Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found athttp://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=gini20

Download by: [University of Nebraska, Lincoln] Date: 17 May 2016, At: 13:04

International InteractionsEmpirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations

ISSN: 0305-0629 (Print) 1547-7444 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/gini20

The Deterrent Effects of the International CriminalCourt: Evidence from Libya

Courtney Hillebrecht

To cite this article: Courtney Hillebrecht (2016): The Deterrent Effects of theInternational Criminal Court: Evidence from Libya, International Interactions, DOI:10.1080/03050629.2016.1185713

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2016.1185713

View supplementary material

Accepted author version posted online: 05May 2016.Published online: 05 May 2016.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 9

View related articles

View Crossmark data

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

1 1

The Deterrent Effects of the International Criminal

Court: Evidence from Libya1

Courtney Hillebrecht

University of Nebraska-Lincoln

The International Criminal Court (ICC) was designed to try the worst war criminals for crimes

against humanity, genocide and other instances of mass human suffering. By providing a

permanent, international mechanism to hold perpetrators of mass human rights abuse

accountable, the ICC is also meant to be a deterrent—to prevent potential genocidaires from

committing systematic human rights abuses in the first place. But what if the effect is actually

quite the opposite? While advocates of international justice have made conjectures about the

effect of the ICC on stopping human rights abuses, the existing scholarship does not empirically

test assumptions about the relationship between international criminal justice and violence. This

article outlines the causal mechanisms by which the ICC could affect on-going violence and tests

1 I would like to thank Carrie Booth Walling, Ross Miller, Nam Kim, Christian Davenport, Will Moore, Erik

Voeten, Chris Fariss, Amanda Murdie, and Jim Meernik for their very constructive comments on

previous versions of this paper. I am also grateful to Jake Wobig and Rula Jabor for their research

assistance and Reed Wood, Anita Ghodes, Yuri Zhukov and Matthew Baum for directing me

toward/sharing data. All errors are mine alone.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

2 2

these assumptions using event count models of the relationship between the ICC and the level of

violence against civilians in Libya during the 2011 crisis. These analyses suggest that the ICC’s

involvement in conflict does have a dampening effect on the level of mass atrocities committed.

The results also call for a broad and sustained research agenda on the effect of international

accountability efforts on on-going violence.

The International Criminal Court (ICC/the Court) is designed to be a standing international

forum for the adjudication of atrocity crimes. The violations on which the ICC adjudicates are

grave—genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes of aggression—and the Court

does not enter into investigations or indictments lightly. The express objective of the ICC is to

bring perpetrators of these major war crimes to justice, but underlying this goal is the hope that

the ICC will serve as a deterrent for would-be perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against

humanity. As the ICC’s first president and lead judge, Philippe Kirsch, said, “By putting

potential perpetrators on notice that they may be tried before the Court, the ICC is intended to

contribute to the deterrence of these crimes” (Interview with Mr. Philippe Kirsch, President and

Chief Judge of the ICC 2005).

In the best-case scenario, the International Criminal Court would hold perpetrators accountable,

set standards and norms for protecting human rights, engage in outreach activities to help

improve domestic judiciaries, deter violence and encourage states to live up to their broader

international human rights commitments regarding accountability for human rights abuses.

Empirical research on the effects of the ICC during ongoing conflict, however, is limited. What

if the International Criminal Court has no effect on the protection of human rights? The

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

3 3

international community provides a great deal of political and financial support (to the tune of

166 million USD in 2014) to the ICC, and if the ICC’s efforts are for naught, that political and

financial capital could go to other efforts that are more effective in curbing human rights abuses

(“ICC Secures Budget Increase - Institute for War and Peace Reporting - P213” 2014). Worst of

all, however, what if the ICC has a perverse effect on the protection of human rights? If

perpetrators of human rights abuse expect that they will be held accountable tomorrow, will they

fight harder and dirtier today? With the growth of international and domestic accountability

mechanisms for human rights violations, this is an important question to address, yet it is one

that has received relatively scant attention in recent years (see, however, Cronin-Furman 2013;

Jo and Simmons 2014; Kim and Sikkink 2010; Olsen, Payne, and Reiter 2010; Sikkink 2011;

Subotic 2011).

This article seeks to answer these questions by conducting an empirical analysis of the

effects of the International Criminal Court.2 Using event count models of violence against

civilians, including government-sponsored civilian deaths, this article evaluates the conditions

under which the ICC had a deterrent effect on the commission of civilian casualties during the

2011 crisis in Libya. The situation in Libya provides a novel case study in which to examine the

effect of the ICC because, as I explain in more detail below, if international criminal

accountability has an effect on war crimes during ongoing conflict, it would be in a situation in

which there was active international military and political involvement. Libya provides precisely

such a test case given NATO’s involvement in the conflict and the United Nations Security

2 This work follows the model set out by Meernik 2005.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

4 4

Council’s referral of the Libyan crisis to the ICC.3 Further, while the ICC can—and has—

investigated rebel forces for the perpetration of atrocity crimes, in Libya and in other situations,

such as Darfur and Côte d’Ivoire, the main suspects are or were government agents at the time of

the violence. As such, the theoretical framework and empirical analyses below look at the role

of the ICC in affecting total civilian fatalities as well as state-sponsored civilian deaths.

By examining the effects of the ICC on civilian deaths committed during ongoing conflict, this

article makes a number of contributions to the conflict, human rights, international relations and

international law literatures. First, this article seeks to connect these literatures by looking at the

effect of justice efforts during conflict, as opposed to once the conflict has ended. This article

does not make any claims about the effects of the ICC during peacetime, nor does it speak to a

potential deterrent effect on non-parties to the violence or in stopping conflict from erupting in

the first place (Grono and International Crisis Group 2012). Rather, this article examines the

under-studied question of the short-term effects of the ICC during conflict by examining how

ICC involvement changes the dynamics of violence against civilians. In doing so, this article

engages with the literature on conflict dynamics and provides an analysis of the real-time effects

of international criminal accountability. Second, this article takes up the broader question of the

role of international criminal law in curbing violence and seeks to identify the limits and abilities

of international law to mitigate mass atrocities. Third, by examining the role of the ICC in the

3 Appendix A outlines lists the crises in which the ICC got involved whilst the conflict was

ongoing and the mode of referral of the situations.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

5 5

violence in Libya, this article also aims to provide academics and policymakers alike with timely

empirical analyses of the ICC’s effects on on-going humanitarian crises.

Through an investigation of the effect of the ICC’s involvement in the 2011 conflict in Libya the

research presented below suggests that the ICC can have a moderate dampening effect on

civilian casualties, particularly at the beginning of the conflict. Even when controlling for other

factors like conflict dynamics and media coverage of the events, the models suggest that the ICC

can serve as a deterrent of violence against civilians. These findings must be taken in light of the

larger aims of the ICC, however, and do not speak to the ICC’s other goals holding individuals

accountable and providing justice to victims. Reducing the intensity of war crimes committed

during conflict certainly feeds into the ICC’s larger objectives of doling out punishment for

perpetrators, supplying justice and creating a culture of accountability, but it is only part of the

process.

This article proceeds as follows. The next section describes the work of the International

Criminal Court and the crisis in Libya. Next, I consider the potential deterrent effect of the

ICC’s involvement on ongoing conflict. The third section outlines a set of competing hypotheses

about the effects of the ICC. The fourth section then tests these hypotheses with a set of event

count models and the fifth section discusses the results of these models. The sixth section

concludes by proposing that the International Criminal Court can have a deterrent effect on the

perpetration of human rights violations and by calling for a larger, systematic research agenda on

the deterrent effects of international criminal accountability.

The International Criminal Court and the Crisis in Libya

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

6 6

The International Criminal Court is an independent adjudicative body designed to investigate and

hear cases concerning individual criminal responsibility for wide-scale human rights violations.

In the aftermath of mass human suffering in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti and Bosnia in the 1990s, the

international community recognized the need for a standing international body ready and willing

to prosecute the worst perpetrators. The Court’s establishment under the 1998 Rome Statute was

the result of this shared vision for accountability. To date, 122 countries have ratified the Rome

Statute and accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction to prosecute perpetrators of mass human rights abuse

(Ellis and Goldstone 2008; International Criminal Court 2011a; International Criminal Court

2011b; Schabas 2007).

The ICC is a mechanism of last resort and positions itself as a safety net at the bottom of the

human rights legal order (Yates 2009). The ICC is designed to complement, not replace,

domestic judicial institutions (International Criminal Court 2011a; International Criminal Court

2011b; Mitchell and Powell 2011). The Court can adjudicate on cases concerning genocide,

crimes against humanity and war crimes, and its jurisdiction only covers those crimes if the

accused is a national of a party to the Rome Statute, the abuse took place in a state party to the

Rome Statue, or if the United Nations Security Council refers the case to the Court. The Court’s

jurisdiction is not retroactive and only extends to those abuses committed after July 1, 2002,

when the Rome Statute officially entered into force. Further, under the principle of

complementarity, the ICC can only adjudicate on cases that domestic courts are unwilling or

unable to handle (Burke-White 2008; International Criminal Court 2011a; Kleffner 2003;

Nouwen 2014). Despite these limitations to the Court’s jurisdiction, the ICC does pose a very

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

7 7

real threat to leaders who might be engaged in the atrocity crimes that fall under the Court’s

purview.

