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Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff

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Course : Game Theory and Psychology Instructors : Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs : Christian Ferko , Maxim Massenkoff. Let’s discuss some puzzles of psychology…. Puzzle 1: Norm against Chemical Weapons. Why were chemical weapons the red line? Why not 100,000 deaths? - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Course:Game Theory and Psychology

Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli

TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff

Page 2: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Let’s discuss some puzzles of psychology…

Page 3: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Puzzle 1:

Norm against Chemical Weapons

Page 4: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :
Page 5: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Why were chemical weapons the red line?

Why not 100,000 deaths?

Why not wanton murder of civilians?

Page 6: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

This norm reared its head many times before…

Page 7: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

“These flamethrowers were used to kill Japanese holed into pillboxes, buildings and caves. “-Wiki entry for Battle of Iwo Jima

Page 8: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Why flame throwers?

“A strong military case was made for the use of gas before America’s attack on the island of Iwo Jima; Japanese defenders in caves and tunnels would have been particularly vulnerable. Franklin Roosevelt rejected the idea.”-The Economist, The History of Chemical Weapons

Page 9: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

>26,000 American casualties, Iwo Jima, WWII

Page 10: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

“Because all the civilians had been evacuated, there were no civilian casualties at Iwo Jima”

Page 11: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Video Clip: Japanese Soldier Burnt Alive by Flame Thrower

Page 12: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

More humane than chemical weapon?

Page 13: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Thus,

-Chemical weapons would have saved lives!-No civilian casualties either way!-Not obviously “more humane”

Page 14: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

In general:

1) Where do such inefficient norms come from?2) What types of norms occur?

Page 15: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Puzzle 2:

Apologies

Page 16: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Salala Pakistan, Nov 26 2011:US accidentally killed 24 Pakistani Soldiers

Page 17: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Pakistan closed supply routes, until we apologized

Page 18: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

~$1 billion in extra shipping fees

Page 19: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Until July 3 2012

“We are sorry for the losses suffered by the Pakistani military”

-Hilary Clinton

Page 20: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Immediately after…

“…the ground supply lines into Afghanistan are opening”

Page 21: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Why wouldn’t US just say sorry? -mere words? -worth a billion?

Why would Pakistan care?-wouldn’t US “fake it”?

Page 22: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

More generally:

1) Why do mere words matter? 2) When do mere words matter? 3) What about other symbolic gestures (e.g.

coronations, handshakes, etc)?

Page 23: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Puzzle 3:

Why do we consider transgressions of commission worse than those of omission?

Page 24: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

“I won’t kill you…but I don’t have to save you”

Page 25: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Notice:

-Batman’s intention is the same-The outcome is the same-But Batman (and presumably the viewer) thinks omission less bad

Page 26: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

1) Why is omission viewed differently from commission?

2) Is this distinction something we should legally respect or overcome?

Page 27: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

More generally:

1) Where do our moral intuitions come from?2) Do they make a good basis for law?

Page 28: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Puzzle 4:

Where do “rights“ come from?

Page 29: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Self evident? The creator?

“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created

equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable

Rights…”

Page 30: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Might?

Page 31: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

The “state of nature”?

Page 32: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

A “social contract”?

Page 33: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

What does this mean?

Page 34: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

1) Where DO rights ACTUALLY come from?2) What can cause them to change? 3) What kind of rights are we likely to observe?

Page 35: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Puzzle 5:

Why does love “blind us”?

Page 36: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

When we get married, we vow, “for better or for worse, for richer, for poorer, in sickness, and in health.”

And sometimes, we commit acts of love that are extremely costly…

Page 37: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

End of Last of the Mohicans

Page 38: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Why does love cause us to ignore the costs of the relationship, sometimes to catastrophic

results?

Why doesn’t it just cause us to consider their interests, while being sensitive to the costs?

Page 39: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

In other classes…

Page 40: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Brooks, Alison Wood, Hengchen Dai, and Maurice E. Schweitzer. "I’m Sorry About the Rain! Superfluous Apologies Demonstrate Empathic Concern and Increase Trust." Social Psychological and Personality Science (2013): 1948550613506122.

Page 41: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Super interesting. But does not answer why apologies have this effect…

Page 42: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Acevedo, Bianca P., et al. "Neural correlates of long-term intense romantic love." Social cognitive and affective neuroscience 7.2 (2012): 145-159.

Page 43: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Important to know neural pathways.

But doesn’t explain why love works this way…

Page 44: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Spranca, Mark, Elisa Minsk, and Jonathan Baron. "Omission and commission in judgment and choice." Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 27.1 (1991): 76-105.

Page 45: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Important to document.

And to rule out obvious alternative explanations.

But doesn’t explain why…

Page 46: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

In this class…

We will address these “why’s”

…Using game theory

Page 47: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

What is game theory?

Page 48: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

5, 6 8, 4

3, 2 0, -3

U

D

L RThe simplest “game” can be represented by the following “payoff matrix”

Page 49: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

5,6 8, 4

3, 2 0, -3

U

D

L RPlayer 1 chooses between two actions

Page 50: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

5, 6 8, 4

3, 2 0, -3

U

D

L RPlayer 2 simultaneously chooses between 2 actions

Page 51: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

5, 6 8, 4

3, 2 0, -3

U

D

L RThe payoffs to player 1 are determined by her action as well as the action of player 2

Page 52: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

5, 6 8, 4

3, 2 0, -3

U

D

L RThe payoffs to player 2 are determined by her action as well as the action of player 2

Page 53: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

5, 6 8, 4

3, 2 0, -3

U

D

L RThis game can be “solved” by finding the “Nash equilibria”

Page 54: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

5, 6 8, 4

3, 2 0, -3

U

D

L R(U, L) is a Nash Equilibrium b/c neither can benefit by unilaterally deviating

Page 55: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

“Prediction” of game theory:

If both “expected” (U,L), both would play (U,L)!

