1. Calimutan v. People 482 SCRA 47Facts: Victim Cantre and Saano, together with two other companions had a drinking spree in a videoke bar at ten oclock in the morning of February 4, 1996. Thereafter, they decided to part ways and went to their respective houses. On their way home, Cantre and Sanano met the petitioner and Michael Bulalacao. Cantre suddenly punched Bulalacao because he is suspecting the latter as the one responsible for throwing stones at his house on previous night. After being hit, Bulalacao ran away. Petitioner picked-up a stone which is as big as mans fist, ran toward Cantre, and threw it to the latter, hitting him at the left side of his back. When Cantre turned his attention to the petitioner, Sanano tried pacify the two. Both Cantre and petitioner calmed down and went to their houses. When Cantre arrived at his house, he complained of the pain in the left side of his back which was hit by the stone. At that night, he again complained of backache and also of stomachache. Hes condition immediately became worst, and at around three oclock in the following morning, Cantre died.

Right after his death, Cantre was examined by Dr. Conchita S. Ulanday, the Municipal Health Officer and made a finding that the cause of death was cardio-respiratory arrest due to suspected food poisoning. Unsatisfied, the Cantre family requested for an exhumation and autopsy of the body of the victim by the NBI. Dr. Mendez conducted an exhumation and autopsy and reported that the cause of the death was traumatic injury of the abdomen. The victim suffered from an internal hemorrhage and there was massive accumulation of blood in his abdominal cavity due to his lacerated spleen caused by any blunt instrument, such as a stone.

Petitioner alleged that he only attempted to pacify the victim but the latter refused and pulled out eight-inch Balisong. When he saw the victim was about to stab Bulalacao, he picked up a stone and threw it at the victim Cantre. He was able to hit the victim. He contended that the throwing of the stone was in defense of his companion.

The RTC rendered a decision, which was later affirmed by the CA, holding that petitioner was criminally liable for homicide and that the act of throwing a stone from behind was a treacherous one and the accused committed a felony which caused the death of the victim and held that the accused is criminally liable for all the direct and natural consequences of this unlawful act even if the ultimate result had not been intended. Hence, these case.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has the intent to kill the victim and thus liable for homicide?

Decision: While the Supreme Court is in accord with the factual findings of the RTC and the CA and affirms that there is ample evidence proving that the death of the victim Cantre was caused by his lacerated spleen which is the result by the stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan, it nonetheless, is at variance with the RTC and the CA as to the determination of the appropriate crime or offense for which the petitioner should have been convicted for.

Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code classifies felonies according to the means by which they are committed, in particular: (1) intentional felonies, and (2) culpable felonies. These two types of felonies are distinguished from each other by the existence or absence of malicious intent of the offender.

In intentional felonies, the act or omission of the offender ismalicious. In the language of Art. 3, the act is performed with deliberate intent (with malice). The offender, in performing the act or in incurring the omission,has the intention to cause an injuryto another. In culpable felonies, the act or omission of the offender isnotmalicious. The injury caused by the offender to another person is "unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performedwithoutmalice." (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil. 939). As stated in Art. 3, the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.

In the Petition at bar, this Court cannot, in good conscience, attribute to petitioner any malicious intent to injure, much less to kill, the victim Cantre; and in the absence of such intent, this Court cannot sustain the conviction of petitioner Calimutan for the intentional crime of homicide, as rendered by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Instead, this Court finds petitioner Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the culpable felony ofreckless imprudence resulting in homicideunder Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. The prosecution did not establish that petitioner Calimutan threw the stone at the victim Cantre with the specific intent of killing, or at the very least, of harming the victim Cantre. What is obvious to this Court was petitioner Calimutans intention to drive away the attacker who was, at that point, the victim Cantre, and to protect his helper Bulalacao who was, as earlier described, much younger and smaller in built than the victim Cantre.

2. Manuel v. People 476 SCRA 461Facts: This is a case filed against Eduardo Manuel for bigamy by Tina B. Gandalera. Complainant allege that she met the petitioner in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. When he visited her in Baguio, as one thing led to another, they went to a motel where, Eduardo succeeded in having his way with her. Petitioner proposed marriage and even brought his parents to assure that he is single. Tina finally accepted the marriage proposal and they were married on April 22, 1996. In their marriage contract, it appeared that Eduardo is single. However, their happy relationship turns into a disaster, Manuel started making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. One day, petitioner took all of his cloths, left and never returned. Out of curiousity, Tina went to NSO in Manila where she found out that petitioner had been previously married to Rubylus Gaa. She was so embarrassed and humiliated when she learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when they exchanged their own vows.

For his part, Eduardo testified that he informed Tina of his previous marriage, but she nevertheless agreed to marry him. He abandoned her when he noticed that she had a "love-bite" on her neck, suspecting it that it come from another man. Eduardo further testified that he declared he was "single" in his marriage contract with Tina because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina.. Rubylus was charged withestafain 1975 and thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in jail after three months and never saw her again. He insisted that he married Tina believing that his first marriage was no longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years. After trial, the court rendered judgment finding Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. It declared that Eduardos belief, that his first marriage had been dissolved because of his first wifes 20-year absence, even if true, did not exculpate him from liability for bigamy and that even if the private complainant had known that Eduardo had been previously married, the latter would still be criminally liable for bigamy. Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA maintaining his contentions. He insisted that conformably to Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there must be malice for one to be criminally liable for a felony. He was not motivated by malice in marrying the private complainant because he did so only out of his overwhelming desire to have a fruitful marriage. Hence, these case.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has criminal intent to contract on the second marriage to be liable for bigamy?

Decision: The Supreme Court ruled that the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to Gaa in 1975, and such marriage was not judicially declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist.The prosecution also proved that the petitioner married the private complainant in 1996, long after the effectivity of the Family Code. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony bydolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law.Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private complainant in 1996, he was of the well-grounded belief that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years since 1975. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code. Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part when he married the private complainant and, as a consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. The petitioner, however, failed to discharge his burden.

Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent. Indeed, a felony cannot exist without intent. Since a felony bydolois classified as an intentional felony, it is deemed voluntary. Although the words "with malice" do not appear in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, such phrase is included in the word "voluntary."

Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without legal excuse or justification from which another suffers injury.When the act or omission defined by law as a felony is proved to have been done or committed by the accused, the law presumes it to have been intentional.Indeed, it is a legal presumption of law that every man intends the natural or probable consequence of his voluntary act in the absence of proof to the contrary, and such presumption must prevail unless a reasonable doubt exists from a consideration of the whole evidence.

3. U.S. v. Ah Chong (15 Phil. 488)

Facts: Defendant herein a chinese man named Ah Chong is employed us a cook at Fort Mckinley. At that time there were rumours and accounts of frequent robbing of homes in the area.

On the night of the killing, Ah chong before going to bed, and afraid of the rumoured robberies taking place in the vicinity locked himself in their room by placing wooden blocks and chairs for the purpose of thwarting robbers in case they tried to rob him.

After having gone to bed, he was awakened by the noise of someone trying to open the door. Ah Chong for his part called out twice, Who is there, but to no avail. Fearing that the person trying to enter was robber Ah Chong leaped from his bed and shouted If you enter the room I will kill you. But at that precise moment, he was suddenly struck by the chair that he had placed in the door, and believing that he was being attacked he seized a knife and struck it on the supposed assailant/robber, who was killed by the blow. However the deceased was not a robber not intruder it turned out that the person was his roommate, trying to enter their room.

Issue:Whether or not Ah Chong is criminally liable?

Held: NO. Ah Chong must be acquitted on the basis of honest mistake of fact. Where the facts been as Ah Chong perceived them to be, he would have been justified in killing the intruder under Article 11 of the Revised, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides for a valid self-defense of his person. If the intruder was indeed a robber, forcing his way to enter the room, unlawful aggression would be present. Also the necessity means to avoid or to repel the attack would be reasonable. Using the knife to defend himself. And lastly Ah Chong gave no provocation at all to warrant such aggression. The Supreme Court Held that there is nothing unlawful in the intention as well in the act of Ah Chong, his act would not have been a felony if the real scenario was the facts he believed them to be.

