstantially a repetition of the contents of his affidavits of confession, supra.

[14]He

said: (T)here were persons who visited me while at the Provincial Jail and told me toaccept the crime ** because if I will not accept the crime my wife and my children(and) my parents, they will liquidate all of them **.

Sinocs wife, Jovita, testified for the defense, and sought to corroborate histestimony. She affirmed that she had seen her husband at the CIS on September 20,1992, at about 8:30 in the evening, and he had told her to keep ** silent, not to tellanybody that he will be accompan(ied) by the CIS. Efren Dak-ang also gavecorroborating testimony.

For some undisclosed reason, the surviving victim, Isodoro Viacrusis, did nottestify; this, despite the fiscals assurances to the Trial Judge that he was veryinterested in giving evidence.Obviously because of Viacrusis failure to testify, hisaffidavit of October 17, 1991 was not formally offered, being obviously hearsay,although it is attached to the record.

Be this at it may, the Trial Court was satisfied that the evidence actuallypresented by the Government sufficed to establish Sinocs guilt beyond reasonabledoubt of the two felonies with which he stood charged.

Sinoc has taken an appeal to this Court and ascribes to the Trial Court thefollowing errors: (1) convicting him of the offenses charged although conspiracy hadnot been independently proven to exist among him and the other persons named in

the indictment; (2) not rejecting the evidence obtained after he had been arrestedwithout any warrant of arrest, and (3) not rejecting his confession after he had beenillegally arrested and had thereafter been under custodial investigation ..without acounsel of choice from September 21, 1991 to January 20, 1992, first by theMonkayo 459

thMobile Force, and later by the C.I.S., Butuan City.

As regards Sinocs claim of illegal arrest, the law provides that an arrest without

warrant may be licitly effected by a peace officer, inter alia When an offense has infact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that theperson to be arrested has committed it.

[15]

There is no question that the police officers in this case were aware that anoffense had just been committed: i.e., that some twelve hours earlier, a Pajerobelonging to a private company had been stolen (carnapped) and its driver andpassenger shot, the former having died and the latter being on the verge of death. Noris there any doubt that an informer (asset) had reported that the stolen Pajero wasat the Bliss Housing Project at the Moncayo. It was precisely to recover the Pajerothat a team composed of SPO1 Micheal Aringo and joint elements of 459 PNP MFCand Monkayo Police Stn. Led by Insptr. Eden T. Ugale, went to that place and, ontaking custody of the Pajero, forthwith dispatched a radio message to HigherHeadquarters advising of that fact.

[16]

There is no question either that when SPO1 Aringo and his companions

reached the place where the Pajero was parked, they were told by Paulino Overa,owner of the apartment behind which the vehicle was parked, that the man who hadbrought the Pajero would be back by 12:00 noon; that the person thus described didin fact show up at about 10:00 A.M., and was immediately identified by Overa as theone who rode on that car pajero;'

[17]just as there is no question that when the police

officers accosted him, Sinoc had the key to the stolen Pajero and was in the act ofmoving toward it admittedly to take possession of it (after having arrived by bus fromTagum together with another suspect, Ram). Sinocs link to the stolen vehicle (andhence to the kidnapping and killing accompanying its asportation) was thus palpable.

The foregoing circumstances left the police officers no alternative save to arrestSinoc and take possession of the Pajero. His arrest without warrant was justified;indeed, it was in the premises the officers clear duty to apprehend him; their omissionto do so would have been inexcusable.

Sinocs assault against the propriety of his interrogation after his warrantlessarrest, because conducted without advice to him of his constitutional rights, ispointless. It is true that, as candidly admitted by the arresting officers, their initialinterrogation of Sinoc was made without his first being told of his correspondingrights. This is inconsequential , for the prosecution never attempted to prove what hemight have said on that occasion.

The confession made by him some time afterwards at the Public Attorn eysOffice at Butuan City is altogether a different matter, however. The record adequatelyshows it to have been executed voluntarily and under applicable safeguards, apartfrom being confirmed by, or consistent with, other evidence.

