covert action for toppling the gaddafi regime

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    Covert Action for Toppling the Gaddafi Regime

    by Dr. Shlomo Shpiro

    BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 134, March 23, 2011

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: While Western powers have stepped in to enforce the

    UN Security Council's 'no fly zone' over Libya, depriving Muammar Gaddafi of

    his air power alone will not ensure victory for the insurgents on the ground.

    Covert action, conducted by intelligence operatives, can clandestinely provide

    the rebels with the funds, arms, communication equipment and intelligence

    information crucial for their success, without the need for Western forces tointervene on the ground. Such a strategy can also help unite the insurgents in

    order to create a unified military response to Gaddafi's army.

    The arrest on March 6, 2011 of a team of eight British intelligence operatives and

    SAS commandos in eastern Libya provided a glimpse into the shadowy activities

    surrounding Western attempts to assist Libyan insurgent forces in their fight

    against Colonel Muammar Gaddafis regime. The capture of the British

    undercover team was preceded several days earlier by the arrest of three Dutch

    commandos who landed clandestinely by helicopter south of Tripoli whileassisting Dutch nationals to evacuate the region.

    Intelligence services have long perfected the use of covert action as a tool of

    foreign policy. By secretly equipping and training anti-government forces,

    regime change can be accelerated without Western troops actually being

    deployed on the ground. Covert action has been used before in Iraq, Lebanon,

    Congo, Angola, Cambodia, Afghanistan and many other countries to support

    indigenous uprisings by forces greatly inferior to the government in their

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    military capabilities. Despite the enforcement of the no fly zone, Gaddafis army

    remains relatively strong and well equipped and could remain entrenched in its

    positions or even launch a counter-attack eastward to recapture some areasliberated over the past few weeks, even without using its air force. Covert action

    can be deployed in Libya to assist the insurgents in several crucial ways: to

    provide funds, arms, communication equipment and intelligence information to

    the rebels, to train them in the use of modern arms and tactics, and to mediate

    and coordinate between the different resistance groups.

    One of Gaddafis main advantages is that he controls the states treasury and can

    dispense vast amounts of money to reward, bribe or buy the loyalty of large

    parts of the Libyan military as well as of mercenaries from neighboring African

    states. Despite many Western countries freezing Gaddafis assets, he still has at

    his disposal vast amounts of money. On March 4 th, British border police stopped

    a ship carrying over $160 million in Libyan currency and impounded large

    containers full of cash heading for Tripoli, a clear indication of Gaddafis attempt

    to bring into Libya funds from different sources. Financial backing is crucial for

    the success of the anti-Gaddafi forces, not only in funding their activities but also

    in ensuring the commitment of local clan leaders who still sit on the fence

    waiting to see which side wins. Subsidies for local leaders have been used

    effectively in Afghanistan and Iraq and can, at least in the short term, lower the

    risk of their defection to the other side.

    The anti-Gaddafi rebels are armed with a myriad of small arms and antiquated

    light artillery, mostly looted from local army barracks and arms dumps. These

    arms may make impressive noise on television but lack the ability to counter

    Gaddafis most important military advantage his heavy tanks. Though much

    fuss has been made over the no fly zone and curtailing the attacks of the Libyan

    air force, air power alone will not secure territory lost on the ground. The greater

    danger is Gaddafi's tanks, against which the rebels light arms are all but useless.

    In order to have any chance of stopping armored assaults on the east of the

    country, the rebels must be supplied with effective anti-tank weapons, for which

    they must receive proper instruction and training in their effective use.

    The Gaddafi regime controls all communications in the country, including the

    national telephone network, cell phone networks and the Internet. The rebels

    urgently require effective communication equipment in order to connect

    different rebel groups across the vast Libyan desert so that they can coordinate

    their activities. Such communication equipment would also enable the

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    establishment of an early warning system in case of an impending attack by

    Gaddafi forces, allowing for rebel mobilization and defense preparation.

    Though some of the rebels are former soldiers or officers in the Libyan army, the

    large majority are well meaning, brave citizens with little or no military

    knowledge or training in modern warfare and tactics. Training is critical for

    military success. Western intelligence services could covertly arrange for the

    rapid training of key people outside of Libya, possibly in third countries, who

    will then return to Libya and train others. The value of even a few well trained

    fighters is not only a military necessity but also a key to boosting the motivation

    and morale of others. For example, in the 1960s, a few former British SAS officers

    trained thousands of tribesmen in Yemen who were then able to stop attacks by

    the vastly better equipped Egyptian army.

    At the moment, the uprising against Gaddafi is being conducted haphazardly

    across different areas, driven by the sheer hatred of the regime more than by a

    clear and coherent vision of the potential future of the country. However, covert

    action could be used to mediate between the various local clan leaders, each with

    his own interests and agenda, in order to create a unified strategy. Bringing

    together the various rebel groups would greatly enhance their military

    capabilities, as they will be able to better plan and execute operations. It would

    also contribute significantly to the legitimacy and international recognition of theinsurgents' leadership.

    Covert action is not without its risks. Some covert operatives may be killed or

    captured by pro-Gaddafi forces. Those captured will no doubt be paraded in

    front of the Western media as proof of the Wests nefarious intensions in Libya.

    But the potential value of covert action far outweighs the risks if Libya is to rid

    itself of a cruel dictator who has enslaved its people for four decades. The motto

    of the British SAS commandos, forged in the same deserts of Libya 70 years ago

    when SAS troops clandestinely sabotaged Rommels bombers and fuel depots, is

    Who dares wins. This aptly presents the attitude that should govern covert

    action in Libya if the country is to be freed again from a deadly despot.

    Dr. Shlomo Shpiro is deputy chairman of the Political Studies Department at Bar-Ilan

    University, senior research associate at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, and

    chairman of the International Intelligence History Association (IIHA).

    BESA Perspectives is published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family