credit constraints, firms™precautionary investment, and ......i two sectors: corporate and...
TRANSCRIPT
![Page 1: Credit Constraints, Firms™Precautionary Investment, and ......I Two sectors: corporate and entrepreneurial I Financial intermediaries I Motive for risk management I Froot, Scharfstein](https://reader035.vdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022081409/607f6f0d5571d466027cd274/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
Credit Constraints, Firms�PrecautionaryInvestment, and the Business Cycle
Ander Perez
Universitat Pompeu Fabra
II Bank of Italy Conference on Macro Modeling in the Policy Environment
Rome 30 June - 1 July, 2009
![Page 2: Credit Constraints, Firms™Precautionary Investment, and ......I Two sectors: corporate and entrepreneurial I Financial intermediaries I Motive for risk management I Froot, Scharfstein](https://reader035.vdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022081409/607f6f0d5571d466027cd274/html5/thumbnails/2.jpg)
Background
I Broad theme: Implications for aggregate investment dynamicsof endogenous borrowing constraints for �rms
I Standard theoretical approach
I Bernanke Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki Moore (1997), BernankeGertler Gilchrist (1999), Krishnamurthy (2003)
I Credit multiplier =) prediction about the amount ofinvestment
I Quantitative signi�cance questioned
I Kocherlakota (2000), Cordoba and Ripoll (2004), Chari,Kehoe, McGrattan (2007)
I Model misspeci�cation, or �nancial frictions unimportant?
![Page 3: Credit Constraints, Firms™Precautionary Investment, and ......I Two sectors: corporate and entrepreneurial I Financial intermediaries I Motive for risk management I Froot, Scharfstein](https://reader035.vdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022081409/607f6f0d5571d466027cd274/html5/thumbnails/3.jpg)
Background
I Broad theme: Implications for aggregate investment dynamicsof endogenous borrowing constraints for �rms
I Standard theoretical approach
I Bernanke Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki Moore (1997), BernankeGertler Gilchrist (1999), Krishnamurthy (2003)
I Credit multiplier =) prediction about the amount ofinvestment
I Quantitative signi�cance questioned
I Kocherlakota (2000), Cordoba and Ripoll (2004), Chari,Kehoe, McGrattan (2007)
I Model misspeci�cation, or �nancial frictions unimportant?
![Page 4: Credit Constraints, Firms™Precautionary Investment, and ......I Two sectors: corporate and entrepreneurial I Financial intermediaries I Motive for risk management I Froot, Scharfstein](https://reader035.vdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022081409/607f6f0d5571d466027cd274/html5/thumbnails/4.jpg)
Background
I Broad theme: Implications for aggregate investment dynamicsof endogenous borrowing constraints for �rms
I Standard theoretical approachI Bernanke Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki Moore (1997), BernankeGertler Gilchrist (1999), Krishnamurthy (2003)
I Credit multiplier =) prediction about the amount ofinvestment
I Quantitative signi�cance questioned
I Kocherlakota (2000), Cordoba and Ripoll (2004), Chari,Kehoe, McGrattan (2007)
I Model misspeci�cation, or �nancial frictions unimportant?
![Page 5: Credit Constraints, Firms™Precautionary Investment, and ......I Two sectors: corporate and entrepreneurial I Financial intermediaries I Motive for risk management I Froot, Scharfstein](https://reader035.vdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022081409/607f6f0d5571d466027cd274/html5/thumbnails/5.jpg)
Background
I Broad theme: Implications for aggregate investment dynamicsof endogenous borrowing constraints for �rms
I Standard theoretical approachI Bernanke Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki Moore (1997), BernankeGertler Gilchrist (1999), Krishnamurthy (2003)
I Credit multiplier =) prediction about the amount ofinvestment
I Quantitative signi�cance questioned
I Kocherlakota (2000), Cordoba and Ripoll (2004), Chari,Kehoe, McGrattan (2007)
I Model misspeci�cation, or �nancial frictions unimportant?
![Page 6: Credit Constraints, Firms™Precautionary Investment, and ......I Two sectors: corporate and entrepreneurial I Financial intermediaries I Motive for risk management I Froot, Scharfstein](https://reader035.vdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022081409/607f6f0d5571d466027cd274/html5/thumbnails/6.jpg)
Background
I Broad theme: Implications for aggregate investment dynamicsof endogenous borrowing constraints for �rms
I Standard theoretical approachI Bernanke Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki Moore (1997), BernankeGertler Gilchrist (1999), Krishnamurthy (2003)
I Credit multiplier =) prediction about the amount ofinvestment
I Quantitative signi�cance questioned
I Kocherlakota (2000), Cordoba and Ripoll (2004), Chari,Kehoe, McGrattan (2007)
I Model misspeci�cation, or �nancial frictions unimportant?
![Page 7: Credit Constraints, Firms™Precautionary Investment, and ......I Two sectors: corporate and entrepreneurial I Financial intermediaries I Motive for risk management I Froot, Scharfstein](https://reader035.vdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022081409/607f6f0d5571d466027cd274/html5/thumbnails/7.jpg)
Background
I Broad theme: Implications for aggregate investment dynamicsof endogenous borrowing constraints for �rms
I Standard theoretical approachI Bernanke Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki Moore (1997), BernankeGertler Gilchrist (1999), Krishnamurthy (2003)
I Credit multiplier =) prediction about the amount ofinvestment
I Quantitative signi�cance questionedI Kocherlakota (2000), Cordoba and Ripoll (2004), Chari,Kehoe, McGrattan (2007)
I Model misspeci�cation, or �nancial frictions unimportant?