(Nash is “self enforcing”)

Page 56: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

5, 6 8, 4

3, 2 0, -3

U

D

L R(U,R) is NOT a Nash Equilibrium b/c 2 can benefit by unilaterally deviating to L

Page 57: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Game theory “predicts”:

If both expected (U,R), player 2 would deviate!

(I.e. if not Nash, cannot be “stable”)

Page 58: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Nash makes sense (arguably) if…

-Uber-rational

-Calculating

Page 59: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Such as Auctions…

Page 60: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Or Oligopolies…

Page 61: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

But why would game theory matter for our puzzles?

Page 62: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Norms/rights/morality/emotions are not chosen; rather…

We believe we have rights!

We feel batman would be worse if he killed

Apologies matter because recipients feel nice when they hear them

Page 63: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

But…

From where do these feelings/beliefs come?

Page 64: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Our thesis (in a few steps):

Page 65: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Thesis: Feelings/beliefs that “do better” become “more frequent”

Page 66: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Thesis: Feelings/beliefs that “do better” become “more frequent”

Because of “evolution” (people with certain beliefs or preferences die out?)

Page 67: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Thesis: Feelings/beliefs that “do better” become “more frequent”

Because of “selective imitation”(people with certain beliefs or preferences are more likely to be imitated?)

Page 68: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Thesis: Feelings/beliefs that “do better” become “more frequent”

Because of “reinforcement learning”(certain beliefs or preferences are held onto more tenaciously?)

Page 69: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Thesis: Feelings/beliefs that do better become more frequent

behavior ends up consistent with Nash (o.w. feelings/beliefs would change!)

(even though not conscious of Nash, or of where feelings come from)

Page 70: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Thesis: Feelings/beliefs that do better become more frequent

behavior ends up consistent with Nash (o.w. feelings/beliefs would change!)

(even though not conscious of Nash, or of where feelings come from)

Page 71: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Thesis: Feelings/beliefs that do better become more frequent

behavior ends up consistent with Nash (o.w. feelings/beliefs would change!)

(even though not aware of game, or of where feelings/beliefs come from)

Page 72: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

In detail…

Page 73: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

What is the key assumption in evolution, imitation, reinforcement learning?

Page 74: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

T=0 T=1

Evolution

More successful traits reproduce faster

Page 75: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

T=0 T=1

Selective Imitation

More successful traits more likely to be imitated

Page 76: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

T=0 T=1

Reinforcement Learning

More successful behaviors held more tenaciously

Page 77: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

All 3 processes “optimal behaviors”!

Page 78: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

T=0 T=1 T=2 T=3

Page 79: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Also true in a game…

Page 80: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

T=0 T=1

L

L

L L

L

L

L

R

RR

RR

R R

L L

More successful strategies become more frequent

Page 81: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

T=0 T=1 T=2 T=3

L

L

L

L L

L

L

L

R

RR

RR

R R

L

L

L

L L

L

L

L

R

RL

R R

LL

L

L

And eventually take over…

Page 82: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

What if beliefs/feelings are being learned/evolving instead of “strategies”?

Page 83: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Suppose BL is belief that causes action L to be taken

Page 84: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

T=0 T=1

BL

BL

BL

BL BL

BL

BL

BL

BR

BRBR

BRBR

BR BR

BL

Feelings/beliefs that do better become more frequent

Page 85: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

T=0 T=1 T=2 T=3

BL

BL

BL

BL BL

BL

BL

BL

BR

BRBR

BRBR

BR BR

BL

BL

BL

BL BL

BL

BL

BL

BL

BRBL

BR BR

BLBL

BL

BL

Behavior ends up consistent with Nash

(even though not conscious of Nash, or of where feelings come from)

Page 86: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

How do we know?

Page 87: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

We will …-show model “fits” puzzles, and no alternative can… -develop novel predictions and validate with evidence…-show model is powerful outside of psychology …-demonstrate assumptions…-show robust

Page 88: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Who cares?

Page 89: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Novel prescriptions:

e.g.Should our legal system treat omission and commission differently?

(NO!)

Should we attend to our emotions like love or try to overcome them?

(Falling in love pays!)

Page 90: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Novel Predictions:

e.g. Is commission worse than omission for all types of

judgments?

(We predict don’t care for how much you trust but does matter for how much you punish)

Page 91: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Clarifies:

e.g. What are rights?What is a symbolic gesture?

Page 92: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

Skills you’ll gain:

– Basic game theory• How to solve. • Including some famous models like the “prisoners’ dilemma” and “Hawk-Dove”

– Basic evolutionary dynamics• How to simulate• Including famous models like the “replicator dynamic”

– Basic experimental methods• How to evaluate• At the end of the class, you will design experiments to provide more evidence (or

not!)

And… an understanding of where preferences and ideologies come from!

Page 93: Course : Game  Theory  and Psychology Instructors :  Moshe Hoffman,  Erez Yoeli TAs :

And now, for some logistics…