4. People vs. De Fernando49 Phil. 75

FACTS: The accused, a policeman, was informed that three convicts had escaped. In the dark, he saw a person going up the stairs of a house, carrying a bolo andcalling for someone inside. The daughter of the owner of the house was at thattime with the accused who fired a shot in the air. As the unknown person continued to ascend the stairs and believing that he was one of the escaped convicts, the accused fired directly at the man who turned out to be the nephewof the owner of the house.ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant is exempt from criminal liability due to mistake of fact.

HELD: An agent of the law, to whom notice had been given of the presence ofsuspicious looking persons, who might be escaped prisoners from a nearby penitentiary, prowling around the vicinity, and who enters a house to keep watch, and later in the evening sees a person with a bolo in hand, approaching the house in the attitude of going up the stairs, who does not answer the challenge of the officer of the law, and continues his advance notwithstanding that the latter had fired a shot into the air, and the said agent of the law considering that the said stranger has not been recognized by any person in the household, and thinking him to be anevil-doer, shoots and kills him, is not guilty of murder or homicide. Taking into consideration the state of the mind of the accused at the time, andthe meaning that he gave to the attitude of the unknown person, in shooting the latter, he felt that he was performing his duty by defending the owners of the house against an unexpected attack, and such act cannot constitute the crime ofmurder, but only that of a simple homicide. Hecannot be held guilty, however as principal, with malicious intent, because he thought at the time that he was justified in acting as he did, and he is guilty only because he failed to exercise the ordinary diligence which, under the circumstances, he should have by investigating whether or not the unknown man was really what he thought him to be. In firing the shot, without first exercising reasonable diligence, he acted with reckless negligence. The crime committed by the accused, therefore is homicide though reckless negligence defined andpunished in Article 568,in relationwith Art.404, ofthe Penal Code

5. Diego V Judge Castillo 436 SCRA 67Facts: Complainant herein alleges that the decision rendered by the respondent Judge is manifestly against the law and contrary to the evidence.He questions the evidentiary weight and admissibility of the divorce decree as a basis for the finding of good faith.In addition, complainant stresses that the evidence on record negates respondent Judges finding of good faith on the part of the accused.Thus, complainant urges this Court to impose sanctions upon respondent Judge as, according to complainant, these acts amount to knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and/or gross ignorance of the law.

In his comment, respondent Judge explains that what was in issue was the criminal culpability of the accused under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.Respondent Judge does not dispute that the second marriage was bigamous because at the time it was contracted, the first marriage was still subsisting since divorce is not recognized in our country and because the accuseds first husband was still alive.Respondent Judge, however, maintains that what was controlling was whether by virtue of the divorce decree the accused honestly believed, albeit mistakenly, that her first marriage had been severed and she could marry again.According to respondent Judge, the same is a state of mind personal to the accused. He further stressed that knowledge of the law should not be exacted strictly from the accused since she is a lay person, and that ineptitude should not be confused with criminal intent.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Castillo is guilty of Mistake of fact.

Held: A careful study of the disputed decision reveals that respondent Judge had been less than circumspect in his study of the law and jurisprudence applicable to the bigamy case.

In his comment, respondent Judge stated: That the accused married Manuel P. Diego in the honest belief that she was free to do so by virtue of the decree of divorce is a mistake of fact.

This Court, inPeople v. Bitdu,carefully distinguished between a mistake of fact, which could be a basis for the defense of good faith in a bigamy case, from a mistake of law, which does not excuse a person, even a lay person, from liability.Bitduheld that even if the accused, who had obtained a divorce under the Mohammedan custom, honestly believed that in contracting her second marriage she was not committing any violation of the law, and that she had no criminal intent, the same does not justify her act.This Court further stated therein that with respect to the contention that the accused acted in good faith in contracting the second marriage, believing that she had been validly divorced from her first husband, it is sufficient to say that everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from the consequences thereof.

Moreover, squarely applicable to the criminal case for bigamy, isPeople v. Schneckenburger,where it was held that the accused who secured a foreign divorce, and later remarried in thePhilippines, in the belief that the foreign divorce was valid, is liable for bigamy.

These findings notwithstanding, the issue before us is whether or not respondent Judge should be held administratively liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and/or gross ignorance of the law.

Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is a criminal offense defined and penalized under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code.For conviction to lie, it must be proved that the judgment is unjust and that the judge knows that it is unjust.Knowingly means consciously, intelligently, willfully or intentionally.It is firmly established in this jurisdiction that for a judge to be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it must be shown that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence, and that the same was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice.

The law requires that (a) the offender is a judge; (b) he renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for decision; (c) the judgment is unjust; (d) he knew that said judgment is unjust. This Court reiterates that in order to hold a judge liable, it must be shown that the judgment is unjust and that it was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice.That good faith is a defense to the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment remains the law.

As held inAlforte v. Santos,even assuming that a judge erred in acquitting an accused, she still cannot be administratively charged lacking the element of bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose.Malice or bad faith on the part of the judge in rendering an unjust decision must still be proved and failure on the part of the complainant to prove the same warrants the dismissal of the administrative complaint.

There is, therefore, no basis for the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment.

6. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan 369 SCRA 394Facts: Petitioner Former President Joseph Estrada was prosecuted for a crime of violation of RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing theCrime of Plunder),as amended by RA 7659. Thus, he questions the constitutionality of the said Law. One of the issues that was raised in the petition is whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is amalum prohibitum,and ifso, whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it.

Issue: Whether or not Plunder is acrime malum prohibitum?

Decision: The legislative declaration in R.A. No.7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se.For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in seand it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainlymala in se.Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. BIg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.

7. People v. Go Shiu Ling 251 SCRA 379Facts: The Regional Trial Court of Pasay City finds accused-appellant Antonio Comia guilty of conspiring with four others to import regulated drugs in violation of Art. III, Section 14 in relation to Article IV, Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act (Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended).

Issue: Whether or not a crime for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act is a crime malum prohibitum?

Held: Even granting that Comia acted in good faith, he cannot escape criminal responsibility. The crime with which he is charged is amalum prohibitum. Lack of criminal intent and good faith are not exempting circumstances. As held inPeople v.Lo Ho Wing:

Moreover, the act of transporting a prohibited drug is a "malum prohibitum" because it is punished as an offense under a special law. It is a wrong because it is prohibited by law. Without the law punishing the act, it cannot be considered a wrong. As such, the mere commission of said act is what constitutes the offense punished and suffices to validly charge and convict an individual caught committing the act so punished, regardless of criminal intent.

Likewise, inPeople v.Bayona, it was held:

The rule is that in actsmala in sethere must be a criminal intent, but in thosemala prohibitait is sufficient if the prohibited act was intentionally done. "Care must be exercised in distinguishing the difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate to act."

8. People V. Bayona 61 SCRA 181Facts: Jose E. Desiderio, a representative of the Department of the Interior, and Major Agdamag of the Philippine Constabulary, who had been designated to supervise the elections in the Province of Capiz, testified positively that the defendant was within the fence surrounding the polling place when Desiderio took possession of the revolver the defendant was carrying. This also disposes of that part of the argument under the second assignment of error based on the theory that the defendant was in a public road, where he had a right to be, when he was arrested. The latter part of the argument under the second assignment of error is that if it be conceded that the defendant went inside of the fence, he is nevertheless not guilty of a violation of the Election Law, because he was called by a friend and merely approached him to find out what he wanted and had no interest in the election; that there were many people in the public road in front of the polling place, and the defendant could not leave his revolver in his automobile, which he himself was driving, without running the risk of losing it and thereby incurring in a violation of the law.

Held: We cannot accept the reasons advanced by the Solicitor-General for the acquittal of the defendant. The law which the defendant violated is a statutory provision, and the intent with which he violated it is immaterial. It may be conceded that the defendant did not intend to intimidate any elector or to violate the law in any other way, but when he got out of his automobile and carried his revolver inside of the fence surrounding the polling place, he committed the act complained of, and he committed it willfully. The act prohibited by the Election Law was complete. The intention to intimidate the voters or to interfere otherwise with the election is not made an essential element of the offense. Unless such an offender actually makes use of his revolver, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prove that he intended to intimidate the voters.

