crim pro digests - 115

8/3/2019 Crim Pro Digests - 115

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Andrada v. People

Andrada was charged with frustrated murder for hacking Urgenio (an officer of the defunctPhilippine Constabulary) on the head twice which could have caused his death were it not for the

timely medical attention given to him. The trial court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt,which was affirmed by the CA with modifications as to the penalty taking into account theprivileged mitigating circumstance of minority in his favor.

ISSUES:1. WON his right to due process was violated.

2. WON his plea of self-defense is in order.3. WON the crime committed is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide.4. WON he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

HELD:

1. No. Petitioner ascribes gross incompetence or gross negligence to his counsel for his allegedfailure to present all the witnesses who could have testified that he is innocent, failure to present the

medical certificate showing the injuries inflicted upon him by the victim, failure to notify him of

hearing, and failure to submit a memorandum. For negligence or incompetence to be deemed gross,it must have prejudiced the constitutional right of an accused to be heard. The OSG notes thatpetitioner was represented by his counsel of choice. Records show that counsel for petitioner actively

participated in the cross-examination of witnesses for the prosecution. Petitioner was present duringthe hearing. If he believed that his counsel was incompetent, he could have secured the services of anew counsel.

A client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer, as well as the latter’s decisions regarding the

conduct of the case. His counsel was not so inept or motivated by bad faith, or so careless andnegligent of his duties as to seriously prejudice the substantial rights of petitioner or prevent himfrom putting up a proper defense.

2. No. Petitioner has not adequately discharged his burden of proving the elements of self-defense.The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that at the time he hacked the victim, the latter was

still seated while he (petitioner) was behind him.

3. No. We agree with the lower courts that the petitioner planned to kill the victim with treachery inmind. At that time, the victim was seated, having just finished a meal at a late hour. His back wastowards petitioner when the latter, without warning, hacked him twice on his head with a bolo. The

attack was so sudden and unexpected that the victim had no opportunity either to avert the attack or

to defend himself.

4. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the surrender must be spontaneous, made in such amanner that it shows the interest of the accused to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either

because he acknowledges his guilt or wishes to save them the trouble and expenses that would benecessarily incurred in his search and capture. Here, the surrender was not spontaneous.

Custodio v. Sandiganbayan

Petitioners were members of the military who acted as Senator Ninoy Aquino’s security detail

during his arrival in Manila. Petitioners filed a Motion to Re-Open Case with Leave of Court who

were convicted by the Sandiganbayan for the double murder of Ninoy and Rolando Galman.Petitioners were initially acquitted by the Sandiganbayan in 1985. But after finding that theproceedings were a sham trial, the Court nullified the proceedings and ordered a retrial. The

Sandiganbayan then convicted petitioners in 1990 and the judgment became final. In 2004, the petitioners, with the assistance of the Public Attorney’s Office, sought to present the findings of anindependent forensic group from UP and allow the reopening of the case based on newly found

evidence. The petitioners likewise invoke that there was a grave violation of due process andmisapprehension of facts based on false forensic evidence.

ISSUES:

1. WON a third retrial is proper based on newly discovered pieces of evidence that were notavailable during the second trial.

2. WON petitioners were deprived of adequate legal assistance by counsel.

3. WON there was misapprehension of facts.

HELD:

1. No. The threshold question in resolving a motion for new trial based on newlydiscovered evidence is whether the proferred evidence is in fact a “newlydiscovered evidence which could not have been discovered by due diligence.”

The Court finds that petitioners’ purported evidence does not qualify as newlydiscovered evidence that would justify the re-opening of the case and the holdingof a third trial. Petitioners failed to show that it was impossible for them tosecure an independent forensic study of the physical evidence during the trial of

the double murder case. It appears from their report that the forensic group

used the same physical and testimonial evidence proferred during the trial,but made their own analysis and interpretation of said evidence. The report

of the forensic group essentially reiterates the theory presented by thedefense during the trial of the double murder case. Clearly, the report is not

newly discovered, but rather recently sought, which is not allowed by the Rules.Certainly, a new trial will only be allowed if the new evidence is of such

weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted. Also, new

trial will not be granted if the new evidence is merely cumulative,corroborative or impeaching.