Getting a case to the International Criminal Court is difficult, both because of the Court’s limited

jurisdiction and because of the many steps involved in the legal proceedings at the Court.

Potential cases come to the Court’s attention in one of three ways. First, as in Libya, members of

the UN Security Council (UNSC) can refer a case to the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), which

in turn initiates an investigation into the allegations. Alternatively, states party to the Rome

Statute can refer a case to the OTP, or the Prosecutor may also begin its own investigation with

approval from the Pre-Trial Chamber (International Criminal Court 2011a).

The OTP was very proactive in issuing early and loud calls for accountability for atrocity crimes

and violations of international humanitarian law in Libya. The conflict started on February 17,

2011, when thousands of protestors took to the streets in Benghazi, Tripoli and other cities

throughout the country to protest Muammar Qaddafi’s4 41-year long rule. Protests in the streets

quickly led to armed stand-offs between rebel groups and security forces loyal to Colonel

Qaddafi, as rebels sought to gain control over the eastern part of the country. Rebel forces,

largely untrained and highly fractured, were unable to use many of the bases, planes and

helicopters they captured in their eastern campaign, and Qaddafi’s air power gave him the upper

hand in battering the rebels and retaking strategic oil cities (New York Times, n.d.).

4 With so many different spellings of Qadaffi, I chose to follow the New York Time’s spelling of

his name.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

8 8

The UN and the ICC became involved almost immediately. The OTP issued a statement about

the alleged crimes in Libya on February 23, 2011. Two days later the UN’s Human Rights

Council passed resolution S-15/1, establishing a commission of inquiry into the Libyan violence

(Report of the Human Rights Council on Its Fifteenth Special Session 2011). The following day,

February 26, 2011, the UNSC authorized the ICC (UNSC Resolution 1970) to investigate and

indict the alleged crimes that took place during the conflict. UNSC Resolution 1970 also

included a travel ban, asset freeze and arms embargo, making the ICC’s investigation part of a

larger package of international censure (United Nations Security Council Council 2011). On

March 17, 2011, the United Nations Security Council passed UNSC Resolution 1973, which

allowed for military action to enforce the no fly zone and arms embargo and to protect civilians.

(Bilefsky and Landler 2011; United Nations Security Council 2011). The United States and

France led the initial military incursion into Libya but handed over responsibility for the mission

to NATO shortly thereafter. This political support, coupled with NATO’s military intervention,

makes Libya an important test case of the ICC’s effects. The ICC’s jurisprudential work was

backed by the political desires of the world’s most powerful states; if ever we were to see the

effect of the ICC it should be in Libya.

The deterioration of human rights conditions in Libya was readily apparent. The United Nations

Human Rights Council moved to suspend Libya in February 2011 for using military force to

indiscriminately attack civilians (United Nations News Service Section 2011a). The

International Commission of Inquiry’s report, issued on June 1, 2011, found that Libyan forces

were committing crimes against humanity and war crimes. The UN panel cited a range of

assaults on civilians and indicated that further investigation was needed to corroborate

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

9 9

allegations of abuses, including murder, imprisonment, torture, persecution, forced

disappearances and sexual assault. The International Commission of Inquiry also accused rebel

forces of committing abuses and called for both government and rebel forces to stop the abuses

immediately (Human Rights Council 2011; United Nations News Service Section 2011b).

Attacks against civilians in Benghazi, Misrata, and Sirte, among other cities, left an estimated

2800 dead. Figure 1, below, shows the fluctuations of fatalities incurred in attacks against

civilians.5 Some of the notable spikes in Figure 1 include 300 Libyans attacked during a funeral

in Benghazi at the end of February 2011, the Libyan government’s air strikes against civilians on

February 20, 2011, 267 bodies found in the city of Sirte at the end of October 2011, and the

alleged causalities from NATO airstrikes at the end of May 2011 and in mid-October 2011

(Raleigh et al. 2010).6

The ICC indicted three suspects with respect to this violence: Qaddafi; his son, Saif Al-Islam

Qaddafi; and the Libyan intelligence chief, Abdulla Al-Senussi. While ICC trials might have the

most impact on a conflict, the trials are only part of a long adjudicative process at the ICC, as

indicated above, and it is important to consider the effects of all of the steps that the ICC takes.

These include securing a referral from the Security Council, opening investigations and asking

5 Figure 1 presents the natural log of fatalities for ease of presentation and interpretation given

the large spikes in fatalities.

6 These numbers and descriptions are taken from the ACLED dataset, described in more detail

below.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

10 10

judges to issue arrest warrants. Understanding the impacts of the ICC on the continuing violence

in Libya requires considering all of these initiatives. Table 1, below, outlines the steps that the

ICC has taken toward Libya between the start of the conflict in February 2011 and the end of

October 2011, when Qadaffi was killed.7

Since Qadaffi’s death, the ICC and the interim Libyan government have engaged in contentious

negotiations about who has jurisdiction for holding the other two perpetrators accountable, with

both the Libyan authorities and the ICC invoking their own interpretations of the principle of

complementarity (Gray 2011; “Qaddafi Son Saif Al-Islam, Intelligence Chief ‘want to

Surrender’ to ICC” 2012; Stahn 2012; Willis and Holehouse 2011). In October 2013, the ICC

decided that the case against Abdulla al-Senussi should be tried in domestic courts. Meanwhile,

the ICC, Libyan officials and Qaddafi’s son, Saif al-Islam, are at loggerheads over who has

jurisdiction over al-Islam’s case.

The ICC’s involvement in Libya is unique because it was initiated at the behest of the Security

Council and accompanied by NATO-led military action against Qaddafi. Of the other eight ICC

situations, only Darfur was prompted by a UNSC referral. Libya is also the only of the ICC’s

situations in which significant international military intervention was contemporaneous to the

ICC’s investigations and indictments. These features set Libya apart from the other situations at

this nascent tribunal, but they also reflect the intended role of the ICC as one part of a larger

7 All of this information is available from the ICC’s Weekly Updates, which can be found here:

http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Press+and+Media/ICC+Weekly+Update/

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

11 11

international and domestic legal and political architecture meant to limit and deter atrocity

crimes. For the present purposes—an early empirical analysis of the ICC’s impact on ongoing

conflict—Libya provides an important test case. If the ICC were to have a deterrent effect on

ongoing conflict, we would expect it to be in a situation in which the Court works with others

actors. Of course, given the ICC’s imbrication in the international community’s efforts in Libya,

it is important to take into account the potentially confounding effects of NATO’s military action

and the UNSC’s referral, which the models below do, and to interpret the results of the analysis

with the unique characteristics of Libya in mind.

The Deterrent Effects of the International Criminal Court during

Wartime

Until the recent wave of prosecutions for the perpetrators of systematic atrocity crimes,

suspected war criminals and human rights perpetrators enjoyed a great deal of impunity (Roht-

Arriaza 2006; Sikkink and Walling 2007; Sikkink 2011). The Augusto Pinochet and Hissène

Habré cases, as well as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the special courts for Cambodia and Sierra

Leone began to slowly chip away the shroud of immunity that human rights abusers long

enjoyed (Roht-Arriaza and Mariezcurrena 2006). Similarly, in domestic courts around the

world, governments have been pursuing accountability for human rights abuses. (Kim and

Sikkink 2010; Lutz and Sikkink 2000; Sikkink and Walling 2007; Sikkink 2011). The question

then becomes whether or not the increased likelihood and threat of prosecution is a sufficient

deterrent against the commission of atrocity crimes.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

12 12

Many scholars of transitional justice find that the prosecution of former human rights abuses sets

an important precedent, highlights a normative commitment to human rights and can act as a

deterrent for future abuses (Kritz and Mandela 1995; Osiel 2000; Roht-Arriaza and

Mariezcurrena 2006; Sikkink and Walling 2007). Many of the justifications for accountability

emphasize the precedent-setting and deterrent effects of accountability. Holding perpetrators

accountable, the argument goes, demonstrates the viability of the rule of law and human rights

protections, and thereby should deter future human rights abusers from thinking themselves

above or outside the law. Similarly, if a conflict does erupt, the threat of international criminal

accountability should cause the level of violence and human rights abuses to decrease.

Critics contend that the ICC can pose little more than empty threats, but recent research

suggests that the international criminal law regime can have real, noticeable effects on states’

behavior. For example, in their research on why states ratify (or not) the Rome Statute, Beth

Simmons and Allison Danner (2010) argue that the expectation of accountability is sufficient

enough that some states will not join the Rome Statute in the first place. The very prospect of

having high-level political elites being held accountable at the ICC scares some states away from

ratification (Kelley 2007; Simmons and Danner 2010; see, however, Goodliffe et al. 2012).