![Page 8: Credit Constraints, Firms™Precautionary Investment, and ......I Two sectors: corporate and entrepreneurial I Financial intermediaries I Motive for risk management I Froot, Scharfstein](https://reader035.vdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022081409/607f6f0d5571d466027cd274/html5/thumbnails/8.jpg)
Background
I Broad theme: Implications for aggregate investment dynamicsof endogenous borrowing constraints for �rms
I Standard theoretical approachI Bernanke Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki Moore (1997), BernankeGertler Gilchrist (1999), Krishnamurthy (2003)
I Credit multiplier =) prediction about the amount ofinvestment
I Quantitative signi�cance questionedI Kocherlakota (2000), Cordoba and Ripoll (2004), Chari,Kehoe, McGrattan (2007)
I Model misspeci�cation, or �nancial frictions unimportant?
![Page 9: Credit Constraints, Firms™Precautionary Investment, and ......I Two sectors: corporate and entrepreneurial I Financial intermediaries I Motive for risk management I Froot, Scharfstein](https://reader035.vdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022081409/607f6f0d5571d466027cd274/html5/thumbnails/9.jpg)
Questions
I New approach: precautionary investment motive
I intertemporal investment & frictions: motive for risk andliquidity management
I limited ability to use capital structure / markets to insureI anticipation of future credit constraints may a¤ect willingnessto invest today and preference for the type of investment.
I Questions
I Can precautionary motive resuscitate �nancial accelerator?I Can it account for observed behavior of the composition ofinvestment across the business cycle?
I Broader agenda: credit frictions relevant mainly because ofwhat �rms do to avoid them?
I � bu¤er stock behaviour of consumers
![Page 10: Credit Constraints, Firms™Precautionary Investment, and ......I Two sectors: corporate and entrepreneurial I Financial intermediaries I Motive for risk management I Froot, Scharfstein](https://reader035.vdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022081409/607f6f0d5571d466027cd274/html5/thumbnails/10.jpg)
Questions
I New approach: precautionary investment motiveI intertemporal investment & frictions: motive for risk andliquidity management
I limited ability to use capital structure / markets to insureI anticipation of future credit constraints may a¤ect willingnessto invest today and preference for the type of investment.
I Questions
I Can precautionary motive resuscitate �nancial accelerator?I Can it account for observed behavior of the composition ofinvestment across the business cycle?
I Broader agenda: credit frictions relevant mainly because ofwhat �rms do to avoid them?
I � bu¤er stock behaviour of consumers
![Page 11: Credit Constraints, Firms™Precautionary Investment, and ......I Two sectors: corporate and entrepreneurial I Financial intermediaries I Motive for risk management I Froot, Scharfstein](https://reader035.vdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022081409/607f6f0d5571d466027cd274/html5/thumbnails/11.jpg)
Questions
I New approach: precautionary investment motiveI intertemporal investment & frictions: motive for risk andliquidity management
I limited ability to use capital structure / markets to insure
I anticipation of future credit constraints may a¤ect willingnessto invest today and preference for the type of investment.
I Questions
I Can precautionary motive resuscitate �nancial accelerator?I Can it account for observed behavior of the composition ofinvestment across the business cycle?
I Broader agenda: credit frictions relevant mainly because ofwhat �rms do to avoid them?
I � bu¤er stock behaviour of consumers
![Page 12: Credit Constraints, Firms™Precautionary Investment, and ......I Two sectors: corporate and entrepreneurial I Financial intermediaries I Motive for risk management I Froot, Scharfstein](https://reader035.vdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022081409/607f6f0d5571d466027cd274/html5/thumbnails/12.jpg)
Questions
I New approach: precautionary investment motiveI intertemporal investment & frictions: motive for risk andliquidity management
I limited ability to use capital structure / markets to insureI anticipation of future credit constraints may a¤ect willingnessto invest today and preference for the type of investment.
I Questions
I Can precautionary motive resuscitate �nancial accelerator?I Can it account for observed behavior of the composition ofinvestment across the business cycle?
I Broader agenda: credit frictions relevant mainly because ofwhat �rms do to avoid them?
I � bu¤er stock behaviour of consumers
![Page 13: Credit Constraints, Firms™Precautionary Investment, and ......I Two sectors: corporate and entrepreneurial I Financial intermediaries I Motive for risk management I Froot, Scharfstein](https://reader035.vdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022081409/607f6f0d5571d466027cd274/html5/thumbnails/13.jpg)
Questions
I New approach: precautionary investment motiveI intertemporal investment & frictions: motive for risk andliquidity management
I limited ability to use capital structure / markets to insureI anticipation of future credit constraints may a¤ect willingnessto invest today and preference for the type of investment.
I Questions
I Can precautionary motive resuscitate �nancial accelerator?I Can it account for observed behavior of the composition ofinvestment across the business cycle?
I Broader agenda: credit frictions relevant mainly because ofwhat �rms do to avoid them?
I � bu¤er stock behaviour of consumers
![Page 14: Credit Constraints, Firms™Precautionary Investment, and ......I Two sectors: corporate and entrepreneurial I Financial intermediaries I Motive for risk management I Froot, Scharfstein](https://reader035.vdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022081409/607f6f0d5571d466027cd274/html5/thumbnails/14.jpg)
Questions
I New approach: precautionary investment motiveI intertemporal investment & frictions: motive for risk andliquidity management
I limited ability to use capital structure / markets to insureI anticipation of future credit constraints may a¤ect willingnessto invest today and preference for the type of investment.
