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  • 8/9/2019 Credit LBOs

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    credit OCTOBER 2002 41www.creditmag.com

    LBOs

    With share prices struggling, interest rates

    at rock botto m and comp anies looking

    to spin off non -core b usinesses, it was

    only a matter of time before the leveraged buyout

    (LBO) retu rned in force.

    Observers say the situation now is reminiscent of

    the late 1980 s when LBOs the tactic of using bor-

    rowed m on ey secured against a target comp anysassets to launch a takeover exploded in the U S.

    David Aberle, credit analyst at Baring Asset Manage-

    ment in Boston, says: Equity valuations now look

    very similar to the values that led to the first round

    of LBO activity in the U S in the late 1980 s.

    The tr end started emerging over the summer: in

    August, Rod inheights bou ght Irish pro perty com-

    pany, Green Property, for more than 1 billion in a

    management buyout (different from an LBO in that

    the t arget firms management are involved in th e

    buyout ). T he d eal was backed with private equ ity

    from Merrill Lynch and Bank of Scotland. Another

    Irish company, packaging manufacturer Jefferson

    Smurfit, was acquired in late September for4.5 bil-

    lion by Madison Dearborn Capital Partners

    (MD CP) Acquisitions, an affiliate of the Ch icago-

    based private equity firm Madison Dearborn.

    O ther d eals are in th e pipeline. Th e private

    equity firms Kohlberg Kravis Roberts (KKR) and

    Wend el Investissement are bu ying Legr and, a

    French electrical equipment manufacturer, for 5

    billion from parent company Schneider Electric.

    And bankers are working o n LBO deals for airline

    catering company Gate Gourmet of Switzerland,

    Germanys H aarmann & Reimer, which pro ducesflavours and fragrances, and UK food distribution

    company Brake Brothers.

    This bustle of activity is not only welcome news

    for the m ergers and acquisitions department s of

    investment banks, which have struggled to justify

    themselves since the technology boom turned sour,

    but will also provide a much-needed bo ost to t he

    European high-yield market. Analysts expect that

    deals totalling as much as 4.2 billion might come

    to t he euro and sterling h igh-yield markets to

    finance US and European LBOs. In the first half of

    2002 only

    1.9 billion was raised in the Euro peanhigh-yield market and only 250 million in the ster-

    ling market.

    In fact, the LBO d ebt supply in September is so

    large that investment bankers are said to be tr ying to

    squeeze roadshows around one anoth er, hoping that

    deals do not get overlooked with so many vying for

    investor attention. As Barings Aberle says: The cal-

    endar is the busiest I ve seen it for years.

    Investors are also encouraged that many of the

    buyouts involve large private equity firms such as

    KKR, which was involved in the largest-ever LBO,

    the $ 25 b illion acqu isition of tob acco firm RJR

    Nabisco in 1989. It is always good to see sponsors

    with deep p ockets in case th e deal goes awry and

    needs supporting, says one high-yield fund man-

    ager in London .

    And mo re is expected. There are still plenty of

    deals to be do ne on the lower end of the size spec-

    trum, such as small regional companies with a very

    focused business and a good asset base, says Marino

    Valensise, head of credit at Baring Asset Management .

    But as the saying goes, every silver lining has a

    cloud, so while high-yield investors welcome the

    new supply, not everyone in the investment commu-

    nity is happy abou t a r esurgence in LBO activity.H olders of any bond s that the comp any may have

    issued in t he past may see their investments dwindle

    as the company takes on substantial amounts of new

    debt to finance the buyout.

    A wave of leveraged buyouts is on the horizon, but while private equity firms, investment banks

    and high-yield investors are rubbing their hands at the prospect of a raft of new opportunities,investment-grade bondholders fear they might end up paying the price. Lisa Cooper reports.