At the individual level, it is increasingly clear that the international criminal law regime

is more than simply a nuisance. Those heads of states that do have arrest warrants out have had

to significantly curb their behavior. While this certainly means restricted travel—a point that

both critics and supporters of the ICC raise—it also means changing behavior during elections,

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

13 13

dealing with a consistent barrage of negative and international press and being labeled an

international pariah (Interview with Author 2013).

As Hunjoon Kim and Kathryn Sikkink (2010) and Hyeran Jo and Simmons (2014) both

note, the domestic criminal justice literature has found increasing support for the deterrent effect

of criminal accountability. More specifically, this literature suggests that it the increased

likelihood of accountability, rather than the severity of the punishment, that deters criminal

activity (Chalfin and McCrary 2014; Kim and Sikkink 2010). The nascent literature on the

potential deterrent effects of international trials supports this hypothesis, although scholars

variously suggest that the ICC lacks the direction, capacity and judicial authority to fully live up

to its deterrent potential and/or that the such a deterrent effect is conditional on prosecutorial

strategy and social pressure imposed on states. (Ainley 2011; Cronin-Furman 2013; Jo and

Simmons 2014).

With those caveats in place, if we begin with the premise that it is the likelihood of

accountability, rather than the severity of the punishment, that fosters deterrence, we can identify

a set of specific conditions that are likely to lead to the ICC’s deterring state-sponsored civilian

killings during conflict. First, international criminal accountability hinges on the willingness and

ability of domestic and international actors to turn suspected war criminals over to the ICC (Bass

2001). While the international community has the authority to refer situations, open

investigations and issue warrants, it does not have the authority to capture suspected war

criminals. While the threat of prosecution does not seem particularly ominous if war criminals

believe that political elites abroad will provide refuge and protection, the number of states

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

14 14

willing to host wanted war criminals is shrinking. Consider, for example, the case of Hisséne

Habré, the former Chadian dictator who is now facing trial in Senegal or even the fate of

Qaddafi’s chief of intelligence and ICC suspect, Abdullah al-Senussi, whom the Mauritanian

government turned over to interim authorities in Libya. As Michael Gilligan (2006) argues, the

ICC and similar regimes can have a deterrent effect, even absent full enforcement capabilities, by

virtue of altering the long-term incentives of both leaders and potential allies who might provide

asylum. Gilligan suggests that the presence of an international criminal regime might eliminate

the possibility of seeking asylum elsewhere (Gilligan 2006). Moreover, transfer to The Hague

might be preferable to facing punishment at home, as Qaddafi’s own death later went on to show.

Moreover, we are now witnessing a back-and-forth between the ICC and Libyan officials over

who has jurisdiction over Saif al-Islam’s case. The reason for this on-going exchange is

decidedly not over providing al-Islam with political protection but rather over the opportunity to

try him.

Unless political elites know that they will remain in power and can therefore control their own

destiny, the possibility of transfer to The Hague might, then, be the best of their available

options. As Payam Akhavan (2009) notes, international criminal tribunals can have a deterrent

effect by reshaping political elites calculations about their long-term reputation, even if these

tribunals are unable to execute each and every arrest warrant and build uniformly successful

cases (Akhavan 2001; Akhavan 2009). If political elites know that they will lose or are uncertain

of the outcome of the conflict, imprisonment in The Netherlands is most likely preferable to

facing the domestic aftermath of defeat.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

15 15

Second, in order for the threat of accountability to be credible and for the ICC to serve as

an effective deterrent, the international community writ large must be willing to provide the

political and financial capital needed to initiate, investigate and try cases at the ICC. Even the

most vocal supporters of international criminal justice are not likely to support accountability for

their own citizens (Bass 2001). This umbrella of impunity could also extend to allies and trading

partners. Thus, some human rights abusers might consider themselves to be insulated from

international justice because of their important positions in international politics and trade. In

the particular case of Libya, the ICC was working with the explicit consent and referral of the

UN Security Council. With such political supporters, it was clear that the threat of prosecution at

the ICC was not simply legal peacocking, but was instead a very real message that the

international community would not provide Qaddafi with any refuge. NATO’s involvement in

Libya, including that of Italy, Libya’s staunchest Western ally, further reinforced the point that

there would be little safe haven for Qaddafi after the war.

Third, and finally, international accountability is slow and in order for the threat of

accountability to be a credible one, the ICC needs to make it clear that investigations and trials

will take place in a timely manner. Although the ICC has only handed down three judgments at

the merits stage, those against Thomas Dyilo Lubanga (convicted), Germain Katanga (convicted)

and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (acquitted),8 it has picked up the pace of its jurisprudence in recent

8 See (The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 2012; The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga 2014;

The Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui 2012).

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

16 16

years. Even if Qaddafi or other heads of state were able to delay their trials, the likelihood of

them awaiting trial while out on bail or in absentia is increasingly low.9

Thus, the threat of a accountability and any subsequent deterrent effects of the ICC should be

clearest when: 1) there is little possibility of safe haven in the event of military defeat; 2) the ICC

is backed by other international actors; and 3) when the ICC demonstrates its intentions to bring

a case to trial in a timely manner. The Libyan case satisfies each of these criteria. Qaddafi’s

ability to come out of the civil war victorious was highly uncertain, especially given the UNSC’s

backing of both NATO’s involvement in the war and the ICC’s investigation of atrocity crimes

committed during the conflict. Thus, the main argument of this paper is that the ICC can have a

deterrent effect on the commission of atrocity crimes during conflict. The central hypothesis

tested below suggests:

H1 (Deterrence/Abatement): Action at the ICC will lead to a decrease in the violence

committed during a conflict, particularly government-sponsored killing of civilians.

Competing Hypotheses: The ICC as a Lame Duck or Instigator of Mass Atrocity

It is quite possible that the ICC has no discernable impact on on-going conflict or that it actually

exacerbates the violence that occurs during armed conflict. The International Criminal Court has

9 See, for example, The Prosecutor V. Uhurua Muigai Kenyatta, Confirmation of Charges

(Situation in Kenya) 2012; The Prosecutor V. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang,

Confirmation of Charges (Situation in Kenya) 2012.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

17 17

a restricted mandate and no effective ability to bring perpetrators to justice without the explicit

cooperation of state actors. Governments need to be willing to bring perpetrators to The Hague

and then follow through with the ICC Chief Prosecutor’s requests for access to witnesses,

victims, suspected perpetrators and information. Governments can very easily ignore these

requests, rendering the ICC and the prospect of prosecution moot. Perpetrators might also

discount the likelihood of prosecution because of the glacial pace of international legal

proceedings, a lack of international consensus on adjudication, or their own ability to outwit the

Court (see, relatedly, Peskin 2009).

Even if perpetrators do view accountability at the ICC as a risk in the abstract, they might not

view it as applicable or pertinent to their present situation. For instance, it is possible that

potential abusers do not identify with those already held or tried at the ICC. In the heat of the

battle, suspected war criminals might think of themselves as invincible and untouchable, or even

as heroes (Huntington 1991; Orentlicher 1991; Weschler 1990). In the earlier days of the Court,

it is also possible that the perpetrators, even the highest-ranking among them, did not know about

the International Criminal Court. While this has changed since the ratification of the Rome

Statute in 1998 and the very public pursuit of the ICC most-wanted suspects, perpetrators could

very well still believe themselves outside of the ICC’s grasp. Moreover, prospective perpetrators

of war crimes simply value the present more than the future. An individual war criminal or

genocidaire might privilege today’s military victory or the destruction of an opposition group

over a lifetime in prison in The Hague. In that case, the prospect of prosecution should have

little bearing on the genocidaire’s actions.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

18 18

Similarly, it is also possible that the International Criminal Court has a perverse effect on human

rights abuses: trials, indictments and reports actually lead to an increase in the violence rather

than its mitigation or cessation. In his book, War and Punishment, Hein Goemans (2000)

suggests that when leaders are losing a military battle, they become more risk-acceptant and

undertake dangerous military maneuvers. He calls this the “gamble for resurrection” (Goemans

2000). This same logic might also hold for genocidaires and war criminals. When genocidaires

or would-be war criminals believe that they will be tried for human rights abuses, they fight

harder, longer and dirtier. In effect, they assume that if they are in for a penny, they might as

well be in for a pound.10

The underlying logic here is that if suspected war criminals know that

they will be held accountable for human rights abuses, they have little or no incentive to decrease

the violence. Indeed, a popular line of thinking during the Libyan civil conflict was that

prosecuting Qaddafi would force him to hold on longer. For example, the Christian Science

Monitor reported that Obama-administration officials privately worried that Qaddafi’s

indictment would make peace in Libya more difficult to come by (LaFranchi 2011).