I QuestionsI Can precautionary motive resuscitate �nancial accelerator?
I Can it account for observed behavior of the composition ofinvestment across the business cycle?
I Broader agenda: credit frictions relevant mainly because ofwhat �rms do to avoid them?
I � bu¤er stock behaviour of consumers
![Page 15: Credit Constraints, Firms™Precautionary Investment, and ......I Two sectors: corporate and entrepreneurial I Financial intermediaries I Motive for risk management I Froot, Scharfstein](https://reader035.vdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022081409/607f6f0d5571d466027cd274/html5/thumbnails/15.jpg)
Questions
I New approach: precautionary investment motiveI intertemporal investment & frictions: motive for risk andliquidity management
I limited ability to use capital structure / markets to insureI anticipation of future credit constraints may a¤ect willingnessto invest today and preference for the type of investment.
I QuestionsI Can precautionary motive resuscitate �nancial accelerator?I Can it account for observed behavior of the composition ofinvestment across the business cycle?
I Broader agenda: credit frictions relevant mainly because ofwhat �rms do to avoid them?
I � bu¤er stock behaviour of consumers
![Page 16: Credit Constraints, Firms™Precautionary Investment, and ......I Two sectors: corporate and entrepreneurial I Financial intermediaries I Motive for risk management I Froot, Scharfstein](https://reader035.vdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022081409/607f6f0d5571d466027cd274/html5/thumbnails/16.jpg)
Questions
I New approach: precautionary investment motiveI intertemporal investment & frictions: motive for risk andliquidity management
I limited ability to use capital structure / markets to insureI anticipation of future credit constraints may a¤ect willingnessto invest today and preference for the type of investment.
I QuestionsI Can precautionary motive resuscitate �nancial accelerator?I Can it account for observed behavior of the composition ofinvestment across the business cycle?
I Broader agenda: credit frictions relevant mainly because ofwhat �rms do to avoid them?
I � bu¤er stock behaviour of consumers
![Page 17: Credit Constraints, Firms™Precautionary Investment, and ......I Two sectors: corporate and entrepreneurial I Financial intermediaries I Motive for risk management I Froot, Scharfstein](https://reader035.vdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022081409/607f6f0d5571d466027cd274/html5/thumbnails/17.jpg)
Questions
I New approach: precautionary investment motiveI intertemporal investment & frictions: motive for risk andliquidity management
I limited ability to use capital structure / markets to insureI anticipation of future credit constraints may a¤ect willingnessto invest today and preference for the type of investment.
I QuestionsI Can precautionary motive resuscitate �nancial accelerator?I Can it account for observed behavior of the composition ofinvestment across the business cycle?
I Broader agenda: credit frictions relevant mainly because ofwhat �rms do to avoid them?
I � bu¤er stock behaviour of consumers
![Page 18: Credit Constraints, Firms™Precautionary Investment, and ......I Two sectors: corporate and entrepreneurial I Financial intermediaries I Motive for risk management I Froot, Scharfstein](https://reader035.vdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022081409/607f6f0d5571d466027cd274/html5/thumbnails/18.jpg)
Empirical MotivationCREDIT CONDITIONS AND SMALL FIRMS�INVESTMENT
0
10
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Capi
tal Exp
enditure
s
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Seve
rity
of C
redi
t C
ondi
tion
s
Capital Expenditures Severity of Credit Conditions
I US Small Business Survey data (from NFIB)I Capital expenditures: % maintaining or increasingI Credit conditions: % seeing a worsening of credit availability
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Empirical MotivationCREDIT CONDITIONS AND SMALL FIRMS�INVESTMENT
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
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2009
Capi
tal Exp
enditure
s
0
2
4
6
8
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16
Seve
rity
of C
redi
t C
ondi
tion
s
Capital Expenditures Structures Equipment Severity of Credit Conditions
I US Small Business Survey data (from NFIB)I Capital expenditures: % maintaining or increasingI Credit conditions: % seeing a worsening of credit availability
![Page 20: Credit Constraints, Firms™Precautionary Investment, and ......I Two sectors: corporate and entrepreneurial I Financial intermediaries I Motive for risk management I Froot, Scharfstein](https://reader035.vdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022081409/607f6f0d5571d466027cd274/html5/thumbnails/20.jpg)
Empirical MotivationR&D INVESTMENT ACROSS THE BUSINESS CYCLE
7.0%
5.0%
3.0%
1.0%
1.0%
3.0%
5.0%
7.0%
1953
1956
1959
1962
1965
1968
1971
1974
1977
1980
1983
1986
1989
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1995
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2001
Largel Average Size Small Average Size
Figure: % variation in ratio of R&D expenditures as a share of totalinvestment - Data for the United States from National ScienceFoundation
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Empirical MotivationCOMPOSITION OF INVESTMENT ACROSS THE BUSINESS CYCLE
I Firm-level evidenceI Share of R&D and structural investment over total
I Aghion et al. (2007), Barlevy (2007), Aghion et al. (2005)
I Cash �ow sensitivity of cash (Almeida et al. (2004))
I Aggregate evidenceI Sensitivity of composition of investment to shocks in less�nancially developed countries (Aghion et al. (2005)).