The rule is that in actsmala in sethere must be a criminal intent, but in thosemala prohibitait is sufficient if the prohibited act was intentionally done. "Care must be exercised in distinguishing the difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. ..." (U.S.vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil., 128.)

9. U.S. V Mallari 29 PHIL 19Facts: On the morning of September 25, 1913, in the barrio of Batasan, municipality of Macabebe, Province of Pampanga, before going to his work, the defendant Maximo Mallari went to the house of the married couple, Vicente Sunga and Canuta Flores, and from the shed outside asked Vicente Sunga to cure his wife of a sickness from which she had been suffering for several days, and which he thought was due to enchantment on the part of the said Vicente. As the latter refused, averring that he was not a wizard and that he had not caused the illness of defendants wife, the former became enraged and insulted the said spouses. Threatening to kill them, he ascended the stairway carrying in his hand a thin, sharp bolo. At his wifes suggestion Vicente Sunga tried to get out to report the matter to the teniente of the barrio, who lived at some paces from their house, but as he met the defendant on the stairway, he immediately went back inside and jumped out of a window. He was straightway pursued by the defendant and on arriving almost in front of the house of the teniente saw that the defendant was following closely behind him. He therefore turned to face his pursuer and defend himself as well as he could with his hands. Thereupon the defendant with a single slash of the bolo wounded Vicente Sunga in the abdomen, so that his intestines protruded therefrom. In this condition the victim sat down, endeavoring with his hands to keep his intestines from falling out, while his assailant took to flight.

The justice of the peace of Macabebe arrived on the scene a few moments later and in his presence the wounded man declared that his assailant was Mallari, who had been in his house, and who had inflicted the serious wound he had in the abdomen. As a consequence of this wound he died three days later.

Issue: Whether Mallari should still be liable for the death of the victim even though it was also proven that had there been sufficient medical intervention the victim would have survived.

Held: With reference to the classification of the criminal act, it does not appear in the case that this was erroneous, for in spite of the statement of the health officer that the deceased might have been saved if the wound had been aseptically treated from the first, its seriousness and fatal character being due to lack of antiseptics, still the person inflicting it is responsible for all the consequences of his criminal action, and therefore for the death that occurred some days after the deceased received the wound.

10. Bataclan V. Medina 102 SCRA 181Facts: Pass-midnight in September 1952, Juan Bataclan rode a bus owned by Mariano Medina from Cavite to Pasay. While on its way, thedriverof the bus was driving fastand when he applied the brakes it cause the bus to be overturned. Thedriver, the conductor, and some passengers were able tofreethemselves from the bus except Bataclan and 3 others. The passengers called the help of the villagers and as it was dark, the villagers brought torch with them. Thedriverand the conductor failed to warn the would-be helpers of the fact that gasoline has spilled from the overturned bus so a huge fire ensued which engulfed the bus thereby killing the 4 passengers trapped inside. It was also found later in trial that the tires of the bus were old.

ISSUE:Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan et al was their burning by reason of the torches which ignited the gasoline.

HELD:No. The proximate cause was the overturning of the bus which was caused by the negligence of thedriverbecause he was speeding and also he was already advised by Medina to change the tires yet he did not. Such negligence resulted to the overturning of the bus. The torches carried by the would-be helpers are not to be blamed. It is just but natural for the villagers to respond to the call for help from the passengers and since it is a rural area which did not have flashlights, torches are the natural source of lighting. Further, the smell of gas could have been all over the place yet thedriverand the conductor failed to provide warning about said fact to the villagers.

Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.

And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.

11. Quinto V. Andres 453 SCRA 511Facts: At around 7:30 a.m. on November 13, 1995, eleven-year-old Edison Garcia, a Grade 4 elementary school pupil, and his playmate, Wilson Quinto, who was also about eleven years old, were at Barangay San Rafael, Tarlac, Tarlac. They saw respondents Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco by the mouth of a drainage culvert. Andres and Pacheco invited Wilson to go fishing with them inside the drainage culvert.[1]Wilson assented. When Garcia saw that it was dark inside, he opted to remain seated in a grassy area about two meters from the entrance of the drainage system.

Respondent Pacheco had a flashlight. He, along with respondent Andres and Wilson, entered the drainage system which was covered by concrete culvert about a meter high and a meter wide, with water about a foot deep.After a while, respondent Pacheco, who was holding a fish, came out of the drainage system and leftwithout saying a word. Respondent Andres also came out, went back inside, and emerged again, this time, carrying Wilson who was already dead. Respondent Andres laid the boys lifeless body down in the grassy area.[5]Shocked at the sudden turn of events, Garcia fled from the scene.For his part, respondent Andres went to the house of petitioner Melba Quinto, Wilsons mother, and informed her that her son had died. Melba Quinto rushed to the drainage culvert while respondent Andres followed her.

Two weeks thereafter, or on November 28, 1995, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigators took the sworn statements of respondent Pacheco, Garcia and petitioner Quinto.Respondent Pacheco alleged that he had never been to the drainage system catching fish with respondent Andres and Wilson. He also declared that he saw Wilson already dead when he passed by the drainage system while riding on his carabao.

Issue: Whether or not evidence exist to hold respondents civilly liable for the death of Wilson Quinto.Held: In the present case, we rule that, as held by the trial court and the CA, the prosecution failed to adduce preponderant evidence to prove the facts on which the civil liability of the respondents rest,i.e., that the petitioner has a cause of action against the respondents for damages.

It bears stressing that the prosecution relied solely on the collective testimonies of Garcia, who was not an eyewitness, and Dr. Aguda.

We agree with the petitioner that, as evidenced by the Necropsy Report of Dr. Dominic Aguda, the deceased sustained a 14x7-centimeter hematoma on the scalp. But as to how the deceased sustained the injury, Dr. Aguda was equivocal. He presented two possibilities: (a) that the deceased could have been hit by a blunt object or instrument applied with full force; or (b) the deceased could have slipped, fell hard and his head hit a hard object.12. People V Pilola 405 SCRA 134FACTS: February 5, 1988 11:30 pm: Elisa Rolan was inside their store waiting for her husband to arrive. Joselito Capa and Julian Azul, Jr. were drinking beer. Although already drunk, Edmar Aguilos and Odilon Lagliba joined them.Edmar had a heated argument with Julian.Elisa pacified Edmar and advised them to go home as she was already going to close up. Edmar and Odilon left then returned to block Joselito and Julian.Edmar took off his eyeglasses and punched Julian in the face.Elisa shouted: Tama na.Tama na but she was ignored as they continued until they reached the end of the street.Odilon positioned himself on top of a pile of hollow blocks and watched as Edmar and Julian swapped punches.As Joselito tried to stopthe fight, Odilon pulled out his knife with his right hand and stepped down from his perch.He placed his left arm around Joselitos neck, and stabbed him.Ronnie and Rene Gayot Pilola, who were across the street, saw their gangmate Odilon stabbing the victim and decided to join the fray.Ronnie took a knife from the kitchen of Teresita and rushed together with Pilola to the scene and stabbed Joselito.As Joselito was stabbed 11 times (6 fatal stab wounds), he fell in the canal.Odilon and Pilola fled while Ronnie went after Julian who ran dear life.When Julian noticed that Ronnie was no longer running after him, he lookedback andsaw Ronnie pick up a piece of hollow block and bashed Joselitos head.Then, Ronnie got a piece of broken bottle and struck Joselito once more before fleing from the scene.Joselito died on the spot.Elisa rushed to Joselitos house and informed his wife and brother of the incident.

ISSUE: Whether or not Pilola is guilty of murder.

Held: Yes. The identity of the person who hit the victim with a hollow block is of de minimis importance.Elisas testimony is corroborated by the autopsy report of Dr. Bienvenido Muoz. No showing of any improper motive on the part of a witness to testify falsely against the accused or to falsely implicate the latter in the commission of the crime.The trial court gave credence and full probative weight to Elisas testimony.

