SAYO VS. CHIEF OF POLICE OF MANILA

80 PHIL 859 (1948)

FACTS:

Upon complaint of one Bernardino Malinao, charging the petitioners with havingcommitted the crime of robbery, Benjamin Dumlao, a policeman of the City of Manila,arrested the petitioners on April 2, 1948, and presented a complaint against them withthe fiscal's office of Manila. Until April 7, 1948, the petitioners were still detained orunder aarest, and the city fiscal had not yet released or filed against them an informationwith the proper court of justice.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners had been illegally restrained of their liberty?

RULING:

Yes. Petitioners are being illegally restrained of their liberty, and their release ishereby ordered unless they are now detained by virtue of a process issued by acompetent court of justice. Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code provides that “thepenalties provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officeror employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliversuch person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of six hours.” PolicemanDumlao may have acted in good faith in believing that he had complied with the mandateof article 125 by delivering the petitioners within six hours to the office of the city fiscal,and the latter may have ignored the fact that the petitioners were being actually detainedwhen said policeman filed a complaint against them with the city fiscal.

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE; "JUDICIAL AUTHORITY"; MEANING AS USED IN ARTICLE 125OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE. In view of the history of article 125 of the Revised Penal Codepenalizing any 'public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shallfail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of six hours," the preceptof the Constitution guaranteeing individual liberty, and the provisions of the Rules of Court regardingarrest and habeas corpus, the words "judicial authorities," as used in said article 125, mean the courts of justice or judges of said courts vested with judicial power to order the temporary detention orconfinement of a person charged with having committed a public offense, that is, "the Supreme Courtand such inferior courts as may be established by law." (Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.

People vs. Alunday

The Government (P) vs. Marijuana Grower (D)

 GR 181546, September 3, 2008 [T]

Summary: A suspected marijuana plantation was the subject of a raiding operation when

the alleged marijuana grower was caught cutting and gathering marijuana. Further, when

taken to a nearby hut, an unlicensed firearm was found.

Rule of Law: A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person

when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or

is attempting to commit an offense.

Facts: The Intelligence Section of the Police Provincial Office of the Mountain Province

received a report from a confidential informant that there was an existing marijuana

plantation within the vicinity of Mt. Churyon. After a series of validations, the existence of

the subject plantation was finally confirmed.

The Police Director ordered a contingent of policemen to the subject plantation and upon

arriving at the area saw Ricardo Alunday (D) cutting and gathering marijuana leaves. The

police took Alunday (D) to the hut where they saw a woman, an M16 riffle and some dried

marijuana leaves.

Issues: Is the warrantless arrest valid?

Ruling: Yes. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person

when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or

is attempting to commit, an offense. Section 5(a) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court refers to

arrest in flagrante delicto.

Furthermore, the Court has consistently ruled that any objection involving a warrant of

arrest or the procedure for the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of

the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed

waived. We have also ruled that an accused may be estopped from assailing the illegality of

his arrest if he fails to move for the quashing of the information against him before his

arraignment. And since the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court

over the person of the accused, any defect in the arrest of the accused may be deemed

cured when he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the trial court. We have also held in

a number of cases that the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient cause for setting

aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error;

such arrest does not negate the validity of the conviction of the accused.

Herein, Alunday (D) went into arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, he

actively participated in his trial. He raised the additional issue of irregularity of his arrest

only during his appeal to this Court. He is, therefore, deemed to have waived such alleged

defect by submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the court by his counsel-assisted plea

during his arraignment; by his actively participating in the trial and by not raising the

objection before his arraignment.

G.R. No. 178039 January 19, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.

ERNESTO UYBOCO y RAMOS

FACTS:

On 20 December 1993, Nimfa and her wards, siblings Jeson Kevin and Jeson Kirby Dichaves were abducted and brought to a house in Merville Subdivision, Parañaque. Nimfa was able to recognized one of the kidnappers as appellant, because she had seen the latter in her employer’s office.