![Page 22: Credit Constraints, Firms™Precautionary Investment, and ......I Two sectors: corporate and entrepreneurial I Financial intermediaries I Motive for risk management I Froot, Scharfstein](https://reader035.vdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022081409/607f6f0d5571d466027cd274/html5/thumbnails/22.jpg)
Empirical MotivationFIRMS�PRECAUTIONARY BEHAVIOR AND IMPORTANCE OF THE QUESTION
I Anticipation of future �nancing constraints a¤ects �rms�current behavior:
I Real decisions: Caggese and Cunat (2007), Almeida et al(2004), (2006)
I Financial behavior: Graham and Harvey (2001), Bancel andMittoo (2002)
I Surveys: NFIB, Fed Board SSBF
I Small and Medium Enterprises a signi�cant portion ofeconomic activity (half of private sector GDP in the U.S.)
![Page 23: Credit Constraints, Firms™Precautionary Investment, and ......I Two sectors: corporate and entrepreneurial I Financial intermediaries I Motive for risk management I Froot, Scharfstein](https://reader035.vdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022081409/607f6f0d5571d466027cd274/html5/thumbnails/23.jpg)
What I do
I Introduce a Real Business Cycle model including:
I Two sectors: corporate and entrepreneurialI Financial intermediariesI Motive for risk management
I Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993): avoid future constraintsto avoid having to fore-go positive NPV projects.
I Financial constraints
I Limited commitment and collateral constraints as in Kiyotakiand Moore (1997)
![Page 24: Credit Constraints, Firms™Precautionary Investment, and ......I Two sectors: corporate and entrepreneurial I Financial intermediaries I Motive for risk management I Froot, Scharfstein](https://reader035.vdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022081409/607f6f0d5571d466027cd274/html5/thumbnails/24.jpg)
What I do
I Introduce a Real Business Cycle model including:I Two sectors: corporate and entrepreneurial
I Financial intermediariesI Motive for risk management
I Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993): avoid future constraintsto avoid having to fore-go positive NPV projects.
I Financial constraints
I Limited commitment and collateral constraints as in Kiyotakiand Moore (1997)
![Page 25: Credit Constraints, Firms™Precautionary Investment, and ......I Two sectors: corporate and entrepreneurial I Financial intermediaries I Motive for risk management I Froot, Scharfstein](https://reader035.vdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022081409/607f6f0d5571d466027cd274/html5/thumbnails/25.jpg)
What I do
I Introduce a Real Business Cycle model including:I Two sectors: corporate and entrepreneurialI Financial intermediaries
I Motive for risk management
I Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993): avoid future constraintsto avoid having to fore-go positive NPV projects.
I Financial constraints
I Limited commitment and collateral constraints as in Kiyotakiand Moore (1997)
![Page 26: Credit Constraints, Firms™Precautionary Investment, and ......I Two sectors: corporate and entrepreneurial I Financial intermediaries I Motive for risk management I Froot, Scharfstein](https://reader035.vdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022081409/607f6f0d5571d466027cd274/html5/thumbnails/26.jpg)
What I do
I Introduce a Real Business Cycle model including:I Two sectors: corporate and entrepreneurialI Financial intermediariesI Motive for risk management
I Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993): avoid future constraintsto avoid having to fore-go positive NPV projects.
I Financial constraints
I Limited commitment and collateral constraints as in Kiyotakiand Moore (1997)
![Page 27: Credit Constraints, Firms™Precautionary Investment, and ......I Two sectors: corporate and entrepreneurial I Financial intermediaries I Motive for risk management I Froot, Scharfstein](https://reader035.vdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022081409/607f6f0d5571d466027cd274/html5/thumbnails/27.jpg)
What I do
I Introduce a Real Business Cycle model including:I Two sectors: corporate and entrepreneurialI Financial intermediariesI Motive for risk management
I Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993): avoid future constraintsto avoid having to fore-go positive NPV projects.
I Financial constraints
I Limited commitment and collateral constraints as in Kiyotakiand Moore (1997)
![Page 28: Credit Constraints, Firms™Precautionary Investment, and ......I Two sectors: corporate and entrepreneurial I Financial intermediaries I Motive for risk management I Froot, Scharfstein](https://reader035.vdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022081409/607f6f0d5571d466027cd274/html5/thumbnails/28.jpg)
What I do
I Introduce a Real Business Cycle model including:I Two sectors: corporate and entrepreneurialI Financial intermediariesI Motive for risk management
I Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993): avoid future constraintsto avoid having to fore-go positive NPV projects.
I Financial constraints
I Limited commitment and collateral constraints as in Kiyotakiand Moore (1997)
![Page 29: Credit Constraints, Firms™Precautionary Investment, and ......I Two sectors: corporate and entrepreneurial I Financial intermediaries I Motive for risk management I Froot, Scharfstein](https://reader035.vdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022081409/607f6f0d5571d466027cd274/html5/thumbnails/29.jpg)
What I do
I Introduce a Real Business Cycle model including:I Two sectors: corporate and entrepreneurialI Financial intermediariesI Motive for risk management
I Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993): avoid future constraintsto avoid having to fore-go positive NPV projects.