Even if two or more offenders do not conspire to commit homicide or murder, they may be held criminally liable as principals by direct participation if they perform overt acts which mediately or immediately cause or accelerate the death of the victim.Art. 4.Criminal liability. Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

Odilon all by himself initially decided to stab the victim. However, while Odilon was stabbing the victim, the appellant and Ronnie agreed to join. All the overt acts of Odilon, Ronnie and the Pilola before, during, and after the stabbing incident indubitably show that they conspired to kill the victim.Since the victim is not yet dead, the crime is not yet consummated so Pilola is a principal by direct participation.

13. People V Balmores 85 PHIL 493Facts: Balmores was found guilty of attempted estafa through falsification of a government obligation. He attempted to cash in a sweepstakes ticket that was obviously falsified (the ticket was split into, and the winning ticket number written in ink at the bottom left part of the halved ticket). He presented his falsified ticket to a PCSO booth. The PCSO employee manning the booth sawthat the ticket was obviously falsified, and had Balmores arrested. Balmores waived the right to counsel, and pleaded guilty to the crime of attempted estafa.

Issue: Whether or not Balmores committed an impossible crime.

Held: No. The recklessness and clumsinessof the act of falsification did not make the crimean impossible one under Paragraph 2 Article 4 of the RPC.1

The alteration of a losing sweepstakes ticket would constitute a crime only if an attempt to cash it were done, which iswhat occurred in this case.

14. Intod V. CA 215 SCRA 52Facts: Intod and company were tasked to kill Palang-pangan due to land dispute. They fired at her room.However,she was in another city then thusthey hit no one.

Issue: WON he is liable for attempted murder?

Held: No. They are only guilty of an impossible crime. In the Philippines, Article 4(2) providesand punishes an impossible crimean act which, were it not aimed at something quite impossible orcarried out with means which prove inadequatewould constitute a felony against person or family. Its purpose isto punish criminal tendencies. There must either be (1 )legal responsibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act inorder to qualify the act asan impossible crime. Legal impossibility occurs where the intended actseven if completed, would not amount to a crime. Thus: Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstanceswhere:(1)The motive, desire and expectation is to perform anact in violation ofthe law;(2)There isno intention to perform thephysical act;(3)There isa performanceof theintended physicalact; and(4)The consequence resulting from theintended act does not amountto a crime. Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to actoror beyond control prevent consummation of intended crime. Factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not adefense. If the crime could have been committed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be,it is no defense that in reality, the crimewas impossible of commission. Legal impossibility on the other hand is a defense which can be invoked to avoid criminal liability for an attempt. The factual situation in the case at bar presents a physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.

15. Jacinto V. People G.R. 162540Facts: Jacinto along with Valencia and Capitle was charged with qualified theft for having stolen anddeposited a check with an amount of 10,000 php. Such check was issued byBaby Aquino for payment of her purchases from Mega Foam, but the check bounced. Dyhengco found out about the theftand filed a complaint with the NBI. An entrapment operation was conducted, with the use of marked bills. Theentrapment was a success and the petitioner along with her co-accused was arrested.

Issue: Whether this can constitute as an impossible crime and not as qualified theft

Held: This constitutes as animpossible crime. The requisites of animpossible crime are:

1. That the actperformed would be anoffense against persons or property;

2. That the act was done with evil intent;

3. Thatits accomplishment was inherently impossible or themeans employed was either inadequate orineffectual orthe extraneous circumstance that constituted it asa factual impossibility.Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, evenif completed, would not amount to a crime. (Impossibility of killing adead person)

From the time the petitioner took possession of the check meant for Mega Foam, shehad performed all the acts to consummate the crime of theft, had itnot been impossible of accomplishment in this case. Replacement for the check was no longer necessary for theconsummation of the crime since thecrime oftheft is not a continuing offense, petitioners act of receiving thecash replacement should not be considered as a continuation of thetheft. The fact that the petitioner was caught receiving the marked money was merely corroborating evidence to strengthen proof of her intent to gain.16. Valenzuela v. People 525 SCRA 306Facts: On 19 May1994, Valenzuela and Calderon were seen outside the Super Sale Club inside the SM Complex along North Edsa by Lorenzo Lago, SM Security Guard. Valenzuela was hauling a push cart with cases of Tide detergent and unloaded these cases of Tide in an open parking space where Calderon was waiting. Valenzuela went inside the supermarket again and came back with more cases of detergent.

Thereafter, Valenzuela left the parking lot and haled a taxi. He boarded the cab and told the driver to go to the area where Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded the cases of Tide and boarded the taxi. Lago saw all of this and proceeded to stop the taxi. When Lago asked for a receipt of the merchandise, the two accused reacted by fleeing on foot. Valenzuela and Calderon were apprehended at the scene.

Valenzuela and Calderon were both convicted by the trial court of consummated theft.

It was only Valenzuela who filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. Petitioner contends that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft since at the time he was apprehended, he was never placed in a position to freely dispose of the articles stolen. The Court of Appeals rejected this contention, hence, this Petition for Review.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner Valenzuela is guilty only of frustrated theft?

Decision: Petition dismissed. Under the statutory definition of theft, free disposal of the stolen items is not a constitutive element of theft.

Under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of theft is defined as follows. Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without force or violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take the property of another without the latters consent xxx

On the face of the definition, there is only one operative act of execution by the actor involved in theft the taking of personal property of another. It is also clear from the definition that in order such taking may be qualified as theft, there must further be present the descriptive circumstances that the taking was with intent to gain; without force upon things or violence against or intimidation of persons; and is was without the consent of the owner of the property.

For the purpose of ascertaining whether theft is susceptible of commissions in the frustrated stage, the question is again, when is the crime of theft produced? There would be all but certain unanimity in the position that theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property due to to its taking by one with intent to gain. Viewed from that perspective, it is immaterial to the product of the felony that the offender, once having committed all the acts of execution for theft, is able or unable to freely disposed of the property stolen since the deprivation from the owner alone has already ensued from such acts of execution.

Indeed the SC, after all, held that unlawful taking is deemed complete from the moment of the offender gains possession of the thing even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.

17. People V. Palaganas 501 SCRA 533FACTS:January 16, 1998 8pm: Brothers Servillano, Melton and Michael Ferrer were on a drinking spree in their house because Melton visited his brothers in Pangasinan all the way from SanFernando, La Union. The brothers decided to go to Tidbits Videoke bar to continue their drinking spree and to sing. They were the only customers at around10:30 pm, Jaime Palaganas, Ferdinand Palaganas and Virgilio Bautista arrived and they occupied a different table. When Jaime sang My Way, Melton sang along. But, Jaime resented this, approached the brother and said in Pangasinan dialect "Asif you aretough guys. You are already insulting me in that way." Jaime struck Servillanos head with the microphone and a fight ensued. Virgilio Bautista did not joined in and just left. During the rumble, Ferdinand went out of the bar. Michael was about to pursue him but was stopped by Servillano. They went back to continue to fight with Jaime. Edith Palaganas, sister of Jaime and the owner of the bar, arrived and pacified them. Servillano noticed that his wristwatch was missing. Since the brothers could not locate it inside the bar, they went outside. They saw Ferdinand at them and said to Rujjeric Palaganas "Oraratan paltog mo lara" meaning "They are the ones, shoot them." Rujjeric shot Servillano first at theleft sideof theabdomenpenetrating his large intestine and urinary bladder causing him to fall on the ground then Melton with a fatal shot on the head and on the right thigh. When Servillano noticed that Melton was no longer moving, he told Michael "Bato, bato and they threw stones at Rujjeric and Ferdinand. Michael was hit on the right shoulder.