The kidnappers called Jepson and demanded for ransom of P26 Million. In one of the calls of the kidnappers, Jepson was able to recognize the voice of appellant because he had several business transactions. After, numerous times of negotiation, the parties finally agreed to a ransom of P1.5 Million, some in ash and the balance to be paid in kind, such as jewelry and a pistol. Appellant asked Jepson to bring the ransom alone at Pancake House in Magallanes Commercial Center and ordered him to put the bag in the trunk, leave the trunk unlocked, and walk away for ten (10) minutes without turning back. P/Insp. Esc and or and P/Supt. Chan were assigned to proceed to Magallanes Commercial Center and brought a camera to take photo and video coverage of the supposed pay-off. He identified Macias together with appellant and the latter as the one who took the ransom.

Later, appellant checked on his trunk and the bag was already gone. Appellant then apprised him that his sons and helper were already at the Shell Gasoline Station along South Luzon Expressway. He immediately went to the place and found his sons and helper seated at the corner of the gas station. P/Supt. Cruz and his group was assigned at Fort Bonifacio then heard on their radio that the suspect’s vehicle, a red Nissan Sentra was heading in their direction. A few minutes later, they saw the red car and

tailed it until it reached Dasmariñas Village in Makati. When said car slowed down, they blocked it and immediately approached the vehicle.

They introduced themselves as police officers and accosted the suspect, who turned out to be appellant. Appellant suddenly pulled a .38caliber revolver and a scuffle took place. They managed to subdue appellant and handcuffed him. Appellant was requested to open the compartment and a gray bag was found inside. P/Supt. Cruz saw money, jewelry and a gun inside the bag.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid arrest and search without warrant?

DOCTRINE: The arrest was validly executed pursuant to Section 5, paragraph (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

“A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: x x x; (b) When an offense has in fact been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and, (c) x x x.

” A search incident to a lawful

arrest is also valid under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which states:

“A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.”

RATIONALE: The instance of lawful warrantless arrest covered by paragraph (b) cited above necessitates two stringent requirements before a warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just been committed; and (2) the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. Records show that both requirements are present in the instant case. The police officers present in Magallanes Commercial Center were able to witness the pay-off which effectively consummates the crime of kidnapping. Such knowledge was then relayed to the other police officers stationed in Fort Bonifacio where appellant was expected to pass by. Personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. Section 5, Rule 113 does not require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the offense with their own eyes. It is sufficient for the arresting team that they were monitoring the pay-off for a number of hours long enough for them to be informed that it was indeed appellant, who was the kidnapper. This is equivalent to personal knowledge based on probable cause. Likewise, the search conducted inside the car of appellant was legal because the latter consented to such. Even assuming that appellant did not give his consent for the police to search the car, they can still validly do so by virtue of a search incident to a lawful arrest under Section 13, Rule 126. In lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area within the latter's reach. Therefore, it is only but expected and legally so for the police to search his car as he was driving it when he was arrested.

ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS

An information was filed charging herein petitioner Rolito Go for murder before the Regional Trial Court of Metro Manila. Petitioner voluntarily presented himself together with his two lawyers to the police upon obtaining knowledge of being hunted by the latter. However, he was immediately detained and denied his right of a preliminary investigation unless he executes and sings a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Upon omnibus motion for immediate release on recognizance or on bail and proper preliminary investigation on the ground that his warrantless arrest was unlawful and no preliminary investigation was conducted before the information was filed, which is violative of his rights, the same was granted but later on reversed by the lower court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The appellate court in sustaining the decision of the lower court held that petitioner's warrantless arrest was valid in view of the fact that the offense was committed, the petitioner was clearly identified and there exists valid information for murder filed against petitioner

Hence, the petitioner filed this present petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE/S

: The issues assailed in the case at bar are the following:1.whether or not the warrantless arrest of herein petitioner was lawful, and