Sinoc does not dispute that he was taken to the Public Attorneys Office; that hespoke to Atty. Alfredo Jalad and it was in the latters office that his confession was

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prepared by the CIS investigator. Nor does he deny that he was then brought to thehome of City Prosecutor Ernesto M. Brocoy who certified that the confession had beensubscribed and sworn to before him and that he was satisfied that Sinoc hadvoluntarily executed and understood his statement. Sinoc nonetheless claims that hewas under intimidation at that time and never advised of his constitutional rights.

After carefully considering the evidence, this Court is convinced that the Trial

Judge was correct in accepting the account of the execution of Sinocs confession(Exhs. K, K-1 to K-5) narrated by Public Atty. Alfedo Jalad and City ProsecutorErnesto Brocoy, to the effect that the confession was voluntarily given after he hadbeen duly informed of his constitutional rights. No reason whatever is discernible inthe record for these Government officials to give false evidence against Sinoc, ortestify otherwise than to the truth.

Sinocs confession of January 21, 1992 is confirmed by the letter he admittedlywrote to the Trial Judge more than a year later, on August 11, 1993,

[18]the contents of

which are, as observed by the Trial Judge, substantially identical with those of theconfession. In said letter, in which he narrates in no little detail the same storycontained in his confession, he apologizes for bothering you again at this time(obviously referring to his prior letters to the Judge of June and July 1992), and giveshis reasons for writing the latest letter: to ask for the Judges assistance and takeaccount of his allegation that his agreement with his co-accused was only to stop the"Pajero," that it was poverty that impelled him to join the plotters (Vicente Salon, etal.); to see that Tarcisio Guijapon and Viacrucis be given justice; and to plead that theJudge take pity on him, and not give him too heavy a penalty.

The confession is also consistent with Sinoc's testimony at his trial in which headmitted that he had indeed traveled from Tagum to Monkayo where he was arrested;and that he had made the trip, together with his co- accused, Ram, precisely to getthe stolen Pajero the key of which he had on his person at the time. It containsdetails (e.g., the use of two (2) hand guns and a wooden rifle, the bringing of thePajero from the scene of the killing to Moncayo, the identities of the individualmalefactors who shot the victims) which is improbable to think were conjured out ofthin air by the police investigators or deduced from other evidence. The confession isconsistent, too, with the other proofs, particularly the testimony of Marlyn Legaspi andBarangay Councilor Jamero as regards the time and place of the shooting of thehapless victims.

In any event, the Trial Judge appears to have carefully assessed the demeanorof the witnesses for the prosecution and those for the defense, in relation to thedocuments on record, and on this basis and from his vantage point, found that theprosecutions proof were more credible than the defense, and that their combinedweight established beyond reasonable doubt the appellants culpable participation inthe crimes charged.

It must additionally be pointed out that apart from Sinocs protestations that hisextrajudicial confession was the result of torture and threats, no competent evidenceexists on record to substantiate that claim. He made no such claim to either Public

Attorney Alfredo Jalad or City Prosecutor Ernesto Brocoy although there is absolutelynothing in the record to indicate any cause for him to distrust either governmentofficer, much less believe they were in conspiracy with the police officers to concoct a

case against him. In fact, although he professes to have disclosed his supposedmaltreatment to his wife when she visited him at the place of his detention, the lattermade no mention of it in her testimony, nor did she ever attempt to have him medicallyexamined to confirm such a revelation, if it had been made. Moreover, the counsel hesaid he wanted to represent him during his interrogation at Public Attorney Jaladsoffice, Atty. Gavino Samontina, was never presented to confirm his statement.