Several cases where filed against Rujjeric among them

Criminal Case No. U-9608: Shooting Servillano with unlicensed firearm Criminal Case No. U-9609: Shooting Melton with unlicensed firearm Criminal Case No. U-9610: Shooting Michael with unlicensed firearm Criminal Case No. U-9634: using a caliber .38 without first securing the necessary permit/license in violation to Comelec Res. 2958 Rujjeric and Ferdinand entered separate pleas of "Not Guilty" Upon motion of Ferdinand, the four cases were consolidated. RTC: Rujjeric was guilty of the crime of Homicide and 2 counts of Frustrated Homicide but acquitted of the charge of Violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2958 in relation to Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code while Ferdinand was acquitted of all the charges against him. CA Affirmed Rujjeric argued that all the elements of a valid self-defense are present in the instant case and, thus, his acquittal on all the charges is proper; that when he fired his gun,he wasthen a victim of an unlawful aggression perpetrated by the Ferrer brothers; that he, in fact, sustained an injury in his left leg and left shoulder caused by the stones thrown by the Ferrer brothers

ISSUE: W/N Rujjeric was guilty of the crime of Homicide and 2 counts of Frustrated Homicide.

HELD: YES. And is affirmed with the following modifications:Criminal Case No. U-9608: Shooting Servillano with unlicensed firearm - attempted homicide. There being a special aggravatingcircumstanceof the use of an unlicensed firearm and applying the Indeterminate Sentence of Law, the penalty now becomes four (4) years and two (2) months of arresto mayor as minimum period to six (6) years of prision correccional as maximum period

Criminal Case No. U-9609: Shooting Melton with unlicensed firearm - homicide is reclusion temporal - There being a special aggravatingcircumstanceof the use of an unlicensed firearm and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty now is twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum period to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum period

Criminal Case No. U-9610: Shooting Michael with unlicensed firearm - frustrated homicide. There being a special aggravatingcircumstanceof the use of an unlicensed firearm and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty now becomes six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum period to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum period.

Petitioner argued that all the elements of a valid self-defense are present in the instant case and, thus, his acquittal on all the charges is proper; that when he fired his gun on that fateful night,he wasthen a victim of an unlawful aggression perpetrated by the Ferrer brothers; that he, in fact, sustained an injury in his left leg and left shoulder caused by the stones thrown by the Ferrer brothers.

ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. The following do not incur any criminal liability:

1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur;First. Unlawful aggression;No unlawful aggression on the part of the Ferrer brothers that justified the act of petitioner in shooting them. Ferrer brothers then were merely standing outside the videoke bar and were not carrying any weapon. When the Ferrer brothers started throwing stones, petitioner was not in a state of actual or imminent danger considering the wide distance (4-5 meters) of the latter from the location of the former.He wasstill capable of avoiding the stones by running away or by taking cover. He could have also called or proceeded to the proper authorities for help.

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;the gun was far deadlier compared to the stones thrown by the Ferrer brothers.

Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.Unlawful aggression is a primordial element in self-defense. It is an essential and indispensable requisite, for without unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.As the burden of evidence is shifted on the accused to prove all the elements of self-defense, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution.

1.) In frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution which shouldproducethe felony as a consequence; whereas in attempted felony, the offender merely commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution.

2.) In frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment of the crime is some cause independent of the will of the perpetrator; on the other hand, in attempted felony, the reason for the non-fulfillment of the crime is a cause or accident other than the offender's own spontaneous desistance.

When the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault, and his victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance, the crime committed is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide depending on whether or not any of the qualifying circumstances under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code are present. However, if the wound/s sustained by the victim in such a case were not fatal or mortal, then the crime committed is only attempted murder or attempted homicide.

If there was no intent to kill on the part of the accused and the wound/s sustained by the victim were not fatal, the crime committed may be serious, less serious or slight physical injury

18. Rivera V. People 480 SCRA 188Facts: As the victim, Ruben Rodil, went to a nearby store to buy food, accused Edgardo Rivera mocked him for being jobless and dependent on his wife for support. Ruben resented the rebuke and thereafter, a heated exchange of words ensued. In the evening of the following day, when Ruben and his three-year-old daughter went to the store to buy food, Edgardo, together with his brother Esmeraldo Rivera and Ismael Rivera, emerged from their house and ganged up on him.Esmeraldo and Ismael mauled Ruben with fist blows. And as he fell to the ground, Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block on the parietal area. Esmeraldo, Ismael and Edgardo fled to their house only when the policemen arrived. Ruben sustained injuries and was brought to the hospital. The doctor declared that the wounds were slight and superficial, though the victim could have been killed had the police not promptly intervened. The trial court found the accused guilty of the crime of frustrated murder. An appeal was made by the accused, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision with modification, changing the crime to attempted murder and imposed an indeterminate penalty of 2 years of prision correccional as minimum to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum.

Issues: Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in modifying the crime from frustrated to attempted murder.

Held: Yes.Article 6of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. Although the wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial and could not have produced his death, it does not negate criminal liability of the accused for attempted murder. The intent to kill was already presumed based on the overt acts of the accused. In fact, victim could have been killed had the police not promptly intervened.

19. People V. Almazan 365 SCRA 373On 28 September 1996, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Vicente Madriaga and a certain Allan played chess in front of the former's house at Pag-asa, Camarin, Caloocan City.Spectators were Vicente's son Noli, who was carrying his 2-year old daughter, Vicente's grandson Noel, and a neighbor named Angel Soliva.While the game was underway, Henry Almazan unexpectedly arrived and brandished a .38 caliber revolver in front of the group.Almazan's fighting cocks had just been stolen and he suspected Angel, one of the spectators, to be the culprit.Thus he said, "manos-manos na lang tayo,"[2]aimed his gun at Angel and pulled the trigger.It did not fire.He tried again, but again it failed.

At this juncture, Vicente Madriaga stood up and tried to calm down Henry, but the latter refused to be pacified("ayaw paawat").Angel ran away and Henry aimed his gun instead at Noli.Noli cried for mercy, for his life and that of his daughter, but to no avail.Henry shot Noli at the left side of his stomach sending him immediately to the ground.His daughter, unscathed, held on to Noli, crying.Henry then turned on Noel and shot him on the left thigh.Noel managed to walk lamely("paika-ika")but only to eventually fall to the ground.Thereafter, Vicente Madriaga called on his neighbors who brought Noli and Noel to the hospital.Noli however died before reaching the hospital, while Noel survived his injuries.

Dr. Ma. Cristina Freyra of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service conducted an autopsy on the body of Noli which revealed that the cause of the victim's death was a gunshot at the trunk from a .38 caliber revolver.Dr. Misael Jonathan Ticman, attending physician of Noel, in turn declared that the gunshot wound on the left thigh of Noel was a minor injury that would heal in a week.Noel was never admitted in the hospital as his doctor sent him home the same day.On cross-examination, Dr. Ticman testified that if not medically treated the wound might get infected or lead to the victim's death.

Issue: whether or not the accused should be liable only for physical injuries and not frustrated murder in Crim. Case No. C-51277.Held: The SC found that the accused-appellant should be held liable for attempted murder, not frustrated murder.For the charge of frustrated murder to flourish, the victim should sustain a fatal wound that could have caused his death were it not for timely medical assistance.The courtanchored its ruling on the statement of Dr. Ticman on cross-examination that the wound of Noel could catch infection or lead to his death if not timely and properly treated.However, in his direct testimony, Dr. Ticman declared that the wound was amere minor injuryfor which Noel, after undergoing treatment, was immediately advised to go home. He even referred to the wound as aslight physical injury that would heal within a weekand for which the victim was in no danger of dying.Clear as the statement is, coupled with the fact that Noel was indeed immediately advised to go home as he was not in any danger of death, we have no reason to doubt the meaning and implications of Dr. Ticman's statement.His statement that Noel could catch infection was based on pure speculation rather than on the actual nature of the wound which was amere minor injury, hence, not fatal.According to jurisprudence, if the victim was wounded with an injury that was not fatal, and could not cause his death, the crime would only be attempted.The observation that the conviction should be for slight physical injuries only is likewise improper as the accused-appellant was motivated by the same impetus and intent, i.e., to exact vengeance and even kill, if necessary, when he shot Noel Madriaga.The fact that the wound was merely a minor injury which could heal in a week becomes inconsequential.