It is also possible that the ICC’s intervention will affect the general dynamics of a conflict. For

example, Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjurami (2004) suggest that trials of perpetrators can threaten

to undermine peace and reconciliation processes, in no small part because perpetrators are

10 This same logic is embodied in the principle of “double jeopardy,” which states that you

cannot be punished for the same crime(s) more than once.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

19 19

unwilling to stop fighting if they know that they will be held accountable for their abuses.11

Investigations and trials by the ICC might inspire other pro-government fighters to fight harder

to avenge the ICC’s actions on the part of their compatriot or in order to dispute the ICC and the

international community’s intrusion on the sovereignty of the given state. At the same time, by

accusing one side of human rights abuses, the ICC’s involvement might legitimize the other side,

thereby encouraging them to take more risks with respect to abusing humanitarian and human

rights law. Similarly, the ICC’s intervention might prevent outside actors from intervening in the

conflict, further altering the conflict dynamics and emboldening the combatants (Neumayer

2009).

While the fear that the threat of prosecution will ramp up atrocity crimes during conflict is

attention grabbing, the logic of accountability and punishment suggests that if the ICC has any

effect it should in fact be a mitigating one. If the ICC has already made it clear that it will

investigate and that it has the support, politically and in some cases militarily of the international

community, and the outcome of the conflict is uncertain, the likelihood that the Court will pursue

accountability is high. It then behooves political elites to dampen down, rather than ramp up,

atrocities, because they now are playing a new game: a game to either minimize their

11 This emphasis on state security likely follows directly from Snyder and Edward Mansfield’s

work (2002), which suggests that states undergoing transitions are likely to use force due to a

lack of full accountability. Of course, others, like Sikkink (2011) and Kim and Sikkink (2010),

contest this assumption.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

20 20

punishment or manipulate the legal process such that they can walk free. By curbing their

behavior after the ICC signals its intent to investigate, political elites are trying to produce the

smallest number of data points for their prosecution as possible. Indeed, doing so has two

benefits. The first is the immediate benefit of undermining the case against them, a strategy

Kenya’s Uhuru Kenyatta recently deployed to great success. The second benefit is longer-term:

the act of delegitimizing the ICC itself by producing yet another overturned case.

The following section tests the central hypothesis—that the ICC has a mitigating effect on

violence committed during armed conflict—as well as these alternative explanations using event

count models on the relationship between the ICC and violence against civilians amidst the back-

drop of the Libyan civil war. The discussion that follows also addresses questions about external

validity.

Models and Data

Identifying mass atrocities is, in many respects, only possible in the aftermath of conflict, once

conflict dynamics are better documented and parsed. Further, the crimes that fall under the

ICC’s jurisdiction—genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes—are legal classifications

determined post hoc through the trial process. All of this is to say that measuring mass atrocities

during a conflict is difficult, if not functionally impossible. One indicator of the crimes that fall

under the ICC’s jurisdiction, however, is a high civilian death toll. As such, the analyses that

follow look specifically at violence against civilians and the death tolls related to those attacks.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

21 21

This data is taken from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED). The ACLED

data provides daily event count data and covers a range of events, including violence against

civilians. ACLED uses source materials from local, regional, national and continental news

media, NGO reports and Africa-focused news reports. The dependent variable here is the

number of fatalities accumulated per day. Models 1-6 use only government-sponsored fatalities

as the dependent variable. Models 7-12 use all civilian fatalities as the dependent variable.

When events are labeled as “Violence against Civilians” within the ACLED events data the

assumption is that in this context, the victims are unarmed and not able to defend themselves.

This means that while the victims could be considered combatants in other contexts, in these

events they are non-combatants. The ACLED data is conservative in its counting for fatalities

and only includes numbers of fatalities when explicitly reported by its source materials. When

sources conflict, ACLED uses the lower count.12

While the atrocity crimes under the ICC’s

jurisdiction extend beyond violence against civilians and are determined post-hoc in the trial

phase, ACLED’s daily civilian death count provides a disaggregated proxy for the level of

civilian causalities omitted during the conflict. ACLED also includes data on whether the

12 The ACLED data is conservative in its counting of civilian casualties, but this does not imply

that it is a biased undercount. Rather, the ACLED data triangulates accounts of civilian deaths

from a number of sources, thereby mitigating potential over- or undercounting biases that

might result from only relying on major newspapers or local NGOs. The fact that ACLED is

conservative in its counting of civilian casualities should make it even more likely to see an

effect of the ICC on lowering the civilian casualty count.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

22 22

perpetrator was a government agent or rebel. As the central concern in this article is the role of

the ICC in changing rates of government-sponsored killing, the dependent variable taken from

ACLED only concerns the number of civilians killed by the government.13

I include two different measures of the ICC’s actions. First, I include seven dummy variables

that capture the ICC’s initiatives against Libya (see Table 1, above): 1) when the ICC issued a

statement regarding the potential crimes against humanity in Libya; 2) when the UN Security

Council referred the case to the ICC; 3) when the ICC opened the investigation; 4) when the ICC

assigned the case to a chamber; 5) when the ICC requested that the chamber issue arrest

warrants; 6) when the ICC issued the warrants; and 7) when the ICC asked INTERPOL for help

with the arrests. I excluded the ICC news briefing in May 2011, as well as Libya’s receipt of the

arrest warrants and subsequent meeting about the arrest warrants in June 2011 due to the

redundancy of those events with aforementioned actions. Each of these variables is coded as 0

prior to the event and 1 thereafter until the next ICC initiative, when the value for that variable

reverts to 0. This ensures ease of interpretation such that each additional initiative is not an

interactive term of the previous initiatives, but rather discrete interventions. The downside of

this approach, however, is that it treats the ICC’s interventions separately, rather than as a series

of linked actions. This can lead to a disjointed interpretation of the coefficients. Thus, in

addition to this measure, in Models 4-6 and 9-12, I include a cumulative count of the ICC’s

13 For an exhaustive discussion of measuring causalities during conflict, see Seybolt, Aronson,

and Fischhoff 2013.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

23 23

involvement in Libya to date. This cumulative measure is predicated on the idea that each of the

ICC’s actions builds on previous actions. The ICC’s actions are sequential and path dependent,

meaning that the ICC cannot, for example, issue arrest warrants, without first getting a referral.

Figure 2 provides an overview of ICC interventions and the daily number of fatalities incurred

during attacks on civilians with the ICC’s interventions into the conflict.

The models estimated below include a set of controls, including the level of conflict between

pro-Qadaffi forces and the rebels and vice-versa and the level of conflict between NATO and

pro-Qadaffi forces. The first two control variables account for the effects of conflict dynamics

on mass atrocity. The civil war research suggests that the relative power relations between rebels

and government forces, as well as third-party interventions all affect the likelihood of civilian

casualties, and these variables account for those relationships (for example, Azam and Hoeffler

2002; Davenport 2013; Eck and Hultman 2007; Hultman 2010; Kalyvas 2006; Kalyvas, Shapiro,

and Masoud 2008; Levi 2013; Sullivan 2012; Wood 2010). The third variable, the level of

conflict between NATO and pro-Qaddafi forces, accounts for the effect of NATO’s intervention

on the conflict. Because NATO became increasingly involved in the conflict over time, it is

important to differentiate between the effect of NATO on the ongoing conflict and the ICC’s

actions.

Because the dependent variable—fatalities in attacks against civilians—is a daily count, I also

need daily event data on conflict intensity. As such, I use original data from the CAMEO coding

scheme to measure conflict and cooperation among Qaddafi’s forces, the rebel groups and

NATO. The CAMEO coding scale ranks conflict-related events in terms of their inherent level

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

24 24

of conflict or cooperation, ranging from actions like expressing intentions to cooperate and

allowing humanitarian aid to pass through an occupied zone to threatening to use force and

employing aerial weapons. Each action is assigned a score, in which the larger the negative

number, the more conflictual the relationship between the actor pairs and the greater the positive

number, the more cooperative the relationship.14

The scores are then added together into a

continuous variable that measures the daily level of conflict and cooperation between the actor

pairs. I explain this coding process in more detail in Appendix B.

Using the CAMEO scale, I generated three variables: Government to Rebels, Rebels to

Government and NATO to Government. In the case of Government to Rebels, for example, the

CAMEO coding scale reflects how cooperative or threatening the Libyan government was

toward the rebel group; the Rebels to Government variable measures the opposite. In the case of

the Libyan conflict, these variables range from -25 (highly conflictual) to 11 (moderately

cooperative).