I Financial constraints
I Limited commitment and collateral constraints as in Kiyotakiand Moore (1997)
![Page 30: Credit Constraints, Firms™Precautionary Investment, and ......I Two sectors: corporate and entrepreneurial I Financial intermediaries I Motive for risk management I Froot, Scharfstein](https://reader035.vdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022081409/607f6f0d5571d466027cd274/html5/thumbnails/30.jpg)
Main Findings
I Novel ampli�cation mechanism: composition of investment &endogenous productivity
I Model accounts for cyclical variation in the composition ofinvestment
I Also
I Ampli�cation vs. dampening: crucially depends on persistenceof productivity shocks
I Identi�cation for ex-ante vs contemporaneous e¤ect of creditconstraints
I Role of shocks to uncertainty in generating aggregate�uctuations
![Page 31: Credit Constraints, Firms™Precautionary Investment, and ......I Two sectors: corporate and entrepreneurial I Financial intermediaries I Motive for risk management I Froot, Scharfstein](https://reader035.vdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022081409/607f6f0d5571d466027cd274/html5/thumbnails/31.jpg)
Main Findings
I Novel ampli�cation mechanism: composition of investment &endogenous productivity
I Model accounts for cyclical variation in the composition ofinvestment
I Also
I Ampli�cation vs. dampening: crucially depends on persistenceof productivity shocks
I Identi�cation for ex-ante vs contemporaneous e¤ect of creditconstraints
I Role of shocks to uncertainty in generating aggregate�uctuations
![Page 32: Credit Constraints, Firms™Precautionary Investment, and ......I Two sectors: corporate and entrepreneurial I Financial intermediaries I Motive for risk management I Froot, Scharfstein](https://reader035.vdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022081409/607f6f0d5571d466027cd274/html5/thumbnails/32.jpg)
Main Findings
I Novel ampli�cation mechanism: composition of investment &endogenous productivity
I Model accounts for cyclical variation in the composition ofinvestment
I Also
I Ampli�cation vs. dampening: crucially depends on persistenceof productivity shocks
I Identi�cation for ex-ante vs contemporaneous e¤ect of creditconstraints
I Role of shocks to uncertainty in generating aggregate�uctuations
![Page 33: Credit Constraints, Firms™Precautionary Investment, and ......I Two sectors: corporate and entrepreneurial I Financial intermediaries I Motive for risk management I Froot, Scharfstein](https://reader035.vdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022081409/607f6f0d5571d466027cd274/html5/thumbnails/33.jpg)
Main Findings
I Novel ampli�cation mechanism: composition of investment &endogenous productivity
I Model accounts for cyclical variation in the composition ofinvestment
I AlsoI Ampli�cation vs. dampening: crucially depends on persistenceof productivity shocks
I Identi�cation for ex-ante vs contemporaneous e¤ect of creditconstraints
I Role of shocks to uncertainty in generating aggregate�uctuations
![Page 34: Credit Constraints, Firms™Precautionary Investment, and ......I Two sectors: corporate and entrepreneurial I Financial intermediaries I Motive for risk management I Froot, Scharfstein](https://reader035.vdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022081409/607f6f0d5571d466027cd274/html5/thumbnails/34.jpg)
Main Findings
I Novel ampli�cation mechanism: composition of investment &endogenous productivity
I Model accounts for cyclical variation in the composition ofinvestment
I AlsoI Ampli�cation vs. dampening: crucially depends on persistenceof productivity shocks
I Identi�cation for ex-ante vs contemporaneous e¤ect of creditconstraints
I Role of shocks to uncertainty in generating aggregate�uctuations
![Page 35: Credit Constraints, Firms™Precautionary Investment, and ......I Two sectors: corporate and entrepreneurial I Financial intermediaries I Motive for risk management I Froot, Scharfstein](https://reader035.vdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022081409/607f6f0d5571d466027cd274/html5/thumbnails/35.jpg)
Main Findings
I Novel ampli�cation mechanism: composition of investment &endogenous productivity
I Model accounts for cyclical variation in the composition ofinvestment
I AlsoI Ampli�cation vs. dampening: crucially depends on persistenceof productivity shocks
I Identi�cation for ex-ante vs contemporaneous e¤ect of creditconstraints
I Role of shocks to uncertainty in generating aggregate�uctuations
![Page 36: Credit Constraints, Firms™Precautionary Investment, and ......I Two sectors: corporate and entrepreneurial I Financial intermediaries I Motive for risk management I Froot, Scharfstein](https://reader035.vdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022081409/607f6f0d5571d466027cd274/html5/thumbnails/36.jpg)
Contribution to the Literature
I Aggregate business cycle implications of endogenousborrowing constraints for �rms
I Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist(1999), Krishnamurthy (2003)
I Corporate Finance: intertemporal links between �nancialconstraints and investment
I Thakor (1990), Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993), Almeida,Campello and Weisbach (2004, 2008), Hennessy, Levy and Whited(2005), Caggese and Cuñat (2008)
I E¤ects on capital accumulation, real interest rates and outputgrowth of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk
I labor-income risk: Aiyagari (1994), Krusell and Smith (1998) /investment risk: Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), Angeletos andCalvet (2006)
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Structure of Talk
1. Introduction
2. A General Investment Model to Fix Ideas
3. Partial Equilibrium Analysis of Entrepreneurial Investment
4. General Equilibrium and Dynamics: Response to ProductivityShock
5. The Role of Financial Intermediaries
6. Conclusion
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Partial-Equilibrium Investment Model - General Framework
I Firm maximizes
V0 = E0∞
∑t=0M0,tdt ,
I where
M0,t = stochastic discount factor
dt = ∑j[f (kj ,t ) + (1� δ)kj ,t � kj ,t+1 ]
+bt+1 � (1+ rt )btj = 1, ..., J are di¤erent projects �rm can invest in
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Financing Constraints
I Equity:
dt � d�, where d� � 0
I Debt:bt+1 � b.