    Jumping on thebandwagon

    Elder, JPMorgan: credit

    protection now greater

  • 8/9/2019 Credit LBOs

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    42 credit OCTOBER 2002

    Of the firms with recent o r imminent LBOs, both

    Jefferson Smurfit and Legrand have bonds outstand-

    ing. Jefferson Smurfits financing arm, Smurfit Fund-

    ing, has a $250 million bond due 2005 and a $350million bond due 2025. These will both become sub-

    ordinate to the new debt. As a result Standard &

    Poors downgraded the company from BBB+ to BB+

    at the start of September and left it on watch nega-

    tive. Moodys has kept the company on Baa2.

    Legrand h as a $400 million 30-year Yankee bond

    issued in 1995. Standard & Poors current ly rates the

    notes A- and Moodys Baa1, but both ratings are on

    review for possible downgrade. Xavier Buffon, S&Ps

    Legrand analyst, says that if the takeover is successful

    a multi-notch downgrade is likely, though he will

    not speculate on where th e rating will end up.

    The acquisition of Legrand, due to close late this

    year, will use 2 billion of equity, 2.2 b illion o f

    senior bank debt and a 60 0 m illion high-yield

    bond issue. Ho ward Sharp, director, leveraged syn-

    dications at Royal Bank of Scotland, o ne of th ebanks involved in the deal, estimates that the bonds

    will be rated in th e single-B range, Th erefore any

    outstanding bo nds will be downgraded t o th e same

    level. And wh ile the o utstand ing bo nds include a

    change o f contro l provision, t his only takes effect in

    the event of a ho stile takeover. With t he m anage-

    ment of parent company Schneider backing the deal,

    it does not qualify as hostile.Sharp says: The b onds are non -callable, so we

    dont have the option to refinance them. But he

    admits that even if bondholders asked the company

    to red eem the debt , it would be unlikely to d o so

    since it is not ob liged to.

    Some investors are so incensed by the way exist-

    ing bondholders can be t reated when an LBO takes

    place that t hey are taking d rastic action. I f any bank

    issues bon ds in connection with an LBO and we

    already ho ld bo nds in t hat com pany, we will ques-

    tion our trading levels with that bank, says Bernard

    H unter, director of fixed income at Merrill Lynch

    Investment Managers. I ts a message weve made

    quite clear to our o wn count erparties and I kno w

    others have too,

    Another senior Lo ndo n-based credit research

    analyst agrees: O ur high-yield investors would

    invest in new issues from leveraged buyouts, bu t no t

    if this would hurt existing bondholders; just as I

    wouldnt buy a stolen Rolex even th ough it wasnt

    stolen from me.

    H e continues: It shou ld be bad business prac-

    tice to advise comp anies on ho w they can shaft

    bo ndh olders. If they are fair and reasonable with

    us, then well be fair and reasonab le with them.Frances H utchinson, head o f European credit

    research at H SBC, says this policy can work. The ster-

    ling market is dominated by a relatively small group of

    investors who can make or break a transaction, she

    The sterling market is dominated by a relatively

    small group of investors who can make or break

    a transaction

    Frances Hutchinson, HSBC

    Illustration:David

    Lyttleton

  • 8/9/2019 Credit LBOs

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    says. This allows institutional investors to have more

    influence on the terms and conditions of specific deals.

    A recent example o f the influence investors can

    wield in the UK is Green Property, which issued 150

    million o f investment- grade, fixed-rate b on ds in

    December 2001. As a result of this summers LBO, the

    bon ds were downgraded to sub-investment grade.

    H owever in this instance, existing investors should

    not find themselves out of pocket. When t he bo nds

    were launched in 20 01 b ond investors demanded

    comprehensive covenants because property compa-

    nies had become frequent t argets for t akeovers and a

    previous attempt was made to bu y out t he company

    in 2000. The implementation of change of control

    covenants which state that in t he event of a

    takeover resulting in a downg rade of bonds below aspecified level, the debt must be bought back and

    new bonds issued means the debt is in the process

    of being redeemed.

    Green P ropert ys bon d issue was joint-led by

    H SBC. H SBCs Hu tchinson says: We have long been

    advocates of appropriate use of covenants, in particular

    change of cont rol provisions. She adds: When were

    advising a potent ial borrower, its important that the

    debt is stru ctured and pr iced appro priately. Issuers

    want th e mo st efficient source of fund ing, while

    investors want the best deal. In the long run, its bad

    for the investment b anks if deals are not structuredproperly or are detrimental to one group of investors.

