cpted crime and design.pdf

8/14/2019 CPTED crime and design.pdf

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A Quick

Review ofCPTED

Strategies(Crime Prevention

ThroughEnvironmental

Design)

By: Russell James, J.D., Ph.D., Associate Professor,College of Human Sciences, Texas Tech University


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Surveillance(Will I be seen?)

Research


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burglarizedhouses had

less visualaccess toimmediately

neighboringhouses thandid non-

burglarizedhouses

Brown, B. (University of Utah), Altman, B. (University of Utah). 1983. Territoriality, defensible space andresidential burglary: an environmental analysis,Journal of Environmental Psychology, 3(3), 203-20.


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Convenience stores

experienced mean

annual robbery ratereductions after

installation of CCTV

systems (-23%);

installation of video

cameras with monitors(-54%)

C. Casteel (UCLA) & C. Peek-Asa (UCLA). 2000. Effectiveness of crime prevention through

environmental design (CPTED) in reducing robberies. American Journal of PreventativeMedicine, 18, 99-115, p. 110


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Office beveragesavailable withpayment on an

honor system.Picture abovepaymentinstructionsrotated weekly.

Payments werehigher when

picture of eyeswas posted.

M. Bateson, D. Nettle & G. Roberts (2006). Cuesof being watched enhance cooperation in a real-world setting. Biology Letters 2, 412414.


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A B

Two groups with two computer backgrounds. Eachperson receives $10. Computer question: Do you want toshare any of it with another (anonymous) participant?

K. J. Haley (UCLA), D.M.T. Fessler (UCLA). 2005. Nobodys watching? Subtle cues affect generosityin an anonymous economic game. Evolution and Human Behavior, 26, 245256


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Sharing

55%

NotSharing

45%

Normal

Screen

Sharing88%

Not

Sharing

12%

Eyes Screen

K. J. Haley (UCLA), D.M.T. Fessler (UCLA). 2005. Nobodys watching? Subtle cues affect generosityin an anonymous economic game. Evolution and Human Behavior, 26, 245256


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Access(Can I get in and out)?

Research


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Burglarized houses had fewerfences and locked gates

surrounding the yard than didnon-burglarized houses.

Brown, B., Altman, B. (1983). Territoriality,

defensible space and residential burglary:an environmental analysis, Journal ofEnvironmental Psychology, 3(3), 203-20.

b dd h l k f


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Preventing access by adding chain link fencingand lighting to lower levels of this parkinggarage led to 50% drop in reported crime.

Tseng, C.-H. (Ohio State U.), Duane, J. (Ohio State U.), &Hadipriono, F. (Ohio State U.). 2004. Performance of

Campus Parking Garages in Preventing Crime.Journal ofPerformance of Constructed Facilities, 18(1), 21-28.

h


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Territoriality

(Does anyone carewhat happens

here?)

Research

b l i d h h d f b li


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burglarized houses had fewer symbolicbarriers characteristic of primaryterritories (i.e., fewer markers depictingthe identity of the territory owners)

Brown, B. (University of Utah), Altman, B. (University of Utah). 1983. Territoriality, defensible space andresidential burglary: an environmental analysis,Journal of Environmental Psychology, 3(3), 203-20.


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In a study of 400 convenience store robberies, onesignificant difference between robbed and non-robbed stores was distance from nearest graffiti

S. A. Hendricks, D. P. Landsittel, H. E. Amandus, J. Malcan, & J. Bell. (1999) A matched case-control study of convenience store robbery risk factors.Journal of Occupational andEnvironmental Medicine, 41 11 , 995-1004


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Surveillance(Will I be seen?)

Access(Can I get in and out)?

Territoriality(Does anyone care what happens here?)


16/99Will I be seen?


17/99Surveillance: FAIL


18/99Can I get in and out?


19/99Access: FAIL


20/99Does anyone care what happens here?


21/99Territoriality: FAIL


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Does anyone care what happens here?

Territoriality: FAIL


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Can I get in and out?

Access: FAIL


24/99Does anyone care what happens here?


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26/99Access: Can I get in and out? Territoriality impacts Access


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If no one cares what happens here, is itless risky to try opening the door with

a crowbar or bolt cutter?

Territoriality impacts Access


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ACCESS: Does t e ence ma e it ar er to


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ACCESS: Does t e ence ma e it ar er toget in and out?

SURVEILLANCE: Does t e ence ma e it ess


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SURVEILLANCE: Does t e ence ma e it esslikely I will be seen when attempting to break in

through a back door?

Survei ance + Access + Territoria ity may impact


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Survei ance + Access + Territoria ity may impacteach other.



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T e ence says May e


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T e ence says May e .Everything else says No



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TERRITORIALITY:


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TERRITORIALITY:High level maintenance. Defined borders.

Short decorative fencing can enhance


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Short decorative fencing can enhanceterritoriality inside the fence withoutdisconnecting from the surroundingneighborhood

Short decorative fencing can enhance


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Short decorative fencing can enhanceterritoriality inside the fence withoutdisconnecting from the surroundingneighborhood


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Short fencing,even if solid,

creates nosurveillanceproblems.


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As fences get higher, the access barrierincreases, but the risk of visually disconnecting

from the neighborhood also grows


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Does anyone carewhat happens hereINSIDE the fence?


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Does anyone carewhat happens hereOUTSIDE the fence?


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High fences maydiminish territorialityoutside the fence


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High solid fences

Indicates lack of

territoriality

outside of walls Reduces natural

surveillance

Can anyone see whathappens outside the fence?


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High solid fences

Indicates lack of

territoriality


surveillance

Does anyone care whathappens outside the fence?


