country reports on terrorism 2004 · 2019-09-06 · country reports on terrorism 2004 april 2005....

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US Department of StateOffice of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism

Country Reports on Terrorism 2004

April 2005

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Department of State Publication 11248Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism

Printed in Multi-Media Services

Released April 2005

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1. Legislative Requirements and Key Terms ......................................................... 1

Chapter 2. Overview ........................................................................................................ 3

Chapter 3. Global Jihad: Evolving and Adapting .............................................................. 7

Chapter 4. Building International Will and Capacity to Counter Terrorism....................... 9Antiterrorism Assistance Program................................................................... 9Countering Terrorism on the Economic Front ................................................. 11Multilateral and Regional Cooperation ........................................................... 12Role of the United Nations in Fighting Terrorism............................................ 14

Chapter 5. Country Reports .............................................................................................. 28

Africa Overview ............................................................................................. 28Djibouti ................................................................................................... 29Ethiopia .................................................................................................... 30Kenya ....................................................................................................... 30Nigeria ..................................................................................................... 30Rwanda .................................................................................................... 31Somalia .................................................................................................... 31South Africa ............................................................................................. 31Tanzania .................................................................................................. 32Uganda .................................................................................................... 32

East Asia and Pacific Overview ....................................................................... 33Australia ................................................................................................... 35Cambodia ................................................................................................ 35China ....................................................................................................... 36Indonesia ................................................................................................. 36Japan ........................................................................................................ 37Laos ......................................................................................................... 38Malaysia................................................................................................... 38New Zealand ........................................................................................... 38Philippines ............................................................................................... 38Singapore ................................................................................................. 39Taiwan ..................................................................................................... 39Thailand ................................................................................................... 41

Europe and Eurasia Overview ......................................................................... 42Albania .................................................................................................... 44Armenia ................................................................................................... 44Austria ..................................................................................................... 44Azerbaijan ............................................................................................... 44Belgium ................................................................................................... 44Bosnia and Herzegovina .......................................................................... 45Bulgaria ................................................................................................... 45Czech Republic ........................................................................................ 45

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Finland ..................................................................................................... 45France ...................................................................................................... 46Georgia .................................................................................................... 46Germany .................................................................................................. 47Greece ..................................................................................................... 47Hungary ................................................................................................... 48Italy .......................................................................................................... 48Kazakhstan ............................................................................................... 48Kosovo (Serbia and Montenegro) .............................................................. 49Kyrgyzstan ................................................................................................ 49The Netherlands ....................................................................................... 50Norway .................................................................................................... 50Poland...................................................................................................... 50Portugal .................................................................................................... 50Romania .................................................................................................. 51Russia ...................................................................................................... 51Slovenia ................................................................................................... 52Spain........................................................................................................ 52Tajikistan .................................................................................................. 54Turkey ...................................................................................................... 54Turkmenistan............................................................................................ 54Ukraine .................................................................................................... 55United Kingdom....................................................................................... 55Uzbekistan ............................................................................................... 56

Near East and North Africa Overview ............................................................ 57Algeria ..................................................................................................... 58Bahrain .................................................................................................... 59Egypt ........................................................................................................ 60Iraq .......................................................................................................... 60Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza ............................................................... 63Jordan ...................................................................................................... 64Kuwait ...................................................................................................... 65Lebanon ................................................................................................... 65Morocco .................................................................................................. 66Oman ...................................................................................................... 67Qatar ....................................................................................................... 67Saudi Arabia ............................................................................................. 67Tunisia ..................................................................................................... 68United Arab Emirates ............................................................................... 68Yemen ...................................................................................................... 69

South Asia Overview ...................................................................................... 70Afghanistan .............................................................................................. 70Bangladesh .............................................................................................. 72India ........................................................................................................ 73Nepal ....................................................................................................... 74Pakistan .................................................................................................... 74Sri Lanka .................................................................................................. 75

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Western Hemisphere Overview ...................................................................... 76Bolivia ..................................................................................................... 77Canada .................................................................................................... 78Chile ........................................................................................................ 79Colombia ................................................................................................. 79Ecuador .................................................................................................... 81Mexico ..................................................................................................... 82Panama .................................................................................................... 82Peru ......................................................................................................... 83Triborder Area .......................................................................................... 84 Argentina ......................................................................................... ... 84 Brazil ............................................................................................... ... 85 Paraguay .............................................................................................. 85Uruguay ................................................................................................... 86Venezuela ................................................................................................ 86

State Sponsors of Terrorism Overview ............................................................ 88Cuba ........................................................................................................ 88Iran .......................................................................................................... 88Libya ........................................................................................................ 89North Korea ............................................................................................. 90Sudan ....................................................................................................... 90Syria ......................................................................................................... 90

Chapter 6. Terrorist Groups ............................................................................ 92

Foreign Terrorist Organizations ...................................................................... 9217 November ........................................................................................... 93Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) ................................................................ 93Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) .......................................................................... 93Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade ........................................................................... 94Ansar al-Islam (AI) .................................................................................... 94Armed Islamic Group (GIA) ...................................................................... 95Asbat al-Ansar .......................................................................................... 95Aum Shinrikyo (Aum) .............................................................................. 96Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)......................................................... 96Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA) ............... 97Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) .................................................. 97Gama’a al-Islamiyya (IG) .......................................................................... 98HAMAS.................................................................................................... 98Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM) ................................................................... 99Hizballah ................................................................................................. 99Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) ................................................... 100Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) ......................................................................... 100Jemaah Islamiya Organization (JI) ............................................................. 101Al-Jihad (AJ) ............................................................................................. 101Kahane Chai (Kach) .................................................................................. 102Kongra-Gel (KGK) .................................................................................... 102

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Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LT) .............................................................................. 103Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ) ................................................................................ 103Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) ..................................................... 104Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) ....................................................... 104Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK) ................................................... 104National Liberation Army (ELN) ................................................................ 105Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) ................................................................. 105Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) .................................................................... 106Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) ................................... 106Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-GeneralCommand (PFLP-GC) ............................................................................... 106Al-Qa’ida ................................................................................................. 107Real IRA (RIRA) ........................................................................................ 108Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) ..................................... 108Revolutionary Nuclei (RN) ....................................................................... 109Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) ........................... 109Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) .............................................. 110Shining Path (SL)...................................................................................... 110Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (QJBR) .................................. 111United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) ........................................ 111

Other Terrorist Organizations......................................................................... 113Al-Badhr Mujahedin (al-Badr) .................................................................. 113Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) .......................................................................... 114Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB) .................................................................. 114Anti-Imperialist Territorial Nuclei (NTA).................................................... 114Cambodian Freedom Fighters (CFF) .......................................................... 115Communist Party of India (Maoist) ............................................................ 115Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN/M) ............................................ 116Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) ........................... 116East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) ................................................... 116First of October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO) ............................ 117Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami (HUJI) ................................................................ 117Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B) .......................................... 118Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) ................................................................. 118Hizbul-Mujahedin (HM)........................................................................... 118Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) ...................................................... 119Irish Republican Army (IRA) ..................................................................... 119Islamic Army of Aden (IAA) ...................................................................... 119Islamic Great East Raiders–Front (IBDA-C) ................................................ 120Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade (IIPB) .................................... 120Islamic Jihad Group (IJG) .......................................................................... 121Jamiat ul-Mujahedin (JUM) ....................................................................... 121Japanese Red Army (JRA) .......................................................................... 121Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) ..................................................... 122Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) ................................................................... 122Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) ................................................................... 123Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) ........................................... 123New Red Brigades/Communist Combatant Party (BR/PCC) ....................... 124

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People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) ..................................... 124Red Hand Defenders (RHD) ..................................................................... 124Revolutionary Proletarian Initiative Nuclei (NIPR) .................................... 125Revolutionary Struggle (RS) ...................................................................... 125Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of ChechenMartyrs (RSRSBCM) .................................................................................. 125Sipah-I-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP) ................................................................... 126Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR) .................................................. 126Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG) ............................................................ 126Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) ....................................... 127Turkish Hizballah ..................................................................................... 127Ulster Defense Association/Ulster Freedom Fighters (UDA/UFF) ............... 127Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) .................................................................... 128United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) .................................................. 128

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This report is submitted in compliance with Title 22 of theUnited States Code, Section 2656f (the “Act”), which re-quires the Department of State to provide Congress a fulland complete annual report on terrorism for those coun-tries and groups meeting the criteria of the Act. Statutoryexcerpts relating to the terms used in this report and a dis-cussion of the interpretation and application of those termsin this report are included below.

Statutory Excerpts

Section 2656f(a) of Title 22 of the United States Code statesas follows:

(a) … The Secretary of State shall transmit to the Speakerof the House of Representatives and the Committee onForeign Relations of the Senate, by April 30 of each year,a full and complete report providing -

(1) detailed assessments with respect to each foreigncountry –

(A) in which acts of international terrorism occurredwhich were, in the opinion of the Secretary, ofmajor significance;

(B) about which the Congress was notified during thepreceding five years pursuant to section 2405(j)of the Appendix to Title 50; and

(C) which the Secretary determines should be thesubject of such report;

(2) all relevant information about the activities duringthe preceding year of any terrorist group, and anyumbrella group under which such terrorist group falls,known to be responsible for the kidnapping or death ofan American citizen during the preceding five years, anyterrorist group known to be financed by countries aboutwhich Congress was notified during the preceding yearpursuant to section 2405(j) of the Appendix to Title 50,and any other known international terrorist group whichthe Secretary determines should be the subject of suchreport;

(3) with respect to each foreign country from which theUnited States Government has sought cooperationduring the previous five years in the investigation or

prosecution of an act of international terrorism againstUnited States citizens or interests, information on -

(A) the extent to which the government of the foreigncountry is cooperating with the United StatesGovernment in apprehending, convicting, andpunishing the individual or individuals responsiblefor the act; and

(B) the extent to which the government of the foreigncountry is cooperating in preventing further actsof terrorism against United States citizens in theforeign country; and

(4) with respect to each foreign country from which theUnited States Government has sought cooperationduring the previous five years in the prevention of an actof international terrorism against such citizens orinterests, the information described in paragraph (3)(B).

Section 2656f(d) of Title 22 of the United States Codedefines certain key terms referred to in Section 2656(a) asfollows:

(d)…(1) the term “international terrorism” means terrorisminvolving citizens or the territory of more than onecountry;

(2) the term “terrorism” means premeditated, politicallymotivated violence perpetrated against noncombatanttargets by subnational groups or clandestine agents; and

(3) the term “terrorist group” means any grouppracticing, or which has significant subgroups whichpractice, international terrorism.

Interpretation and Application of Key Terms

For purposes of this report, the terms “international terror-ism,” “terrorism,” and “terrorist group” have the definitionsassigned to them in 22 USC 2656f(d) (see above). Theterm “noncombatant,” which is referred to but not definedin 22 USC 2656f(d)(2), is interpreted to mean, in additionto civilians, military personnel (whether or not armed oron duty) who are not deployed in a war zone or a war-likesetting.

Chapter 1Legislative Requirements and Key Terms

These statutory excerpts do not reflect amendments that were contained in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 andother legislation passed in December 2004. By their terms, those amendments do not apply to the present report, but will apply to subsequentreports under 22 USC Section 2656f, as so amended.

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It should be noted that 22 USC 2656f(d) is one of manyUS statutes and international legal instruments that con-cern terrorism and acts of violence, many of which usedefinitions for terrorism and related terms that are differ-ent from those used in this report. The interpretation andapplication of defined and related terms concerning ter-rorism in this report is therefore specific to the statutoryand other requirements of the report, and is not intendedto express the views of the US Government on how theseterms should be interpreted or applied for any other pur-pose. Accordingly, there is not necessarily any correlationbetween the interpretation of terms such as “noncomba-tant” for purposes of this report and the meanings ascribedto similar terms pursuant to the law of war (which encap-sulates the obligations of states and individuals with respectto their activities in situations of armed conflict).

Contextual Reporting

Adverse mention in this report of individual members ofany political, social, ethnic, religious, or national group isnot meant to imply that all members of that group areterrorists. Indeed, terrorists rarely represent anything otherthan a tiny fraction of such groups. It is those few — andtheir actions — that are the subject of this report.

Furthermore, terrorist acts are part of a larger phenom-enon of politically inspired violence, and at times the linebetween the two can become difficult to draw. This reportincludes some discretionary information in an effort torelate terrorist events to the larger political context in whichthey occur, and to give a feel for the conflicts that spawnviolence. Thus, this report will discuss terrorist acts aswell as other violent incidents that are not necessarily in-ternational terrorism and therefore are not subject to thestatutory reporting requirement.

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Chapter 2Overview

“The appeal of justice and liberty, in the end, is greaterthan the appeal of hatred and tyranny in any form. “

President Bush, July 12, 2004

Terrorism remains a global threat from which no nation isimmune. Despite ongoing improvements in US homelandsecurity, military campaigns against insurgents and terror-ists in Iraq and Afghanistan, and deepeningcounterterrorism cooperation among the nations of theworld, international terrorism continued to pose a signifi-cant threat to the United States and its partners in 2004.The slaughter of hundreds of innocents in the Beslan school,in the commuter trains of Madrid, on a Philippines ferry,and in a Sinai resort proved again that the struggle againstterrorism is far from over. Over the long run, the spread ofdemocracy and economic and social reform, sustained andencouraged by the United States and others, should pro-mote political, economic and social conditionsinhospitable to terrorist exploitation. For now, however,the tasks confronting the United States and its partners inthe struggle against terrorism remain formidable.

A look back on the events of 2004 in the global war onterrorism reveals the following:

Casualties• There were no terrorist attacks in the US homeland.• Many other countries were hit by terrorist attacks; the

most deadly, like Beslan, Madrid, and the Philippinesferry, were committed by local groups, many inspiredby or linked to al-Qa’ida.

• American deaths due to terrorist attacks were confinedto Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Egypt and Gaza.

• The overwhelming majority of victims of terrorist attacks were citizens of countries other than the United States.Many victims were Muslims.

The al-Qa’ida Threat• The primary terrorist threat to the United States in 2004

continued to be al-Qa’ida, which remained intent onattacking the US homeland as well as US interestsabroad.

• The United States and its partners, however, degradedal-Qa’ida and its affiliates’ leadership abilities anddepleted the ranks of their operatives.

• Al-Qa’ida, weakened operationally, adapted byspreading its ideology to local groups throughout theworld. Al-Qa’ida-affiliated groups and locally-basedextremists continued to be inspired or assisted by Usamabin Ladin and other al-Qa’ida leaders.

International Cooperation• The diffusion of the al-Qa’ida ideology in many

countries makes even more crucial the need for deeperinternational cooperation to defeat emerging violentextremist groups.

• The United States and other donor nations mustintensify current efforts to bolster the political will andthe intelligence, law enforcement, financial andmilitary capabilities of partner nations to combatterrorism, on their own or with us.

• The United States and its partners must work together to prevent the spread of al-Qa’ida ideology and thegrowth of jihadist terror.

• The United States and its partners must also continueefforts to defeat non-al-Qa’ida terrorist groups,discourage state sponsorship of terrorism, and preventterrorist access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

The Evolving Terrorist Threat

Al-Qa’ida leadership was degraded through arrests andongoing Pakistani operations to assert greater control alongthe border with Afghanistan where some al-Qa’ida lead-ers are believed to hide. Numerous al-Qa’ida and affiliatedfoot soldiers were captured or killed during the year.

• Pakistani authorities captured al-Qa’idacommunications expert and Heathrow bomb plotsuspect Naeem Noor Khan and US Embassy bombing

Abdulaziz al-Muqrin, leader of al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula —an unidentified member of which appears in this website posting —was killed by Saudi security officers in Riyadh on June 18, hours afterhis group beheaded an American engineer. (AP Photo/APTN)

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suspect Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani in July 2004, andkilled Amjad Farooqui, suspected in the murder of USjournalist Daniel Pearl, in September 2004.

• Saudi security forces killed several top leaders of theal-Qa’ida organization in Saudi Arabia, includingKhalid Ali al-Hajj and Abdulaziz al-Muqrin.

• Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, leader of the al-Qa’ida-affiliatedJemaah Islamiya remained in jail pending his early 2005trial for involvement in the 2002 Bali bombings.

• The Filipino Antiterrorism Task Force captured sevenforeigners in 2004 believed to be elements of al-Qa’idaand Jemaah Islamiya.

• British authorities in August 2004 arrested suspectedal-Qa’ida-affiliated individuals who were subsequentlyindicted in the United States for plotting to attackfinancial institutions in the United States.

Many senior al-Qa’ida leaders remained at large, contin-ued to plan attacks against the United States, US interests,and US partners, and sought to foment attacks by inspir-ing new groups of Sunni Muslim extremists to undertakeviolent acts in the name of jihad. In some cases, al-Qa’idaattempted to bring other extremist groups under its ban-ner, while in other cases, groups claimed allegiance toal-Qa’ida despite little evidence of any connection withal-Qa’ida leaders. In still other cases, the existence of newgroups only became evident following an attack.

• Al-Qa’ida cells continued to carry out attacks in SaudiArabia throughout 2004.

• Al-Qa’ida-affiliate Jemaah Islamiya continued to plotattacks against the United States, Australian and otherforeign interests in Indonesia, bombing the AustralianEmbassy in September 2004.

• The al-Qa’ida cell in East Africa, including terroristslinked to the 1998 bombings of US Embassies inNairobi and Dar es Salaam and the 2002 attacks on aMombasa hotel and an Israeli commercial aircraft,remained at large, and are suspected of planning newattacks.

• Notorious terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi pledged thefealty of himself and his group in Iraq to bin Ladin;al-Zarqawi is now the recognized leader of al-Qa’idain Iraq.

• The March 2004 bombing of commuter trains in Madridthat killed 191 innocent people was executed by apreviously unknown group of jihadist terrorists (mostlyMoroccan immigrants resident in Spain for years)inspired by, but without direction from, al-Qa’ida.

• The new leader of the GSPC in Algeria announced hisaffiliation with al-Qa’ida, but there was no evidenceof assistance or direction from al-Qa’ida leadership.

The latter two incidents illustrate what many analysts be-lieve is a new phase of the global war on terrorism, one inwhich local groups inspired by al-Qa’ida organize andcarry out attacks with little or no support or direction fromal-Qa’ida itself.

As al-Qa’ida itself weakens and local groups take ongreater responsibility for planning, acquiring resources andcarrying out attacks in their localities, it will be ever moreimportant for the United States to help partners who re-quire assistance to counter this new manifestation of theterrorist threat. Furthermore, although al-Qa’ida remainsthe primary concern regarding possible WMD threats, thenumber of groups expressing an interest in such materialsis increasing, and WMD technology and know-how isproliferating within the jihadist community.

International Cooperation

International cooperation is an integral and growing as-pect of the overall US “National Strategy for CombatingTerrorism” which calls for:

• Defeating terrorist organizations by eliminating theirsanctuaries, leadership, finances, and command,control and communications capabilities;

• Denying further sponsorship, support, and sanctuaryto terrorists by cooperating with other states to takeaction against those who provide support;

An Egyptian (right) and an Israeli rescue worker (left) cover a body infront of the Hilton Hotel in Taba, Egypt, October 8, following a carbomb on October 7. (AP Photo/Amr Nabil)

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• Diminishing the underlying conditions that terroristsseek to exploit by enlisting the internationalcommunity to focus our mutual efforts and resourceson addressing legitimate political and social needs andby reducing security vulnerabilities in the countriesmost at risk; and

• Defending the United States, its citizens, and interestsat home and abroad.

The continuing threats by al-Qa’ida make necessary thecontinued investment of enormous effort and resourcesby the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, De-partment of Justice, Department of State, and Departmentof Defense (among other federal agencies), as well as stateand local governments, in new and strengthened home-land defense measures. They also require a growing levelof international cooperation between the United Statesand its many partner nations around the world to inter-dict terrorists, disrupt their planning, restrict their travel,reduce the flow of financial and material support to ter-rorist groups, and enable partner governments to assertcontrol over weakly governed territory where terroristsfind sanctuary.

In 2004, the United States broadened and deepened itsinternational cooperation on counterterrorism issues. In-creased diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement, militaryand financial cooperation contributed directly to home-land security and the interdiction or disruption of terroristsaround the globe. Examples are discussed throughout thisreport, but the following successes stand out for 2004:

• Close cooperation with British, French, and otherauthorities – coordinated through the State Departmentand US Embassies in London, Paris and else where –was pivotal to managing threats to airline securityduring the 2003-2004 New Year period.

• Information-sharing with the United Kingdom andPakistan led to the disclosure and disruption ofal-Qa’ida attack planning against US financialinstitutions.

• US diplomatic and military assistance facilitatedcooperation among Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, Niger,Libya and Chad that led to the capture and return ofwanted GSPC factional leader al-Para to Algeria to standtrial.

• Law enforcement officers in Iraq, Colombia,Indonesia, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan(among others) applied US specialized counterterrorismtraining to bring terrorists to justice.

• Working with a broad spectrum of domestic andinternational partners, the United States has identifiedand disrupted many sources of terrorist finance.

• The United States used its G8 presidency in 2004 toadvance new international transportation securitymeasures and to coordinate internationalcounterterrorism assistance among G8 and otherdonors, ensuring that counterterrorism needs of statesrequiring assistance were addressed and wastefulduplication avoided.

Notably, 2004 was marked by progress in decreasing thethreat from states that sponsor terrorism. Iraq’s designa-tion as a state sponsor of terrorism was formally rescindedin October 2004. Libya and Sudan took significant stepsto cooperate in the global war on terrorism. Unfortunately,Cuba, North Korea, Syria, and, in particular, Iran continueto embrace terrorism as an instrument of policy. Mostworrisome is that these countries also have the capabili-ties to manufacture weapons of mass destruction and otherdestabilizing technologies that could fall into the handsof terrorists. Iran and Syria are of special concern for theirdirect, open, and prominent role in supporting Hizballahand Palestinian terrorist groups, for their unhelpful actionsin Iraq, and Iran’s unwillingness to bring to justice senioral-Qa’ida members it detained in 2003.

American noncombatants in Iraq and Afghanistan com-prised most of the American victims of terrorism this year.These casualties occured against a backdrop of US com-bat operations against terrorists and insurgents in bothcountries. Americans were also killed in terrorist incidentsin Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Gaza.

President George W. Bush lays a wreath at the residence of the Spanishambassador to the United States for the victims of the March 11railway bombings. (AP Photo/Charles Dharapak)

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The United States continued in 2004 to harden security ofits official presence overseas and to step up travel adviso-ries and warnings to American citizens to help themmanage and weigh the risks associated with travel intoareas in which terrorist threats may be elevated. The UnitedStates also continued to work with international and mul-tilateral organizations to tighten security of seaports andairports and improve security of international travel.

The United States will continue to broaden and deepeninternational cooperation to protect US citizens. The trendaway from centralized planning of terrorist activities andtowards inspiration of local groups to commit acts of ter-ror makes even more crucial the need for deeperinternational cooperation to defeat emerging violent ex-tremist groups. The United States and its partners mustintensify current efforts to bolster the political will and theintelligence, law enforcement, financial, and military ca-

pabilities of partner nations to combat terrorism, on theirown or with us. The United States will step up coopera-tion with its partners to prevent the spread of al-Qa’idaideology and the growth of jihadist terror. The UnitedStates will also continue its efforts to defeat non-al-Qa’idaterrorist groups, discourage state sponsorship of terror-ism, and mobilize international will and build capacityto prevent terrorist access to WMD. No single countrycan successfully deal with terrorism on its own, but to-gether we will prevail.

US Counterterrorism Policy

President Bush has laid out the scope of the war on terrorism. Four enduring policy principles guide US counterterrorismstrategy.

First, make no concessions to terrorists and strike no deals. The US Government will make no concessions to individu-als or groups holding official or private US citizens hostage. The United States will use every appropriate resource togain the safe return of US citizens who are held hostage. At the same time, it is US Government policy to deny hostage-takers the benefits of ransom, prisoner releases, policy changes, or other acts of concession.

Second, bring terrorists to justice for their crimes. The United States will track terrorists who attack Americans and USproperty, no matter how long it takes.

Third, isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor terrorism to force them to change their behavior. There are sixcountries that are designated state sponsors of terrorism: Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. (Note: TheUS Government rescinded Iraq’s designation as a state sponsor in October 2004.)

Fourth, bolster the counterterrorist capabilities of those countries that work with the United States and requireassistance. Under the Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) Program, the United States provides training, equipment, andrelated assistance to law enforcement and security services of selected friendly foreign governments. Courses coversuch areas as airport security, bomb detection and disposal, hostage rescue, and crisis management. A recent compo-nent of the training, entitled the Interdicting Terrorist Organizations Program, provides four courses teaching techniquesto identify and apprehend terrorist cells before they have an opportunity to strike. During the past 20 years, the ATAProgram has trained over 48,000 officials from 141 countries in various aspects of counterterrorism.

A broad range of counterterrorism training resources from other US Government agencies, including military trainingby the Department of Defense, are being used to bolster international capabilities. The United States will work with theworld community and seek assistance from other partner nations as well in the war on terrorism.

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Chapter 3Global Jihad: Evolving and Adapting

The global jihadist movement — including its most promi-nent component, al-Qa’ida — remains the preeminentterrorist threat to the United States, US interests and USallies. While the core of al-Qa’ida has suffered damage toits leadership, organization, and capabilities, the groupremains intent on striking US interests in the homelandand overseas. During the past year, concerted antiterroristcoalition measures have degraded al-Qa’ida’s central com-mand infrastructure, decreasing its ability to conductmassive attacks. At the same time, however, al-Qa’ida hasspread its anti-US, anti-Western ideology to other groupsand geographical areas. It is therefore no longer only al-Qa’ida itself but increasingly groups affiliated withal-Qa’ida, or independent ones adhering to al-Qa’ida’sideology, that present the greatest threat of terrorist attacksagainst US and allied interests globally.

US and coalition successes against al-Qa’ida have forcedthese jihadist groups to compensate by showing a greaterwillingness to act on their own and exercising greater lo-cal control over their strategic and tactical decisions. As aresult of this growing dispersion and local decision-mak-ing, there is an increasing commingling of groups,personnel, resources, and ad hoc operational and logisti-cal coordination. These groups affiliated with al-Qa’ida orindoctrinated with al-Qa’ida’s ideology are now carryingout most of the terrorist attacks against US and allied inter-ests. Their decreased power projection and limitedresources mean that an increasing percentage of jihadistattacks are more local, less sophisticated, but still lethal.Some groups, however, are seeking to replicate al-Qa’ida’sglobal reach and expertise for mass casualty attacks. Thistrend underscores that America’s partners in the global waron terror require the capabilities to identify and eliminateterrorist threats in their countries for their own securityand ultimately to stop terrorists abroad before they cangain the ability to attack the US homeland.

Al-Qa’ida

Despite intensive US and partner operations that have ledto the killing or capture of much of al-Qa’ida’s senior lead-ership, Usama bin Ladin and his deputy, Aymanal-Zawahiri, remain at large. In late 2004, they made vid-eotaped statements addressed directly to the US publicthat warned of more attacks. The two have also publiclythreatened at least three dozen countries in Europe, Af-rica, the Middle East, and South Asia.

The apparent mergers or declarations of allegiance ofgroups such as Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi’s organization withal-Qa’ida suggest that al-Qa’ida is looking to leverage thecapabilities and resources of key regional networks andaffiliates — a trend that al-Qa’ida could also use to try tosupport new attacks in the United States and abroad.

The Global Jihadist Movement

The global jihadist movement predates al-Qa’ida’s found-ing and was reinforced and developed by successiveconflicts in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, and elsewhereduring the 1990s. As a result, it spawned several groupsand operating nodes and developed a resiliency that en-sured that destruction of any one group or node did notdestroy the larger movement. Since 2001, extremists, in-cluding members of al-Qa’ida and affiliated groups, havesought to exploit perceptions of the US-led global war onterrorism and, in particular, the war in Iraq to attract con-verts to their movement. Many of these recruits come froma large and growing pool of disaffected youth who aresympathetic to radical, anti-Western militant ideology. Atthe same time, these extremists have branched out to es-tablish jihadist cells in other parts of the Middle East, SouthAsia, and Europe, from which they seek to prepare opera-tions and facilitate funding and communications.

Foreign fighters appear to be working to make the insur-gency in Iraq what Afghanistan was to the earlier generationof jihadists — a melting pot for jihadists from around theworld, a training ground, and an indoctrination center. Inthe months and years ahead, a significant number of fight-ers who have traveled to Iraq could return to their homecountries, exacerbating domestic conflicts or augmentingwith new skills and experience existing extremist networksin the communities to which they return.

The Spread of Al-Qa’ida’s Ideology

Al-Qa’ida’s ideology resonates with other Sunni extremistcircles. Some affiliated groups — including JemaahIslamiyah in Southeast Asia — look to their own spiritualleaders, yet historically have shared close ideological andoperational ties to al-Qa’ida. In recent years, however, theresonance of al-Qa’ida’s message has contributed to theformation of an assortment of grassroots networks and cellsamong persons that previously have had no observablelinks to bin Ladin or al-Qa’ida aside from general ideo-logical and religious affinity.Examples of this trend include Salafiya Jihadia, a loosely-

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organized Moroccan movement that carried out the bomb-ings in May 2003 in Casablanca, and the terrorists whoexecuted the March 2004 attack in Madrid. Although thesecells do not appear to have been acting directly on al-Qa’ida orders, their attacks supported al-Qa’ida’s ideologyand reflected al-Qa’ida’s targeting strategy.

Terrorist capabilities for attacks will remain uneven, giventhe varying degrees of expertise and increasing decentrali-zation within the movement. Most groups will be capableonly of relatively unsophisticated, but still deadly attacks.Others, however, may seek to acquire or replicate al-Qa’ida’s expertise and material support for mass-casualtyattacks. The explosive growth of media and the Internet,as well as the ease of travel and communication aroundthe world have made possible the rapid movement of op-eratives, expertise, money, and explosives. Terroristsincreasingly will use media and the Internet to advancekey messages or rally support, share jihadist experiencesand expertise, and spread fear.

Although the jihadist movement remains dangerous, it isnot monolithic. Some groups are focused on attacking theUnited States or its allies, while others view governmentsand leaders in the Muslim world as their primary targets.The United States and its partners in the global war onterrorism will continue to use all means available to iden-tify, target, and prevent the spread of these jihadist groupsand ideology.

The Spread of a Poisonous Worldview: Elements of Al-Qa’ida’s Ideology

Many jihadist groups have now adopted the ideology and targeting strategies of bin Ladin and other senioral-Qa’ida leaders. Al-Qa’ida’s public statements have sought to promulgate the following tenets of its ideology:

• This is a clash of civilizations. Militant jihad is a religious duty before God, and therefore necessary forthe salvation of one’s soul as well as for the defense of the Muslim nation.

• Only two camps exist. There can be no middle ground in an apocalyptic showdown between Islam and“the forces of evil,” defined not merely as “the West” but also Muslims that do not share al-Qa’ida’s visionof “true Islam.”

• Violence by Muslims in the defense of Islam is the only solution. Peaceful existence with the West is adangerous illusion.

• Many of the theological and legal restrictions on the use of violence by Muslims do not apply to this war.Given that the stakes are high, compunctions against violence only assist “the infidel.”

• US power is based on its economy. Therefore, large-scale, mass-casualty attacks — especially focused onUS and other Western economic targets — are a primary goal.

• “Apostate” regimes must go. Muslim governments that cooperate with the West and that have not imposedSharia law are religiously unacceptable and must be violently overthrown.

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Chapter 4Building International Will and Capacityto Counter Terrorism

The Department of State engages diplomatically with for-eign governments and in international and regional fora toaccomplish the US Government’s first priority — protect-ing Americans at home and abroad.

The Department of State’s diplomatic efforts help build thepolitical will and operational skills of foreign governmentsto combat terror. Many countries are committed allies inthe global war on terrorism. Some, however, need train-ing and resources to develop stronger institutions andcapabilities. The Department of State’s counterterrorismefforts are an essential component in the success of USmilitary, law enforcement, intelligence, and financial ac-tivities in the global fight against terrorism.

Multilateral and regional organizations are also a key plat-form for developing broad international support for theadoption and implementation of policies, strategies, and“best practices” in combating terrorism and financing ofterrorist activities. The Department of State works activelywith foreign governments to urge adoption of all 12 inter-national counterterrorism conventions, as well asadherence to and implementation of UNSCR 1373, whichimposes binding obligations on all states to suppress andprevent terrorist financing, improve their border controls,enhance information sharing and law enforcement coop-eration, suppress terrorist recruitment, and deny terroristssafe haven.

Antiterrorism Assistance Program

Congress authorized the Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) Pro-gram in 1983 as part of a major initiative against internationalterrorism. Since that time, ATA has trained over 48,000 par-ticipants from 141 countries. The ATA Program providestraining and related assistance to law enforcement and se-curity services of selected partner nations. Assistance toqualified countries focuses on the following objectives:

• Enhancing the antiterrorism skills of partner nations byproviding training and equipment to deter and counterthe threats of terrorism.

• Strengthening the bilateral ties of the United States withpartner nations by offering concrete assistance in areasof mutual concern.

• Increasing respect for human rights by sharing withcivilian authorities modern, humane, and effectiveantiterrorism techniques.

ATA courses are tailored to the requirements of individualpartner nations and are developed in response to terror-ism trends. The training can be categorized into fourfunctional areas: Crisis Prevention, Crisis Management,Crisis Resolution, and Investigation. Countries needingassistance are identified on the basis of the threat or actuallevel of terrorist activity they face.

Antiterrorism assistance and training may be conductedeither in-country or within the United States. This arrange-ment provides flexibility to maximize the effectiveness ofthe program for countries of strategic importance in theglobal war on terrorism.

Ambassador J. Cofer Black, former US State Department Coordinatorfor Counterterrorism, during a news conference at the IV RegularSession of the Organization of American States Inter-AmericanCommittee Against Terrorism (CICTE) in Montevideo, Uruguay, January29. (AP Photo/Luis Alonso)

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ATA programs may take the form of advisory assistance,such as the impact of counterterrorism activities on policeadministration and management of police departments,how to teach counterterrorism tactics to police instructorsor develop counterterrorism curriculum for a police acad-emy, and modern interview and investigative techniques.This approach enables the program to provide a narrowfocus to solutions for country-specific problems that arenot resolved in the classroom training environment. Equip-ment or explosive-detection trained dogs may also beincluded in the assistance package.

The ability of the United States to assist partner nations tomaster the detection and prevention of terrorist activitieswill clearly enhance the mutual security of all the partici-pating countries. Detecting and eliminating terrorist cellsat the root before their violence can cross borders andoceans will ensure a safer world for all nations.

ATA continues its efforts to familiarize ambassadors, USEmbassy regional security officers, and other US officialswith the program offerings. The success of these efforts isevidenced by the fact that every frontline nation has

ATA Successes in 2004

The ATA program has greatly enhanced the counterterrorism abilities of many foreign nations allied with the UnitedStates in the global war on terrorism. ATA’s training initiatives provide the strategic, operational, and tactical capabilitiesneeded to detect, confront, and defeat terrorists. In many countries, ATA-trained officials have played key roles in local,regional, and global counterterrorism efforts. ATA alumni have served as the lead investigators of a number of recentterrorist attacks and have utilized their training to track down and arrest many of the perpetrators. The following are justa few examples of the overall impact of the program:

• In November, Indonesian counterterrorism officers of the ATA-trained Task Force 88 arrested the terrorist whohad commanded the attack against the Australian Embassy that resulted in 10 deaths. When Task Force88 arrested the terrorist, he had explosives in his possession and was planning additional attacks. Task Force 88also apprehended three terrorists as they attempted to bomb a major shopping center. Additionally, they arrested11 other bombing suspects, including members of the Jemaah Islamiya terrorist organization.

• In Colombia, ATA-trained government anti-kidnapping units rescued 48 kidnapped hostages, including twoAmerican citizens. In conducting these operations, the anti-kidnapping units arrested 206 hostage takers, killedfour members of their groups, and recovered $7 million in ransom money.

• In the Philippines, ATA-trained personnel led the post-blast investigations of three terrorist bombing incidents,and ATA-trained officers were instrumental in securing the release of an American citizen kidnapped by a crimesyndicate in Manila.

• In Pakistan, the ATA-trained Special Investigation Group (SIG) arrested members of a terrorist organization thathad twice attempted to assassinate President Musharraf and had detonated two car bombs near the USConsulate General in Karachi. The SIG also arrested 12 terrorists involved in the attempted assassination of thenPrime Minister-designate Aziz.

• An Azerbaijani police officer who completed an ATA explosives countermeasures course successfully disposed of 30volatile explosive projectiles discovered in a factory in a densely populated area.

• ATA-trained Uzbekistani police utilized their advanced post-blast investigation and analysis training when aseries of bombings rocked their country in late March. They quickly responded to the crime scenes, professionallycollected and analyzed evidence, and subsequently arrested dozens of suspected terrorists and discovered severaltons of explosives. When the US Embassy was attacked in July, these personnel employed many of these skills again,and cooperated fully with the FBI and other US Government agencies investigating the attack. Such effectivebilateral law enforcement cooperation resulted directly from investigative skills and collaborative relationshipsfostered by the ATA program.

ATA training focuses on a “train the trainer” approach to ensure that host nation officials who have received ATA trainingcan successfully teach those principles and techniques in their own academies. In many instances, law enforcementofficials who have participated in ATA training during their careers have risen to prominent positions within theirorganizations. In the Philippines, for example, General Aglipay, the head of the Philippine National Police, has partici-pated in the ATA program throughout much of his career and readily credits it with improving his skills as a senior lawenforcement professional.

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requested antiterrorist assistance in some form. US diplo-mats report that the ability of the United States to offerimmediate, specific, and intensive training, along withtechnical tools and equipment, has succeeded in break-ing down barriers and building trust.

Countering Terrorism on the Economic Front

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the USGovernment has acted to block funding of terrorists andtheir supporters and to promote international cooperationagainst them.

On September 23, 2001, the President signed ExecutiveOrder (EO) 13224, giving the United States Government(USG) a powerful tool to impede terrorist funding. In gen-eral terms, the EO provides a means to disrupt thefinancial-support network for terrorists and terrorist orga-nizations by authorizing the US Government to designateand block the assets of foreign individuals and entitiesthat commit, or pose a significant risk of committing, actsof terrorism. In addition, because of the pervasivenessand expansiveness of the financial foundations of foreignterrorists, the order authorizes the US Government to blockthe assets of individuals and entities that provide support,offer assistance to, or otherwise associate with designatedterrorists and terrorist organizations. The EO also coverstheir subsidiaries, front organizations, agents, and associ-ates.

The Secretary of State, in consultation with the AttorneyGeneral and the Secretary of the Treasury, continues todesignate foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) pursuantto Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, asamended. FTO designations play a critical role in the USfight against terrorism and are an effective means of cur-tailing support for terrorist activities and pressuring groupsto get out of the terrorism business. Among other conse-quences of such a designation, it is unlawful for US personsor any persons subject to the jurisdiction of the UnitedStates to provide material support or resources to a desig-nated FTO. US financial institutions are also required tofreeze the funds of designated FTOs.

EO and FTO designations support US efforts to curb fi-nancing of terrorism and encourage other nations to dothe same. They stigmatize and isolate designated terroristentities and individuals internationally. They deter dona-tions or contributions to, and economic transactions with,named entities and individuals. They heighten publicawareness and knowledge of terrorist organizations andsignal to other governments US concerns about namedentities and individuals.

During 2004, the United States and other UN membersdesignated a number of individuals and entities:

• On January 16, the United States Governmentdesignated Sulaiman Jassem Sulaiman Abo Ghaith under

EO 13224, and his name was added, at the request of theKuwaiti Government, to the UNSCR 1267 SanctionsCommittee’s (“Sanctions Committee”) consolidated list ofindividuals and entities with links to the Taliban, Usama binLadin, or al-Qa’ida the same day.

• The USG designated the branch offices of the Saudi-based charity al-Haramain Islamic Foundation locatedin Indonesia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Pakistan onJanuary 22 under EO 13224. At the request of theUnited States and Saudi Arabia, these entities were alsolisted by the Sanctions Committee on January 26.

• The USG designated Shaykh ‘Abd al-Majid al-Zindaniunder EO 13224 on February 24. At the request of theUnited States, he was also listed by the SanctionsCommittee on February 27.

• On March 15, Italy submitted 10 names to the UN 1267Sanctions Committee, which listed them on March 17.The United States designated and froze the assets ofthese 10 individuals domestically on March 18.

• On May 3, the Sanctions Committee listed four namessubmitted by Germany. The United States designatedand froze the assets of these four individualsdomestically on April 30.

• On May 6, the USG designated al-Furqan, TaibahInternational (Bosnia), and al-Haramain & al-Masjedal-Aqsa Charity Foundation under Executive Order13224. At the request of the United States, two of theseal-Qa’ida-linked Bosnian charities were listed by theSanctions Committee on May 11 and one on June 28.

• On June 2, the USG designated the al-HaramainIslamic Foundation branch offices in Afghanistan,Albania, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and the Netherlandsunder EO 13224. At the request of the United Statesand Saudi Arabia, these additional al-Haramainbranches were listed by the Sanctions Committee onJuly 6.

• The United States designated Hassan Abdullah Hersial-Turki under EO 13224 on June 3. At the request ofthe United States, his name was listed by theSanctions Committee on July 6.

• On June 10, the United States designated Assad AhmadBarakat and two businesses under EO 13224.

• On June 23, the Sanctions Committee listed six namesproposed by Italy, and the United States designatedthese six individuals under EO 13224.

• On July 13, the USG designated the Continuity IrishRepublican Army (CIRA) as a Foreign TerroristOrganization (FTO) and amended the Executive Orderdesignation of CIRA to include two aliases: Continuity

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Army Council and Republican Sinn Fein. The USGhad designated Continuity Irish Republican Army(CIRA) under EO 13224 on December 31, 2001.

• On September 9, the United States designated al-Haramain Islamic Foundation branch offices in theUnited States (Ashland, Oregon and Springfield,Missouri) and a branch of the Foundation in theComoros Islands under EO 13224. In addition, thedirector of the US branch of the al-Haramain IslamicFoundation, Suliman al-Buthe, was also designated.At the request of the United States, the additional al-Haramain branches and Suliman al-Buthe were listedby the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee on September 28.

• On October 13, the United States designated theIslamic African Relief Agency (IARA), its offices worldwide, and five of its senior officials (Dr. MohammedIbrahim Sulaiman, Jaffar Ahmad Abdullah Makki,Khalid Ahmad Jumah al-Sudani, Abdul Aziz AbbabakarMuhamad, and Ibrahim Buisir) under EO 13224.

• On October 15, the United States designated Jama’atal-Tawhid wa’al-Jihad (JTJ) both as an FTO andseparately under EO 13224. At the request of theUnited States, the United Kingdom, Jordan, and Iraq,this organization was also listed by the SanctionsCommittee on October 18.

• On November 30, the USG amended the previousdesignation of Jama’at al-Tawhid wa’al-Jihad (JTJ), toinclude its new alias Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Biladal-Rafidayn and all its possible translations. OnDecember 2, Japan, joined by the United Kingdom andGermany, submitted the new alias Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn and all its possibletranslations and transliterations to the SanctionsCommittee. The USG fully supported those efforts.

• On December 17, the United States designated KhadafiAbubaker Janjalani, the leader of a major faction ofthe Abu Sayyaf Group, under EO 13224 and co-

sponsored the submission of Janjalani to the UN 1267Sanctions Committee with the Governments of thePhilippines and Australia.

• On December 21, the United States designated AdelAbdul Jalil Batterjee and Saad Rashed Mohammad al-Faqih for providing material support to al-Qa’ida andUsama bin Ladin under EO 13224 and submitted bothnames to the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee; they werelisted by the Committee on December 23.

As of December 31, 2004, the United States had desig-nated under EO 13224 a total of 397 individuals andentities as terrorists, their financiers, or facilitators. SinceSeptember 11, 2001, the global community has frozenover $146 million in terrorist-related assets.

Throughout the year, the United States also continued towork closely with multilateral partners in numerouscounterterrorist financing tracks, including theCounterterrorism Committee of the United Nations, theEgmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, the FinancialAction Task Force (FATF), and the Counterterrorism Assis-tance Group (CTAG), as well as in international financialinstitutions. In addition, in June the United States agreedwith the European Union on a Declaration on CombatingTerrorism that ratified a wide-ranging set of counterterrorisminitiatives, including a commitment to establish a regulardialogue on terrorism finance between the European Unionand the United States. Since it was launched in September2004, the dialogue has served as the framework for ongoingexchanges to promote information-sharing and cooperationon FATF and on technical assistance issues.

Multilateral and Regional Cooperation

Multilateral and regional organizations are crucial to build-ing a seamless global counterterrorism web. Specializedmultilateral organizations like the International Civil Avia-tion Organization (ICAO) and the International MaritimeOrganization (IMO) can set international counterterrorismstandards and best practices. Regional groups around the

Addressing The Threat of Terrorist Financing through Non-Bank Conduits

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the international community has made significant progress in safe-guarding international financial markets from abuse by terrorist financiers. The public and private sectors have adoptedmore stringent measures to regulate and supervise the traditional banking system. Governments around the globe haveemployed the public designations and asset freezing process to identify and isolate terrorist financiers from the interna-tional financial system and global economy. The United States and its foreign partners have reinforced theircounterterrorism finance regimes to detect, disrupt, and dismantle terrorist financing networks. Such measures havedeterred terrorist financiers and money launderers from using the formal banking system and have forced them to seekother, more risky methods to raise and move their funds.

In light of these developments, the international community has recognized the threat of terrorist financing through theabuse of non-bank conduits such as alternative remittance systems, cash couriers, and charitable organizations. Theinter-governmental Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) adopted nine Special Recommendations

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on Terrorist Financing that include the importance of preventing the abuse of these mechanisms by terrorist financingnetworks. In turn, the United States has expanded its counterterrorism financing strategy to address non-bank conduitsby strengthening domestic oversight of these non-bank mechanisms and providing technical assistance to foreign part-ners to combat these methods of terrorist financing.

Alternative Remittance Systems

Alternative remittance systems, or money value transfer services, are financial services, traditionally operating outsidethe conventional financial sector, where value or funds are moved from one geographic location to another. Whilealternative remittance systems provide a legitimate, inexpensive, and efficient service to send funds to remote areas ofthe world, such services, if unregulated, have been and can be used for terrorist financing and money laundering.

FATF Special Recommendation VI calls on each country to take measures to ensure that persons or legal entities,including agents, that provide a service for the transmission of money or value, including transmission through aninformal money or value transfer system or network, should be licensed or registered and subject to all the FATFRecommendations that apply to banks and non-bank financial institutions. Each country should ensure that persons orlegal entities that carry out this service illegally are subject to administrative, civil, or criminal sanctions. The interna-tional community seeks to encourage the licensing and registration of money value transfer services and to raise thepublic’s awareness (of service providers and customers) of the potential abuse of these financial services by terroristfinanciers and money launderers. To that end, several international conferences on terrorist financing have includedsessions examining the threat of terrorist financing through alternative remittance systems and exchanging “best prac-tices” on regulating the sector. In April 2004, the United Arab Emirates hosted the Second International Conference onHawala in Abu Dhabi, attended by 375 delegates representing 70 countries, that focused on the potential abuse ofalternative remittance systems by terrorist financiers or money launderers.

Cash Couriers

As the formal financial sector has adopted more rigorous anti-money laundering measures, terrorist networks andorganized crime groups have become more reluctant to use the traditional banking system to move funds. According toFATF, law enforcement and intelligence reports indicate that cash smuggling is one of the major methods used byterrorist financiers and money launderers to finance their activities.

To address the threat of terrorist financing through cash smuggling, FATF issued Special Recommendation IX on CashCouriers in October 2004 that states:

• Countries should have measures in place to detect the physical cross-border transportation of currency andbearer negotiable instruments, including a declaration system or other disclosure obligation.

• Countries should ensure that their competent authorities have the legal authority to stop or restrain currency orbearer negotiable instruments that are suspected to be related to terrorist financing or money laundering, or that arefalsely declared or disclosed.

• Countries should ensure that effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions are available to deal with personswho make false declaration(s) or disclosure(s). In cases where the currency or bearer negotiable instruments arerelated to terrorist financing or money laundering, countries should also adopt measures which would enableconfiscation of such currency or instruments.

Recognizing the threat of terrorist financing through cash smuggling, countries are re-examining their cross-border cashreporting requirements through either disclosure or declaration systems in order to better supervise and regulate cashcouriers. The international community is improving intelligence and law enforcement cooperation and reinforcingcustoms and border capabilities to detect and disrupt bulk cash smuggling.

Non-Profit Organizations

The charitable sector is a vital component of the world economy providing public services aimed at improving thequality of life; however, numerous cases have come to light in which charitable fundraising has been used to providecover for the financing of terror with or without the knowledge of donors, or even members of the management staff.

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world, including the European Union, the African Union,the Organization of American States and others, can, anddo, encourage their member states to adopt these stan-dards and best practices, and help in their implementation.

One example of how the United States is working withmultilateral and regional organizations to improvecounterterrorism capabilities involves different multilat-eral groups, each doing what it does best:

• The G8 developed a set of guidelines and bestpractices to improve the security of travel documents,including the use of biometrics.

• The ICAO reviewed these guidelines and bestpractices and agreed to adopt them as internationalstandards.

• The Organization for Security and Cooperation inEurope (OSCE) agreed in a Ministerial decision inDecember 2003 to a US-initiated proposal for all 55OSCE member states to adopt and implement the ICAOstandards.

• The G8 Counterterrorism Action Group (CTAG), whichcoordinates members’ counterterrorism programs andassistance to avoid duplication of effort, worked tocoordinate donor assistance on document securityneeds in the OSCE region and beyond.

G8 actions in these areas can serve as a first step in furtherbolstering the security of travel. As with G8 documentsecurity and issuance standards, the next steps will be toexport completed standards and practices to other orga-nizations for broader adoption, and then to assist thoselacking the means to implement them.

Role of the United Nations in Fighting Terrorism

There are 12 universal conventions and protocols currentlyin force against terrorism that have been developed underthe auspices of the United Nations and its specialized agen-cies and are open to participation by all member states.Various UN Security Council resolutions, including Reso-lution 1373, have called upon all member states to becomeparties to these international instruments. However, manystates are not yet parties to all 12 instruments (and thushave not yet implemented them), while still other stateshave not fully implemented them despite becoming par-ties. (A thirteenth instrument, the Nuclear TerrorismConvention, was adopted by the UN General Assemblyon April 13, 2005, and will be opened for signature inSeptember 2005.)

These conventions and protocols were negotiated from1963 to 1999. Most are penal in nature with a commonformat. Typically, they define a particular type of terroristconduct as an offense under the convention, such as sei-zure of an aircraft in flight by threat or force; require stateparties to penalize that activity in their domestic law; iden-tify certain bases upon which the relevant state parties are

FATF Special Recommendation VIII calls on countries to review the adequacy of laws and regulations that relate toentities that can be abused for the financing of terrorism. Non-profit organizations are particularly vulnerable, andcountries should ensure that they cannot be misused:

• by terrorist organizations posing as legitimate entities;

• to exploit legitimate entities as conduits for terrorist financing, including for the purpose of escaping assetfreezing measures; and

• to conceal or obscure the clandestine diversion of funds intended for legitimate purposes to terrorist organizations.

The international community encourages charities to know the origins of their funding, to ensure the integrity of theirorganization’s activities through active program oversight, and to establish formal administrative and managerial con-trol over their operations to prevent the abuse of non-profit organizations by terrorist financiers. In order to promotepublic sector-private sector partnership in this field, the United States, as well as other foreign partners and internationalorganizations, has conducted conferences and training sessions to exchange “best practices” on how to safeguardcharitable organizations from abuse, whether it be by corrupt government officials, employee malfeasance, or terroristfinancing networks. To raise awareness of the threat of terrorist financing through the non-profit sector, the United Statessponsored a conference on “Safeguarding Charities from Abuse” in Bangkok, Thailand, in December 2004 for SoutheastAsian states to discuss ways to regulate the charitable sector and detect the misuse of charities by corrupt officials,money launderers, or terrorist financiers.

Consult the FATF website at http://www.fatf-gafi.org for more information on Special Recommendations on TerroristFinancing

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G8 Counterterrorism Actions

The Group of Eight (G8) — the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, and the United Kingdom— has been instrumental in developing cutting-edge counterterrorism standards and practices, ranging from enhancedtravel document security standards to improved practices for mitigating the MANPADS (man-portable air defense sys-tems, i.e., shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles) threat to airports. G8 counterterrorism initiatives often have an impactwell beyond the borders of G8 member states, as the group actively seeks to promulgate the standards and practices itdevelops to international standard-setting organizations. G8 travel document security standards, for example, havebeen adopted by the International Civil Aviation Organization for all its members, and a port and maritime securityassessment guide created by the G8 was adopted by the International Maritime Organization in December 2004. TheG8 focused on two primary counterterrorism initiatives in 2004, adopting the Secure and Facilitated International TravelInitiative (SAFTI) and expanding the activities of the Counterterrorism Action Group (CTAG).

Secure and Facilitated International TravelSecurity Initiative

At the June 2004 Sea Island Summit, President Bush and the other G8 leaders committed to strengthen internationalcounterterrorism cooperation by launching the Secure and Facilitated International Travel Initiative (SAFTI), which isdesigned to increase passenger confidence in the security of international transportation, speed the processing of trav-elers by border authorities, promote international commerce, and reduce the threat of MANPADS to civil aviation. TheG8 partners agreed to shared principles, including commitments to:

• Maximize effective information exchange among partner states as a key element of strengthening internationalborder security;

• Work cooperatively to improve screening methods for international travelers, crews, and cargo for known oremerging threats as far in advance as possible; and

• Make all possible efforts to ensure that travel documents are secure, resistant to fraud, and globally interoperable.

G8 Leaders as part of SAFTI also adopted a 28-point action plan (see details at: http://www.g8usa.gov/d_060904f.htm),committing G8 members to implement security-enhancing projects in a variety of transportation security fields, including:

• Strengthening international standards for passport issuance;

• Developing new measures to defend against the threat of MANPADS;

• Establishing a Point-of-Contact network to deal with aviation threat emergencies; and

• Expanding training and assistance on transportation security to third-party states.

By the end of 2004, projects for nine of the 28 actions items had been completed, and progress made on the remainder.All projects are scheduled for completion by the end of 2005.

Counterterrorism Action Group (CTAG)

G8 leaders at the June 2003 Evian Summit adopted a plan to build political will and capacity to combat terrorismglobally, and established the Counterterrorism Action Group (CTAG) to implement this plan. CTAG has supported theUN Counterterrorism Committee’s efforts to oversee implementation of UNSCR 1373 by developing into an activeforum for donors to coordinate counterterrorism cooperation with, and assistance to, third countries. CTAG promotescounterterrorism by prioritizing needs and targeting assistance to expand counterterrorism capacity in recipient coun-tries. CTAG also encourages all countries to meet their obligations under Resolution 1373 of the United NationsSecurity Council and the 12 international counterterrorism conventions and protocols.

Under the chairmanship of France and then the United States, CTAG has met five times, twice in Paris in 2003 and threetimes in Washington in 2004, with the active participation of G8 member states, the European Commission, and the UN

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Counterterrorism Committee. They were joined at one or more meetings by Australia, Spain, Switzerland, the AsianDevelopment Bank, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the International Civil Aviation Organization, theInternational Maritime Organization, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Terror-ism Prevention Branch of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. CTAG is scheduled to meet three times in 2005 under theUK’s chairmanship. Coordination meetings hosted by the local embassy of the G8 presidency have also been heldamong CTAG members’ diplomatic missions in recipient countries, involving as appropriate the host government andothers as agreed locally by CTAG members.

CTAG has coordinated diplomatic, donor cooperation, and donor assistance efforts, such as:

• Facilitating universal adherence to the 12 international counterterrorism conventions and protocols by encouragingnearly 100 countries to ratify the instruments;

• Working with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to assess the potential technical assistance needs of keycountries to help them comply with the nine special FATF recommendations on terrorist financing.

• Focusing counterterrorism donor assistance on needs in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) region,especially port and maritime security gaps, in concert with APEC’s Counterterrorism Task Force;

• Coordinating donor assistance to help countries in the western Balkans to assess and improve airport security; and

• Promoting and assisting implementation of travel security and facilitation standards and practices being developedby the G8 under its Secure and Facilitated International Travel Initiative (SAFTI).

CTAG’s standing members include the G8 member states, the European Commission, and the UN CounterterrorismCommittee.

required to establish jurisdiction over the defined offense,such as registration, territoriality, or nationality; and cre-ate an obligation on the state party in which an accusedoffender is found to establish jurisdiction over the offenseand to refer the offense for prosecution if the party doesnot extradite pursuant to other provisions of the conven-tion. This last element gives effect to the principle of “nosafe haven for terrorists.” UN Security Council Resolu-tion 1373 particularly stresses this principle and obligatesall states to “deny safe haven to those who finance, plan,support, or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe havens.”

The 1991 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explo-sives for the Purpose of Detection is regulatory in natureand contains no penal provisions. The 1963 Conventionon Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on BoardAircraft requires a state party to establish penal jurisdic-tion over offenses committed on board its registered aircraftin flight, without requiring how those offenses should bedefined.

The following matrix includes the 12 universal conven-tions and protocols against terrorism, which have beensigned (S), and/or ratified/acceded to (P) through the endof 2004. Information is derived from notifications fromthe United Nations, listings placed on UN websites, otherdepositories, and through depositary notes received ei-ther by US posts abroad or at home.