    It leaves a bad taste in investors mouths.

    O ne o f the mo st not orious examples of existing

    bo nd holders getting a raw deal in a buyou t was

    N om ura Pr incipal Finances takeover of electrical

    appliance manufacturer Thorn for 1 billion in 199 8

    the b iggest LBO that year. In that instance, the

    existing senior unsecured debt was made subordi-

    nate to all new debt . Bond ho lders were left with

    junk bon ds th at effectively function ed as venture

    capital if the firm d id badly, bu t wou ld no t b enefit

    from the company doing well. Although they did-

    nt break any laws or th e letter of the bon d d ocu-

    ment ation, it was a clear violation of the spirit o f the

    bond covenants. You could call it daylight ro bber y,

    says Bergq wist.

    Even the rumo ur of an LBO is enou gh to set a

    companys bond spreads widening. For example, an

    article in a Sunday newspaper in 1998 hinted that a

    private equity firm was eyeing up the UK leisure and

    entertainment grou p Rank. The price of the com-

    panys bonds dro pped from 102 to 8 8 and t heir liq-

    uidity dried up.

    But Fergus Elder, managing director and co-head

    of loan capital markets at JPMorgan, which is involvedin the H aarmann & Reimer and Brake Brothers LBOs

    this year, says times are different now. H e believes it is

    unlikely that extreme examples like the Thorn deal will

    occur again. Id be very surprised to see something

    like that happen no w, as were in an era of greater

    credit protection. Most buyers would want to revamp

    the financing anyway and take out the senior bond-

    ho lders. You really don t want a recalcitrant b on d

    group in an LBO, as there will always be some issue

    you need to tinker with, which will need bot h b ank

    and bondholder approval.

    Despite the examples outlined above, it must be

    stated that n ot all LBOs are evil. In Euro pe, only a

    small minority of companies und ergoing an LBO

    actually have bonds ou tstanding. And when they do,

    this debt is not necessarily structurally subordinated.

    In most instances, existing b on dho lders will be

    bought out.

    And there are plenty of willing buyers of LBO debt

    in the European high-yield market, where banks andhedge funds are vying with fund managers. In the case

    of LBO financing, investors need to assess the type of

    business, the quality of the equity sponsor and the man-

    agement plan. As most bond launches originating from

    LBOs are, by their very nature, large issues, any high-

    yield investor would t ake an interest in them. For exam-

    ple, around 1 billion of not es were offered in Septem-

    ber via Deutsche Bank and Merrill Lynch as part of the

    Jefferson Smurfit LBO. No manager of a European

    high-yield port folio can afford not to look at this. It is a

    big deal and will make up a sizeable port ion o f their

    index, says Barings Valensise.

    H owever other investors insist th at, un like invest-

    ment-grade debt, very few high-yield funds are actu-

    ally managed against an ind ex, so investment compa-

    nies wanting to take a stand against what they see as

    uneth ical behaviour are free to do so. By refusing to

    participate in a deal in which existing bon dho lders will

    be pen alised, investors ho pe th ey will be able to

    encourage better m arket practice for the future.

    A companys attitude to its existing bond holders

    may depend on whether it is likely to need continued

    access to the bond market. If the firm needs to issue

    more bonds in future, it must be cautious in its treat-

    ment of existing investors so that th ey wont refuse to

    participate in any forthcoming issues.

    As the Green Proper ty example shows, covenants

    can help bondh olders assert t heir rights. As well as the

    change of control clause, a second provision that canbe beneficial is a negative pledge. T his should ensure

    that senior unsecured d ebt remains senior and unse-

    cured, and is not subordinated by assets being

    pledged to raise further debt finance.

    LBOs

    credit OCTOBER 2002 43

    You really dont want a recalcitrant bond group in

    an LBO, as there will always be some issue you need

    to tinker with

    Fergus Elder, JPMorgan

    www.creditmag.com