In addition to these controls, I also include a measure for global news coverage, which is based

on 3,233 newspapers in 114 countries between December 18, 2010 and October 20, 2011 (Baum

14 The mean for the Government to Rebels variable is -1.37. The mode and median are both

zero and the standard deviation is 4.49. The mean for the Rebel to Government variable is -

1.24, with a standard deviation of 4.37. Both the mean and mode are 0. The mean of the

NATO to Government variable is -1.80, the mean and mode are 0 and the standard deviation is

6.37. See also Appendix C.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

25 25

and Zhukov 2013). This variable captures the degree to which the violence in Libya is in the

international spotlight. We might expect that the more the conflict is in the spotlight, the more

likely the conflicting parties are to watch the level of violence against civilians. By shedding

light on human rights abuses, the ICC can inspire outrage among the international community

and lay the groundwork for an extensive naming and shaming campaign. International naming

and shaming, under varying conditions, can give way to more forceful diplomatic, economic and

military punishment, and/or tap into similar domestic efforts to name and shame violating states

(Krain 2012; Murdie and Davis 2011; see however, Hafner-Burton 2008). The models also

include a count for the number of days the conflict has been ongoing in order to take into the

evolution and duration of the crisis. This variable also helps to control for increased NATO

military involvement over time and changing dynamics of the conflict.

The data cover 246 days, with fatalities taking place on 36 of those. Appendix C provides

descriptive statistics of the dependent variables and the control variable. As the level of fatalities

is a count variable, I estimate a negative binomial model.15

I estimate three different model

specifications. Model 1 includes the variables for each of the ICC interventions, as well as the

15 In the robustness checks in Appendix D, I estimate a zero-inflated negative binomial. I use

the three variables that account for the level of conflict at any given day—Government to

Rebels, Rebels to Government and NATO to Government—for the inflation stage of the model,

as the level of conflict on any given day should affect whether or not there was violence against

civilians on that day.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

26 26

control variables for the government’s actions toward the rebels, the rebels’ actions toward the

government, NATO’s actions toward the government and media coverage. In Model 2, I include

these variables as well as a one-day lag of each of the controls and a one-day lag for the number

of fatalities. Doing so takes into account any retaliatory measures that might cause or be caused

by attacks on civilians. In Model 3, I include the un-lagged versions of these control variables,

as well as one-day lagged and one-week lagged versions of them, as such retaliatory attempts

might not taken place instantaneously but instead take some time to percolate. All of the models

include the variable daymarker, which, as explained above, counts the number of days the

conflict has been ongoing. Table 2 shows the results of these models. Models 4, 5 and 6 use the

cumulative count of ICC action and include the un-lagged, one-day lagged, and one-week lagged

variables described above.

Models 7-12 use the same specifications as Models 1-6 with the dependent variable restricted to

government-sponsored civilian casualties.

Discussion of Statistical Results

The results of this analysis suggest that the ICC’s involvement in Libya had a negative

and statistically significant effect on the number of fatalities. The results suggest that the ICC

can, in fact, serve as a deterrent of violence against civilians, particularly government-sponsored

civilian casualties, during ongoing conflict. When the ICC became involved in Libya, through

issuing statements and arrest warrants, and all of its actions in between, actors on the ground

took note and improved their human rights practices. It is important to stress that the ICC’s

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

27 27

involvement did not stop violence against civilians in Libya, but rather that it correlated to a

decrease in the violence.

In addition to supporting the overall hypothesis about the deterrent effects of the ICC, the results

in Models 1-3, support the notion that it is the intent to prosecute that deters crimes. Consistent

with this logic, the UNSC referral—a manifestation of the international community’s willingness

to support prosecution in a timely manner—prompted a significant abatement in the level of

civilian casualties, while later procedural actions, like issuing arrest warrants or invoking

INTERPOL have little, if any, statistically significant effect.

The results in Model 5 further corroborate this finding. Instead of differentiating among the

different types of ICC actions, the cumulative effect of ICC action here produces a statistically

significant decrease in the number of government-sponsored civilian deaths. Underlying this

logic is the idea that the more actions the ICC takes, the more credible the threat of investigation

and prosecution. We can think of this as encompassing some path dependence. The further

down the path of referrals, investigations, arrest warrants and the like, the more likely it is that

the investigations and trials will proceed. Thus, as discussed above, the likelihood of prosecution

increases the deterrent effects of the ICC. These results should be interpreted with caution,

however, as the results do not hold in the un-lagged (Model 4) or one week lagged models

(Model 6). This suggests that any deterrent effect that the ICC can have is modest and that these

analyses must be approached prudently. Moreover, these results are consistent with the idea that

it is the expressed intent and commitment to prosecute that has a deterrent effect on civilian

fatalities rather than the actual execution of the accountability process.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

28 28

Models 7-12 in Table 3 are generally consistent with the findings presented in Table 2, with the

caveat that cumulative ICC action only has a statistically significant effect in Model 11.

Moreover, in Models 7-9, later ICC action does have a statistically significant deterrent effect on

government-sponsored civilian fatalities. The divergent effects of later ICC actions in Models 1-

3 and 7-9, as well as in the models using the cumulative measure of ICC action, highlight a

tension between differing interpretations of the deterrent effect of the anticipation of punishment.

As I suggest above, the anticipatory effect of ICC punishment slows the more the ICC signals its

intent to prosecute the perpetrators. The further the ICC goes down the path of prosecution, the

less punishment is an abstract threat and the more it becomes a distinct political reality. This is

consistent with the findings in Models 1-3. Alternatively, however, one could argue that until

the trial actually begins and punishment is doled out, the threat or anticipation of punishment

continues to be at play. This would suggest, then, that the further along the path of prosecution

the ICC goes, the stronger the deterrent effect should be, as each subsequent step in the

investigation and trial process is a signal of the ICC’s commitment to prosecute. This is

consistent with the findings in Models 7-9.

These divergent interpretations and empirical results highlight the need for further empirical and

theoretical examination of the ICC’s work and its possible deterrent effects. Namely, future

research should continue to disaggregate the ICC’s work to understand the nuances of the

different strategies the ICC and suspected perpetrators deploy throughout the long preliminary

examination, investigation and trial/appeal processes. It is important, too, to recognize that each

of these stages involves different actors within the ICC, and that each of those actors has his or

her own objectives and strategies. As such, one particularly salient question for subsequent

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

29 29

research is the following: Once an ICC trial chamber begins its work, do states and the OTP

enter into a new form of bargaining? Does the logic become not one of avoiding the OTP’s gaze

but instead of manipulating the subsequent process, as we have seen in the Kenyan and Ivorian

cases?

Of course, it is important to consider not just the statistical significance of these results,

but also the substantive effects. Table 4 shows the marginal effects of the ICC’s actions toward

Libya. The predicted number of fatalities per day is 2.85, but many of the ICC’s actions,

including issuing a statement about the possible war crimes committed in Libya and receiving

the UNSC referral decreased the predicted number of fatalities per day to zero. This should not

be interpreted to mean that daily ICC action would remove all conflict, but instead that the

aftermath of ICC action did have a noticeable and statistically significant effect on civilian

casualties. Appendix D includes the full set of marginal effects for Models 2 and 5.

These models produce some other notable results. First, few of the control variables have a

statistically significant effect on the number of daily fatalities incurred during violence against

civilians. The models suggest that conflict dynamics did not have a consistent statistically

significant effect on the number of fatalities. For example, in Models 3, 5, 6, and 9, as NATO

took a more cooperative stance toward the Libyan government, the number of fatalities

decreased. Similarly, in some of the model specifications, the relationship between the

government and the rebels had a changeable effect on the number of fatalities, as did the

previous number of civilian fatalities. While news coverage had a statically significant effect on

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

30 30

the number of fatalities across a variety of model specifications, it also had a coefficient of zero.

Thus, while news coverage had a statistical correlation with the number of civilian causalities, it

did not have much of a substantive impact (see also Appendix D, which provides information on

the marginal effects for all of the variables in Models 2 and 5.)

In addition to the models presented above, I include a number of robustness checks. For Models

1-3, I also include the results of a Vuong test, which tests the assumption that a zero-inflated

negative binomial is preferable to a standard negative binomial model. Because the results of the

Vuong tests are borderline statistically significant in Models 1 and 2, I estimated the same

models using a zero-inflated negative binomial model. Those results are available in Appendix

E and are consistent with the results presented here. Further, in Appendix F, I include the results

of Prais-Winsten models that use the degree of conflict and cooperation between Qaddafi and

opposition forces, “Government to Rebels,” which is one of the control variables in Models 1-6),

as the dependent variable. The results are consistent with findings presented above.

Conclusion

This article set out to examine the possible effects of ICC action on civilian casualties during the

conflict in Libya and to consider what effect, if any, the ICC has in deterring or exacerbating

atrocities crimes. While the ICC serves many functions, particularly punishing perpetrators and

providing justice to victims, one of its aims is also to serve as a deterrent of violence. As the

International Criminal Court seeks to expand its influence, it is more important than ever to

understand the possible effects of the International Criminal Court on the very conflicts on which

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

31 31

it seeks to adjudicate. This article aims to fill a gap in the literature by offering an investigation

of the short-term effects of the ICC’s actions against Libya.