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First Order Conditions
I Investment (one for each type j of investment):
1+ λt = EtfMt ,t+1[f 0(kj ,t+1) + (1� δ)](1+ λt+1)g
I Borrowing:
µt = 1+ λt � Et [Mt ,t+1(1+ rt+1)(1+ λt+1)]
I where
λt = shadow cost of equity �nance
µt = shadow cost of debt �nance
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Financing Constraints only matter if shadow cost is timevarying
I E¤ect of �nancial constraints fully captured by Ψt+1 in
1 = EtfMt ,t+1R Ij ,t+1Ψt+1g
where
Ψt+1 =1+ λt+11+ λt
I Financing constraints only a¤ect investment if they are timevarying (Ψt+1 6= 1).
I Shadow value of constraint today relative to tomorrow matters.
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Future Binding Constraints and the Composition ofInvestment
I AssumeI Two investment alternatives j = fS ,Rg = fSafe, Riskyg
I f (kS ,t ) = zS kαS ,t
I f (kR ,t ) = zR ,tkαR ,t ,
I where
I α < 1I zR ,t captures idiosyncratic riskI Et (zR ,t+1) > zSI δ = 1
I Mt ,t+1 is independent of zj ,t , λt+1
I How is the share of risky vs. safe investment a¤ected byfuture credit constraints?
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Future Binding Constraints and the Composition ofInvestment
I Safe investment
1+ λt = αzSkα�1S ,t+1Et (Mt ,t+1)Et (1+ λt+1)
I overinvestment?
I Risky investment
1+ λt = Et (Mt ,t+1)Et [αzR ,t+1kα�1R ,t+1(1+ λt+1)]
= Et (Mt ,t+1)αkα�1R ,t+1[Cov(zR ,t+1,λt+1)
+Et (zR ,t+1)Et (1+ λt+1)]
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Future Binding Constraints and the Composition ofInvestment
I Ratio of risky to safe investment
kR ,t+1kS ,t+1
=
�cov(zR ,t+1,λt+1) + Et (zR ,t+1)Et (1+ λt+1)
zSEt (1+ λt+1)
� 11�α
I Persistence of idiosyncratic productivity processI Jensen and Meckling (1976) risk-shifting result
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Aggregate Risk
I Add aggregate risk: f (kR ,t ) = (At + zR ,t ) kαR ,t
I Risky investment
1+ λt = Et (Mt ,t+1)Et [α (zR ,t+1 + At+1) kα�1R ,t+1(1+ λt+1)]
= Et (Mt ,t+1)αkα�1R ,t+1[Cov(zR ,t+1,λt+1)
+Cov(At+1,λt+1)
+[Et (zR ,t+1) + Et (At+1)]Et (1+ λt+1)]
I Financing frictions: more important with good economicconditions?
I Yes: Dow, Gorton, and Krishnamurthy (2003), Gomes, Yaron,and Zhang (2003)
I No: Braun and Larrain (2005),...
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Structure of Talk
1. Introduction
2. A General Investment Model to Fix Ideas
3. Partial Equilibrium Analysis of Entrepreneurial Investment
4. General Equilibrium and Dynamics: Response to ProductivityShock
5. The Role of Financial Intermediaries
6. Conclusion
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Model
I In�nite horizon, discrete time economyI Four agents
I HouseholdsI Firms: produce consumption good using labor and investmentgoods
I Entrepreneurs: produce the investment goods. Overlappinggenerations.
I Financial intermediaries: channel savings from households toentrepreneurs
I 3 goods: consumption good, investment good, entrepreneurialcapital
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The Economy
Households
FinancialIntermediaries
EntrepreneursProduce investment
goods usingentrepreneurial capital
FirmsProduce
consumptiongoods using
investment goods
Savings
Savings
NewInvestmentGoods
Rental of Stockof InvestmentGoods
Labor
Labor
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Partial Equilibrium Analysis of Entrepreneurs
I Risk-neutral and live for two full periodsI Investment opportunity when young and oldI Supply labor inelastically when young, receive wage w et .I Maximize consumption at the end of their lifetimes.
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Timeline of Events in the Lifetime of Entrepreneur
t t+1 t+2
Sell remainingentrepreneurialcapital.
Consume allremaining networth.
Borrow
Invest mt+1
BEGINNING
Supply labor (wet)
Invest:mt (risky)st (safe)
Enter into statecontingent contractwith bank
END
Idiosyncraticproduction shockrealized (“lucky”or “unlucky”)
State contingentpayments to/frombank
“Young” “Old” “Dying”
t t+1 t+2
Sell remainingentrepreneurialcapital.
Consume allremaining networth.
Borrow
Invest mt+1
BEGINNING
Supply labor (wet)
Invest:mt (risky)st (safe)
Enter into statecontingent contractwith bank
END
Idiosyncraticproduction shockrealized (“lucky”or “unlucky”)
State contingentpayments to/frombank
BEGINNING
Supply labor (wet)
Invest:mt (risky)st (safe)
Enter into statecontingent contractwith bank
END
Idiosyncraticproduction shockrealized (“lucky”or “unlucky”)
State contingentpayments to/frombank
“Young” “Old” “Dying”
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Entrepreneurs
Budget constraint of "young":
ptmt + st = w et + ∑i=L,U
φitbit ,
Budget constraint of "old":
pt+1mit+1 = nit+1 + bt+1.
where:
nLt+1 = qtg(mt )� bLt + pt+1(1� δ)mt + st (1+ rt+1)
nUt+1 = xmt � bUt + pt+1(1� δ)mt + st (1+ rt+1)
where mt : risky technology, st : safe alternative (st � 0), bit : state-contingentrepayment to/from bank, rt : return on s , qt :price of investment goods, x :idiosyncratic liquidity shock. x � 0.