20. People V. Campuhan 329 SCRA 270FACTS: April 25, 1996 4 pm: Ma.CorazonP. Pamintuan, mother of 4-year old Crysthel Pamintuan, went to the ground floor of their house to prepare Milo chocolate drinks for her 2 children. There she met Primo Campuhan,helperof Conrado Plata Jr., brother ofCorazon, who was then busy filling small plastic bags with water to be frozen into ice in the freezer located at the second floor.

Then she heard Crysthel cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" so she went upstairs and saw Primo Campuhan inside her children'sroomkneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were already removed, while his short pants were down to his knees and hishands holdinghis penis with his right hand. Horrified, she cursed "P - t - ng ina mo, anak ko iyan!" and boxed him several times. He evaded her blows and pulled up his pants. He pushedCorazonaside who she tried to block his path.Corazonthen ran out and shouted for help thus prompting Vicente, her brother, a cousin and an uncle who were living within their compound, to chase the Campuhan who was apprehended.However, the accused kept his innocence and contested that Pamintuans statements were not credible for the latter has ill will against him.

ISSUE: W/N it was a consummated statutory rape

Held: The records reviewed failed to show the proof whether Primos penis was able to penetrate Chrystels vagina. Failure to prove such penetration, even the slightest one, cannot be considered consummated rape, however, only attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness. Also, there were no physical signs of injuries on the witness body to conclude a medical perspective that a penetration has taken place. In rape cases, it is important that a valid testimony and medical certificate complements each other, for relying alone on testimonial evidence may create unwarranted or mischievous results. It is necessary to carefully establish a proof that the penis, in reality, entered the labial threshold of the female organ to accurately conclude that the rape was consummated. The decision of the court on convicting Campuhan guilty of statutory rape is modified. Hence, he was convicted of attempted rape instead.21. People V. Anticamara 651 SCRA 489

Facts:Lando, Al, Dick Taedo (Dick), Roberto Taedo (Bert), Marvin Lim (Marvin), Necitas Ordeiza-Taedo (Cita), and Fred Doe are charged with the crimes of Murder and of Kidnapping/Serious Illegal Detention in two separate Informations, for Murder and for Kidnapping with serious illegal detention.

The charge for murder reads:

That on or about the early morning of May 7, 2002, in Sitio Rosalia,Brgy. San Bartolome, Municipality of Rosales, Province of Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then armed with a hand gun, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery, evident premeditation and superior strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take Sulpacio Abad, driver of the Estrellas, hog tied (sic) him, brought (sic) to a secluded place, shoot and bury in a shallow grave, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim.

While the charge for Kidnapping with serious illegal detention reads as:

That on or about the 7th day of May 2002, more or less 3:00 oclockin the early morning, at the Estrella Compound, Brgy. Carmen East, Municipality of Rosales, Province of Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who are private persons, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping

one another, armed with firearms, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap Sulpacio Abad and AAA, both employees of the Estrellas, thereby depriving them of their liberty, all against their will for a period of twenty-seven (27) days. That in the course of the kidnapping, Sulpacio Abad was killed and buried in Brgy. Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan and AAA was raped for several times by her abductors. Contrary to Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.In his defense, Lando denied having committed the crimes charged and interposed alibi as a defense. He claims that at the time of the incident on May 7, 2002, he was in Barangay Maligaya, San Miguel, Tarlac, with his family. He denied ever going to the Estrella farm in Sitio Rosalia, Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan.

Al claimed that he acted as a lookout and was tasked to report to his companions if any person or vehicle would approach the house of the Estrellas. He said that he was forced to follow what was ordered of him and did not report the matter to the police because he was threatened to be killed, including the members of his family who were in Cebu.

Issue: Whether or not the prosecution failed to prove that he was a co-conspirator in the kidnapping charge and that he did not participate in the rape of the victim.

Held: To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. Each conspirator may be assigned separate and different tasks which may appear unrelated to one another but, in fact, constitute a whole collective effort to achieve their common criminal objective. Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators. The precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals

Appellant Al attempts to evade criminal liability by alleging that he was only forced to participate in the commission of the crime because he and his family were threatened to be killed. Als defense fails to impress us. Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is exempt from criminal liability if heacts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, because such person does not act with freedom. To avail of this exempting circumstance, the evidence must establish: (1) the existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) that the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than, or at least equal to, that committed. For such defense to prosper, the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough.There is nothing in the records to substantiate appellant Als insistence that he was under duress from his co-accused while participating in the crime that would suffice to exempt himfrom incurring criminal liability. The evidence shows that Al was tasked to act as a lookout and directed to station himselfacross the house of the Estrellas. Al was there from 7:30 p.m. to 1:00 a.m.21 of the following day, while the rest of the group was waiting in the landing field. Thus, while all alone, Al had every opportunity to escape since he was no longer subjected to a real, imminent or reasonable fear. However, he opted to stay across the house of the Estrellas for almost six (6) hours,22 and thereafter returned to the landing field where the group was waiting for his report. Subsequently, the group proceeded to the Estrellas house. When the group entered the house, Al stayed for almost one (1) hour outside to wait for his companions. Later, when the group left the house aboard a vehicle, Al rode with them in going to Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, bringing with them Sulpacio and AAA. Clearly, appellant Al had ample opportunity to escape if he wished to, but he never did. Neither did he request for assistance from the authorities or any person passing by the house of the Estrellas during the period he was stationed there. Clearly, Al did not make any effort to perform an overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the conspiracy to commit the felony and prevent the commission thereof that would exempt himself from criminal liability.24 Therefore, it is obvious that he willingly agreed to be a part of the conspiracy.22. People V. Baharan 639 SCRA 157Facts: On 14 February 2005, an RRCG bus was plying its usual southbound route, from its Navotas bus terminal towards its Alabang bus terminal via Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA). Around 6:30 to 7:30 in the evening, while they were about to move out of the Guadalupe-EDSA southbound bus stop, the bus conductor noticed two men running after the bus. The two insisted on getting on the bus, so the conductor obliged and let them in.

According to Elmer Andales, the bus conductor, he immediately became wary of the two men, because, even if they got on the bus together, the two sat away from each other one sat two seats behind the driver, while the other sat at the back of the bus. At the time, there were only 15 passengers inside the bus. He also noticed that the eyes of one of the men were reddish. When he approached the person near the driver and asked him whether he was paying for two passengers, the latter looked dumb struck by the question. He then stuttered and said he was paying for two and gave PhP20. Andales grew more concerned when the other man seated at the back also paid for both passengers. At this point, Andales said he became more certain that the two were up to no good, and that there might be a holdup.

Afterwards, Andales said he became more suspicious because both men kept on asking him if the bus was going to stop at Ayala Avenue. The witness also noticed that the man at the back appeared to be slouching, with his legs stretched out in front of him and his arms hanging out and hidden from view as if he was tinkering with something. When Andales would get near the man, the latter would glare at him. Andales admitted, however, that he did not report the suspicious characters to the police.

As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner of Ayala Avenue and EDSA, the two men insisted on getting off the bus. According to Andales, the bus driver initially did not want to let them off the bus, because a Makati ordinance prohibited unloading anywhere except at designated bus stops. Eventually, the bus driver gave in and allowed the two passengers to alight.

The two immediately got off the bus and ran towards Ayala Avenue. Moments after, Andales felt an explosion. He then saw fire quickly engulfing the bus. He ran out of the bus towards a nearby mall. After a while, he went back to where the bus was. He saw their bus passengers either lying on the ground or looking traumatized. A few hours after, he made a statement before the Makati Police Station narrating the whole incident.

Issue: Whether there was sufficient proof to prove that there was conspiracy from the acts of the accused and the confessions made by the witnesses.

