covert action for toppling the gaddafi regime
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Covert Action for Toppling the Gaddafi Regime
by Dr. Shlomo Shpiro
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 134, March 23, 2011
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: While Western powers have stepped in to enforce the
UN Security Council's 'no fly zone' over Libya, depriving Muammar Gaddafi of
his air power alone will not ensure victory for the insurgents on the ground.
Covert action, conducted by intelligence operatives, can clandestinely provide
the rebels with the funds, arms, communication equipment and intelligence
information crucial for their success, without the need for Western forces tointervene on the ground. Such a strategy can also help unite the insurgents in
order to create a unified military response to Gaddafi's army.
The arrest on March 6, 2011 of a team of eight British intelligence operatives and
SAS commandos in eastern Libya provided a glimpse into the shadowy activities
surrounding Western attempts to assist Libyan insurgent forces in their fight
against Colonel Muammar Gaddafis regime. The capture of the British
undercover team was preceded several days earlier by the arrest of three Dutch
commandos who landed clandestinely by helicopter south of Tripoli whileassisting Dutch nationals to evacuate the region.
Intelligence services have long perfected the use of covert action as a tool of
foreign policy. By secretly equipping and training anti-government forces,
regime change can be accelerated without Western troops actually being
deployed on the ground. Covert action has been used before in Iraq, Lebanon,
Congo, Angola, Cambodia, Afghanistan and many other countries to support
indigenous uprisings by forces greatly inferior to the government in their
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military capabilities. Despite the enforcement of the no fly zone, Gaddafis army
remains relatively strong and well equipped and could remain entrenched in its
positions or even launch a counter-attack eastward to recapture some areasliberated over the past few weeks, even without using its air force. Covert action
can be deployed in Libya to assist the insurgents in several crucial ways: to
provide funds, arms, communication equipment and intelligence information to
the rebels, to train them in the use of modern arms and tactics, and to mediate
and coordinate between the different resistance groups.
One of Gaddafis main advantages is that he controls the states treasury and can
dispense vast amounts of money to reward, bribe or buy the loyalty of large
parts of the Libyan military as well as of mercenaries from neighboring African
states. Despite many Western countries freezing Gaddafis assets, he still has at
his disposal vast amounts of money. On March 4 th, British border police stopped
a ship carrying over $160 million in Libyan currency and impounded large
containers full of cash heading for Tripoli, a clear indication of Gaddafis attempt
to bring into Libya funds from different sources. Financial backing is crucial for
the success of the anti-Gaddafi forces, not only in funding their activities but also
in ensuring the commitment of local clan leaders who still sit on the fence
waiting to see which side wins. Subsidies for local leaders have been used
effectively in Afghanistan and Iraq and can, at least in the short term, lower the
risk of their defection to the other side.
The anti-Gaddafi rebels are armed with a myriad of small arms and antiquated
light artillery, mostly looted from local army barracks and arms dumps. These
arms may make impressive noise on television but lack the ability to counter
Gaddafis most important military advantage his heavy tanks. Though much
fuss has been made over the no fly zone and curtailing the attacks of the Libyan
air force, air power alone will not secure territory lost on the ground. The greater
danger is Gaddafi's tanks, against which the rebels light arms are all but useless.
In order to have any chance of stopping armored assaults on the east of the
country, the rebels must be supplied with effective anti-tank weapons, for which
they must receive proper instruction and training in their effective use.
The Gaddafi regime controls all communications in the country, including the
national telephone network, cell phone networks and the Internet. The rebels
urgently require effective communication equipment in order to connect
different rebel groups across the vast Libyan desert so that they can coordinate
their activities. Such communication equipment would also enable the
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establishment of an early warning system in case of an impending attack by
Gaddafi forces, allowing for rebel mobilization and defense preparation.
Though some of the rebels are former soldiers or officers in the Libyan army, the
large majority are well meaning, brave citizens with little or no military
knowledge or training in modern warfare and tactics. Training is critical for
military success. Western intelligence services could covertly arrange for the
rapid training of key people outside of Libya, possibly in third countries, who
will then return to Libya and train others. The value of even a few well trained
fighters is not only a military necessity but also a key to boosting the motivation
and morale of others. For example, in the 1960s, a few former British SAS officers
trained thousands of tribesmen in Yemen who were then able to stop attacks by
the vastly better equipped Egyptian army.
At the moment, the uprising against Gaddafi is being conducted haphazardly
across different areas, driven by the sheer hatred of the regime more than by a
clear and coherent vision of the potential future of the country. However, covert
action could be used to mediate between the various local clan leaders, each with
his own interests and agenda, in order to create a unified strategy. Bringing
together the various rebel groups would greatly enhance their military
capabilities, as they will be able to better plan and execute operations. It would
also contribute significantly to the legitimacy and international recognition of theinsurgents' leadership.
Covert action is not without its risks. Some covert operatives may be killed or
captured by pro-Gaddafi forces. Those captured will no doubt be paraded in
front of the Western media as proof of the Wests nefarious intensions in Libya.
But the potential value of covert action far outweighs the risks if Libya is to rid
itself of a cruel dictator who has enslaved its people for four decades. The motto
of the British SAS commandos, forged in the same deserts of Libya 70 years ago
when SAS troops clandestinely sabotaged Rommels bombers and fuel depots, is
Who dares wins. This aptly presents the attitude that should govern covert
action in Libya if the country is to be freed again from a deadly despot.
Dr. Shlomo Shpiro is deputy chairman of the Political Studies Department at Bar-Ilan
University, senior research associate at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, and
chairman of the International Intelligence History Association (IIHA).
BESA Perspectives is published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family