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Precautionary Motive
I Production technology of "old":
yoldt+1 = f (mt+1),
f 0(�) > 0, f 00(�) < 0
I Demand for insurance to smooth net worth at beginning of"old" age (second period).
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Financial Friction, Optimal Contract and ImperfectInsurance
I Contract fully state contingentI First best contract: bLt > 0, b
Ut < 0, b
Lt + b
Ut = 0
I However, limited commitment and need to back all borrowingwith physical assets:
bit � θ(1� δ)pt+1
1+ rt+1mt
I Source of lack of full insurance against idiosyncratic shockI May mean that bLt + b
Ut < 0.
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Optimal Choice of Entrepreneurs I
RLm,t+1
"qtg 0(mt ) + (1� δ)pt+1 � θ(1� δ) pt+1
1+rt+1
pt � 0.5θ(1� δ) pt+11+r t+1
#+
RUm,t+1
"x + pt+1(1� δ)
pt � 0.5θ(1� δ) pt+11+r t+1
#
= RUm,t+1
�1φt
�= RUm,t+1 (1+ rt+1) + R
Lm,t+1 (1+ rt+1)
Equate marginal return to investment in risky technology,insurance, and safe asset.
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Optimal Choice of Entrepreneurs II
where Rm,t+1 is marginal return to investment in entrepreneurialtechnology in the second period:
R im,t+1 =qt+1f 0(mt+1) + (1� δ)pt+2 � θ(1� δ) pt+2
1+rt+2
pt+1 � θ(1� δ) pt+21+rt+2
where i = fL,Ug.
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Entrepreneurs�Optimal Reaction to Changes in ExpectedCredit ConditionsPARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM
I A decrease in expected ex-post borrowing capacity in periodt + 1, captured by a decrease in
θ(1� δ)pt+2
1+ rt+2
may result in a decrease in risky investment in period t as ashare of total investment
dmtdpt+2
> 0,dbUtdpt+2
> 0,dstdpt+2
? 0.
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Structure of Talk
1. Introduction
2. A General Investment Model to Fix Ideas
3. Partial Equilibrium Analysis of Entrepreneurial Investment
4. General Equilibrium and Dynamics: Response to ProductivityShock
5. The Role of Financial Intermediaries
6. Conclusion
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Entrepreneurial Capital MarketEndogenizing p
I Entrepreneurial capital is durable, depreciates at rate δ.
I Created instantaneously one-for-one using consumption goodsI Upper bound on price: pt � 1.
I In periods of low demand, price will decrease to absorb allexisting stock of capital:
∑ πiiMit (pt ) = ∑
iπi (1� δ)Mit�1, for i = Y , L,U,DL,DU
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The Economy
Households
FinancialIntermediaries
EntrepreneursProduce investment
goods usingentrepreneurial capital
FirmsProduce
consumptiongoods using
investment goods
Savings
Savings
NewInvestmentGoods
Rental of Stockof InvestmentGoods
Labor
Labor
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Households
Continuum of risk-averse households, maximizing:
E0∞∑t=0
βtu(ct , 1� Lt )
ct + qt [kt+1 � (1� δk )kt ] = wtLt + rtkt
Optimal labor-leisure choice:
uL(t)uc (t)
= wt
Optimal savings-consumption choice:
uc (t) = βEtfuc (t + 1)[qt+1(1� δ) + rt+1]
qtg.
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Firms
Firms produce the consumption good using a constant returns toscale production function:
Yt = θtF (Kt ,Ht ,Het )
(Kt = stock of investment goods, Ht = aggregate labor suppliedby households, and Het = H
e = labor supplied by entrepreneurialagents).Perfect competition in the factor markets implies the followingfactor prices:
rt = θtF1(t)
wt = θtF2(t)
w et = θtF3(t)
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Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
De�nitionThe recursive competitive equilibrium is de�ned by decision rulesfor Kt+1,Ct ,Ht , MY
it , MLit ,M
Uit , Z
Lit , Z
Uit ,Z
OLit , Z
OUit , It ,St ,CEt , B
Yit ,
BLit , BUit , qt , pt , and φt , as a function of Kt , θt , and fMi ,t�1g and
fZit�1g.
I Where fMi ,tg is the distribution of entrepreneurial capital,and fZi ,tg is the distribution of end-of-period entrepreneurialnet worth.
I Equilibrium solved numerically using the ParameterizedExpectations Approach of den Haan and Marcet (1990).
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Calibration I
I Model parameterized at the non-stochastic steady state usingvalues to replicate long-run empirical regularities in U.S.post-World War II macro data.
αK 0.36 Capital Shareαe 0.01 Entrepreneurial L Shareα 0.63 HH labor Shareδ 0.02 Depreciationρ 0.95 in log θt+1 = ρ log θt + σεεt+1σ 0.01 in log θt+1 = ρ log θt + σεεt+1γ 1 in U = (c1�γ � 1)/(1� γ) + v(1� L)v Chosen to obtain L = 0.3
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Calibration II
I Entrepreneurial sector parametersI Pledgeability of entrepreneurial capital (θ)
I match empirically documented Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratios forcommercial mortgage lending to small and medium-sizedenterprises
I Remaining parameters relate to the entrepreneurial riskytechnology, calibrated to match
I risk premium: average spread between the 3-month CP rateand prime rate: 187 basis points.
I share of loans issued on commitment basis. Kashyap et al.(2002): 70% of bank lending by U.S. small �rms throughcredit lines.