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es fo

r th

e Pu

rpos

e of

D

etec

tion

Con

vent

ion

for

the

Supp

ress

ion

of

Unl

awfu

l Act

s A

gain

st th

e Sa

fety

of

Mar

itim

e N

avig

atio

n

Prot

ocol

for t

he

Supp

ress

ion

of

Unl

awfu

l Act

s A

gain

st th

e Sa

fety

of F

ixed

Pl

atfo

rms

Loca

ted

on th

e C

ontin

enta

l Sh

elf

Prot

ocol

for t

he

Supp

ress

ion

of

Unl

awfu

l Act

s of

Vi

olen

ce a

t A

irpor

ts S

ervi

ng

Inte

rnat

iona

l C

ivil

Avi

atio

n

Con

vent

ion

on

the

Phys

ical

Pr

otec

tion

of

Nuc

lear

Mat

eria

l

Con

vent

ion

Aga

inst

the

Taki

ng o

f H

osta

ges

Con

vent

ion

on

the

Prev

entio

n an

d Pu

nish

men

t of

Crim

es A

gain

st

Inte

rnat

iona

lly

Prot

ecte

d Pe

rson

s

Mon

trea

l C

onve

ntio

n fo

r th

e Su

ppre

ssio

n of

U

nlaw

ful A

cts

Aga

inst

the

Safe

ty o

f Civ

il A

viat

ion

Hag

ue

Con

vent

ion

for

the

Supp

ress

ion

of

Unl

awfu

l Se

izur

e of

A

ircra

ft

Toky

o C

onve

ntio

n on

O

ffens

es a

nd

Cer

tain

Oth

er

Act

s C

omm

itted

on

Boa

rd A

ircra

ft

Afg

hani

stan

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

P

Alb

ania

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

Alg

eria

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

P

And

orra

SP

PP

P

Ang

ola

PP

P

Ant

igua

& B

arbu

daP

PP

PP

PP

Arg

entin

aS

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

P

Arm

enia

PP

PP

PP

PP

P

Aus

tral

iaP

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

Aus

tria

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

Aze

rbai

jan

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

Bah

amas

SS

SP

PP

PP

Bah

rain

PP

PP

PP

P

Ban

glad

esh

PP

P

Bar

bado

sP

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

Bel

arus

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

Bel

gium

PS

SS

SP

PP

PP

PP

Bel

ize

PP

SP

PP

PP

P

Ben

inP

PP

PP

PP

PP

Bhu

tan

PP

PP

PP

Bol

ivia

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

1 H

ong

Kon

g2

Mac

au3T

aiw

an c

omm

its to

the

12

P =

A P

AR

TY T

OS

= S

IGN

ATO

RY

Billett George

Rectangle

INTE

RN

ATI

ON

AL

CO

UN

TER

TER

RO

RIS

M C

ON

VEN

TIO

NS

2 of

10

1999

1998

1991

1988

1988

1988

1980

1979

1973

1971

1970

1963

Con

vent

ion

for

the

Supp

ress

ion

of

the

Fina

ncin

g of

Ter

roris

m

Con

vent

ion

for

the

Supp

ress

ion

of T

erro

rist

Bom

bing

s

Con

vent

ion

on

the

Mar

king

of

Plas

tic

Expl

osiv

es fo

r th

e Pu

rpos

e of

D

etec

tion

Con

vent

ion

for

the

Supp

ress

ion

of

Unl

awfu

l Act

s A

gain

st th

e Sa

fety

of

Mar

itim

e N

avig

atio

n

Prot

ocol

for t

he

Supp

ress

ion

of

Unl

awfu

l Act

s A

gain

st th

e Sa

fety

of F

ixed

Pl

atfo

rms

Loca

ted

on th

e C

ontin

enta

l Sh

elf

Prot

ocol

for t

he

Supp

ress

ion

of

Unl

awfu

l Act

s of

Vi

olen

ce a

t A

irpor

ts S

ervi

ng

Inte

rnat

iona

l C

ivil

Avi

atio

n

Con

vent

ion

on

the

Phys

ical

Pr

otec

tion

of

Nuc

lear

Mat

eria

l

Con

vent

ion

Aga

inst

the

Taki

ng o

f H

osta

ges

Con

vent

ion

on

the

Prev

entio

n an

d Pu

nish

men

t of

Crim

es A

gain

st

Inte

rnat

iona

lly

Prot

ecte

d Pe

rson

s

Mon

trea

l C

onve

ntio

n fo

r th

e Su

ppre

ssio

n of

U

nlaw

ful A

cts

Aga

inst

the

Safe

ty o

f Civ

il A

viat

ion

Hag

ue

Con

vent

ion

for

the

Supp

ress

ion

of

Unl

awfu

l Se

izur

e of

A

ircra

ft

Toky

o C

onve

ntio

n on

O

ffens

es a

nd

Cer

tain

Oth

er

Act

s C

omm

itted

on

Boa

rd A

ircra

ft

Bos

nia-

Her

zego

vina

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

Bot

swan

aP

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

P

Bra

zil

SP

PS

SP

PP

PP

PP

Bru

nei

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

Bul

garia

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

Bur

kina

Fas

oP

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

P

Bur

ma

SP

PP

PP

PP

PP

P

Bur

undi

SS

PP

SP

Cam

bodi

aS

PP

PP

Cam

eroo

nP

PP

PP

PP

P

Can

ada

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

Cap

e Ve

rde

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

P

Cen

tral

Afr

ican

Rep

ublic

S

PP

PP

Cha

dP

PP

Chi

leP

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

P

Chi

naS

PP1

PP

P1P

P1,2

P1P1,

2P2

P1,2

Col

ombi

aP

PS

PP

PP

PP

Com

oros

PP

PP

PP

P

Con

go (R

OC

, Bra

zzav

ille)

SS

PP

P

Con

go (D

RO

C, K

insh

asa)

SS

PS

PP

PP

Coo

k Is

land

sP

Cos

ta R

ica

PP

SP

PP

PP

PP

PP

1 H

ong

Kon

g2

Mac

au3T

aiw

an c

omm

its to

the

12

P =

A P

AR

TY T

OS

= S

IGN

ATO

RY

Billett George

Rectangle

INTE

RN

ATI

ON

AL

CO

UN

TER

TER

RO

RIS

M C

ON

VEN

TIO

NS

3 of

10

1999

1998

1991

1988

1988

1988

1980

1979

1973

1971

1970

1963

Con

vent

ion

for

the

Supp

ress

ion

of

the

Fina

ncin

g of

Ter

roris

m

Con

vent

ion

for

the

Supp

ress

ion

of T

erro

rist

Bom

bing

s

Con

vent

ion

on

the

Mar

king

of

Plas

tic

Expl

osiv

es fo

r th

e Pu

rpos

e of

D

etec

tion

Con

vent

ion

for

the

Supp

ress

ion

of

Unl

awfu

l Act

s A

gain

st th

e Sa

fety

of

Mar

itim

e N

avig

atio

n

Prot

ocol

for t

he

Supp

ress

ion

of

Unl

awfu

l Act

s A

gain

st th

e Sa

fety

of F

ixed

Pl

atfo

rms

Loca

ted

on th

e C

ontin

enta

l Sh

elf

Prot

ocol

for t

he

Supp

ress

ion

of

Unl

awfu

l Act

s of

Vi

olen

ce a

t A

irpor

ts S

ervi

ng

Inte

rnat

iona

l C

ivil

Avi

atio

n

Con

vent

ion

on

the

Phys

ical

Pr

otec

tion

of

Nuc

lear

Mat

eria

l

Con

vent

ion

Aga

inst

the

Taki

ng o

f H

osta

ges

Con

vent

ion

on

the

Prev

entio

n an

d Pu

nish

men

t of

Crim

es A

gain

st

Inte

rnat

iona

lly

Prot

ecte

d Pe

rson

s

Mon

trea

l C

onve

ntio

n fo

r th

e Su

ppre

ssio

n of

U

nlaw

ful A

cts

Aga

inst

the

Safe

ty o

f Civ

il A

viat

ion

Hag

ue

Con

vent

ion

for

the

Supp

ress

ion

of

Unl

awfu

l Se

izur

e of

A

ircra

ft

Toky

o C

onve

ntio

n on

O

ffens

es a

nd

Cer

tain

Oth

er

Act

s C

omm

itted

on

Boa

rd A

ircra

ft

Cot

e d'

Ivoi

reP

PS

SP

PP

PP

Cro

atia

PP

PP

PP

PP

Cub

aP

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

P

Cyp

rus

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

Cze

ch R

epub

licS

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

P

Den

mar

kP

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

P

Djib

outi

SP

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

Dom

inic

aP

PP

PP

PP

Dom

inic

an R

epub

licS

SS

PP

PP

East

Tim

or

Ecua

dor

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

P

Egyp

tS

SP

PP

PP

PP

PP

El S

alva

dor

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

P

Equa

toria

l Gui

nea

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

P

Eritr

eaP

Esto

nia

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

Ethi

opia

PP

PP

PP

P

Fiji

PP

PP

Finl

and

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

Fran

ceP

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

P

Gab

onS

SP

SP

PP

P

Gam

bia

PP

P

PP

P

1 H

ong

Kon

g2

Mac

au3T

aiw

an c

omm

its to

the

12

P =

A P

AR

TY T

OS

= S

IGN

ATO

RY

Billett George

Rectangle

INTE

RN

ATI

ON

AL

CO

UN

TER

TER

RO

RIS

M C

ON

VEN

TIO

NS

4 of

10

1999

1998

1991

1988

1988

1988

1980

1979

1973

1971

1970

1963

Con

vent

ion

for

the

Supp

ress

ion

of

the

Fina

ncin

g of

Ter

roris

m

Con

vent

ion

for

the

Supp

ress

ion

of T

erro

rist

Bom

bing

s

Con

vent

ion

on

the

Mar

king

of

Plas

tic

Expl

osiv

es fo

r th

e Pu

rpos

e of

D

etec

tion

Con

vent

ion

for

the

Supp

ress

ion

of

Unl

awfu

l Act

s A

gain

st th

e Sa

fety

of

Mar

itim

e N

avig

atio

n

Prot

ocol

for t

he

Supp

ress

ion

of

Unl

awfu

l Act

s A

gain

st th

e Sa

fety

of F

ixed

Pl

atfo

rms

Loca

ted

on th

e C

ontin

enta

l Sh

elf

Prot

ocol

for t

he

Supp

ress

ion

of

Unl

awfu

l Act

s of

Vi

olen

ce a

t A

irpor

ts S

ervi

ng

Inte

rnat

iona

l C

ivil

Avi

atio

n

Con

vent

ion

on

the

Phys

ical

Pr

otec

tion

of

Nuc

lear

Mat

eria

l

Con

vent

ion

Aga

inst

the

Taki

ng o

f H

osta

ges

Con

vent

ion

on

the

Prev

entio

n an

d Pu

nish

men

t of

Crim

es A

gain

st

Inte

rnat

iona

lly

Prot

ecte

d Pe

rson

s

Mon

trea

l C

onve

ntio

n fo

r th

e Su

ppre

ssio

n of

U

nlaw

ful A

cts

Aga

inst

the

Safe

ty o

f Civ

il A

viat

ion

Hag

ue

Con

vent

ion

for

the

Supp

ress

ion

of

Unl

awfu

l Se

izur

e of

A

ircra

ft

Toky

o C

onve

ntio

n on

O

ffens

es a

nd

Cer

tain

Oth

er

Act

s C

omm

itted

on

Boa

rd A

ircra

ft

Geo

rgia

PP

PP

PP

PP

P

Ger

man

yP

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

P

Gha

naP

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

P

Gre

ece

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

Gre

nada

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

Gua

tem

ala

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

Gui

nea

PP

PP

PP

PP

P

Gui

nea-

Bis

sau

SS

PP

Guy

ana

PP

PP

PP

Hai

tiS

PP

PP

P

Hol

y Se

eS

Hon

dura

sP

PP

PP

PP

PP

P

Hun

gary

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

Icel

and

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

Indi

aP

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

P

Indo

nesi

aS

SP

PP

P

Iran

PP

PP

P

Iraq

SS

PS

PP

PP

Irela

ndS

SP

PP

PP

PP

P

Isra

elP

PS

SS

PP

SP

PP

P

Italy

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

Jam

aica

SS

SP

PP

P

1 H

ong

Kon

g2

Mac

au3T

aiw

an c

omm

its to

the

12

P =

A P

AR

TY T

OS

= S

IGN

ATO

RY

Billett George

Rectangle

INTE

RN

ATI

ON

AL

CO

UN

TER

TER

RO

RIS

M C

ON

VEN

TIO

NS

5 of

10

1999

1998

1991

1988

1988

1988

1980

1979

1973

1971

1970

1963

Con

vent

ion

for

the

Supp

ress

ion

of

the

Fina

ncin

g of

Ter

roris

m

Con

vent

ion

for

the

Supp

ress

ion

of T

erro

rist

Bom

bing

s

Con

vent

ion

on

the

Mar

king

of

Plas

tic

Expl

osiv

es fo

r th

e Pu

rpos

e of

D

etec

tion

Con

vent

ion

for

the

Supp

ress

ion

of

Unl

awfu

l Act

s A

gain

st th

e Sa

fety

of

Mar

itim

e N

avig

atio

n

Prot

ocol

for t

he

Supp

ress

ion

of

Unl

awfu

l Act

s A

gain

st th

e Sa

fety

of F

ixed

Pl

atfo

rms

Loca

ted

on th

e C

ontin

enta

l Sh

elf

Prot

ocol

for t

he

Supp

ress

ion

of

Unl

awfu

l Act

s of

Vi

olen

ce a

t A

irpor

ts S

ervi

ng

Inte

rnat

iona

l C

ivil

Avi

atio

n

Con

vent

ion

on

the

Phys

ical

Pr

otec

tion

of

Nuc

lear

Mat

eria

l

Con

vent

ion

Aga

inst

the

Taki

ng o

f H

osta

ges

Con

vent

ion

on

the

Prev

entio

n an

d Pu

nish

men

t of

Crim

es A

gain

st

Inte

rnat

iona

lly

Prot

ecte

d Pe

rson

s

Mon

trea

l C

onve

ntio

n fo

r th

e Su

ppre

ssio

n of

U

nlaw

ful A

cts

Aga

inst

the

Safe

ty o

f Civ

il A

viat

ion

Hag

ue

Con

vent

ion

for

the

Supp

ress

ion

of

Unl

awfu

l Se

izur

e of

A

ircra

ft

Toky

o C

onve

ntio

n on

O

ffens

es a

nd

Cer

tain

Oth

er

Act

s C

omm

itted

on

Boa

rd A

ircra

ft

Japa

nP

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

P

Jord

anP

PP

PP

PP

PP

P

Kaz

akhs

tan

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

P

Ken

yaP

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

P

Kiri

bati

Kor

ea (D

PRK

)S

PP

PP

PP

Kor

ea (R

OK

)P

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

P

Kuw

ait

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

P

Kyr

gyzs

tan

PP

PP

PP

PP

P

Laos

PP

PP

PP

P

Latv

iaP

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

P

Leba

non

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

Leso

tho

PP

PP

PP

Libe

riaP

PP

PP

PP

PP

P

Liby

aP

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

P

Liec

hten

stei

nP

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

P

Lith

uani

aP

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

P

Luxe

mbo

urg

PP

PP

PP

PP

Mac

edon

ia, F

YRO

MP

PP

PP

PP

PP

P

Mad

agas

car

PP

PP

PP

PP

PP

Mal

awi

PP

SP

PP

PP

1 H

ong

Kon

g2

Mac

au3T

aiw

an c

omm

its to

the

12

P =

A P

AR

TY T

OS

= S

IGN

ATO

RY

Billett George

Rectangle

INTE

RN

ATI

ON

AL

CO

UN

TER

TER

RO

RIS

M C

ON

VEN

TIO

NS

6 of

10

1999

1998

1991

1988

1988

1988

1980

1979

1973

1971

1970

1963

Con

vent

ion

for

the

Supp

ress

ion

of

the

Fina

ncin

g of

Ter

roris

m

Con

vent

ion

for

the

Supp

ress

ion

of T

erro

rist

Bom

bing

s

Con

vent

ion

on

the

Mar

king

of

Plas

tic

Expl

osiv

es fo

r th

e Pu

rpos

e of

D

etec

tion

Con

vent

ion

for

the

Supp

ress

ion

of

Unl

awfu

l Act

s A

gain

st th

e Sa

fety

of

Mar

itim

e N

avig

atio

n

Prot

ocol

for t

he

Supp

ress

ion

of

Unl

awfu

l Act

s A

gain

st th

e Sa

fety

of F

ixed

Pl

atfo

rms

Loca

ted

on th

e C

ontin

enta

l Sh

elf

Prot

ocol

for t

he

Supp

ress

ion

of

Unl

awfu

l Act

s of

Vi

olen

ce a

t A

irpor

ts S

ervi

ng

Inte

rnat

iona

l C

ivil

Avi

atio

n

Con

vent

ion

on

the

Phys

ical

Pr

otec

tion

of

Nuc

lear

Mat

eria

l

Con

vent

ion

Aga

inst

the

Taki

ng o

f H

osta

ges

Con

vent

ion

on

the

Prev

entio

n an

d Pu

nish

men

t of

Crim

es A

gain

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27

UN Role in Fighting Terrorism

The United Nations continues to provide focus and energy to the international community in its collective fight againstterrorism. In 2004, the Security Council adopted five resolutions related to terrorism:

• Resolution 1526 strengthened the current sanctions regime against individuals and entities associated withthe Taliban and al-Qa’ida.

• Resolution 1530 condemned as a terrorist act the March 11 bombings that killed commuters on packed trainsin Madrid.

• Resolution 1535 established the Counterterrorism Committee (CTC) Executive Directorate, as part of its effort torevitalize the CTC.

• Resolution 1540 required all states to take steps to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

• Resolution 1566 recalled that criminal acts against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or seriousbodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose of provoking terror, among other things, are unjustifiable by anyconsideration. This resolution also established a working group to consider and submit recommendations to theCouncil on practical measures to be imposed upon individuals or entities involved in or associated with terroristactivities, other than those designated by the al-Qa’ida/Taliban Sanctions Committee.

The Counterterrorism Committee (CTC), established by Security Council Resolution 1373 after September 11, madecontinued progress toward its goal of raising the level of performance of the governments of all 191 member states in thefight against terrorism. A Counterterrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) was established by UNSCR 1535 toenhance the Committee’s ability to monitor the implementation of Resolution 1373 and effectively continue the capac-ity-building work in which it is engaged. The Committee has sought to become more active in facilitating technicalassistance to member states and promoting closer cooperation and coordination among international, regional, andsub-regional organizations. In addition, the CTED, under the direction of the CTC, is expected to begin site visits tocertain states to assess on-the-ground implementation of obligations under Resolution 1373 and any need for technicalassistance.

The UNSCR 1267 Sanctions Committee, also established by the Security Council, maintains a list of individuals andentities associated with members of al-Qa’ida and the Taliban, and/or Usama bin Ladin against whom member statesare obligated to implement Security Council-mandated sanctions — an asset freeze, travel ban, and arms embargo. TheCommittee’s consolidated list contains 443 names, including all of the most notorious al-Qa’ida-related individuals andgroups. During 2004, the General Assembly negotiated and adopted five antiterrorism resolutions, 59/46, 59/80, 59/153, 59/191, and 59/195, and continued work on the negotiation of a Comprehensive Convention on InternationalTerrorism and a Nuclear Terrorism Convention.

Secretary General Annan continued to use his office to focus the international community on the scourge of terrorism.In a June 17, 2004, speech he declared, “Terrorism strikes at the very heart of everything the UN stands for. It is a globalthreat to democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and stability, and therefore requires a global response.”

UN Secretariat staff of the Terrorism Prevention Branch in Vienna, Austria, continued to help countries build the legal frameworknecessary to become party to and implement the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

UN specialized agencies are also involved in the work of fighting terrorism. For example, the International Civil Avia-tion Organization has adopted travel document security standards, and the International Maritime Organization isengaged in security-related activities designed to make it harder for terrorists to operate in the commercial shippingarena. The International Atomic Energy Agency has launched a nuclear security action plan to combat the threat ofterrorism involving nuclear and other radioactive materials.

The Report of the Secretary General’s High Level Panel of Experts issued in December contains recommendations forstrengthening the work of the United Nations in response to the threat of terrorism, among other things. It is hoped thatthe expected debate and discussion of the Report by all 191 member states will result in new energy and focus for theUnited Nations in this area.

28

Chapter 5Country Reports

Africa Overview

A small number of al-Qa’ida operatives in East Africa, par-ticularly Somalia, continued to pose the most serious threatto American interests in the region. It is unclear to whatextent terrorist groups are present in South Africa, how-ever, the activity of al-Qa’ida and affiliated persons orgroups in South Africa and Nigeria, home to Africa’s larg-est Muslim population, is of growing concern. Hizballahcontinues to engage in fundraising activities in Africa, par-ticularly in West Africa.

Though civil conflict and ethnic violence continued in anumber of African countries in 2004, there were few sig-nificant international terrorist incidents in Africa during theyear. An increase in anti-American and anti-Western rheto-ric from a number of Islamic radicals is of growing concern.Many African governments improved their cooperation andstrengthened their efforts in the war on terrorism. Both theAfrican Union (AU) and other African regional organiza-tions undertook initiatives to improve counterterrorismcooperation and information sharing.

In October, the Government of Chad helped negotiate theturnover of captured Salafist Group for Call and Combat(GSPC) factional leader Amari Saifi (aka Abderazak al-Para)from a Chadian rebel group to the Algerian Government.Chadian military forces had routed the GSPC element ledby al-Para in northern Chad in March, and he was subse-quently captured by the rebel group. Al-Para headed a

GSPC faction responsible for the kidnapping of 32 Euro-pean tourists in Algeria in the summer of 2003. Al-Paratook the captives to Mali, where the government was in-strumental in securing their release. Members of the GSPCcontinue to operate in the Sahel region, crossing difficult-to-patrol borders between Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Algeriaand Chad. With the help of US-funded training, those coun-tries have increasingly cooperated against the GSPC. Atyear’s end, al-Para was in Algerian custody.

Sahel countries Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Chad aredevoting more resources to improve their counterterrorismcapabilities. These countries also participate in the US-sponsored Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), a program designedto assist those nations in protecting their borders, combat-ing terrorism, and enhancing regional stability.Components of the program are intended to encouragethe participating countries to cooperate with each otheragainst smuggling and trafficking in persons, as well as inthe sharing of information. The State Department fundedand currently supervises the program, which has includedproviding equipment and training by US European Com-mand (EUCOM) trainers to Sahel country military units.The United States has also provided counterterrorism train-ing for senior police and other officials from eastern andsouthern Africa at the International Law Enforcement Acad-emy in Gaborone, Botswana. A continuation of the PSIprogram, called the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Initia-tive, is now under consideration.

Many African nations have taken cooperative action againstterrorism, including making real efforts to sign and ratifythe 12 international conventions and protocols relating toterrorism. Botswana, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Mada-gascar, Mali, Niger, the Seychelles, and Sudan have signedall 12 protocols. In October, the African Union (AU)opened the new African Center for Study and Research onTerrorism in Algiers. Several nations have formed nationalcounterterrorism centers, including Nigeria, Kenya, andSouth Africa.

Brig. Gen. Mahamat Saleh Kaya, Joint Chiefs of Staff of the ChadianArmed Forces, congratulates 1st platoon honor graduate ChadianLieutenant Abakar Ibrahim Iguah during the summer 2004 graduationceremony at Chadian Army Camp 27 as Maj. Paul Baker, CommandingOfficer of the Pan-Sahel Initiative, looks on. (USMC photo by Cpl.Lameen Witter)

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Djibouti

Djibouti has taken a strong stand against international ter-rorist organizations and individuals. Djibouti hosts the onlyUS military base in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Combined JointTask Force-Horn of Africa, as well as Combined Task Force150 which operates offshore and is headquartered in Bahrain.

The Djiboutian Government has increased its efforts to trainsecurity forces, secure borders, and expand its capacity formaritime interdiction. Djibouti also joined the ranks of coun-tries participating in the US Government’s Safe Skies for Africaprogram in late 2004. Through this program, Djibouti isscheduled to receive assistance to improve its airport secu-rity and infrastructure. The Government has also closed downterrorist-linked financial institutions and shared informationon possible terrorist activity in the region. Thecounterterrorism committee under President Guelleh movedto enhance coordination and action on information con-cerning terrorist organizations.

Global Terror, Global Response: Partnership in East Africa

The US East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI), a $100 million program announced by President Bush in 2003,dedicated sizeable resources to improving counterterrorism capabilities in the East African countries of Kenya, Uganda,Tanzania, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Ethiopia in 2004. EACTI put into motion steps necessary to accomplish a number ofother important objectives in the battle against terrorists and terrorism:

• Financial intelligence units (FIUs) are being developed in several countries, to ensure that nations have the toolsthey need to stop terrorists abusing their financial systems.

.• Police training, along with such items as communications equipment, vehicles, and spare parts, has been provided

to assist participating nations to patrol their borders and prevent terrorist infiltration.

• Several countries in the region have received training and computer systems to help them identify, monitorand interdict terrorists at their borders.

• Regional navies and coastal patrols are receiving EACTI-funded training in maritime and coastal bordersecurity operations, along with equipment (such as small craft for close-in patrols) and the opportunity toexercise with US and Coalition forces. These efforts are also coordinated through the US Central Command’sCombined Joint Task Force, Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) located in Djibouti.

• EACTI funds have helped the Kenyan Government improve its National Counterterrorism Center and establish a jointterrorism task force, allowing interagency communication and information sharing on a real-time basis to preventterrorist attacks and respond to potential terrorist incidents.

• To counter extremist influence and diminish the conditions terrorists seek to exploit for safe haven andrecruitment, EACTI is funding teacher education in disadvantaged Muslim communities, encouraginggreater access to education for girls, and improving community involvement in education.

• Media and information outreach and English language teaching are expanding, both to put forward a more accuratepicture of the United States and its values, and to serve as a counterweight to Islamist-controlled media outlets.

In April 2004, the State Department’s Office of Counterterrorism invited EACTI participating nations to Kampala for aconference to review the initiative. G8 representatives and observers from neighboring states also participated. Theconference served to strengthen regional ties, particularly in the area of information sharing, and helped to increaseinternational donor interest and coordination in fighting the long-term battle against terrorism.

1st Lt. Marcus P. Cornelius (right), 3rd platoon team leader, leads hisplatoon in a conditioning run at the Koundoul Training InstructionCenter in Chad as part of the Pan-Sahel Initiative in the summer of2004. (USMC photo by Cpl. Lameen Witter)

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Ethiopia

Ethiopia’s support in the global war on terrorism has beenconsistently solid and unwavering. The Government ofEthiopia has conducted investigations regarding regionalrebel and possibly transnational terrorist threats to West-erners and US military officials in the Ogaden region ofEthiopia. Ethiopia has also been cooperative in sharinginformation with the United States on terrorist activities.To counter the threat from these groups and from elementsof the Somalia-based Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI), Ethiopiahas undertaken increased military efforts to control itslengthy and porous border with Somalia. Its draft penalcode includes provisions that criminalize terrorism,money-laundering, and providing financial support forterrorism. The Government also has developed and in-stalled new security systems for Addis Ababa’s internationalairport that allow the tracking of terrorists and terroristsupporters, and introduced a new, more secure passportthat includes anti-tampering features.

Kenya

Kenya remains an active and critical partner in the war onterrorism. The Government established the NationalCounter Terrorism Center in January 2004 as well as theNational Security Advisory Committee to oversee its op-erations. However, Kenya registered only slow progresstowards the overall strengthening of its capabilities to com-bat terrorism, prosecute terror suspects, or respond toemergency situations. In April 2003, Kenya published adraft “Suppression of Terrorism” bill, but withdrew it in2004 due to broad human rights concerns. At year’s end,the Kenyan Government had not submitted to parliamenta revised draft to address these concerns.

The Kenyan Government has taken the initiative in arrest-ing terrorist suspects and disrupting terrorist operations.The trials of seven terror suspects — arrested in Novem-ber 2003 on charges related to the Kikambala hotelbombing and attempted shoot-down of an Israeli airliner

in November 2002, the 1998 Embassy bombings and asubsequent plot to attack the US Embassy in 2003 — con-tinued but were not concluded by year’s end. Kenya mademany security improvements at airports and hotels in 2004,particularly in Mombasa. The Government’s uncoordi-nated response to an explosion at Nairobi’s Wilson Airportin October, however, indicates the need for better coordi-nation and continued improvement of security measures.

Nigeria

In 2004, Nigeria remained committed to the global waragainst terrorism and has stepped up diplomatic efforts inboth global and regional forums concerningcounterterrorism issues. Nigerian President OlusegunObasanjo and other African heads of state founded theNew Partnership for African Development — geared to-ward sustainable development in Africa — that has helpedAfrican countries combat terrorism. Nigeria initiated andsponsored the first-ever regional conference of securityand intelligence service chiefs during 2004 under the aus-pices of the Economic Community of West African States(ECOWAS). A central theme during this conference was

Kenyan defendants, charged with killing 15 people in the bombing of abeachfront hotel north of Mombasa, Kenya, in 2002, stand in the dockat the high court in Nairobi at the start of their trial in February 2004.(AP Photo/Khalil Senosi)

US troops in Amaiya, Kenya, doing medical and veterinary work. TheUS soldiers are based in Djibouti, a tiny Horn of Africa nation that since2002 has been home to the headquarters of a US-led task force leadingthe war on terrorism in eastern Africa. (AP Photo/Karel Prinsloo)

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the need to share information and cooperate more fully ona host of transnational issues, particularly terrorism. Thiseffort was followed by an African Union conference, chairedby President Obasanjo, which specifically addressed theneed for broader cooperation within the intelligence andsecurity service communities of AU member countries onthe issue of terrorism.

Nigeria has participated actively in international efforts totrack and freeze terrorists’ assets. However, Nigeria’s rela-tively large and complex banking sector, combined withwidespread corruption, makes combating terrorism financ-ing more difficult. There are growing concerns about therise of radical Islam in Nigeria — home of Africa’s largestMuslim population. Links were also uncovered connect-ing Nigerians to al-Qa’ida in 2004.

In late December 2003, early January and again in Sep-tember 2004, a group calling itself the “Taleban” raidedpolice stations in the northeastern states of Yobe and Borno,reportedly taking several police officers hostage, stealingweapons, and killing at least seven civilians. Nigeriansecurity services quickly responded to both attacks andclaim to have killed or captured dozens of the “Taleban”members in the aftermath of the attacks.

Rwanda

The Rwandan Government has continued to give full sup-port to international efforts to combat terrorism. TheGovernment has been responsive on efforts to combat ter-rorism financing and has increased its border controlmeasures to identify potential terrorists. Rwanda estab-lished an intergovernmental counterterrorism committeeand has an antiterrorism section in its police intelligenceunit. Despite lack of training and resources, Rwanda’s Cen-tral Bank and Ministry of Finance officials have providedoutstanding cooperation on terrorist financing issues.Rwanda has participated in regional initiatives on interna-tional counterterrorism cooperation with other Africancountries.

During 2004, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation ofRwanda (FDLR), known as the Army for the Liberation ofRwanda (ALIR) until 2001, an armed rebel force includ-ing former soldiers and supporters of the previousgovernment that orchestrated the genocide in 1994, con-tinued to operate in Rwanda and the Democratic Republicof the Congo. Rwanda continues to pursue the rebels. AnALIR unit was responsible for the kidnapping and murderof nine persons, including two US tourists, in Bwindi Parkin 1999. In 2004, the Rwandan Government assisted USlaw enforcement officials seeking to prosecute three sus-pects in the attack who were transferred to the UnitedStates for prosecution in 2003. At year’s end, the suspectswere in US custody awaiting trial.

Somalia

Somalia’s lack of a functioning central government, pro-tracted state of violent instability, long unguarded coastline,porous borders, and proximity to the Arabian Peninsulamake it a potential location for international terrorists seek-ing a transit or launching point to conduct operationselsewhere. Regional efforts to bring about a national recon-ciliation and establish peace and stability in Somalia areongoing. Although the ability of Somali local and regionalauthorities to carry out counterterrorism activities is con-strained, some have taken limited actions in this direction.

Members of the Somalia-based al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI)have committed terrorist acts in the past, primarily in Ethio-pia. AIAI rose to power in the early 1990s with a goal ofcreating an Islamic state in Somalia. In recent years, AIAIhas become highly factionalized and diffuse, and its mem-bership is difficult to define. Some elements of AIAIcontinue to pose a threat to countries in the region, otherfactions may be targeting Western interests in the region,while still other elements are concerned with humanitar-ian issues. Some members are sympathetic to and maintainties with al-Qa’ida.

South Africa

South Africa publicly supports global efforts against ter-rorism and has shared financial, law enforcement, andintelligence information with the United States. South Af-rica took several strong steps forward in combating terrorin 2004, particularly in the legislative arena. The SouthAfrican Parliament in November adopted the thorough“Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terroristand Related Activities Bill,” which has been sent to thePresident’s office for signature into law. The act clearlydefines terrorism and specifically criminalizes terrorist ac-tivities in application of its international obligations. Itprescribes prison sentences of up to 15 years or large finesfor those convicted.

Two South Africans were arrested in Pakistan in July aspart of the Pakistani Government’s efforts against al-Qa’ida.South African officials were satisfied they were not plan-ning to conduct attacks in South Africa. This incident,however, brought to international attention the possibilityof South Africans participating in terrorist activities. Someweaknesses of the South African passport were identified,and the Home Affairs Department is taking initial steps toimprove the security of both the passport and nationalidentity document.

The South African Government in March organized a four-week multinational Anti-Terrorism Training Program inPretoria, which brought together police from South Africaand eleven other African countries to teach methods forcombating terrorism. In early October, the Governmentreleased a report on the first full year’s activities of the

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Financial Intelligence Unit. The Unit received almost 7,500reports of suspicious financial transactions. Though thequality of the reports was uneven, this is expected to im-prove during the Unit’s next year of operation. Also inOctober, the Government announced the establishmentof an anti-terrorism “nerve center,” to bring together sev-eral police and intelligence agencies. A specialized rapidresponse anti-terrorism unit also is planned for the future.

Tanzania

Tanzania continues to be a supportive partner in the glo-bal war on terrorism. It has cooperated on severalmulti-year programs to build law enforcement capacity,enhance border security, improve civil aviation security,and combat money laundering and terrorist finance. Italso hosts the East and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laun-dering Group (ESAAMLG), an international group whoseaim is to develop a comprehensive anti-money launder-ing regime on a regional scale.

Tanzanian and US authorities established a close workingrelationship after the bombing in 1998 of the US Embassyin Dar Es Salaam and have cooperated in bringing bomb-ing suspects to trial in New York and Dar Es Salaam. RashidSweleh Hemed, on trial in Tanzania in late 2003 for hisrole in the 1998 Embassy attacks, was acquitted in lateDecember by the High Court following the government’sappeal of his initial acquittal earlier in the year. A Tanza-nian suspected of involvement in the 1998 bombing,Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, was arrested in July in Pakistan.Although cooperative, Tanzanian law enforcement authori-ties still have a limited capacity to investigate terroristsuspects and bring them to justice. A comprehensive Pre-vention of Terrorism Act, approved in late 2002, has yet tobe enforced, and implementing regulations for the lawhave not been drafted.

Uganda

Uganda continued its firm stance against local and inter-national terrorism. Uganda enacted the Anti-TerrorismAct in 2002, which provides a legal basis for bringing sus-pected terrorists to court and freezing assets of certainterrorist entities.

The Government of Uganda has fought the Lord’s Resis-tance Army (LRA) since the 1980s. This group has carriedout acts of extreme brutality against innocent civilians (kid-napping children for use as soldiers and sex slaves) andoperates in northern and eastern Uganda and southernSudan. In February, the LRA attacked the Barlonyo refu-gee camp near Lira, Uganda, killing nearly 200 people.In previous years, the LRA received assistance from theGovernment of Sudan. During 2004, the Sudanese Gov-ernment cooperated with the Ugandan Government to cutoff supplies to the LRA, and to allow the Ugandan militaryto operate on Sudanese territory. The Ugandan Govern-

ment inflicted severe setbacks to the LRA. It also contin-ued an amnesty program for senior LRA combatants, manyof whom opted to come out of the bush and accept theoffer. In an attempt to hold a direct dialogue with theLRA, the Government announced a limited ceasefire inmid-November and extended it through December 31,2004. At year’s end, however, no peace had been agreed,and fighting resumed on January 1, 2005, when the LRAambushed a government vehicle.

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East Asia and Pacific Overview

East Asian countries made significant progress in 2004 inpreventing terrorist attacks and creating an internationalenvironment inhospitable to terrorists. Despite thisprogress, Southeast Asia continues to be an attractive the-ater of operations for terrorist groups such as JemaahIslamiya (JI) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). The regionfaced continuing terrorist threats on several fronts, and in2004 several terrorist assaults occurred. In February, thePhilippines suffered the worst terrorist attack in its historywhen a bomb planted by the ASG sunk SuperFerry 14,killing approximately 130 passengers. In September, acar bomb was detonated in front of the Australian Em-bassy in Indonesia, reportedly killing 10 and woundingnearly 200. JI claimed responsibility for the attack.

Because terrorism in Asia is a transnational problem, ca-pacity building in a regional context has emerged as apriority alongside national capacity building efforts. Inan important development, centers like the Southeast AsiaRegional Center for Counterterrorism (SEARCCT) in Ma-laysia and the US-Thailand International Law EnforcementAcademy (ILEA) in Bangkok expanded their activities toprovide counterterrorism training to law enforcement of-ficers throughout the region. Likewise, theAustralian-Indonesian Jakarta Center for Law EnforcementCooperation (JCLEC) is a promising additional regionalcenter for capacity building. Multilateral fora, includingthe United Nations Security Council’s CounterterrorismCommittee (UNCTC), G8’s Roma-Lyon andCounterterrorism Action Groups (CTAG), Asia-Pacific Eco-nomic Cooperation (APEC), the Association of SoutheastAsian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Regional Forum(ARF), also emerged as important organizations for regionaland transnational counterterrorism cooperation.

Australia deserves special recognition for its continuingrobust counterterrorism posture in 2004, as the Govern-ment undertook strong measures not only to improvedomestic counterterrorism capacities, but also tostrengthen cooperation and capabilities throughout theregion. Japan also made valuable contributions to regionalcounterterrorism capacity building efforts.

Measures to strengthen law enforcement efforts support-ive of the global war on terror accelerated in 2004, andseveral economies in the region developed new institu-tions to address gaps in their current counterterrorismefforts. The People’s Bank of China established an anti-money laundering bureau, which created a terrorist financeinvestigative unit, and in November Beijing joined theEurasia Group, a regional anti-money laundering group.In the Philippines, President Arroyo created a multi-agencyAnti-Terrorism Task Force (ATTF), which captured over 60suspected terrorists in its first five months of existence.New Zealand further enhanced its capacity by allocatingfunds for the creation of National Security Teams speciallydesignated to combat terrorism. Taiwan authorities an-

A man carries a young girl who was critically injured by a bomboutside the Australian Embassy in Jakarta in September 2004. Hermother was among those killed in the explosion and her father wascritically injured. (AP Photo/Alfian Kartim)

Militant Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Ba’asyir speaks during his trial inDecember 2004 in Jakarta, Indonesia. Ba’asyir was being tried oncharges of leading the Jemaah Islamiya terrorist group and for hisinvolvement in the 2002 Bali bombings and 2003 J.W. Marriottbombing in Indonesia. (AP Photo/Irwin Fedriansyah)

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nounced the creation of a counterterrorism policy com-mittee chaired by the Premier of the Executive Yuan andcomposed of seven multi-agency task forces.

Several countries achieved successes in bringing terror-ists to justice, as the fight against terrorism in East Asiamatured to move beyond arrests towards prosecutions. TheIndonesian police arrested approximately two dozen ter-rorist suspects, including suspected senior JI leaders, formerinstructors at JI training camps, financiers of attacks, andmembers of splinter networks who joined with JI to carryout attacks. When JI Emir Abu Bakar Ba’asyir completeda sentence for document fraud and immigration violations,Indonesian police rearrested and charged him with con-spiracy to commit terrorist acts, linking him to the Bali

and Jakarta Marriott bombings as well as to a cache of armsand explosives found in central Java. Ba’asyir’s trial on thesecharges was underway at year’s end. Following up on 2003arrests for channeling terrorist money into Cambodia throughthe Umm al-Qura Islamic school, a Cambodian court con-victed three suspects of supporting JI and sentenced them tolife imprisonment. The Philippines arrested numerous ASGmembers, including a senior ASG leader wanted by theUnited States for his role in the kidnappings of Americans in2001, and a Philippines court sentenced 17 ASG membersto death, although four were convicted in absentia after hav-ing escaped from jail. Lack of specific anti-terrorismlegislation continues to be a challenge to comprehensivelaw enforcement efforts in several countries in the region.

Asia-Pacific Region Counterterrorism Initiatives

Throughout 2004, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation(APEC) forum continued to strengthen and expand cooperation to combat international terrorism and other transnationalcrimes. A series of conferences and ministerial meetings set the tone for future engagement on regional counterterrorismissues, fostering political will and building the capabilities of their respective members to fight terrorism.

The United States has worked closely with the ten member countries of ASEAN (comprising Brunei Darussalam, Burma,Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) and through the ASEAN RegionalForum (ARF) (with 24 current participants including all of the ASEAN members and Australia, Canada, People’s Repub-lic of China, European Union, India, Japan, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Mongolia, NewZealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Russia, and the United States) to enhance counterterrorism cooperation. TheASEAN community has vigorously supported expansion of regional counterterrorism capacities as envisioned in the2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, and the US-ASEAN Counterterrorism Work Plan is theblueprint for US engagement on this effort. ASEAN members have reached out to neighboring countries to expandcooperation in areas of information exchange and law enforcement cooperation, as well as increasing counterterrorismfinance and law enforcement capacity-building efforts through training and education. The ARF continued efforts toincrease maritime security cooperation and adopted the ARF Statement on Strengthening Transport Security AgainstInternational Terrorism in July of 2004. Working closely with ARF partners Malaysia and Indonesia, the United States in2004 co-hosted an ARF confidence-building measure in Kuala Lumpur focused on preventing and countering terroristattacks and other unlawful acts against shipping.

The 21 members of APEC (Australia; Brunei Darussalam; Canada; Chile; People’s Republic of China; Hong Kong, China;Indonesia; Japan; Republic of Korea; Malaysia; Mexico; New Zealand; Papua New Guinea; Peru; Philippines; RussianFederation; Singapore; Chinese Taipei; Thailand; United States; and Vietnam) have agreed to dedicate APEC not only toadvancing prosperity of their economies, but also to the complementary mission of ensuring the security of their people.The APEC Counter Terrorism Task Force (CTTF) coordinates implementation of the APEC Leaders’ 2002 Los CabosStatement on Fighting Terrorism and Promoting Growth, the Leaders’ 2003 Bangkok Commitments on Security, andsubsequent APEC Leaders’ and Ministers’ security priorities. These include counterterrorism, nonproliferation, andtrade security initiatives. The CTTF met several times during 2004 to review progress on economies’ efforts to dismantletransnational terrorist groups, eliminate the severe and growing danger posed by proliferation of weapons of massdestruction and their means of delivery, and improve regional maritime and port security.

— All 21 APEC members have prepared individual Counter-Terrorism Action Plans, which describe their completedand planned counterterrorism activities, and which identify technical assistance needs, if any.

— APEC economies are working to strengthen export control systems and to increase control and security over Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS), based on “best practices” and guidelines agreed at the 2004 APEC JointMinisterial Meeting.

— APEC members convened the third Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR) Conference in February 2004 to fostergovernment and private sector collaboration in protecting sea and air transport from acts of terrorism.

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Although governments in Southeast Asia made progressin the fight against terrorism in 2004, they face tremen-dous challenges as they continue to deal with the terroristthreat. Separatist insurgencies, currently ongoing in thePhilippines, Indonesia, and southern Thailand, also con-tribute to an environment of lawlessness, which terroristgroups may attempt to exploit for their own purposes.

Australia

Australia maintained its robust support for domestic andinternational counterterrorism efforts in 2004, adding toalready significant commitments of personnel and re-sources. Demonstrating a clearer appreciation than mostfor the scope and nature of the terrorist threat, the Austra-lian Government worked to advance practical proposalsfor regional cooperation to deter attacks, disrupt terroristcells, mitigate the effects of any attacks that did occur, andbring terrorists and their supporters to justice.

In 2004, Australia committed significant resources tostrengthen its own national security capabilities in areassuch as intelligence collection, protective security, andborder protection. In May, the National Threat AssessmentCenter located within the Australian Security IntelligenceOrganization (ASIO) began operating 24 hours a day, sevendays a week. The Australian Transaction Reports and Analy-sis Center also assisted regional financial intelligence unitsby building investigation skills and by helping officersthroughout the region detect patterns of financial transac-tions that could be used in terrorist financing.

The Australian Government also introduced legislation togive ASIO new powers to fight terrorism. By the close of2004, Australia had designated 17 groups as terrorist or-ganizations under legislation creating offenses formembership in, or other specified links to, such groups.Australia also extended measures to freeze terrorist assetsof an additional 55 individuals and entities pursuant toAustralia’s obligations under UN Security Council Reso-lutions 1267 and 1390 (and their successor resolutions)and 1373.

The Australian Government conducted a national reviewof the regulations, reporting requirements, and securityfor the storage, sale, and handling of hazardous materials,with ammonium nitrate a particular priority because of itsready availability and history of terrorist use. The Councilof Australian Governments agreed to ban access to am-monium nitrate for other than specifically authorized users.The agreement mandated establishing in each state a li-censing regime for the use, manufacture, storage, transport,supply, import, and export of ammonium nitrate.

The Australian Ambassador for Counterterrorism contin-ued to serve as a focal point for coordinating, promoting,and intensifying Australia’s international counterterrorismefforts throughout 2004. In continuation of a major dip-lomatic initiative, Australia broadened its network of

bilateral counterterrorism arrangements in Southeast Asia.By the end of 2004, the Australian Government had signednine bilateral memoranda of understanding (MOUs) oncooperation to combat international terrorism with Indo-nesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Papua New Guinea, thePhilippines, Fiji, Cambodia, East Timor, and India.

Australia launched a number of multi-year plans to helpcountries in the Asia-Pacific region build capacity to com-bat terrorism in areas such as law enforcement, bordermanagement, transportation security, intelligence, anti-ter-rorist financing, and the development of legal regimes.Australia’s support for the Jakarta Center for Law Enforce-ment Cooperation (JCLEC) in Semarang, Indonesia is aparticularly noteworthy development, as JCLEC will serveas a counterterrorism training resource for regional lawenforcement agencies. Australia also funded the establish-ment in 2004 of the Transnational Crime Center (TNCC) inJakarta, which will provide a focal point within the Indone-sian police for prevention, identification and dismantlingall forms of transnational crime, including terrorism.

In February, Australia and Indonesia convened a regionalmeeting of Justice and Interior ministers to strengthen lawenforcement efforts on counterterrorism information shar-ing and cooperative legal frameworks. Australian lawenforcement agencies continued to build working-levelrelationships with their regional counterparts in 2004. TheAustralians also provided legal drafting assistance to Pa-cific Island Forum (PIF) states seeking to adopt UNconventions against terrorism and to bring their domesticlaws into conformity with the conventions.

In partnership with the United States, Australia played aleading role in continuing development of a RegionalMovement Alert List (RMAL) system. A fully functionalRMAL should strengthen the ability of participating coun-tries to fight terrorism by monitoring the movement of peopleacross borders. Following completion of a feasibility studyundertaken by Australia and the United States, APEC minis-ters agreed in November to pilot the RMAL in 2005.

Cambodia

Despite legislative and investigative limitations, Cambo-dia took several important measures to counter the threatof terrorism. On March 31, 2004, Cambodia, with theassistance of the United States, destroyed its entire stockof man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) in partto ensure these weapons would never fall into the handsof terrorists.

In April, a bomb detonated at a ferry in the southwesterntown of Koh Kong, slightly injuring several people. Fivepersons allegedly belonging to the Cambodian FreedomFighters (CFF), an anti-government group, were subse-quently arrested. Cambodian authorities had previouslyarrested seven members of the CFF in November 2003 forallegedly planning a terrorist attack in Koh Kong. How-

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ever, in October 2004 the court dropped all charges inthese cases. Some of the accused claimed they were co-erced into confessions.

In December, a Cambodian court convicted three suspects(one Cambodian and two Thai) of supporting JemaahIslamiya (JI), sentencing them to mandatory life imprison-ment. The court acquitted an Egyptian defendant. Thecase began in May 2003 when the four were arrested byCambodian authorities for using an Islamic school run bythe Saudi Arabia-based non-government organization(NGO) Umm al-Qura as a front for channeling terroristmoney into Cambodia from Saudi Arabia. In addition tothe arrests of the four, the Government shut down twobranches of the Umm al-Qura Islamic School and deported28 foreign teachers and their dependents. During the trial,the court also convicted in absentia JI operations chiefHambali and two others of attempted murder for terroristpurposes. According to evidence presented in court,Hambali and the others convicted were involved in theplanning of terrorist attacks on the US and UK embassiesin Phnom Penh.

The Cambodian Government’s ability to investigate po-tential terrorist activities is limited by a lack of trainingand resources, and it has requested international assis-tance to upgrade its law enforcement/security capabilities,particularly in border security. The Government has in-stalled with US assistance computerized border controlsystems at Cambodia’s international airports in PhnomPenh and Siem Reap, and land border crossing points atPoipet and Koh Kong. The Cambodian Government hasalso cooperated fully with US requests to monitor terror-ists and terrorist entities listed as supporters of terroristfinancing.

China

China continues to take a clear stand against internationalterrorism and is broadly supportive of the global war onterror. China holds regular counterterrorism consultationswith the United States, and is supportive of internationalefforts to block and freeze terrorist assets. The ChineseGovernment treats designations of terrorists under US Ex-ecutive Order 13224 on an equal basis with thosedesignated by the United Nations UNSCR 1267 SanctionsCommittee. In 2004, the Bank of China established a fi-nancial intelligence unit (FIU) to track suspicioustransactions. China joined with Belarus, Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Russia to form the EurasiaGroup, a newly created regional anti-money launderingorganization or Financial Action Task Force-style regionalbody, and is in the process of becoming an observer in theFinancial Action Task Force (FATF).

In 2004, China agreed to grant permanent status to theFBI Legal Attaché Office in Beijing, thus providing for long-term stability and expansion of US-Chinese law

enforcement and counterterrorism cooperation. AlthoughUS authorities have sought more timely Chinese responsesto terrorist investigation requests, substantive intelligencehas been exchanged in some cases. Lack of training andcounterterrorism expertise remains an issue for Chineselaw enforcement officials, but some received training incombating terrorist financing at the International Law En-forcement Academy in Thailand in 2004. While no acts ofinternational terrorism were committed in China in 2004,there were several reports of bombings and bomb threatsin various parts of China. It is unclear whether these wereacts of terrorism or criminal attacks. Chinese authoritiesassert that ethnic Uighur terrorists, primarily based inXinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, continue to oper-ate on Chinese territory.

Indonesia

In 2004, Indonesia continued building on its successescombating terrorism, but the bombing of the AustralianEmbassy in Jakarta in September that killed 10 demon-strates the continued threat posed by terrorists operatingin Indonesia. The Indonesian National Police continuedto take effective steps to counter the threat posed by the

Approximately 1,000 Indonesian Muslims staged a rally in Jakarta inSeptember to protest against terrorism, two days after suspectedIslamic terrorists detonated a suicide bomb outside the AustralianEmbassy. (AP Photo/Dita Alangkara)

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regional terrorist network Jemaah Islamiya (JI). Indonesianpolice arrested approximately two dozen terrorist suspectsin 2004. Those arrested or convicted in 2004 include sus-pected senior JI leaders, former instructors at JI trainingcamps, financiers of attacks, and members of splinter net-works who joined with JI to carry out attacks. Since theOctober 2002 Bali bombings, Indonesian prosecutors andcourts have convicted more than 100 members of JI oraffiliated groups on terrorism charges.

Indonesian prosecutors and courts became a focal pointof counterterrorism efforts in 2004, as more than 45 JImembers stood trial on terrorism charges in Jakarta, Cen-tral Sulawesi, and Sumatra. As in previous years, theGovernment continued to mount effective prosecutionsand the courts continued to convict those arrested in casessuch as the Marriott bombing, although prosecution casescould have been strengthened in many instances. Addi-tionally, prosecutors have begun levying terrorism chargesagainst suspects involved in sectarian violence in Malukuand Central Sulawesi.

In September 2003, the Indonesian Supreme Court foundsuspected JI Emir Abu Bakar Ba’asyir guilty of documentfraud and immigration violations, but exonerated him oncharges of leading and participating in treasonous acts,accepting defense arguments that prosecutors had shownno connection between Ba’asyir and JI. A Supreme Courtdecision in January 2004 reduced his sentence from threeyears to 18 months. As Ba’asyir completed that sentencein April 2004, Indonesian police rearrested him andcharged him with conspiracy to commit terrorist acts, link-ing him to the Bali and Marriott bombings as well as to acache of arms and explosives found in central Java. His trialbegan in October 2004 and was ongoing at year’s end.

In July, the Constitutional Court struck down the retroac-tive application of the 2003 Anti-Terror Law, passed afterthe Bali attack. In a divided decision, the Court ruled thatthe Bali bombings did not constitute an extraordinarycrime. Both the Constitutional Court and Supreme Courtofficials said publicly the ruling would not affect Bali bomb-ing cases already adjudicated. At the time of writing, nosentences of those convicted of Bali-related charges havebeen appealed based on the Constitutional Court ruling.

In October, an Indonesian court convicted and sentencedRusman “Gun Gun” Gunawan, an Indonesian connectedto the bombing of the J.W. Marriott hotel in Jakarta, tofour years in prison for his role in helping facilitate thetransfer of funds for that attack.

The South Jakarta District Court handed down an impor-tant verdict in November when it found JI memberMohammad Qital guilty under corporate criminal liabil-ity provisions of the Anti-Terror Law. In its decision, thecourt officially recognized the existence of JI and acknowl-edged that it engaged in terrorist actions. The court then

found Qital guilty of terrorist activities through his dutiesas a JI member. However, at year’s end, JI was not a bannedorganization in Indonesia. The Government has also es-tablished and is implementing an interagency process forresponding to UN 1267 Sanctions Committee designa-tions. The Government of Indonesia notified the UNResolution 1373 Committee that it has frozen 18 accounts,but the details of those freeze orders are unclear.

By year’s end, newly-elected President Yudhoyono hadidentified the capture of fugitive JI bomb-makers NoordinMohammad Top and Azahari Hussein as a top priority.The Indonesian Government demonstrated commitmentto regional leadership in counterterrorism efforts by work-ing with the Australians to establish the Jakarta Center forLaw Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC), which will developinto a regional counterterrorism training institute.

Japan

Japan continued its strong counterterrorism stance, bothdomestically and abroad, in 2004. In May, the Diet rati-fied a mutual legal assistance treaty with the United States.The treaty will make cooperation in investigations andprosecution of terrorists easier.

Japan is active regionally in building counterterrorism co-operation and capacity among Asian countries. In June,Japan announced its APEC Counterterrorism CapacityBuilding Initiative and its plans to provide assistance toaddress aviation, port, and maritime security, as well asterrorism financing shortfalls in the region. The JapaneseCoast Guard invited students from Southeast Asian coun-tries to study at its academy, provided training for maritimelaw enforcement activities, and conducted a human re-source development project to modernize and furtherprofessionalize the Philippine Coast Guard. Japanese of-ficials have led regional seminars on terrorist finance,customs cooperation, law enforcement, immigration con-trol, and export control. To help stem the flow of terroristfinancing to al-Qa’ida and the Taliban, Japan designatedunder its asset-freezing program all entities and individu-als included on the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee’sconsolidated list and sponsored an experts seminar on es-tablishing financial intelligence units for Southeast Asiancountries in December 2004.

There were no serious incidents of international or do-mestic terrorism in Japan during 2004. The leader of AumShinrikyo, a US-designated foreign terrorist organizationaccused of perpetrating the sarin gas attack on the Tokyosubway system in 1995, was sentenced to death in Febru-ary. Appeals are pending. The Public Security IntelligenceAgency is continuing its surveillance of the group through2005, as authorized by the Public Security Commissionin December 2002.

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Laos

Laos has continued to support the global war on terror-ism, but lacks specific counterterrorism laws. The Officeof the Prosecutor General is drafting amendments to ex-isting criminal law, under which acts of terrorism fall, tomake more explicit the descriptions of and punishmentsfor terrorism-related crimes. Efforts to implement thecounterterrorism provisions of multilateral agreements arehampered by weak enforcement procedures and ineffi-ciency of security organizations. The Governmentcooperated bilaterally on counterterrorism issues with theUnited States and other nations, and multilaterally withthe United Nations and the Association of Southeast AsianNations (ASEAN).

Laos suffered a handful of incidents of domestic terrorismin 2004, carried out by groups opposed to the Lao Gov-ernment. A group calling itself the Free DemocraticPeople’s Government of Laos claimed credit for severalsmall bombings, which resulted in one death and a num-ber of injuries. This group also claimed responsibility forseveral explosions in Vientiane designed to disrupt theASEAN Summit in late November 2004.

Malaysia

The Malaysian Government continues to be a strong part-ner in the war on terrorism, taking on a leading role tofacilitate regional cooperation, most notably through itsSoutheast Asia Regional Center for Counter Terrorism(SEARCCT). Malaysia has detained more than 100 sus-pected terrorists under the Internal Security Act (ISA) sinceMay 2001. According to the Internal Security Ministry, 87such suspects remained in custody. Malaysia issued eightand renewed 32 two-year detention orders for terrorist sus-pects in 2004. Five detained terrorist suspects were grantedconditional release in 2004.

The SEARCCT, established in 2003, focused primarily ontraining for regional authorities in law enforcement, bank-ing, and other sectors. US trainers conducted courses forofficials throughout the region at SEARCCT, and Malay-sian, Japanese, Australian, South Korean, British, Croatian,and Canadian trainers also participated in regionalcounterterrorism courses, seminars, lectures, and workshops.

The Malaysian Government has worked to ensure thatseparatist violence in southern Thailand, which haswounded Malaysian tourists, does not spill over into Ma-laysia. Malaysia has strengthened border controls alongthe frontier between the two countries.

New Zealand

New Zealand has a strong capacity to develop and imple-ment counterterrorism policies, and further strengthenedits role in the global war on terror in 2004 through do-mestic legislation and regional involvement. In May, New

Zealand hosted a counterterrorism meeting for Pacific Is-land Forum members. The meeting, which was fundedthrough the Government’s Pacific Island Security Fund,discussed the region’s counterterrorism obligations and therange of international assistance available to help PacificIsland nations meet these requirements. In December, theGovernment introduced a bill into Parliament to extenduntil 2007 New Zealand’s UN Security Council-relateddesignations of terrorist organizations. By year’s end, NewZealand had designated 420 terrorist organizations andwas considering adding more to the list. In its 2004 bud-get, New Zealand allocated funds for the creation ofspecially-dedicated National Security Teams to combatterrorism.

Philippines

The Philippines continues to cooperate on a range of bi-lateral and multilateral counterterrorism efforts. Indigenousterrorist groups, as well as operatives of Jemaah Islamiya,continue to threaten the security of the country. The Phil-ippines suffered the worst terrorist attack in its history whena bomb planted by Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) terrorists sunkSuperFerry 14 in Manila Bay, killing approximately 130passengers. In December, a bomb exploded in a crowdedmarket in General Santos City, Mindanao, killing a reported17 people. No group claimed responsibility for the at-tack.

Philippine authorities had a number of successes againstterrorists in 2004. In March, they arrested seven ASG mem-bers responsible for the SuperFerry bombing anduncovered their plans to bomb the US Embassy, shoppingmalls, and other targets in Metro Manila. In April, a Phil-ippine military unit killed six ASG members on BasilanIsland, including Hamsiraji Sali, a senior ASG leaderwanted by the United States for his role in the kidnappingsof Americans Guillermo Sobero and Gracia and MartinBurnham and Sobero’s and Martin Burnham’s subsequentdeaths. One of the three US-trained Light Reaction Com-panies bloodlessly apprehended two New People’s Army(NPA) commanders in June, and an August air strike againstthe Pentagon Gang destroyed its leadership and virtuallyeliminated it as an organization. A court in August sen-tenced 17 ASG members to death, although four wereconvicted in absentia after having escaped from jail. InOctober, authorities arrested two men and one womanfor their roles in bomb attacks at the Davao airport andferry port.

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo announced the cre-ation of a multi-agency Anti-Terrorism Task Force (ATTF)in March. During the first five months of its existence, ATTFoperatives, backed up by law enforcement, captured over60 suspected terrorists, seven of them foreigners believedto be elements of al-Qa’ida and JI.

The Philippines has made progress in tracking, blocking,and seizing terrorist assets. The main body tasked with

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investigating terrorist finance cases — the Anti-MoneyLaundering Council (AMLC) — completed the first phaseof its information technology upgrades in 2004. The ar-rests in May and September, respectively, of ASG suspectsKhair Mundus and Satrap Tilao on the first-ever moneylaundering charges against terrorists grew out of an inves-tigation initiated by the US Department of HomelandSecurity (DHS) in coordination with Philippine officials.On December 17, the Philippines agreed to co-sponsor,with the United States, the submission of ASG leaderKhadaffy Janjalani for inclusion on the United Nations1267 Sanctions Committee list.

Major evidentiary and procedural obstacles in the Philip-pines, such as the absence of a law defining and codifyingterrorist acts and restrictions on gathering of evidence,hinder the building of effective terrorism cases. Althoughseveral new counterterrorism bills were introduced in thenew session of Congress in July, the Philippines failed toenact new antiterrorism legislation in 2004. Generic prob-lems in the law enforcement and criminal justice systemsalso hamper bringing terrorists to justice. Among themare corruption, low morale, inadequate salaries, recruit-ment and retention difficulties, and lack of effectivecooperation between police and prosecutors.