2. No. Records show that they were ably represented by Atty. Jimenez. Petitioners

did not allege any specific facts in their present motion to show that Atty.Jimenez had been remiss in his duties as counsel. Petitioners are therefore bound

by the acts and decisions of their counsel as regards the conduct of the case. Thegeneral rule is that the client is bound by the action of his counsel in the conductof his case and cannot be heard to complain that the result of the litigation might

have been different had his counsel proceeded differently. In criminal as well as

civil cases, it has frequently been held that the fact that blunders and mistakesmay have been made in the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court, as aresult of the ignorance, inexperience, or incompetence of counsel, does not

furnish a ground for a new trial. So it has been held that mistakes of attorneys asto the competency of a witness, the sufficiency, relevancy, materiality, orimmateriality of a certain evidence, the proper defense, or the burden of proof

are not proper grounds for a new trial;



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3. No. The Court is not moved by petitioners’ assertion that the forensic evidence

may have been manipulated and misinterpreted during the trial of the case.Again, petitioners did not allege concrete facts to support their crass claim.

Gamas v. Oco (admin)

Complainants are the accused of a case for theft of corn worth P4,500. They are complaining againstJudge Oco, presiding judge of the MTC of Polomok, South Cotabato, and police prosecutor

Adulacion for grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the law. As respondent judge had issuedwarrants for their arrest, complainants on 3 October 1996 went to the MTC Polomolok to postbail. Complainants allege that respondent Adulacion enticed them to plead guilty to the charge,

apply for probation, and thus avoid imprisonment. The complainants signed the draft decisionallegedly prepared by Adulacion upon the latter’s assurance that once the police apprehend the rest

of the accused, the police will revive the case and respondent Adulacion will present complainants as“star witnesses.” Complainants later found out that what they signed was an Order finding themguilty of theft. Complainants sought assistance of a lawyer and upon the latter’s motion, respondent

judge vacated his order on the ground that the complainants entered improvident guilty pleas andscheduled their re-arraignment. Complainants contend that respondent judge is administrativelyliable for rendering judgment against them without the benefit of an arraignment and in violation of

their right to be represented by counsel. The investigating judge found the respondent guilty of

simple neglect of duty and recommended a P10,000 fine. The OCA found respondent liable for grossignorance of the law.

ISSUE: WON respondent judge is liable.

HELD: Yes. Respondent judge failed to properly apprise the complainants of their right to counsel.Sec 6 of Rule 116 mandates that it is the duty of the court to inform the accused of his right to

counsel. “Unless the accused is allowed to defend himself in person or has employed counsel of his

choice, the court must assign a counsel de oficio to defend him .” It means that the court has four

duties to comply with: ppears [at the arraignment] without [an] attorney, the court has four importantduties to comply with: 1 – It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have [an] attorneybefore being arraigned; 2 – After giving him such information the court must ask him if he desires

the aid of attorney; 3 – If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign [an]attorney de oficio to defend him; and 4 – If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own thecourt must grant him a reasonable time therefor.

The only instance when the court can arraign an accused without the benefit of counsel is if the

accused waives such right and the court, finding the accused capable, allows him to representhimself in person. However, to be a valid waiver, the accused must make the waiver voluntarily,knowingly, and intelligently. In this case, there is no basis for the alleged waiver of such right. In his

Answer, respondent judge does not deny that when he “arraigned” complainants, no lawyer assistedthe complainants. . Respondent judge is grossly mistaken in saying that securing a “lawyer was their (complainants’) problem.” Once the accused informs the judge that he cannot afford a lawyer and

the court has not allowed the accused to represent himself, or the accused is incapable of representing himself, the judge has the duty to appoint a counsel de oficio to give meaning and

substance to the constitutional right of the accused to counsel.