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Steady State Properties
Composition (Share of Risky Investment)
75%80%85%90%95%
100%105%
8% 11% 14% 17% 20% 23% 26% 29% 32% 35%
Idiosyncratic Volatility
Share
Full Model No Precautionary
Aggregate Capital
3.33.43.53.63.73.83.94.0
8% 11% 14% 17% 20% 23% 26% 29% 32% 35%
Idiosyncratic Volatility
AggregateCapital
Full Model No Precautionary
Figure: Composition of entrepreneurial investment and aggregate capitalin the steady state, as a function of changes in idiosyncratic volatility.
I Mean-preserving increase in volatility of entrepreneurialactivity decreases steady-state share of risky investment, andsteady-state capital.
I Not the case in model with no precautionary e¤ects
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Moments
σcσY
σiσY
σHσY
Empirical Data 0.51 2.86 0.92
Model
Standard Credit 0.71 2.97 0.61
Precautionary 0.74 3.05 0.64
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Dynamics - Persistent aggregate shock
I Response to a negative 1% productivity shock, persistenceρ = 0.95
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Intuition
I Negative shock hitsI �rms understand shock will be persistent =) probability ofbeing �nancially constrained next period increases.
I react by decreasing share of risky investment
I Larger contemporaneous response to shocks (moreampli�cation)
I Standard �nancial accelerator framework, �rms invest asmuch as they can at every point in time.
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Dynamics - Low Persistence in aggregate shock
I Response to a negative 1% productivity shock, persistenceρ = 0.70
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Asymmetry
I Hansen and Prescott (2002) and Sichel (1993)I evidence that positive shocks produce smaller positive outpute¤ects than negative shocks produce negative output e¤ects.
I Existing theory:I Capacity constraint models: Hansen and Prescott (2002),Danziger (2003)
I Sticky price models: Devereux and Siu (2003).
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Asymmetry
Table: Summary of Numerical Results - Comparison of Outcomes
Full Model Full Model
Recessions Upturns
σ(Output) / σ(Tech Shock) 2.13 3.73 1.67
σ(Inv) / σ(Tech Shock) 6.48 8.36 5.71
I Asymmetric ampli�cation mechanism: ampli�cation ofnegative shocks stronger.
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Structure of Talk
1. Introduction
2. A General Investment Model to Fix Ideas
3. Partial Equilibrium Analysis of Entrepreneurial Investment
4. General Equilibrium and Dynamics: Response to ProductivityShock
5. The Role of Financial Intermediaries
6. Conclusion
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Role of Financial Intermediaries
I Need to collateralize all their obligations (�insurance�payments to the unlucky entrepreneurs):
it � bt = ∑i=L,U ,DL,DU
�πi θ(1� δ)Et (
pt+11+ rt+1
)mit
�where it =
REbUt are the �insurance�commitments of the
representative intermediary
I Only assets they can use to collateralize are the loans theyextend to entrepreneurs.
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Entrepreneurs�Optimal Reaction to Worsening ExpectedCredit Conditions
I Following a decrease in expected borrowing capacity in t + 1
Et
�θ(1� δ)
pt+21+ rt+2
�and if frictions in the supply of insurance are severe enough,and φt increases su¢ ciently as a result, then
mt # , st ", it ?
in contrast to a situation where banks�constraint is notbinding, and in which:
mt # , st ?, it " .
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Dynamics
I Insurance is priced at a premium above actuarially fair price insevere downturns
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Cross Country ComparisonsSize of the ampli�cation e¤ect as a function of theta (non-monotonic) and volatility ofaggregate shock (monotonic)
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Conclusions
I I develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model ofentrepreneurial activity and intermediation with endogenous�nancial constraints
I Describes a novel ampli�cation mechanism of macro shocksbased on �rms�precautionary behavior in anticipation offuture credit constraints.
I Is able to account for observed pattern of composition ofinvestment across the business cycle
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Conclusions and Further Research
I Can this mechanism capture the most signi�cant e¤ect ofcredit frictions in investment and output dynamics?
I Analysis of monetary policy shocksI Capital structure implications of precautionary behaviorI Asset pricing implications: �Liquidity Asset Pricing Model�(Holmstrom and Tirole (2001))
I Study precautionary behavior in other agents: eg. �nancialintermediaries in current episode of turbulence
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Appendix Material
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Working Capital Investment
I Inventories small share of GDP, large share of GDP�uctuations (Blinder and Maccini (1991), Stock and Watson(1998))
I Inventories are more volatile than sales (Carpenter, Fazzariand Petersen (1993))
I Gertler and Gilchrist (94): following MP tightening:I Inventories (absolute) fall MORE for smaller �rmsI Inventory /sales ratio falls MORE in small �rms
I Inventory investment considerably more cyclical for durablesthan for nondurables
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Average Inventory Holdings
USD million Small Firms Large FirmsInventories 23.7 279.5Total Assets 98.1 1491.9(I/TA) 24.2% 18.7%Total Sales 36.8 488.7(I/TS) 64.4% 57.2%
Carpenter, Fazzari and Petersen (1993)
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Cash Holdings and Firm Size
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Accuracy
I Den Haan and Marcet (1994) testI Forecast errors of agents in RE models should be uncorrelatedwith past information.
I Regress forecast errors of three approximated expectationalequations on lagged values of model variables.
I DM Statistic: Under the null that numerical solution is exact,the DM statistic has χ2 distribution.
I Statistic < 2.5% and > 97.5% critical values in less than 5%of occasions.