US and Philippine authorities worked closely during 2004to energize rewards programs targeting terrorist groups.Using its Rewards Program, the US Department of De-fense made two payments of $15,000 and $9,800 toFilipino informants for their roles in the capture of ASGcell leaders Galib Andang (aka “Commander Robot”) andAlhamzer Limbong (aka “Kumander Kosovo”). The USDepartment of State, through its Rewards for Justice pro-gram, made a payment of $1 million to the three Philippineinformants who played a crucial role in the attemptedcapture of Hamsiraji Sali, during which Sali was killed.

Singapore

Singapore continued its strong opposition to terrorism andworked vigorously to advance the counterterrorism agendain bilateral and multilateral contexts. While there wereno acts of international or domestic terrorism in Singaporein 2004, Singaporean authorities pressed their investiga-tion of the regional terrorist group Jemaah Islamiya (JI),and continued to detain JI members who plotted to carryout attacks in Singapore in the past.

Over the course of the year, the number of terrorism-re-lated detainees held under the Internal Security Actdecreased from 37 to 35. Detainees include members ofJI and two members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front(MILF). The “Restriction Orders” authorizing detentionrequire these persons to undergo a program of religiouscounseling with a group of volunteer religious counselors.

During 2004, Singapore continued its intelligence and lawenforcement cooperation with a variety of governments,

including the United States, to investigate terrorist groups,especially JI. Singapore provided information to Indone-sia to assist in the second trial of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. Ithas requested that Indonesia extradite to Singapore sev-eral JI members to face trial for engaging in a conspiracyto commit terrorist acts.

In 2004, authorities updated the Monetary Authority ofSingapore Act (Anti-Terrorism Measures) and the UnitedNations Act (Anti-Terrorism Measures). These regulationsprohibit the provision of any funds or other assistance toterrorists, and provide the authority for the seizure of fi-nancial or other assets.

Singaporean officials have taken strong measures to en-hance maritime security in nearby waters, especially theStrait of Malacca. These measures are focused on address-ing terrorist threats as well as piracy and other criminalattacks. The Maritime and Port Authority (MPA) ofSingapore issued new security control measures on shipscalling at the Port of Singapore, including pre-arrival noti-fication requirements. In July, the navies of Singapore,Indonesia, and Malaysia initiated coordinated patrols inthe Strait of Malacca. The Government of Singapore hasscheduled a Proliferation Security Initiative maritime in-terdiction exercise in August 2005. Based on an initiativeby Japan, 16 countries, including Singapore, agreed to theregional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy andArmed Robbery against Ships in Asia. The countries agreedto establish a center, based in Singapore, to coordinateinformation exchange on maritime piracy. Singapore andthe other members of the Five Power Defense Arrange-ment (Malaysia, Australia, United Kingdom, and NewZealand) announced that their agreement would be ex-panded to deal with terrorism and other unconventionalthreats, including maritime security.

Singapore actively participated in counterterrorism effortsthrough various international fora, including the ASEANRegional Forum, and has worked to enhance regionalcounterterrorism capabilities. Singaporean police con-ducted a regional workshop on “Explosives and SuicideBomber Counter-Measures” to enhance the capabilitiesof police units in other ASEAN member countries.Singapore hosted an APEC Counterterrorism Task Forcemeeting to further develop proposals to enhance thecounterterrorism capabilities of APEC members, as com-mitted by leaders in November 2003.

Taiwan

Taiwan remains a responsive partner in the global war onterrorism, although it is frequently prevented from partici-pating in international and regional fora oncounterterrorism issues.

In November 2004, Taiwan authorities announced the cre-ation of a counterterrorism policy committee chaired bythe Premier of the Executive Yuan and composed of seven

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Container Security Initiative (CSI)

Announced by US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in January 2002, the Container Security Initiative (CSI) isintended to ensure that maritime containers posing a risk for terrorism are identified and examined at foreign portsbefore they are shipped to the United States.

CSI is founded on four core elements: 1) using intelligence and automated information to identify and target containersthat pose a risk for terrorism; (2) pre-screening those containers that pose a risk at the port of departure before they arriveat US ports; (3) using detection technology to quickly pre-screen containers that pose a risk; and (4) using smarter,tamper-evident containers.

Under the CSI program, a small number of CBP officers are deployed to work with host nation counterparts to target allcontainers that pose a potential threat for terrorism as well as WMD, their delivery systems, related technologies, andadvanced conventional weapons.

Containerized shipping is a critical component of global trade because about 90 percent of the world’s trade is trans-ported in cargo containers. In the United States, almost half of incoming trade (by value) arrives by containers on boardships. Nearly nine million cargo containers arrive on ships and are offloaded at US seaports each year.

Early on, CSI focused on the top 20 foreign ports that ship approximately two-thirds of the volume of containers to theUnited States. Governments from these 20 foreign ports have already agreed to implement CSI. As CSI has evolved, CBPhas expanded the program to additional ports based on volume, location, and strategic concerns.

A reciprocal program, CSI offers participant countries the opportunity to send their customs officers to major US ports totarget ocean-going, containerized cargo destined for their countries. Likewise, CBP shares information on a bilateralbasis with its CSI partners. As part of reciprocal CSI agreements, Japan and Canada currently station customs personnelin US ports.

Currently Operational Ports:

In North America:• Montreal, Vancouver, and Halifax, Canada.

In Europe:• Rotterdam, The Netherlands.• Bremerhaven and Hamburg, Germany.• Antwerp and Zeebrugge, Belgium.• Le Havre and Marseille, France.• Gothenburg, Sweden.• La Spezia, Genoa, Naples, Gioia Tauro, and Livorno, Italy.• Felixstowe, Liverpool, Thamesport, Tilbury, and Southampton, United Kingdom.• Piraeus, Greece.• Algeciras, Spain.

In East Asia and the Pacific:• Singapore.• Yokohama, Tokyo, Nagoya, and Kobe, Japan.• Hong Kong.• Pusan, South Korea.• Port Klang and Tanjung Pelepas, Malaysia.• Laem Chabang, Thailand.

In Africa:• Durban, South Africa.

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multi-agency task forces. Each task force is required tocollect information and develop operational plans to dealwith such contingencies as terrorist attacks on public in-frastructure and telecommunication networks. TheNational Police Administration (NPA) also established aspecial SWAT team to respond to terrorist incidents andcontinues to send law enforcement personnel abroad forcounterterrorism training.

Cooperation on maritime security issues advanced in 2004,as Taiwan and the United States agreed on a framework toimplement the US Department of Homeland Security’sContainer Security Initiative (CSI) in the southern port cityof Kaohsiung. Kaohsiung is one of the busiest containerports in the world and will be the eleventh port in the EastAsia Pacific region to implement CSI standards designedto protect shipping containers against exploitation by ter-rorists and criminal elements. US customs and borderprotection officers are tentatively scheduled to begin op-erations with their Taiwanese counterparts in 2005.

Although not a member of the United Nations and there-fore unable to become a party to international treaties,Taiwan has nonetheless committed to implement the 12UN conventions and protocols related to international ter-rorism, and has taken some unilateral measures to combatillicit money flows. In 2004, Taiwan’s legislative Yuanamended the Money Laundering Control Act, strengthen-ing provisions to identify and seize terrorist assets andproperty. Taiwanese authorities also continue to maintaina centralized database to verify and track remittances.

Thailand

There were no significant acts of international terrorism inThailand during 2004. However, there was a significantincrease in acts of domestic violence fueled by a renewedseparatist insurgency based in the far southern provincesof Thailand. The violence has been primarily concentratedin the Muslim majority provinces of Pattani, Yala, andNarathiwat, which are located along the Thai-Malaysianborder. Most estimates put the number of deaths this yeardirectly related to the violence at over 500. The victimsinclude government officials and civilians, both Buddhistand Muslim. The Thai Government has expressed con-cern that Thai militants may be seeking refuge across theborder; Malaysia has denied these allegations.

There is no evidence of a direct connection between mili-tants in southern Thailand and international terroristorganizations such as Jemaah Islamiya and al-Qa’ida.However, there is concern that transnational groups mayattempt to capitalize on the increasingly violent situationfor their own purposes. Long-standing Muslim separatistorganizations in southern Thailand continue to be activeto some degree, but there is little direct evidence that thesegroups are actively organizing the violence. Thai separat-ist groups by all indications remained focused on seeking

autonomy or independence for the far southern provinces.Violence in the south remains focused on government of-ficials and other symbols of Thai authority, as well ascivilians.

Thailand has commitments to work with neighboring coun-tries on counterterrorism issues and is a participant in theSoutheast Asia Regional Center for Counterterrorism(SEARCCT) in Malaysia.

Thailand is also enhancing the security of its borders byimplementing more effective controls. In cooperation withthe G8 Counterterrorism Action Group (CTAG) membergovernments, Thailand has increased efforts to combatdocument fraud. During 2004, Thailand enhanced its abil-ity to internally coordinate its response to terrorist financingactivities. Thailand has embarked on an aggressive pro-gram to equip its air, land, and sea ports of entry with acomputerized terrorist watch listing system. The systemwill be operational at a limited number of locations in2005, with completion forecast for 2006.

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Europe and Eurasia Overview

Major terrorist events occurred in Europe in 2004, withhundreds dying in horrific attacks in Spain, Russia, andUzbekistan, accompanied by major successes, includingbroad-based international cooperation to secure the Olym-pics in Greece, and deepened multilateral efforts toimprove capabilities to combat the threat of terrorism. Eu-ropean nations continued to work in close partnership withthe United States in the global counterterrorism campaignand, galvanized by the Madrid bombings and growingawareness of their own vulnerabilities, took significantsteps to enhance their capability to combat terrorists andtheir supporters. The contributions of European countriesin sharing intelligence, arresting members of terrorist cells,and interdicting terrorist financing and logistics contin-ued to be vital elements in the war on terrorism.

The European Union (EU) remained a key partner in thewar on terrorism and has moved to strengthen Commu-nity legal and administrative capacity, and that of EUmember states, to combat terrorism. The EU created theposition of Coordinator for Counterterrorism following theMadrid attacks in March. International judicial coopera-tion advanced as EU members brought into effect theEuropean Arrest Warrant and enacted implementing leg-islation for US-EU Extradition and Mutual Legal AssistanceTreaties. The June US-EU Summit Declaration on Com-bating Terrorism reaffirmed a wide range of transatlanticcommitments to cooperate closely and continue to worktogether to develop measures to maximize capacities todetect, investigate and prosecute terrorists and prevent ter-rorist attacks, prevent access by terrorists to financial andother economic resources, enhance information sharingand cooperation among law enforcement agencies, andimprove the effectiveness of border information systems.The United States and EU initiated a dialogue on terror-ism finance issues in September.

European nations are active participants in a variety ofmultilateral organizations that have made contributionsin counterterrorist efforts, including the G8, NATO, theFinancial Action Task Force (FATF), the Organization forSecurity and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Interna-tional Maritime Organization (IMO), and the InternationalCivil Aviation Organization (ICAO). They worked activelywith the United States and other partners through theseorganizations to establish and implement best practices,build the counterterrorism capabilities of “weak but will-ing” states, and institutionalize the war against terrorismglobally. OSCE members have committed themselves tobecoming parties to the 12 UN terrorism conventions andprotocols, to work together to modernize travel documentsand shipping container security, and to prevent and sup-press the financing of terrorist organizations.

Terrorist activity and the presence of terrorist support net-works in Europe remain a source of concern. Efforts to

Investigators at the site of an explosion that hit the General Prosecutor’soffice in the Uzbek capital Tashkent. In July, suicide bombers stagednearly simultaneous attacks outside the US and Israeli Embassies as wellas the prosecutor’s office. (AP Photo/Anvar Ilyasov)

Relatives mourn 11-year old Albert Berdikov near his grave when thetown of Beslan marked the end of the traditional 40-day mourningperiod for the victims of the hostage-taking. (AP Photo/Ivan Sekretarev)

A man carries an injured child, who escaped from a seized school inBeslan, North Ossetia, Russia, September 3. (AP Photo/Ivan Sekretarev)

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combat the threat in Europe are sometimes hampered bylegal protections that make it difficult to take firm judicialaction against suspected terrorists, asylum laws that af-ford loopholes, inadequate legislation, or standards ofevidence that limit use of classified information in hold-ing terrorist suspects. Ease of travel within Schengen visacountries also makes Western Europe attractive to terror-ists. Some European states have at times not been able toprosecute successfully or hold some of the suspected ter-rorists brought before their courts. The Clearinghousemechanism for authorizing EU-wide terrorist designationswas unable to generate consensus on action to block theassets of charities associated with HAMAS and Hizballah.

In March, Islamic extremists linked to the Moroccan Is-lamic Combatant Group (GICM) detonated 10 bombs oncommuter trains during the Madrid rush hour, killing 191persons and wounding hundreds more; several suspectslater blew themselves up in order to avoid arrest.

Russia endured a series of deadly terrorist attacks in Feb-ruary, August and September 2004, including explosionson the Moscow subway, suicide bomb attacks that broughtdown two Russian airliners simultaneously, a suicidebomber attack outside a Moscow metro station, and theseizure of approximately 1,200 hostages, most of whomwere school children, at a school in Beslan, North Ossetia,that left at least 331 people dead, more than half of themchildren, and hundreds of others injured.

In Uzbekistan in March and April 2004, suicide bombersattacked a popular bazaar and other locations resulting inthe death of more than a dozen police officers and inno-cent bystanders. A further round of bombings in Julyoutside the US and Israeli Embassies and the UzbekistaniGeneral Prosecutor’s Office resulted in the death of fourUzbekistani security officers.

Deploying thousands of security personnel and workingclosely with partners from across the globe, Greece stagedsuccessful and secure summer Olympic Games.

The Netherlands was rocked by the brutal assassination ofa prominent film director by a Dutch-born Moroccan dualnational. The killing and its aftershocks, like the Madridbombings, focused attention throughout Europe on the po-tential threat from extremist groups recruited from withinEurope.

Cooperation among European law enforcement authori-ties continued to be key to counterterrorism successes.Intra-European information exchanges shed light on thecontinent-wide linkages of the Madrid bombers and fa-cilitated the April arrests across Europe of suspectsconnected to the Turkish Revolutionary People’s Libera-tion Party/Front (DHKP/C).

Enhancing regional counterterrorism cooperation has beena priority for the United States. Toward that end, the USDepartment of State co-hosted with the Swiss Governmentthe sixth Counterterrorism Conference for Eurasian statesin Zurich, Switzerland, in December 2004. Participantsincluded most of the Eurasian states, Turkey, and repre-sentatives from the World Health Organization, the EU,Interpol, OSCE, NATO, and Poland’s recently developedFoundation for the Prevention of Terrorism and BiologicalThreats. The conference provided participants an oppor-tunity to describe and identify components of their nationalprograms to respond to a bioterrorism attack, and to seehow their various governments would respond togetherto a transnational bio-emergency. The Dutch EU Presidencyhosted an EU-wide conference on terrorism finance inBrussels in September, which included participation bythe United States as well as other third countries and in-ternational organizations, including the United Nations.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) also playeda key role in combating terrorism at the regional level inEurope. First and foremost, NATO continues OperationActive Endeavor (OAE), a naval operation aimed at com-bating terrorism by monitoring maritime traffic in theMediterranean. Thus far, Alliance warships have hailed over57,000 vessels and have boarded nearly 100 vessels. Cur-rently, NATO is discussing expanding OAE into the BlackSea and strengthening the mandate’s directives for search-ing for WMD materials. Additionally, during the Olympics,NATO provided critical chemical, biological, radiologi-cal, nuclear (CBRN), and air patrol capabilities to theGovernment of Greece.

Despite limited resources, the countries of southeast Eu-rope have actively supported the international coalitionagainst terrorism. Through the Southeast European Coop-eration Initiative (SECI) Regional Center to CombatTransborder Crime, based in Romania, the twelve states

Former Secretary of State Colin Powell welcomes Russia’s DefenseMinister Sergei Ivanov during their meeting at the State Department onApril 6, 2004. The war on terrorism and Russia’s relationship with arecently expanded NATO were Ivanov’s top issues as he met with USofficials. (AP Photo/J. Scott Applewhite)

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of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia,Greece, Hungary, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Serbiaand Montenegro, Slovenia, and Turkey cooperated to com-bat organized crime and various forms of trafficking,enhance border security, and improve training for bordersecurity personnel.

In October Belarus, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan, and Russia created the Eurasia Group, a regionalanti-money laundering organization or Financial ActionTask Force-style regional body (FSRB).

Albania

Despite limited resources, Albania continued to supportthe global war on terrorism and made progress in imple-menting its national action plan against terrorism, originallyapproved in 2002. Albania has steadfastly supported USactions against terrorism, sharing information and investi-gating terrorist-related groups and activities. In 2004, theGovernment froze the assets of terrorist financiers, cur-tailed the activities of suspect Islamic NGOs, and detainedor expelled individuals suspected of having links to terror-ism or attempting to foment religious intolerance. In July,Parliament passed legislation to implement asset freezesagainst persons designated as terrorists or terrorist finan-ciers by the United Nations. Albania has begun crackingdown on ethnic Albanian extremists, including leaders ofthe ultranationalist Albanian National Army. In December,police apprehended four arms traffickers dealing in surfaceto air missiles likely intended for regional extremists.

Armenia

In 2004, Armenia continued to be a full and active par-ticipant in the global war against terrorism. A newArmenian criminal law more clearly defining terrorist actsreplaced Soviet-era legislation in 2003. The National As-sembly passed legislation outlawing money laundering andfinancing of terrorism in December 2004, bringing Arme-nian legislation in line with its international obligations tocombat terrorist finance, and strengthening the ability ofthe Government to prosecute terrorist-related offenses.Border Guards seized 42 grams of non-weapons-grade ra-dioactive material in 2004. While none of the materialwas likely destined for terrorist organizations, the BorderGuards have shown that they are capable of detecting andinterdicting nuclear material. The Armenian Central Bankfully cooperated with efforts to freeze terrorist assets butreported finding none in 2004.

Austria

Austria continued its participation in multilateral missions,its cooperation with US law enforcement agencies, andits leadership in regional anti-terrorism initiatives. In 2004,the Government made efforts to tighten financial oversightof suspected terrorism financing.

In 2004, the Interior Ministry’s intelligence arm, the Fed-eral Office for the Protection of the Constitution and forTerrorism (BVT), stepped up surveillance of suspected Is-lamic extremists; it also increased monitoring of suspectedextremist prayer houses in Vienna and surveillance of theEgyptian al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyah movement and of sus-pected Afghan extremists entering Austria as asylumseekers. Austria passed legislation to allow police videosurveillance of public spaces. Austria’s legal and institu-tional framework to combat terrorism was strengthened.Its money laundering and terrorist financing legislation isnow in compliance with FATF 40+9 Recommendations,and the EU-wide arrest warrant became effective in 2004.

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan and the United States have a very good recordof cooperation on counterterrorism issues that predatesthe September 11, 2001, attacks. With the 2004 ratifica-tion of the Convention on Offenses and Certain Other ActsCommitted on Board Aircraft and the Convention on thePhysical Protection of Nuclear Material, Azerbaijan hasacceded to all 12 international conventions and proto-cols relating to terrorism. While Azerbaijan has served asa route for international mujahedin with ties to terroristorganizations seeking to move men, money, and materielthroughout the Caucasus, the Azeri Government hasstepped up its efforts and succeeded in reducing their pres-ence and hampering their activities. Azerbaijan has takensteps to combat terrorist financing and identify possibleterrorist-related funding by distributing lists of suspectedterrorist groups and individuals to local banks. An expertsgroup, led by the National Bank of Azerbaijan, has pre-pared draft anti-money laundering legislation that wouldestablish a financial intelligence unit (FIU) and expandthe predicate crimes for money laundering beyond nar-cotics trafficking.

In 2004, the Government continued to make significantarrests of individuals associated with terrorist groups.Members of Jayshullah, an indigenous terrorist group, whowere arrested in 2000 and tried in 2001 for plotting toattack the US Embassy in Baku, remain in prison.

Belgium

In 2004, the Belgian Government continued anti-terroristcooperation with European neighbors and the US Gov-ernment on multiple levels. Belgium remained active insharing information with the United States regarding ter-rorist threats to US interests or persons. In 2004, Belgiumand the United States broadened cooperation under theContainer Security Initiative — in place for the Port ofAntwerp since 2003 — to include a second Belgian port,Zeebrugge. The two governments also agreed to placeradiation detection equipment in the Port of Antwerp un-der the Department of Energy’s Megaports program.

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The Belgian judicial system applied the rule of law to ter-rorist conspirators in 2004, when it charged 10 suspectswith criminal conspiracy related to possible terrorist ac-tivities. Eight of the defendants were found guilty, receivingsentences ranging from 11 months to five years. One ofthose convicted, Tarek Maaroufi, had been found guilty inthe 2003 terrorist trial in Belgium and will serve a total ofseven years in prison based on that previous conviction.A Belgian appellate court rejected appeals filed by nineof the 18 convicted in Belgium’s 2003 terrorist trial, in-cluding Maaroufi and Nizar Trabelsi, a Tunisian nationaland al-Qa’ida associate. The court actually increasedMaaroufi’s sentence from six to seven years, while main-taining the ten-year sentence of Trabelsi and the shortersentences of three other defendants. Another of the ap-pellants, Mouloud Haiter, had his sentence increased fromthree to four years, while Abelhouaid Aberkan’s sentencewas reduced from three to two years. A final appellant,who cooperated with authorities in the initial trial, hadhis sentence suspended.

The Belgian authorities, in cooperation with Spanish, Ital-ian, and Dutch investigators, continued criminalinvestigations of over 20 other suspects in Belgium for pos-sible terrorism activities, including possible links to theMarch Madrid bombing and the November murder ofDutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh. Belgian legislationadopted in 2003 to implement the EU’s Framework Deci-sion of June 2002 on combating terrorism and the EuropeanArrest Warrant came into effect in December 2003 andJanuary 2004, respectively.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) re-mained a strong and active partner in the global war onterrorism. The country’s ethnic divisions, its complex andmulti-level government structure, and its still weak cen-tral institutions complicate its efforts against terrorism, butBosnia made great strides in institutionalizing itscounterterrorism capabilities. State-level Ministries ofDefense and Security were established in 2004, and thetwo entity-level (Federation and Republika Srpska) intelli-gence services were merged into a single state-levelservice. US Government assistance helped establish theState Investigative and Protection Agency (SIPA), an FBI-like agency responsible for investigating complex crimesincluding terrorism, illegal trafficking, organized crime,and smuggling of weapons of mass destruction. SIPA willhave a financial intelligence unit (FIU), and a sub-unit ofits Criminal Investigation Department will be dedicatedto counterterrorism and WMD. However, these units ofSIPA are not yet fully staffed or fully operational, and stateinstitutions in general are largely under-funded, under-resourced, and lack sufficiently trained personnel.

In June, Bosnia adopted a package of laws that, when fullyimplemented, will dramatically strengthen state-level lawenforcement capabilities. The set of laws includes legisla-

tion giving SIPA law enforcement and investigative au-thority for state-level crimes, including terrorism, and alaw on prevention of money laundering. The law, whichcame into force on December 28, determines the mea-sures and responsibilities for detecting, preventing, andinvestigating money laundering and terrorist financing, andprescribes measures and responsibilities for internationalcooperation. Bosnia lacks established procedures for deal-ing with such issues as denaturalization, extradition, andpreventive detention.

The BiH Government took decisive action in apprehend-ing suspects and shutting down NGOs and bank accountstied to terrorist-linked organizations. In the past year anda half, Bosnian Federation authorities shut down NGOswith terrorist links and froze accounts of terrorist support-ers. In 2004, the Government disrupted the operations ofal-Furqan (a.k.a. Sirat Istikamet), al-Haramain and al-Masjed al-Aqsa Charity Foundation, and Taibah Interna-tional, organizations listed by the UN 1267 Committee ashaving direct links with al-Qa’ida. Of continuing con-cern are the foreign Islamic extremists who remain inBosnia as a legacy of the 1992-95 war.

Bulgaria

Bulgaria is a staunch ally of the United States in the globalwar against terror. During 2004, the Bulgarian Govern-ment continued its high level of cooperation with theUnited States in preventing acts of terrorism in Bulgariaand elsewhere. This included information sharing on po-tential terrorist threats. Bulgarian officials have aggressivelypursued and developed leads and provided extensive co-operation to US officials. Cooperation with US andregional officials on export and border controls contin-ued to be outstanding.

Czech Republic

Czech authorities have cooperated closely with the USGovernment and other European governments to preventterrorist activity. In 2004, the Czechs blocked several ex-ports of weapons and explosives that were linked topossible terrorist activity. Czech authorities responded ef-fectively to requests for increased protection of USfacilities, including at the Prague headquarters of RadioFree Europe/Radio Liberty.

Finland

Finland enhanced its ability to combat terrorism in 2004,implementing legislation that allowed it to freeze assets with-out prior action by the EU or UN. Finland amended itscriminal code to make it possible to sentence leaders ofterrorist groups to 15 years in jail, although the group has tohave actually committed acts of terrorism in Finland beforeinvestigation and prosecution can begin. In January, the Finn-ish Security Police created a special unit concentrating solelyon fighting terrorism, the first of its kind in Finland.

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France

Throughout 2004, France continued to pursue one ofEurope’s most effective and aggressive counterterrorismpolicies and made significant terrorism-related arrests. InApril, French authorities shut down a cell of the Moroc-can Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) that was consideredto be extremely dangerous. In July, the Government tookcustody of four former detainees at Guantanamo Bay andcharged them with terrorist conspiracy; all four remain inpretrial detention with trials expected to begin in 2005.In October, French and Spanish authorities struck a sig-nificant blow to ETA terrorism through the arrest in Franceof two top ETA leaders and the seizure of significant armsand materials caches. Judicial and police investigationsfollowing the high-profile arrests in 2003 of German na-tional Christian Ganczarski and Moroccan national KarimMehdi continued in 2004. Ganczarski and Mehdi, whoare suspected of ties to al-Qa’ida, remain in pretrial de-tention in France. The investigation into the activities ofsuspected terrorist Djamel Beghal concluded in late 2004.His trial, as well as the trials of seven associates, will be-gin in January 2005. The Beghal network is suspected of

planning a number of terrorist acts, including an attackon the US Embassy in Paris.

The Ministry of Finance’s terrorism financing coordina-tion cell TRACFIN maintained direct coordination withthe US Treasury Department. At the level of the EuropeanUnion, France played an active role in the Clearinghouse,the Union’s terrorism financing coordination body. Francehas not designated HAMAS-affiliated charities, arguing thatthey have no links to terrorism, and continues to opposedesignating Lebanese Hizballah as a terrorist organiza-tion. France took rapid action in support of US requeststo freeze Taliban, al-Qa’ida, and other terrorist financialassets.

In 2004, France expanded its international judicial coop-eration. In addition to bringing into force the EuropeanArrest Warrant, France signed with the United States twonew agreements in September that updated a bilateralextradition treaty and improved overall counterterrorismcooperation.

Georgia

The Georgian Government remained deeply committedto combating international and domestic terrorism in 2004and has consistently and publicly condemned acts of ter-ror. Georgia is still used to a limited degree as a terroristtransit state, although much less so since the governmentcrackdown on the Pankisi Gorge in late 2002. Stepped-upGeorgian law enforcement counterterrorism operations inlate 2004 in Pankisi, in the wake of the Beslan terroristattack in September 2004 in Russia, have further erodedthe ability of transnational terrorist groups to use the PankisiGorge as a transit area.

Georgian law enforcement capabilities are limited, al-though improving through internal reform and USGovernment and Western donor technical and financialassistance. In particular, the United States is providingcounterterrorism training via the State Department’s Anti-terrorism Assistance Program. The Procuracy has a specialunit of six prosecutors and investigators solely dedicated toterrorism financing and money laundering cases. Efforts toreform the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of StateSecurity and enhance their counterterrorism capabilities areconstrained by lack of adequate resources, equipment, and,mostly, training. These reform efforts, coupled with frequentpersonnel turnover, have created confusion and preventeddevelopment of an overall counterterrorism policy. Borderguard and customs reform is continuing, and over the pastfew years, maritime, air, and communications capabilitieshave improved considerably.

Bulgarian Muslims pray at a mosque in Sofia, Bulgaria, for the lives oftwo Bulgarian civilians working as truck drivers and kidnapped in Iraqby Jordanian terrorist Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, who threatened toexecute the two captives if the US military did not release all Iraqidetainees within 24 hours. (AP Photo/Dimitar Deinov)

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Germany

Germany continued to be a dedicated and important par-ticipant in the global coalition against terrorism;cooperation with the United States remained solid.Throughout 2004 German law enforcement authoritiesconducted numerous actions against individuals, organi-zations, and mosques suspected of involvement interrorism. In some cases, hundreds of individuals and ve-hicles were searched, which resulted in arrests fordocument fraud, illegal residency, and weapons violations.

To improve coordination of state and federal law enforce-ment and intelligence agencies, in December 2004 InteriorMinister Schily announced establishment of a Berlin-based“Information and Analysis Center” that will bring togetherall agencies involved in the German fight against terror-ism. In 2004, the German Federal Criminal Office alsoestablished an Office for International Coordination toimprove counterterrorism collaboration with foreign lawenforcement authorities. In July, Germany adopted a newimmigration law containing provisions to strengthenGermany’s fight against terrorism. The new law took ef-fect in January 2005.

Germany is currently investigating almost 200 cases ofterrorism nationwide, but has at times had difficulties inconvicting terrorist suspects. The 2003 conviction ofMoroccan citizen Mounir el Motassadeq for accessory tomurder and membership in the “Hamburg cell” that hadformed around 9/11 suicide pilot Mohammed Atta wasoverturned and Motassadeq was released in April pend-ing a retrial, despite what the court called “strongevidence” of his membership in a terrorist organization.His retrial began in August. A trial on similar chargesagainst another “Hamburg cell” suspect, Moroccan citi-zen Abdelghani Mzoudi, ended with his acquittal inFebruary. Prosecutors filed an appeal. German authori-ties have initiated deportation proceedings against bothMotassadeq and Mzoudi.

Other notable 2004 arrests and indictments include thecases of several alleged members of the Iraq-based terror-ist group Ansar al-Islam. Three Iraqi alleged members ofAnsar al-Islam were arrested in December on charges ofplotting an attack on Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi dur-ing his visit to Berlin. Tunisian national Ishan Garnouiwas indicted by the Federal Prosecutor in January 2004for attempted formation of a terrorist organization withthe intention to unleash explosive attacks on US and Jew-ish targets in Germany. He was convicted in April 2005on charges of tax evasion, illegal possession of weapons,and violation of the immigration law, but was acquittedon terrorism charges.

German authorities deported Turkish extremist MetinKaplan to Turkey, where authorities detained him to facenumerous charges, including treason. German authorities

made several indictments and arrests related to the Turk-ish terrorist group PKK/KADEK/Kongra-Gel, although oneprominent PKK suspect was later released.

German prosecutors were unsuccessful in bringing indict-ments against several prominent al-Qa’ida suspects,including German national Christian Ganczarski, a sus-pect in the April 2002 bombing of a Tunisian synagoguein which several German citizens were killed. Similarly,authorities were unable to indict Syrian-German dual na-tional Mamoun Darkazanli, but he is in custody andauthorities are seeking to extradite him to Spain, where a2003 arrest warrant accuses him of membership in andproviding logistical and financial support to al-Qa’ida. InNovember, the Federal Constitutional Court blocked hisextradition pending its review of the constitutionality ofthe new European Arrest Warrant.

In 2002 the German Interior Ministry banned the al-AqsaFoundation on the grounds of providing financial supportto HAMAS. In July 2003, a German court temporarily liftedthe ban pending a final court ruling, although it also im-posed financial reporting requirements on al-Aqsa. InDecember 2004, following a court ruling upholding the2002 ban on the al-Aqsa Foundation, German law en-forcement officials searched more than 30 al-Aqsa officesnationwide. The Interior Ministry has banned the extrem-ist Islamic association Hizb ut-Tahrir — based outsideGermany — from any activity within the country and hasseized the association’s assets in Germany. The US Gov-ernment has no evidence that Hizb ut-Tahrir has committedany terrorist acts, but the group’s radical anti-US and anti-Semitic ideology is sympathetic to acts of violence againstthe United States and its allies, and it has publicly calledon Muslims to travel to Iraq and Afghanistan to fight Coa-lition forces.

Greece

Greece continued to strengthen its ability to fight terror-ism and held the 2004 Olympic and Paralympic Gamesin Athens without incident. In June, the Greek Parliamentpassed new counterterrorism legislation that broughtGreece into compliance with the EU Framework Deci-sion on Combating Terrorism, including approval of theEU Arrest Warrant. This legislation made specific refer-ence to terrorist crimes and groups for the first time. Amongits provisions, the legislation extends the statute of limita-tions on terrorist-related killings from 20 to 30 years,established a framework for EU-wide probes and rapidextradition of terrorist suspects within the EU bloc, andprovided for harsher treatment of terrorist leaders and thosewho provide money and logistics to terrorists.

In October, after an eight month process, a Greek courtsentenced four of five accused members of the domesticterrorist group Peoples’ Revolutionary Struggle (ELA) towhat amounts to 25 years imprisonment, the maximum

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allowed under Greek law, for bombings/attempted mur-ders, possession of firearms/explosives, and involvementin the 1994 assassination of a police officer. The ELA de-fense immediately appealed these sentences; by year’s endthere was no decision on the timing of the appeals. InJuly the Athens Court of Appeals indicted longtime sus-pected ELA leader Yannis Serifis for his role in the 1994assassination; the trial is set to begin in February 2005.

A Greek court announced in October that the appeals pro-cess for members of the 17 November (17N) terrorist group,convicted in December 2003 of hundreds of crimes overthe years, including the murder of five US Governmentemployees, would begin in December 2005. Top Greeklaw enforcement officials have stated that further investi-gation of 17N suspects/evidence will continue and thatthe case is not considered closed.

Anarchists and domestic terrorists continued to conductnumerous small-scale arson attacks, most involving gascanister or other crude improvised explosive devices(IEDs), against an array of perceived establishment andso-called “imperialist targets,” such as banks, US fast foodrestaurants, courts, and personal vehicles. In May, exactly100 days before the start of the Olympic Games in Ath-ens, a group calling itself “Revolutionary Struggle” tookresponsibility for three IEDs which detonated near a po-lice station in the Athens suburb of Kallithea, causingsignificant property damage but no injuries. The reportednumber of IED attacks dropped dramatically during theOlympic and Paralympic Games (August-September), butincreased soon after.

In October, in a departure from crude IED attacks againstproperty that usually occur in the dead of night, a remotely-controlled device detonated during the morning rush hournear two police buses that were carrying officers to theKorydallos prison (where 17N members are imprisoned).The explosion caused no injuries and only minor dam-age. No group has thus far claimed responsibility for thisattack and Greek authorities have continued their investi-gation. In December, unknown assailants shot and killeda Greek Special Guard at his post outside the residence ofthe British Defense Attaché. While the case has not yetbeen solved, police are treating the case as a domesticterrorist incident.

Hungary

In early 2004, the Hungarian Parliament passed far-reach-ing legislation on reporting requirements for financialtransactions. This follows Hungarian initiatives on moneylaundering and terrorist financing that brought it into fullcompliance with EU and Financial Action Task Forcenorms. Hungary has been fully supportive of the war againstterrorism and US initiatives against al-Qa’ida and other ter-rorist organizations both within its borders and abroad.

Cooperation with US and regional officials on export andborder controls is outstanding. In several cases in 2004,Hungarian officials aggressively pursued and developedleads and provided extensive cooperation to US officersthat have stopped the transshipment of hazardous goods.Hungary is actively improving its technical ability to trackand control dangerous materials, and its accession intothe EU is accelerating this process.

Italy

Italy has been a staunch ally in the war against terror. Thecommitment of the Government of Italy to the global waron terrorism remained steadfast, despite two separate hos-tage-takings in Iraq, the brutal murders of an Italianjournalist and another Italian hostage, and terrorist threatsthroughout the year against Italy for its participation inthe OEF coalition and in the reconstruction of Iraq, andfor its active efforts against terrorism.

Italy’s law enforcement authorities maintained the initia-tive against Italy-based terrorist suspects throughinvestigations, detentions, prosecutions, and expulsions.According to Ministry of Interior data and the media, Ital-ian authorities in 2004 arrested more than 60 individualssuspected of planning or providing support to terroristactivity, both international and internal. Many of thosearrested were suspected al-Qa’ida sympathizers and re-cruiters supporting anti-coalition activities in Iraq. Manywere also suspected of having ties to Ansar al-Islam andother al-Qa’ida-linked extremist organizations. Includedamong those arrested was Rabei Osman Sayed Ahmed,who was suspected of involvement in the March Madridbombings. In April, Italy coordinated with four of its Eu-ropean neighbors the arrests of multiple suspects believedto have ties to the Turkish DHKP/C and in September, Ital-ian intelligence and law enforcement agencies joined withLebanese authorities to thwart a plot to attack the ItalianEmbassy in Beirut. Italy’s Minister of Interior continued toexpel terrorist suspects he believed posed a serious terror-ist threat.

The domestic leftwing terrorist group, the new Red Bri-gades-Communist Combatant Party (BR-CCP), presents adiminished threat due to Italian authorities’ continued ef-forts to dismantle the organization. In June, the BR-CCP’spresumed leader, Desdemona Lioce, was given a life sen-tence for killing one police officer and wounding a secondduring a train shootout in 2003.

Kazakhstan

After the July 30 suicide bombings in Tashkent, Uzbekistan,the Government of Kazakhstan aggressively sought leadsand prosecuted individuals involved with extremist groupstargeting Western interests in the region. The Government’scooperation and timeliness in sharing information withthe United States has greatly improved since 2003. The

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Government is pursuing legislation to make banking lawsmore transparent to facilitate terrorist finance investiga-tions. In October, Kazakhstan, along with Belarus, China,Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Russia joined the Eurasia Group,a regional anti-money laundering organization or Finan-cial Action Task Force-style regional body. Kazakhstan,along with China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, andUzbekistan, is a member of the Shanghai CooperationOrganization, which established a Regional AntiterrorismCenter in Tashkent in June.

In October, the Supreme Court recognized al-Qa’ida, theEast Turkistan Islamic Party, the Kurdish People’s Congress,and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) as terror-ist groups, a decision that prohibits them from any activityin the country. Lacking legislative means for prosecutingsuspected terrorists, the Government must use other pro-visions of its criminal code. In 2004, Kazakhstan arrestedand tried more than 60 individuals suspected of partici-pation in Hizb ut-Tahrir activities. They were prosecutedunder the criminal code for “participating in activities ofillegal organizations” (although Hizb ut-Tahrir has not beenbanned by name in Kazakhstan) and “inciting social, na-tional, tribal, racial, or religious hatred.” Several thousandmembers of Hizb ut-Tahrir, an extremist political move-ment advocating the establishment of a borderless,theocratic Islamic state throughout the entire Muslimworld, are present in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,and Uzbekistan as well as in countries outside the CentralAsian region. The US Government has no evidence thatHizb ut-Tahrir has committed any terrorist acts, but thegroup’s radical anti-US and anti-Semitic ideology is sympa-thetic to acts of violence against the United States and itsallies, and it has publicly called on Muslims to travel to Iraqand Afghanistan to fight Coalition forces.

In November, the Government announced thatKazakhstani security agencies had detained leaders andaccomplices of the Central Asia Mujahedeen Jamaat (morefrequently referred to in English as the Islamic Jihad Group).More than a dozen suspects were detained, including fourwomen who were allegedly preparing to be suicide bomb-ers. This group was alleged to have links to the July 30bombings in Tashkent.

Kosovo (Serbia and Montenegro)

Kosovo, currently under the administration of the UnitedNations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo(UNMIK) pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution1244, successfully prosecuted individuals for terrorism anddeveloped new tools to combat terrorist financing. Radi-cal Islamic organizations, some with links to terrorism,have attempted to recruit followers among Kosovo Alba-nian Muslims but these attempts have largely failed. InJune 2004, authorities in Albania arrested and extraditedFlorim Ejupi to Kosovo, a suspect in a deadly 2001 terror-ist attack against a bus carrying Kosovo Serbs; Ejupi was

later indicted by a local Kosovo District Court for terror-ism and murder. In February, UNMIK passed a regulationand later established a Financial Information Center tomonitor suspicious financial transactions and deter moneylaundering and identify sources of terrorist financing.UNMIK, as well as Kosovo’s local Provisional Institutionsof Self-Government (PISG), continue to cooperate closelywith the United States and other governments in sharinginformation and investigating terrorist-related groups andactivities.

Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan in 2004 remained a dependable and outspo-ken ally in the global war on terrorism, taking political,legislative, and law enforcement initiatives to disrupt anddeter terrorism.

Kyrgyzstan suffered a deadly act of terrorism in 2004. Anexplosion in the southern city of Osh in November killedone police officer and one suspected terrorist. The Minis-try of Interior announced in December that it would opena temporary antiterrorism center in Osh. In Decemberthe Kyrgyz Parliament began consideration of a law onterrorism financing that, if passed, will considerablystrengthen Kyrgyzstani efforts in this area. In April,Kyrgyzstan added Hizb ut-Tahrir to the list of banned re-ligious extremist groups, though members are typicallyonly arrested for distributing literature that “incites reli-gious, ethnic or racial hatred.” Several thousand membersof Hizb ut-Tahrir, an extremist political movement advo-cating establishment of a borderless, theocratic caliphatethroughout the entire Muslim world, are present inKazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan as wellas in countries outside the Central Asian region. Hizb ut-Tahrir pamphlets, filled with anti-US propaganda, havebeen distributed throughout the southern region of thecountry and even appeared in Bishkek and other parts ofthe north. The US Government has no evidence that Hizbut-Tahrir has committed any terrorist acts, but the group’sradical, anti-US and anti-Semitic ideology is sympatheticto acts of violence against the United States and its allies,and it has publicly called on Muslims to travel to Iraq andAfghanistan to fight Coalition forces.

Kyrgyzstan’s military and internal forces worked to im-prove their counterterrorism capabilities and to expandtheir cooperation with regional partners in 2004. TheKyrgyz, Tajik, and Kazakh Border Services held joint exer-cises along their common borders in June to improveregional cooperation against terrorists. In July, Russia, Ar-menia, Belarus, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstanheld joint military counterterrorism exercises in Kyrgyzstan.In April, the National Border Service opened an Inter-agency Training Center, which will focus on training tofight illegal migration and terrorism. Kyrgyzstan and Chinasigned a bilateral agreement in September on coopera-tion against terrorism, separatism, and extremism.

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Kyrgyzstan hosts a Commonwealth of Independent States(CIS) counterterrorism center in its capital, Bishkek.Kyrgyzstan, along with China, Kazakhstan, Russia,Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, is a member of the ShanghaiCooperation Organization, which established a RegionalAntiterrorism Center in Tashkent in June. In October,Kyrgyzstan, along with Belarus, China, Kazakhstan,Tajikistan, and Russia, formed the Eurasia Group, a re-gional anti-money laundering organization or FinancialAction Task Force-style regional body.

The Netherlands

In November 2004, the Netherlands was rocked by themurder of prominent Dutch film director Theo van Goghby a Dutch Moroccan acting out of radical Islamic con-victions, prompting a national debate on the need totoughen immigration and counterterrorism legislation.

In June, the Dutch for the first time successfully convictedtwo individuals of terrorist activity; two men suspected ofplotting to bomb the US Embassy in Paris were sentencedto six and four-year jail terms, respectively. The appealscourt ruled information by the General Intelligence andSecurity Service (AIVD) served as a legitimate base forstarting criminal investigations, thereby allowing use ofAIVD intelligence as evidence. Justice Minister Donnersubmitted legislation codifying the court’s ruling to allowthe use of intelligence information in criminal proceed-ings. The bill is still awaiting parliamentary action.

The Act on Terrorist Crimes, implementing the 2002 EUframework decision on combating terrorism, became ef-fective in August. The Government also reorganized itscounterterrorism efforts to centralize and coordinate in-formation sharing, currently shared by multiple ministriesand agencies. As part of this effort, the Justice and InteriorMinistries have proposed additional legislation to enhancethe ability of law enforcement to detect and prevent ter-rorist activity and to hold and prosecute terrorists.

The six-month Dutch EU Presidency placed a priority oncounterterrorism issues. The US and the EU initiated a dia-logue on terrorism finance issues in September. TheNetherlands finance ministry and Europol hosted a jointUS-EU workshop for prosecutors and investigators of ter-rorism finance cases in November. EU leaders approvedupdated Presidency action plans on counterterrorism andterrorist financing in December.

Using national sanctions authority, the Dutch blocked theaccounts and financial transactions of a HAMAS fundraiser,the al-Aqsa Foundation, and al-Qa’ida-affiliated Benevo-lence International Nederland. In July, the Netherlandsfroze all financial assets of the Dutch branch of al-Haramain.The Dutch have also been active in seeking support for anEU designation of Hizballah as a terrorist group.

The Netherlands continued its cooperation with the UnitedStates on shipping and port security. Under the Depart-ment of Energy’s (DOE) Megaport/Second Line of DefenseInitiative, four radiological monitors (provided by DOE)became operational in the port of Rotterdam in February.An estimated 31 additional monitors (funded by the Dutch)will be installed by the end of 2006. Improved securitytargeting at the port resulted from bilateral discussions. InJuly, the Government approved an experiment with airmarshals on certain transatlantic flights, and the Dutchalso permitted US immigration officials to return toSchiphol Airport to assist with US-bound passenger screen-ing (now part of the Immigration Assistance Program).

Norway

Norway remained a stalwart ally in the war against terror.Due to lack of evidence admissible in Norwegian courts,authorities dropped their criminal case against suspectedAnsar al-Islam leader (and Norway resident) Mullah Krekarbut ordered his expulsion from Norway on national secu-rity grounds. The administrative and legal processes relatedto the expulsion order have extended into 2005.

Poland

Poland continued to play an active role in the war on ter-rorism as a leader in Central and Eastern Europe. In 2004,Poland’s active Financial Intelligence Unit — the GeneralInspectorate for Financial Information (GIIF) — amendedlegislation to include non-profit organizations and legalpractitioners as institutions obligated to file reports. TheGIIF suspended five transactions worth 650,000 Euros, andblocked 12 accounts worth 2.1 million Euros in cases in-volving money laundering.

Portugal

In response to the March 11 train bombings in Spain, Por-tuguese security forces reassessed the security situationfor the June-July EURO 2004 soccer tournament, increas-ing security at all levels within the country, enhancingcooperation with neighboring countries, and solicitingNATO air support during the games. While the gameswent forward without incident, the Portuguese addressedcertain vulnerabilities, most notably the use of false docu-mentation, and the relative ease with which terrorists couldenter the country. In November, the media revealed thatPortugal had apprehended ten suspected terrorists, pre-dominantly Moroccan nationals, on the eve of the EURO2004 opening ceremony in Porto. The suspected terror-ists were deported both to Morocco and the Netherlands.One was later linked to the terror cell that carried out themurder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh. In addition,accused Indian terrorist Abu Salem remained in Portuguesecustody pending extradition to India.

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Romania

Romania is a staunch ally of the United States in the glo-bal war against terrorism, providing full public anddiplomatic support for US goals to counter terrorism. TheRomanian Government has established internal mecha-nisms to combat terrorism, including adoption of a nationalantiterrorism strategy and guidelines to prevent the use ofthe Romanian financial and banking system for the pur-pose of financing terrorist acts. As part of its nationalstrategy, Romania adopted legislation in 2004 that delin-eates the responsibilities of Romanian Governmentinstitutions in battling terrorism, providing a clearer frame-work for interagency coordination and cooperation.Bucharest hosts the headquarters of the Southeast Euro-pean Cooperation Initiative’s regional center that provideslaw enforcement training and intelligence sharing ontransborder criminal activities, including terrorism, for 12member countries in Southeastern and Central Europe.

Russia

Russia pursued several major domestic and globalcounterterrorism initiatives in 2004, expanding its role inthe global war on terrorism. Russia’s leadership and pub-lic assigned increasing importance to counterterrorismfollowing a series of deadly terrorist attacks in 2004. Sepa-ratist terrorists based in the North Caucasus wereresponsible for the murder of hundreds of Russian citi-zens. There is evidence of a foreign terrorist presence inChechnya and of international financial ties with Chechengroups, although much of the actual terrorist activity inthe region and elsewhere in Russia is homegrown andlinked to the Chechen separatist movement.

Throughout the year, Russia continued revamping its do-mestic counterterror legislation and restructuring its lawenforcement and security services in response to the ter-rorist threat. It facilitated effective interdiction of terroristfinance flows as a full member of the Financial ActionTask Force (FATF). In October, Russia fulfilled its pledgeto create a Central Asian FATF-style regional body (FSRB)— the Eurasia Group — whose members include Belarus,China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Russia. Aschair of that new group, Russia declared its intention tocreate a training center in Moscow to bolster regionalcooperation.

On September 13, immediately following the Beslan trag-edy, President Putin announced political reforms (includingthe presidential nomination of governors) that the Gov-ernment said would result in greater domestic security.Some Russians view those reforms as anti-democratic, andthe United States expressed concerns about the nature ofsome of the proposals and the degree to which they wouldaddress Russia’s counterterrorism efforts.

Examples of noteworthy law enforcement and judicial ac-tions undertaken by Russia in 2004 include: Zarema

Muzhikhoyeva, a failed Chechen suicide bomber, was con-victed of terrorism by a Moscow court in April andsentenced to 20 years in prison. In November, Russianlaw enforcement officials arrested Alisher Usmanov, whomthe Russian authorities allege was the leader of a terroristcell. Usmanov was reportedly carrying explosives and al-Qa’ida training manuals at the time of his arrest. AbdullaAliyev, an aide to Chechen terrorist Shamil Basayev, wasconvicted of involvement in Basayev’s 1999 incursion intoDagestan after returning to Dagestan from self-imposedexile in Turkey and confessing to prosecutors. He wasgiven an eight-year suspended sentence.

Russia increasingly oriented its foreign policy to strength-ening efforts to fight terrorism and engaged in bilateralcounterterrorism cooperation with numerous countries,including the United Kingdom, India, France, Pakistan,Japan, and Germany. President Putin created the post ofSpecial Envoy for International Counterterrorism Coop-eration and appointed former Deputy Foreign MinisterAnatoliy Safonov to fill that role. Safonov co-chaired manyof the bilateral meetings.

The US-Russia Counterterrorism Group met in March andOctober, fostering cooperative operational links betweennumerous US agencies and their counterparts in Russia.The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and the US Fed-eral Bureau of Investigation (FBI) regularly exchangedoperational counterterrorism information, and several jointinvestigations were underway in 2004. The FSB andRussia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) have providedinformation to US agencies that has helped identify po-tential terrorism financing flows and suspect bank accountsand transactions. During FBI Director Mueller’s Decem-ber 2004 visit to Moscow, he and FSB Chief Patrushevsigned a comprehensive memorandum of cooperationbetween the two agencies on counterterrorism, specifi-cally committing them to the timely sharing of terroristthreat information. The FSB and FBI agreed to expandtheir cooperative exchange program to include informa-tion on weapons of mass destruction. Russia alsocooperated extensively with the DHS Transportation Se-curity Agency to increase airport security followingterrorists’ downing of two Russian airliners in August. TheUS Department of Treasury and Russia’s Federal Servicefor Financial Monitoring (FSFM) submitted a joint reportto Presidents Bush and Putin in July 2004 on CooperativeStrategies for Countering Terrorist Finance.

Russia was the chief sponsor of UN Security Council Reso-lution 1566, passed October 8, which created a workinggroup to explore ways to sanction terrorist groups not cov-ered by the al-Qa’ida/Taliban Sanctions Committee andstrengthened the UN’s Counter-Terrorism Committee(CTC). Russia chaired the CTC in the latter half of 2004and was active in numerous other international fora inbuilding cooperative mechanisms and programs to counterterror. For example, Russia led efforts in the Asia-PacificEconomic Cooperation (APEC) and the Shanghai Coop-

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eration Organization (SCO) to focus those organizationson counterterrorism cooperation. Russia signed a jointdeclaration on international counterterrorism cooperationwith the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)in Jakarta in July, and has pushed that organization’s mem-bers to create a Russia-ASEAN counterterrorism task force.Russia has urged the OSCE and other organizations to ori-ent their missions and goals to the global counterterroristfight. The NATO-Russia Council adopted a jointcounterterrorism plan at its December meeting in Brus-sels. Russia signed an agreement at the same meeting tobegin permanent participation in 2005 in NATO’s Opera-tion Active Endeavor by providing naval assets to theongoing sea interdiction operation in the Mediterranean.

Major terrorist acts perpetrated against Russia during 2004included, in chronological order:

On February 6, suicide bombers blew up a Moscow sub-way train, killing at least 41 and wounding more than 100.

On April 6, a suicide bomber tried to assassinate IngushPresident Murat Zyazikov by ramming an explosive-ladenvehicle into Zyazikov’s motorcade. The blast woundedfour of Zyazikov’s bodyguards and two civilians. Zyazikovwas lightly wounded.

On May 9, Chechen President Akhmed Kadyrov was as-sassinated during Victory Day celebrations in a Groznystadium.

On June 22, armed militants seized a Ministry of Interiorbuilding in Ingushetia, killing at least 92 people.

On August 24, suicide bombers simultaneously broughtdown two Russian airliners, killing 88 passengers and crew.

On August 31, a female suicide bomber killed at leasteight persons and wounded more than 50 others when shedetonated explosives outside a Moscow subway station.

September 1-3, terrorists seized approximately 1,200 hos-tages, more than half children, at a school in Beslan, NorthOssetia. Two days later, an explosion inside the gymna-sium where hostages were held sparked a fierce gun battlebetween terrorists and security forces. According to offi-cial figures, 331 people were killed, 172 of them children,though many believe the actual number of deaths washigher. Hundreds of others were injured.

Slovenia

Slovenia hosted a regional anti-money laundering confer-ence for eight of its Balkan neighbors in October 2004. In2004, Slovenia changed its penal code, increasing theprison term for money laundering from three to five years.Slovenia is actively involved in regional efforts to combatmoney laundering and terrorism financing, working

throughout the Balkans and Eastern Europe, especially withSerbia and Montenegro, Ukraine, Macedonia, and Rus-sia, through its Office for Money Laundering Prevention(OMLP). In 2004, Slovenia provided police trainers inAmman, Jordan, to train Iraqi policemen. Slovenia pro-vides training to its non-EU member neighbors on bordersecurity and enforcement against financial crimes.

Spain

Spain remained a strong ally in the global war against ter-rorism and suffered a massive terrorist attack in March,when Islamic extremists attacked commuter trains inMadrid, killing 191 and wounding hundreds of others.

On the morning of March 11, 2004, terrorists detonatedbombs on commuter trains, including five near Atocha,the city’s biggest train station. Police discovered that ex-tremists associated with the Moroccan Islamic CombatantGroup (GICM), most of them North African residents ofSpain, had carried out the attacks. On April 2, authoritieslocated an explosive device under the high-speed railwayconnecting Madrid and Seville that failed to detonate. OnApril 3, seven suspects sought by police in connectionwith the March 11 bombings detonated explosives in anapartment in a Madrid suburb in order to avoid arrest. Allseven suspects and one police officer were killed in theexplosion. Authorities are holding approximately twodozen individuals in connection with the March 11 bomb-ings. Those charged in the case are pending trial on chargesof murder and belonging to a terrorist organization.

Spain has arrested and indicted scores of individuals withpossible links to al-Qa’ida since September 11. In No-vember, Spanish police arrested more than 30 suspectedmembers of a radical Islamic organization, disrupting ap-parent plans to bomb Spain’s High Court, Madrid’s largestsoccer stadium, the headquarters of the opposition Popu-lar Party, an office building, and other public landmarks.Spain requested the extradition from Switzerland of

Relatives and friends bury a victim of the train bombings at Madrid’sSouth Cemetery March 13. Nearly 200 people were killed in Spain’sworst terrorist attack when bombs were placed in commuter trains inthe Spanish capital on March 11. (AP Photo/Denis Doyle)

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Mohamed Achraf, the alleged leader of this terrorist con-spiracy, also known as “Mikael Etienne Christian Lefevre.”Extradition was authorized in January 2005 by the SwissFederal Office of Justice, and in April 2005, Achraf’s ap-peal against extradition was denied. In May, a Spanishjudge ordered the detention of three Algerian nationalsand one Spanish national for their ties to an al-Qa’ida cellin Hamburg, Germany. Police in Barcelona arrested tenPakistani nationals suspected of providing logistical andfinancial support to Islamic extremist groups outside ofSpain. At the time of their arrest, Spanish officials explic-itly said these individuals were not known to be linked toal-Qa’ida. On December 17, Spanish police arrested Mo-roccan national Hassan El Haski and three other membersof the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group in the CanaryIslands on charges of participating in the March 11 trainbombings.

Spain has had some success in prosecuting terrorism cases.In November, a Spanish judge issued the first sentenceconnected to the March 11 train bombings, sentencing a16-year-old male to six years in a juvenile prison facilityand five years probation for helping the conspirators ob-tain the explosives used in the blasts. In November, a judgeordered the detention of an al-Jazeera television networkjournalist with alleged ties to the Spain-based al-Qa’idanetwork of Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas. The journalist had

been released on bail in 2003 for health reasons. The trialof 24 suspects charged in the Barakat Yarkas case is sched-uled to begin in April 2005. The prosecutor is requesting25-year prison terms for each victim of the 9/11 attacks forseveral members of the Barakat Yarkas cell.

Spain scored significant successes in its decades-old cam-paign to eliminate domestic terrorist groups, including theBasque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) organization, a radi-cal terrorist group. Spanish police arrested more than 70individuals in 2004 for association with or membershipin ETA and dismantled several ETA operational terroristcells, dealing a blow to ETA’s logistic, recruitment, andoperational capabilities. In October, a joint French-Span-ish investigation led to the arrest in France of high-rankingETA terrorists Mikel Antza and Soledad Iparragirre. Antzawas the leader of ETA at the time of his arrest and Iparragirrewas sought in connection with 14 murders. ETA carriedout a series of bombings of tourist areas during the sum-mer and detonated 12 bombs on December 3 and 6 inMadrid and eight other cities, resulting in minor injuriesto approximately a dozen people. Spanish and French au-thorities also made joint advances against the domesticterrorist group First of October Antifascist ResistanceGroup, all but eliminating the group.

US Attorney General John Ashcroft visited Spain on De-cember 17 to sign the bilateral protocols to the US-EUMutual Legal Assistance Treaty and Extradition Agreement,deepening bilateral judicial cooperation. In December,Spain signed a Memorandum of Understanding with theUS Department of Energy for the installation of nuclear

Two people injured by an explosion in a train wait for aid outside thetrain station of Atocha in Madrid, March 11. (AP Photo/EFE, JoseHuesca)

A body of a dead passenger lies next to a damaged train car in Atochatrain station in Madrid March 11 after bombs rocked trains in threetrain stations. (AP Photo/EFE, J.J. Guillen)

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material detectors at the port of Algeciras. Spain is alsocooperating with the Department of Homeland Securityon the Container Security Initiative to scan containersbound from Algeciras to the United States for hazardousmaterials. Spain led the effort in the EU to approve theEU-wide common arrest and detention order, which theEU approved in late 2001. Spain co-chairs with the UnitedStates the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Terrorism Fi-nance Working Group and is pressing to become astanding member of the G8’s Counterterrorism ActionGroup on the basis of its high level of technicalcounterterrorism assistance to third countries.