2. whether or not petitioner waived his right to preliminary investigation

RULING

: The general rule on arrest provides that the same is legitimate if effected with a valid warrant. However, there are instances specifically enumerated under the law when a warrantless arrest may be considered lawful. Despite that, the warrantless arrest of herein petitioner

Rolito Go does not fall within the terms of said rule. The police were not present at the time of the commission of the offense, neither do they have personal knowledge on the crime to be committed or has been committed not to mention the fact that petitioner was not a prisoner who has escaped from the penal institution. In view of the above, the allegation of the prosecution that petitioner needs to sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code before a preliminary investigation may be conducted is baseless. In this connection, petitioner has all the right to ask for a preliminary investigation to determine whether is probable cause that a crime has been committed and that petitioner is probably guilty thereof as well as to prevent him from the hassles, anxiety and aggravation brought by a criminal proceeding. This reason of the accused is substantial, which he should not be deprived of. On the other hand, petitioner did not waive his right to have a preliminary investigation contrary to the prosecutor's claim. The right to preliminary investigation is deemed waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a pleas at arraignment. The facts of the case

show that petitioner insisted on his right to preliminary investigation before his arraignment and he, through his counsel denied answering questions before the court unless they were afforded the proper preliminary investigation

. For the above reasons, the petition was granted and the ruling of the appellate court was set aside and nullified. The Supreme Court however, contrary to petitioner's allegation, declared that failure to accord the right to preliminary investigation did not impair the validity of the information charging the latter of the crime of murder.

David vs. Arroyo G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006Facts of the case:

During the celebration of People Power I, President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP 1017 for brevity) declaring a state of national emergency.  The President also issued General Order (G.O.) No. 5 implementing PP 1017. 

The President stated that over the past months, elements in political opposition have conspired with extreme left represented by NDF- CCP- NPA and military adventurists, which caused her to declare such order. The President considered aims to oust the President and take- over reigns of government as clear and present danger. 

On March 3, President Arroyo lifted PP 1017. 

Solicitor General argued that the basis of declaring PP 1017 was that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling out the AFP. 

However despite the contentions of the Solicitor General, the Magdalo group indicted the Oakwood mutiny and called to wear red bands on their left arms to show disgust. 

At the same time Oplan Hackle I was discovered, which constitutes plans of bombings and attacks on PMA Alumni Homecoming in Baguio, the same event where the President was invited.  The next morning after the alumni homecoming celebration, a bomb was found inside the campus. 

PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao also intercepted information that PNP- SAF members are planning to defect from the administration, while on the same view Congressman Peping Cojuanco plotted moves to bring down the Arroyo Administration. 

Huge number of soldiers joined the rallies to provide critical mass and armed component to Anti- Arroyo protests. 

Bombings of telephone communication towers and cell sites in Bulacaan and Bataan was also considered as an additional factual basis after the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5. 

Because of these incidental series of events which clearly presents a critical situation, President Arroyo cancelled all activities related to EDSA People Power I.  Mike Arroyo, then Executive Secretary, announced that warrantless arrest and takeover of facilities can be implemented. 

Succeeding this announcement was the arrest of Randy David, a Filipino journalist and UP professor due to a mistake of fact that he was actually involved in the street rallies. Seizure of Daily Tribune, Malaya and Abante-- all local news publication, took place which, according to the PNP, was meant to show a strong presence to tell the media outlets not to connive or do anything that would help rebels in bringing down the government.  Police also arrested Congressman Crispin Beltran, who then represented the Anakpawis Party. 

Issue:

Whether or not the arrest of Randy David and the seizure of Daily Tribune et. al., is valid? 

Ruling of the court:

NO, the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribune’s officesconducted

pursuant to PP 1017 was NOT valid.

[T]he search [and seizure in the Daily Tribune premises] is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised

Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search and seizure. Section 4

requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific

offence to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the

complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a house,

room, or any other premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member

of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and

discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be

served in the daytime, unless the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in

which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. All these

rules were violated by the CIDG operatives.