The event count models estimated in this article suggest that the ICC can have an effect on on-

going violence and dampen the level of violence committed against civilians. That is, the ICC

can serve as a deterrent during conflict, even when taking into account other conflict dynamics

and media coverage of the conflict. For those advocates of international justice, this is good

news, but it is important to be clear about the constraints on this data and the implications of

these findings.

First, as James Meernik (2005) suggests in his piece on the International Criminal Tribunal for

the Former Yugoslavia, a number of caveats are in order when assessing the impact of

international criminal courts (Meernik 2005). Namely, analysts and observers must approach

conflict data cautiously. While the ACLED data provides daily information on the number of

fatalities incurred during attacks on civilians, this data is conservatively measured, and fatalities

could be demonstrably higher than recorded. Second, the ACLED data is taken largely from

news sources. News agencies could very well miss small but systematic atrocity crimes,

particularly those involving sexual violence, and prefer to report on more salient violations. .

Third, although the TABARI and CAMEO coding schemes are well documented and fare

remarkably well against human coders, they are not foolproof and can miss degrees of nuance

important in the relationship among Muammar Qaddafi, the rebel forces and NATO (Gerner et

al. 2002; Goldstein 1992; Goldstein and Pevehouse 1997; Meernik 2005; Schrodt, Yilmaz, and

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

32 32

Center for International Political Analysis: Institute for Policy and Social Reserearch, University

of Kansas 2007).16

It is similarly important to consider the external validity and generalizability of the results

presented above. As discussed above, the ICC did not act alone in Libya. Instead, it operated in

concert with the UNSC and NATO. The implications of this are two-fold. First, we should be

careful not to extrapolate the findings above to situations in which the ICC is the only or even

main international actor. Instead, the results above can be understood as reflective of a conflict

situation in which the ICC was one part of a larger coalition of international actors. As I note

above, in the case of Libya, Qaddafi’s future was uncertain, the ICC worked in concert with the

UNSC and NATO, and the ICC’s OTP made an early and clear signal that it was committed to

investigating and prosecuting any possible crimes in Libya. As the main hypothesis suggests

and the empirical analysis corroborates, the ICC should have a deterrent effect on conflict under

these conditions. This finding, however, needs to be understood in its given context.

Above all, it is important to note that the analysis above does not speak to the ICC’s general

deterrent effects, but rather examines the impact of the ICC’s intervention during conflict. That

said, this analysis is just the first of a larger, multi-method investigation into the effect of the ICC

and other criminal tribunals on on-going conflict. This broader research agenda is designed to

assess the external validity of these results, not only by applying the methods used here to other

cases but also through methodological triangulation drawing on qualitative case studies and elite

16 More information is available here: http://web.ku.edu/~keds/papers.dir/automated.html

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

33 33

interviews. As such, we can interpret these results as a call for action: to consider the potential

role of the ICC in exacerbating or mitigating conflict; to identify which ICC steps have an

ameliorative effect and which play the opposite role; to articulate and test the causal mechanisms

through which the ICC could impact conflict; and to more clearly outline how those on the

receiving end of the ICC’s orders interpret their actions and whether they view them as credible

forms of justice or shallow threats and mandates for revenge. While we have seen less

international military involvement in the other situations at the ICC, we might well expect that in

future conflicts that prompt humanitarian intervention, the ICC will be part of those international

coalitions; this analysis gives us some preliminary analysis of the types of responses that the

ICC’s actions as part of that coalition are likely to prompt. The International Criminal Court

can—and should—be a powerful voice for preventing human rights abuse and holding

perpetrators of crimes against humanity to account. In order for this vision to be realized,

however, it is critical that the ICC and the policymakers and advocates that support it understand

the full spectrum of its effects.

Works Cited

Ainley, Kirsten. 2011. “The International Criminal Court on Trial.” Cambridge Review of

International Affairs 24 (3): 309–33. doi:10.1080/09557571.2011.558051.

Akhavan, Payam. 2001. “Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future

Atrocities?” The American Journal of International Law 95 (1): 7–31. doi:10.2307/2642034.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

34 34

———. 2009. “Are International Criminal Tribunals a Disincentive to Peace?: Reconciling

Judicial Romanticism with Political Realism.” Human Rights Quarterly 31 (3): 624–54.

doi:10.1353/hrq.0.0096.

Azam, Jean-Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2002. “Violence against Civilians in Civil Wars: Looting

or Terror?” Journal of Peace Research 39 (4): 461–85.

Bass, Gary Jonathan. 2001. Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals.

Princeton University Press.

Baum, Matthew A., and Yuri M. Zhukov. 2013. “Filtering Revolution: Reporting Bias in

International Newspaper Coverage of the Libyan Civil War (Working Paper).”

Bilefsky, Dan, and Mark Landler. 2011. “U.N. Approves Airstrikes Against Libya.” The New

York Times, March 17, sec. World / Africa.

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/18/world/africa/18nations.html?hp.

Burke-White, William W. 2008. “Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal Court

and National Courts in the Rome System of International Justice.” Harvard International Law

Journal 49: 53.

Chalfin, Aaron, and Justin McCrary. 2014. “Criminal Deterrence: A Review of the Literature.”

Cronin-Furman, Kate. 2013. “Managing Expectations: International Criminal Trials and the

Prospects for Deterrence of Mass Atrocity.” International Journal of Transitional Justice,

August, ijt016. doi:10.1093/ijtj/ijt016.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

35 35

Davenport, Christian. 2013. “State Repression and Political Order.” Domestic Political Violence

and Civil War 1 (1): 1–23. doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.101405.143216.

Eck, Kristine, and Lisa Hultman. 2007. “One-Sided Violence Against Civilians in War Insights

from New Fatality Data.” Journal of Peace Research 44 (2): 233–46.

Ellis, Mark, and Richard Goldstone, EDS. 2008. The International Criminal Court: Challenges

to Achieving Justice and Accountability in the 21st Century. New York: IDEBATE Press.

Gerner, Deborah J., Philip A. Schrodt, Rajaa Abu-Jabr, and Ömür Yilmaz. 2002. “Conflict and

Mediation Event Observations (CAMEO): A New Event Data Framework for the Analysis of

Foreign Policy Interactions.” In . New Orleans, LA.

Gilligan, Michael J. 2006. “Is Enforcement Necessary for Effectiveness? A Model of the

International Criminal Regime.” International Organization 60 (04): 935–67.

doi:10.1017/S0020818306060310.

Goemans, Hein Erich. 2000. War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First

World War. Princeton University Press.

Goldstein, Joshua S. 1992. “A Conflict-Cooperation Scale for WEIS Events Data.” Journal of

Conflict Resolution 36 (2): 369–85. doi:10.1177/0022002792036002007.

Goldstein, Joshua S, and Jon C. Pevehouse. 1997. “Reciprocity, Bullying, and International

Cooperation: Time-Series Analysis of the Bosnian Conflict.” American Political Science Review

91 (3): 515–29.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

36 36

Gray, Sadie. 2011. “Saif Gaddafi Negotiating Surrender on War Crimes Charges.” The Times,

UK, October 28, sec. Middle east.

Grono, Nick, and International Crisis Group. 2012. “The Deterrent Effect of the ICC on the

Commission of International Crimes by Government Leaders.” Accessed November 28.

http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/speeches/2012/grono-the-deterrent-effect-of-the-

icc.aspx.

Hafner-Burton, Emilie. 2008. “Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights

Enforcement Problem.” International Organization 62 (4): 689–716.

Hultman, Lisa. 2010. “Keeping Peace or Spurring Violence? Unintended Effects of Peace

Operations on Violence against Civilians.” Civil Wars 12 (1-2): 29–46.

Human Rights Council. 2011. Report of the International Commission of Inquiry to Investigate

All Alleged Violations of International Human Rights Law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

Advance Unedited Version A/HRC/17/44. United Nations.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.

University of Oklahoma Press.

“ICC Secures Budget Increase - Institute for War and Peace Reporting - P213.” 2014. Accessed

September 15. http://iwpr.net/report-news/icc-secures-budget-increase.

International Criminal Court. 2011a. “ICC at a Glance.” Accessed June 8.

http://212.159.242.180/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court/ICC+at+a+glance/.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

37 37

———. 2011b. “Frequently Asked Questions.” Accessed June 8.

http://212.159.242.180/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court/Frequently+asked+Questions/.

Interview with Mr. Philippe Kirsch, President and Chief Judge of the ICC. 2005 Interview by

Citizens for Global Solutions.

http://archive2.globalsolutions.org/publications/publications_phillipe_kirsch.

Jo, Hyeran, and Beth Simmons. 2014. “Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity?”

Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2006. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. 1st ed. Cambridge University

Press.

Kalyvas, Stathis N., Ian Shapiro, and Tarek Masoud. 2008. Order, Conflict, and Violence.

Cambridge University Press.

Kelley, Judith. 2007. “Who Keeps International Commitments and Why? The International

Criminal Court and Bilateral Nonsurrender Agreements.” American Political Science Review

101 (3): 573–88.