Tajikistan

The Government of Tajikistan continues to be a staunchsupporter of the United States in the global war on terror-ism. The Tajik Government directs intelligence and lawenforcement resources against terrorist groups operatingwithin its borders such as the Islamic Movement ofUzbekistan. In addition, Tajikistan combats terrorist fi-nancing by distributing lists of designated terrorist groupsand individuals to local banks and other financial institu-tions. On the international level, Tajikistan participates inantiterrorist initiatives advanced by the Shanghai Coop-eration Organization (SCO) and the Community ofIndependent States Antiterrorist Center. The SCO estab-lished a Regional Antiterrorism Center in Tashkent in June.In 2004, Tajikistan, with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,China, and Belarus, co-founded the Eurasia Group, a re-gional anti-money laundering organization or FinancialAction Task Force-style regional body. The United Statescurrently provides technical aid to the antiterrorist unitsof the Tajik Government. With the assistance of the UnitedStates and other foreign countries, Tajikistan’s law enforce-ment personnel receive training in such areas as crisismanagement, bomb detection, and post-blast investiga-tion. In 2004, Tajikistan worked with Russia to extradite aTajik citizen to Russia to stand trial for accusations of ter-rorist acts in 2000.

Turkey

Turkish authorities, long staunch counterterrorism allies,continued to provide strong support in the global war onterrorism. Domestic and transnational terrorist groups havetargeted Turks and foreigners, occasionally including USGovernment personnel, for over 40 years. Internationaland domestic terrorist groups operating in Turkey includeMarxist-Leninist, radical Islamist, separatist, and pro-Chechen-separatist groups. In response to these threatsthe Government has developed strong determination andthe capability to fight most domestically-based terrorism.The Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary People’s LiberationParty-Front (DHKP/C) continued to be active, and alleg-edly was responsible for a blast on an Istanbul bus in Junethat killed four and injured more than a dozen, as well asa number of smaller “sound” bombs. Turkish law enforce-

ment authorities pursued several successful operationsagainst DHKP/C cells.

In the summer of 2004, PKK/KADEK/Kongra-Gel re-nounced its self-proclaimed cease-fire and threatened torenew its separatist struggle in both the Southeast andTurkey’s western cities. The Turkish press subsequently re-ported multiple incidents in the Southeast of PKK/KADEK/Kongra-Gel terrorist actions or clashes between Turkishsecurity forces and PKK/KADEK/Kongra-Gel militants. PKK/KADEK/Kongra-Gel maintains approximately 500 armedmilitants in Turkey and an estimated 3,000 to 3,500 armedmilitants in northern Iraq, according to Turkish govern-ment sources and NGOs.

A new group calling itself the Kurdistan Liberation Hawks(TAK) used pro-PKK/KADEK/Kongra-Gel media sources inGermany to claim responsibility for several attacks on ci-vilian targets this year, including two Istanbul hotels, thegovernor of Van province, and a music festival in Mersin.Several civilians, including international tourists, werekilled and dozens were wounded in these attacks.

A criminal trial is underway for dozens of defendantscharged with involvement in the November 2003 bomb-ings of banks and synagogues in Istanbul. The leaddefendants have admitted to contacts with al-Qa’ida andwarned of further attacks if Turkey continues to cooperatewith the United States and Israel. However, most of theother defendants denied any responsibility for or knowl-edge of the bombings. Verdicts are not expected untilsometime in 2005.

On March 9, a suicide attack against an Istanbul Masoniclodge killed one attacker and one other person andwounded several others. Statements made by the surviv-ing attacker suggest the attack was conducted by Islamicextremists against what they believed was a “Zionist” orJewish target. Thirteen suspects have been charged in thisattack, including one who is also a defendant in the trialrelated to the November 2003 bombings.

In May, Turkish authorities announced that they had foileda plot to attack the NATO Summit in Istanbul. Turkeycharged nine alleged members of the Ansar al-Islam ter-rorist group — which has ties to al-Qa’ida — with planningthe bombing.

Turkmenistan

The Government of Turkmenistan has been a cautiousmember of the international coalition against terrorism,taking limited action to secure its border with Afghani-stan, demonstrating greater willingness to accept someborder security expertise and equipment from the inter-national community, and instituting new airport securitymeasures.

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There was a significant change in the Government’s atti-tude toward terrorism, specifically “domestic terrorism,”following the November 25, 2002, attack on PresidentNiyazov’s motorcade. The intent of the new antiterrorismlaws and strictures, however, has been to strengthen inter-nal security controls to ensure the survival of the Niyazovgovernment. The effect of these new laws has been a se-rious infringement on civil liberties and violations ofhuman rights.

To build on its Law on Fighting Terrorism, adopted in Au-gust 2003, the President issued a decree in September 2004approving the creation of the State Commission on Fight-ing Terrorism. The Department for Organized Crime atthe Ministry of Internal Affairs also took on the responsibil-ity for counterterrorism activities in 2004, becoming theDepartment for Counterterrorism and Organized Crime.

Ukraine

The fight against terrorism is a top foreign policy priorityfor the Government of Ukraine. Ukraine does not sufferfrom a domestic terrorism problem. In 2004, Ukrainiancourts carried out no prosecutions on charges of interna-tional terrorism, although in May Ukrainian authoritiesarrested an Iraqi, two Greeks, and a Pakistani in a stingoperation to foil an attempt to buy weapons for use in Iraqby the Iraqi insurgency; the four were convicted in lateDecember, given suspended sentences, and deported.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom has been and remains one of theUnited States’ strongest partners in the global fight againstterrorism. In what was reportedly the largestcounterterrorism operation in the UK since 9/11, policein March arrested eight men, all British citizens of Paki-stani descent, and seized a half-ton of ammonium nitrate.The men were charged under the Terrorism Act for involve-ment in a plot to manufacture and deploy an improvisedexplosive device. The UK has not commented publicly onthe eight plotters’ likely target. Their trials are expected tobegin in 2005. In an unrelated case, police arrested eightmen in August for planning a terrorist attack in the UK.All eight were charged with terrorism-related offenses, andat the time of their arrests, it was widely reported that po-lice suspected them of having links with al-Qa’ida. Theirtrials are expected to begin in late 2005. The first trials forindividuals arrested in connections with the 2003 “ricinplot” began in September. A second group of trials relatedto the ricin plot are likely to begin after the first groupconcludes.

UK law enforcement authorities may detain without chargeindividuals suspected of having committed a terrorism-related offense for up to 48 hours. Until January 2004,this period could be extended by court order to seven days.In January, a new law came into force allowing court or-

dered detention without charge for up to 14 days. In De-cember, the UK’s highest court ruled that specialimmigration powers that allowed the Home Secretary todetain indefinitely certain foreign nationals were incom-patible with the European Convention on Human Rights(ECHR). In response to the ruling, the detention powerswere allowed to lapse and Parliament adopted the Pre-vention of Terrorism Act. The Act gives the Home Secretarypowers to make control orders that impose a range of con-ditions, including a ban on Internet or mobile phone use,restrictions on movement and travel, restrictions on asso-ciation with named individuals, curfews, and tagging. Thesemay be applied to both UK citizens and foreign nationalssuspected of involvement in international terrorism.

The UK continued to assist with the US request for theextradition of Khaled al-Fawwaz, Adel Abdel Bary, andIbrahim Eidarous for their involvement in the 1998 bomb-ings of two US embassies in East Africa. However, allthree have exercised their legal right to make representa-tions to the Home Secretary against their surrender to theUnited States. The United States has also requested theextradition of Abu Doha in connection with the Decem-ber 1999 plot by Ahmed Ressam and others to attack LosAngeles International Airport. As in the case of the Em-bassy bombers, his case is before the Home Secretary. InMay, British officials arrested the radical cleric, AbuHamza, on a US extradition warrant. The UK Governmentsubsequently arrested Hamza on separate terrorism-relatedcharges and in October the Crown Prosecution Servicecharged him with 16 criminal offenses, including solicit-ing murder, inciting racial hatred, and possessing adocument that contained information “of a kind likely tobe useful to a person committing or preparing an act ofterrorism.” The British case against Hamza takes legal pre-cedence over the US extradition request, which has beensuspended until the British case is settled. In August, theUnited States requested the extradition of Babar Ahmed,an alleged terrorist recruiter.

UK law enforcement and intelligence authorities workclosely with their US counterparts. The regular exchangeof law enforcement reporting and intelligence has resultedin the successful disruption of several significant plots tocommit terrorist attacks against unspecified targets in theUK and the United States. The Metropolitan Police havealso assisted other international partners with terrorism-related investigations, including Turkey, Saudi Arabia,Indonesia, and Iraq.

The United States and the United Kingdom are also strongallies in combating terrorism finance. Both work closelytogether and with other partners within the United Na-tions and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and theG8 Counterterrorism Action Group to promote initiativesto deny terrorists and their supporters access to the inter-national financial system.The UK has strong legalprovisions for freezing assets related to terrorist financing.

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In 2004, the United States and the UK co-sponsored aproposal to the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee to includeon its consolidated list the Jama’at al-Tawhid wa’al-Jihad(subsequently renamed al-Qa’ida of the Jihad Organiza-tion in the Land of the Two Rivers), the organization whichwas responsible for the bombing of UN headquarters inBaghdad and the brutal abduction and execution of sevencivilians in Iraq.

In Northern Ireland, Republican and Loyalist paramilitaryorganizations have increasingly shifted their activity frompolitical actions to criminal racketeering. This shift beganwith the 1994 ceasefires of the Provisional Irish Republi-can Army (PIRA), the Ulster Defense Association (UDA),and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), and has acceler-ated since the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in1998. Two relatively small “dissident” Republicanparamilitaries — Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)and Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) — are not observ-ing a ceasefire, and continue to advocate the use of armedviolence to support their goal of uniting the northern andsouthern parts of Ireland. The activities of Loyalistparamilitaries take place almost exclusively within North-ern Ireland, while Republican paramilitaries also have apresence in the Republic of Ireland.

In December, unknown persons suspected of being linkedto PIRA robbed a Belfast bank of some $50 million dollars.

Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan has played an active role in multilateral re-gional efforts to address terrorism. In June, the ShanghaiCooperation Organization (SCO) Regional AntiterrorismCenter was established in Tashkent and is in the early stagesof development. The SCO membership includes China,Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.After an explosion at a safe house in Bukhara, suicidebombers attacked a popular bazaar and other locations inTashkent in March and April, resulting in the deaths ofmore than a dozen police officers and innocent bystand-ers and dozens of injuries. These were the first suicidebombings to occur in Central Asia. A further round ofbombings took place in July outside the US and IsraeliEmbassies and the Uzbek General Prosecutor’s Office,resulting in several injuries and the death of twoUzbekistani police officers at the US Embassy, oneUzbekistani National Security Service Officer, and anUzbekistani guard at the Israeli Embassy. The Govern-ment of Kazakhstan has recently detained individualssuspected of organizing these latest attacks.

Uzbekistan continues to make countering terrorism andanti-government threats a high priority. In August and Sep-tember, Uzbek courts convicted more than 80 individualsof terrorist activities for their involvement in the Marchand April attacks.

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Middle East and North Africa Overview

The Middle East and North Africa region continues to bethe region of greatest concern in the global war on terror-ism. Iraq witnessed extensive terrorism and violence byforeign jihadists, former regime elements, and Islamic ex-tremists. Numerous attacks in Iraq targeted foreign aidworkers, contractors, and other non-combatants. Majorterrorist attacks also occurred in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, andIsrael. Active groups in the Middle East included al-Qa’ida,the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS), Hizballah,Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade(Fatah’s militant wing), the Popular Front for the Libera-tion of Palestine (PFLP), Ansar al-Islam and its offshootAnsar al-Sunna, and Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s organiza-tion Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn, or theal-Qa’ida Jihad Organization in the Land of the Two Riv-ers (formerly Jama’at al-Tawhid wa’al-Jihad). There wasan increase in terrorist groups affiliating themselves withal-Qa’ida or expressing support for al-Qa’ida’s ideology.In December, the United States amended the Foreign Ter-rorist Organization (FTO) designation of Zarqawi’s groupto include its new name and aliases and designated theLibyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) as an FTO. Leba-nese Hizballah’s television network, al-Manar, was alsoadded to the Terrorist Exclusion List (TEL).

Almost all countries in the region continued significantinternational counterterrorism cooperation and undertookefforts to strengthen their counterterrorism capabilities andeffectiveness. Many countries continued to provide sup-port to Coalition efforts to bring peace and stability to Iraqand Afghanistan. The United States continued to providetraining throughout the region to assist US allies to en-hance their counterterrorism capacity. In November,Bahrain hosted the first meeting of the newly-establishedFATF-style regional body, the Middle East and North AfricaFinancial Action Task Force (MENA FATF), the creation ofwhich should strengthen members’ efforts to combat moneylaundering and terrorist financing in countries in the region.

Iraq’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism was offi-cially rescinded on October 20, and the United Statescontinued to work closely with the Iraqi Interim Govern-ment (IIG) and Iraqi Security Forces to combat terrorismin Iraq. Nevertheless, terrorists and insurgents endeav-ored to prevent the establishment of a free, sovereign, anddemocratic Iraq through numerous attacks, includingbombings, assassinations, kidnappings, and beheadings.

Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Kuwait undertook aggressiveactions to prevent terrorists and insurgents from crossingtheir borders into Iraq. Syria also took some measures tointercept Iraq-bound foreign jihadists, but those efforts wereonly partly successful.

Terrorist attacks in Israel in 2004 killed almost 100 people,a significant decrease from the year before. HAMASclaimed responsibility for the deadliest attack of the year,the August 31 double suicide bombing of two buses inBeersheva that killed 16 people and wounded 100.

In Egypt on October 7, terrorists attacked three tourist tar-gets in Taba and Nuweiba on the Sinai peninsula, killing34 people, including Egyptians, Israelis, Italians, a Rus-sian, and an American-Israeli dual national, and injuringover 140. By the end of the year, the Egyptian Govern-ment assessed that of the nine individuals responsible forthe attacks, two had been killed in the attacks, five werein custody, and two were still at large.

In Saudi Arabia, terrorists killed dozens of foreigners andSaudi citizens in 2004, including six Americans. Saudiauthorities aggressively pursued terrorists and succeededin capturing or killing many on their most-wanted list. OnDecember 6, an attack on the US Consulate in Jeddahkilled four Consulate locally engaged staff and one contractguard, and significantly injured ten employees. Three of theattackers were killed at the site, and one died later of his

In Baghdad’s Haifa Street, on December 19, several employees ofIraq’s Independent Electoral Commission are killed by unidentifiedgunmen after being dragged from their car. (AP Photo/STR)

A Yemeni employee of the US Consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia,wounded during a December 6 attack on the Consulate, talks withtwo Saudi men at a Jeddah hospital the day following the terroristattacks. (AP Photo/Hasan Jamali)

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Saudi forces gathered outside the US Consulate in Jeddah onDecember 6 after terrorists threw explosives at the gate, forced theirway in, and held hostages at gunpoint. Three of the five terrorists werekilled during the attack and a fourth later died of wounds. (AP Photo/Saudi Gazette)

Public Diplomacy

The foundation of the US Government’s public diplomacystrategy is to engage, inform, and influence foreign pub-lics in order to increase understanding of American values,policies, and initiatives. Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11,reaching foreign audiences with core policy messages ondemocracy, tolerance, and the universal values of libertyand freedom remains at the center of US efforts to counterextremist rhetoric and disinformation coming from hos-tile groups.

Support for and understanding of the United States gohand-in-hand with strengthening moderate voices as anantidote to extremism. Through public diplomacy pro-grams such as Fulbright academic exchanges, InternationalVisitor Leadership projects, speaker programs, journalisttours, English-language development, Internet websites,and digital video conferences, the US Government is com-municating American principles and values. At the sametime, these programs work to increase mutual understand-ing and respect between the people of the United Statesand those of other countries.

Through public diplomacy the United States calls for dia-logue with key communities, while encouraging thegrowth of moderation, based on mutual interests of de-mocracy, security, prosperity, and shared values. In 2002,the Department launched Partnerships for Learning (P4L),which directs exchanges toward youth and youthinfluencers and focuses on the universal need for educa-tion and opportunity. A powerful component of the USGovernment’s public diplomacy programs is the broadrange of American academic institutions, NGOs, and pri-vate citizens who play a vital role in hosting approximately30,000 academic, cultural, and professional exchange visi-tors annually.

One of the most effective public diplomacy tools is Ameri-can Corners. Often housed in educational institutions,American Corners in 201 cities in 89 countries serve asplatforms for public outreach, especially to young people,offering them knowledge about life in the United States,American government, and American culture throughcomputers, books, magazines, and information.

Radio, television, Internet and video products continue tobe powerful tools for bringing America’s foreign policymessage to worldwide audiences. The State Departmentproduces a wide array of print and electronic materialsdescribing for foreign audiences, in their own languages,the need to counter those who have committed or wish tocommit terrorist acts, as well as the achievements madein that struggle. The US Agency for International Devel-opment (USAID) carries out foreign assistance programsthat support key US foreign policy interests and have apositive public diplomacy impact for many people in the

injuries. The fifth is in Saudi custody. Two groups associatedwith al-Qa’ida claimed responsibility for the attack.

Jordan’s State Security Court sentenced eight men to death,including Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, for the 2002 murder ofUSAID official Laurence Foley. In Yemen, the Sana’a Pri-mary Court, in separate trials, convicted the defendants inthe USS Cole and French M/V Limburg attacks. Both caseswere under appeal at the end of 2004.

Algeria killed or apprehended key leaders of the SalafistGroup for Call and Combat (GSPC) and the Armed IslamicGroup (GIA), and arrested more than 400 other GSPC andGIA terrorists during 2004. On October 12, Algerian Presi-dent Abdelaziz Bouteflika opened the African Union’sCenter for Study and Research on Terrorism in Algiers.

Morocco continued its aggressive action against suspectsin the May 2003 Casablanca bombing.

Algeria

Algeria continued strong support for US counterterrorismefforts and demonstrated its overall support of the globalwar on terror. Algeria made impressive gains against boththe Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC - also knownas the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat) and theArmed Islamic Group (GIA). In June, GSPC “Emir” NabilSahraoui (aka Abu Ibrahim Mustapha) was killed by secu-rity forces during an armed clash. In October, Amari Saifi,a.k.a. Abderazak al-Para, the GSPC leader responsible forthe 2003 kidnapping of 32 European hostages in Algeria,was apprehended through cooperation with the Chadianand Libyan authorities, and returned to Algeria after beingheld by a Chadian rebel group, the Movement for De-mocracy and Justice, for several months. In earlyNovember, Algerian security forces captured GIA leaderNouredine Boudiaf and three of his associates along witha large cache of weapons near the Algiers airport. Alge-

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rian authorities arrested more than 400 other GSPC andGIA terrorists during 2004.

According to Algerian authorities, fewer than 800 terror-ists remain active in Algeria, down from a possible high of28,000 terrorists in the mid-1990s. The Government’s suc-cess in capturing or killing a number of GSPC and GIAleaders has further weakened the effectiveness of thesetwo groups. The GSPC, however, carried out several op-erations in Algeria in 2004, including the August ambushof a military convoy in which 40 members of the securityforces were killed. On June 21, GSPC terrorists explodeda vehicle-borne explosive device outside the El-Hammaelectric power generating facility in central Algiers, caus-ing no casualties but knocking out 210 MW of generatingcapacity for several months. Members of the cell respon-sible for the El-Hamma bombing were reportedly killedby security forces in October. Numerous smaller inci-dents occurred in 2004, mainly in the Boumerdes areaand in parts of Kabylie.

Algeria’s neighbors, including Mali, Niger, Chad, andMauritania, continue to be affected by the GSPC’s activi-ties. The GSPC conducts smuggling activities betweenAlgeria and neighboring countries. There are also finan-cial links between GSPC cells in Europe and Algeria. TheGSPC issued several communiqués on its website threat-ening foreigners in Algeria and pledged renewed allegianceto al-Qa’ida and global jihad. Algeria cooperates closelywith its neighbors in the Sahel. This cooperation led to theapprehension of Abderrazak al-Para.

On October 12, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika hosted ahigh-level African Union (AU) conference oncounterterrorism in Algiers and opened the new AU Cen-ter for Study and Research on Terrorism. This center isintended to facilitate information exchange and trainingfor AU member states in the fight against terrorism. In thefinancial arena, Algeria drafted legislation to criminalizemoney laundering activities. A financial intelligence unit(FIU), which turns over actionable information to thecourts, became operational.

Bahrain

Bahrain provides important support to US counterterrorismefforts, particularly efforts to block the financing of terrorgroups. Bahrain has continued to respond positively torequests for assistance to combat terror financing and hasfrozen about $18 million in terrorist-linked funds. In No-vember, Bahrain hosted the inaugural meeting of theMiddle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force(MENA FATF). Bahrain worked closely with FATF for sev-eral years to establish this regional body. Located inBahrain, the new MENA FATF secretariat will promote FATFrecommendations to combat money laundering and ter-rorist financing.

developing world. USAID’s humanitarian aid programsand its activities in the areas of economic growth, agricul-ture, trade, global health, democracy, and conflictprevention help reduce the risk of countries becomingbreeding grounds for terrorism. In Afghanistan, USAID ishelping to build a safe, stable society that meets the needsof its people and eliminates an environment in which ter-rorist groups have flourished. USAID has been on thefront lines of support to tsunami-affected countries, gar-nering goodwill toward the United States among peoplein the hardest-hit areas.

At the Sea Island summit hosted by the United States inJune 2004, the G8 launched the Broader Middle East andNorth Africa (BMENA) Initiative to support reform effortsunderway in the region in the areas of democratization,economics, and education. A key component of theBMENA initiative is the Forum for the Future, which bringstogether annually foreign, education, and economic min-isters, as well as civil society and business representatives,from the Broader Middle East and the G8 to discuss waysto support reform. In addition to the forum, the G8 agreedto support a Democracy Assistance Dialogue, a Networkof Funds, Entrepreneurship Centers, a microfinance ini-tiative, a literacy initiative, an Investment Task Force, anda private enterprise partnership at the International FinanceCorporation.

Also of public diplomacy significance, the Middle EastPartnership Initiative (MEPI), launched in December 2002,is a Presidential initiative established to support economic,political, and educational reform in the Middle East andexpand opportunity for all people of the region, especiallywomen and youth. By working closely with governmentsin the Arab world, academic institutions, the private sec-tor, and non-governmental organizations, MEPI increasessupport for core democratic values and self-generated re-form efforts in the Middle East.

Among the hallmark activities being conducted under theauspices of MEPI are plans for the creation of a MiddleEast Justice Institute, multiple sessions for Middle East En-trepreneurship Training in the United States for men andwomen, and regional campaign schools teaching politi-cal skills to female candidates. In addition, “PartnershipSchools” help transform the classroom learning experi-ence through innovative alternatives that can serve asmodels for governments as they build new schools andreform educational systems.

The success of public diplomacy efforts is not measuredin days or weeks; it is a long-term commitment measuredin the course of generations.

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Bahrain is an active participant in the US Government’sAntiterrorism Assistance Program. Bahrain continued tocooperate with the US on intelligence and law enforce-ment matters.

The Government actively monitored terrorist suspects, butdomestic legal constraints, including the absence of com-prehensive conspiracy legislation, have at times hamstrungthe Government’s ability to detain and prosecute suspects.In June, the Government arrested six Bahrainis and placedone Bahraini under house arrest on suspicion of plottingterrorist attacks. All seven were released within two days.The Government re-arrested the six individuals in mid-July. The court ordered the release of two of the individualsin mid-September and ordered the release of the remain-ing four in early November pending trial. Preliminaryhearings for the case began in early December. The courtreferred to the Constitutional Court a motion contestingthe constitutionality of the charges against the suspects.One of the four escaped the courtroom during a hearingin mid-September and was recaptured the same day. Hewas convicted in mid-November for the escape attemptand began serving a six-month sentence.

Egypt

The Egyptian and US Governments maintained close co-operation on a broad range of counterterrorism and lawenforcement issues in 2004. A high-level Egyptian judi-cial delegation visited the United States in June and metwith representatives of the US Departments of Justice, State,and the FBI to discuss cooperation in the areas ofcounterterrorism, law enforcement, and the mutual legalassistance treaty. In September, 20 generals from Egyp-tian security services attended a crisis managementseminar in Washington funded by the Department of State’sAntiterrorism Assistance Program.

The Egyptian and US Governments also exchanged infor-mation on a variety of terrorism, security, and lawenforcement matters during the course of the year. In thepast two years, Egypt has tightened its assets-freezing re-gime in keeping with relevant UN Security CouncilResolutions. Egypt passed strong anti-money launderinglegislation in 2002 and established a financial intelligenceunit in 2003. Egypt maintained its strengthened airportsecurity measures and security for the Suez Canal, and con-tinued to institute more stringent port security measures.

Egypt was a victim of terrorism in 2004. On October 7,terrorists attacked tourist targets in Taba and Nuweiba onthe Sinai peninsula in three separate but coordinated ac-tions. Thirty-four people were killed, including Egyptians,Israelis, Italians, a Russian, and an American-Israeli dualnational, and over 140 were injured. On October 25, theMinister of Interior announced that the Government hadidentified nine individuals responsible for the attack. Ac-cording to the Egyptian Government, a Palestinian resident

in North Sinai was the group’s ringleader. The Govern-ment reported that the Palestinian and an accomplice werekilled in the course of the attack in Taba, and that fiveothers had been taken into custody. At year’s end, two ofthe nine named by the Government remained at large.The Government asserted that the nine perpetrators werenot part of a wider conspiracy and did not receive assis-tance from international terrorist organizations.

The Egyptian judicial system does not allow plea bargain-ing in most cases, and terrorists have historically beenprosecuted to the full extent of the law. Defendants aretried in military tribunals or emergency courts. In March,an emergency court pronounced its verdict in the trial of26 persons accused of attempting to reconstitute the Is-lamic Liberation Party (Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami), which wasbanned in Egypt in 1974 for its efforts to overthrow theEgyptian Government. The court sentenced 12 of the de-fendants (including three UK citizens) to prison. In April,Ahmad Hussein Agiza, an Islamist militant returned toEgypt by Sweden in 2001, was sentenced by a militarycourt to 25 years in prison for membership in a bannedorganization, although his sentence was subsequentlycommuted to 15 years.

Egypt continued to release from prison members of theterrorist Islamic Group (IG) who recanted their past ac-tions and renounced the use of violence. Approximately700 people were released over the course of the year, ofwhich the majority were reportedly IG members. TheGovernment characterized the releases as the result of atransformation in the ideological and theological positionsof the imprisoned IG leadership, reflected in a number ofbooks, pamphlets, and interviews in which they espouseda new non-violent philosophy. Some IG members in Egyptand abroad rejected the leadership’s move to adopt non-violence.

Egypt continued to work with Israel to crack down on long-established smuggling tunnels through the Sinai to Gaza.Egypt has destroyed more than 40 tunnel openings since2003 and long ago cleared sensitive portions of the bor-der area spanning the tunneling area. Egypt has activelyengaged Palestinian leaders on the question of reorganiz-ing the Palestinian Authority’s security services to betterpolice the border area.

Iraq

Iraq remains the central battleground in the global war onterrorism. Former regime elements as well as foreign fight-ers and Islamic extremists continued to conduct terroristattacks against civilians and non-combatants. These ele-ments also conducted numerous insurgent attacks againstCoalition and Iraqi Security Forces, which often had dev-astating effects on Iraqi civilians and significantly damagedthe country’s economic infrastructure. Following the re-turn of sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG)

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on June 28, 2004, Iraqi authorities began to implement anew legal regime and to undertake needed law enforce-ment action to counter terrorist activity. Iraqi Security Forces(including the Police, Border Enforcement, National Guard,and Iraqi Armed Forces) worked closely with the Multi-Na-tional Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) to combat terrorism in Iraq. OnOctober 20, 2004, Iraq’s designation as a state sponsor ofterrorism was rescinded by the United States.

Prior to the IIG, the governing Coalition Provisional Au-thority (CPA) implemented several orders (bindinginstructions or directives that have the force of law) gov-erning the creation of a revised penal code, new policieson border security, management of the court system, andnew security forces. IIG cooperation with MNF-I forceswas enshrined in Article 59 of the Transitional Administra-tive Law (TAL), which established the framework for Iraq’stransition from the CPA through the sovereign IIG and even-tually to a permanent sovereign Iraqi Government. TheTAL names the Iraqi Armed Forces as the MNF-I’s “princi-pal partner…pursuant to the provisions of United NationsSecurity Council Resolution 1511 (2003)…until the ratifi-cation of a permanent constitution.”

At the United Nations, the IIG consistently responded posi-tively to US requests to co-sponsor the listing of al-Qa’ida-related entities and individuals pursuant to UN Se-curity Council Resolution 1267 and related resolutions thatprovide for the imposition of sanctions against entities asso-ciated with Usama bin Ladin, al-Qa’ida and the Taliban.

Terrorist attacks against a variety of targets increased inlate 2004 in the run-up to the January 30, 2005, electionsfor the Transitional National Assembly and regional par-liamentary bodies.

Jordanian-born Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi and his organiza-tion emerged in 2004 to play a leading role in terrorist

activities in Iraq. In October, the US Government desig-nated Zarqawi’s group, Jama’at al Tawhid wa’al-Jihad, asa Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). In December, thedesignation was amended to include the group’s new nameTanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (or “The al-Qa’ida Jihad Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers”)and other aliases following the “merger” between Zarqawiand Usama bin Ladin’s al-Qa’ida organization. Zarqawiannounced the merger in October, and in December, binLadin endorsed Zarqawi as his official emissary in Iraq.

Zarqawi’s group claimed credit for a number of attackstargeting Coalition and Iraqi forces, as well as civilians,including the October massacre of 49 unarmed, out-of-uniform Iraqi National Guard recruits. Attacks that killedcivilians include the March 2004 bombing of the MountLebanon Hotel, killing seven and injuring over 30, and aDecember 24 suicide bombing using a fuel tanker thatkilled nine and wounded 19 in the al-Mansur district ofBaghdad.

In February, Zarqawi called for a “sectarian war” in Iraq.He and his organization sought to create a rift betweenShi’a and Sunnis through several large terror attacks againstIraqi Shi’a. In March 2004, Zarqawi claimed credit forsimultaneous bomb attacks in Baghdad and Karbala thatkilled over 180 pilgrims as they celebrated the Shi’a festi-val of Ashura. In December, Zarqawi also claimed creditfor a suicide attack at the offices of Abdel Aziz al-Hakim,leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolutionin Iraq (SCIRI), one of Iraq’s largest Shi’a parties, which killed15 and wounded over 50. Zarqawi has denied responsibil-ity for another significant attack that same month in Karbalaand Najaf, two of Shi’a Islam’s most holy cities, which killed62 Iraqi civilians and wounded more than 120.

Terrorists operating in Iraq used kidnapping and targetedassassinations to intimidate Iraqis and third-country na-

Family members grieve for Musab al-Awadi, deputy chief of tribalaffairs at the Iraqi Ministry of Interior, who was shot on July 26 at hisBaghdad home in a drive-by shooting. Two of his bodyguards werealso killed. (AP Photo/Karim Kadim)

One of a series of coordinated explosions that struck major Shiiteshrines in the holy city of Karbala on March 2 during the commemora-tion of Ashura. (AP Photo/APTV)

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tionals working in Iraq as civilian contractors. Nearly 60noncombatant Americans died in terrorist incidents in Iraqin 2004. Other American noncombatants were killed inattacks on coalition military facilities or convoys. In June,Zarqawi claimed credit for the car bomb that killed thechairman of the Coalition-appointed Iraqi GoverningCouncil. In April, an American civilian was kidnappedand later beheaded. One month later, a video of his be-heading was posted on an al-Qa’ida-associated website.Analysts believe that Zarqawi himself killed the Americanas well as a Korean hostage, kidnapped in June. Zarqawitook direct credit for the September kidnapping and mur-der of two American civilians and later their Britishengineer co-worker, and the October murder of a Japa-nese citizen.

In August, the Kurdish terrorist group Ansar al-Sunnaclaimed responsibility for the kidnapping and killing of12 Nepalese construction workers, followed by the mur-

der of two Turkish citizens in September. Many other for-eign civilians have been kidnapped. Some have beenkilled, others released, some remain in their kidnappers’hands, and the fate of others, such as the director of CARE,is unknown.Other terrorist groups were active in Iraq. Ansar al-Sunna,believed to be an offshoot of the Ansar al-Islam groupfounded in Iraq in September 2001, first came to be knownin April 2003 after issuing a statement on the Internet. InFebruary 2004, Ansar al-Sunna claimed responsibility forbomb attacks on the offices of two Kurdish political partiesin Irbil, which killed 109 Iraqi civilians. The Islamic Army inIraq has also claimed responsibility for terrorist actions.

Approximately 3,800 disarmed persons remained residentat the former Mujahedin-e Khalq (MeK) military base atCamp Ashraf; the MeK is a designated US Foreign Terror-ist Organization (FTO). More than 400 membersrenounced membership in the organization in 2004. Forty-

Contributions to Iraq’s Security

Iraq remains the central front for the global war on terrorism. UN Security Council Resolution 1546 authorizes theMultinational Force (MNF) to conduct stability, reconstruction, and humanitarian assistance missions in Iraq. US forces,which numbered approximately 138,000 troops at the end of 2004, and Coalition partners have aggressively targetedterrorists and terrorist networks in Iraq. In preparation for Iraqi elections in January 2005, the MNF launched a series ofoffensive strikes throughout the fall of 2004 in Najaf, Samarra, and Tal Afar. In November 2004, Coalition and Iraqiforces liberated Fallujah from former regime elements and their terrorist allies, specifically members of the al-Zarqawinetwork.

Over the course of 2004, in addition to the United States, 36 countries contributed troops to support Coalition efforts inIraq, including Albania, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, ElSalvador, Estonia, Georgia, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova,Mongolia, The Netherlands, Nicaragua, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Singapore,Slovakia, South Korea, Spain, Thailand, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. Fiji contributed to the security of the UNAssistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) in 2004. As of December 2004, 28 of the 36 troop-contributing countries wereproviding approximately 25,000 troops to MNF operations in Iraq.

On June 28, 2004, NATO Heads of State and Government agreed to assist in the training of Iraqi security forces; the firstmission personnel arrived in Iraq just two days later. The mission’s focus is training and mentoring mid- and senior-levelpersonnel from the Iraqi security forces and assisting with equipping those forces. At year’s end, the NATO ForeignMinisters approved increasing the mission from about 50 personnel to over 300. This will step up the ongoing trainingand mentoring of senior-level Iraq security forces, and lead to establishment of a NATO-supported Iraqi Training, Educa-tion, and Doctrine Center near Baghdad in 2005. Though distinct from the MNF’s Security Transition Command-Iraq(MNSTC-I), the NATO training mission shares the same commander in a “dual-hatted” arrangement, which facilitatesclose coordination of the two complementary efforts. The NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) continues the signifi-cant efforts of the international community to develop Iraqi security forces that can provide security for Iraq. Bulgaria,Canada, Hungary, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States all con-tributed personnel to the NTM-I during 2004.

Donor governments other than the United States pledged $8 billion for the reconstruction of Iraq, in addition to at least$5.5 billion in lending by the IMF and World Bank. Contributors of financial or in-kind assistance included: Australia,Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, theEuropean Commission, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Jordan, Iceland, India, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kuwait,Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines,Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thai-land, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and Vietnam.

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one additional defectors elected to return to Iran, and an-other two hundred were awaiting ICRC assistance forvoluntary repatriation to Iran at the end of the year. PKK/KADEK/Kongra Gel, a designated foreign terrorist group,maintains an estimated 3,000 to 3,500 armed militants innorthern Iraq, according to Turkish Government sourcesand NGOs. In the summer of 2004, PKK/KADEK/KongraGel renounced its self-proclaimed cease-fire and threat-ened to renew its separatist struggle in both Turkey’sSoutheast and urban centers. Turkish press subsequentlyreported multiple incidents in the Southeast of PKK/KADEK/Kongra Gel terrorist actions or clashes between Turkish se-curity forces and PKK/KADEK/Kongra Gel militants.

Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza

Israel maintained staunch support for US-ledcounterterrorism efforts in 2004. Palestinian terroristgroups conducted a large number of attacks in Israel, theWest Bank, and Gaza Strip in 2004. HAMAS, PalestinianIslamic Jihad (PIJ), the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, and thePopular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) — allUS-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations — were re-sponsible for most of the attacks, which included suicidebombings, shootings, and mortar and rocket firings againstcivilian and military targets. Terrorist attacks in 2004 killedalmost 100 people (mostly Israelis, as well as a number offoreigners, including one US citizen), a decrease from thealmost 200 people killed in 2003.

The October 15, 2003, attack on a US diplomatic convoyin Gaza that killed three Americans is the most lethal at-tack ever directly targeting US interests in Israel, the WestBank, or Gaza. The Popular Resistance Committees (PRC),a loose association of Palestinians with ties to various Pal-estinian militant organizations such as HAMAS, PIJ, andFatah, claimed responsibility, although that claim was laterrescinded. Official investigations continued and resultedin the arrests of four suspects. A Palestinian civil courtordered the four suspects freed on March 14, citing a lackof evidence. Palestinian Authority (PA) Chairman Arafatrescinded the order and kept the suspects in custody untilPalestinian gunmen attacked the Gaza prison and releasedthe four suspects on April 24. Since the April 24 incident,the PA has failed to re-arrest the four suspects or to iden-tify and bring to justice the perpetrators of the October2003 attack.

Palestinian terrorist groups in Israel, the West Bank, andGaza continue to focus their attention on the Palestinians’historical conflict with Israel, attacking Israel and Israeliinterests within Israel and the Palestinian territories, ratherthan engaging in operations worldwide.

Israel employed a variety of military operations in itscounterterrorism efforts. Israeli forces launched frequent raidsthroughout the West Bank and Gaza, conducted targetedkillings of suspected Palestinian terrorists, destroyed homes— including those of families of suicide bombers — im-

posed strict and widespread closures and curfews in Pales-tinian areas, and continued construction of an extensivesecurity barrier in the West Bank. Israeli counterterrorismmeasures appear to have reduced the lethality of attacks;continuing attacks and credible threats of attacks, however,show that the terrorist groups remained potent.

Israel also took action in February to block what it labeledterrorist funding in two Palestinian banks. The Israeli De-fense Forces (IDF) and Shin Bet raided the West Bank officesof the Arab Bank and the Cairo-Amman Bank, seizing al-most $9 million in cash from 310 accounts. Israeli lawdoes not allow seizure of funds via correspondent accountsin Israel, and the Israeli Government claimed that the PAhad failed to act on earlier intelligence. PA officials as-serted that the funds belonged to reputable clients, withno connection to terrorism. The funds remain seized byorder of an Israeli court.

HAMAS was particularly active in 2004, carrying out at-tacks that included shootings, suicide bombings, andstandoff mortar and rocket attacks against civilian and mili-tary targets, many of them joint operations with othermilitant organizations. HAMAS was responsible for thedeadliest attack of the year in Israel — the August 31 doublesuicide bombing of two buses in Beersheva that killed 16people and wounded 100. HAMAS was also responsiblefor an increase in Qassam rocket attacks. A rocket attackon Sderot on June 28 was the first fatal attack against Is-raelis using Qassam rockets. Two Israelis died in the attack.In September, two Israeli children were killed in Sderotfrom another Qassam rocket attack. In response to thecontinued Qassam rocket fire, the IDF launched a three-week operation on September 28, in which 130 Palestinians(among them 68 HAMAS and Palestine Islamic Jihad mili-tants) and five Israelis died, according to press reports.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)was active in 2004. The group was responsible for theNovember 1 suicide bombing at the Carmel Market in TelAviv, which killed three people and wounded 30. Pales-

Israeli police officers examine the scene of a double-bombing in thesouthern Israeli city of Beersheba, August 31. (AP Photo)

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tinian Islamic Jihad conducted numerous attacks on Is-raeli settlements and checkpoints, including the April 3attacks on the Avnei Hafetz and Enav settlements in theWest Bank which killed one Israeli and seriously woundeda child.

Fatah’s militant wing, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, con-ducted numerous shooting attacks and suicide bombingsin 2004. It was responsible for two suicide bus bombingsin Jerusalem during January and February. The attackskilled 21 people and wounded over 110. Al-Aqsa alsoclaimed responsibility along with HAMAS for the March14 suicide attack in the port of Ashdod. The double sui-cide attack killed ten people and wounded at least 15.The group also claimed responsibility for a suicide bomberattack which killed two people and wounded 17 at a check-point near Jerusalem on August 11. On May 2, Palestiniangunmen belonging to the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade and PIJshot and killed an Israeli settler and her four daughters inthe Gaza Strip. The group also claimed responsibility for asuicide bomber attack which killed two people and wounded17 at a checkpoint near Jerusalem on August 11.

Lebanese Hizballah remained a serious threat to the se-curity of the region, continuing its call for the destructionof Israel and using Lebanese territory as a staging groundfor terrorist operations. Lebanese Hizballah was also in-volved in providing material support to Palestinian terrorist

groups to augment their capacity and lethality in conduct-ing attacks against Israel.In December, Israel convicted and sentenced an Israeliman for membership in the “New Jewish Underground,”a terrorist organization that aimed to carry out attacks onArab civilians. On September 29, a group of five Israelisettlers attacked and seriously wounded two US citizens,members of an NGO, who were escorting Palestinian chil-dren to school near Hebron. As of the end of 2004, theIsraeli police had not arrested those responsible.

The Palestinian Authority’s efforts to thwart terrorist op-erations were minimal in 2004. The PA security servicesremained fragmented and ineffective, hobbled by corrup-tion, infighting, and poor leadership. Following theNovember 11 death of PA Chairman Arafat, Prime Minis-ter Ahmed Qurei and then PLO Chairman MahmoudAbbas engaged in an effort to convince militant Palestin-ian groups to agree to a cease-fire. Cease-fire talks wereinconclusive by the end of 2004. Palestinian officials, in-cluding Mahmoud Abbas, and some Palestinianintellectuals have called for an end to armed attacks againstIsraelis.

Jordan

Jordan continued its strong support for the global war onterrorism in 2004. Jordanian security services disruptednumerous terrorist plots during the year, including severalthat targeted US interests in Jordan. It has aggressivelypursued the network of fugitive Jordanian terrorist AbuMus’ab al-Zarqawi, deemed responsible for numerousplots and attacks in Jordan and Iraq. In the most seriousplot disrupted to date in Jordan, security services in Aprilarrested Zarqawi affiliates in the advanced stages of a planto launch truck bombs against Jordanian Government tar-gets and the US Embassy in Amman. In an unprecedentedmove, the Jordanian Government aired the plotters’ con-fessions on state-run television, emphasizing their plansto kill thousands, including Jordanian citizens. In late April,Government officials, including Queen Rania, joined thou-sands of Jordanians in a street march against terrorism.The Government publicly condemned terrorist acts through-out the world. King Abdullah was an outspoken critic ofterrorism and Islamic extremism, and in September directedreligious authorities to deliver the “Amman Message,” a dec-laration that rejects religious extremism and terrorism, andseeks to promote moderate Islam and dialogue.

Jordan’s State Security court, which has purview over ter-rorism-related cases, maintained a heavy caseload overthe year, most of which involved Zarqawi-affiliated sus-pects. The Court in April sentenced eight men to death,including Zarqawi and five others in absentia, for themurder of USAID official Laurence Foley in front of hisAmman home on October 28, 2002. The Governmentannounced in July that Muammar al-Jaghbir, sentenced todeath in absentia for his role in the Foley murder, was in

Britain’s Prime Minister Tony Blair meets US Secretary of StateCondoleezza Rice for bilateral talks at the “Supporting the PalestinianAuthority” meeting in London on March 1, 2005. (AP Photo/John DMcHugh, Pool)

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Jordanian custody and would be re-tried according to Jor-danian law. In May, the Court found guilty three Jordanians— including one of Zarqawi’s nephews — for plotting at-tacks against US and Israeli tourists in the country. In June,the Court sentenced Ahmad al-Riyati and eight men be-ing tried in absentia (including Zarqawi and reputed Ansaral-Islam leader Mullah Krekar) to prison for plotting againstUS interests. In October, the Court sentenced Bilal al-Hiyari, a Zarqawi fundraiser, to six months in jail for hisactivities. It also indicted suspected Zarqawi affiliateMiqdad al-Dabbas for planning attacks against Jordanianinterests in Iraq. In November, the Court began the trial ofthe 13 suspects accused in the April plot, includingZarqawi in absentia.

In one of the few non-Zarqawi related terrorism cases, theState Security Court in September indicted two Jordani-ans for plotting to attack foreign diplomats in Amman.Separately, the Court in November acquitted four men ofcharges they plotted attacks against US and Israeli targetsin Jordan, although they were sentenced to one year in jailfor possession of an automatic weapon. In late December,the court convicted 11 men on weapons charges in a plotagainst the US Embassy and US military forces in Jordan.

The State Security Court also moved forward on other long-standing terrorism cases. In June, the Court affirmed itsguilty verdict (first handed down in September 2000)against ten men accused of plotting attacks during Jordan’smillennial celebrations, sentencing two to death. In Oc-tober, Jordan’s Court of Cassation, which hears appealsfrom the State Security Court, upheld the lower court’sguilty verdict of US-Jordanian citizen Ra’ed Hijazi, one ofthose sentenced to death for his role in the plot, but com-muted the death sentence, sentencing him to 20 years injail with labor. The decision is final, and no more appealswill be heard.

Border security remained a top concern of Jordanian offi-cials in 2004, as the Jordanian Government continued tointerdict weapons and potential infiltrators at its borders.In July, Jordanian border officials intercepted and killedarmed individuals attempting to infiltrate northern Israelfrom Jordan. Jordanian border officials allegedly inter-cepted suspects involved in the April Zarqawi plot as theytried to enter Jordan from Syria. In November, a terroristdriving a vehicle loaded with explosives tried to cross theIraqi-Jordanian border, but was stopped before the explo-sives detonated.

Kuwait

Kuwait continued to engage with the US Government andits neighbors to thwart domestic threats to Kuwaiti andforeign interests. It also continued to provide significantsupport to US efforts to stem terror financing. Followingthe four terror attacks carried out against Operation IraqiFreedom and Coalition forces in Kuwait between Octo-

ber 2002 and December 2003 that resulted in the deathof one US Marine and a US defense contractor, the Gov-ernment of Kuwait sought to strengthen domesticcounterterrorism efforts, but the potential for further at-tacks remains a serious concern.

The Kuwaiti Government has taken significant measuresto bolster security and enhance protection for Coalitionforces transiting Kuwait. Kuwait responded quickly to USconcerns about a possible terror attack in December 2004.Kuwaiti officials have heightened security along their bor-der with Iraq to prevent terrorist infiltration and have alsoworked with Syria and Iran to develop procedures to in-crease intelligence sharing and enhance customs andborder-monitoring cooperation. In July, Syria repatriatedto Kuwait seven people recruited to carry out suicide bombattacks in Iraq. Kuwait subsequently arrested a dozen Ku-waitis reportedly being trained to attack US and Coalitionforces in Iraq. By the end of 2004, all but two of them hadbeen released on bail.

The Kuwaiti Government was able to identify and arrestterror suspects in some cases, but was on occasion un-able to secure convictions, citing a lack of evidence foruse in court. Those actually sentenced to jail on terrorismcharges often had their sentences reduced.

As part of its campaign against terror, the Governmentformed in October a ministerial committee chaired by theMinister of Islamic Endowments and Islamic Affairs to de-velop strategies to combat terror and extremists. InNovember, the Government forbade Kuwaiti ministries andreligious institutions from extending official invitations to26 Saudi clerics who reportedly signed a statement in sup-port of jihad in Iraq. No entry ban was imposed, however,and at least one cleric visited the homes of some Mem-bers of Parliament and other private gatherings, sparkingwidespread public criticism of the cleric’s presence. TheIslamic political bloc in the Kuwaiti Parliament has beencritical of the Government’s methods in confronting anddealing with Islamic extremists.

Lebanon

Lebanon remains host to numerous US-designated terror-ist groups. Beirut continued to demonstrate anunwillingness to take steps against Lebanese Hizballah,Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Popular Front for theLiberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), theAbu Nidal organization (ANO), and HAMAS. In contrast,the Lebanese Government moved vigorously through le-gal and operational initiatives against Sunni extremistgroups, including those similar in ideology to al-Qa’ida.

The Lebanese Government recognized as legitimate resis-tance groups organizations that target Israel and permittedthem to maintain offices in Beirut. Lebanon also exemptswhat it terms “legal resistance” groups, including Leba-

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nese Hizballah, from money laundering and terrorism fi-nancing laws. Lebanese leaders, including President EmileLahud, reject assessments of Lebanese Hizballah’s globalterror activities, though the group’s leadership has openlyadmitted to providing material support for terror attacksinside Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. Hizballah, whichholds 12 seats in the Lebanese parliament, is generallyseen as a part of Lebanese society and politics.The Lebanese Government has failed to comply with nu-merous UN resolutions to extend sole and effectiveauthority over all Lebanese territory. The Lebanese secu-rity forces remain unable or unwilling to enter Palestinianrefugee camps, the operational nodes of terrorist groupssuch as Asbat al-Ansar and other Palestinian terror groups,and to deploy forces into areas dominated by LebaneseHizballah, including the Beka’a Valley, southern Beirut,and the south of the country up to the UN-demarcatedBlue Line.

Syria’s predominant role in Lebanon facilitates the Leba-nese Hizballah and Palestinian terrorist presence in portionsof Lebanon. In addition, Syrian and Iranian support for Leba-nese Hizballah activities in southern Lebanon, and forPalestinian terrorist groups throughout the country, help pro-mote an environment where terrorist elements flourish.

The Lebanese and Syrian Governments have not fully com-plied with UN Security Council Resolution 1559, whichcalls for, among other things, respect for the sovereigntyand political independence of Lebanon, and the disarm-ing and disbandment of all Lebanese and non-Lebanesemilitias. Lebanese Hizballah militiamen operate freely insouthern Lebanon without interference from Lebanesesecurity forces. Lebanese Government officials haveopenly and publicly condoned Lebanese Hizballah op-erations against Israel. Lebanese authorities furthermaintain that the Government’s provision of amnesty toLebanese individuals involved in acts of violence duringthe civil war prevents Beirut from prosecuting many casesof concern to the United States, including the hijacking in1985 of TWA 847 and the murder of a US Navy diver onthe flight, and the abduction, torture, and murder of UShostages from 1984 to 1991. US courts have brought in-dictments against Lebanese Hizballah operativesresponsible for a number of those crimes, and some ofthese defendants remain prominent terrorist figures. De-spite evidence to the contrary, the Lebanese Governmenthas insisted that Imad Mugniyah, wanted in connectionwith the TWA hijacking and other terrorist acts, who wasplaced on the FBI’s list of most-wanted terrorists in 2001,is no longer in Lebanon. The Government’s legal systemalso has failed to hold a hearing on the prosecutor’s ap-peal in the case of Tawfic Muhammad Farroukh, who —despite the evidence against him — was found not guiltyof murder for his role in the killings of US AmbassadorFrancis Meloy and two others in 1976.

Lebanon’s Special Investigation Commission (SIC), an in-

dependent legal entity with judicial status empowered toinvestigate suspicious transactions, investigated over 176cases involving allegations of money laundering and ter-rorist financing activities in 2004.

Lebanon has taken other counterterrorism measures in2004, primarily directed against Sunni extremists. InMarch, a Lebanese military tribunal sentenced eight al-leged Sunni extremists, for periods varying from five to 20years imprisonment with hard labor, who were accusedof carrying out terrorist attacks against foreign interests inLebanon (including bombings of McDonalds and PizzaHut restaurants) and plotting to assassinate the US Am-bassador. Lebanese security services, in concert withItalian and Syrian authorities, rounded up members of aSunni extremist cell in September that was allegedly plan-ning to bomb the Italian and Ukrainian Embassies, andassassinate Western diplomats. The alleged cell leaderlater died in Lebanese custody. In October, a Lebanesemilitary tribunal found guilty and sentenced two peopleto imprisonment with hard labor on charges of bringingan explosives device to US Embassy premises. One wassentenced for seven years and the other for three years.

Morocco

The Government of Morocco continues to be a staunchally in the war on terror. King Mohammed VI has been asteadfast supporter of efforts to confront terrorism, inparticular by promoting internal reforms designed to com-bat sources of terrorism over the long-term. Towards thisend, during 2004 Morocco implemented reforms to theMinistry of Islamic Affairs to promote religious modera-tion and tolerance. Domestically, Morocco’s historicalrecord of strong vigilance against terrorist activity re-mained unwavering.

Following the May 16, 2003, Casablanca attacks in whichsuicide bombers from the “Salafiya Jihadiya” group killed42 and wounded approximately 100 others, the Govern-ment arrested several thousand people, prosecuted 1,200and sentenced about 900 for various terrorism-relatedcrimes. The Minister of Justice announced that these ar-rests represented approximately 90 percent of those soughtby the Government. The remaining ten percent were sub-jects of international arrest warrants. A spate of May16-related terrorist arrests since June 2004, however, inAgadir, Beni Mellal, Fes, Khourigba, and Meknes suggeststhat the number of at-large suspects has likely decreasedfurther. The Government also aggressively pursued SalafiyaJihadiya terrorist cells in several Moroccan cities.

The al-Qa’ida-affiliated Moroccan Islamic CombatantGroup (GICM) continues to pose a threat in Morocco aswell as in Europe. Moroccan extremists, associated withthe GICM, were among those implicated in the March 11terrorist attacks in Madrid.

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Oman

Oman continued to provide support for the global war onterrorism, and has been responsive to requests for Coali-tion military and civilian support, making arrests as wellas working with its neighbors to improve cross-border se-curity. During the last three years, the Government ofOman has implemented a tight anti-money launderingregime, including surveillance systems designed to iden-tify unusual transactions, with plans to require financialinstitutions to verify customer identities using sophisticatedbiometric technology. Omani financial authorities havealso demonstrated their commitment to freeze the assetsof any UN-listed individual found in Oman.

Qatar

The Government of Qatar provided the United States withsignificant counterterrorism support during 2004, build-ing on the bilateral cooperation it has maintained sinceSeptember 11, 2001.

No terrorist attacks occurred in Qatar in 2004, and theQatari security services had some successes against ter-rorist targets. In March, Qatar passed the CombatingTerrorism Law. The law defines terrorism and terrorist acts,lists specific punishments for terrorist crimes to includethe death penalty, provides measures against terrorist fi-nancing or fundraising activities, and gives the Governmentsweeping authority to take action against terrorist crimesand activities. The law incorporates existing laws such asQatar’s penal code, criminal procedures code, judicial law,law on weapons, ammunitions and explosives, and theanti-money laundering law.

In March, the Government passed a new law to establishthe Qatar Authority for Charitable Works, which monitorsall domestic and international charitable activities. TheSecretary General of the Authority approves internationalfund transfers by the charities. The Authority has primaryresponsibility for monitoring overseas charitable, devel-opmental, and humanitarian projects, and is to reportannually to concerned Government ministries on the sta-tus of all projects. The Authority was still in the process ofdeveloping concrete measures to exert more control overdomestic charity collection.

In October, the Government appointed a member of theruling al-Thani family as director of its financial intelli-gence unit (FIU). The FIU is responsible for reviewing allfinancial transaction reports, identifying suspicious trans-actions and financial activities of concern, and ensuringthat all Government ministries and agencies have proce-dures and standards to ensure proper oversight of financialtransactions.

Saudi Arabia

In 2004, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia continued to sup-port the global war on terror. Terrorists killed dozens offoreigners and citizens, including six Americans, in attacksthroughout the country. The attacks consisted ofkidnappings, armed assaults, targeted shootings, bomb-ings, and beheadings. In the first half of 2004, the al-Qa’idapresence in Saudi Arabia kept up a steady tempo of at-tacks, surpassing the number and lethality of attacksconducted in the previous year. In the second half of theyear, facing concerted pressure from Saudi authorities, thenetwork appeared to be largely on the defensive, and didnot mount a major operation until the December 6 attackon the US Consulate General in Jeddah. Five foreign na-tionals — four locally engaged staff and one local guard— working at the Consulate were killed. This attack waslater claimed by “al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula,”which also claimed credit for other deadly attacks againstAmerican citizens in 2004. Two car bombs, one aimed atthe Ministry of Interior, exploded December 29, killingone passer-by and injuring several others.

In response to the wave of terrorist violence in the King-dom, the Saudi Government aggressively pursued terroristsand achieved successes, including the capture or killingof all but seven of the Kingdom’s 26 most-wanted terror-ists and most of the known terrorist leadership in SaudiArabia. Saudi forces launched dozens of security sweepsthroughout the country, dismantling several al-Qa’ida cells,some of which were directly involved in attacks againstUS citizens and interests. More than thirty members ofthe Saudi security forces lost their lives in this campaign.

Saudi Arabia continued a public outreach campaign inthe war against terror. As custodian of the two holymosques in Mecca and Medina, the Saudi Governmentworked to delegitimize the inappropriate use of Islam tojustify terrorist attacks. During the year, Saudi authoritiesaired confessions of militants and interviews with fathersof wanted men as part of a campaign to rally the publicagainst radicals who carried out attacks in the Kingdom.In June, the Grand Mufti Shaykh Abd al-Aziz Al al-Shaykhissued a fatwa condemning terrorist acts and calling oncitizens to report “saboteurs and anyone planning or pre-paring to carry out terrorist acts to the concernedauthorities.” Also in June, six senior religious leaders is-sued a statement denouncing terrorist attacks as “heinouscrimes.” A November “fatwa” issued by 26 radical Saudiclerics, who called on Iraqis to resist Coalition forces inIraq by force, was rebutted by senior members of the Saudiofficial religious establishment, including the Grand Mufti.The Government also focused on internal social, politi-cal, and economic reforms as a method to reduce theappeal of radical ideologies. The media reported widelyon each of the attacks conducted by terrorists in the King-dom and the subsequent Government crackdown, leadingto widespread public recognition that terrorism is a seri-

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ous threat in the Kingdom, not only to foreigners, but toSaudis as well.

During the year, the Government launched intensivesearches and counterterrorism sweeps in the country, of-ten involving thousands of Saudi security personnel. OnJune 23, Crown Prince Abdullah issued an ultimatum toterrorists: surrender in 30 days or suffer the full force ofthe state. The ultimatum prompted several notable extrem-ists to turn themselves in, including one terrorist suspecton Saudi Arabia’s 26 most-wanted list. On June 29, thePrince Nayif Security Academy began training employeesof the national oil company (Saudi ARAMCO) oncounterterrorism measures. On the same day, the Minis-try of Interior announced a 60-day pardon for persons tosurrender unlicensed weapons.

In July, reporting on the results of a mutual evaluation con-ducted in 2003, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)concluded that Saudi Arabia’s financial regime met thegeneral obligations of the organization’s recommendationsfor combating money laundering and financing of terror-ism. The Government continued to take steps to makeoperational a financial intelligence unit (FIU) establishedin 2003 under anti-money laundering and antiterrorist fi-nancing law. Concerned about the possible misuse ofcharitable organizations for terrorist purposes, the Gov-ernment issued a set of bylaws for the Commission forRelief and Charitable Work Abroad, designed to overseeall Saudi charities. In this regard, the Government orderedthe closure of the al-Haramain Foundation, a Saudi char-ity with a number of overseas offices that had beendesignated by the UN Sanctions Committee for providingsupport for terrorist activities. The Government also main-tained its prohibition, imposed in 2003, on the collectionof cash donations at mosques or commercial establish-ments and its restrictions on the bank accounts of charities,including prohibiting fund transfers out of the country. Themedia reported during the year that Saudi banks froze morethan 250,000 accounts for noncompliance with anti-money laundering and terrorist finance laws. During the

year, the Saudi Government requested that the UN 1267Sanctions Committee add entities and individuals sus-pected of terrorist activities or of supporting terrorists toits consolidated list.