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High solid fences

Indicates lack of

territoriality


surveillance

High solid fences maycreate spaces with littlesurveillance or territoriality

Some high fences


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Some high fencescontrol access, butfail the S.A.T. by

(1) Blockingsurveillance

(2) Sending a clear

message thatthe area isdangerous,crime isaccepted, andno one careswhat happens

outside the wall


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Making the chain link fence opaque blockssurveillance and permits graffiti showing a lack

of external territoriality.


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With proper designand maintenance,

high fences canlimit access without

damagingsurveillance or

territoriality


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A high fence blocking access without

damaging surveillance or territoriality Spikes can add a visceral


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Spikes can add a visceralelement of accessreduction that is still

decorative and residential

Of course, you


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Of course, youcan go too farwith anything!


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Window bars limit access, but may also send anegative territoriality message about

neighborhood safety.


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Glass block can createsecurity similar to windowbars but without the sti ma


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Most burglaryentries do notoccur through

the front door,often becauseof natural

surveillance.


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Open accessto side or

rear entrypoints wherethere is no

naturalsurveillancemake formore

attractiveburglaryentrances.

Access barriers toid


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side or rear entrancecan reduce the risk


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A very short barrier may provide

insufficient access control

As barriers rise access


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As barriers rise, access

is reduced


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Tall opaque barrierslimit access, but mayalso eliminate natural

surveillance The line of sight for entry points is critical.


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The line of sight for entry points is critical.

Am I visible to outsiders here?


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s b e to outs de s e e?



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Consider thesight-lines inthis aerial shotof a new group

of duplexes Front

E t /


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RearEntrance /Windows

Entrance /Windows

SideWindows

What are thesight lines forthe potentialentry points in

this unit?


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10residenceshave sight

lines tothe rear

entry


this unit?


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16residenceshave sightlines to thefront entry


this unit?


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lines toside

window


this unit? Rear Entrance /

WindowsSide Entrance/

Windows


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FrontEntrance /Windows


this unit?


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lines torear

entrance


this unit?


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lines toside

window


this unit?


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Zone outsideresidence

where sight

lines arecovered by

wooded areawith link to

walking trail


this unit?


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Which residencehas better SAT

scores? What natural surveillance issue best


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predicted convenience store robberies?

C. Casteel (UCLA) & C. Peek-Asa (UCLA). 2000. Effectiveness of crime prevention through environmentaldesign (CPTED) in reducing robberies. American Journal of Preventative Medicine, 18, 99-115, p. 110

C. Casteel (UCLA) & C. Peek-Asa (UCLA). 2000. Effectiveness of crime prevention through environmentaldesign (CPTED) in reducing robberies. American Journal of Preventative Medicine, 18, 99-115, p. 110


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Visibility from outside the store to inside

the store was the most important sight line C. Casteel (UCLA) & C. Peek-Asa (UCLA). 2000. Effectiveness of crime prevention through environmentaldesign (CPTED) in reducing robberies. American Journal of Preventative Medicine, 18, 99-115, p. 110


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Visibility from outside the store to insidethe store was a more significant predictorof convenience store robberies than thenumber of clerks or the proximity to drug

traffic, gangs, or subsidized housing. At night, surveillance depends on lighting.


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Of course, surveillance canbe blocked by both darkness

and solid barriers.


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line of site; access out

Lighting alone may notovercome natural barriers to

surveillance


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Lighting can alsobe importantduring the day,

especially wherelines of sight arelimited


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What signals doyou get thatterritoriality

appears weakhere?


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Closed stairwells have low natural surveillance

and easy access for both entry and escape Combined with territoriality deficiencies,

stairwells can create CPTED problem areas


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stairwells can create CPTED problem areas.


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Design solutionscan improve the

naturalsurveillance for

stairwells
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/31/Student_center_York_University_Goddess_of_Democracy.jpg


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Open stairwellshave strong

natural

surveillance

properties
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/31/Student_center_York_University_Goddess_of_Democracy.jpg


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All ranges of

naturalsurveillancelevels are

possible forstairwells

depending uponthe design

solution chosen

replacing bathroom entrance doorswith right-angle entrances permit the


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g g pwarning sounds of crime to travel morefreely and reduce the sense of isolation

Sommer, R. (1983). Social design: Creating buildings with people in mind. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall


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Cul-de-sacs make automobile

escape more problematic as

there is only one exit route


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Street closures can providesimilar access results

Pedestrian trafficcan also be limited


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can also be limitedwith street closures

High rise buildingsprovide weaker


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provide weakersurveillance of

street level activitybecause ofstructural

separation, distance

separation, andsound separation.

This separation alsolimits the sense ofterritoriality over

street level

activities


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Mid rise balconies create stronger surveillance and

territoriality connecting residents with street level

Mid-rise balconyneighborhoods


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neighborhoods

create safer

street level areaswith high levels

of perceived

surveillance and

perceived

territoriality

Presentation by Russell James III, J.D., Ph.D.,Associate Professor, College of Human

Sciences, Texas Tech University.


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, y

Dr. James research has been published in a

variety of housing and design related

academic journals including: Environment& Behavior; Housing Policy Debate; Journal

of Urban Planning & Development (ASCE);

Journal of Performance of Constructed

Facilities (ASCE); Housing, Theory, and

Society; Housing & Society; Journal of the

Community Development Society

Please feel free to use any of these slides

for any non-commercial purposes.

All pictures used in this presentation are

creative commons licensed, have beenpurchased with rights to allow this usage,

are from MS PowerPoint or are the authors

own photographs. Citations for all creative

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