Kim, Hunjoon, and Kathyrn Sikkink. 2010. “Explaining the Deterrence Effect of Human Rights

Prosecutions for Transitional Countries.” International Studies Quarterly 54 (4): 939–63.

Kleffner, Jann K. 2003. “The Impact of Complementarity on National Implementation of

Substantive International Criminal Law.” Journal of International Criminal Justice 1 (1): 86–

113. doi:10.1093/jicj/1.1.86.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

38 38

Krain, Matthew. 2012. “J’accuse! Does Naming and Shaming Perpetrators Reduce the Severity

of Genocides or Politicides.” International Studies Quarterly 56 (3): 547–89.

Kritz, Neil J., and Nelson Mandela, EDS. 1995. Transitional Justice: How Emerging

Democracries Reckon with Former Regimes. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for

Peace.

LaFranchi, Howard. 2011. “Libya’s Qaddafi Charged with War Crimes: A Help or Hindrance to

NATO?” Christian Science Monitor, June 27. http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-

Policy/2011/0627/Libya-s-Qaddafi-charged-with-war-crimes-a-help-or-hindrance-to-NATO.

Levi, Margaret. 2013. “Domestic Political Violence and Civil War: An Introduction.” Domestic

Political Violence and Civil War 1 (1): null. doi:10.1146/annurev.violence.010813.100001.

Lutz, Ellen L., and Kathryn Sikkink. 2000. “International Human Rights Law and Practice in

Latin America.” International Organization 54 (3): 633–59. doi:10.1162/002081800551235.

Meernik, James. 2005. “Justice and Peace? How the International Criminal Tribunal Affects

Societal Peace in Bosnia.” Journal of Peace Research 42 (3): 271–89.

doi:10.1177/0022343305052012.

Mitchell, Professor Sara McLaughlin, and Emilia Justyna Powell. 2011. Domestic Law Goes

Global: Legal Traditions and International Courts. 1st ed. Cambridge University Press.

Murdie, Amanda, and David Davis. 2011. “Shaming and Blaming: Using Events Data to Assess

the Impact of Human Rights INGOs.” International Studies Quarterly 56 (1): 1–16.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

39 39

Neumayer, Eric. 2009. “A New Moral Hazard? Military Intervention, Peacekeeping and

Ratification of the International Criminal Court.” Journal of Peace Research 46 (5): 659–70.

doi:10.1177/0022343309339246.

New York Times. n.d. Libya--Protests and Revolt (2011).

http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/libya/index.html.

Nouwen, Sarah M. H. 2014. Complementarity in the Line of Fire: The Catalysing Effect of the

International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan. Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York:

Cambridge University Press.

Olsen, Tricia D., Leigh A. Payne, and Andrew G. Reiter. 2010. Transitional Justice in Balance:

Comparing Processes, Weighing Efficacy. United States Institute of Peace Press.

Orentlicher, Diane. 1991. “Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations

of a Prior Regime.” Yale 100 (8): 2537–2615.

Osiel, Mark. 2000. “Why Prosecute? Critics of Punishment for Mass Atrocity.” Human Rights

Quarterly 22 (1): 118–47. doi:10.1353/hrq.2000.0013.

“Qaddafi Son Saif Al-Islam, Intelligence Chief ‘want to Surrender’ to ICC.” 2012. Accessed

September 20. http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/10/26/173899.html.

Raleigh, Clionadh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre, and Joakim Karlsen. 2010. “Introducing

ACLED: An Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset Special Data Feature.” Journal of

Peace Research 47 (5): 651–60. doi:10.1177/0022343310378914.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

40 40

Report of the Human Rights Council on Its Fifteenth Special Session. 2011. A/HRC/S-15/1. New

York: United Nations.

Roht-Arriaza, Naomi. 2006. The Pinochet Effect: Transnational Justice in the Age of Human

Rights. University of Pennsylvania Press.

Roht-Arriaza, Naomi, and Javier Mariezcurrena, eds. 2006. Transitional Justice in the Twenty-

First Century: Beyond Truth versus Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schabas, William. 2007. An Introduction to the International Criminal Court. Third. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.

Schrodt, Philip A., Ömür Yilmaz, and Center for International Political Analysis: Institute for

Policy and Social Reserearch, University of Kansas. 2007. “CAMEO: Conflict and Mediation

Event Observations Codebook.”

Seybolt, Taylor B., Jay D. Aronson, and Baruch Fischhoff, EDS. 2013. Counting Civilian

Casualties: An Introduction to Recording and Estimating Nonmilitary Deaths in Conflict.

Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sikkink, Kathryn. 2011. The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing

World Politics. 1st ed. W. W. Norton & Company.

Sikkink, Kathryn, and Carrie Booth Walling. 2007. “The Impact of Human Rights Trials in Latin

America.” Journal of Peace Research 44 (4): 427–45. doi:10.1177/0022343307078953.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

41 41

Simmons, Beth A., and Allison Danner. 2010. “Credible Commitments and the International

Criminal Court.” International Organization 64 (02): 225–56. doi:10.1017/S0020818310000044.

Stahn, Carsten. 2012. “Libya, the International Criminal Court and Complementarity A Test for

‘Shared Responsibility.’” Journal of International Criminal Justice 10 (2): 325–49.

doi:10.1093/jicj/mqs016.

Subotic, Jelena. 2011. “Expanding the Scope of Post-Conflict Justice Individual, State and

Societal Responsibility for Mass Atrocity.” Journal of Peace Research 48 (2): 157–69.

doi:10.1177/0022343310394696.

Sullivan, Christopher Michael. 2012. “Blood in the Village: A Local-Level Investigation of State

Massacres.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 29 (4): 373–96.

doi:10.1177/0738894212449087.

The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga. 2014. International Criminal Court, Trial Chamber II.

The Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui. 2012. International Criminal Court Trial Chamber II.

The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo).

2012. International Criminal Court.

The Prosecutor v. Uhurua Muigai Kenyatta, Confirmation of Charges (Situation in Kenya). 2012.

International Criminal Court.

The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Confirmation of Charges

(Situation in Kenya). 2012. International Criminal Court.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

42 42

United Nations News Service Section. 2011a. “UN Rights Council Recommends Suspending

Libya, Orders Inquiry into Abuses.” February 25.

http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37626&Cr=Libya&Cr1.

———. 2011b. “Libyan Government Forces and Opposition Committed War Crimes – UN

Panel.” June 1. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=38578&Cr=libya&Cr1.

United Nations Security Council. 2011. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973.

S/RES/1973 (2011). http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1973(2011).

United Nations Security Council Council. 2011. United Nations Security Council Resolution

1970 (2011). S/Res/1970 (2011).

Weschler, Lawrence. 1990. A Miracle a Universe: Settling Accounts with Torturers. New York:

Pantheon.

Willis, Amy, and Matthew Holehouse. 2011. “Libya Live: Gaddafi’s Last Stand; Live Coverage

of Events in Libya as Gaddafi’s Son and Heir Apparent Saif as-Islam Reappears on the Streets of

Tripoli after Previous Claims by the ICC That He Had Been Detained.” Thee Telegraph, August

23. http://www.lexisnexis.com.leo.lib.unomaha.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/?

Wood, Reed M. 2010. “Rebel Capability and Strategic Violence against Civilians.” Journal of

Peace Research 47 (5): 601–14.

Yates, Pamela. 2009. The Reckoning: The Battle for the International Criminal Court.

Documentary. PBS. http://www.pbs.org/pov/reckoning/.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

43 43

FIGURE 1 Fatalities in Attacks on Civilians

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

44 44

FIGURE 2 ICC Actions and Fatalities in Attacks against Civilians

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

45 45

TABLE 1 ICC Actions toward Libya

DATE ICC ACTOR LIBYAN ACTOR ACTION

February 23, 2011 ICC Prosecutor Libya Issues statement on

alleged crimes in

Libya.

February 26, 2011 UN Security Council Libya Refers situation in

Libya to ICC

Prosecutor.

March 3, 2011 ICC Prosecutor Libya Opens investigations.

March 7, 2011 Pre-Trial Chamber 1 Libya Assigned situation in

Libya.

May 4, 2011 ICC Prosecutor Libya Briefing to UNSC on

Libya. Informs of

request to issue 3

arrest warrants. Will

continue

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

46 46

investigations.

May 16, 2011 ICC Prosecutor Qaddafi and 2 Others Requests that ICC

judges issue arrest

warrants for 3

individuals.

June 27, 2011 Pre-Trial Chamber 1 Qaddafi, Saif Al-

Islam Qaddafi and

Abdulla Al-Senussi

Issued arrest warrants.

June 28, 2011 ICC Prosecutor Qaddafi’s government

and interim National

Council

Receive notice of the

arrest warrants.

June 29, 2011 ICC Prosecutor Head of the Executive

Council of the Interim

National Council

(Mahmoud Jibril)

Meeting to discuss

ICC action.