People vs. Racho

626 SCRA 633, August 3, 2010

Facts:

On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent reported the transaction to the police authorities who immediately formed a team to apprehend the appellant. The team members posted themselves along the national highway in Baler, Aurora, and at around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to him as the person he transacted with, and when the latter was about to board a tricycle, the team approached him and invited him to the police station as he was suspected of carrying shabu. When he pulled out his hands from his

pants’ pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened

, yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug. The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation and the confiscated specimen was marked in the presence of appellant. The field test and laboratory examinations on the contents of the confiscated sachet yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride. Appellant was charged in two separate information, one for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for transporting or delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the same law for possessing, dangerous drugs. During the arraignment, appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges.

On July 8, 2004, the RTC rendered a Joint Judgment convicting appellant of Violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 but acquitted him of the charge of Violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9165. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. The appellant brought the case to SC assailing for the first time he legality of his arrest and the validity of the subsequent warrantless search.

Issue:

Whether or not the appellant has a ground to assail the validity of his arrest.

Held:

The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. We find no cogent reason to depart from this well-established doctrine. Appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. Neither did the arresting officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed, was committing, or about to commit an offense. At the time of the arrest, appellant had just alighted from the Gemini bus and was waiting for a tricycle. Appellant was not acting in any suspicious manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the police officers to suspect and conclude that he was committing or intending to commit a crime. Were it not for the information given by the informant, appellant would not have been apprehended and no search would have been made, and consequently, the sachet of shabu would not have been confiscated. Neither was the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away with the requisite warrant. As testified to by Police Officer 1 Aurelio Iniwan, a member

of the arresting team, their office received the "tipped information" on May 19, 2003. They likewise learned from the informant not only the appellant’s physical description but also his name. Although it was not certain that appellant would arrive on the same day (May 19), there was an assurance that he would be there the following day(May 20). Clearly, the police had ample opportunity to apply for a warrant.

People v. Ancheta

G.R. No. 197371, June 13, 2012

FACTS

: On August 10, 2004 at 545 PM, a team of law enforcers from the Makati Police Station Anti-Drug Abuse Council descended on Llorando Compound, Brgy. East Rembo, Makati City to conduct abuy-bust operation. Through an informant, PO1 Marmonejo, poseur-buyer purchased PHP 500

worth of shabu from a certain “Joker”, later identified as Joel Ancheta and arrested the same.

Also arrested were John Llorando, the man in the alley who took the marked money and handed it to Ancheta and Juan Carlos Gernada, the laundry man who was paid by Ancheta a sachet of a white crystalline substance for his laundry services. Recovered from accused-appellant Ancheta were 5 sachets of a white crystalline substance later identified as methyl amphetamine HCL, from accused-appellant Gernada 1 sachet of the same. Ancheta was charged for violation of Sec. 5 and 11, Art. II, RA 9165, Gernada with violation of Sec.11, Art. II, RA 9165 and Llorando with violation of Sec. 15, Art. II, RA 9165In a decision dated September 17, 2008, the Makati City RTC convicted all accused-appellants with the crimes charged against them plus violation of Sec. 5, Art. II, RA 9165 for Llorando. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC on November 30, 2010.

ISSUE

: Will the failure of arresting officers to follow Sec. 21, Art. II, RA 9165 cause the discharge of the accused-appellants from the crimes in which they were convicted?

RULING

: Yes, the Court ruled that the failure of the arresting officers to follow Sec. 21, Art. II, RA 9165without stating a (1) justifiable cause and (2) its failure to protect the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items invalidates the arrest process and the evidences seized. Court sets aside the decision of the CA which affirmed the conviction of Joel Ancheta, JohnLlorando and Juan Carlos Gernada by the RTC of Makati City and acquits them of the crimes charged against them and are ordered to be immediately released.