The Court also finds the arraignment highly irregular. Respondent judge similarly failed to complywith the requirements of Section 1(a) of Rule 116. Complainants deny respondent judge’s claim that

he arraigned complainants by “read[ing] to them [the information] in the dialect they understand and

inform[ing] them [of] the nature of the evidence arrayed [against them]. However, there is nodisputing that respondent judge failed to furnish complainants a copy of the information with the listof the witnesses.

The rule is that when the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know itconstitutes gross ignorance of the law. The Court sustained the OCA’s recommendation but

refrained from passing upon the complaint against Adulacion as he is not a member of the Bar nor a judiciary employee.

People v. Peralta

Appellants were convicted of qualified theft for taking or carrying away punctured currencynotes due for shredding. The offense was committed with grave abuse of confidence as they were at

the time being employees of the Central Bank of the Philippines. The prosecution alleged that based

on a complaint filed, one of the accused, Garcia, was apprehended and was brought to the policestation for investigation. The latter allegedly gave three statements admitting his guilt, identified the

other accused and narrated their participation. Based on these sworn statements, the other named

accused were invited for questioning and were subsequently charged. According to the defense,Garcia was arrested without a warrant, brought to a safe house where he was tortured by water cure,

and was forced to sign the alleged sworn statements. During the trial, Atty. Sanchez testified that hedid not assist Gracia when he was investigated by the police and that he signed the sworn statementsmerely as a witness. The RTC found Garcia’s allegations of torture and coerced confe ssionsunsupported by evidence. Moreover, it held that the recovery of three pieces of perforated P100 bills

from Garcia’s wallet and the flight of Peralta and Datuin Jr. were indicative of the guilt of theaccused.

ISSUES:

1. WON there is sufficient evidence against the appellants, including the admissibility of Garcia’s

confessions and of the three perforated P100 currency notes.

2. WON the denial to their demurrer to evidence was proper.

HELD:

1. The three sworn statements were obtained without the assistance of counsel in violation of theaccused’s constitutional right. The right to counsel has been written into our Constitution in order toprevent the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a suspect in a

crime. The basic law specifically requires that any waiver of this right must be made in writing and

executed in the presence of a counsel. Hence, the lawyer’s role cannot be reduced to being that of a

mere witness to the signing of a pre-prepared confession, even if it indicated compliance with theconstitutional rights of the accused. A waiver in writing, like that which the trial court relied upon in

the present case, is not enough. Without the assistance of a counsel, the waiver has no evidentiaryrelevance. The Constitution states that “[a]ny confession or admission obtained in violation of [the

aforecited Section 12] shall be inadmissible in evidence x x x.” Hence, the trial court was in error

when it admitted in evidence the uncounseled confessions of Garcia and convicted appellants on thebasis thereof. The question of whether he was tortured becomes moot.



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Garcia’s arrest was not under any of the circumstance that would justify a valid warrantless arrest.

Hence, Garcia was not lawfully arrested. Nonetheless, not having raised the matter before enteringhis plea, he is deemed to have waived the illegality of his arrest. Note, however, that this waiver islimited to the arrest. It does not extend to the search made as an incident thereto or to the subsequent

seizure of evidence allegedly found during the search. Where the arrest was incipiently illegal, itfollows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal. In this case, the perforated currency notesare inadmissible as evidence.

Indeed, the prosecution sufficiently proved the theft of the perforated currency notes forretirement. It failed, however, to present sufficient admissible evidence pointing to appellants as the

authors of the crime. Without the extrajudicial confession and the perforated currency notes, theremaining evidence would be utterly inadequate to overturn the constitutional presumption of innocence.

2. Yes. Even if the confiscated perforated notes from the person of the former were held to beinadmissible, the confessions would still have constituted prima facie evidence of the guilt of

appellants. On that basis, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying their demurrer toevidence.

People v. Larranaga

Appellants filed four motions for reconsideration assailing the decision of the Court convicting them

of the crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention, including a case concerning the abductionand killing of the Chiong sisters. Appellants brought up various issues, including one of theaccused’s (Aznar) assignment of error based on a violation of the accused’s right to due process. The

trial court excluded Professor Jerome Bailen and Atty. Florencio Villarin, NBI, Regional Director, asdefense witnesses.