September 8, 2011 ICC Prosecutor Qadaffi and Others ICC requests

INTERPOL support

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

47 47

to locate Qadaffi.

TABLE 2 The Effect of the ICC on Violence against Civilians Negative Binomial Regression (All

Fatalities)

Variable Model 1

(No Lag)

Model 2

(One Day

Lag)

Model 3

(One Week

Lag)

Model 4

(No Lag)

Model 5

(One Day

Lag)

Model 6

(One Week

Lag)

ICC Issues Statement -6.46

(2.52)***

-6.62

(2.52)***

-12.24

(5.54)**

--- --- ---

UNSC Refers Case -6.29

(2.95)**

-6.88

(2.31)***

-10.15

(5.30)*

--- --- ---

ICC Opens Investigation -4.49

(2.91)*

-3.82

(2.74)

-4.45

(5.49)

--- --- ---

ICC Assigns Case -3.96 -5.43 -6.38 --- --- ---

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

48 48

(1.41)*** (1.43)*** (3.59)*

ICC Requests Warrants 1.25

(2.36)

-1.17

(2.16)

-4.67

(2.84)*

---

--- ---

ICC Issues Warrants -.50

(3.39)

-3.36

(3.11)

-6.10

(1.60)***

--- --- ---

ICC Requests INTERPOL

Support

3.82

(4.44)

0.36

(4.04)

omitted --- --- ---

Cumulative ICC Action --- --- --- -0.46

(0.44)

-0.94

(0.43)**

1.54

(1.04)*

News Coverage 0.001

(0.001)*

0.003

(0.001)***

0.01

(0.002)***

0.0002

(0.001)

0.01

(0.001)***

0.01

(0.002)***

Daymarker -0.03

(0.02)

-0.02

(0.02)

-0.04

(0.02)*

0.01

(0.02)

0.02

(0.01)

-0.03

(0.02)

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

49 49

Government to Rebels 0.06

(0.11)

0.11

(0.09)

0.23

(0.10)**

0.09

(0.07)

0.10

(0.08)

0.16

(0.07)**

Rebels to Government -0.27

(0.13)**

-0.43

(0.15)***

-0.27

(0.12)**

-0.07

(0.07)

-0.18

(0.09)**

-0.15

(0.11)

NATO to Government -0.08

(0.05)

-0.09

(0.06)*

-0.09

(0.08)

0.07

(0.04)*

-0.001

(0.05)

-0.14

(0.08)*

Gov. Fatalities Lagged 1

Day

-0.01

(0.01)**

-0.01

(0.004)**

-0.01

(0.01)*

-0.01

(0.003)***

News Coverage Lagged 1

Day

-0.002

(0.001)***

-0.01

(0.02)**

-0.01

(0.002)***

-0.01

(0.002)***

Government to Rebels

Lagged 1 Day

-0.09

(0.08)

-0.14

(0.08)*

-0.02

(0.10)

-0.01

(0.09)

Rebels to Government 0.15 0.05 0.10 -0.05

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

50 50

Lagged 1 Day (0.10)* (0.13) (0.12) (0.15)

NATO to Government

Lagged 1 Day

0.03

(0.06)

0.14

(0.08)*

0.07

(0.07)

0.15

(0.08)**

Gov. Fatalities Lagged 1

Week

-0.003

(0.001)**

-0.002

(0.002)*

News Coverage Lagged 1

Week

-0.002

(0.001)*

-0.0003

(0.001)

Government to Rebels

Lagged 1 Week

0.42

(0.10)***

0.38

(0.09)***

Rebels to Government

Lagged 1 Week

-0.39

(0.14)***

-0.07

(0.11)

NATO to Government

Lagged 1 Week

0.15

(0.06)***

0.09

(0.04)**

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

51 51

p <.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; two-tailed test.

Constant 3.66

(0.82)***

4.90

(0.97)***

11.60

(5.29)**

3.56

(0.97)***

4.48

(1.10)***

-9.94

(3.57)

N 246 245 239 246 245 239

Wald Chi2 55.60 80.12 90.93 17.73 38.80 66.50

Prob > Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

52 52

TABLE 3 The Effect of the ICC on Violence against Civilians Negative Binomial Regression

(Only Government-Sponsored Fatalities

Variable Model 7

(No Lag)

Model 8

(One Day

Lag)

Model 9

(One

Week

Lag)

Model 10

(No Lag)

Model 11

(One Day

Lag)

Model 12

(One Week

Lag)

ICC Issues Statement -10.18

(1.97)***

-13.52

(2.56)***

18.15

(6.48)***

--- --- ---

UNSC Refers Case -7.89

(1.95)***

-12.97

(2.73)***

24.32

(6.70)***

--- --- ---

ICC Opens Investigation -3.63

(1.91)*

-9.90

(2.61)***

27.42

(5.74)***

--- --- ---

ICC Assigns Case -4.61

(1.50)***

-10.74

(2.14)***

21.29

(4.93)***

--- --- ---

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

53 53

ICC Requests Warrants -40.38

(2.36)***

-41.17

(2.43)***

-24.93

(4.19)***

---

--- ---

ICC Issues Warrants 4.84

(4.29)

-8.87

(3.20)***

24.15

(3.42)***

--- --- ---

ICC Requests

INTERPOL Support

-30.95

(5.39)***

-50.84

(4.75)***

Omitted --- --- ---

Cumulative ICC Action --- --- --- -0.68

(0.54)

-2.26

(0.40)***

-0.05

(1.19)

News Coverage 0.003

(0.001)***

0.004

(0.001)***

0.004

(0.002)*

0.001

(0.001)*

0.002

(0.001)***

0.003

(0.001)***

Daymarker -0.07

(0.03)***

-0.01

(0.02)

0.01

(0.02)

-0.01

(0.02)

0.03

(0.01)**

0.01

(0.02)

Government to Rebels 0.32 0.19 0.30 0.23 0.18 0.18

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

54 54

(0.09)*** (0.09)** (0.11)*** (0.06) (0.07)*** (0.08)**

Rebels to Government -0.10

(0.06)*

-0.08

(0.07)

-0.06

(0.08)

-0.06

(0.05)

-0.12

(0.05)**

-0.004

(0.05)

NATO to Government -0.32

(0.07)***

-0.33

(0.08)***

-0.50

(0.09)***

-0.07

(0.05)

-0.28

(0.06)***

-0.39

(0.08)***

Fatalities Lagged 1 Day -0.02

(0.01)**

-0.70

(0.15)***

-0.01

(0.004)

-0.51

(0.11)***

News Coverage Lagged 1

Day

-0.002

(0.001)

0.001

(0.002)

-0.001

(0.001)

0.0004

(0.001)

Government to Rebels

Lagged 1 Day

-0.44

(0.09)***

-0.74

(0.16)***

-0.60

(0.11)***

-0.68

(0.14)***

Rebels to Government

Lagged 1 Day

0.38

(0.11)***

0.65

(0.14)***

0.59

(0.13)***

0.56

(0.16)***

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

55 55

NATO to Government

Lagged 1 Day

0.09

(0.09)

-0.12

(0.07)*

0.12

(0.05)**

0.01

(0.07)

Fatalities Lagged 1 Week 0.01

(0.01)*

0.01

(0.01)

News Coverage Lagged 1

Week

-0.001

(0.001)

-0.001

(0.001)

Government to Rebels

Lagged 1 Week

-0.51

(0.16)***

-0.23

(0.12)**

Rebels to Government

Lagged 1 Week

0.88

(0.22)***

0.57

(0.20)***

NATO to Government

Lagged 1 Week

0.10

(0.06)*

0.04

(0.06)

Constant 3.16 5.06 -33.61 2.66 3.07 -8.95

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

56 56

p <.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; two-tailed test.

(0.82) (1.35) (7.34) (0.84)*** (0.98)*** (4.21)**

N 246 245 239 246 245 239

Wald Chi2 17912.63 4138.50 . 106.01 281.65 213.56

Prob > Chi2 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

57 57

TABLE 4 Marginal Effects (Models 2): Changes in Fatalities

ICC Action Change in Number

of Fatalities*

(Model 2)

Change in Number

of Fatalities*

(Model 5)

ICC Statement -3.09

(0.88)***

---

UNSC Refers -3.28

(0.93)***

---

ICC Opens Investigation -2.97

(0.92)***

---

ICC Assigns Case -13.42

(6.54)**

---

ICC Requests Arrest

Warrant

-2.41 ---

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016

Accep

ted M

anus

cript

58 58

(3.22)

ICC Issues Arrest

Warrant

-7.48

(8.29)

---

ICC Requests Interpol

Support

1.17

(14.68)

---

Cumulative ICC

Intervention

--- -4.95

(2.28)***

Predicted Number of

Fatalities

2.85 5.26

* p <.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; two-tailed test.

* For dummy variables, this is the change when moving from 0 to 1.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

ebra

ska,

Lin

coln

] at

13:

04 1

7 M

ay 2

016