Held: The Court affirms the finding of the existence of conspiracy involving accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Rohmat. Conspiracy was clearly established from the collective acts of the accused appellants before, during and after the commission of the crime. As correctly declared by the trial court in its Omnibus Decision

While said conspiracy involving the four malefactors has not been expressly admitted by accused Baharan, Angelo Trinidad, and Rohmat, more specifically with respect to the latters participation in the commission of the crimes, nonetheless it has been established by virtue of the aforementioned evidence, which established the existence of the conspiracy itself and the indispensable participation of accused Rohmat in seeing to it that the conspirators criminal design would be realized.

It is well-established that conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused, which clearly manifests a concurrence of wills, a common intent or design to commit a crime (People v. Lenantud, 352 SCRA 544). Hence, where acts of the accused collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a common design towardsthe accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident and all the perpetrators will be held liable as principals.23. People V. Montanir 647 SCRA 170Facts: Rosalina Reyes and her partner Rafael Mendoza was kidnapped by the group of Josie Herrera, Robert Uy, Alicia a.k.a. Alice Buenaflor, together with appellants Ronald Norva and Eduardo Chua. In the course of the kidnapping Rafael Mendoza died of cardiac arrest while Rosalina escaped with the help of some of her kidnappers Larry, Jack and Boy. She would later ask the help of her attorney to file a case against her kidnappers.

Upon arraignment, with the assistance of counsel, Jonard and appellants Ronald, Dima and Eduardo, pleaded not guiltyto the crime charged. Robert Uy, Alice Buenaflor and Jessie Doe remained at-large during the trial of the case. Jonard was later on discharged as a state witness. Afterwards, the trial on

the merits ensued.Issue: whether or not Chua, Norva and Montanir is guilty of conspiracy to kidnapping.

Held: Yes. When conspiracy is established, the responsibility of the conspirators is collective, not individual. This renders all of them equally liable regardless of the extent of their respective participations, the act of one being deemed to be the act of the other or the others, in the commission of the felony.

Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates which follows incidentally in the execution of a common design as one of its probable and natural consequences even though it was not intended as part of the original design. Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended.Conspirators are held to have intended the consequences of their acts and by purposely engaging in conspiracy which necessarily and directly produces a prohibited result, they are, in contemplation of law, chargeable with intending that result. Conspirators are necessarily liable for the acts of another conspirator unless such act differs radically and substantively from that which they intended to commit.

24. People v. Quirol 473 SCRA 509

Facts: On December 4, 1993, in celebration of a fiesta in Apas, Lahug, Cebu City, a benefit disco dance was held at the local UCMA Village. Appellants, Juanito and Mario Quirol, and the two victims, Benjamin Silva and Roel Ngujo, attended.

At the dance, Juanito, Mario and Jed were together and drank all through the night with some friends. The dance ended just prior to 4 a.m. and prosecution principal witness Wilson Cruz testified that it was about that time when he was asked by Benjamin and Roel to accompany them in escorting some ladies home.

Wilson told them to go ahead and that he would just follow. Wilson was behind them at a distance of 7 to 10 fathoms when the group passed by the house of Jed. From his vantage point, Wilson saw Jed stop the two victims in front of his house and frisk them.

Thereafter, Wilson saw Jed bind Benjamin and Roel together with a pair of handcuffs and lead them towards the control tower of the old airport of Lahug, Cebu City. There, the three were met by Juanito and Mario and together they proceeded to the airport runway.

Wilson, hidden behind a bush, said he could hear Benjamin plead for his life. A few seconds later, Jed took out his .38 caliber service revolver and shot Benjamin at point-blank range on the head. As Benjamin fell, Roel was dragged down to his knees since he was handcuffed to Benjamin. Mario then held Roel while Juanito started stabbing him using a Batangas knife. Jed finished it by shooting Roel.

The lower court and Court of Appeals find that there was conspiracy and convicting them despite their defense of alibi.

Issue: Can there be a conspiracy based on the foregoing facts?

Decision: Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence of prior agreement to commit the crime.Neither it is necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the victim. What has to be shown is that all the participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose and design. The conspiracy in the instant case was sufficiently proven by Jed meeting with appellants at the old airport tower and walking together with them towards the runway where appellants and Jed performed acts in unison with each other as to unmistakably reveal a common purpose and design.

Anent Marios defense of alibi, despite corroboration from Exequiel Aranas, it is still an inherently weak defense and cannot prevail over a positive identification from a witness found credible by the trial court. Absent arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of significance and influence, we will not interfere with the credence given to the testimony of Wilson over that of Mario and that of Exequiel, as assessments of credibility are generally left to the trial court whose proximate contact with those who take the witness stand places it in a more competent position to discriminate between true and false testimony. Moreover, as correctly discussed by the Court of Appeals, the distance between the scene of the crimes and where Mario claims he passed out is not so far away as to prevent him from being physically present at the place of the crimes or its immediate vicinity at the time the crimes were committed.

25. People V. Bulan 459 SCRA 550Facts: Jose Bulan and his sons, Allan and Estemson, were charged with murder in an Information filed on October 11, 1994. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:

That on or about the 6th day of June 1994 at Barangay Datag, Municipality of Caramoran, Province of Catanduanes, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another for a common purpose, that is, to kill with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, Jose Bulan and Allan Bulan held both hands of Alberto Mariano to deprive him of any defense, while Estemson Bulan stabbed him from behind with a deadly weapon, hitting him twice at the back which resulted to his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the victims heirs.

Jose and Allan were duly arraigned on March 6, 1995, and pleaded not guilty. Estemson, on the other hand, remained at large.

After trial, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the accused of murder as accomplices.The trial court declared that there was no conspiracy between the appellants and Estemson.

On appeal to the CA, the appellate court rendered judgment on June 13, 2000 affirming the decision of the RTC, with the modification that the appellants and Estemson were guilty of murder as principals by indispensable cooperation. The appellate court declared that as gleaned from the evidence on record, the three of them conspired to kill the deceased.

This case was certified by the Court of Appeals (CA) to this Court for review, in view of its finding in its Decision that appellants Jose Bulan and his son, Allan Bulan, are guilty of murder as principals by indispensable cooperation punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, and not merely as accomplices as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 42.

Issue: Whether or not there was conspiracy in this case.

Held: Yes, there is conspiracy. Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a crime and decide to commit it. Direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy; it may be established by acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime charged, from which it may be logically inferred the existence of a common purpose to commit the same. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jun2005/143404.htm" \l "_ftn47" \o "" The prosecution must prove conspiracy by the same quantum of evidence as the felony charged itself. Indeed, proof of previous agreement among the malefactors to commit the crime is not essential to prove conspiracy. It is not necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the victim; what is primordial is that all the participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to indicate a common purpose or design to bring out the victims death. HYPERLINK "http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jun2005/143404.htm" \l "_ftn49" \o "" Once conspiracy is established, it is unnecessary to prove who among the conspirators inflicted the fatal injury. If conspiracy is proved, all the conspirators are criminally liable for the crime charged and proved. The act of one is the act of all.

In this case, the appellants were waiting outside the dance hall near the gate when Edwin Solo brought the victim towards them, onto the street. Jose held the victim by the right shoulder, while Allan held him by the left. Estemson suddenly appeared from behind the victim and stabbed the latter at the back with a small bolo. The appellants continued holding the victim as Estemson stabbed him yet again. Even as Estemson fled, the appellants dragged the victim from the gate, towards the store, where they dropped the victims body and fled from the scene. Allan then left Catanduanes and hid in Pasay City where he was arrested by the NBI on August 7, 1994.

Considering the foregoing, the Court affirms the finding of the CA that the appellants are guilty as principals by direct participation in the killing of Alberto Mariano

26. People V. Comadre 431 SCRA 366Facts: As culled from the records, at around 7:00 in the evening of August 6, 1995, Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Gerry Bullanday, Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio were having a drinking spree on the terrace of the house of Roberts father, Barangay Councilman Jaime Agbanlog, situated in Barangay San Pedro, Lupao, Nueva Ecija. Jaime Agbanlog was seated on the banister of the terrace listening to the conversation of the companions of his son.