While the evidence does show that Sinoc became embroiled in a criminalconspiracy

[19]-- he agreed (out of poverty, he says) to join in a crime being planned by

certain men named by him and decided to commit it with them -- the agreement, as faras he was concerned, was to waylay Viacrusis, the Manager of the Tagum MiningCompany, and rob him of his Pajero, for which his share would be P20,000.00; but itdid not include the shooting of Viacrusis or any one else. In fact, he raised a protestwhen Viacrusis and Guijapon were shot. In other words, as far as Sinoc understood it,and as far as may in fact be deduced from the evidence, the plan was not so much tocapture Viacrusis and deprived him of liberty, even less to assassinate him, butto steal his Pajero by violent means . The kidnapping was not the principalobjective; it was merely incidental to the forcible taking of the vehicle. Unfortunately,by reason or on the occasion of the seizure of the Pajero -- and (as far as the proofsdemonstrate) without foreknowledge on Sinocs part -- its driver was killed, and thelone passenger seriously injured.

There was thus no kidnappingas the term is understood in Article 267 of theRevised Penal Code -- the essential object of which is to kidnap, or detain another, orin any other manner deprive him of his liberty. The idea of kidnapping in this caseappears to have been the result of the continuous but uninformed use of that term bythe peace officers involved in the investigation, carelessly carried over into theindictments and the record of the trial, and even accepted by His Honor.

[20]

The offense actually committed in Criminal Case No. 3564 -- where the killing ofTarcesio Guijapon accompanied the taking of the Pajero -- is that defined andpenalized by Article 294 of the Criminal Code,

[21]viz.:

ART. 294.Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons-- Penalties.-- Any personguilty of robbery with the use of violence against any person shall suffer:

1. The penalty ofreclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery,

the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have beenaccompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.

*** *** ***."

It is germane to observe that even if the intent to deprive of liberty were asimportant or primordial an objective as the asportation of the Pajero, the kidnappingwould be absorbed in the robbery with homicide;

[22]and that the term, homicide, is

used in the quoted article in the generic sense-- i.e., as also including murder, thenature of the offense not being altered by the treacherous character, or the number, ofthe killings in connection with the robbery.

[23]

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/jul1997/113511-12.htm#_edn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/jul1997/113511-12.htm#_edn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/jul1997/113511-12.htm#_edn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/jul1997/113511-12.htm#_edn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/jul1997/113511-12.htm#_edn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/jul1997/113511-12.htm#_edn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/jul1997/113511-12.htm#_edn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/jul1997/113511-12.htm#_edn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/jul1997/113511-12.htm#_edn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/jul1997/113511-12.htm#_edn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/jul1997/113511-12.htm#_edn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/jul1997/113511-12.htm#_edn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/jul1997/113511-12.htm#_edn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/jul1997/113511-12.htm#_edn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/jul1997/113511-12.htm#_edn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/jul1997/113511-12.htm#_edn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/jul1997/113511-12.htm#_edn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/jul1997/113511-12.htm#_edn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/jul1997/113511-12.htm#_edn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/jul1997/113511-12.htm#_edn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/jul1997/113511-12.htm#_edn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/jul1997/113511-12.htm#_edn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/jul1997/113511-12.htm#_edn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/jul1997/113511-12.htm#_edn18

7/27/2019 CRIM2 art 124-133

14/19

On the other hand, the wrongful acts actually proven to have been committed bythe defendants in Criminal Case No. 3565are: (1) robbery, of course, as abovedescribed, and (2) frustrated murder on the occasion thereof -- gunshot woundshaving been inflicted on Isidoro Viacrusis, while bound and prostrate on the ground,utterly unable to put up any defense, the wounds being of such a nature as wouldhave resulted in his death were it not for timely medical intervention. Obviously, theseacts do not fall within the ambit of article 294, which treats of the special complex

crime of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons, but NOT robberywith attemptedorfrustrated homicide (or murder), although the law does punish thecrime ofattemptedandfrustrated robberywith homicide.

[24]

Neither do the crimes come within the operation of Article 48 of the CriminalCode which, speaking ofcomplex crimes, provides that when a single act constitutestwo or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means forcommitting the other, the penalty for the more serious crime shall be imposed, thesame to be applied in its maximum period. Actually in this case, the tw o crimes ofcarnapping and frustrated murder did not result from a single act. Nor was eitheroffense a necessary means for committing the other. The shooting of the v