Tunisia

The Government of Tunisia publicly supported the inter-national coalition against terrorism and respondedpositively to US requests for information and assistance inblocking financial assets. Tunisia’s active stance againstterrorism has been reinforced by its own experience withinternational terrorism. In April 2002, a suicide truck bombdetonated outside the el-Ghriba synagogue on the islandof Djerba, killing at least twenty.

The Government of Tunisia has taken steps to strengthencounterterrorism laws. The Tunisian legislature in Decem-ber 2003 passed a comprehensive law to “support theinternational effort to combat terrorism and money laun-dering.” The first prosecution of suspected terrorists underthe law’s provisions commenced in February 2004. Tuni-sia has consistently emphasized the threat that terrorismposes to security and stability in the region. Further, it hasencouraged Libya to abandon terrorism. Domestically, theTunisian Government has prohibited the formation of re-ligious-based political parties and groups, which it believespose a terrorist threat.

United Arab Emirates

In 2004, the United Arab Emirates continued to providestaunch assistance and cooperation to the global waragainst terrorism. In July, late President Sheikh Zayed is-sued an antiterrorism law defining terrorist crimes andpunishment, and specifically criminalizing the funding ofterrorist organizations. In December, the United Statesand the Emirate of Dubai signed a Container Security Ini-tiative Statement of Principles aimed at screeningUS-bound containerized cargo transiting Dubai’s ports.The UAE also undertook several security measures alongits land border and at sea to deter terrorists from reachingUAE soil.

In October, the UAE hosted an international conferenceon Islam intended to encourage moderation and condemnterrorism and extremism. The conference included ses-sions by prominent international and Emirate Muslimreligious figures, and called for moderate Islamic preach-ing, increased training of imams, and reforms of the Islamicstudies education curriculum.

In suppressing terrorist financing, the UAE Central Bankcontinued to enforce anti-money laundering regulationsaggressively. Tightened oversight and reporting require-ments for domestic financial markets resulted in a strongerlegal and regulatory framework to deter abuse of the UAEfinancial system. The Central Bank has provided training

The Ministry of the Interior was damaged by an explosion when terror-ists launched coordinated car bombings and battled security forces inRiyadh on December 29. (AP Photo/STR)

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programs to financial institutions on money launderingand terrorist financing. In April, the Central Bank hostedthe Second International Hawala Conference, which wasattended by 375 participants from around the world todiscuss how to better monitor money flows occurring out-side the formal banking structure. (Hawalas are informalmoney remittance and exchange businesses common inthe Middle East and South Asia.) The conference includedinteractive panels, overviews of anti-money launderingsystems in various other countries, and presentations frommultilateral organizations such as the International Mon-etary Fund, World Bank, FATF, and the United NationsOffice on Drugs and Crime. The Central Bank has alsoinvestigated financial transactions and frozen accounts inresponse to UN resolutions and internal investigations,and continued the process of registering hawala dealers.

Yemen

In 2004, the Republic of Yemen continued to provide sup-port for the global war on terrorism and took action againstal-Qa’ida and local extremists, arresting several individu-als suspected of having al-Qa’ida ties and prosecuting theperpetrators of several terrorist acts.

On August 28, the Sana’a Primary Court convicted 14 al-Qa’ida members for the October 2002 attack on the Frenchtanker M/V Limburg, the murder of a Ministry of Interiorofficer during the November 2002 attack on an oil com-pany helicopter, a plot to attack the Civil Aviation andMeteorology Authority, a plot to attack four foreign em-bassies in Sana’a and to kill the US Ambassador, and forforging documents for the purpose of carrying out terror-ism. Two defendants received death sentences, one inabsentia. The other defendants were sentenced to prisonterms ranging from three to ten years. Under Yemeni law,both defendants and the prosecution have the right to ap-peal rulings. All defendants have appealed their sentences,as has the prosecution, the latter arguing that some of thesentences were too light. The appeals process is expectedto conclude in early 2005.

On September 10, the Sana’a Primary Court concludedthe trial of five defendants for the October 12, 2000, at-tack on the USS Cole in Aden that killed 17 US sailors andinjured 35. This included suspects Jamal al-Badawi andFahad al-Quso, who were re-apprehended on March 10by Yemeni authorities following their escape from an Adenprison in April 2003. On September 29, the court issuedtwo death sentences for the ringleaders of the bombing(al-Badawi and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri in absentia). Threeothers were convicted and sentenced to prison terms rang-ing from five to ten years for their roles in the attack. Thesecases were under appeal by both the Government and thedefense at the end of 2004.

The Yemeni Supreme Court heard appeals on the deathsentences of Abed Abdulrazak al-Kamel and Ali AhmedMohamed Jarallah for the December 30, 2002, shootingsof three American citizens in Jibla. No final decision hasbeen issued in these cases.

Yemen has expressed a willingness to fight internationalterrorists by denying them the use of its territorial seas andports. Over the past year, Yemen has increased its mari-time security capabilities. The US Government providedextensive training and eight boats to the Yemeni CoastGuard, which is now a visible patrolling force along thecoastline. Coast Guard operations are expanding to stemthe use of Yemen as a way station for smuggling of per-sons, drugs, weapons, and explosives.

Land border security along Yemen’s extensive frontier withSaudi Arabia remains a major concern. In February, Yemenand Saudi Arabia agreed to bolster cooperation in orderto combat the cross-border smuggling of arms and people.The two countries also agreed to establish joint patrolsand increase monitoring.

The Government’s capacity for stemming terrorism financ-ing remains limited. In February, the UN 1267 SanctionsCommittee designated prominent Yemeni sheikh and op-position Islah party leader Abd al-Majid al-Zindani for hisassociation with al-Qa’ida. The Yemeni Government hastaken no action to bar his travel or to freeze his assets incompliance with its UN obligations, and Zindani contin-ues to appear prominently at public events.

Yemen utilized its Islamic Dialogue Committee, headedby a leading judge, to continue its dialogue with detain-ees arrested for connections to terrorist groups andextremist elements. In a 2004 Ramadan amnesty theGovernment released over 100 security detainees, claimingthat they had been rehabilitated and had made commit-ments to uphold the Yemeni constitution and laws, the rightsof non-Muslims, and the inviolability of foreign interests.

Several terrorist organizations continued to maintain apresence in Yemen throughout 2004. HAMAS and Pales-tinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) are recognized as legalorganizations, and HAMAS maintains offices in Yemen.Neither organization has engaged in any known terroristactivities in Yemen, and PIJ does not have any known op-erational presence. HAMAS conducts extensive fundraisingthrough mosques and other charitable organizationsthroughout the country. While al-Qa’ida’s operationalstructure in Yemen has been weakened and dispersed,concerns remain about the organization’s attempts to re-constitute operational cells in Yemen.

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South Asia Overview

South Asia continued in 2004 to be a major theater of theglobal war on terrorism, and partner countries achievedseveral notable successes in countering terrorist groups.Afghanistan ratified a new constitution in January, andHamid Karzai became the country’s first popularly electedleader in October’s presidential election. The Afghan Na-tional Army (ANA), while still limited in its capabilities,has lent support to US-led Coalition forces against anti-government elements in the country’s southern and easternregions. The number of trained Afghan National Police(ANP) also continued to grow, playing an increasingly im-portant role in deterring terrorist and extremist activity.

Security remained a key concern in the region. Insurgentand terrorist elements in Afghanistan continued to targetinternational military forces, international and non-gov-ernmental organizations (IOs and NGOs), the AfghanGovernment, and Afghan civilians. The Coalition soughtto address security concerns by extending its activities intothe Afghan provinces, aided by a growing network of pro-vincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). For its part, theNATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)expanded into northern Afghanistan and worked on plansto extend its reach into the country’s western regions.

Pakistan also achieved notable gains in the war on terror-ism. Assassination attempts against key Governmentofficials and numerous terrorist attacks were thwarted, asPakistan continued its close cooperation with the UnitedStates. Counterterrorist activities and military operationsin the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, where elementsof al-Qa’ida and other groups continue to hide, disruptedterrorist command and control capabilities and killed orcaptured hundreds of militants. Authorities continued toarrest members of al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groupsthroughout the country while providing many new leadsfor future investigations and arrests.

India joined the United States in a renewed commitment tocooperate in a broadening range of counterterrorism mea-sures. India suffered hundreds of attacks from both foreignand domestic terrorists this year, but security forces wereincreasingly effective, particularly in Kashmir, where thelevel of terrorist violence declined. The Indian Governmentcooperated with both Nepal and Bhutan in these countries’counterterrorist efforts. The Indian legislature modified itscounterterrorism law regime in December, removing con-troversial elements while maintaining or strengtheningprovisions essential to fighting the war on terror.

Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh experienced mixed re-sults in 2004. Violence in Sri Lanka increased as fightingbroke out between differing factions of the Liberation Ti-gers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). While the ceasefire betweenthe Government and the LTTE was generally observed,the LTTE repeatedly struck at dissident members of theTamil community. Both sides failed to resume the nego-tiations broken off by the LTTE in 2003, but the December26 tsunami may have an impact on reconciliation in 2005.In Nepal, the Maoist insurgency continued, accompaniedby increased anti-US and anti-Indian rhetoric. The Maoiststhreatened numerous companies, shut down business op-erations, and called for several general strikes throughoutthe country. They continued to extort money from Nepalisand foreign tourists. In September, suspected Maoistsbombed the American Center in Kathmandu. Political vio-lence increased in Bangladesh, where political ralliessuffered from attacks with explosives. The United Statesconcentrated its assistance on strengthening Bangladesh’sweak institutions and laws to combat terror.

Afghanistan

Afghanistan made great strides towards building democ-racy and rebuilding the country in 2004. In January, Afghandelegates ratified a new national constitution that em-braced democracy and pluralism in the context of Afghan

US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Christina Rocca(right) meets with Sri Lankan President Kumaratunga (left) in Colombo,Sri Lanka, on May 14, stating that Tamil Tiger rebels should disarm,renounce terrorism and enter into peace negotiations to end the islandnation’s civil war. (AP Photo/Eranga Jayawardena)

Pakistan’s six most wanted terrorists, including a top al-Qa’ida operativeaccused of masterminding two attempts to assassinate PresidentMusharraf. (AP Photo/Anjum Naveed)

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Contributions to Afghanistan’s Security

Security Operations

During 2004, US military, Coalition, and NATO forces conducted a wide range of security operations throughoutAfghanistan. In southern, southeastern, and eastern Afghanistan, US and Coalition forces continued combat operationsagainst al-Qa’ida terrorists, anti-Coalition militias, and Taliban insurgents. Coalition operations included provincialreconstruction teams (PRTs), which provide security and reconstruction assistance to the Afghan Government; trainingfor the Afghan National Army; security for the Afghan presidential election; and a range of combat operations. TheNATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), meanwhile, conducted ongoing security operations in Kabuland northern Afghanistan. NATO also runs PRTs in northern Afghanistan.

Anti-government activity targeting Afghan security forces, civic leaders, and international and national aid workerscontinued to destabilize the southern and eastern regions of the country. The frequency of attacks rose steadily until theweek of the Presidential election in October, but tapered off with the onset of winter. This gradual improvement at theend of the year was reflective of Afghanistan’s slow but steady progress back from 25 years of Soviet-era invasion andoccupation, civil war, and Taliban misrule. Presidential elections were held in October, with President Karzai winninga majority of votes cast. Over 10 million Afghans registered to vote, and over 8 million cast ballots on election day;more than 40 percent of whom were women. The success of the election was a blow to the Taliban insurgency, whichproved unable to significantly disrupt the process or intimidate voters from participating. Parliamentary elections arescheduled for September 2005 to complete the political roadmap laid out by the Bonn Process.

Afghanistan remains a security challenge. The Taliban and associated elements, such as those loyal to former primeminister and mujahideen commander Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (a group often referred to as Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin, orHIG), regrouped in 2003 and continued in 2004 to conduct low-level insurgency in the “Pashtun belt,” primarilyremote rural areas of southern, southeastern, and eastern Afghanistan dominated by Pashtun tribes. They use clan andfamily ties, propaganda, violence, weak national government control, religious fundamentalism, and intimidation tomaintain a foothold in several provinces. For aid and support, the Taliban and others rely on sympathizers in thesouthern, southeastern, and eastern provinces, and on supporters in the largely autonomous Federally AdministeredTribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan.

Nations contributing troops to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) efforts in Afghanistan during 2004 included Austra-lia, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Egypt, Estonia, France, Italy, Lithuania, Mongolia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, South Korea, and the United Kingdom. Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, andUzbekistan provided support to OEF troops en route to Afghanistan. Turkmenistan provided support to OEF humanitar-ian efforts. Germany was active in OEF efforts outside of Afghanistan. The Republic of Djibouti hosts OEF Coalitionforces from several countries on a rotating basis, including France, Germany, Spain, Italy, and the United Kingdom, andserves as a refueling point for US military forces in the region. Japan continues to contribute rear-area logistical supportfor maritime interdiction operations.

A number of countries also supported UN-mandated efforts to assist the Afghan Government in maintaining securitythrough troop contributions to NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Countries contributing troops toISAF are Albania, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, TheNetherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and theUnited Kingdom. Tajikistan and Ukraine provided support to ISAF troop contributors.

Reconstruction Assistance

The international community has pledged almost $13 billion in assistance for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Do-nors include the Aga Khan Foundation, Asian Development Bank, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, Denmark,ECHO (Humanitarian Aid Department of the EU), the European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,Hungary, India, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Islamic Development Bank, Japan, Kuwait, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, NewZealand, Norway, the Organization of Islamic Conference, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Russia, SaudiArabia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the UnitedStates, and the World Bank.

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and Islamic traditions. On October 9, over eight millioncitizens defied terrorist and extremist threats and small-scale attacks by voting in Afghanistan’s first democraticpresidential election. Hamid Karzai became the country’sfirst popularly elected leader and was inaugurated asAfghanistan’s president on December 7. Both the electionand inauguration occurred without any major security in-cidents, despite Taliban threats to disrupt the democraticprocess. Other achievements included: the growing ef-fectiveness of the Afghan National Army (ANA), with over18,000 personnel in its ranks; a build-up to 33,000 per-sonnel in the Afghan National Police (ANP); major gainsin the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration(DDR) process; arrests of suspects in the August and Oc-tober Kabul street bombings; and the expansion ofreconstruction efforts. In the coming year, Afghans willface the challenge of building upon these gains, especiallythrough holding parliamentary, provincial, and districtelections.

President Karzai and his Government remained stronglycommitted to the war on terrorism. The ANA stepped upits role alongside the US-led Coalition in fighting insur-gents and terrorists in Afghanistan’s south and east. TheANA and ANP, along with the Coalition and the Interna-tional Security Assistance Force (ISAF), played a key rolein thwarting extremist attempts to disrupt the October presi-dential election. The Afghan people were also instrumental

in thwarting terrorist threats against the election, provid-ing information that in some cases resulted in the discoveryof improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

Terrorist and insurgent elements targeted Afghan Govern-ment, US, Coalition, and ISAF assets in Kabul, as well asin southern and eastern provinces. Four American non-combatants are known to have died in internationalterrorist incidents in Afghanistan in 2004. Terrorists andother extremists hampered reconstruction efforts with at-tacks on NGOs and UN facilities and personnel in anunsuccessful attempt to drive the international commu-nity out of Afghanistan. These elements also targetedAfghan citizens who were trying to participate in theircountry’s political process, in some cases reportedly kill-ing people for possessing voter registration cards. Despitethese concerted efforts, they failed to disrupt the October9 presidential election.

Afghan troops continued to carry out joint operations withCoalition forces against the Taliban, al-Qa’ida, and otheranti-government elements. The Tripartite Commission,formed in 2003 by the United States, Afghanistan, andPakistan, continued to improve the sharing of informationand coordination of border security efforts and to discussother political issues between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Bangladesh

Bangladesh supports the global war on terror but its ability tocombat terrorism is undermined by weak institutions, porousborders, limited law enforcement capabilities, and debilitatingin-fighting between the two major political parties.

Bangladesh’s long tradition of inclusive, moderate Islamis increasingly under threat from extremist alternatives,already offering an attractive breeding ground for politi-cal and sectarian violence. Endemic corruption, poverty,and a stalemated political process could further contrib-ute to the type of instability and widespread frustration

In Kandahar, an Afghan woman shows her voter registration card asshe prepares to vote in Afghanistan’s historic presidential electionOctober 9. (AP Photo/Elizabeth Dalziel)

Afghan President Hamid Karzai takes the oath of office as Afghanistan’sfirst popularly elected president during a ceremony at the PresidentialPalace in Kabul December 7. (AP Photo/Shah Marai, Pool)

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that has elsewhere provided recruits, support, and safehaven to international terrorist groups.

There was an increase in political violence using explosivesin 2004. In May, the British High Commissioner and morethan 70 others were injured in a grenade attack in Sylhet. InAugust, approximately 20 Awami League supporters werekilled, and 200 injured during an attack on the party’s oppo-sition rally in Dhaka.

Bangladesh, with US technical assistance, is strengthen-ing police institutions with a professionalization program,enhancing police and banking capabilities to combat ter-rorist financing, and strengthening border control systemsto detect suspicious travel and improve the integrity ofBangladeshi travel documents. The United States is as-sisting Bangladesh in developing new, stronger laws toenhance banking oversight and enforcement and in cre-ating a financial intelligence unit (FIU). The Governmentis committed to enforcing UN Security Council resolu-tions and actions related to terrorism, including theidentification and freezing of assets of individuals and or-ganizations designated as terrorists or terrorist supporters,such as the Saudi-based charity al-Haramain Foundation.It also ordered the closure of the local Rabita Trust officeand the departure from Bangladesh of its expatriate staff.

The Bangladesh military maintains a large presence in theChittagong Hill Tracts, and has been successful in locat-ing hidden weapons. In April it seized a large cache ofweapons in Chittagong harbor. Bangladesh is taking stepsto improve its effectiveness in preventing maritime smug-gling and its capabilities in terrorist interdiction operations.

India

India remains an important ally in the global war on ter-ror. Cooperative counterterrorism training expanded duringthe year, with hundreds of Indian military and law en-forcement officers trained under State Department andDepartment of Defense programs. In 2004, both the US-India Counterterrorism Joint Working Group (CTJWG) andthe Indo-US Cyber Security Forum, which includescounterterrorism prevention and detection discussions, metin New Delhi and Washington, respectively. These con-sultations improved information exchanges and underlinedpolitical commitment in both countries to counterterrorismcooperation as a strong pillar of the bilateral relationship.In November, the Indian Cabinet ratified the US-IndiaMutual Legal Assistance Treaty, which will come into forceonce the instruments of ratification are exchanged.

Separatist terrorists and insurgents staged hundreds of at-tacks on people and property in 2004, especially in Jammuand Kashmir, in the northeastern states, and the “Naxalite(Maoist) belt” in eastern India. The Government noted asignificant decline in infiltration from Pakistani Kashmirduring 2004, attributing the drop in large part to the fenceit constructed during the year-long cease-fire with Paki-

stan and more effective counter-insurgency methods.Nevertheless, in Jammu and Kashmir insurgent and ter-rorist groups made numerous attempts to kill Indian andKashmiri politicians, targeted public areas frequented bytourists, and attacked security forces. More than 500 ci-vilians were killed in these attacks. Foreign TerroristOrganizations Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM), operating through front groups in Indiaunder a number of new names, claimed responsibility forattacks on prominent Indian politicians and for killing theuncle of a prominent Kashmiri religious and politicalleader. In eastern India, the primary Naxalite groups tooksteps towards consolidation by combining to form theCommunist Party of India (Maoist). Naxalite violencedropped significantly in 2004, but the future of peace talkswas uncertain at year’s end.

The Government further engaged other neighbors in theregion, supporting Bhutanese and Nepalese counterterrorismefforts, and continues to pursue counterterrorism diplomacyat international and multilateral fora.

In December, India modified its counterterrorism legisla-tion, repealing the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) andsimultaneously amending the Unlawful Activities Preven-tion Act (ULPA). The new legislation retained POTA’s salientaspects and maintained India’s compliance with UNSCR1373, expanded the legal definition of terrorism to includeextraterritorial acts, and strengthened Government wire-tapping authority in terrorism cases. In November, theGovernment also announced a review of its policy on theresolution of hostage crises.

Indian authorities began issuing machine-readable pass-ports in New Delhi and Mumbai, and plan to expand thisprogram to other major cities. The Cabinet approved theestablishment of a financial intelligence unit (FIU) in No-vember, although by year’s end had yet to issue theregulations needed to make this unit fully effective. TheGovernment was also unable to complete the requirements

Doctors treat a boy injured during a raid by terrorists reportedly fromLashkar e-Tayyiba and Hizbul-Mujahedin’s Pir Punjal Regiment who mas-sacred 11 Muslim civilians sleeping in their homes and injured 10 othersin Surankot, Kashmir, India on June 26. (AP Photo/Channi Anand)

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to accept the Financial Action Task Force’s long-standinginvitation to join.

Nepal

In April 2003, Nepal signed an agreement with the US Gov-ernment establishing an antiterrorism assistance program.The Government continued its strong support of the globalcoalition against terrorism in 2004, and was responsive toboth US and multilateral efforts to police international ter-rorism. Nepal’s primary focus, however, remained the Maoistinsurgency, active in Nepal since February 1996.

After unilaterally withdrawing from a seven-month cease-fire in August 2003, the Maoists resumed full-scalehostilities. In 2004 alone, Maoists were responsible forthe deaths of at least 383 civilians and 214 Governmentsecurity forces, with some estimates running as high as831 victims. The Government has stated that Nepalesesecurity forces have arrested thousands of suspectedMaoists and killed more than 1,555 during the year.

Repeated anti-US rhetoric suggests the Maoists view USsupport for Kathmandu as a key obstacle to their goal ofestablishing a communist dictatorship in Nepal. Maoistsupreme commander Prachanda issued a press statementin July 2004 threatening to use “more violent means” ifpeace talks with the Government of Nepal were not forth-coming or were unsuccessful. In August and September,Maoists threatened almost 50 companies and forced themto shut down operations. In August, a Maoist-affiliatedgroup stated that it had decided to close down all multi-national corporations in Nepal with US investmentpermanently. All companies reopened in mid-Septemberafter an agreement was reached between the Maoist-af-filiated group and the Government of Nepal.

In addition to the threats against American-affiliated busi-ness enterprises, Maoists have threatened attacks againstUS and international NGOs, including those associatedwith Peace Corps programs. In September, Maoists attackedan American NGO worker in midwestern Nepal. Theysought to extort money from Nepalis and foreigners toraise funds for their insurgency. The Maoists’ public state-ments have criticized the United States, the UnitedKingdom, and India for providing security assistance toNepal. On September 10, Maoists bombed the AmericanCenter in Kathmandu. The attack occurred during non-duty hours and there were no injuries, but the blastdamaged the facility.

Security remains weak at many public facilities, includ-ing Tribhuvan International Airport in Kathmandu. TheUnited States and other donor countries are actively work-ing to improve this situation, but limited Governmentfinances, weak border controls, and poor security infra-structure could make Nepal a convenient logistic and transitpoint for outside militants and international terrorists.

Pakistan

Pakistan continues to be one of the United States’ mostimportant partners in the war on terrorism. Few countriessuffered as much from terrorism in 2004 as Pakistan, andfew did as much to combat it. After the two near-missassassination attempts against President Musharraf in De-cember 2003, groups linked to al-Qa’ida tried toassassinate a corps commander in Karachi in June, andthe Finance Minister (now Prime Minister) in July. Nearly200 people were killed in major Sunni-Shia sectarian at-tacks. Al-Qa’ida declared the Government of Pakistan tobe one of its main enemies, and called for its overthrow.

The Government of Pakistan continues to pursue al-Qa’idaand its allies aggressively through counterterrorist policemeasures throughout the country and large-scale militaryoperations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)along the rugged Afghanistan-Pakistan border. PakistaniArmy and Frontier Corps units destroyed key al-Qa’idasafe havens in South Waziristan Agency (part of the FATA),killing over 100 foreign terrorists and dispersing severalhundred more. These operations significantly degradedal-Qa’ida’s command and control capabilities in the re-gion, but at a cost of approximately 200 Pakistaniservicemen killed in action. Parallel to this military effort,the Government pursued a strategy to win the support ofthe tribes in the FATA with a combination of negotiationsand economic development investments.

In addition to counterterrorism operations in the tribal ar-eas, Pakistani security services are cooperating closely withthe United States and other nations in a successful cam-paign to eliminate terrorism both within Pakistan andabroad. Over 600 suspected operatives of al-Qa’ida andother groups have been killed or captured by Pakistaniauthorities since September 2001. Individuals detained in2004 have provided leads that aided investigations by se-curity agencies around the world. Particularly notable in

A man injured in a mosque bombing that killed 22 people andwounded dozens at a local hospital, May 31, in Karachi, Pakistan. (APPhoto/Mohammad Ali)

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2004 were the capture of al-Qa’ida communications ex-pert and Heathrow bomb plot suspect Naeem Noor Khanin July, the arrest of 1998 US Embassy bombing suspectAhmed Khalfan Ghailani the same month, and the killingof Daniel Pearl murder-suspect Amjad Farooqi in Septem-ber. The Government also cracked down on several groupsthat had been active in the Kashmir insurgency, detainingthe head of Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM) for severalmonths and arranging the extradition of the head of Harakatul-Jihad-I-Islami (HUJI).

Pursuant to its obligations under UN Security CouncilResolution 1267 and subsequent resolutions, Pakistan con-tinues to work with the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee tofreeze the assets of individuals and groups identified asterrorist entities linked to al-Qa’ida and the Taliban.Pakistan’s Parliament passed an amendment to the 1997Antiterrorism Act that increased penalties and prohibitedbail for those who finance terrorism. Pakistan also draftedand won agreement for a regional convention against ter-rorist financing. However, the Government’s failure to passan anti-money laundering or counterterrorist financing lawthat meets international standards has inhibited Pakistan’sability to cooperate internationally on counterterrorismfinance issues.

Pakistan’s Antiterrorism Courts continue to prosecute ter-rorism cases. In 2004, the courts convicted a suspect inthe 2003 bombing of the US Consulate in Karachi, sev-eral suspects in the assassination attempts against PresidentMusharraf, seven suspects in the 2002 attack on a Chris-tian school, and nine suspects in the bombing of theMacedonian Consulate in Karachi.

US-Pakistan joint counterterrorism efforts have been ex-tensive. They include cooperative efforts in border securityand criminal investigations, as well as several long-termtraining projects. A Joint Working Group onCounterterrorism and Law Enforcement, established in

2002, met in September to assess joint efforts and discussenhanced cooperation.

Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka supports the global war on terror and continuesto demonstrate a strong commitment to combating terror-ism. The Sri Lankan Government has cooperated with USefforts to track terrorist financing, although no assets havebeen identified in Sri Lanka to date. The United States hasworked with the Government of Sri Lanka to develop anti-money laundering legislation, develop a Sri Lankanfinancial intelligence unit, and provide training for rel-evant Government agencies and the banking sector. SriLankan police provided investigative assistance in responseto US requests.

The 2002 ceasefire between the Sri Lankan Governmentand the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a desig-nated Foreign Terrorist Organization, continued to holddespite lack of progress in resuming the negotiations bro-ken off by the LTTE in April 2003. The Sri Lankan Armyremains deployed across the country for counter-insur-gency purposes. The paramilitary Special Task Force police(STF) is deployed in the east.

Numerous violations of the ceasefire agreement were re-portedly committed, primarily by the LTTE, during the year.Fighting broke out between a dissident LTTE faction, ledby eastern military commander Karuna, and the main-stream LTTE in March, leading initially to the deaths of atleast 120 LTTE cadres and civilians in the east. Followingthe split, the LTTE began a campaign of targeted assassi-nations against political opponents, members of the Karunafaction, and suspected Sri Lankan Army informants, kill-ing at least another 80 individuals during the year. Inaddition, at least 26 members of the mainstream LTTE werekilled by suspected Karuna sympathizers, while six mem-bers of the Sri Lankan security forces were killed in isolatedincidents by suspected LTTE terrorists. On July 7, a sus-pected LTTE suicide bomber detonated herself while beingquestioned inside a Colombo police station, killing her-self and four policemen. Her intended target was believedto be the Minister of Hindu Affairs, a Tamil politician op-posed to the LTTE.

The renewed violence in Sri Lanka has done much to dis-sipate the cautious optimism that surrounded the processlast year. In September, State Department Coordinator forCounterterrorism Cofer Black affirmed that the UnitedStates would maintain the designation of the LTTE as aForeign Terrorist Organization until it unequivocally re-nounces terrorism in both word and deed.

In Islamabad, on September 2, Pakistan’s Interior Secretary TariqMehmud, left, receives J. Cofer Black, right, former US Coordinatorfor Counterterrorism, for two days of official talks. (AP Photo/B.K.Bangash)

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Western Hemisphere Overview

Terrorism in the Western Hemisphere historically has beenperpetrated by groups advocating internal political changeand by criminal organizations seeking to intimidate soci-ety and governments to allow them to exist and operateunfettered. The focus of terrorist groups has been prima-rily domestic. In the last year alone, Colombia’s threeUS-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) —the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), theNational Liberation Army (ELN), and the United Self-De-fense Forces of Colombia (AUC) — were responsible formurdering approximately 3,000 people, mostly Colombi-ans. Shining Path’s bloody 30-year campaign in the 1980sand early 1990s left over 35,000 Peruvians dead.

Terrorists in the region are becoming increasingly activein illicit transnational activities, including the drug trade,arms trafficking, money laundering, contraband smuggling,and document and currency fraud. The WesternHemisphere’s lightly-defended “soft” targets — its tour-ism industry, large American expatriate communities,thriving aviation sector, and busy ports — as well as sys-temic disparities between countries in border security, legaland financial regulatory regimes, and the difficulty of main-taining an effective government presence in remote areas–represent targets and opportunities for domestic and for-eign terrorists to exploit.

Although the threat of international terrorism in the West-ern Hemisphere remained relatively low during 2004compared to other world regions, terrorists may seek safe-haven, financing, recruiting, illegal travel documentation,or access to the United States from the area and pose seri-

ous threats. International terrorists have not hesitated to makethe Western Hemisphere a battleground to advance theircauses. The attacks of September 11, 2001, in the UnitedStates and the bombings of the Israeli Embassy in BuenosAires in 1992 and the Argentine-Jewish Cultural Center in1994 are stark reminders of this. Americans have fallen vic-tim to terrorists elsewhere in the region; since 1992, theFARC has murdered at least 10 US citizens and currentlyholds three US Government civilian contractors hostage.

Various countries participated in joint counterterrorismtraining and simulations during 2004, including “Panama2004” in August and “Fuerzas Comando 2004” (El Salva-dor) in July. Many countries in the Western Hemisphereare also active participants in the Counterterrorism ActionGroup (CTAG) meetings hosted by local US embassies.An initiative coming out of the US Government’s chair-manship of CTAG in 2004, these meetings bring togetherlocal representatives of the G8, host government, and otherregional governments to discuss counterterrorism capac-ity-building assistance. The countries of the hemisphereare also active in the OAS Inter-American CommitteeAgainst Terrorism (Spanish acronym, CICTE).

Significant developments in specific countries and sub-regions:

Colombia suffered continued terrorist violence as theRevolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and othernarcoterrorist groups conducted car bombings,kidnappings, and political murders, as well as targetedcritical infrastructure (water, oil, gas, electricity) and trans-portation systems. Three Americans, whose plane madean emergency crash landing in southern Colombia on Feb-ruary 13, 2003, continue to be held hostage by the FARC.

Mexican President Vicente Fox shakes hands with US Secretary ofState Condoleezza Rice when she arrived at the Los Pinos presidentialresidence in Mexico City on March 10, 2005. (AP Photo/EduardoVerdugo)

Members of the Salvadoran Special Forces participate in the inaugura-tion ceremony of the “Fuerzas Comando 2004,” a joint operation ofCentral American, South American, Dominican, and US troops to com-bat terrorism. (AP Photo/Edgar Romero)

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At the time of the crash, the FARC murdered a fourth Ameri-can and a Colombian soldier. Under President Uribe, theColombian military, police, and intelligence forces con-tinued successfully to disrupt the activities of Colombianterrorist groups. Acts of terrorism, homicides, massacres,and kidnappings dropped significantly in 2004, while theColombian Government captured FARC leaders, includ-ing Nayibe Rojas Cabrera (aka “Sonia”) and Juvenal OvidioRicardo Palmera (aka “Simon Trinidad”) who were extra-dited to the United States. Colombia demobilizedthousands of AUC members, and continued aggressivecoca and poppy eradication.

The United States continued strong cooperative relation-ships with Canada and Mexico on a range ofcounterterrorism issues, including border, aviation, mari-time, and transportation security. In September 2004,Canada hosted a border symposium for the 34 OAS mem-ber states in Vancouver to demonstrate US-Canadacooperation on border security and encourage more ac-tive border security measures by CICTE members.

The primary focus in 2004 for many of the countries inthe region was to strengthen capabilities to prevent or dis-rupt possible terrorist fundraising activity in their territories,and to bolster their ability to combat transnational crime,including activities that terrorists could undertake to sup-port terrorism. In Central America, governmentsconcentrated on strengthening intelligence collection andsharing capabilities, and on their ability to respond to ter-rorist threats and incidents. Efforts were made more difficultby widespread, unfounded media reports alleging formallinks between transnational criminal gangs and Islamicextremists in the region.

The United States strengthened its cooperative dialoguewith the “Three Plus One” partners Argentina, Brazil, andParaguay, and provided advice and training support to ElSalvador after Islamic terrorists threatened attacks to pun-

ish El Salvador’s participation in the Coalition fighting toliberate Iraq. In the Caribbean, the US Government begana series of assessments requested by countries to deter-mine ways to improve their counterterrorism regimes, andassisted countries to comply with new international normsfor port security. Governments stepped up efforts to tightenborder secuirty and in general, vigilance against the de-velopment of Islamic extremism or other potential misuseof their territories, whether from within or from abroad.

Bolivia

Despite considerable political and economic instabilityin 2004, Bolivia continued to work closely with the USGovernment to combat terrorism both domestic and for-eign. In late 2004, Bolivia’s Financial Investigation Unitcollaborated with the US Government to share informa-tion about possible terrorist-linked financial transactionsand enhance the monitoring and enforcement of finan-cial networks. The Bolivian Government established in2004 a counterterrorism coordination unit in the Ministryof the Presidency, including elements of the Bolivian Na-tional Police and military, to develop nationalcounterterrorism policy, manage terrorism-related infor-mation, and coordinate Bolivian Government agencies(military, police, diplomatic, intelligence) to address ter-rorist threats and activities. The Bolivian Government isan active participant in Counterterrorism Action Group(CTAG) meetings.

Although no significant acts of international terrorism oc-curred in Bolivia in 2004, domestic terrorism relatedmainly to the drug trade continued to be a threat, thoughrelatively less than in 2003. Bolivia remains vulnerableto terrorists seeking to exploit its porous borders, resourceconstraints, corruption, and lack of investigative expertiseto disrupt recruiting and fundraising. Members of the Revo-lutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Peru’s ShiningPath (SL, in Spanish) and Tupac Amaru Revolutionary

Thousands attend the tenth anniversary of the 1994 bombing of theBuenos Aires Jewish community center AMIA in Buenos Aires,Argentina, on July 18. (AP Photo/Daniel Luna)

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) leader RicardoPalmera (aka “Simon Trinidad”) escorted by Colombian authorities inBogota, Colombia, after his arrest in Ecuador in January. Laterextradited to the United States, Palmera is the most senior FARC leaderto face US drug and terrorism charges. (AP Photo/Javier Galeano, File)

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Movement (MRTA) have at times been identified in Bo-livia; FARC and SL are US Government-designated ForeignTerrorist Organizations (FTOs). More than 300 membersof Shining Path and MRTA have been resettled in El Altounder United Nations auspices. Many maintain contactsin Peru and may have contributed to politically motivatedviolence in Bolivia. The widespread availability of explo-sives and miners skilled in detonation techniques hascomplicated Bolivia’s counterterrorism efforts. On at leasttwo occasions, domestic groups planned to attack the Con-gress with dynamite and small arms. Police acted quicklyto quell the threats, although one distraught miner in March2004 detonated charges inside the parliament, killing twopolicemen and himself, while injuring bystanders.

Colombian National Liberation Army (ELN) member Fran-cisco “Pacho” Cortes — arrested in 2003 on espionageand terrorism charges while attempting to create an ELN-Bolivia branch — remains in custody, but the presidingjudge in the case has ruled Cortes eligible for bail. NGOsand Cortes’ supporters are attempting to raise funds forhis release. The Bolivian Government continues to huntfor organized crime head Marco Marino Diodato, who es-caped from prison in early 2004. Diodato is suspected oforchestrating the fatal car bombing of Bolivian prosecutorMonica von Borries in mid-2004, and has reportedly madethreats against members of the US Embassy and other Ameri-cans in Bolivia. Little progress was made in the investigationof the 2000 torture and murder of police officer DavidAndrade and his wife, and the suspects remain at large.

Bolivia maintained its policy of forced coca eradicationin the Chapare growing region, despite continued threatsof violence against Government eradicators there. Vio-lence in the Chapare dropped off, however, after theGovernment and coca grower syndicates signed an ac-cord in October 2004 allowing for a limited exception of3,200 hectares to remain untouched for one year. At thesame time, there were incidents of violence in the Yungasgrowing region, a lawless area of both legal and illegalcoca cultivation. Coca growers dynamited USAID alter-native development projects, threatened police and othergovernment officials, and delayed construction of a po-lice checkpoint.

Bolivia has signed the Inter-American Convention AgainstTerrorism and the August 2003 Asuncion Declaration, inwhich several South American nations committed them-selves to support the Colombian Government in its ongoingstruggle against terrorism and drug trafficking.

Canada

The Canadian Government continued in 2004 to be astrong ally of the United States in the fight against interna-tional terrorism. Counterterrorism cooperation withCanada remains excellent. The Canadian Government hasresponded quickly to requests from the United States for

assistance in areas ranging from information-sharing todisrupting terrorism activities.

Day-to-day cooperation between US and Canadian lawenforcement agencies is close and continuous. Canada’s2001 Antiterrorism Act strengthened its ability to identify,deter, disable, prosecute, convict, and punish terroristgroups. It also provides investigative tools for Canadianlaw enforcement agencies, while providing substantialsafeguards to privacy and due process. In December 2003,the Canadian Government established Public Safety andEmergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC), a counterpartof the US Department of Homeland Security, and gave itthe mandate of protecting Canadians from criminals andterrorists.

Canada cooperates closely with the United States on in-vestigations. There is a heavy volume of extraditionrequests between the two countries. Canadian privacylaws, limited resources, and criminal procedures limit afuller and more timely exchange of information with theUnited States.

The diplomatic engagement between the United States andCanada on counterterrorism issues remains strong, main-tained in long-standing bilateral fora. For over 15 years,the US-Canada Bilateral Consultative Group (BCG) hasbrought together government officials to develop ways toenhance cooperation on a broad range of counterterrorismissues, including technical research and development, ter-rorist designations, threat alerts, and cross-border crime.Canada plans to host the next round of the BCG in 2005.

On December 12, 2001, the United States and Canadasigned the Smart Border Declaration, which sets forth a30-point (later expanded to 32-point) action plan basedon four pillars: the secure flow of people, the secure flowof goods, secure infrastructure, and coordination and in-formation-sharing in the enforcement of these objectives.Under the Smart Border Declaration, 15 Integrated Bor-der Enforcement Teams (IBETS) are coordinating US andCanadian efforts to disrupt cross-border criminal and po-tential terrorist activity. Canada and the United Statescooperate on shared immigration issues through the Bor-der Vision process, which began in 1997 and seeks todevelop a joint regional approach to migration throughinformation and intelligence sharing, policy coordination,joint overseas operations, and border cooperation.

Canada and the United States coordinate judicial effortsat the US-Canadian Cross-Border Crime Forum, which lastmet in Ottawa in October 2004 and has a sub-group oncounterterrorism. Through the 1995 Shared Border Ac-cord, Canada and the United States continue to streamlineprocesses for legitimate travelers and commercial goods,provide enhanced protection against drug smuggling andthe illegal entrance of people, and promote internationaltrade. Canada was the first country to join the United States

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in developing the Container Security Initiative (CSI) to screenincoming container shipments, and Canada has been anactive participant in the Proliferation Security Initiative.

Canada and the United States also work multilaterally, infora such as in the G8’s Counterterrorism Action Group(CTAG) and the OAS Inter-American Committee AgainstTerrorism (CICTE), to build legal and financialcounterterrorism capacity globally and to strengthen se-curity at ports, airports, and land borders around the world.In September 2004, Canada hosted a border symposium,which brought representatives from the 34 OAS memberstates to Vancouver to view US-Canada cooperation onborder security (land, air, and sea). Participants are ex-pected to report on their border security programs toCICTE.

Canada implements terrorist finance listings in compli-ance with UN requirements and coordinates closely withthe United States on plans to freeze assets. Efforts tocounter terrorist financing include implementing the pro-visions of UN Security Council Resolution 1373,promoting the Special Recommendations on Terrorist Fi-nancing of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), andactively participating in the G7, G8, and G20. UnderCanadian law, all terrorist entities listed by the UnitedNations are automatically designated on a domestic basiswithin Canada as well. Although they are subject to pros-ecution under the Criminal Code of Canada, the lawremains untested and no prosecutions have yet taken place.

Chile

Chile is a steadfast ally in the global war on terrorism. In2004 Chile served as chair of the UN’s al-Qa’ida andTaliban sanctions committee, and moved to address thepotential threat from Islamic extremist fundraising in its freetrade zone of Iquique. As host of the 2004 Asia-Pacific Eco-nomic Cooperation (APEC) Summit, Chile emphasizedsecurity and counterterrorism issues on the agenda.

There were no significant incidents of international terror-ism in Chile in 2004, although various domestic groupsfirebombed a McDonald’s restaurant and planted or deto-nated low-powered bombs outside banks, ATM machines,a subway, and in a restroom in the Brazilian consulate inSantiago. There were no injuries or deaths.

Chilean law enforcement agencies were consistently co-operative in investigating links to international terrorism,but, hampered by a restrictive law, the Investigative Po-lice were unable to bring any investigation to prosecution.Chile has a 200-person designated counterterrorist forcein the national uniformed police. In October 2004, a newNational Intelligence Agency became fully operational asthe coordinator of intelligence gathering for Chile. A num-ber of Chilean Government entities and officials benefitedfrom US-sponsored training during 2004, including the

Chilean Air Force and law enforcement personnel at vari-ous levels.

Chile’s money laundering statute covers terrorist financ-ing and expands the Government’s ability to freeze andseize assets, although the Government has yet to chargeanyone under that law or to apply it against terrorist assetsidentified by other governments or international institu-tions. Chile launched in June 2004 its financial analysisunit (UAF) charged with investigating suspicious transac-tions. However, the Constitutional Tribunal ruled some ofthe UAF provisions to be unconstitutional. Efforts areunderway to amend the laws to provide the UAF withgreater investigative authority.

Colombia

Colombia remained a steadfast ally of the United States inthe fight against narcoterrorism in 2004. The ColombianGovernment, through bilateral, multilateral, military, andeconomic activities, continued to assist US Governmentcounterterrorism efforts and to disrupt terrorist acts, blockterrorist finances, and extradite terrorists to face justice inthe United States.

The US Government has designated three Colombianarmed groups as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs):the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), theNational Liberation Army (ELN), and the United Self-De-fense Forces of Colombia (AUC). In February 2004, theUS Government also designated the FARC and the AUCas significant foreign narcotics traffickers under the King-pin Act. All three Colombian FTOs are primarily focusedon domestic change in Colombia and on maintaining theirown influence and viability but recently have been sus-pected of assisting violent groups in other countries suchas Paraguay. In 2004, the three FTOs conducted car bomb-ings, kidnappings, political murders, and the indiscriminateuse of landmines. They also targeted critical infrastruc-ture (water, oil, gas, electricity), public recreational areas,and modes of transportation.

Some examples in 2004 included the FARC’s ChristmasEve kidnapping of seven people in Antioquia Department(Province) and New Year’s Eve massacre of at least 17people for suspected affiliation with the AUC; the FARC’sbombing in May of a popular nightclub in Apartado,Antioquia, which killed five and injured almost 100; thesuspected FARC bombing in August of Medellin’s annualflower festival that injured approximately 38; the FARC’sattempted mass kidnapping in February in a condominiumcomplex in Neiva, Huila Department (one hostage was re-leased two months later and three hostages remain incaptivity); and the ELN’s July kidnapping of the Bishop ofYopal, Casanare Department. Paramilitaries continued todisplace forcibly civilians who resided along drug and weap-ons transit corridors or who were suspected of being guerrillasympathizers. In late June, the AUC kidnapped former Sena-

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tor Jose Eduardo Gnecco and his family. Both FARC and theELN continued attacks against the country’s infrastructureand oil pipelines, albeit at reduced levels. Many more at-tacks were thwarted nationwide by the ColombianGovernment’s excellent intelligence and security work.

All three FTOs carried out attacks in and around majorurban areas in Colombia, including at supermarkets, placesof entertainment, and other areas frequented by US citi-zens and expatriates. Colombia’s FTOs continued tothreaten and target US citizens in 2004. Historically,American victims of kidnappings and murders have in-cluded journalists, missionaries, scientists, human rightsworkers, US Government employees, and business people,as well as tourists and family visitors, and even small chil-dren. On February 13, 2003, a plane carrying five crewmembers (four US citizens who were US Governmentdefense contractors and one Colombian citizen) crashedin a remote section of Colombia. Two crew members (theColombian and one of the Americans) were killed by theFARC and the remaining crew members were taken hos-tage. The FARC continues to hold captive the three UScitizens. In the past four years, 30 American citizens havebeen reported kidnapped in Colombia.

President Uribe’s Government has made significantprogress in achieving the goals of his national securitystrategy: to regain control of national territory fromColombia’s FTOs, promote desertion and reintegration offormer illegal armed militants, and demobilize AUC blocs.Colombian statistics for 2004 indicate that acts of terror-ism fell by 42 percent, homicides by 13.2 percent,massacres by 43.5 percent, and kidnappings by 42.4 per-cent. At least 20 mid-level FARC leaders and financiersand at least 11 paramilitary field commanders have beenkilled or captured. Nayibe Rojas Cabrera (aka “Sonia”),who managed the finances and drug trafficking of theFARC’s Southern Bloc, was captured in February 2004 andlater extradited to the United States. In November, the Co-lombian Army killed FARC’s Teofilo Forero Mobile ColumnDeputy and Operations Chief Humberto Valbuena (aka“Yerbas”), who had replaced Victor Hugo Navarro (aka“El Mocho”) after he was killed by the Colombian Armyin October 2003. On December 13, the Colombian Gov-ernment arrested Rodrigo Granda Escobar, a reported FARCGeneral Staff member, considered the FARC’s “foreign min-ister.” Nearly 7,000 insurgents and paramilitaries havebeen captured and more than 4,000 terrorists have de-serted their FTOs. Approximately 1,100 extortionists and400 kidnappers have been captured and 120 civilian hos-tages have been rescued. Government presence has beenrestored in all municipalities and internal displacement isdown 50 percent.

The US-Colombian extradition relationship continues tobe one of the most successful in the world; President Uribe’sadministration has extradited more than 180 individuals tothe United States through the end of 2004. On December

31, the Colombian Government extradited senior FARC com-mander Juvenal Ovidio Ricardo Palmera (aka “SimonTrinidad”) to the United States on charges of kidnapping,providing material support to terrorists, and narcotics traf-ficking. The threat of extradition has been cited as asignificant concern of the FARC, ELN, and AUC leaders.

The Colombian Government’s peace process with theAUC, involving AUC demobilization, made substantialprogress in 2004 with the removal of nearly 3,000 AUCparamilitaries from combat in November and December2004. This effort should further reduce overall violenceand atrocities, disrupt drug trafficking, and serve as a modelfor future peace processes with the FARC and ELN.

Although kidnappings have declined, Colombia still suf-fers from the world’s highest kidnapping rate (over 1,500in 2004). The US Government has provided $25 millionto support the Colombian Government’s Anti-KidnappingInitiative, which trains and equips Colombian Army andColombian National Police anti-kidnapping units(GAULAs); is developing an anti-kidnapping database tocollect, analyze, and disseminate information onkidnappings; and has established a training facility nearBogota. US-trained GAULA units have rescued over 48hostages, arrested over 200 hostage takers, and seized over$7 million paid as ransom money.

In September, Colombia’s Constitutional Court struck downthe 2003 Antiterrorism Bill (proposed by President Uribe)that would have allowed the Colombian Government toconduct wiretaps, search residences, and detain suspectsmore easily.

Colombia continued to cooperate internationally in thewar against terror. On December 16, 2004, the BogotaAppeals Court reversed an earlier decision to acquit threeIRA members of providing support to the FARC, sentencedthem to 17 years in prison, levied heavy fines, and or-dered their recapture. It is unclear, however, whether theyare still in Colombia, having been released under condi-tional parole based on earlier acquittal. This case reportedlycame from an exchange of information by Interpol in 2000about a possible three-way link among the FARC, the IRA,and ETA. Less than a year later, Colombian authorities ar-rested the IRA members, who had been preparing to leavethe country; one of the three was the official Sinn Feinrepresentative to Havana. Even though the IRA-ETA link iswell established, there is little indication that ETA has everactively engaged with the FARC.

Counterterrorism cooperation has paid dividends for Co-lombia, as illustrated by Ecuador’s capture and deportationto Colombia in January 2004 of “Simon Trinidad.” Canadaand the European Union have added the FARC, ELN, andAUC to their terrorist lists. Mexico closed the official FARCoffice there in April 2002. Colombia continued to take anactive role in the OAS Inter-American Committee Against

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Terrorism (CICTE) to enhance hemisphericcounterterrorism cooperation, information-sharing, andcapacity-building. In August 2003, the Chiefs of State ofArgentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru, and Uru-guay signed the Asuncion Declaration supportingColombia’s struggle against terrorism and condemningterrorism and narcotic trafficking.

The use of areas along Colombia’s porous border by theFARC, ELN, and AUC to find logistical support and rest, aswell as to transship arms and drugs, poses a serious chal-lenge to Colombia. Colombia seeks to cooperate with itsneighbors to enhance border security. The situation onthe Venezuelan side of the Colombian border, which allthree Colombian FTO’s exploit, is especially disconcert-ing. Even though the Colombian Government repeatedlymade offers to Venezuela to enhance counterterrorism co-operation, the level and quality of cooperation fromVenezuela has been very limited. This is despite the issu-ance by the Colombian Government of a strong statementcondemning an alleged paramilitary plot against Venezu-elan President Hugo Chavez in May 2004, and the releaseof prison records and criminal information on all indi-viduals arrested.

Colombia continued to cooperate fully with the UnitedStates in blocking terrorist assets. The Colombian Finan-cial Information and Analysis Unit collaborated with theUS Government to close suspicious bank accounts. InAugust, the Colombian military, police, and investigativeunits produced an estimate of FARC finances. The Gov-ernment plans to continue this research and expand it toinclude other terrorist groups in Colombia, which will as-sist in further developing strategies to cut off the FARC’sfinancial resources. In September, US Secret Service andColombian National Police seized $3.6 million counter-feit dollars from the FARC, which had planned to use themto purchase weapons and explosives. The Governmentalso took steps to reorganize and streamline its Inter-Insti-tutional Committee Against Subversive Finances.

Colombia made significant strides in combatingnarcotrafficking, the primary source of revenue forColombia’s terrorist organizations. Eradication programstargeting coca and opium poppies continued throughoutthe year with record results for the third straight year. Inter-diction operations also resulted in record seizures this year.

Ecuador

The Ecuadorian Government continued in 2004 to sup-port US efforts to combat terrorism. Ecuadorian securityforces were receptive to US requests to investigate do-mestic terrorist incidents and assist with internationalterrorism investigations. Ecuador shared terrorism-relatedinformation with US counterparts. Ecuador’s Banking Su-perintendency cooperated in requesting that Ecuadorianfinancial institutions report transactions involving known

terrorists, as designated by the US Government or by theUN 1267 Sanctions Committee.

In 2004, the Ecuadorian Armed Forces (FFAA) and Na-tional Police (ENP) sustained an aggressive campaign toprevent Colombia’s narcoterrorism from spreading to Ec-uador, and in doing so, disrupted several Colombiannarcoterrorist encampments in Ecuador. The FFAA in Janu-ary and November conducted large-scale operations inSucumbios province near the Colombian border, captur-ing several FARC members. FFAA has reportedly tripledits force posture to approximately 8,000 soldiers along itsnorthern border with Colombia. Since 2003, Ecuadorianarmed forces have interdicted thousands of gallons ofsmuggled petroleum ether, a precursor used in Colom-bian cocaine laboratories. The US Government providesassistance to Ecuadorian security forces to enhance bor-der security along its northern border with Colombia.

Although no significant international acts of terrorism oc-curred in Ecuador in 2004, Ecuadorian police suspectseveral groups of domestic subversion and probable in-volvement in a dozen pamphlet and incendiary bombs.Prime among the suspected groups is the “Popular Com-batants Group” (GCP, in Spanish), which reportedlynumbers roughly 200 and is an armed faction of the Marx-ist-Leninist Communist Party of Ecuador.

Ecuador’s porous borders, endemic corruption, and well-established illegal migrant networks may serve as attractivegateways for terrorists to exploit. The Revolutionary ArmedForces of Colombia (FARC), a US-designated Foreign Ter-rorist Organization, continues to utilize Ecuador forresupply, rest, and recuperation. However, the FARC real-izes that Ecuador is less hospitable than before. Limited lawenforcement (especially prosecutorial capacity) and militaryresources limit Ecuador’s counterterrorism capabilities.

High rates of migrant smuggling from Ecuador to the UnitedStates remain a concern. In response, the EcuadorianGovernment operates a US Government-supported anti-smuggling police unit (COAC, in Spanish), which suppliedinformation that led to the 2004 conviction in the UnitedStates of an Iranian smuggler, Mehrzade Arbade, whomthe COAC had arrested in Ecuador in 2003. In December2004, the Ecuadorian Government sought US Governmentassistance and technology to establish a comprehensiveentry/exit control system. Ecuador’s four international portsmet International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS)technical requirements in 2004.

Cooperation between Colombian and Ecuadorian policeforces improved in 2004. On January 3, Juvenal OvidioRicardo Palmera (aka “Simon Trinidad”), the most seniorFARC official to be captured in decades, was detained bythe ENP in Quito and deported to Colombia. Cooperationbetween the two countries continued to grow through theyear, leading to a meeting of Colombian and Ecuadorianlaw enforcement in Pasto, Colombia, in December 2004.

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The Ecuadorian Government has signed and submittedfor ratification to its Congress the Inter-American Conven-tion Against Terrorism. In 2004, the EcuadorianGovernment also submitted comprehensive anti-moneylaundering legislation that is moving through its legislature.

Mexico

Mexico is a key ally of the United States in combatingterrorism. The Mexican Government works closely withthe US Government to enhance aviation, border, mari-time, and transportation security; protect US citizens,businesses, and Government facilities and personnel inMexico; secure critical infrastructure; and combat terror-ism financing.

The Mexican and US Governments have participated in arange of bilateral fora that sought to address sharedcounterterrorism-related concerns, including the US-Mexico Border Partnership Action Plan, Senior LawEnforcement Plenary, the Bi-National Commission, andthe Mexico-US Committee on Transborder Critical Infra-structure Protection. On the multilateral front, Mexicohosted the Special Summit of the Americas in Monterreyon January 12-13, 2004, during which issues of regionalcounterterrorism cooperation were advanced.

In 2004, Mexico continued to offer outstanding coopera-tion in improving border security. The United States andMexico continued to follow through on implementationof the US-Mexico Border Partnership Action Plan, signedin March 2002 in Monterrey, to improve infrastructure atports of entry, expedite legitimate travel, and increase secu-rity related to the movement of goods. The US Governmenthas provided $25 million in support. Law enforcement offi-cials on both sides of the border participated in a workshopon emergency responses to chemical incidents and terroristattacks. Mexico’s Plan Centinela, initiated in 2003, contin-ued to integrate security efforts to manage issues along thenorthern and southern Mexican border, to protect infrastruc-ture, and to enhance airport security.

The Mexican military continued to take steps to improvethe capabilities of their counterterrorism forces with addi-tional training and equipment. The Secretariat of the Navyincreased security operations for passenger cruise shipsand military vessels calling on Mexican ports. The Mexi-can Navy also established an offshore rapid response basefor the protection of oil production infrastructure. Mexicohas effectively undertaken implementation of InternationalShip and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) and related portsecurity efforts.

A continuing issue of strategic concern in 2004 to US-Mexico counterterrorism efforts remained the existenceand continued exploitation of smuggling channels travers-ing the US-Mexico border. Despite active and prolongedcooperation by the Mexican Government to address these

smuggling routes, many smugglers have avoided prosecu-tion. The Mexican Government continued in 2004 to stepup efforts to address the flow of illegal migrants intoMexico, many of whom sought eventually to reach theUnited States. In October and November, a comprehen-sive operation targeting gangs and migrant smugglersbegan along Mexico’s southern border that resulted inhundreds of arrests.

Panama

Panama is a stalwart supporter of the United States in thewar on terror. As the custodian of key infrastructure astridea strategic location, Panama takes the threat of terror seri-ously, and is taking appropriate measures.

There were no significant incidents of international terror-ism in Panama in 2004.

Panama’s immediate terrorism concern is incursions byColombian narcoterrorists into Panama’s remote Darienregion. Following the murder of four Panamanians bynarcoterrorists in 2003, Panama entered into a border se-curity cooperation agreement with Colombia andstrengthened police presence in Darien, and along thefrontier. To confront challenges in the medium and longerterm, Panama is taking other steps.

Panama’s new antiterrorism legislation mandates severepenalties for a variety of activities in support of terrorists.Heavy caseloads, lack of expertise for complex interna-tional investigations, and extra-legal influence hinder thepolice and judicial system, however. Panama’s securityand anti-money laundering authorities have taken goodadvantage of US-provided training opportunities andequipment. The Government could bolster its alreadystrong political will to combat terrorism by devoting moreof its own resources to counterterrorism efforts.

Panama has increased the security of its key infrastructureand of the Panama Canal significantly. The Governmenthas installed surveillance technology at critical points, suchas the Bridge of the Americas and container ports. ThePanama Canal Authority has improved its collection ofinformation on ships that use the Canal and has modern-ized its incident management center. Panama has alsostrengthened the capabilities of its national security au-thorities to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence.Anti-money laundering authorities are extremely coop-erative in preventing terror financing through Panamanianinstitutions.

In 2004, Panama signed an agreement with the UnitedStates under the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) thatfacilitates boarding procedures to search vesels suspectedof carrying cargoes of proliferation concern. Panama alsoprovided enhanced force protection for US warships tran-siting the Canal.

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Shortly before leaving office in September 2004, Presi-dent Moscoso pardoned four foreigners arrested in 2000and jailed for illegal possession of explosives. The Gov-ernment of Cuba alleged that the suspects were plottingto kill Fidel Castro, who was attending the Ibero-Ameri-can summit in Panama, and sought their extradition.Panama refused, on grounds that they would not be ac-corded a fair trial in Cuba. Upon their release, the CubanGovernment suspended diplomatic relations with Panama.Relations were later restored.

Panama has a significant Muslim population, augmentedrecently by an influx of South Asian immigrants, that hastraditionally remained apolitical and focused on businessinterests centered around the Colon Free Trade Zone andprovincial towns. While rumors persist of ties betweenPanama’s Muslim community and terrorist groups in theMiddle East, there has been no credible evidence to sup-port such speculation. The Panamanian Governmentremains cognizant of the potential threat posed by immi-grants from countries associated with Islamic extremism.