ISSUE: WON the trial court violated their right to due process when it excluded the testimony of other defense witnesses

HELD: No. Professor Bailen was properly excluded. First , he is not a finger-print expert but anarchaeologist. And second, his report consists merely of the results of his visual inspection of theexhibits already several months old. Anent Atty. Villarin’s failure to testify before the trial court,

suffice it to say that his belated Affidavit, which Aznar submitted via his supplemental motion for

reconsideration dated May 5, 2004, raises nothing to change our findings and conclusions. Whatclearly appears in said Affidavit is a man trying to impress people that he was the one responsible forsolving the Chiong case and for that, he deserves a promotion.

The Court also refused to entertain at a late stage Dr. Fortun’s separate study to show that theexamination conducted on the body found in Tan-awan, Carcar is inadequate. Such study cannot

be classified as newly-discovered evidence warranting belated reception.

*The Court denied all the motions except for the motion filed by the Uy brothers with respect to

James Andrews’ alleged minority.

People v. Jusayan

Appellant Jusayan was convicted of statutory rape for sexually abusing a 10-year old girl. As thetrial court imposed a death penalty, the case was brought for automatic review. Prosecutionpresented as evidence the testimony of the victim and that of Dr. Bautista as the examining

physician. The victim testified that the accused was a pedicab driver who, instead of bringing her toschool, brought her to the cemetery. She was raped there and sustained physical injuries. A witness,

Rentoza, testified that he saw the victim and the accused in the cemetery twice that morning. Dr.Bautista, on the other hand, testified that the victim’s hymen had fresh minimal laceration and wasfound positive for spermatozoa. Accused’s counsel, Atty. Sampang from the PAO of Dinalupihan,

Bataan, filed an urgent motion for the mental and psychiatric examination of the appellant as he was

allegedly feeble-minded and had difficulty in comprehending the questions propounded to him. Thesame was denied as it appeared that appellant was of sound mind. In a manifestation, Atty. Sampang

submitted the case for resolution as the defense waived its right to present evidence on the groundthat the prosecution had not proved appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the trial court

convicted the accused and sentenced him to death.

ISSUES:

1. WON, appellant, through counsel, validly waived his right to present evidence.

2. WON the prosecution has proven appellant’s guilt with moral certainty.

3. WON the imposition of death penalty was p roper.

HELD:

1. Although there is nothing in the records to show that the trial court advised appellant on the

repercussions of his waiver to present evidence in his own defense, this lapse did not work toeffectively vacate the findings of guilt made by the trial court because appellant’s guilt for the crime

of statutory rape has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. In the case at bar, the elements of

statutory rape were adequately established not only by the victim’s straightforward testimony butlikewise by the findings of the examining physician presented by the prosecution.

2. Yes. Private complainant’s account on how appellant ravished her sexually was replete with

details, dispelling any bit of suspicion on its truthfulness. The fact that private complainant wascrying during her testimony bolstered her credibility with the verity born out of human nature andexperience. Furthermore, as p reviously held, when a young girl like private complainant cries rape,

she is saying in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has indeed been committed.

3. No. The fact that the victim in this case was only ten years old when the rape occurred does not byitself warrant the penalty of death. In this case, although the minority of the victim was alleged and

proven, such allegation and proof of the minority of the victim, without any allegation and proof of



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her relationship to the appellant, would not qualify rape as a capital crime. Moreover, as previously

held, minority of the offended party, by itself, is not an aggravating circumstance that can increasethe penalty to death (refer to Anti-Rape Law). Neither can we sentence appellant to death under par.5 of Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code because par. 5 refers only to rape of "a child below

seven (7) years old." Here the victim was already ten (10) years old. In fine, appellant is guilty onlyof statutory rape defined in Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, punishable by reclusionperpetua.

*The Court modified the award of damages to include moral and exemplary damages in addition to

civil indemnity.

crim pro digests - 115

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