As the drinking session went on, Robert and the others noticed appellants Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano walking. The three stopped in front of the house. While his companions looked on, Antonio suddenly lobbed an object which fell on the roof of the terrace. Appellants immediately fled by scaling the fence of a nearby school.

The object, which turned out to be a hand grenade, exploded ripping a hole in the roof of the house. Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Gerry Bullanday, Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio were hit by shrapnel and slumped unconscious on the floor. They were all rushed to the San Jose General Hospital in Lupao, Nueva Ecija for medical treatment. However, Robert Agbanlog died before reaching the hospital.

Dr. Tirso de los Santos, the medico-legal officer who conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of Robert Agbanlog, certified that the wounds sustained by the victim were consistent with the injuries inflicted by a grenade explosion and that the direct cause of death was hypovolemic shock due to hand grenade explosion. The surviving victims, Jimmy Wabe, Rey Camat, Jaime Agbanlog and Gerry Bullanday sustained shrapnel injuries.

Issue: Whether or not the presence of George Comadre and Danilo Lozano at the time the grenade was thrown by Antonio Comadre, enough to make them as co-conspirators and prove the existence of conspiracy among them.

Held: No. Similar to the physical act constituting the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Settled is the rule that to establish conspiracy, evidence of actual cooperation rather than mere cognizance or approval of an illegal act is required.

A conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence. It must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the crime itself. Mere presence of a person at the scene of the crime does not make him a conspirator for conspiracy transcends companionship.

The evidence shows that George Comadre and Danilo Lozano did not have any participation in the commission of the crime and must therefore be set free. Their mere presence at the scene of the crime as well as their close relationship with Antonio are insufficient to establish conspiracy considering that they performed no positive act in furtherance of the crime.

Neither was it proven that their act of running away with Antonio was an act of giving moral assistance to his criminal act. The ratiocination of the trial court that their presence provided encouragement and sense of security to Antonio, is devoid of any factual basis. Such finding is not supported by the evidence on record and cannot therefore be a valid basis of a finding of conspiracy.

Time and again we have been guided by the principle that it would be better to set free ten men who might be probably guilty of the crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he did not commit. There being no conspiracy, only Antonio Comadre must answer for the crime.

27. People V. Ramos 427 SCRA 299Facts: Eulalia San Roque de Francisco, was charged with murder along with Narciso Ramos, Ramon San Roque, Wilfredo Ramos and three (3) other John Does.

The the case began when William Lomida was picked up in his house by Narciso Ramos, Ramon San Roque and three (3) others, he was then brought to Narcisos house where he pleaded for his life with the appellant Eulalia and his live in partner but was nevertheless stabbed, shot and later burned in a pile of rubber.

All this was seen by the witness Bernie Ambal and later Saturnino Rivera which proceeded to call the NBI and became witnesses.

On April 24, 1998, the trial court rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the accused Eulalia San Roque de Francisco y dela Cruz alias Laling GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as charged in the Information and hereby sentences her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with accessory penalties as provided by the law and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P50,000.00.

Issue: whether there is enough evidence to prove that Eulalia was part of the conspiracy to kill William.Held: Yes. In determining the existence of conspiracy, it is not necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the victim. The presence of conspiracy among the accused can be proven by their conduct before, during or after the commission of the crime showing that they acted in unison with each other, evincing a common purpose or design. There must be a showing that appellant cooperated in the commission of the offense, either morally, through advice, encouragement or agreement or materially through external acts indicating a manifest intent of supplying aid in the perpetration of the crime in an efficacious way. In such case, the act of one becomes the act of all, and each of the accused will thereby be deemed equally guilty of the crime committed.

The series of events in this case convincingly show that appellant and her co-accused acted in unison and cooperated with each other in killing William Lomida. Appellant was the one who opened the door and allowed the other accused to enter the house. She joined them in bringing the victim to the residence of Narciso Ramos, her brother-in-law. While her co-accused dragged the helpless victim, tied him to a santol tree, stabbed him twice by a bladed knife, and shot him 5 to 7 times, appellant merely watched intensely. She even turned her back as the lifeless body of the victim was being burned. And after attaining their purpose, she fled with the other accused.

The above circumstances clearly show the common purpose and concerted efforts on the part of appellant and her co-accused. We agree with the trial court in concluding that their acts were indications of a criminal conspiracy to commit the crime of murder.

28. People V. Pacificador 376 SCRA 180Facts: On April 16, 1986, senior state prosecutor Tirso C. Velasco filed with the Regional Trial Court, Antique, San Jose, Branch 11 an amended information for multiple murder and frustrated murder against Arturo F. Pacificador, S/Sgt. Domingo Dalmacio PC, Sgt. Enrico Cabaero PC, C2C Reynaldo Aliupala PC, Pfc Vicente Vegafria PA, Cpl. Hector Fullon INP, and Pat. Lorenzo Mingote INP, which reads:

"That on or about May 13, 1984in the evening, at the Municipality of Sibalom, Province of Antique, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Assemblyman ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR, his military security men: S/SGT. DOMINGO DALMACIO PC, SGT. ENRICO CABAERO PC, C2C REYNALDO ALIPALA PC, PFC VICENTE VEGAFRIA PA, CPL. HECTOR FULLON INP and PAT LORENZO MINGOTE INP, whose military jurisdiction over their case had been waived by the President of the Philippines pursuant to P. D. 1952 in favor of the civil court, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, treachery,and evident premeditation,attack, assault and shoot Rhium Sanchez, Plaridel Sanchez IV, Aldrick Sanchez, Mamerto Zaldivar, Jr., Clemente Samulde, Abner Varon and Pat. Armelito Tamboong with the use of armalite rifles and explosives thus inflicting gunshot wounds on vital parts of their bodies which caused their death as a consequence, and the wounding of Luna Sanchez on vital parts of his body which ordinarily would cause his death thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of murder as a consequence but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of cause independent of his will, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to Luna Sanchez which prevented his death.

"CONTRARY TO LAWwith aggravating circumstances of nighttime, by a band, with evident premeditation or treachery, superior strength and by means of motor vehicle.

Accused S/Sgt. Domingo Dalmacio, C2C Reynaldo Alipala, PFC Vicente Vegafria, PCpl. Hector Fullon and Pat. Lorenzo Mingote, appealed from the decisionof the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, San Jose, Antique finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of multiple murder committed against Clemente Samulde, Rhium Sanchez, Plaridel Sanchez IV, Aldrick Sanchez, Mamerto Zaldivar, Jr., Armelito Tamboong and Abner Varon and frustrated murder committed against Luna Sanchez.On March 6, 2000, accused-appellants filed their brief. Accused-appellants contend that the trial court erred in ruling that: (1) murder has been proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution; (2) sufficient evidence existed to establish conspiracy; (3) the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation were present. They reiterated that the group of Luna Sanchez was the first to fire against them and they merely fired back as an act of retaliation and in self-defense. Hence, they claim that it was erroneous for the trial court to find all of them guilty of multiple murder and frustrated murder and sentencing them accordingly.Accused-appellants anchor their defense on the theory that the group of the victims staged the ambush, and that they merely retaliated and fired back as an act of self-defense. In support of such theory, they presented evidence that all the deceased on the side of the prosecution were found positive for nitrates indicating that they fired guns, some of which are armalite rifles, others revolvers or pistols.

Issue: Whether or not there is sufficient evidence to prove conspiracy notwithstanding that the victims were positive for nitrates, an indication that they have fired their weapons and that the ambush was staged by the victims.Held: Yes, conspiracy was sufficiently proven in this case. Conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused, before, during, and after the commission of the crime, which, if all taken together, would reasonably be strong enough to show a community of criminal design.

Prosecution witness Luna Sanchez, was present at the scene of the crime, he being one of the victims. He stated that during the election campaign trails on May 13, 1984, the group of Pacificador, escorted by the accused-appellants overtook their Ford Tamaraw vehicle several times, and the latter pointed their guns against them, making it very apparent that accused-appellants were tailing the group of Luna Sanchez. And ultimately, accused-appellants perpetrated their unlawful design against the group of Luna Sanchez when they strategically positioned themselves a