Peru

Peru remained a supporter of US counterterrorism effortsin 2004. Even though the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso,or SL), a US Government-designated Foreign Terrorist Or-ganization (FTO), remains small and isolated, SL continuesto pose a threat to US and Peruvian interests. SL con-ducted several deadly attacks in remote Peruvian areas in2004. SL has a few hundred armed members concentratedin the coca-growing valleys where they reportedly are in-creasing their involvement in the drug trade, gaining moreresources for terrorist activities. Lack of an effective Gov-ernment presence in these areas has complicated effortsto disrupt SL activity. A purported SL leader threatenedattacks against US and Peruvian coca eradication effortsin Huanaco Department (Province). Armed terrorist inci-dents fell to 40 in 2004 from 100 in 2003. Reports suggestthat SL is trying to rebuild support in the universities wherethey excercised considerable influence in the 1980s.ThePeruvian Government arrested 161 suspected SL mem-bers, including alleged key leader Gavino Mendoza. Perusuccessfully extradited from Spain suspected SL leaderAdolfo Olaechea in 2003; his case will be tried in 2005.

The Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) wassignificantly reduced in numbers in recent years, but itappears to be quietly trying to rebuild its membership.The MRTA has not conducted a significant terrorist attacksince the December 1996 hostage siege at the JapaneseAmbassador’s residence in Lima, and posed a very lim-ited threat in 2004. The Peruvian Communist Party (PatriaRoja) has not engaged in terrorist acts but has been sus-pected of advocating violent confrontation with Peruviansecurity forces.

There is only limited evidence of the Revolutionary ArmedForces of Colombia (FARC) or Colombia’s National Lib-eration Army (ELN) operating inside Peru or working withSL. In January 2004, a FARC member and several Peruvi-ans were arrested for arms trafficking in northern Peru. In2004, Peru, Colombia, and Brazil signed a border secu-rity agreement to enhance cooperation to combat terrorismand arms trafficking.

President Toledo has pledged increased funding for secu-rity forces and social development projects in areas whereSL and other terrorist groups operate. The Peruvian Con-gress approved the President’s request to create a NationalDefense and Security Fund, totaling $40 million for 2005.The Peruvian Congress created a national security systemdesigned to improve inter-governmental cooperation andstrengthen prosecutors. The National Police (PNP) Direc-torate of Counterterrorism (DIRCOTE) is the primaryPeruvian agency coordinating counterterrorism efforts,along with the Peruvian Army, which operates approxi-mately 75 bases.

President Toledo has repeatedly extended a state of emer-gency, which suspends some civil liberties and gives theArmed Forces authority to maintain order, for successiveperiods of up to 60 days in parts of Peru’s five departmentswhere SL is believed still to have armed members. ThePeruvian Government and civil society are working toimplement the 2002 recommendations of the Truth andReconciliation Commission to heal wounds from the ter-rorist conflict of the 1990s. President Toledo’s Peace andDevelopment Commissions, formed in 2002, continuedto promote cooperation between police, military, and resi-dents in the areas where SL and MRTA conflicts had beenthe greatest.

The Government continued to prosecute terrorist suspectsaggressively. Peru’s special antiterrorism court is retryingaround 750 of the 1,900 overturned convictions, in con-formance with the findings of the Inter-American Court ofHuman Rights (IACHR), of SL and MRTA defendants whohad been tried on Fujimori-era decree laws on terrorism.All the cases must be re-tried by January 2006 or the de-fendants will be released in accordance with Peruvian law.A retrial (“megatrial”) of SL founder Abimael Guzman and15 co-defendants began in November 2004. The retrialof 13 MRTA leaders, including its founder Victor Polay,together in another “megatrial” began in December 2004.Six SL members remain in various stages of trials and ap-peals for complicity in the March 2002 bombing near theUS Embassy that killed ten people; two defendants werereleased for lack of evidence. A principal SL leader, OsmanMorote, was acquitted of charges relating to a 1992 tele-vision station bombing, although three other SL memberswere convicted and sentenced. Morote continues to servean 18-year sentence on a previous terrorism convictionand is one of the “megatrial” defendants.

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In May 2004, the IACHR issued its decision in the casebrought by Lori Berenson, a US citizen and convictedMRTA member, who claimed that the terrorism law en-acted to deal with the overturned terrorist convictions stillviolated international due process of law. While the Courtfound against Peru on some claims, the Court did not in-validate Berenson’s conviction or 20-year sentence.

Peru passed legislation in July 2004 to strengthen and ex-pand the authorities of its financial intelligence unit (FIU).The new legislation included counterterrorist finance ac-tivities among the FIU’s functions; greatly expanded theFIU’s capacity to engage in joint investigations and infor-mation-sharing with foreign FIU’s; enhanced the FIU’scapacity to exchange information and pursue joint caseswith other agencies of the Peruvian Government; and re-quired that individuals and entities transporting more than$10,000 in currency or monetary instruments into or outof Peru file reports with Peruvian Customs. The US Govern-ment continued to provide assistance, including a technicaladvisor and funding for hardware and software, to help Perufight money laundering and other financial crimes.

All of Peru’s major seaports achieved UN and private sec-tor security certifications. The US Government supports aport security program in Peru that focuses onnarcotrafficking but also counters terrorist threats and armssmuggling. Airport security in Peru has been enhancedwith US assistance.

Peru has ratified the Inter-American Convention AgainstTerrorism and signed the August 2003 Asuncion Declara-tion, by which several South American nations committedthemselves to support the Colombian Government in itsongoing struggle against terrorism and drug trafficking.Peru has been an active participant in the United Nationsand OAS Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism(CICTE).

Triborder Area (Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay)

The countries of the Triborder Area (TBA) — Argentina,Brazil, and Paraguay — have long been concerned aboutthe pervasiveness of transnational crime in the regionwhere the three nations converge. In the early 1990s, thecountries established a mechanism for addressing jointlyarms and drug trafficking, contraband smuggling, docu-ment and currency fraud, money laundering, and themanufacture and movement of pirated goods. In 2002, attheir invitation, the United States joined them in a consul-tative mechanism — the “Three Plus One” Group onTriborder Area Security — to strengthen the capabilitiesto fight cross-border crime and thwart money launderingand terrorist fundraising activities. The United States re-mains concerned that Hizballah and HAMAS raise fundsamong the sizable Muslim communities in the region, andthat the high incidence of illicit activity could tempt ter-rorist groups to seek to establish safe havens in this largelyuncontrolled area. Persons suspected of ties to terrorist

groups have been spotted in the TBA, but no operationalactivities of terrorism have been detected.

In December 2004, the United States hosted the fourthhigh-level meeting of the “Three Plus One,” at which thepartners exchanged views on measures taken and progressconfronting the region’s security challenges. Argentina,Brazil, and Paraguay agreed to develop guidelines for de-tecting and monitoring potentially illegal flights in the TBA,to exchange information on cargo flights, and to explorethe feasibility of conducting joint patrols on Iguacu water-ways. They also agreed to meet in 2005 to strengtheninstitutional ties among prosecutors, to consider integratedborder and customs controls, to enhance cooperationamong their financial analysis units, and to begin lookingat charities to prevent their abuse of fundraising. Brazilannounced the creation of a Regional Intelligence Centerin Foz do Iguacu, and Argentina and Paraguay committedto designate liaisons to it. The parties agreed to continueto work among themselves and with the United States toconfront transnational crime and continue to deny the TBAto terrorists.

Individually, the TBA countries maintained strong stancesagainst international terrorism.

Argentina continued to cooperate with the United Na-tions, the OAS, its neighbors, and the United States on anumber of counterterrorism initiatives. Argentine securityforces have been especially vigilant in monitoring illicitactivity and its potential links to Islamic radical groups inthe TBA. There is no credible evidence that operationalIslamic terrorist cells exist in Argentina. Argentina main-tains a leading role in the OAS Inter-American CommitteeAgainst Terrorism (CICTE), established on Argentina’s ini-tiative in the 1990s.

There were no significant acts of international terrorism inArgentina in 2004. In November, small explosive devicesset to detonate after hours at three foreign bank branches(one US) killed a security guard and injured a policeman.No group has claimed responsibility. In September, a three-judge panel acquitted all 22 Argentine defendants chargedin connection with the 1994 terrorist bombing of theBuenos Aires Jewish Community Center, in which at least85 persons were killed. The panel faulted the investiga-tion of the original judge and prosecutors and called foran investigation of their handling of the case and trial. AnArgentine criminal court judge reconfirmed the validityof international arrest warrants against 12 Iranian nation-als, including diplomats stationed in Buenos Aires in 1994,and one Lebanese official believed to head Hizballah’sterrorist wing. There were no new developments in theinvestigation of the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy,in which at least 29 persons were killed.

Draft legislation to criminalize terrorist financing intro-duced in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies in 2003remained stalled through 2004. The draft provides penal-

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ties for violations of international conventions, includingthe UN’s Convention for the Suppression of the Financingof Terrorism. Argentina’s lower legislative chamber willconsider the new legislation once it ratifies the UN pact,as well as the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism.

Argentine executive branch officials and the Central Bankcontinued to be extremely cooperative in 2004, respond-ing quickly and effectively to ensure that the assets ofterrorist groups identified by the United States or the UNwould be frozen if detected in Argentine financial institu-tions. New regulations require travelers to report thecross-border transport of currency in excess of $10,000,whether inbound or outbound and the country is estab-lishing an automated entry/exit system at ports of entry.

Brazil continues to extend practical and effective supportfor US counterterrorism efforts on all fronts, including in-telligence, law enforcement, and finance. There were nointernational terrorism incidents of significance in Brazilin 2004, and no credible evidence of the existence of op-erational terrorist cells. The United States remainedconcerned about the possible use of Brazilian territory fortransit by terrorists using established illegal migrant smug-gling groups or for fundraising for terrorist groups.

In May 2004, the Government of Brazil created a techni-cal team from five key ministries and the Armed Forces toformulate a national policy to combat terrorism. Thegroup’s recommendations are intended as the basis of abill to establish a national authority for combating terror-ism. By the end of 2004, however, the administration ofPresident Lula da Silva had yet to submit a bill to the leg-islature. Also awaiting legislative action were a billintroduced in 2003 aimed at preventing terrorist attackson Brazil’s cyber infrastructure and measures to updateBrazil’s money laundering law that dates back to 1978.There are no significant impediments to the prosecutionor extradition of suspected terrorists by Brazil, althoughBrazil’s legal procedures can be protracted.

Brazil is increasingly capable of monitoring domestic fi-nancial operations and effectively utilizes its FinancialActivities Oversight Council (COAF, in Portuguese) to iden-tify possible funding sources for terrorist groups. The UnitedStates recently provided assistance and training to COAFto upgrade its database and data collection mechanism.In January 2005, the Brazilian Federal Police will inaugu-rate a regional field office in Foz do Iguacu to coordinateits law enforcement efforts in the TBA.

Paraguay has cooperated in the global war against terror-ism by actively supporting counterterrorism initiatives atthe UN and the OAS. In December 2004, at the fourthmeeting of the “Three Plus One”, Paraguay offered to hosta conference of TBA financial intelligence units in the firsthalf of 2005.

In September 2004, Cecilia Cubas, the daughter of a formerpresident of Paraguay, was abducted and subsequentlymurdered. The Paraguayan Government charged, credibly,that what appeared as a kidnap for profit gone awry wasreally the work of a radical leftist group with possible tiesto the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).

Paraguay remained vigilant throughout 2004 against ex-tremists seeking to raise funds among Paraguay’s Muslimcommunity for terrorist activities outside Paraguay. Therewas no credible evidence of operational Islamic terroristcells in Paraguay.

The executive branch’s strong political will to combat ter-rorism notwithstanding, the Government remainedhampered by weak or non-existent legislation and by lim-ited law enforcement and intelligence capabilities. Inparticular, Paraguay lacks an antiterrorism law that wouldafford authorities the special powers needed to investi-gate and prosecute terrorism-related crimes. Lacking sucha law, and adequate money laundering legislation, theGovernment is only able to prosecute suspected terroristfinanciers for tax evasion or other crimes. To address thesedeficiencies, the Government in 2004 prepared for con-sideration by the legislature draft legislation to strengthenParaguay’s anti-money laundering regime and an antiter-rorism bill that would outlaw support for terrorists. Bothneed to be adopted by the legislature. These initiativesare key to Paraguay meeting its internationalcounterterrorism obligations as set forth in UN SecurityCouncil Resolutions.

Despite the lack of specific antiterrorist statutes, Paraguayhas actively prosecuted suspected terrorist fundraisersunder other statutes. Hizballah fundraisers Sobhi Fayadand Ali Nizar Dahroug were sentenced to lengthy prisonterms in November 2002 and August 2003, respectively,for tax evasion. A major accomplishment in 2004 was thesuccessful prosecution and conviction in May of Hizballahfundraiser Assad Ahmad Barakat on charges of tax eva-sion, following his extradition from Brazil. He wassentenced to six and one-half years. The Government isconsidering additional charges of bank fraud, pendingconcurrence by Brazil. (The terms of the Paraguay-Brazilextradition treaty prohibit prosecution of extradited sus-pects on charges other than those that were the basis forextradition.) Separately, in March Paraguay opened a caseof tax evasion against a money exchange house and 46individuals suspected of involvement in money launder-ing. In August, Paraguay brought charges of documentfraud against Barakat’s brother Hatem Barakat, also a sus-pected terrorist financier. Paraguay’s antiterrorist policeSecretariat for the Prevention of International Terrorism(SEPRINTE) continued to provide excellent support in theseand other investigations.

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Uruguay

The Government of Uruguay cooperates fully with theUnited States and international institutions in the war onterrorism, but has not devoted great resources to the ef-fort. There were no significant incidents of internationalterrorism in Uruguay in 2004.

Uruguayan banking and law enforcement agencies pro-fess to search for financial assets, individuals, and groupswith links to terrorism, but they have not discovered anyterrorist assets in Uruguayan financial institutions, nor anyterrorist operatives in Uruguay. The Government has oc-casionally assisted in monitoring the possibility ofextremists raising funds for terrorist groups from Muslimcommunities in the Triborder area and along Uruguay’snorthern frontier with Brazil.

In September 2004, Uruguay approved legislation that sig-nificantly strengthened its anti-money laundering regime.It also signed the Asuncion Declaration in support ofColombia’s efforts against terrorism and drug trafficking.Uruguay seconded personnel to the Executive Secretariatof the Organization of American States’ Committee toCombat Terrorism (CICTE) and, as CICTE Chair, hosted theannual meeting in Montevideo in January 2004.

Venezuela

In 2004, Venezuelan-US counterterrorism cooperationcontinued to be inconsistent at best. Public recrimina-tions against US counterterrorism policies by PresidentChavez and his close supporters overshadowed and de-tracted from the limited cooperation that exists amongspecialists and technicians of the two nations.

Venezuela continued in 2004 to be unwilling or unableto assert control over its 1,400-mile border with Colom-bia. Consequently, Colombia’s three US-designatedForeign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) — the Revolution-ary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the NationalLiberation Army (ELN), and the United Self-Defense Forcesof Colombia (AUC) — continued to regard Venezuelanterritory near the border as a safe area to conduct cross-border incursions, transship arms and drugs, rest, andsecure logistical supplies, as well as to commit kidnappingsand extortion for profit. Weapons and ammunition —some from official Venezuelan stocks and facilities — con-tinued flowing from Venezuelan suppliers andintermediaries into the hands of Colombia’s FTOs. It isunclear to what extent and at what level the VenezuelanGovernment approves of or condones material support toColombian terrorists. President Chavez’s close ties to Cuba,a US-designated state sponsor of terrorism, continue toconcern the US Government.

Current Venezuelan law does not specifically mentioncrimes of terrorism, although the UN Convention on Ter-

rorist Bombings of 1997 and the UN Convention on Ter-rorism Financing of 1999 became law in Venezuela inJuly 2003. Venezuela neither maintains a foreign terroristlist nor designates groups as such. Venezuela signed theOAS Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism in June2002 and ratified it in January 2004. Legislation consid-ered throughout 2004 — including the organized crimebill, anti-terrorism bill, and proposed changes to the pe-nal code — defined terrorist activities, establishedpunishments, facilitated investigation and prosecution, andfroze the assets of terrorism financiers. However, otherproposed changes to the penal code would undercut po-litical freedoms. The law modifying the penal code passedin the Assembly on January 6, 2005, and is awaitingChavez’s signature.

President Chavez’s stated ideological affinity with FARCand ELN — both US-designated Foreign Terrorist Organi-zations (FTOs) — further limited Venezuelancounterterrorism cooperation with Colombia, which in2004 continued to receive less cooperation from Venezu-ela than from its other neighbors. Venezuelan andColombian military and police cooperated on some ter-rorism and drug-related cases. Moreover, the September17 murder of at least six Venezuelan National Guard mem-bers and a civilian engineer near the border with Colombia,reportedly by FARC forces, publicly upset Chavez andraised expectations that border policing would be steppedup with additional resources and political will.

However, President Chavez’s and the VenezuelanGovernment’s acerbic reaction to the December 13 de-tention of Rodrigo Granda Escobar, a reported FARCGeneral Staff member who is considered the FARC’s “for-eign minister,” complicated efforts to enhanceVenezuelan-Colombian counterterrorism cooperation.Granda had reportedly been captured in Venezuela bybounty hunters, and then brought to Cucuta, Colombia(near the Venezuelan border), where he was detained byColombian officials. President Chavez and the Venezu-elan Government publicly accused the ColombianGovernment of infringing on Venezuela’s sovereignty, sus-pended trade and business accords with Colombia, andrecalled Venezuela’s Ambassador to Colombia. PresidentChavez rejected Colombian President Uribe’s offer to meetface-to-face to resolve the impasse and conditioned anymeeting with Uribe — as well as the resumption of traderelations and return of Venezuela’s Ambassador to Colom-bia — on Uribe’s apologizing to Chavez and acceptingresponsibility for violating Venezuela’s sovereignty. In early2005, Chavez and Uribe resolved to move past this inci-dent. However, future counterterrorism cooperationbetween Venezuela and Colombia remains uncertain.

Following the killing of prosecutor Danilo Anderson onNovember 18, 2004, President Chavez orderedVenezuela’s National Defense Council to define an anti-terrorism strategy to include tighter border and

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communications security. At President Chavez’s instruc-tion, the National Assembly formed a committee todevelop an antiterrorism law, and the Supreme Court des-ignated a group of judges to handle terrorism cases.Nevertheless, there are concerns within Venezuela, basedon preliminary details of the antiterrorism law, that Chavez’srecent attention to “terrorism” may be intended to targetdomestic opponents of his Government. An increasinglypoliticized judiciary and the recent appointment of Venezu-elan Government supporters to fill the 12 new seats addedto the Supreme Court (plus five vacancies) cast serious doubtson the judges’ independence and impartiality.

Terrorist tactics were employed throughout 2004 by uni-dentified domestic groups attempting to influence thetenuous political situation, particularly in Caracas. A se-ries of small bombs and threats throughout the year werein some cases blamed on supporters of President Chavezor on the Government’s political opponents. The Venezu-elan Government alleged in 2004 that exile groups andthe US Government sought to overthrow or assassinatePresident Chavez, but offered no proof to support its claims.The Government claimed on May 8 that some 100 Co-lombian paramilitaries were training secretly near Caracas;those detained turned out to be unarmed Colombian agri-cultural workers.

Venezuela’s limited document security, especially for citi-zenship, identity, and travel documents, makes it an

attractive venue for persons involved in criminal activi-ties, including terrorism. Venezuela could serve as a transitpoint for those seeking illegal entry into the United States,Europe, or other destinations.

Most examples of positive counterterrorism cooperationwith the United States pre-date 2004. In the wake of 9/11, Venezuela supported the invocation of the Inter-Ameri-can Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (“The Rio Treaty”),which calls for the collective self-defense of OAS memberstates in response to an attack on any member. Venezuelahad provided limited cooperation to the US Governmenton counterterrorism and counterterrorist finance efforts,as well as US Government counternarcotics initiatives. InNovember 2002, a US Financial Systems Assessment Team(FSAT) visited Venezuela and met with Venezuelan Gov-ernment officials to assess Venezuela’s counterterrorismfinance regime. Venezuelan officials have participated invarious US Government counterterrorism finance courses,identified by the FSAT. The Venezuelan military has re-ceived anti-kidnapping training from the US military.Venezuela helped provide evidence that led to the indict-ment of FARC members for the 1999 murder of threeAmerican indigenous activists. Future counterterrorismcooperation with the United States remains uncertain,especially given President Chavez’s and the VenezuelanGovernment’s actions in 2004.

Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE)

A continuing positive trend in the Western Hemisphere has been the high level of political will to combat terrorism.Although counterterrorism capacity and expertise remain lacking in many states in the hemisphere, countries continuedefforts to strengthen their counterterrorism regimes on all fronts, with an emphasis on cooperation.

At the heart of this cooperation lies the Organization of American States’ Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism(CICTE, in Spanish), which continued in 2004 to enhance regional counterterrorism cooperation and capacity-building.Then-Coordinator for Counterterrorism Cofer Black led the US delegation to the January 2004 CICTE Fourth RegularSession in Montevideo, Uruguay, during which CICTE expanded its mission beyond disrupting terrorism financing andenhancing border security to addressing threats to transportation security (aviation and seaport) and cyber security. Toaccomplish this enhanced mission, CICTE has four ongoing counterterrorism capacity-building programs: airport secu-rity training, border security (land, air, sea) and financial controls, policy engagement exercises, and counterterrorismneeds assessments.

CICTE has delivered over $3 million in counterterrorism capacity-building assistance in the region. In 2004, CICTEprovided training to over 300 port and airport security officials from 28 member states to help meet the requirements ofthe International Maritime Organization’s International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) code, and the InternationalCivil Aviation Organization’s (ICAO) new air security standards. CICTE has advised 15 member state governments onhow to meet the requirements of UNSCR 1373, the 12 UN conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, and theInter-American Convention Against Terrorism.

In 2004, Chile, Dominica, Honduras, Panama, and Venezuela ratified the Inter-American Convention Against Terror-ism, bringing the total number to 12. Having received the 10th ratification, a meeting of states parties, as called for inthe Convention, will be held in 2005. The Convention has been signed by all but one OAS member state, and it cameinto force July 10, 2003. The Convention complements and expands on the 12 UN conventions and protocols relatingto terrorism.

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State Sponsors of Terrorism Overview

Iraq, as it transitioned to democracy, ceased to supportterrorism and its designation as a state sponsor of terror-ism was rescinded in October 2004. Libya and Sudantook significant steps to cooperate in the global war onterrorism in 2004. Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Syria,however, continued to maintain their ties to terrorism.Although some countries in this latter group have takensteps to improve cooperation with global counterterrorismefforts in some areas, all have also continued the actionsthat led them to be designated as state sponsors.

State sponsors of terrorism impede the efforts of the UnitedStates and the international community to fight terrorism.These countries provide a critical foundation for terroristgroups. Without state sponsors, terrorist groups wouldhave a much more difficult time obtaining the funds, weap-ons, materials, and secure areas they require to plan andconduct operations. Most worrisome is that these coun-tries also have the capabilities to manufacture weapons ofmass destruction and other destabilizing technologies thatcould fall into the hands of terrorists. The United Stateswill continue to insist that these countries end the supportthey give to terrorist groups.

Cuba

Throughout 2004, Cuba continued to actively oppose theUS-led coalition prosecuting the global war on terrorism.Cuba continues to maintain at the UN and other fora thatacts by legitimate national liberation movements cannotbe defined as terrorism, and has sought to characterize as“legitimate national liberation movements” a number ofgroups that intentionally target innocent civilians to ad-vance their political, religious, or social agendas. TheCuban Government claims, despite the absence of evidence,that it is a principal victim of terrorism sponsored by Cuban-Americans in the United States. The Cuban Government’sactions and public statements run contrary to the spirit ofthe UN conventions on terrorism that it has signed.

In 2004, Cuba continued to provide limited support todesignated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, as well assafehaven for terrorists. The Cuban Government refusesto turn over suspected terrorists to countries that havecharged them with terrorist acts, alleging that the receiv-ing government would not provide a fair trial on chargesthat are “political.” Havana permitted various ETA mem-bers to reside in Cuba, despite a November 2003 publicrequest from the Spanish Government to deny them sanctu-ary, and provided safehaven and some degree of support tomembers of the Colombian FARC and ELN guerilla groups.

Many of the over seventy fugitives from US justice thathave taken refuge on the island are accused of commit-ting violent acts in the Unites States that targeted innocentsin order to advance political causes. They include JoanneChesimard, who is wanted for the murder of a New Jersey

State Trooper in 1973. On a few rare occasions the Cubangovernment has transferred fugitives to the United States,although it maintains that fugitives would not receive afair trial in the United States.

Iran

Iran remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism in2004. Its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Ministryof Intelligence and Security were involved in the planningand support of terrorist acts and continued to exhort avariety of groups to use terrorism in pursuit of their goals.

Iran continued to be unwilling to bring to justice senioral-Qa’ida members it detained in 2003. Iran has refusedto identify publicly these senior members in its custodyon “security grounds.” Iran has also resisted numerouscalls to transfer custody of its al-Qa’ida detainees to theircountries of origin or third countries for interrogation and/or trial. Iranian judiciary officials claimed to have triedand convicted some Iranian supporters of al-Qa’ida dur-ing 2004, but refused to provide details. Iran also continuedto fail to control the activities of some al Qa’ida memberswho fled to Iran following the fall of the Taliban regime inAfghanistan.

During 2004, Iran maintained a high-profile role in en-couraging anti-Israeli terrorist activity, both rhetorically andoperationally. Supreme Leader Khamenei praised Pales-tinian terrorist operations, and Iran provided LebaneseHizballah and Palestinian terrorist groups — notably

State Sponsor: Implications

Designating countries that repeatedly provide support foracts of international terrorism results in the imposition offour main sets of US Government sanctions:

1. A ban on arms-related exports and sales.2. A requirement for notification to Congress of any

license issued for exports that could make a significantcontribution to the state sponsor’s military potential orcould enhance their ability to support acts ofinternational terrorism.

3. Prohibitions on foreign assistance.4. Miscellaneous financial and other restrictions,

including:• US opposition to loans by the World Bank and other

international financial institutions.• Providing an exception to sovereign immunity to

allow families of terrorist victims to file civil lawsuitsin US courts.

• Restrictions on tax credits for income earned in statesponsor countries.

• Denial of duty-free treatment of goods exported to theUnited States.

• Prohibition of certain Defense Department contractswith companies controlled by state sponsors.

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HAMAS, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the al-Aqsa Mar-tyrs Brigades, and the Popular Front for the Liberation ofPalestine-General Command — with funding, safe haven,training, and weapons. Iran provided an unmanned aerialvehicle that Lebanese Hizballah sent into Israeli airspaceon November 7, 2004.

Iran pursued a variety of policies in Iraq during 2004, someof which appeared to be inconsistent with Iran’s statedobjectives regarding stability in Iraq as well as those ofthe Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) and the Coalition. Se-nior IIG officials have publicly expressed concern overIranian interference in Iraq, and there were reports thatIran provided funding, safe transit, and arms to insurgentelements, including Muqtada al-Sadr’s forces.

Libya

Following Libya’s December 19, 2003, announcement thatit would eliminate its weapons of mass destruction andnon-Missile Technology Control Regime class missiles, theUnited States, the United Kingdom, and relevant interna-tional agencies worked with Libya to eliminate theseweapons in a transparent and verifiable manner. In rec-ognition of Libya’s actions, the United States and Libyabegan the process of improving diplomatic relations. OnFebruary 26, the United States lifted its restriction on theuse of US passports for travel to Libya and eased someeconomic sanctions. On April 23, the United States easedmore sanctions and terminated the applicability of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act provisions to Libya. On June 28, theUnited States reestablished direct diplomatic relations withLibya by upgrading its Interests Section to a US LiaisonOffice. On September 20, the President terminated thestate of emergency declared in 1986 and revoked the re-lated executive orders. This rescinded the remainingeconomic sanctions against Libya under the InternationalEmergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).

Libya remains designated as a state sponsor of terrorismand is still subject to the related sanctions. In 2004, Libyaheld to its practice in recent years of curtailing support forinternational terrorism, although there are outstandingquestions over its residual contacts with some past terror-ist clients. Libya has provided cooperation in the globalwar on terrorism, and Libyan leader Muammar Qadhaficontinued his efforts to identify Libya with the interna-tional community in the war on terrorism. Prior to the January30, 2005, elections in Iraq, senior Libyan officials made state-ments that defended insurgent attacks on US and Coalitionforces; following strong US protests, Libya encouraged Iraqiparticipation in the elections, indicating its intent to recog-nize the upcoming Transitional Iraqi Government, andsupport reciprocal diplomatic missions with Iraq.

Following Libya’s steps to eliminate its weapons of massdestruction and the September 20 revocation of US eco-nomic sanctions related to the national emergency, Libya

authorized a second payment of $4 million per family tothe families of the 270 victims of the 1988 Pan Am 103bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland. This payment was partof a deal concluded in 2003 between Libya and the fami-lies in which Libya agreed to pay $10 million per family,or $2.7 billion, contingent upon the lifting of UN and USsanctions and removal of Libya from the state sponsors ofterrorism list. By year’s end, UN and US sanctions werelifted and the families had received a total of $8 millioneach, even though Libya remained designated as a statesponsor of terrorism. A remaining $2 million per familyremained in a third-country escrow account, pendingLibya’s removal from the terrorism list.

Libya resolved two other outstanding international disputesstemming from terrorist attacks that Libya conducted dur-ing the 1980s. In January, the Qadhafi Foundation agreedto pay $170 million to the non-US families of victims ofthe 1989 bombing of a French UTA passenger aircraft.Separate cases for compensation filed by US victims’ fami-lies are still pending in the US courts. In 2001, a Germancourt issued a written opinion finding that the Libyan in-telligence service had orchestrated the 1986 bombing ofthe La Belle nightclub in Berlin, in which two US service-men and a Turkish woman were killed and 229 people wereinjured. The Court convicted four individuals for carryingout the attack. In August, the Qadhafi Foundation agreed topay $35 million to compensate non-US victims of the LaBelle attack. In reaching the agreement to pay compensa-tion, Libya stressed that it was not acknowledgingresponsibility for the attack, but was making a humanitariangesture. The families of the US victims are pursuing sepa-rate legal cases, and Libyan officials publicly called forcompensation for their own victims of the 1986 US air strikesin Libya.

In October, Libya was instrumental in the handover ofAmari Saifi, also known as Abderrazak al-Para, the num-ber two figure in the Salafist Group for Call and Combat(GSPC), to Algeria. Al-Para, responsible for the kidnap-ping of 32 Western tourists in Algeria in 2003, had beenheld by a Chadian rebel group, the Movement for De-mocracy and Justice, for several months. In August,Abdulrahman Alamoudi pled guilty to one count of unli-censed travel and commerce with Libya. Alamoudi statedthat he had been part of a 2003 plot to assassinate SaudiCrown Prince Abdullah at the behest of Libyan officials.The United States expressed its serious concerns aboutthese allegations and continues to evaluate Libya’s De-cember 2003 assurances to halt all use of violence forpolitical purposes.

In December 2004, the US designated the Libyan IslamicFighting Group (LIFG) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

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North Korea

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is notknown to have sponsored any terrorist acts since the bomb-ing of a Korean Airlines flight in 1987.

At a summit with Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi inPyongyang in September 2002, National Defense Com-mission Chairman Kim Jong Il acknowledged theinvolvement of DPRK “special institutions” in the kidnap-ping of Japanese citizens and said that those responsiblehad already been punished. Pyongyang in 2003 allowedthe return to Japan of five surviving abductees, and in 2004of eight family members, mostly children, of thoseabductees. Questions about the fate of other abducteesremain the subject of ongoing negotiations between Ja-pan and the DPRK. In November, the DPRK returned toJapan what it identified as the remains of two Japaneseabductees whom the North had reported as having diedin North Korea. Subsequent DNA testing in Japan indi-cated that the remains were not those of Megumi Yokotaor Kaoru Matsuki, as Pyongyang had claimed, and the is-sue remained contentious at year’s end. Four JapaneseRed Army members remain in the DPRK following theirinvolvement in a jet hijacking in 1970; five of their familymembers returned to Japan in 2004.

Although it is a party to six international conventions andprotocols relating to terrorism, Pyongyang has not takensubstantial steps to cooperate in efforts to combat interna-tional terrorism.

Sudan

In 2004, despite serious strains in US-Sudanese relationsregarding the ongoing violence in Darfur, US-Sudanesecounterterrorism cooperation continued to improve. WhileSudan’s overall cooperation and information sharing im-proved markedly and produced significant progress incombating terrorist activity, areas of concern remain. InMay, the US Government certified to Congress a list of coun-tries not fully cooperating in US antiterrorism efforts. For thefirst time in many years, this list did not include Sudan.

Sudan increased cooperation with Ugandan authoritiesto diminish the capabilities of the Lord’s Resistance Army(LRA), a Ugandan group which has terrorized civilians innorthern Uganda and has claimed that it wants to over-throw the current Ugandan Government. The Ugandanmilitary, with Sudanese Government cooperation, inflicteda series of defeats on the LRA at its hideouts in southernSudan, forcing its leaders to flee into Uganda and engagein peace talks with the Ugandan Government.

Domestically, the Government of Sudan stepped up ef-forts to disrupt extremist activities and deter terrorists fromoperating in Sudan. In March 2004, a new HAMAS repre-sentative arrived in Khartoum. According to some press

reports, he was received by Sudanese officials in an offi-cial capacity. In response to ongoing US concern, theSudanese Government closed a HAMAS office inKhartoum in September. In August, Sudanese authoritiesarrested, prosecuted, and convicted Eritreans who hadhijacked a Libyan aircraft and forced it to land in Khartoum.In October, the United States designated the Khartoum-based NGO Islamic African Relief Agency as a supporterof terrorism under EO 13224 for its support of Usama binLadin and al-Qa’ida.

The Sudanese Government also took steps in 2004 tostrengthen its legislative and bureaucratic instruments forfighting terrorism. In January, Sudan co-hosted a three-day workshop on international cooperation oncounterterrorism and the fight against transnational orga-nized crime with the United Nations Office of DrugControl. Neighboring countries from the Horn of Africaand member states of the Inter-Governmental Authorityon Development (IGAD) attended the workshop, whichculminated in the “Khartoum Declaration on Terrorismand Transnational Organized Crime,” in which IGAD mem-ber states reaffirmed their commitment to the fight againstterrorism. The Khartoum Declaration also focused on thetechnical assistance needs of the IGAD member states withregard to implementing the 12 international conventionsand protocols against terrorism.

Syria

The Syrian Government in 2004 continued to providepolitical and material support to both Lebanese Hizballahand Palestinian terrorist groups. HAMAS, Palestinian Is-lamic Jihad (PIJ), the Popular Front for the Liberation ofPalestine (PFLP) and the Popular Front for the Liberationof Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), among oth-ers, continue to operate from Syria, although they havelowered their public profiles since May 2003, when Dam-ascus announced that the groups had voluntarily closedtheir offices. Many of these Palestinian groups, in state-ments originating from both inside and outside of Syria,claimed responsibility for anti-Israeli terrorist attacks in2004. The Syrian Government insists that these Damascus-based offices undertake only political and informationalactivities. Syria also continued to permit Iran to use Dam-ascus as a transshipment point for resupplying LebaneseHizballah in Lebanon.

Syrian officials have publicly condemned internationalterrorism, but make a distinction between terrorism andwhat they consider to be the legitimate armed resistanceof Palestinians in the occupied territories and of LebaneseHizballah. The Syrian Government has not been implicateddirectly in an act of terrorism since 1986, although Israeliofficials accused Syria of being indirectly involved in theAugust 31, 2004, Beersheva bus bombings that left 16 dead.

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Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism

Production of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems constitutes a major threat tointernational peace and security. The threat is compounded by the interests of terrorists in acquiring WMD.This would undermine the foundations of international order. We pledge to use all means available to avertWMD proliferation and the calamities that would follow.

Joint statement by President George W. Bush, European Council President Konstandinos Simitis,and European Commission President Romano Prodi

The September 11, 2001, attacks confirmed that terrorists will seek to produce mass casualties whenever they believe itserves their purposes. Although terrorists will probably continue to rely on traditional terrorist tactics, several groups —including al-Qa’ida — increasingly look to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) materials as a meansto cause mass casualties rivaling or exceeding those of September 11. Troublesome amounts of dangerous materials,and information about how to create and deliver CBRN weapons, remain available to terrorists.

Usama bin Ladin has said he sees the acquisition of WMD as a “religious duty,” and he has threatened to use suchweapons. This rhetoric was underscored by reports that documents retrieved from al-Qa’ida facilities in Afghanistancontain information on CBRN materials.

However, the threat is not limited to bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida. Information indicates that small but growing numbers ofother terrorist groups are also interested in CBRN materials. In Europe, French police seized a chemical contaminationsuit and arrested a terrorist cell in December 2002 that allegedly was planning an attack using chemical agents.

CBRN terrorism events to date have generally involved crude and improvised delivery means that have been onlymarginally effective. With the exceptions of the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo attacks inTokyo and the 2001 US anthrax attacks,the materials employed in these events also have been crudely manufactured. Other events have involved dual-usematerials that have legitimate civilian applications, such as industrial chemicals, poisons, pesticides, and radiologicalsource materials embedded in legitimate measuring instruments. Although terrorist events involving these materials andimprovised delivery systems can cause significant casualties, damage, and disruption, such events pale in comparisonto the casualties and damage that could occur if terrorists acquired WMD and the ability to deliver them effectively.

Preventing the proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials and technologies has long been apillar of national security. Since September 11, the nonproliferation of WMD has become an even more urgent priority.President Bush made this clear in his December 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, inwhich he set out a comprehensive strategy to prevent WMD proliferation, including to terrorists.

In May 2003, President Bush announced the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a global multilateral arrangement toseize sensitive cargoes that may be in transit to and from states and nonstate actors of proliferation concern. PSI is aninterdiction program. PSI participants jointly explore and train in the best use of counterproliferation tools — diplo-matic, intelligence, and operational — to stop proliferation at sea, in the air, and on land. The United States is workingwithin multilateral non-proliferation regimes and other international fora. Bilaterally, the United States promotes morestringent non-proliferation policies and programs; strengthened export controls; and improved border security to pre-vent terrorists or their state sponsors from acquiring WMD, their delivery systems, related materials, or technologies. Asthe President’s National Strategy notes, however, should diplomatic efforts fall short, the United States will be preparedto deter and defend against the full range of WMD threats.

Damascus has cooperated with the United States and otherforeign governments against al-Qa’ida and other terroristorganizations and individuals; it also has discouraged signsof public support for al-Qa’ida, including in the mediaand at mosques.

In September 2004, Syria hosted border security discus-sions with the Iraqis and took a number of measures to

improve the physical security of the border and establishsecurity cooperation mechanisms. Although these andother efforts by the Syrian Government have been partlysuccessful, more must be done in order to prevent the useof Syrian territory by those individuals and groups sup-porting the insurgency in Iraq.

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Chapter 6Terrorist Groups

Title 22 of the US Code, Section 2656f, which requires the Department of State to provide an annual report to Con-gress on terrorism, requires the report to include, inter alia, information on terrorist groups and umbrella groups underwhich any terrorist group falls, known to be responsible for the kidnapping or death of any US citizen during thepreceding five years; groups known to be financed by state sponsors of terrorism about which Congress was notifiedduring the past year in accordance with Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act; and any other known interna-tional terrorist group that the Secretary of State determined should be the subject of the report. The list of designatedForeign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) below is followed by a list of other selected terrorist groups also deemed ofrelevance in the global war on terrorism.

Foreign Terrorist Organizations

17 NovemberAbu Nidal Organization (ANO)Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)Al-Aqsa Martyrs BrigadeAnsar al-Islam (AI)Armed Islamic Group (GIA)Asbat al-AnsarAum Shinrikyo (Aum)Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA)Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)Gama’a al-Islamiyya (IG)HAMASHarakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM)HizballahIslamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM)Jemaah Islamiya Organization (JI)Al-Jihad (AJ)Kahane Chai (Kach)Kongra-Gel (KGK)Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LT)Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ)Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK)National Liberation Army (ELN)Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)Al-Qa’idaReal IRA (RIRA)Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)Revolutionary Nuclei (RN)Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC)Shining Path (SL)Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (QJBR)United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)

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17 Novembera.k.a. Epanastatiki Organosi 17 NoemvriRevolutionary Organization 17 November

Description17 November is a radical leftist group established in 1975and named for the student uprising in Greece in Novem-ber 1973 that protested the ruling military junta. 17November is an anti-Greek establishment, anti-UnitedStates, anti-Turkey, and anti-NATO group that seeks theouster of US bases from Greece, the removal of Turkishmilitary forces from Cyprus, and the severing of Greece’sties to NATO and the European Union (EU).

ActivitiesInitial attacks were assassinations of senior US officialsand Greek public figures. They began using bombings inthe 1980s. Since 1990, 17 November has expanded itstargets to include EU facilities and foreign firms investingin Greece and has added improvised rocket attacks to itsmethods. It supported itself largely through bank robber-ies. A failed 17 November bombing attempt in June 2002at the Port of Piraeus in Athens, coupled with robust de-tective work, led to the arrest of 19 members — the first17 November operatives ever arrested. In December2003, a Greek court convicted 15 members — five ofwhom were given multiple life terms — of hundreds ofcrimes. Four other alleged members were acquitted forlack of evidence. In September 2004, several jailed mem-bers serving life sentences began hunger strikes to attainbetter prison conditions.

StrengthUnknown but presumed to be small.

Location/Area of OperationAthens, Greece.

External AidUnknown.

Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)a.k.a. Fatah Revolutionary Council, ArabRevolutionary Brigades, Black September,Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims

DescriptionThe ANO international terrorist organization was foundedby Sabri al-Banna (a.k.a. Abu Nidal) after splitting fromthe PLO in 1974. The group’s previous known structureconsisted of various functional committees, includingpolitical, military, and financial. In November 2002 AbuNidal died in Baghdad; the new leadership of the organi-zation remains unclear.

ActivitiesThe ANO has carried out terrorist attacks in 20 countries,killing or injuring almost 900 persons. Targets includethe United States, the United Kingdom, France, Israel,moderate Palestinians, the PLO, and various Arab coun-tries. Major attacks included the Rome and Vienna airportsin 1985, the Neve Shalom synagogue in Istanbul, the hi-jacking of Pan Am Flight 73 in Karachi in 1986, and theCity of Poros day-excursion ship attack in Greece in 1988.The ANO is suspected of assassinating PLO deputy chiefAbu Iyad and PLO security chief Abu Hul in Tunis in 1991.The ANO assassinated a Jordanian diplomat in Lebanonin 1994 and has been linked to the killing of the PLOrepresentative there. The group has not staged a majorattack against Western targets since the late 1980s.

StrengthFew hundred plus limited overseas support structure.

Location/Area of OperationAl-Banna relocated to Iraq in December 1998 where thegroup maintained a presence until Operation Iraqi Free-dom, but its current status in country is unknown. Knownmembers have an operational presence in Lebanon, in-cluding in several Palestinian refugee camps. Authoritiesshut down the ANO’s operations in Libya and Egypt in1999. The group has demonstrated the ability to operateover a wide area, including the Middle East, Asia, andEurope. However, financial problems and internal disor-ganization have greatly reduced the group’s activities andits ability to maintain cohesive terrorist capability.

External AidThe ANO received considerable support, including safehaven, training, logistical assistance, and financial aidfrom Iraq, Libya, and Syria (until 1987), in addition toclose support for selected operations.

Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

DescriptionThe ASG is primarily a small, violent Muslim terroristgroup operating in the southern Philippines. Some ASGleaders allegedly fought in Afghanistan during the Sovietwar and are students and proponents of radical Islamicteachings. The group split from the much larger MoroNational Liberation Front in the early 1990s under theleadership of Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani, who waskilled in a clash with Philippine police in December 1998.His younger brother, Khadaffy Janjalani, replaced him asthe nominal leader of the group and appears to have con-solidated power.

ActivitiesThe ASG engages in kidnappings for ransom, bombings,beheadings, assassinations, and extortion. The group’sstated goal is to promote an independent Islamic state in

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western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago (areas in thesouthern Philippines heavily populated by Muslims) butthe ASG has primarily used terror for financial profit. Re-cent bombings may herald a return to a more radical,politicized agenda, at least among certain factions. Thegroup’s first large-scale action was a raid on the town ofIpil in Mindanao in April 1995. In April of 2000, an ASGfaction kidnapped 21 persons, including 10 Western tour-ists, from a resort in Malaysia. On May 27, 2001, theASG kidnapped three US citizens and 17 Filipinos from atourist resort in Palawan, Philippines. Several of the hos-tages, including US citizen Guillermo Sobero, weremurdered. During a Philippine military hostage rescueoperation on June 7, 2002, US hostage Gracia Burnhamwas rescued, but her husband Martin Burnham andFilipina Deborah Yap were killed. Philippine authoritiessay that the ASG had a role in the bombing near a Philip-pine military base in Zamboanga in October 2002 thatkilled a US serviceman. In February 2004, KhadaffyJanjalani’s faction bombed SuperFerry 14 in Manila Bay,killing approximately 132, and in March, Philippine au-thorities arrested an ASG cell whose bombing targetsincluded the US Embassy in Manila.

StrengthEstimated to have 200 to 500 members.

Location/Area of OperationThe ASG was founded in Basilan Province and operatesthere and in the neighboring provinces of Sulu and Tawi-Tawi in the Sulu Archipelago. The group also operates onthe Zamboanga peninsula, and members occasionallytravel to Manila. In mid-2003, the group started operat-ing in the major city of Cotobato and on the coast of SultanKudarat on Mindanao. The group expanded its opera-tional reach to Malaysia in 2000 when it abductedforeigners from a tourist resort.

External AidLargely self-financing through ransom and extortion; hasreceived support from Islamic extremists in the MiddleEast and may receive support from regional terroristgroups. Libya publicly paid millions of dollars for the re-lease of the foreign hostages seized from Malaysia in 2000.

Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (al-Aqsa)a.k.a. al-Aqsa Martyrs Battalion

DescriptionThe al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade consists of an unknown num-ber of small cells of terrorists associated with thePalestinian Fatah organization. Al-Aqsa emerged at theoutset of the 2000 Palestinian intifadah to attack Israelitargets with the aim of driving the Israeli military and set-tlers from the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Jerusalem, andto establish a Palestinian state.

ActivitiesAl-Aqsa has carried out shootings and suicide operationsagainst Israeli civilians and military personnel in Israeland the Palestinian territories, rocket and mortar attacksagainst Israel and Israeli settlements from the Gaza Strip,and the killing of Palestinians suspected of collaboratingwith Israel. Al-Aqsa has killed a number of US citizens,the majority of them dual US-Israeli citizens, in its at-tacks. In January 2002, al-Aqsa was the first Palestinianterrorist group to use a female suicide bomber.

StrengthUnknown.

Location/Area of OperationAl-Aqsa operates in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip,and has only claimed attacks inside these three areas. Itmay have followers in Palestinian refugee camps in south-ern Lebanon.

External AidIn the last year, numerous public accusations suggest Iranand Hizballah are providing support to al-Aqsa elements,but the extent of external influence on al-Aqsa as a wholeis not clear.

Ansar al-Islam (AI)a.k.a. Ansar al-Sunnah Partisans of Islam,Helpers of Islam, Kurdish Taliban

DescriptionAnsar al-Islam (AI) is a radical Islamist group of Iraqi Kurdsand Arabs who have vowed to establish an independentIslamic state in Iraq. The group was formed in December2001. In the fall of 2003, a statement was issued callingall jihadists in Iraq to unite under the name Ansar al-Sunnah (AS). Since that time, it is likely that AI has postedall claims of attack under the name AS.

AI is closely allied with al-Qa’ida and Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi’s group, Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Biladal-Rafidayn (QJBR) in Iraq. Some members of AI trainedin al-Qa’ida camps in Afghanistan, and the group pro-vided safe haven to al-Qa’ida fighters before OperationIraqi Freedom (OIF). Since OIF, AI has become one ofthe leading groups engaged in anti-Coalition attacks inIraq and has developed a robust propaganda campaign.

ActivitiesAI continues to conduct attacks against Coalition forces,Iraqi Government officials and security forces, and eth-nic Iraqi groups and political parties. AI members havebeen implicated in assassinations and assassination at-tempts against Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) officialsand Coalition forces, and also work closely with both al-Qa’ida operatives and associates in QJBR. AI has alsoclaimed responsibility for many high profile attacks, in-

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cluding the simultaneous suicide bombings of the PUKand Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) party offices in Ibrilon February 1, 2004, and the bombing of the US militarydining facility in Mosul on December 21, 2004.

StrengthApproximately 500 to 1,000 members.

Location/Area of OperationPrimarily central and northern Iraq.

External AidThe group receives funding, training, equipment, andcombat support from al-Qa’ida, QJBR, and other interna-tional jihadist backers throughout the world. AI also hasoperational and logistic support cells in Europe.

Armed Islamic Group (GIA)

DescriptionAn Islamist extremist group, the GIA aims to overthrowthe Algerian regime and replace it with a fundamentalistIslamic state. The GIA began its violent activity in 1992after the military government suspended legislative elec-tions in anticipation of an overwhelming victory by theIslamic Salvation Front, the largest Islamic oppositionparty.

ActivitiesThe GIA has engaged in attacks against civilians and gov-ernment workers. Starting in 1992, the GIA conducted aterrorist campaign of civilian massacres, sometimes wip-ing out entire villages in its area of operation, and killingtens of thousands of Algerians. GIA’s brutal attacks oncivilians alienated them from the Algerian populace.Since announcing its campaign against foreigners livingin Algeria in 1992, the GIA has killed more than 100 ex-patriate men and women, mostly Europeans, in thecountry. Many of the GIA’s members have joined otherIslamist groups or been killed or captured by the AlgerianGovernment. The GIA’s most recent significant attackswere in August, 2001.

StrengthPrecise numbers are unknown, but probably fewer than 100.

Location/Area of OperationAlgeria, Sahel (i.e. northern Mali, northern Mauritania,and northern Niger), and Europe.

External AidThe GIA has members in Europe that provide funding.

Asbat al-Ansar

DescriptionAsbat al-Ansar, the League of the Followers or Partisans’League, is a Lebanon-based Sunni extremist group, com-posed primarily of Palestinians with links to Usama BinLadin’s al-Qa’ida organization and other Sunni extremistgroups. The group follows an extremist interpretation ofIslam that justifies violence against civilian targets toachieve political ends. Some of the group’s goals includeoverthrowing the Lebanese Government and thwartingperceived anti-Islamic and pro-Western influences in thecountry.

ActivitiesAsbat al-Ansar has carried out multiple terrorist attacksin Lebanon since it first emerged in the early 1990s. Thegroup assassinated Lebanese religious leaders andbombed nightclubs, theaters, and liquor stores in the mid-1990s. The group raised its operational profile in 2000with two attacks against Lebanese and international tar-gets. It was involved in clashes in northern Lebanon inDecember 1999 and carried out a rocket-propelled gre-nade attack on the Russian Embassy in Beirut in January2000. Asbat al-Ansar’s leader, Abu Muhjin, remains atlarge despite being sentenced to death in absentia for the1994 murder of a Muslim cleric.

Suspected Asbat al-Ansar elements were responsible foran attempt in April 2003 to use a car bomb against aMcDonald’s in a Beirut suburb. By October, Lebanesesecurity forces arrested Ibn al-Shahid, who is believed tobe associated with Asbat al-Ansar, and charged him withmasterminding the bombing of three fast food restaurantsin 2002 and the attempted attack on a McDonald’s in2003. Asbat forces were involved in other violence inLebanon in 2003, including clashes with members ofYassir Arafat’s Fatah movement in the ‘Ayn al-Hilwah refu-gee camp and a rocket attack in June on the Future TVbuilding in Beirut.

In 2004, no successful terrorist attacks were attributed toAsbat al-Ansar. However, in September, operatives withlinks to the group were believed to be involved in aplanned terrorist operation targeting the Italian Embassy,the Ukrainian Consulate General, and Lebanese Govern-ment offices. The plot, which reportedly also involvedother Lebanese Sunni extremists, was thwarted by Ital-ian, Lebanese, and Syrian security agencies. In 2004,Asbat al-Ansar remained vocal in its condemnation ofthe United States’ presence in Iraq, and in April the groupurged Iraqi insurgents to kill US and other hostages toavenge the death of HAMAS leaders Abdul Aziz Rantisiand Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. In October, Mahir al-Sa’di, amember of Asbat al-Ansar, was sentenced in absentia tolife imprisonment for plotting to assassinate former USAmbassador to Lebanon David Satterfield in 2000. Untilhis death in March 2003, al-Sa’di worked in cooperationwith Abu Muhammad al-Masri, the head of al-Qa’ida at

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the ‘Ayn al-Hilwah refugee camp, where fighting has oc-curred between Asbat al-Ansar and Fatah elements.

StrengthThe group commands about 300 fighters in Lebanon.

Location/Area of OperationThe group’s primary base of operations is the ‘Ayn al-Hilwah Palestinian refugee camp near Sidon in southernLebanon.

External AidProbably receives money through international Sunni ex-tremist networks and possibly Usama Bin Ladin’s al-Qa’idanetwork.

Aum Shinrikyo (Aum)a.k.a. Aum Supreme Truth, Aleph

DescriptionA cult established in 1987 by Shoko Asahara, the Aumaimed to take over Japan and then the world. Approvedas a religious entity in 1989 under Japanese law, the groupran candidates in a Japanese parliamentary election in1990. Over time, the cult began to emphasize the immi-nence of the end of the world and stated that the UnitedStates would initiate Armageddon by starting World WarIII with Japan. The Japanese Government revoked its rec-ognition of the Aum as a religious organization in October1995, but in 1997 a Government panel decided not toinvoke the Anti-Subversive Law against the group, whichwould have outlawed it. A 1999 law continues to givethe Japanese Government authorization to maintain po-lice surveillance of the group due to concerns that theAum might launch future terrorist attacks. Under the lead-ership of Fumihiro Joyu, the Aum changed its name toAleph in January 2000 and tried to distance itself fromthe violent and apocalyptic teachings of its founder. How-ever, in late 2003, Joyu stepped down, pressured bymembers who wanted to return fully to the worship ofAsahara.

ActivitiesOn March 20, 1995, Aum members simultaneously re-leased the chemical nerve agent sarin on several Tokyosubway trains, killing 12 persons and injuring up to 1,500.The group was responsible for other mysterious eventsinvolving chemical incidents in Japan in 1994. Its effortsto conduct attacks using biological agents have been un-successful. Japanese police arrested Asahara in May 1995,and authorities sentenced him in February 2004 to deathfor his role in the attacks of 1995. Since 1997, the culthas continued to recruit new members, engage in com-mercial enterprise, and acquire property, although itscaled back these activities significantly in 2001 in re-sponse to public outcry. In July 2001, Russian authorities

arrested a group of Russian Aum followers who hadplanned to set off bombs near the Imperial Palace in To-kyo as part of an operation to free Asahara from jail andsmuggle him to Russia.

StrengthThe Aum’s current membership in Japan is estimated tobe about 1,650 persons. At the time of the Tokyo subwayattack, the group claimed to have 9,000 members in Ja-pan and as many as 40,000 worldwide.

Location/Area of OperationThe Aum’s principal membership is located in Japan, buta residual branch comprising about 300 followers hassurfaced in Russia.

External AidNone.

Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)a.k.a. Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna, Batasuna

DescriptionETA was founded in 1959 with the aim of establishing anindependent homeland based on Marxist principles andencompassing the Spanish Basque provinces of Vizcaya,Guipuzcoa, and Alava, as well as the autonomous regionof Navarra and the southwestern French Departments ofLabourd, Basse-Navarra, and Soule. Spanish and Frenchcounterterrorism initiatives since 2000 have hamperedthe group’s operational capabilities. Spanish police ar-rested scores of ETA members and accomplices in Spainin 2004, and dozens were apprehended in France, in-cluding two key group leaders. These arrests includedthe capture in October of two key ETA leaders in south-western France. ETA’s political wing, Batasuna, remainsbanned in Spain. Spanish and French prisons are esti-mated to hold over 700 ETA members.

ActivitiesPrimarily involved in bombings and assassinations ofSpanish Government officials, security and military forces,politicians, and judicial figures, but has also targeted jour-nalists and tourist areas. Security service scrutiny and apublic outcry after the Islamic extremist train bombingon March 11, 2004, in Madrid limited ETA’s capabilitiesand willingness to inflict casualties. ETA conducted nofatal attacks in 2004, but did mount several low-levelbombings in Spanish tourist areas during the summer and11 bombings in early December, each preceded by awarning call. The group has killed more than 850 per-sons and injured hundreds of others since it began lethalattacks in the 1960s. ETA finances its activities primarilythrough extortion and robbery.

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StrengthUnknown; hundreds of members plus supporters.

Location/Area of OperationOperates primarily in the Basque autonomous regions ofnorthern Spain and southwestern France, but also has at-tacked Spanish and French interests elsewhere.

External AidHas received training at various times in the past in Libya,Lebanon, and Nicaragua. Some ETA members allegedlyfled to Cuba and Mexico while others reside in SouthAmerica. ETA members have operated and been arrestedin other European countries, including Belgium, The Neth-erlands, and Germany.

Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA)

DescriptionThe military wing of the Communist Party of the Philip-pines (CPP), the NPA is a Maoist group formed in March1969 with the aim of overthrowing the Governmentthrough protracted guerrilla warfare. The chairman of theCPP’s Central Committee and the NPA’s founder, JoseMaria Sison, reportedly directs CPP and NPA activity fromThe Netherlands, where he lives in self-imposed exile.Fellow Central Committee member and director of theCPP’s overt political wing, the National Democratic Front(NDF), Luis Jalandoni also lives in The Netherlands andhas become a Dutch citizen. Although primarily a rural-based guerrilla group, the NPA has an active urbaninfrastructure to support its terrorist activities and usescity-based assassination squads. The rebels have claimedthat the FTO designation has made it difficult to obtainforeign funding and forced them to step up extortion ofbusinesses and politicians in the Philippines.

ActivitiesThe NPA primarily targets Philippine security forces, poli-ticians, judges, government informers, former rebels whowish to leave the NPA, rival splinter groups, alleged crimi-nals, Philippine infrastructure, and businesses that refuseto pay extortion, or “revolutionary taxes.” The NPA op-poses any US military presence in the Philippines andattacked US military interests, killing several US servicepersonnel, before the US base closures in 1992. Pressreports in 1999 and in late 2001 indicated the NPA wasagain targeting US troops participating in joint militaryexercises, as well as US Embassy personnel. The NPAhas claimed responsibility for the assassination of two con-gressmen from Quezon in May 2001 and Cagayan in June2001 and for many other killings. In January 2002, theNPA publicly expressed its intent to target US personnelif discovered in NPA operating areas.

StrengthEstimated at less than 9,000, a number significantly lowerthan its peak strength of around 25,000 in the 1980s.

Location/Area of OperationsOperates in rural Luzon, Visayas, and parts of Mindanao.Has cells in Manila and other metropolitan centers.


Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)a.k.a. Continuity Army Council, Republican Sinn Fein

DescriptionCIRA is a terrorist splinter group formed in the mid 1990sas the clandestine armed wing of Republican Sinn Fein,which split from Sinn Fein in 1986. “Continuity” refersto the group’s belief that it is carrying on the original IrishRepublican Army’s (IRA) goal of forcing the British out ofNorthern Ireland. CIRA’s aliases, Continuity Army Coun-cil and Republican Sinn Fein, were also designated asFTOs. CIRA cooperates with the larger Real IRA.

ActivitiesCIRA has been active in Belfast and the border areas ofNorthern Ireland, where it has carried out bombings, as-sassinations, kidnappings, hijackings, extortion, androbberies. On occasion, it has provided advance warn-ing to police of its attacks. Targets include British military,Northern Ireland security forces, and Loyalist paramili-tary groups. Unlike the Provisional IRA, CIRA is notobserving a cease-fire. CIRA has continued its activitieswith a series of hoax bomb threats, low-level improvisedexplosive device attacks, kidnapping, intimidation, andso-called “punishment beatings.”

StrengthMembership is small, with possibly fewer than 50 hard-core activists. Police counterterrorist operations havereduced the group’s strength, but CIRA continues to re-cruit, train, and plan operations.

Location/Area of OperationNorthern Ireland, Irish Republic. Does not have an es-tablished presence in Great Britain.

External AidSuspected of receiving funds and arms from sympathiz-ers in the United States. May have acquired arms andmateriel from the Balkans in cooperation with the Real IRA.

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Gama’a al-Islamiyya (IG)a.k.a. Islamic Group, al-Gama’at

DescriptionThe IG, Egypt’s largest militant group, has been activesince the late 1970s, and is a loosely organized network.It has an external wing with supporters in several coun-tries. The group’s issuance of a cease-fire in 1997 led toa split into two factions: one, led by Mustafa Hamza, sup-ported the cease-fire; the other, led by Rifa’i Taha Musa,called for a return to armed operations. The IG issuedanother ceasefire in March 1999, but its spiritual leader,Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman, sentenced to life in prisonin January 1996 for his involvement in the 1993 WorldTrade Center bombing and incarcerated in the UnitedStates, rescinded his support for the cease-fire in June2000. IG has not conducted an attack inside Egypt sincethe Luxor attack in 1997, which killed 58 tourists andfour Egyptians and wounded dozens more. In February1998, a senior member signed Usama Bin Ladin’s fatwacalling for attacks against the United States.

In early 2001, Taha Musa published a book in which heattempted to justify terrorist attacks that would cause masscasualties. Taha Musa disappeared several months there-after, and there is no information as to his currentwhereabouts. In March 2002, members of the group’shistoric leadership in Egypt declared use of violence mis-guided and renounced its future use, promptingdenunciations by much of the leadership abroad. TheEgyptian Government continues to release IG membersfrom prison, including approximately 900 in 2003; like-wise, most of the 700 persons released in 2004 at the end ofthe Muslim holy month of Ramadan were IG members.

For IG members still dedicated to violent jihad, their pri-mary goal is to overthrow the Egyptian Government andreplace it with an Islamic state. Disaffected IG members,such as those inspired by Taha Musa or Abd al-Rahman,may be interested in carrying out attacks against US in-terests.

ActivitiesIG conducted armed attacks against Egyptian security andother Government officials, Coptic Christians, and Egyp-tian opponents of Islamic extremism before the cease-fire.After the 1997 cease-fire, the faction led by Taha Musalaunched attacks on tourists in Egypt, most notably theattack in November 1997 at Luxor. IG also claimed re-sponsibility for the attempt in June 1995 to assassinateEgyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethio-pia.

StrengthUnknown. At its peak IG probably commanded severalthousand hard-core members and a like number of sym-pathizers. The 1999 cease-fire, security crackdownsfollowing the attack in Luxor in 1997 and, more recently,

security efforts following September 11 probably have re-sulted in a substantial decrease in the group’s numbers.

Location/Area of OperationOperates mainly in the al-Minya, Asyut, Qina, and SohajGovernorates of southern Egypt. Also appears to havesupport in Cairo, Alexandria, and other urban locations,particularly among unemployed graduates and students.Has a worldwide presence, including in the United King-dom, Afghanistan, Yemen, and various locations in Europe.

External AidUnknown. There is some evidence that Usama bin Ladinand Afghan militant groups support the organization. IGalso may obtain some funding through various Islamicnon-governmental organizations (NGOs).

HAMASa.k.a. Islamic Resistance Movement

DescriptionHAMAS was formed in late 1987 as an outgrowth of thePalestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. VariousHAMAS elements have used both violent and politicalmeans, including terrorism, to pursue the goal of estab-lishing an Islamic Palestinian state in Israel. It is looselystructured, with some elements working clandestinely andothers operating openly through mosques and social ser-vice institutions to recruit members, raise money, organizeactivities, and distribute propaganda. HAMAS’ strengthis concentrated in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

ActivitiesHAMAS terrorists, especially those in the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, have conducted many attacks,including large-scale suicide bombings, against Israeli ci-vilian and military targets. HAMAS maintained the paceof its operational activity in 2004, claiming numerous at-tacks against Israeli interests. HAMAS has not yetdirectly targeted US interests, although the group makeslittle or no effort to avoid targets frequented by foreign-ers. HAMAS continues to confine its attacks to Israelisinside Israel and the occupied territories.

StrengthUnknown number of official members; tens of thousandsof supporters and sympathizers.

Location/Area of OperationHAMAS currently limits its terrorist operations to Israelimilitary and civilian targets in the West Bank, Gaza Strip,and Israel. Two of the group’s most senior leaders in theGaza Strip, Shaykh Ahmad Yasin and Abd al Aziz alRantisi, were killed in Israeli air strikes in 2004. The groupretains a cadre of senior leaders spread throughout theGaza Strip, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, and the Gulf States.

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External AidReceives some funding from Iran but primarily relies ondonations from Palestinian expatriates around the worldand private benefactors in Saudi Arabia and other Arabstates. Some fundraising and propaganda activity takeplace in Western Europe and North America.

Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM)a.k.a. Harakat ul-Ansar

DescriptionHUM is an Islamist militant group based in Pakistan thatoperates primarily in Kashmir. It is politically alignedwith the radical political party Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam’sFazlur Rehman faction (JUI-F). The long-time leader ofthe group, Fazlur Rehman Khalil, in mid-February 2000stepped down as HUM emir, turning the reins over to thepopular Kashmiri commander and his second-in-com-mand, Farooqi Kashmiri. Khalil, who has been linked toUsama Bin Ladin and signed his fatwa in February 1998calling for attacks on US and Western interests, assumedthe position of HUM Secretary General. HUM oper-ated terrorist training camps in eastern Afghanistan untilCoalition air strikes destroyed them during fall 2001.Khalil was detained by the Pakistanis in mid-2004 andsubsequently released in late December. In 2003, HUMbegan using the name Jamiat ul-Ansar (JUA), and Paki-stan banned JUA in November 2003.

ActivitiesHas conducted a number of operations against Indiantroops and civilian targets in Kashmir. Linked to theKashmiri militant group al-Faran that kidnapped five West-ern tourists in Kashmir in July 1995; one was killed inAugust 1995, and the other four reportedly were killed inDecember of the same year. HUM was responsible forthe hijacking of an Indian airliner on December 24, 1999,which resulted in the release of Masood Azhar. Azhar,an important leader in the former Harakat ul-Ansar, wasimprisoned by the Indians in 1994 and founded Jaish-e-Muhammad after his release. Also released in 1999 wasAhmed Omar Sheik, who was convicted of the abduc-tion/murder in January-February 2002 of US journalistDaniel Pearl.

StrengthHas several hundred armed supporters located in AzadKashmir, Pakistan, and India’s southern Kashmir and Dodaregions and in the Kashmir valley. Supporters are mostlyPakistanis and Kashmiris and also include Afghans andArab veterans of the Afghan war. Uses light and heavymachineguns, assault rifles, mortars, explosives, and rock-ets. HUM lost a significant share of its membership indefections to the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) in 2000.

Location/Area of OperationBased in Muzaffarabad, Rawalpindi, and several othertowns in Pakistan, but members conduct insurgent andterrorist activities primarily in Kashmir. HUM trained itsmilitants in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

External AidCollects donations from Saudi Arabia, other Gulf and Is-lamic states, Pakistanis and Kashmiris. HUM’s financialcollection methods also include soliciting donations inmagazine ads and pamphlets. The sources and amountof HUM’s military funding are unknown. In anticipationof asset seizures in 2001 by the Pakistani Government,the HUM withdrew funds from bank accounts and in-vested in legal businesses, such as commodity trading,real estate, and production of consumer goods. Itsfundraising in Pakistan has been constrained since theGovernment clampdown on extremist groups and freez-ing of terrorist assets.

Hizballaha.k.a. Party of God, Islamic Jihad,Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine

DescriptionFormed in 1982 in response to the Israeli invasion of Leba-non, this Lebanon-based radical Shia group takes itsideological inspiration from the Iranian revolution andthe teachings of the late Ayatollah Khomeini. The Majlisal-Shura, or Consultative Council, is the group’s highestgoverning body and is led by Secretary General HasanNasrallah. Hizballah is dedicated to liberating Jerusalemand eliminating Israel, and has formally advocated ulti-mate establishment of Islamic rule in Lebanon.Nonetheless, Hizballah has actively participated inLebanon’s political system since 1992. Hizballah isclosely allied with, and often directed by, Iran but has thecapability and willingness to act independently. ThoughHizballah does not share the Syrian regime’s secular ori-entation, the group has been a strong ally in helping Syriaadvance its political objectives in the region.

ActivitiesKnown or suspected to have been involved in numerousanti-US and anti-Israeli terrorist attacks, including the sui-cide truck bombings of the US Embassy and US Marinebarracks in Beirut in 1983 and the US Embassy annex inBeirut in 1984. Three members of Hizballah, ‘ImadMughniyah, Hasan Izz-al-Din, and Ali Atwa, are on theFBI’s list of 22 Most Wanted Terrorists for the 1985 hi-jacking of TWA Flight 847 during which a US Navy diverwas murdered. Elements of the group were responsiblefor the kidnapping and detention of Americans and otherWesterners in Lebanon in the 1980s. Hizballah also at-tacked the Israeli Embassy in Argentina in 1992 and theIsraeli cultural center in Buenos Aires in 1994. In 2000,Hizballah operatives captured three Israeli soldiers in theShab’a Farms and kidnapped an Israeli noncombatant.

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Hizballah also provides guidance and financial and op-erational support for Palestinian extremist groups engagedin terrorist operations in Israel and the occupied territories.

In 2004, Hizballah launched an unmanned aerial vehicle(UAV) that left Lebanese airspace and flew over the Is-raeli town of Nahariya before crashing into Lebaneseterritorial waters. Ten days prior to the event, the HizballahSecretary General said Hizballah would come up withnew measures to counter Israeli Air Force violations ofLebanese airspace. Hizballah also continued launchingsmall scale attacks across the Israeli border, resulting inthe deaths of several Israeli soldiers. In March 2004,Hizballah and HAMAS signed an agreement to increasejoint efforts to perpetrate attacks against Israel. In late2004, Hizballah’s al-Manar television station, based inBeirut with an estimated ten million viewers worldwide,was prohibited from broadcasting in France. Al-Manarwas placed on the Terrorist Exclusion List (TEL) in theUnited States, which led to its removal from the programofferings of its main cable service provider, and made itmore difficult for al-Manar associates and affiliates tooperate in the United States.

StrengthSeveral thousand supporters and a few hundred terroristoperatives.

Location/Area of OperationOperates in the southern suburbs of Beirut, the Beka’aValley, and southern Lebanon. Has established cells inEurope, Africa, South America, North America, and Asia.

External AidReceives financial, training, weapons, explosives, politi-cal, diplomatic, and organizational aid from Iran, anddiplomatic, political, and logistical support from Syria.Hizballah also receives funding from charitable donationsand business interests.

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)

DescriptionThe Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is a group ofIslamic militants from Uzbekistan and other Central Asianstates. The IMU is closely affiliated with al-Qa’ida and,under the leadership of Tohir Yoldashev, has embracedUsama Bin Ladin’s anti-US, anti-Western agenda. TheIMU also remains committed to its original goals of over-throwing Uzbekistani President Karimov and establishingan Islamic state in Uzbekistan.

ActivitiesThe IMU in recent years has participated in attacks on USand Coalition soldiers in Afghanistan and Pakistan, andplotted attacks on US diplomatic facilities in Central Asia.

In November 2004, the IMU was blamed for an explo-sion in the southern Kyrgyzstani city of Osh that killedone police officer and one terrorist. In May 2003,Kyrgyzstani security forces disrupted an IMU cell that wasseeking to bomb the US Embassy and a nearby hotel inBishkek, Kyrgyzstan. The IMU was also responsible forexplosions in Bishkek in December 2002 and Osh in May2003 that killed eight people. The IMU primarily targetedUzbekistani interests before October 2001 and is believedto have been responsible for five car bombs in Tashkentin February 1999. IMU militants also took foreigners hos-tage in 1999 and 2000, including four US citizens whowere mountain climbing in August 2000 and four Japa-nese geologists and eight Kyrgyzstani soldiers in August1999.

StrengthProbably fewer than 500.

Location/Area of OperationIMU militants are scattered throughout South Asia,Tajikistan, and Iran. The area of operations includes Af-ghanistan, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan,Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.

External AidThe IMU receives support from other Islamic extremistgroups and patrons in the Middle East and Central andSouth Asia.

Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM)a.k.a. Army of Mohammed Tehrik ul-Furqaan, Khuddam-ul-Islam

DescriptionThe Jaish-e-Mohammed is an Islamic extremist groupbased in Pakistan that was formed in early 2000 byMasood Azhar upon his release from prison in India. Thegroup’s aim is to unite Kashmir with Pakistan. It is politi-cally aligned with the radical political party JamiatUlema-i-Islam’s Fazlur Rehman faction (JUI-F). By 2003,JEM had splintered into Khuddam ul-Islam (KUI), headedby Azhar, and Jamaat ul-Furqan (JUF), led by Abdul Jabbar,who was released in August 2004 from Pakistani custodyafter being detained for suspected involvement in the De-cember 2003 assassination attempts against PresidentMusharraf. Pakistan banned KUI and JUF in November2003. Elements of JEM and Lashkar e-Tayyiba combinedwith other groups to mount attacks as “The Save KashmirMovement.”

ActivitiesThe JEM’s leader, Masood Azhar, was released from In-dian imprisonment in December 1999 in exchange for155 hijacked Indian Airlines hostages. The Harakat-ul-Ansar (HUA) kidnappings in 1994 of US and Britishnationals by Omar Sheik in New Delhi and the HUA/al-

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Faran kidnappings in July 1995 of Westerners in Kashmirwere two of several previous HUA efforts to free Azhar.On October 1, 2001, JEM claimed responsibility for asuicide attack on the Jammu and Kashmir legislative as-sembly building in Srinagar that killed at least 31 personsbut later denied the claim. The Indian Government haspublicly implicated JEM, along with Lashkar e-Tayyiba,for the December 13, 2001, attack on the Indian Parlia-ment that killed nine and injured 18. Pakistani authoritiessuspect that perpetrators of fatal anti-Christian attacks inIslamabad, Murree, and Taxila during 2002 were affili-ated with JEM. The Pakistanis have implicated elementsof JEM in the assassination attempts against PresidentMusharraf in December 2003.

StrengthHas several hundred armed supporters located in Paki-stan and in India’s southern Kashmir and Doda regionsand in the Kashmir valley, including a large cadre of formerHUM members. Supporters are mostly Pakistanis andKashmiris and also include Afghans and Arab veterans ofthe Afghan war.

Location/Area of OperationPakistan. JEM maintained training camps in Afghanistanuntil the fall of 2001.

External AidMost of JEM’s cadre and material resources have beendrawn from the militant groups Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami(HUJI) and the Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM). JEM hadclose ties to Afghan Arabs and the Taliban. Usama binLadin is suspected of giving funding to JEM. JEM also col-lects funds through donation requests in magazines andpamphlets. In anticipation of asset seizures by the Paki-stani Government, JEM withdrew funds from bankaccounts and invested in legal businesses, such as commod-ity trading, real estate, and production of consumer goods.

Jemaah Islamiya Organization (JI)

DescriptionJemaah Islamiya Organization is responsible for numer-ous high-profile bombings, including the bombing of theJ. W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta on August 5, 2003, and theBali bombings on October 12, 2002. Members of thegroup have also been implicated in the September 9,2004, attack outside the Australian Embassy in Jakarta.The Bali attack, which left more than 200 dead, was re-portedly the final outcome of meetings in early 2002 inThailand, where attacks in Singapore and against soft tar-gets such as tourist spots were also considered. In June2003, authorities disrupted a JI plan to attack several West-ern embassies and tourist sites in Thailand. In December2001, Singaporean authorities uncovered a JI plot to at-tack the US and Israeli Embassies and British andAustralian diplomatic buildings in Singapore. JI is alsoresponsible for the coordinated bombings of numerous

Christian churches in Indonesia on Christmas Eve 2000and was involved in the bombings of several targets inManila on December 31, 2000. The capture in August2003 of Indonesian Riduan bin Isomoddin (a.k.a.Hambali), JI leader and al-Qa’ida Southeast Asia opera-tions chief, damaged the JI, but the group maintains itsability to target Western interests in the region and to re-cruit new members through a network of radical Islamicschools based primarily in Indonesia. The emir, or spiri-tual leader, of JI, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, was on trial at year’send on charges of conspiracy to commit terrorist acts,and for his links to the Bali and Jakarta Marriott bombingsand to a cache of arms and explosives found in central Java.

StrengthExact numbers are unknown, but Southeast Asian authori-ties continue to uncover and arrest JI elements. Estimatesof total JI members vary widely from the hundreds to thethousands.

Location/Area of OperationJI is believed to have cells spanning Indonesia, Malaysia,and the Philippines.

External AidInvestigations indicate that JI is fully capable of its ownfundraising, although it also receives financial, ideologi-cal, and logistical support from Middle Eastern and SouthAsian contacts, non-governmental organizations, andother groups.

Al-Jihad (AJ)a.k.a. Jihad Group, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, EIJ

DescriptionThis Egyptian Islamic extremist group merged with UsamaBin Ladin’s al-Qa’ida organization in 2001. Usama BinLadin’s deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, was the former headof AJ. Active since the 1970s, AJ’s primary goal has beenthe overthrow of the Egyptian Government and the es-tablishment of an Islamic state. The group’s primarytargets, historically, have been high-level Egyptian Gov-ernment officials as well as US and Israeli interests in Egyptand abroad. Regular Egyptian crackdowns on extrem-ists, including on AJ, have greatly reduced AJ capabilitiesin Egypt.

ActivitiesThe original AJ was responsible for the 1981 assassina-tion of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. It claimedresponsibility for the attempted assassinations of InteriorMinister Hassan al-Alfi in August 1993 and Prime Minis-ter Atef Sedky in November 1993. AJ has not conductedan attack inside Egypt since 1993 and has never success-fully targeted foreign tourists there. The group wasresponsible for the Egyptian Embassy bombing inIslamabad in 1995 and a disrupted plot against the USEmbassy in Albania in 1998.

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StrengthUnknown, but probably has several hundred hard-coremembers inside and outside of Egypt.

Location/Area of OperationHistorically AJ operated in the Cairo area. Most AJ mem-bers today are outside Egypt in countries such asAfghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon, the United Kingdom, andYemen. AJ activities have been centered outside Egyptfor several years under the auspices of al-Qa’ida.

External AidUnknown. Since 1998 AJ received most of its fundingfrom al-Qa’ida, and these close ties culminated in theeventual merger of the groups. Some funding may comefrom various Islamic non-governmental organizations,cover businesses, and criminal acts.

Kahane Chai (Kach)

DescriptionKach’s stated goal is to restore the biblical state of Israel.Kach, founded by radical Israeli-American rabbi MeirKahane, and its offshoot Kahane Chai, (translation:“Kahane Lives”), founded by Meir Kahane’s son Binyaminfollowing his father’s 1990 assassination in the UnitedStates, were declared to be terrorist organizations in 1994by the Israeli Cabinet under its 1948 Terrorism Law. Thisfollowed the groups’ statements in support of Dr. BaruchGoldstein’s attack in February 1994 on the al-IbrahimiMosque (Goldstein was affiliated with Kach) and theirverbal attacks on the Israeli Government. Palestinian gun-men killed Binyamin Kahane and his wife in a drive-byshooting in December 2000 in the West Bank.

ActivitiesThe group has organized protests against the Israeli Gov-ernment. Kach has harassed and threatened Arabs,Palestinians, and Israeli Government officials, and hasvowed revenge for the death of Binyamin Kahane and hiswife. Kach is suspected of involvement in a number oflow-level attacks since the start of the al-Aqsa intifadahin 2000. Known Kach sympathizers are becoming morevocal and active against the planned Israeli withdrawalfrom the Gaza Strip in mid-2005.

StrengthUnknown.

Location/Area of OperationIsrael and West Bank settlements, particularly Qiryat Arba’in Hebron.

External AidReceives support from sympathizers in the United Statesand Europe.

Kongra-Gel (KGK)a.k.a. Kurdistan Workers’ Party, PKK, Kurdistan Free-dom and Democracy Congress, KADEK, KurdistanPeople’s Congress, Freedom and Democracy Con-gress of Kurdistan

DescriptionThe Kongra-Gel was founded by Abdullah Ocalan in 1974as a Marxist-Leninist separatist organization and formallynamed the Kurdistan Workers’ Party in 1978. The group,composed primarily of Turkish Kurds, began its campaignof armed violence in 1984, which has resulted in some30,000 casualties. The PKK’s goal has been to establishan independent, democratic Kurdish state in southeastTurkey, northern Iraq, and parts of Iran and Syria. In theearly 1990s, the PKK moved beyond rural-based insur-gent activities to include urban terrorism. Turkishauthorities captured Ocalan in Kenya in early 1999, andthe Turkish State Security Court subsequently sentencedhim to death. In August 1999, Ocalan announced a“peace initiative,” ordering members to refrain from vio-lence and requesting dialogue with Ankara on Kurdishissues. At a PKK Congress in January 2000, memberssupported Ocalan’s initiative and claimed the group nowwould use only political means to achieve its public goalof improved rights for Kurds in Turkey. In April 2002 at its8th Party Congress, the PKK changed its name to theKurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK)and proclaimed a commitment to non-violent activitiesin support of Kurdish rights. In late 2003, the group soughtto engineer another political face-lift, renaming itselfKongra-Gel (KGK) and promoting its “peaceful” intentionswhile continuing to conduct attacks in “self-defense” andto refuse disarmament. After five years, the group’s hard-line militant wing, the People’s Defense Force (HPG),renounced its self-imposed cease-fire on June 1, 2004.Over the course of the cease-fire, the group had dividedinto two factions – politically-minded reformists, andhardliners who advocated a return to violence. Thehardliners took control of the group in February 2004.

ActivitiesPrimary targets have been Turkish Government securityforces, local Turkish officials, and villagers who opposethe organization in Turkey. It conducted attacks on Turk-ish diplomatic and commercial facilities in dozens of WestEuropean cities in 1993 and again in spring 1995. In anattempt to damage Turkey’s tourist industry, the then-PKKbombed tourist sites and hotels and kidnapped foreigntourists in the early-to-mid-1990s. While most of thegroup’s violence in 2004 was directed toward Turkish se-curity forces, KGK was likely responsible for anunsuccessful July car bomb attack against the governorof Van Province, although it publicly denied responsibil-ity, and may have played a role in the August bombingsof two Istanbul hotels and a gas complex in which twopeople died.

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StrengthApproximately 4,000 to 5,000, 3,000 to 3,500 of whomcurrently are located in northern Iraq. The group has thou-sands of sympathizers in Turkey and Europe. In November,Dutch police raided a suspected KGK training camp in TheNetherlands, arresting roughly 30 suspected members.

Location/Area of OperationOperates primarily in Turkey, Iraq, Europe, and theMiddle East.

External AidHas received safe haven and modest aid from Syria, Iraq,and Iran. Syria and Iran appear to cooperate with Turkeyagainst KGK in a limited fashion when it serves their im-mediate interests. KGK uses Europe for fundraising andconducting political propaganda.

Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LT)a.k.a. Army of the Righteous, Lashkar-e-Toiba, alMonsooreen, al-Mansoorian, Army of the Pure, Armyof the Righteous, Army of the Pure and Righteous

DescriptionLT is the armed wing of the Pakistan-based religious or-ganization, Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad (MDI), ananti-US Sunni missionary organization formed in 1989.LT is led by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed and is one of thethree largest and best trained groups fighting in Kashmiragainst India. It is not connected to any political party.The Pakistani Government banned the group and frozeits assets in January 2002. Elements of LT and Jaish-e-Mohammed combined with other groups to mount attacksas “The Save Kashmir Movement.”

ActivitiesLT has conducted a number of operations against Indiantroops and civilian targets in Jammu and Kashmir since1993. LT claimed responsibility for numerous attacks in2001, including an attack in January on Srinagar airportthat killed five Indians; an attack on a police station inSrinagar that killed at least eight officers and woundedseveral others; and an attack in April against Indian bor-der security forces that left at least four dead. The IndianGovernment publicly implicated LT, along with JEM, forthe attack on December 13, 2001, on the Indian Parlia-ment building, although concrete evidence is lacking. LTis also suspected of involvement in the attack on May 14,2002, on an Indian Army base in Kaluchak that left 36dead. Senior al-Qa’ida lieutenant Abu Zubaydah wascaptured at an LT safe house in Faisalabad in March 2002,suggesting some members are facilitating the movementof al-Qa’ida members in Pakistan.

StrengthHas several thousand members in Azad Kashmir, Paki-stan, in the southern Jammu and Kashmir and Doda

regions, and in the Kashmir valley. Almost all LT mem-bers are Pakistanis from madrassas across Pakistan orAfghan veterans of the Afghan wars.

Location/Area of OperationBased in Muridke (near Lahore) and Muzaffarabad.

External AidCollects donations from the Pakistani community in thePersian Gulf and United Kingdom, Islamic NGOs, andPakistani and other Kashmiri business people. LT alsomaintains a Web site (under the name Jamaat ud-Daawa),through which it solicits funds and provides informationon the group’s activities. The amount of LT funding is un-known. LT maintains ties to religious/militant groupsaround the world, ranging from the Philippines to theMiddle East and Chechnya through the fraternal networkof its parent organization Jamaat ud-Dawa (formerlyMarkaz Dawa ul-Irshad). In anticipation of asset seizuresby the Pakistani Government, the LT withdrew funds frombank accounts and invested in legal businesses, such ascommodity trading, real estate, and production of con-sumer goods.

Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ)

DescriptionLashkar i Jhangvi (LJ) is the militant offshoot of the Sunnisectarian group Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan. LJ focuses pri-marily on anti-Shia attacks and was banned by PakistaniPresident Musharraf in August 2001 as part of an effort torein in sectarian violence. Many of its members thensought refuge in Afghanistan with the Taliban, with whomthey had existing ties. After the collapse of the Taliban, LJmembers became active in aiding other terrorists withsafe houses, false identities, and protection in Pakistanicities, including Karachi, Peshawar, and Rawalpindi. InJanuary 2003, the United States added LJ to the list ofForeign Terrorist Organizations.

ActivitiesLJ specializes in armed attacks and bombings. The groupattempted to assassinate former Prime Minister NawazSharif and his brother Shabaz Sharif, Chief Minister ofPunjab Province, in January 1999. Pakistani authoritieshave publicly linked LJ members to the kidnap and mur-der of US journalist Daniel Pearl in early 2002. Policeofficials initially suspected LJ members were involved inthe two suicide car bombings in Karachi in 2002 againsta French shuttle bus in May and the US Consulate in June,but their subsequent investigations have not led to any LJmembers being charged in the attacks. Similarly, pressreports have linked LJ to attacks on Christian targets inPakistan, including a grenade assault on the ProtestantInternational Church in Islamabad in March 2002 thatkilled two US citizens, but no formal charges have beenfiled against the group. Pakistani authorities believe LJ

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was responsible for the bombing in July 2003 of a Shiitemosque in Quetta, Pakistan. Authorities have also impli-cated LJ in several sectarian incidents in 2004, includingthe May and June bombings of two Shiite mosques inKarachi that killed over 40 people.

StrengthProbably fewer than 100.

Location/Area of OperationLJ is active primarily in Punjab and Karachi. Some mem-bers travel between Pakistan and Afghanistan.


Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)a.k.a. The Tamil Tigers, The Ellalan Force

DescriptionFounded in 1976, the LTTE is the most powerful Tamilgroup in Sri Lanka. It began its insurgency against the SriLankan Government in 1983 and has relied on a guer-rilla strategy that includes the use of terrorist tactics. TheLTTE currently is observing a cease-fire agreement withthe Sri Lankan Government.

ActivitiesThe LTTE has integrated a battlefield insurgent strategywith a terrorist program that targets key personnel in thecountryside and senior Sri Lankan political and militaryleaders in Colombo and other urban centers. The LTTE ismost notorious for its cadre of suicide bombers, the BlackTigers. Political assassinations and bombings were com-monplace tactics prior to the cease-fire.

StrengthExact strength is unknown, but the LTTE is estimated tohave 8,000 to 10,000 armed combatants in Sri Lanka,with a core of 3,000 to 6,000 trained fighters. The LTTE alsohas a significant overseas support structure for fundraising,weapons procurement, and propaganda activities.

Location/Area of OperationsThe LTTE controls most of the northern and eastern coastalareas of Sri Lanka but has conducted operations through-out the island. Headquartered in northern Sri Lanka, LTTEleader Velupillai Prabhakaran has established an exten-sive network of checkpoints and informants to keep trackof any outsiders who enter the group’s area of control.

External AidThe LTTE’s overt organizations support Tamil separatismby lobbying foreign governments and the United Nations.The LTTE also uses its international contacts and the largeTamil diaspora in North America, Europe, and Asia to pro-cure weapons, communications, funding, and otherneeded supplies

Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)

DescriptionThe Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) emerged in theearly 1990s among Libyans who had fought against So-viet forces in Afghanistan and against the Qadhafi regimein Libya. The LIFG declared the Government of Libyanleader Muammar Qadhafi un-Islamic and pledged to over-throw it. Some members maintain a strictly anti-Qadhafifocus and organize against Libyan Government interests,but others are aligned with Usama Bin Ladin and believedto be part of al-Qa’ida’s leadership structure or active inthe international terrorist network.

ActivitiesLibyans associated with the LIFG are part of the broaderinternational jihadist movement. The LIFG is one of thegroups believed to have planned the Casablanca suicidebombings in May 2003. The LIFG claimed responsibilityfor a failed assassination attempt against Qadhafi in 1996and engaged Libyan security forces in armed clashes dur-ing the 1990s. It continues to target Libyan interests andmay engage in sporadic clashes with Libyan security forces.

StrengthNot known, but probably has several hundred active mem-bers or supporters.

Location/Area of OperationProbably maintains a clandestine presence in Libya, butsince the late 1990s many members have fled to variousAsian, Persian Gulf, African, and European countries, par-ticularly the United Kingdom.

External AidNot known. May obtain some funding through privatedonations, various Islamic non-governmental organiza-tions, and criminal acts.

Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK)a.k.a. The National Liberation Army of Iran, ThePeople’s Mujahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI),National Council of Resistance (NCR), The NationalCouncil of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), Muslim Ira-nian Students’ Society

DescriptionThe MEK philosophy mixes Marxism and Islam. Formedin the 1960s, the organization was expelled from Iranafter the Islamic Revolution in 1979, and its primary sup-port came from the former Iraqi regime of Saddam Husseinstarting in the late 1980s. The MEK conducted anti-West-ern attacks prior to the Islamic Revolution. Since then, ithas conducted terrorist attacks against the interests of theclerical regime in Iran and abroad. The MEK advocatesthe overthrow of the Iranian regime and its replacementwith the group’s own leadership.

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ActivitiesThe group’s worldwide campaign against the Iranian Gov-ernment stresses propaganda and occasionally usesterrorism. During the 1970s, the MEK killed US militarypersonnel and US civilians working on defense projectsin Tehran and supported the takeover in 1979 of the USEmbassy in Tehran. In 1981, the MEK detonated bombsin the head office of the Islamic Republic Party and thePremier’s office, killing some 70 high-ranking Iranian of-ficials, including Chief Justice Ayatollah MohammadBeheshti, President Mohammad-Ali Rajaei, and PremierMohammad-Javad Bahonar. Near the end of the 1980-1988 war with Iran, Baghdad armed the MEK with militaryequipment and sent it into action against Iranian forces.In 1991, the MEK assisted the Government of Iraq in sup-pressing the Shia and Kurdish uprisings in southern Iraqand the Kurdish uprisings in the north. In April 1992, theMEK conducted near-simultaneous attacks on Iranian em-bassies and installations in 13 countries, demonstratingthe group’s ability to mount large-scale operations over-seas. In April 1999, the MEK targeted key military officersand assassinated the deputy chief of the Iranian ArmedForces General Staff. In April 2000, the MEK attemptedto assassinate the commander of the Nasr Headquarters,Tehran’s interagency board responsible for coordinatingpolicies on Iraq. The normal pace of anti-Iranian opera-tions increased during “Operation Great Bahman” inFebruary 2000, when the group launched a dozen attacksagainst Iran. One of those attacks included a mortar at-tack against the leadership complex in Tehran that housedthe offices of the Supreme Leader and the President. In 2000and 2001, the MEK was involved regularly in mortar attacksand hit-and-run raids on Iranian military and law enforce-ment units and Government buildings near the Iran-Iraqborder, although MEK terrorism in Iran declined toward theend of 2001. After Coalition aircraft bombed MEK bases atthe outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the MEK leadershipordered its members not to resist Coalition forces, and aformal cease-fire arrangement was reached in May 2003.

StrengthOver 3,000 MEK members are currently confined to CampAshraf, the MEK’s main compound north of Baghdad,where they remain under the Geneva Convention’s “pro-tected person” status and Coalition control. As a conditionof the cease-fire agreement, the group relinquished itsweapons, including tanks, armored vehicles, and heavyartillery. A significant number of MEK personnel have“defected” from the Ashraf group, and several dozen ofthem have been voluntarily repatriated to Iran.

Location/Area of OperationIn the 1980s, the MEK’s leaders were forced by Iraniansecurity forces to flee to France. On resettling in Iraq in1987, almost all of its armed units were stationed in forti-fied bases near the border with Iran. Since OperationIraqi Freedom, the bulk of the group is limited to CampAshraf, although an overseas support structure remains

with associates and supporters scattered throughout Eu-rope and North America.

External AidBefore Operation Iraqi Freedom, the group received allof its military assistance, and most of its financial sup-port, from the former Iraqi regime. The MEK also has usedfront organizations to solicit contributions from expatri-ate Iranian communities.

National Liberation Army (ELN)

DescriptionThe ELN is a Colombian Marxist insurgent group formedin 1965 by urban intellectuals inspired by Fidel Castroand Che Guevara. It is primarily rural-based, although itpossesses several urban units. In May 2004, ColombianPresident Uribe proposed a renewal of peace talks, butby the end of the year talks had not commenced.

ActivitiesKidnapping, hijacking, bombing, and extortion. Mini-mal conventional military capability. Annually conductshundreds of kidnappings for ransom, often targeting for-eign employees of large corporations, especially in thepetroleum industry. Derives some revenue from taxationof the illegal narcotics industry. Frequently assaults en-ergy infrastructure and has inflicted major damage onpipelines and the electric distribution network.

StrengthApproximately 3,000 armed combatants and an unknownnumber of active supporters.

Location/Area of OperationMostly in rural and mountainous areas of northern, north-eastern, and southwestern Colombia, and Venezuelanborder regions.

External AidCuba provides some medical care and political consulta-tion. Venezuela continues to provide a hospitableenvironment.

Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)a.k.a. PLF-Abu Abbas Faction

DescriptionThe Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) broke away fromthe PFLP-GC in the late 1970s and later split again intopro-PLO, pro-Syrian, and pro-Libyan factions. The pro-PLO faction was led by Muhammad Abbas (a.k.a. AbuAbbas) and was based in Baghdad prior to OperationIraqi Freedom.

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ActivitiesAbbas’ group was responsible for the attack in 1985 onthe Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro and the murder ofUS citizen Leon Klinghoffer. Abu Abbas died of naturalcauses in April 2004 while in US custody in Iraq. Cur-rent leadership and membership of the relatively smallPLF appears to be based in Lebanon and the Palestinianterritories. The PLF has become more active since thestart of the al-Aqsa intifadah and several PLF membershave been arrested by Israeli authorities for planning at-tacks in Israel and the West Bank.

StrengthUnknown.

Location/Area of OperationBased in Iraq since 1990, has a presence in Lebanon andthe West Bank.

External AidReceived support mainly from Iraq; has received supportfrom Libya in the past.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)a.k.a. Islamic Jihad of Palestine, PIJ-Shaqaqi Faction,PIJ-Shalla Faction, Al-Quds Brigades

DescriptionFormed by militant Palestinians in the Gaza Strip duringthe 1970s, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) is committedto the creation of an Islamic Palestinian state and the de-struction of Israel through attacks against Israeli militaryand civilian targets inside Israel and the Palestinian terri-tories.

ActivitiesPIJ militants have conducted many attacks, includinglarge-scale suicide bombings, against Israeli civilian andmilitary targets. The group maintained operational activ-ity in 2004, claiming numerous attacks against Israeliinterests. PIJ has not yet directly targeted US interests; itcontinues to direct attacks against Israelis inside Israeland the territories, although US citizens have died in at-tacks mounted by the PIJ.

StrengthUnknown.

Location/Area of OperationPrimarily Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. Thegroup’s primary leadership resides in Syria, though otherleadership elements reside in Lebanon, as well as otherparts of the Middle East.

External AidReceives financial assistance from Iran and limited logis-tical assistance from Syria.

Popular Front for the Liberation ofPalestine (PFLP)

DescriptionFormerly a part of the PLO, the Marxist-Leninist PFLP wasfounded by George Habash when it broke away from theArab Nationalist Movement in 1967. The PFLP does notview the Palestinian struggle as religious, seeing it insteadas a broader revolution against Western imperialism. Thegroup earned a reputation for spectacular internationalattacks, including airline hijackings, that have killed atleast 20 US citizens.

ActivitiesThe PFLP committed numerous international terrorist at-tacks during the 1970s. Since 1978, the group hasconducted attacks against Israeli or moderate Arab tar-gets, including killing a settler and her son in December1996. The PFLP has stepped up its operational activitysince the start of the current intifadah, highlighted by atleast two suicide bombings since 2003, multiple jointoperations with other Palestinian terrorist groups, andassassination of the Israeli Tourism Minster in 2001 to avengeIsrael’s killing of the PFLP Secretary General earlier that year.

StrengthUnknown.

Location/Area of OperationSyria, Lebanon, Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip.

External AidReceives safe haven and some logistical assistance fromSyria.

Popular Front for the Liberation ofPalestine–General Command (PFLP-GC)

DescriptionThe PFLP-GC split from the PFLP in 1968, claiming itwanted to focus more on fighting and less on politics.Originally it was violently opposed to the Arafat-led PLO.The group is led by Ahmad Jabril, a former captain in theSyrian Army, whose son Jihad was killed by a car bombin May 2002. The PFLP-GC is closely tied to both Syriaand Iran.

ActivitiesCarried out dozens of attacks in Europe and the MiddleEast during the 1970s and 1980s. Known for cross-bor-der terrorist attacks into Israel using unusual means, suchas hot-air balloons and motorized hang gliders. Primaryfocus is now on guerrilla operations in southern Lebanonand small-scale attacks in Israel, the West Bank, and theGaza Strip.

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StrengthSeveral hundred.

Location/Area of OperationHeadquartered in Damascus with bases in Lebanon.

External AidReceives logistical and military support from Syria andfinancial support from Iran.

Al-Qa’idaa.k.a. Usama Bin Ladin Organization

DescriptionAl-Qa’ida was established by Usama Bin Ladin in 1988with Arabs who fought in Afghanistan against the SovietUnion. Helped finance, recruit, transport, and train SunniIslamic extremists for the Afghan resistance. Goal is tounite Muslims to fight the United States as a means ofdefeating Israel, overthrowing regimes it deems “non-Is-lamic,” and expelling Westerners and non-Muslims fromMuslim countries. Eventual goal would be establishmentof a pan-Islamic caliphate throughout the world. Issuedstatement in February 1998 under the banner of “TheWorld Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Cru-saders” saying it was the duty of all Muslims to kill UScitizens, civilian and military, and their allies everywhere.Merged with al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad) in June 2001,renaming itself “Qa’idat al-Jihad.” Merged with AbuMus’ab al-Zarqawi’s organization in Iraq in late 2004,with al-Zarqawi’s group changing its name to “Qa’idatal-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn” (al-Qa’ida in the Land ofthe Two Rivers).

ActivitiesIn 2004, the Saudi-based al-Qa’ida network and associ-ated extremists launched at least 11 attacks, killing over60 people, including six Americans, and wounding morethan 225 in Saudi Arabia. Focused on targets associatedwith US and Western presence and Saudi security forcesin Riyadh, Yanbu, Jeddah, and Dhahran. Attacks con-sisted of vehicle bombs, infantry assaults, kidnappings,targeted shootings, bombings, and beheadings. Otheral-Qa’ida networks have been involved in attacks in Af-ghanistan and Iraq.

In 2003, carried out the assault and bombing on May 12of three expatriate housing complexes in Riyadh, SaudiArabia, that killed 30 and injured 216. Backed attackson May 16 in Casablanca, Morocco, of a Jewish center,restaurant, nightclub, and hotel that killed 33 and injured101. Probably supported the bombing of the J.W. MarriottHotel in Jakarta, Indonesia, on August 5, that killed 12and injured 149. Responsible for the assault and bomb-ing on November 9 of a housing complex in Riyadh, SaudiArabia, that killed 17 and injured 122. The suicide bomb-

ers and others associated with the bombings of two syna-gogues in Istanbul, Turkey, on November 15 that killed20 and injured 300 and the bombings in Istanbul of theBritish Consulate and HSBC Bank on November 20 thatresulted in 41 dead and 555 injured had strong links toal-Qa’ida. Conducted two assassination attempts againstPakistani President Musharraf in December 2003. Wasinvolved in some attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In 2002, carried out bombing on November 28 of a hotelin Mombasa, Kenya, killing 15 and injuring 40. Prob-ably supported a nightclub bombing in Bali, Indonesia,on October 12 by Jemaah Islamiya that killed more than200. Responsible for an attack on US military personnelin Kuwait on October 8 that killed one US soldier andinjured another. Directed a suicide attack on the tankerM/V Limburg off the coast of Yemen on October 6 thatkilled one and injured four. Carried out a firebombing ofa synagogue in Tunisia on April 11 that killed 19 and in-jured 22. On September 11, 2001, 19 al-Qa’ida suicideattackers hijacked and crashed four US commercial jets— two into the World Trade Center in New York City, oneinto the Pentagon near Washington, DC, and a fourth intoa field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania — leaving nearly3,000 individuals dead or missing. Directed the attackon the USS Cole in the port of Aden, Yemen, on October 12,2000, killing 17 US Navy sailors and injuring another 39.

Conducted the bombings in August 1998 of the US Em-bassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania,that killed at least 301 individuals and injured more than5,000 others. Claims to have shot down US helicoptersand killed US servicemen in Somalia in 1993 and to haveconducted three bombings that targeted US troops inAden, Yemen, in December 1992.

Al-Qa’ida is linked to the following plans that were dis-rupted or not carried out: to bomb in mid-air a dozen UStrans-Pacific flights in 1995, and to set off a bomb at LosAngeles International Airport in 1999. Also plotted tocarry out terrorist operations against US and Israeli tour-ists visiting Jordan for millennial celebrations in late 1999(Jordanian authorities thwarted the planned attacks andput 28 suspects on trial). In December 2001, suspectedal-Qa’ida associate Richard Colvin Reid attempted to ig-nite a shoe bomb on a trans-Atlantic flight from Paris toMiami. Attempted to shoot down an Israeli charteredplane with a surface-to-air missile as it departed theMombasa, Kenya, airport in November 2002.

StrengthAl-Qa’ida’s organizational strength is difficult to deter-mine in the aftermath of extensive counterterrorist effortssince 9/11. However, the group probably has several thou-sand extremists and associates worldwide inspired by thegroup’s ideology. The arrest and deaths of mid-level andsenior al-Qa’ida operatives have disrupted some commu-nication, financial, and facilitation nodes and interrupted

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some terrorist plots. Al-Qa’ida also serves as a focal pointor umbrella organization for a worldwide network thatincludes many Sunni Islamic extremist groups, includingsome members of Gama’a al-Islamiyya, the Islamic Move-ment of Uzbekistan, and the Harakat ul-Mujahidin.

Location/Area of OperationAl-Qa’ida has cells worldwide and is reinforced by itsties to Sunni extremist networks. It was based in Afghani-stan until Coalition forces removed the Taliban from powerin late 2001. Al-Qa’ida has dispersed in small groupsacross South Asia, Southeast Asia, the Middle East andAfrica, and probably will attempt to carry out future at-tacks against US interests.

External AidAl-Qa’ida maintains moneymaking front businesses, so-licits donations from like-minded supporters, and illicitlysiphons funds from donations to Muslim charitable or-ganizations. US and international efforts to block al-Qa’idafunding have hampered the group’s ability to obtain money.

Real IRA (RIRA)a.k.a. 32-County Sovereignty Committee

DescriptionRIRA was formed in the late 1990s as the clandestinearmed wing of the 32-County Sovereignty Movement, a“political pressure group” dedicated to removing Britishforces from Northern Ireland and unifying Ireland. TheRIRA also seeks to disrupt the Northern Ireland peaceprocess. The 32-County Sovereignty Movement opposedSinn Fein’s adoption in September 1997 of the Mitchellprinciples of democracy and non-violence; it also opposedthe amendment in December 1999 of Articles 2 and 3 ofthe Irish Constitution, which had claimed the territory ofNorthern Ireland. Despite internal rifts and calls by somejailed members — including the group’s founder Michael“Mickey” McKevitt — for a ceasefire and disbandment,RIRA has pledged additional violence and continues toconduct attacks.

ActivitiesBombings, assassinations, and robberies. Many Real IRAmembers are former Provisional Irish Republican Armymembers who left that organization after the ProvisionalIRA renewed its cease-fire in 1997. These membersbrought a wealth of experience in terrorist tactics andbomb making to RIRA. Targets have included civilians(most notoriously in the Omagh bombing in August 1998),British security forces, police in Northern Ireland, andlocal Protestant communities. RIRA’s most recent fatalattack was in August 2002 at a London army base thatkilled a construction worker. In 2004, RIRA conductedseveral postal bomb attacks and made threats againstprison officers, people involved in the new policing ar-rangements, and senior politicians. RIRA also plantedincendiary devices in Belfast shopping areas and con-

ducted a serious shooting attack against a Police Serviceof Northern Ireland station in September. The organiza-tion reportedly wants to improve its intelligence-gatheringability, engineering capacity, and access to weaponry; italso trains members in the use of guns and explosives.RIRA continues to attract new members, and its seniormembers are committed to launching attacks on securityforces. Arrests in the spring led to the discovery of incen-diary and explosive devices at a RIRA bomb makingfacility in Limerick. The group also engaged in smug-gling and other non-terrorist crime in Ireland.

StrengthThe number of activists may have fallen to less than 100.The organization may receive limited support from IRAhardliners and Republican sympathizers dissatisfied withthe IRA’s continuing cease-fire and Sinn Fein’s involve-ment in the peace process. Approximately 40 RIRAmembers are in Irish jails.

Location/Area of OperationNorthern Ireland, Great Britain, and Irish Republic.

External AidSuspected of receiving funds from sympathizers in theUnited States and of attempting to buy weapons from USgun dealers. RIRA also is reported to have purchasedsophisticated weapons from the Balkans, and to havetaken materials from Provisional IRA arms dumps in thelater 1990s.

Revolutionary Armed Forces ofColombia (FARC)

DescriptionEstablished in 1964 as the military wing of the Colom-bian Communist Party, the FARC is Latin America’s oldest,largest, most capable, and best-equipped insurgency ofMarxist origin. Although only nominally fighting in sup-port of Marxist goals today, the FARC is governed by ageneral secretariat led by long-time leader ManuelMarulanda (a.k.a. “Tirofijo”) and six others, including se-nior military commander Jorge Briceno (a.k.a. “MonoJojoy”). Organized along military lines but includes somespecialized urban fighting units. A Colombian militaryoffensive targeting FARC fighters in their former safe ha-ven in southern Colombia has experienced some success,with several FARC mid-level leaders killed or captured.On December 31, 2004, FARC leader Simon Trinidad,the highest-ranking FARC leader ever captured, was ex-tradited to the United States on drug charges.

ActivitiesBombings, murder, mortar attacks, kidnapping, extortion,and hijacking, as well as guerrilla and conventional mili-tary action against Colombian political, military, andeconomic targets. In March 1999, the FARC executed

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three US indigenous rights activists on Venezuelan terri-tory after it kidnapped them in Colombia. In February2003, the FARC captured and continues to hold three UScontractors and killed one other American when theirplane crashed in Florencia. Foreign citizens often aretargets of FARC kidnapping for ransom. The FARC haswell-documented ties to the full range of narcotics traf-ficking activities, including taxation, cultivation, anddistribution.

StrengthApproximately 9,000 to 12,000 armed combatants andseveral thousand more supporters, mostly in rural areas.

Location/Area of OperationPrimarily in Colombia with some activities — extortion,kidnapping, weapons sourcing, logistics, and R&R — sus-pected in neighboring Brazil, Venezuela, Panama, Peru,and Ecuador.

External AidCuba provides some medical care, safe haven, and po-litical consultation. In December 2004, a ColombianAppeals Court declared three members of the Irish Re-publican Army — arrested in Colombia in 2001 uponexiting the former FARC-controlled demilitarized zone(despeje) — guilty of providing advanced explosives train-ing to the FARC. The FARC often uses the Colombia/Venezuela border area for cross-border incursions andconsider Venezuelan territory as a safe haven.

Revolutionary Nuclei (RN)a.k.a. Revolutionary Cells, Revolutionary PopularStruggle, ELA

DescriptionRevolutionary Nuclei (RN) emerged from a broad rangeof antiestablishment and anti-US/NATO/EU leftist groupsactive in Greece between 1995 and 1998. The group isbelieved to be the successor to or offshoot of Greece’smost prolific terrorist group, Revolutionary People’sStruggle (ELA), which has not claimed an attack since Janu-ary 1995. Indeed, RN appeared to fill the void left byELA, particularly as lesser groups faded from the scene.RN’s few communiqués show strong similarities in rheto-ric, tone, and theme to ELA proclamations. RN has notclaimed an attack since November 2000, nor has it an-nounced its disbandment.

ActivitiesSince it began operations in January 1995, the group hasclaimed responsibility for some two dozen arson attacksand low-level bombings against a range of US, Greek,and other European targets in Greece. In its most infa-mous and lethal attack to date, the group claimedresponsibility for a bomb it detonated at the Interconti-

nental Hotel in April 1999 that resulted in the death of aGreek woman and injured a Greek man. Its modus oper-andi includes warning calls of impending attacks, attackstargeting property instead of individuals, use of rudimen-tary timing devices, and strikes during the late-evening toearly-morning hours. RN may have been responsible fortwo attacks in July 2003 against a US insurance companyand a local bank in Athens. RN’s last confirmed attacksagainst US interests in Greece came in November 2000,with two separate bombings against the Athens offices ofCitigroup and the studio of a Greek-American sculptor.Greek targets have included judicial and other Govern-ment office buildings, private vehicles, and the offices ofGreek firms involved in NATO-related defense contractsin Greece. Similarly, the group has attacked European in-terests in Athens. The group did not conduct an attack in2004.

StrengthGroup membership is believed to be small, probablydrawing from the Greek militant leftist or anarchist mi-lieu.

Location/Area of OperationPrimary area of operation is in the Athens metropolitanarea.

External AidUnknown but believed to be self-sustaining.

Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)a.k.a. Devrimci Sol, Dev Sol, Revolutionary Left

DescriptionThis group originally formed in Turkey in 1978 as DevrimciSol, or Dev Sol, a splinter faction of Dev Genc (Revolu-tionary Youth). Renamed in 1994 after factional infighting.“Party” refers to the group’s political activities, while“Front” is a reference to the group’s militant operations.The group espouses a Marxist-Leninist ideology and isvehemently anti-US, anti-NATO, and anti-Turkish estab-lishment. Its goals are the establishment of a socialiststate and the abolition of one- to three-man prison cells,called F-type prisons. DHKP/C finances its activitieschiefly through donations and extortion.

ActivitiesSince the late 1980s the group has targeted primarily cur-rent and retired Turkish security and military officials. Itbegan a new campaign against foreign interests in 1990,which included attacks against US military and diplomaticpersonnel and facilities. To protest perceived US imperi-alism during the Gulf War, Dev Sol assassinated two USmilitary contractors, wounded an Air Force officer, andbombed more than 20 US and NATO military, commer-cial, and cultural facilities. In its first significant terrorist

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act as DHKP/C in 1996, the group assassinated a promi-nent Turkish businessman and two others. DHKP/C addedsuicide bombings to its repertoire in 2001, with success-ful attacks against Turkish police in January and September.Since the end of 2001, DHKP/C has typically used im-provised explosive devices against official Turkish targetsand soft US targets of opportunity; attacks against US tar-gets beginning in 2003 probably came in response toOperation Iraqi Freedom. Operations and arrests againstthe group have weakened its capabilities. DHKP/C didnot conduct any major terrorist attacks in 2003, but onJune 24, 2004 — just days before the NATO summit —an explosive device detonated, apparently prematurely,aboard a passenger bus in Istanbul while a DHKP/C op-erative was transporting it to another location, killing theoperative and three other persons.

StrengthProbably several dozen terrorist operatives inside Turkey,with a large support network throughout Europe. On April1, 2004, authorities arrested more than 40 suspectedDHKP/C members in coordinated raids across Turkey andEurope. In October, 10 alleged members of the groupwere sentenced to life imprisonment, while charges weredropped against 20 other defendants because of a statuteof limitations.

Location/Area of OperationTurkey, primarily Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and Adana.Raises funds in Europe.

External AidWidely believed to have training facilities or offices inLebanon and Syria.

Salafist Group for Call and Combat(GSPC)a.k.a. Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, LeGroupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat

DescriptionThe Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), a splin-ter group of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), seeks tooverthrow the Algerian Government with the goal of in-stalling an Islamic regime. GSPC eclipsed the GIA inapproximately 1998, and is currently the most effectiveand largest armed group inside Algeria. In contrast to theGIA, the GSPC pledged to avoid civilian attacks insideAlgeria.

ActivitiesThe GSPC continues to conduct operations aimed at Al-gerian Government and military targets, primarily in ruralareas, although civilians are sometimes killed. The Gov-ernment of Algeria scored major counterterrorismsuccesses against GSPC in 2004, significantly weaken-ing the organization, which also has been plagued with

internal divisions. Algerian military forces killed GSPCleader Nabil Sahraoui and one of his top lieutenants, AbbiAbdelaziz, in June 2004 in the mountainous area east ofAlgiers. In October, the Algerian Government took cus-tody of Abderazak al-Para, who led a GSPC faction thatheld 32 European tourists hostage in 2003. According topress reporting, some GSPC members in Europe and theMiddle East maintain contact with other North Africanextremists sympathetic to al-Qa’ida. In late 2003, theGSPC leader issued a communiqué announcing thegroup’s support of a number of jihadist causes and move-ments, including al-Qa’ida.

StrengthSeveral hundred fighters with an unknown number of fa-cilitators outside Algeria.

Location/Area of OperationAlgeria, the Sahel (i.e. northern Mali, northern Mauritania,and northern Niger), Canada, and Western Europe.

External AidAlgerian expatriates and GSPC members abroad, manyresiding in Western Europe, provide financial and logisti-cal support. GSPC members also engage in criminalactivity.

Shining Path (SL)a.k.a. Sendero Luminoso People’s Liberation Army

DescriptionFormer university professor Abimael Guzman formed SLin Peru in the late 1960s, and his teachings created thefoundation of SL’s militant Maoist doctrine. In the 1980s,SL became one of the most ruthless terrorist groups in theWestern Hemisphere. Approximately 30,000 personshave died since Shining Path took up arms in 1980. ThePeruvian Government made dramatic gains against SLduring the 1990s, but reports of recent SL involvement innarco-trafficking and kidnapping for ransom indicate itmay be developing new sources of support. Its statedgoal is to destroy existing Peruvian institutions and re-place them with a communist peasant revolutionaryregime. It also opposes any influence by foreign govern-ments. Peruvian Courts in 2003 granted approximately1,900 members the right to request retrials in a civiliancourt, including the imprisoned top leadership. The trialof Guzman, who was arrested in 1992, was scheduledfor November 5, 2004, but was postponed after the firstday, when chaos erupted in the courtroom.

ActivitiesConducted indiscriminate bombing campaigns and se-lective assassinations.

StrengthUnknown but estimated to be some 300 armed militants.

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Location/Area of OperationPeru, with most activity in rural areas.

ExternalAid None.

Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fiBilad al-Rafidayn (QJBR)a.k.a. Al-Zarqawi Network, Al-Qa’ida in Iraq, Al-Qa’ida of Jihad Organization in the Land of The TwoRivers, Jama’at al-Tawhid wa’al-Jihad

DescriptionThe Jordanian Palestinian Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi (AhmadFadhil Nazzal al-Khalaylah, a.k.a. Abu Ahmad, Abu Azraq)established cells in Iraq soon after the commencement ofOperation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), formalizing his group inApril 2004 to bring together jihadists and other insurgentsin Iraq fighting against US and Coalition forces. Zarqawiinitially called his group “Unity and Jihad” (Jama‘at al-Tawhid wa’al-Jihad, or JTJ). Zarqawi and his group helpedfinance, recruit, transport, and train Sunni Islamic extrem-ists for the Iraqi resistance. The group adopted its currentname after its October 2004 merger with Usama BinLadin’s al-Qa’ida. The immediate goal of QJBR is to ex-pel the Coalition — through a campaign of bombings,kidnappings, assassinations, and intimidation — and es-tablish an Islamic state in Iraq. QJBR’s longer-term goalis to proliferate jihad from Iraq into “Greater Syria,” thatis, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan.

ActivitiesIn August 2003, Zarqawi’s group carried out a major in-ternational terrorist attack in Iraq when it bombed theJordanian Embassy in Baghdad, followed 12 days laterby a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device(VBIED) attack against the UN Headquarters in Baghdad,killing 23, including the Secretary-General’s Special Rep-resentative for Iraq, Sergio Vieira de Mello. Also in Augustthe group conducted a VBIED attack against Shi‘a wor-shippers outside the Imam Ali Mosque in Al Najaf, killing85 — including the leader of the Supreme Council forthe Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). It kept up its attackpace throughout 2003, striking numerous Iraqi, Coalition,and relief agency targets such as the Red Cross. Zarqawi’sgroup conducted VBIED attacks against US military per-sonnel and Iraqi infrastructure throughout 2004, includingsuicide attacks inside the Green Zone perimeter inBaghdad. The group successfully penetrated the GreenZone in the October bombing of a popular café and mar-ket. Zarqawi’s group fulfilled a pledge to target Shi‘a; itsMarch attacks on Shi‘a celebrating the religious holidayof Ashura, killing over 180, was its most lethal attack todate. The group also killed key Iraqi political figures in2004, most notably the head of Iraq’s Governing Coun-cil. The group has claimed responsibility for the

videotaped execution by beheading of Americans Nicho-las Berg (May 8, 2004), Jack Armstrong (September 20,2004), and Jack Hensley (September 21, 2004). The groupmay have been involved in other hostage incidents as well.

Zarqawi’s group has been active in the Levant since itsinvolvement in the failed Millennium plot directed againstUS, Western, and Jordanian targets in Jordan in late 1999.The group assassinated USAID official Laurence Foley in2002, but the Jordanian Government has successfully dis-rupted further plots against US and Western interests inJordan, including a major arrest of Zarqawi associates in2004 planning to attack Jordanian security targets.

StrengthQJBR’s numerical strength is unknown, though the grouphas attracted new recruits to replace key leaders and othermembers killed or captured by Coalition forces. Zarqawi’sincreased stature from his formal relationship with al-Qa’ida could attract additional recruits to QJBR.

Location/Area of OperationQJBR’s operations are predominately Iraq-based, but thegroup maintains an extensive logistical network through-out the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe.

External AidQJBR probably receives funds from donors in the MiddleEast and Europe, local sympathizers in Iraq, and a varietyof businesses and criminal activities. In many cases,QJBR’s donors are probably motivated by support for jihadrather than affiliation with any specific terrorist group.

United Self-Defense Forces/Group ofColombia (AUC)a.k.a. Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia

DescriptionThe AUC, commonly referred to as “the paramilitaries,”is an umbrella organization formed in April 1997 to co-ordinate the activities of local paramilitary groups anddevelop a cohesive paramilitary effort to combat insur-gents. The AUC is supported by economic elites, drugtraffickers, and local communities lacking effective Gov-ernment security, and claims its primary objective is toprotect its sponsors from Marxist insurgents. The AUC’saffiliate groups and other paramilitary units are in nego-tiations with the Government of Colombia and in the midstof the largest demobilization in modern Colombian his-tory. To date, approximately 3,600 AUC-affiliated fightershave demobilized since November 2003.

ActivitiesAUC operations vary from assassinating suspected insur-gent supporters to engaging guerrilla combat units. Asmuch as 70 percent of the AUC’s operational costs are

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financed with drug-related earnings, with the rest com-ing from “donations” from its sponsors. The AUC generallyavoids actions against US personnel or interests.

StrengthEstimated 8,000 to 11,000, with an unknown number ofactive supporters.

Location/Area of OperationAUC forces are strongest in the northwest of Colombiain Antioquia, Cordoba, Sucre, Atlantico, Magdelena,Cesar, La Guajira, and Bolivar Departments, with af-filiate groups in the coffee region, Valle del Cauca, andin Meta Department.

External AidNone.

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Al Badhr Mujahedin (al-Badr)

DescriptionThe Al Badhr Mujahedin split from Hizbul-Mujahedin(HM) in 1998. Traces its origins to 1971, when a groupnamed Al Badr attacked Bengalis in East Pakistan. Lateroperated as part of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-I Islami(HIG) in Afghanistan and, from 1990, as a unit of HM inKashmir. The group was relatively inactive until 2000.Since then, it has increasingly claimed responsibility forattacks against Indian military targets.

ActivitiesHas conducted a number of operations against Indianmilitary targets in Jammu and Kashmir.

StrengthPerhaps several hundred.

Location/Area of OperationJammu and Kashmir, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

ExternalAid Unknown.

Other Selected Terrorist Organizations

Al-Badhr Mujahedin (al-Badr)Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI)Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB)Anti-Imperialist Territorial Nuclei (NTA)Cambodian Freedom Fighters (CFF)Communist Party of India (Maoist)Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)First of October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO)Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami (HUJI)Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B)Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)Hizbul-Mujahedin (HM)Irish National Liberation Army (INLA)Irish Republican Army (IRA)Islamic Army of Aden (IAA)Islamic Great East Raiders–Front (IBDA-C)Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade (IIPB)Islamic Jihad Group (IJG)Jamiat ul-Mujahedin (JUM)Japanese Red Army (JRA)Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM)Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF)Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM)New Red Brigades/Communist Combatant Party (BR/PCC)People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD)Red Hand Defenders (RHD)Revolutionary Proletarian Initiative Nuclei (NIPR)Revolutionary Struggle (RS)Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs (RSRSBCM)Sipah-I-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP)Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR)Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG)Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)Turkish HizballahUlster Defense Association/Ulster Freedom Fighters (UDA/UFF)Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)

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Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI)

DescriptionAIAI rose to prominence in the Horn of Africa in the early1990s, following the downfall of the Siad Barre regimeand the subsequent collapse of the Somali nation stateinto anarchy. AIAI was not internally cohesive and suf-fered divisions between factions supporting moderateIslam and more puritanical Islamic ideology. Followingmilitary defeats in 1996 and 1997, AIAI evolved into aloose network of highly compartmentalized cells, factions,and individuals with no central control or coordination.AIAI elements pursue a variety of agendas ranging fromsocial services and education to insurgency activities inthe Ogaden. Some AIAI-associated sheikhs espouse aradical fundamentalist version of Islam, with particularemphasis on a strict adherence to Sharia (Islamic law), aview often at odds with Somali emphasis on clan iden-tity. A small number of AIAI-associated individuals haveprovided logistical support to and maintain ties with al-Qa’ida; however, the network’s central focus remains theestablishment of an Islamic government in Somalia.

ActivitiesElements of AIAI may have been responsible for the kid-napping and murder of relief workers in Somalia andSomaliland in 2003 and 2004, and during the late 1990s.Factions of AIAI may also have been responsible for aseries of bomb attacks in public places in Addis Ababa in1996 and 1997. Most AIAI factions have recently con-centrated on broadening their religious base, renewedemphasis on building businesses, and undertaking “heartsand minds” actions, such as sponsoring orphanages andschools and providing security that uses an Islamic legalstructure in the areas where it is active.

StrengthThe actual membership strength is unknown.

Location/Area of OperationsPrimarily in Somalia, with a presence in the Ogaden re-gion of Ethiopia, Kenya, and possibly Djibouti.

External AidReceives funds from Middle East financiers and Somalidiaspora communities in Europe, North America, and theArabian Peninsula.

Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB)

DescriptionThe ABB, the breakaway urban hit squad of the Commu-nist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army, wasformed in the mid-1980s. The ABB was added to theTerrorist Exclusion list in December 2001.

ActivitiesResponsible for more than 100 murders, including themurder in 1989 of US Army Col. James Rowe in the Phil-ippines. In March 1997, the group announced it hadformed an alliance with another armed group, the Revo-lutionary Proletarian Army (RPA). In March 2000, thegroup claimed credit for a rifle grenade attack against theDepartment of Energy building in Manila and strafed ShellOil offices in the central Philippines to protest rising oilprices.

StrengthApproximately 500.

Location/Area of OperationThe largest RPA/ABB groups are on the Philippine islandsof Luzon, Negros, and the Visayas.


Anti-Imperialist Territorial Nuclei (NTA)a.k.a. Anti-Imperialist Territorial Units

DescriptionThe NTA is a clandestine leftist extremist group that firstappeared in Italy’s Friuli region in 1995. Adopted theclass struggle ideology of the Red Brigades of the 1970sand 1980s and a similar logo — an encircled five-pointstar — for their declarations. Seeks the formation of an“anti-imperialist fighting front” with other Italian leftistterrorist groups, including Revolutionary Proletarian Ini-tiative Nuclei and the New Red Brigades. Opposes whatit perceives as US and NATO imperialism and condemnsItaly’s foreign and labor polices. In a leaflet dated Janu-ary 2002, NTA identified experts in four ItalianGovernment sectors — federalism, privatizations, jus-tice reform, and jobs and pensions — as potential targets.

ActivitiesTo date, NTA has conducted attacks only against prop-erty. During the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999,NTA members threw gasoline bombs at the Venice andRome headquarters of the then-ruling party, Democratsof the Left. NTA claimed responsibility for a bomb attackin September 2000 against the Central European Initia-tive office in Trieste and a bomb attack in August 2001against the Venice Tribunal building. In January 2002,police thwarted an attempt by four NTA members to en-ter the Rivolto Military Air Base. In 2003, NTA claimedresponsibility for the arson attacks against three vehiclesbelonging to US troops serving at the Ederle and Avianobases in Italy. There has been no reported activity by thegroup since the arrest in January 2004 of NTA’s founderand leader.

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StrengthAccounts vary from one to approximately 20 members.

Location/Area of OperationPrimarily northeastern Italy and near US military installa-tions in northern Italy.

External AidNone evident.

Cambodian Freedom Fighters (CFF)a.k.a. Cholana Kangtoap Serei Cheat Kampouchea

DescriptionThe Cambodian Freedom Fighters (CFF) emerged in No-vember 1998 in the wake of political violence that sawmany influential Cambodian leaders flee and the Cam-bodian People’s Party assume power. With an avowedaim of overthrowing the Government, the group is led bya Cambodian-American, a former member of the opposi-tion Sam Rainsy Party. The CFF’s membership reportedlyincludes Cambodian-Americans based in Thailand andthe United States, and former soldiers from the KhmerRouge, Royal Cambodian Armed Forces, and various po-litical factions.

ActivitiesThe Cambodian Government arrested seven CFF mem-bers who were reportedly planning an unspecified terroristattack in southwestern Cambodia in late 2003, but therewere no successful CFF attacks that year. Cambodiancourts in February and March 2002 prosecuted 38 CFFmembers suspected of staging an attack in Cambodia in2000. The courts convicted 19 members, including oneUS citizen, of “terrorism” and/or “membership in anarmed group” and sentenced them to terms of five yearsto life imprisonment. The group claimed responsibilityfor an attack in late November 2000 on several Govern-ment installations that killed at least eight persons andwounded more than a dozen. In April 1999, five CFFmembers were arrested for plotting to blow up a fuel de-pot outside Phnom Penh with anti-tank weapons.

StrengthExact strength is unknown, but totals probably never haveexceeded 100 armed fighters.

Location/Area of OperationNortheastern Cambodia near the Thai border, and theUnited States.

External AidUS-based leadership collects funds from the Cambodian-American community.

Communist Party of India (Maoist)Formerly Maoist Communist Center of India (MCCI)and People’s War (PW)

DescriptionThe Indian groups known as the Maoist Communist Cen-ter of India and People’s War (a.k.a. People’s War Group)joined together in September 2004 to form the Commu-nist Party of India (Maoist), or CPI (Maoist). The MCCIwas originally formed in the early 1970s, while People’sWar was founded in 1975. Both groups are referred to asNaxalites, after the West Bengal village where a revolu-tionary radical Left movement originated in 1967. Thenew organization continues to employ violence to achieveits goals — peasant revolution, abolition of class hierar-chies, and expansion of Maoist-controlled “liberatedzones,” eventually leading to the creation of an indepen-dent “Maoist” state. The CPI (Maoist) reportedly has asignificant cadre of women. Important leaders includeGanapati (the PW leader from Andhra Pradesh), PramodMishra, Uma Shankar, and P.N.G. (alias Nathuni Mistry,arrested by Jharkhand police in 2002).

ActivitiesPrior to its consolidation with the PW, the MCCI ran avirtual parallel government in remote areas, where it col-lected a “tax” from the villagers and, in turn, providedinfrastructure improvements such as building hospitals,schools, and irrigation projects. It ran a parallel court sys-tem wherein allegedly corrupt block development officialsand landlords — frequent MCCI targets — had been pun-ished by amputation and even death. People’s Warconducted a low-intensity insurgency that included at-tempted political assassination, theft of weapons frompolice stations, kidnapping police officers, assaulting ci-vilians, extorting money from construction firms, andvandalizing the property of multinational corporations.Together the two groups were reportedly responsible forthe deaths of up to 170 civilians and police a year.

StrengthAlthough difficult to assess with any accuracy, media re-ports and local authorities suggest the CPI (Maoist)’smembership may be as high as 31,000, including bothhard-core militants and dedicated sympathizers.

Location/Area of OperationsThe CPI (Maoist), believed to be enlarging the scope of itsinfluence, operates in the Indian states of Andhra Pradesh,Orissa, Jharkhand, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, and parts of WestBengal. It also has a presence on the Bihar-Nepal border.

External AidThe CPI (Maoist) has loose links to other Maoist groups inthe region, including the Communist Party of Nepal(Maoists). The MCCI was a founding member of the Co-ordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizationsof South Asia (CCOMPOSA).

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Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists)CPN/M

DescriptionThe Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) insurgency grewout of the radicalization and fragmentation of left-wingparties following Nepal’s transition to democracy in 1990.The United People’s Front — a coalition of left-wing par-ties — participated in the elections of 1991, but the Maoistwing failed to win the required minimum number of votes,leading to its exclusion from voter lists in the elections of1994 and prompting the group to launch the insurgencyin 1996. The CPN/M’s ultimate objective is the overthrowof the Nepalese Government and the establishment of aMaoist state. In 2003, the United States designated Nepal’sMaoists under Executive Order (EO) 13224 as a supporterof terrorist activity.

ActivitiesThe Maoists have utilized traditional guerrilla warfare tac-tics and engage in murder, torture, arson, sabotage,extortion, child conscription, kidnapping, bombings, andassassinations to intimidate and coerce the populace. In2002, Maoists claimed responsibility for assassinating twoNepalese US Embassy guards, citing anti-Maoist spying,and in a press statement threatened foreign embassies,including the US mission, to deter foreign support for theNepalese Government. Maoists are suspected in the Sep-tember 2004 bombing at the American Cultural Centerin Kathmandu. The attack, which caused no injuries andonly minor damage, marked the first time the Maoistshad damaged US Government property.

StrengthProbably several thousand full-time cadres.

Location/Area of OperationOperations are conducted throughout Nepal. Press re-ports indicate some Maoist leaders reside in India.

External AidNone.

Democratic Forces for the Liberation ofRwanda (FDLR)a.k.a. Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALIR), Ex-FAR/Interahamwe

DescriptionThe Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda(FDLR) in 2001 supplanted the Army for the Liberation ofRwanda (ALIR), which is the armed branch of the PALIR,or the Party for the Liberation of Rwanda. ALIR was formedfrom the merger of the Armed Forces of Rwanda (FAR),the army of the ethnic Hutu-dominated Rwandan regimethat orchestrated the genocide of 500,000 or more Tutsis

and regime opponents in 1994, and Interahamwe, thecivilian militia force that carried out much of the killing,after the two groups were forced from Rwanda into theDemocratic Republic of Congo (DRC- then Zaire) thatyear. Though directly descended from those who orga-nized and carried out the genocide, identified FDLRleaders are not thought to have played a role in the kill-ing. They have worked to build bridges to other opponentsof the Kigali regime, including ethnic Tutsis.

ActivitiesALIR sought to topple Rwanda’s Tutsi-dominated Govern-ment, reinstitute Hutu domination, and, possibly,complete the genocide. In 1996, a message — allegedlyfrom the ALIR — threatened to kill the US ambassador toRwanda and other US citizens. In 1999, ALIR guerrillascritical of US-UK support for the Rwandan regime kid-napped and killed eight foreign tourists, including twoUS citizens, in a game park on the Democratic Republicof Congo-Uganda border. Three suspects in the attackare in US custody awaiting trial. In the 1998-2002 Con-golese war, the ALIR/FDLR was allied with Kinshasaagainst the Rwandan invaders. FDLR’s political wingmainly has sought to topple the Kigali regime via an alli-ance with Tutsi regime opponents. It established theADRN Igihango alliance in 2002, but it has not resonatedpolitically in Rwanda.

StrengthExact strength is unknown, but several thousand FDLRguerrillas operate in the eastern DRC close to the Rwandanborder. In 2003, the United Nations, with Rwandan as-sistance, repatriated close to 1,500 FDLR combatants fromthe DRC. The senior FDLR military commander returnedto Rwanda in November 2003 and has been working withKigali to encourage the return of his comrades.

Location/Area of OperationMostly in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

External SupportThe Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congoprovided training, arms, and supplies to ALIR forces tocombat Rwandan armed forces that invaded the DRC in1998. Kinshasa halted that support in 2002, though alle-gations persist of continued support from several localCongolese warlords and militias (including the Mai Mai).

East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)

DescriptionThe East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is a smallIslamic extremist group based in China’s western XinjiangProvince. It is the most militant of the ethnic Uighur sepa-ratist groups pursuing an independent “Eastern Turkistan,”an area that would include Turkey, Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the

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Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region of China. ETIM islinked to al-Qa’ida and the international mujahedin move-ment. In September 2002 the group was designated underEO 13224 as a supporter of terrorist activity.

ActivitiesETIM militants fought alongside al-Qa’ida and Talibanforces in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom.In October 2003, Pakistani soldiers killed ETIM leaderHassan Makhsum during raids on al-Qa’ida–associatedcompounds in western Pakistan. US and Chinese Gov-ernment information suggests ETIM is responsible forvarious terrorist acts inside and outside China. In May2002, two ETIM members were deported to China fromKyrgyzstan for plotting to attack the US Embassy inKyrgyzstan as well as other US interests abroad.

StrengthUnknown. Only a small minority of ethnic Uighurs sup-ports the Xinjiang independence movement or theformation of an Eastern Turkistan.

Location/Area of OperationXinjiang Province and neighboring countries in the region.

External AidETIM has received training and financial assistance fromal-Qa’ida.

First of October Antifascist ResistanceGroup (GRAPO) Grupo de ResistenciaAnti-Fascista Primero de Octubre

DescriptionGRAPO was formed in 1975 as the armed wing of theillegal Communist Party of Spain during the Franco era.Advocates the overthrow of the Spanish Government andits replacement with a Marxist-Leninist regime. GRAPOis vehemently anti-American, seeks the removal of all USmilitary forces from Spanish territory, and has conductedand attempted several attacks against US targets since1977. The group issued a communiqué following theSeptember 11, 2001, attacks in the United States, express-ing its satisfaction that “symbols of imperialist power” weredecimated and affirming that “the war” has only just begun.Designated under EO 13224 in December 2001.

ActivitiesGRAPO did not mount a successful terrorist operation in2004, marking the third consecutive year without an at-tack. The group suffered more setbacks in 2004, withseveral members and sympathizers arrested and sentencesupheld or handed down in April in the appellate case forGRAPO militants arrested in Paris in 2000. GRAPO haskilled more than 90 persons and injured more than 200since its formation. The group’s operations traditionally

have been designed to cause material damage and gainpublicity rather than inflict casualties, but the terrorists haveconducted lethal bombings and close-range assassinations.

StrengthFewer than two dozen activists remain. Police have madeperiodic large-scale arrests of GRAPO members, cripplingthe organization and forcing it into lengthy rebuildingperiods. In 2002, Spanish and French authorities arrested22 suspected members, including some of the group’sreconstituted leadership. More members were arrestedthroughout 2003 and 2004.

Location/Area of OperationSpain.

External AidNone.

Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami (HUJI)(Movement of Islamic Holy War)

DescriptionHUJI, a Sunni extremist group that follows the Deobanditradition of Islam, was founded in 1980 in Afghanistan tofight in the jihad against the Soviets. It also is affiliatedwith the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam’s Fazlur Rehman faction(JUI-F) of the extremist religious party Jamiat Ulema-I-Is-lam (JUI). The group, led by Qari Saifullah Akhtar andchief commander Amin Rabbani, is made up primarily ofPakistanis and foreign Islamists who are fighting for theliberation of Jammu and Kashmir and its accession to Pa-kistan. The group has links to al-Qa’ida. At present, Akhtarremains in detention in Pakistan after his August 2004arrest and extradition from Dubai.

ActivitiesHas conducted a number of operations against Indianmilitary targets in Jammu and Kashmir. Linked to theKashmiri militant group al-Faran that kidnapped five West-ern tourists in Jammu and Kashmir in July 1995; one waskilled in August 1995, and the other four reportedly werekilled in December of the same year.

StrengthExact numbers are unknown, but there may be severalhundred members in Kashmir.

Location/Area of OperationPakistan and Kashmir. Trained members in Afghanistanuntil autumn of 2001.

External AidSpecific sources of external aid are unknown.

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Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami/Bangladesh(HUJI-B)

Description The mission of HUJI-B, led by Shauqat Osman, is to es-tablish Islamic rule in Bangladesh. HUJI-B hasconnections to the Pakistani militant groups Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami (HUJI) and Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM),which advocate similar objectives in Pakistan and Jammuand Kashmir. These groups all maintain contacts withthe al-Qa’ida network in Afghanistan. The leaders of HUJI-B and HUM both signed the February 1998 fatwasponsored by Usama bin Ladin that declared Americancivilians to be legitimate targets for attack.

ActivitiesHUJI-B was accused of stabbing a senior Bangladeshi jour-nalist in November 2000 for making a documentary onthe plight of Hindus in Bangladesh. HUJI-B was suspectedin the assassination attempt in July 2000 of BangladeshiPrime Minister Sheikh Hasina. The group may also havebeen responsible for indiscriminate attacks using impro-vised explosive devices against cultural gatherings inDhaka in January and April 2001.

StrengthUnknown; some estimates of HUJI-B cadre strength sug-gest several thousand members.

Location/Area of OperationThe group operates and trains members in Bangladesh,where it maintains at least six camps.

External AidFunding of the HUJI-B comes primarily from madrassasin Bangladesh. The group also has ties to militants inPakistan that may provide another funding source.

Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)

DescriptionGulbuddin Hikmatyar founded Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin(HIG) as a faction of the Hizb-I Islami party in 1977, andit was one of the major mujahedin groups in the waragainst the Soviets. HIG has long-established links withUsama Bin Ladin. In the early 1990s, Hikmatyar ran sev-eral terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and was apioneer in sending mercenary fighters to other Islamicconflicts. Hikmatyar offered to shelter Bin Ladin after thelatter fled Sudan in 1996. In a late 2004 press release,Hikmatyar reiterated his commitment to fight US andCoalition forces.

ActivitiesHIG has staged small attacks in its attempt to force UStroops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Af-

ghan Transitional Administration, and establish an Islamicfundamentalist state. In 2004, several US soldiers werekilled in attacks in Konar, Afghanistan, the area in whichHIG is most active.

StrengthUnknown, but possibly could have hundreds of veteranfighters on which to call.

Location/Area of OperationEastern Afghanistan (particularly Konar and Nurestan Prov-inces) and adjacent areas of Pakistan’s tribal areas.


Hizbul-Mujahedin (HM)

DescriptionHizbul-Mujahedin (HM), the largest Kashmiri militantgroup, was founded in 1989 and officially supports theliberation of Jammu and Kashmir and its accession to Pa-kistan, although some cadres favor independence. Thegroup is the militant wing of Pakistan’s largest Islamic po-litical party, the Jamaat-i-Islami, and targets Indian securityforces,politicians and civilians in Jammu and Kashmir. Itreportedly operated in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s andtrained with the Afghan Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)in Afghanistan until the Taliban takeover. The group, ledby Syed Salahuddin, is comprised primarily of ethnicKashmiris.

ActivitiesHM has conducted a number of operations against In-dian military targets in Jammu and Kashmir. The groupalso occasionally strikes at civilian targets, but has notengaged in terrorist acts outside India. HM claimed re-sponsibility for numerous attacks within Kashmir in 2004.

StrengthExact numbers are unknown, but estimates range fromseveral hundred to possibly as many as 1,000 membersin Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan.

Location/Area of OperationJammu and Kashmir and Pakistan.

External AidSpecific sources of external aid are unknown.

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Irish National Liberation Army (INLA)

DescriptionThe INLA is a terrorist group formed in 1975 as the mili-tary wing of the Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP),which split from the Official IRA (OIRA) because of OIRA’scease-fire in 1972. The group’s primary aim is to endBritish rule in Northern Ireland, force British troops outof the province, and unite Ireland’s 32 counties into aMarxist-Leninist revolutionary state. Responsible for someof the most notorious killings of “The Troubles,” includ-ing the bombing of a Ballykelly pub that killed 17 peoplein 1982. Bloody internal feuding has repeatedly torn theINLA. The INLA announced a cease-fire in August 1998but continues to carry out occasional attacks and punish-ment beatings.

ActivitiesThe INLA has been active in Belfast and the border areasof Northern Ireland, where it has conducted bombings,assassinations, kidnappings, hijackings, extortion, androbberies. It is also involved in drug trafficking. On oc-casion, it has provided advance warning to police of itsattacks. Targets include the British military, Northern Ire-land security forces, and Loyalist paramilitary groups. TheINLA continues to observe a cease-fire, because — in thewords of its leadership in 2003 — a return to armedstruggle is “not a viable option at this time.” However,members of the group were accused of involvement in arobbery and kidnapping in December 2004, which thegroup denies.

StrengthUnclear, but probably fewer than 50 hard-core activists.Police counterterrorist operations and internal feudinghave reduced the group’s strength and capabilities.

Location/Area of OperationNorthern Ireland, Irish Republic. Does not have a signifi-cant established presence on the UK mainland.

External AidSuspected in the past of receiving funds and arms fromsympathizers in the United States.

Irish Republican Army (IRA)a.k.a. Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA),the Provos

DescriptionFormed in 1969 as the clandestine armed wing of thepolitical movement Sinn Fein, the IRA is devoted both toremoving British forces from Northern Ireland and to uni-fying Ireland. The IRA conducted attacks until its cease-firein 1997 and agreed to disarm as a part of the 1998 BelfastAgreement, which established the basis for peace inNorthern Ireland. Dissension within the IRA over sup-

port for the Northern Ireland peace process resulted inthe formation of two more radical splinter groups: Conti-nuity IRA (CIRA), and the Real IRA (RIRA) in mid to late1990s. The IRA, sometimes referred to as the PIRA to distin-guish it from RIRA and CIRA, is organized into small,tightly-knit cells under the leadership of the Army Council.

ActivitiesTraditional IRA activities have included bombings, assas-sinations, kidnappings, punishment beatings, extortion,smuggling, and robberies. Before the cease-fire in 1997,the group had conducted bombing campaigns on vari-ous targets in Northern Ireland and Great Britain, includingsenior British Government officials, civilians, police, andBritish military targets. The group’s refusal in late 2004 toallow photographic documentation of its decommission-ing process was an obstacle to progress in implementingthe Belfast Agreement and stalled talks. The group previ-ously had disposed of light, medium, and heavy weapons,ammunition, and explosives in three rounds of decom-missioning. However, the IRA is believed to retain theability to conduct paramilitary operations. The group’sextensive criminal activities reportedly provide the IRAand the political party Sinn Fein with millions of dollarseach year; the IRA was implicated in two significant rob-beries in 2004, one involving almost $50 million.

StrengthSeveral hundred members and several thousand sympa-thizers despite the defection of some members to RIRAand CIRA.

Location/Area of OperationNorthern Ireland, Irish Republic, Great Britain, and Europe.

External AidIn the past, the IRA has received aid from a variety ofgroups and countries and considerable training and armsfrom Libya and the PLO. Is suspected of receiving funds,arms, and other terrorist-related materiel from sympathiz-ers in the United States. Similarities in operations suggestlinks to ETA and the FARC. In August 2002, three sus-pected IRA members were arrested in Colombia on chargesof helping the FARC improve its explosives capabilities.

Islamic Army of Aden (IAA)a.k.a. Aden-Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA)

DescriptionThe Islamic Army of Aden (IAA) emerged publicly in mid-1998 when the group released a series of communiquésthat expressed support for Usama Bin Ladin, appealedfor the overthrow of the Yemeni Government, and calledfor operations against US and other Western interests inYemen. IAA was first designated under EO 13224 in Sep-tember 2001.

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ActivitiesIAA has engaged in small-scale operations such as bomb-ings, kidnappings, and small arms attacks to promote itsgoals. The group reportedly was behind an attack in June2003 against a medical assistance convoy in the AbyanGovernorate. Yemeni authorities responded with a raidon a suspected IAA facility, killing several individuals andcapturing others, including Khalid al-Nabi al-Yazidi, thegroup’s leader. Before that attack, the group had not con-ducted operations since the bombing of the BritishEmbassy in Sanaa in October 2000. In 2001, Yemeniauthorities found an IAA member and three associatesresponsible for that attack. In December 1998, the groupkidnapped 16 British, American, and Australian touristsnear Mudiyah in southern Yemen. Although Yemeni offi-cials previously have claimed that the group isoperationally defunct, their recent attribution of the at-tack in 2003 against the medical convoy and reports thatal-Yazidi was released from prison in mid-October 2003suggest that the IAA, or at least elements of the group,have resumed activity. Speculation after the attack onthe USS Cole pointed to the involvement of the IAA, andthe group later claimed responsibility for the attack. TheIAA has been affiliated with al-Qa’ida. IAA members areknown to have trained and served in Afghanistan underthe leadership of seasoned mujahedin.

StrengthNot known.

Location/Area of OperationOperates in the southern governorates of Yemen — pri-marily Aden and Abyan.

External AidNot known.

Islamic Great East Raiders–Front(IBDA-C)

DescriptionThe Islamic Great East Raiders–Front (IBDA-C) is a SunniSalafist group that supports Islamic rule in Turkey and be-lieves that Turkey’s present secular leadership is “illegal.”It has been known to cooperate with various oppositionelements in Turkey in attempts to destabilize the country’spolitical structure. The group supports the establishmentof a “pure Islamic” state, to replace the present “corrupt”Turkish regime that is cooperating with the West. Its pri-mary goal is the establishment of a “Federative IslamicState,” a goal backed by armed terrorist attacks primarilyagainst civilian targets. It has been active since the mid-1970s.

ActivitiesIBDA-C has engaged in activities such as bombings, throw-ing Molotov cocktails, and sabotage. The group hasannounced its actions and targets in publications to itsmembers, who are free to launch independent attacks.IBDA-C typically has attacked civilian targets, includingchurches, charities, minority-affiliated targets, televisiontransmitters, newspapers, pro-secular journalists, Ataturkstatues, taverns, banks, clubs, and tobacco shops. In May2004, Turkish police indicted seven members of the groupfor the assassination of retired Colonel Ihsan Guven, thealleged leader of the “Dost” (Friend) sect, and his wife.One of IBDA-C’s more renowned attacks was the killingof 37 people in a firebomb attack in July 1993 on a hotelin Sivas. Turkish police believe that IBDA-C has alsoclaimed responsibility for attacks carried out by othergroups to elevate its image.

StrengthUnknown.

Location/Area of OperationTurkey.

External AidNot known.

Islamic International PeacekeepingBrigade (IIPB)

DescriptionThe IIPB is a terrorist group affiliated with the Chechenseparatist movement demanding a single Islamic state inthe North Caucasus. Chechen extremist leader ShamilBasayev established the IIPB — consisting of Chechens,Arabs, and other foreign fighters — in 1998, which heled with Saudi-born mujahedin leader Ibn al-Khattab untilthe latter’s death in March 2002. The IIPB was one of threegroups affiliated with Chechen guerrillas that seizedMoscow’s Dubrovka Theater and took more than 700 hos-tages in October 2002. While this group has not beenidentified as conducting attacks since their designationtwo years ago, those Arab mujahedin still operating inChechnya now fall under the command of Abu Hafsal-Urduni, who assumed the leadership in April 2004after the death of Khattab’s successor, Abu al-Walid.Designated under EO 13224 in February 2003.

ActivitiesInvolved in terrorist and guerilla operations against Rus-sian forces, pro-Russian Chechen forces, and Chechennon-combatants.

StrengthUp to 400 fighters, including as many as 100 Arabs andother foreign fighters.

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Location/Area of OperationPrimarily in Russia and adjacent areas of the northCaucasus, particularly in the mountainous south ofChechnya, with major logistical activities in Georgia,Azerbaijan, and Turkey.

External AidThe IIPB and its Arab leaders appear to be a primary con-duit for Islamic funding of the Chechen guerrillas, in partthrough links to al-Qa’ida-related financiers on the Ara-bian Peninsula.

Islamic Jihad Group (IJG)

DescriptionThe Islamic Jihad Group (IJG), probably founded by formermembers of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, madeits first appearance in early April 2004 when it claimedresponsibility for a string of events — including shootoutsand terrorist attacks — in Uzbekistan in late March andearly April that killed approximately 47 people, includ-ing 33 terrorists. The claim of responsibility, which wasposted to multiple militant Islamic websites, raged againstthe leadership of Uzbekistan. In late July 2004, the groupstruck again with near-simultaneous suicide bombings ofthe US and Israeli Embassies and the Uzbek ProsecutorGeneral’s office in Tashkent. The IJG again claimed re-sponsibility via an Islamic website and stated thatmartyrdom operations by the group would continue. Thestatement also indicated the attacks were done in sup-port of their Palestinian, Iraqi, and Afghan brothers in theglobal jihad.

ActivitiesThe IJG claimed responsibility for multiple attacks in 2004against Uzbekistani, American, and Israeli entities. Theattackers in the March and April 2004 attacks, some ofwhom were female suicide bombers, targeted the localgovernment offices of the Uzbekistani and Bukhara po-lice, killing approximately 47 people, including 33terrorists. These attacks marked the first use of femalesuicide bombers in Central Asia. On July 30, 2004, thegroup launched a set of same-day attacks against the USand Israeli Embassies and the Uzbek Prosecutor General’soffice. These attacks left four Uzbekistanis and three sui-cide operatives dead. The date of the latter attackcorresponds to the start of a trial for individuals arrestedfor their participation in earlier attacks.

StrengthUnknown.

Location/Area of OperationMilitants are scattered throughout Central Asia and prob-ably parts of South Asia.


Jamiat ul-Mujahedin (JUM)

DescriptionThe JUM is a small, pro-Pakistan militant group formed inJammu and Kashmir in 1990. Followers are mostlyKashmiris, but the group includes some Pakistanis.

ActivitiesHas conducted a number of operations against Indianmilitary and political targets in Jammu and Kashmir, in-cluding two grenade attacks against political targets in2004.

StrengthUnknown.

Location/Area of OperationJammu and Kashmir and Pakistan.


Japanese Red Army (JRA)a.k.a. Anti-Imperialist International Brigade (AIIB)

DescriptionThe JRA is an international terrorist group formed around1970 after breaking away from the Japanese CommunistLeague–Red Army Faction. The JRA’s historical goal hasbeen to overthrow the Japanese Government and monar-chy and to help foment world revolution. JRA’s leader,Fusako Shigenobu, claimed that the forefront of the battleagainst international imperialism was in Palestine, so inthe early 1970s she led her small group to the MiddleEast to support the Palestinian struggle against Israel andthe West. After her arrest in November 2000, Shigenobuannounced she intended to pursue her goals using a le-gitimate political party rather than revolutionary violence,and the group announced it would disband in April 2001.

ActivitiesDuring the 1970s, JRA carried out a series of attacksaround the world, including the massacre in 1972 at LodAirport in Israel, two Japanese airliner hijackings, and anattempted takeover of the US Embassy in Kuala Lumpur.During the late 1980s, JRA began to single out Americantargets and used car bombs and rockets in attempted at-tacks on US Embassies in Jakarta, Rome, and Madrid. InApril 1988, JRA operative Yu Kikumura was arrested withexplosives on the New Jersey Turnpike, apparently plan-ning an attack to coincide with the bombing of a USOclub in Naples, a suspected JRA operation that killed five,including a US servicewoman. He was convicted of thecharges and is serving a lengthy prison sentence in theUnited States. Tsutomu Shirosaki, captured in 1996, isalso jailed in the United States. In 2000, Lebanon de-ported to Japan four members it arrested in 1997, but

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granted a fifth operative, Kozo Okamoto, political asy-lum. Longtime leader Shigenobu was arrested inNovember 2000 and faces charges of terrorism and pass-port fraud. Four JRA members remain in North Koreafollowing their involvement in a hijacking in 1970; fiveof their family members returned to Japan in 2004.

StrengthAbout six hard-core members; undetermined number ofsympathizers. At its peak, the group claimed to have 30to 40 members.

Location/Area of OperationLocation unknown, but possibly in Asia and/or Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon.


Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM)

DescriptionKumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) favors the over-throw of the Malaysian Government and the creation ofan Islamic state comprising Malaysia, Indonesia, and thesouthern Philippines. Malaysian authorities believe anextremist wing of the KMM has engaged in terrorist actsand has close ties to the regional terrorist organizationJemaah Islamiya (JI). Key JI leaders, including the group’sspiritual head, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, and JI operationalleader Hambali, reportedly had great influence over KMMmembers. The Government of Singapore asserts that aSingaporean JI member assisted the KMM in buying aboat to support jihad activities in Indonesia.

ActivitiesMalaysia is holding a number of KMM members underthe Internal Security Act (ISA) for activities deemed threat-ening to Malaysia’s national security, including planningto wage jihad, possession of weaponry, bombings androbberies, the murder of a former state assemblyman, andplanning attacks on foreigners, including US citizens. Anumber of those detained are also believed to be mem-bers of Jemaah Islamiya. Several of the arrested KMMmilitants have reportedly undergone military training inAfghanistan, and some fought with the Afghan mujahedinduring the war against the former Soviet Union. Somemembers are alleged to have ties to Islamic extremist or-ganizations in Indonesia and the Philippines. InSeptember 2003, alleged KMM leader Nik Adli Nik AbdulAziz’s detention was extended for another two years. InMarch 2004, Aziz and other suspected KMM memberswent on a hunger strike as part of an unsuccessful bid forfreedom, but the Malaysian court rejected their applica-tions for a writ of habeas corpus in September. One allegedKMM member was sentenced to 10 years in prison forunlawful possession of firearms, explosives, and ammu-

nition, but eight other alleged members in detention since2001 were released in July and in November. The Ma-laysian Government is confident that the arrests of KMMleaders have crippled the organization and rendered itincapable of engaging in militant activities. Malaysianofficials in May 2004 denied Thailand’s charge that theKMM was involved in the Muslim separatist movementin southern Thailand.

StrengthKMM’s current membership is unknown.

Location/Area of OperationThe KMM is reported to have networks in the Malaysianstates of Perak, Johor, Kedah, Selangor, Terengganu, andKelantan. They also operate in Kuala Lumpur. Accord-ing to press reports, the KMM has ties to radical IndonesianIslamic groups and has sent members to Ambon, Indone-sia, to fight against Christians and to the southernPhilippines for operational training.

External AidLargely unknown, probably self-financing.

Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)

DescriptionThe LRA was formally established in 1994, succeedingthe ethnic Acholi-dominated Holy Spirit Movement andother insurgent groups. LRA leader Joseph Kony has calledfor the overthrow of the Ugandan Government and itsreplacement with a regime run on the basis of the TenCommandments. More frequently, however, he has spo-ken of the liberation and honor of the Acholi people,whom he sees as oppressed by the “foreign” Governmentof Ugandan President Museveni. Kony is the LRA’s un-disputed leader. He claims to have supernatural powersand to receive messages from spirits, which he uses toformulate the LRA’s strategy.

ActivitiesThe Acholi people, whom Kony claims to be fighting toliberate, are the ones who suffer most from his actions.Since the early 1990’s, the LRA has kidnapped some20,000 Ugandan children, mostly ethnic Acholi, to re-plenish its ranks. Kony despises Acholi elders for havinggiven up the fight against Museveni and relies on abductedchildren who can be brutally indoctrinated to fight forthe LRA. The LRA forces kidnapped children and adultcivilians to become soldiers, porters, and “wives” for LRAleaders. The LRA prefers to attack camps for internallydisplaced persons and other civilian targets, avoiding di-rect engagement with the Ugandan military. Victims ofLRA attacks sometimes have their hands, fingers, ears,noses, or other extremities cut off. The LRA stepped upits activities from 2002 to 2004 after the Ugandan army,with the Sudanese Government’s permission, attacked LRA

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positions inside Sudan. By late 2003, the number of in-ternally displaced had doubled to 1.4 million, and theLRA had pushed deep into non-Acholi areas where it hadnever previously operated. During 2004, a combinationof military pressure, offers of amnesty, and several roundsof negotiation markedly degraded LRA capabilities due todeath, desertion, and defection of senior commanders.

StrengthEstimated in early 2004 at between 500 and 1,000 fight-ers, 85 percent of whom are abducted children andcivilians, but numbers have since declined significantly.

Location/Area of OperationNorthern Uganda and southern Sudan.

External AidAlthough the LRA has been supported by the Govern-ment of Sudan in the past, the Sudanese now appear tobe cooperating with the Government of Uganda in a cam-paign to eliminate LRA sanctuaries in Sudan.

Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF)

DescriptionAn extreme Loyalist group formed in 1996 as a faction ofthe Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), the LVF did not emergepublicly until 1997. Composed largely of UVF hardlinerswho have sought to prevent a political settlement withIrish nationalists in Northern Ireland by attacking Catho-lic politicians, civilians, and Protestant politicians whoendorse the Northern Ireland peace process. LVF occa-sionally uses the Red Hand Defenders as a cover namefor its actions but has also called for the group’s disband-ment. In October 2001, the British Government ruledthat the LVF had broken the cease-fire it declared in 1998after linking the group to the murder of a journalist. Ac-cording to the Independent International Commission onDecommissioning, the LVF decommissioned a smallamount of weapons in December 1998, but it has notrepeated this gesture. Designated under EO 13224 inDecember 2001.

ActivitiesBombings, kidnappings, and close-quarter shooting at-tacks. Finances its activities with drug money and othercriminal activities. LVF attacks have been particularlyvicious; the group has murdered numerous Catholic ci-vilians with no political or paramilitary affiliations,including an 18-year-old Catholic girl in July 1997 be-cause she had a Protestant boyfriend. The terrorists alsohave conducted successful attacks against Irish targets inIrish border towns. From 2000 to 2004, the LVF has beenengaged in a violent feud with other Loyalists, which hasleft several men dead.

StrengthSmall, perhaps dozens of active members.

Location/Area of OperationNorthern Ireland and Ireland.

External AidNone.

Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group(GICM)

DescriptionThe goals of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group(GICM) include establishing an Islamic state in Moroccoand supporting al-Qa’ida’s jihad against the West. Thegroup appears to have emerged in the 1990s and is com-prised of Moroccan recruits who trained in armed campsin Afghanistan and some who fought in the Afghan resis-tance against Soviet occupation. GICM members interactwith other North African extremists, particularly in Eu-rope. On November 22, 2002, the United Statesdesignated the GICM for asset freeze under EO 13224following the group’s submission to the UNSCR 1267Sanctions Committee.

ActivitiesMoroccans associated with the GICM are part of thebroader international jihadist movement. GICM is oneof the groups believed to be involved in planning the May2003 Casablanca suicide bombings, and has been in-volved in other plots. Members work with other NorthAfrican extremists, engage in trafficking falsified docu-ments, and possibly arms smuggling. The group in thepast has issued communiqués and statements against theMoroccan Government. In the last year, a number ofarrests in Belgium, France, and Spain have disrupted thegroup’s ability to operate, though cells and key membersstill remain throughout Europe. Although the Abu Hafsal-Masri Brigades, among others, claimed responsibilityon behalf of al-Qa’ida, Spanish authorities are investigat-ing the possibility that GICM was involved in the March11, 2004, Madrid train bombings.

StrengthUnknown.

Location/Area of OperationMorocco, Western Europe, Afghanistan, and Canada.

External AidUnknown, but believed to include criminal activityabroad.

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New Red Brigades/CommunistCombatant Party (BR/PCC)a.k.a. Brigate Rosse/Partito Comunista Combattente

DescriptionThis Marxist-Leninist group is a successor to the Red Bri-gades, active in the 1970s and 1980s. In addition toideology, both groups share the same symbol, a five-pointed star inside a circle. The group is opposed to Italy’sforeign and labor policies and to NATO.

ActivitiesIn 2004, the BR/PCC continued to suffer setbacks, withtheir leadership in prison and other members under pres-sure from the Italian Government. The BR/PCC did notclaim responsibility for a blast at an employment agencyin Milan in late October, although the police suspect rem-nants of the group are responsible. In 2003, Italianauthorities captured at least seven members of the BR/PCC, dealing the terrorist group a severe blow to its op-erational effectiveness. Some of those arrested aresuspects in the assassination in 1999 of Labor Ministryadviser Massimo D’Antona, and authorities are hopingto link them to the assassination in 2002 of Labor Minis-try advisor Marco Biagi. The arrests in October came onthe heels of a clash in March 2003 involving Italian Rail-way Police and two BR/PCC members, which resulted inthe deaths of one of the operatives and an Italian securityofficer. The BR/PCC has financed its activities througharmed robberies.

StrengthFewer than 20.

Location/Area of OperationItaly.


People Against Gangsterism and Drugs(PAGAD)

DescriptionPeople Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) and itsally Qibla (an Islamic fundamentalist group that favorspolitical Islam and takes an anti-US and anti-Israel stance)view the South African Government as a threat to Islamicvalues. The two groups work to promote a greater politi-cal voice for South African Muslims. PAGAD has usedfront names such as Muslims Against Global Oppressionand Muslims Against Illegitimate Leaders when launch-ing anti-Western protests and campaigns.

ActivitiesPAGAD formed in November 1995 as a vigilante groupin reaction to crime in some neighborhoods of Cape Town.In September 1996, a change in the group’s leadershipresulted in a change in the group’s goal, and it began tosupport a violent jihad to establish an Islamic state. Be-tween 1996 and 2000, PAGAD conducted a total of 189bomb attacks, including nine bombings in the WesternCape that caused serious injuries. PAGAD’s targets in-cluded South African authorities, moderate Muslims,synagogues, gay nightclubs, tourist attractions, and West-ern-associated restaurants. PAGAD is believed to havemasterminded the bombing on August 25, 1998, of theCape Town Planet Hollywood. Since 2001, PAGAD’s vio-lent activities have been severely curtailed by lawenforcement and prosecutorial efforts against leadingmembers of the organization. Qibla leadership has orga-nized demonstrations against visiting US dignitaries andother protests, but the extent of PAGAD’s involvement isuncertain.

StrengthEarly estimates were several hundred members. Currentoperational strength is unknown, but probably vastly di-minished.

Location/Area of OperationOperates mainly in the Cape Town area.

External AidMay have ties to international Islamic extremists.

Red Hand Defenders (RHD)

DescriptionThe RHD is an extremist terrorist group formed in 1998and composed largely of Protestant hardliners from Loy-alist groups observing a cease-fire. RHD seeks to preventa political settlement with Irish nationalists by attackingCatholic civilian interests in Northern Ireland. In January2002, the group announced all staff at Catholic schoolsin Belfast and Catholic postal workers were legitimatetargets. Despite calls in February 2002 by the Ulster De-fense Association (UDA), Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF),and Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) to announce its dis-bandment, RHD continued to make threats and issueclaims of responsibility. RHD is a cover name often usedby elements of the banned UDA and LVF. Designatedunder EO 13224 in December 2001.

ActivitiesIn early 2003, the RHD claimed responsibility for killingtwo UDA members as a result of what is described asLoyalist internecine warfare. It also claimed responsibil-ity for a bomb that was left in the offices of RepublicanSinn Fein in West Belfast, although the device was de-fused and no one was injured. In recent years, the group

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has carried out numerous pipe bombings and arson at-tacks against “soft” civilian targets such as homes,churches, and private businesses. In January 2002, thegroup bombed the home of a prison official in NorthBelfast. Twice in 2002 the group claimed responsibilityfor attacks — the murder of a Catholic postman and aCatholic teenager — that were later claimed by the UDA-UFF, further blurring distinctions between the groups. In2001, RHD claimed responsibility for killing five persons.The RHD has claimed responsibility for hoax bomb de-vices, and recently has set off petrol bombs and madedeath threats against local politicians.

StrengthUp to 20 members, some of whom have experience interrorist tactics and bomb making. Police arrested onemember in June 2001 for making a hoax bomb threat.

Location/Area of OperationNorthern Ireland.

External AidNone.

Revolutionary Proletarian InitiativeNuclei (NIPR)

DescriptionThe NIPR is a clandestine leftist extremist group that ap-peared in Rome in 2000. Adopted the logo of the RedBrigades of the 1970s and 1980s — an encircled five pointstar — for its declarations. Opposes Italy’s foreign andlabor policies. Has targeted property interests rather thanpersonnel in its attacks.

ActivitiesThe NIPR has not claimed responsibility for any attackssince an April 2001 bomb attack on a building housing aUS-Italian relations association and an international af-fairs institute in Rome’s historic center. The NIPR claimedto have carried out a bombing in May 2000 in Rome atan oversight committee facility for implementation of thelaw on strikes in public services. The group also claimedresponsibility for an explosion in February 2002 on ViaPalermo adjacent to the Interior Ministry in Rome.

StrengthPossibly 12 members.

Location/Area of OperationsMainly in Rome, Milan, Lazio, and Tuscany.

External AidNone evident.

Revolutionary Struggle (RS)

DescriptionRS is a radical leftist group that is anti-Greek establish-ment and ideologically aligns itself with the organization17 November. Although the group is not specifically anti-US, its anti-imperialist rhetoric suggests it may become so.

ActivitiesFirst became known when the group conducted a bomb-ing in September 2003 against the courthouse at whichthe trials of alleged 17 November members were ongo-ing. In May 2004, the group detonated four improvisedexplosive devices at a police station in Athens. These twoattacks were notable for their apparent attempts to targetand kill first responders — the first time a Greek terroristgroup had used this tactic. RS is widely regarded as themost dangerous indigenous Greek terrorist group at this time.

StrengthLikely less than 50 members.

Location/Area of OperationAthens, Greece.


Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance andSabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs(RSRSBCM)

DescriptionRiyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalionof Chechen Martyrs (RSRSBCM), led by Chechen extrem-ist leader Shamil Basayev, uses terrorism as part of aneffort to secure an independent Muslim state in the NorthCaucasus. Basayev claimed the group was responsiblefor the Beslan school hostage crisis of September 1-3,2004, which culminated in the deaths of about 330people; simultaneous suicide bombings aboard two Rus-sian civilian airliners in late August 2004; and a thirdsuicide bombing outside a Moscow subway that samemonth. The RSRSBCM, whose name translates into En-glish as “Requirements for Getting into Paradise,” was notknown to Western observers before October 2002, whenit participated in the seizure of the Dubrovka Theater inMoscow. Designated under EO 13224 in February 2003.

ActivitiesPrimarily terrorist and guerilla operations against Russianforces, pro-Russian Chechen forces, and Russian andChechen non-combatants.

StrengthProbably no more than 50 fighters at any given time.

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Location/Area of OperationsPrimarily Russia.

External AidMay receive some external assistance from foreignmujahedin.

Sipah-i-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP)

DescriptionThe Sipah-I-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP) is a Sunni sectariangroup that follows the Deobandi school. Violently anti-Shia, the SSP emerged in central Punjab in the mid-1980sas a response to the Iranian Revolution. Pakistani Presi-dent Musharraf banned the SSP in January 2002. In August2002, the SSP renamed itself Millat-i-Islami Pakistan, andMusharraf re-banned the group under its new name inNovember 2003. The SSP also has operated as a politicalparty, winning seats in Pakistan’s National Assembly.

ActivitiesThe group’s activities range from organizing political ral-lies calling for Shia to be declared non-Muslims toassassinating prominent Shia leaders. The group was re-sponsible for attacks on Shia worshippers in May 2004,when at least 50 people were killed.

StrengthThe SSP may have approximately 3,000 to 6,000 trainedactivists who carry out various kinds of sectarian activities.

Location/Area of OperationThe SSP has influence in all four provinces of Pakistan. Itis considered to be one of the most powerful sectariangroups in the country.

External AidThe SSP reportedly receives significant funding from SaudiArabia through wealthy private donors in Pakistan. Fundsalso are acquired from other sources, including otherSunni extremist groups, madrassas, and contributions bypolitical groups.

Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR)

DescriptionThe SPIR is one of three terrorist groups affiliated withChechen guerrillas that furnished personnel to carry outthe seizure of the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow in Octo-ber 2002. The SPIR has had at least seven commanderssince it was founded in the late 1990s. Movsar Barayev,who led and was killed during the theater standoff, wasthe first publicly identified leader. The group continues toconduct guerrilla operations in Chechnya under the lead-ership of the current leader, Amir Aslan, whose trueidentity is not known. Designated under EO 13224 inFebruary 2003.

ActivitiesPrimarily guerrilla operations against Russian forces. Hasalso been involved in various hostage and ransom opera-tions, including the execution of ethnic Chechens whohave collaborated with Russian authorities.

StrengthProbably no more than 100 fighters at any given time.

Location/Area of OperationsPrimarily Russia.

External AidMay receive some external assistance from foreignmujahedin.

Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG)

DescriptionThe Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG), also known as theJama’a Combattante Tunisienne, seeks to establish an Is-lamic regime in Tunisia and has targeted US and Westerninterests. The group is an offshoot of the banned TunisianIslamist movement, an-Nahda. Founded around 2000by Tarek Maaroufi and Saifallah Ben Hassine, the TCGhas drawn members from the Tunisian diaspora in Eu-rope and elsewhere. It has lost some of its leadership,but may still exist, particularly in Western Europe. Bel-gian authorities arrested Maaroufi in late 2001 andsentenced him to six years in prison in 2003 for his rolein the assassination of anti-Taliban commander AhmadShah Massoud two days before 9/11. The TCG was des-ignated under EO 13224 in October 2002. Historically,the group has been associated with al-Qa’ida as well.Members also have ties to other North African extremistgroups. The TCG was designated for sanctions underUNSCR 1333 in December 2000.

ActivitiesTunisians associated with the TCG are part of the supportnetwork of the broader international jihadist movement.According to European press reports, TCG members oraffiliates in the past have engaged in trafficking falsifieddocuments and recruiting for terror training camps in Af-ghanistan. Some TCG associates were suspected ofplanning an attack against the US, Algerian, and Tunisiandiplomatic missions in Rome in April 2001. Some mem-bers reportedly maintain ties to the Algerian Salafist Groupfor Call and Combat.

StrengthUnknown.

Location/Area of OperationWestern Europe and Afghanistan.


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Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement(MRTA)

DescriptionMRTA is a traditional Marxist-Leninist revolutionary move-ment formed in 1983 from remnants of the Movement ofthe Revolutionary Left, a Peruvian insurgent group activein the 1960s. It aims to establish a Marxist regime and torid Peru of all imperialist elements (primarily US and Japa-nese influence). Peru’s counterterrorist program hasdiminished the group’s ability to conduct terrorist attacks,and the MRTA has suffered from infighting, the imprison-ment or deaths of senior leaders, and the loss of leftistsupport.

ActivitiesPreviously conducted bombings, kidnappings, ambushes,and assassinations, but recent activity has fallen drasti-cally. In December 1996, 14 MRTA members occupiedthe Japanese Ambassador’s residence in Lima and held72 hostages for more than four months. Peruvian forcesstormed the residence in April 1997, rescuing all but oneof the remaining hostages and killing all 14 group mem-bers, including the remaining leaders. The group has notconducted a significant terrorist operation since and ap-pears more focused on obtaining the release of imprisonedMRTA members, although there are reports of low-levelrebuilding efforts.

StrengthBelieved to be no more than 100 members, consistinglargely of young fighters who lack leadership skills andexperience.

Location/Area of OperationPeru, with supporters throughout Latin America and West-ern Europe. Controls no territory.

External AidNone.

Turkish Hizballah

DescriptionTurkish Hizballah is a Kurdish Sunni Islamic terrorist or-ganization that arose in the early 1980s in response tothe Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)’s secularist approachof establishing an independent Kurdistan. TurkishHizballah spent its first 10 years fighting the PKK, accus-ing the group of atrocities against Muslims in southeasternTurkey, where Turkish Hizballah seeks to establish an in-dependent Islamic state.

ActivitiesBeginning in the mid-1990s, Turkish Hizballah, which isunrelated to Lebanese Hizballah, expanded its target base

and modus operandi from killing PKK militants to con-ducting low-level bombings against liquor stores,bordellos, and other establishments the organization con-sidered “anti-Islamic.” In January 2000, Turkish securityforces killed Huseyin Velioglu, the leader of TurkishHizballah, in a shootout at a safe house in Istanbul. Theincident sparked a year-long series of counterterrorist op-erations against the group that resulted in the detentionof some 2,000 individuals; authorities arrested severalhundred of those on criminal charges. At the same time,police recovered nearly 70 bodies of Turkish and Kurdishbusinessmen and journalists that Turkish Hizballah hadtortured and brutally murdered during the mid-to-late1990s. The group began targeting official Turkish inter-ests in January 2001, when its operatives assassinated theDiyarbakir police chief in the group’s most sophisticatedoperation to date. Turkish Hizballah did not conduct amajor operation in 2003 or 2004 and probably is focus-ing on recruitment, fundraising, and reorganization.

StrengthPossibly a few hundred members and several thousandsupporters.

Location/Area of OperationPrimarily the Diyarbakir region of southeastern Turkey.

External AidIt is widely believed that Turkey’s security apparatus origi-nally backed Turkish Hizballah to help the TurkishGovernment combat the PKK. Alternative views are thatthe Turkish Government turned a blind eye to TurkishHizballah’s activities because its primary targets were PKKmembers and supporters, or that the Government simplyhad to prioritize scarce resources and was unable to wagewar on both groups simultaneously. Allegations of collu-sion have never been laid to rest, and the Government ofTurkey continues to issue denials. Turkish Hizballah alsois suspected of having ties with Iran, although there is notsufficient evidence to establish a link.

Ulster Defense Association/UlsterFreedom Fighters (UDA/UFF)

DescriptionThe Ulster Defense Association (UDA), the largest Loyal-ist paramilitary group in Northern Ireland, was formed in1971 as an umbrella organization for Loyalist paramili-tary groups such as the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF).Today, the UFF constitutes almost the entire UDA mem-bership. The UDA/UFF declared a series of cease-firesbetween 1994 and 1998. In September 2001, the UDA/UFF’s Inner Council withdrew its support for NorthernIreland’s Good Friday Agreement. The following month,after a series of murders, bombings, and street violence,the British Government ruled the UDA/UFF’s cease-fire

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defunct. The dissolution of the organization’s politicalwing, the Ulster Democratic Party, soon followed. In Janu-ary 2002, however, the UDA created the Ulster PoliticalResearch Group to serve in a similar capacity. Designatedunder EO 13224 in December 2001.

ActivitiesThe UDA/UFF has evolved into a criminal organizationdeeply involved in drug trafficking and othermoneymaking criminal activities through six largely in-dependent “brigades.” It has also been involved in murder,shootings, arson, and assaults. According to the Interna-tional Monitoring Commission, “the UDA has the capacityto launch serious, if crude, attacks.” Some UDA activi-ties have been of a sectarian nature directed at the Catholiccommunity, aimed at what are sometimes described as‘soft’ targets, and often have taken place at the interfacebetween the Protestant and Catholic communities, espe-cially in Belfast. The organization continues to be involvedin targeting individual Catholics and has undertaken at-tacks against retired and serving prison officers. The grouphas also been involved in a violent internecine war withother Loyalist paramilitary groups for the past several years.In February 2003, the UDA/UFF declared a 12-monthcease-fire, but refused to decommission its arsenal untilRepublican groups did likewise and emphasized its con-tinued disagreement with the Good Friday accords. Thecease-fire has been extended. Even though numerous at-tacks on Catholics were blamed on the group, the UDA/UFF did not claim credit for any attacks, and in August2003 reiterated its intention to remain militarily inactive.

StrengthEstimates vary from 2,000 to 5,000 members, with sev-eral hundred active in paramilitary operations.

Location/Area of OperationNorthern Ireland.


Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)

DescriptionThe UVF is a Loyalist terrorist group formed in 1966 tooppose liberal reforms in Northern Ireland that membersfeared would lead to unification of Ireland. The groupadopted the name of an earlier organization formed in1912 to combat Home Rule for Ireland. The UVF’s goalis to maintain Northern Ireland’s status as part of the UK;to that end it has killed some 550 persons since 1966.The UVF and its offshoots have been responsible for someof the most vicious attacks of “The Troubles,” includinghorrific sectarian killings like those perpetrated in the1970s by the UVF-affiliated “Shankill Butchers.” In Oc-tober 1994, the Combined Loyalist Military Command,

which included the UVF, declared a cease-fire, and theUVF’s political wing, the Progressive Unionist Party, hasplayed an active role in the peace process. Despite thecease-fire, the organization has been involved in a seriesof bloody feuds with other Loyalist paramilitary organi-zations. The Red Hand Commando is linked to the UVF.

ActivitiesThe UVF has been active in Belfast and the border areasof Northern Ireland, where it has carried out bombings,assassinations, kidnappings, hijackings, extortion, androbberies. UVF members have been linked to recent ra-cial attacks on minorities; however, these assaults werereportedly not authorized by the UVF leadership. Onoccasion, it has provided advance warning to police ofits attacks. Targets include nationalist civilians, Republi-can paramilitary groups, and, on occasion, rival Loyalistparamilitary groups. The UVF is a relatively disciplinedorganization with a centralized command. The UVF lead-ership continues to observe a cease-fire.

StrengthUnclear, but probably several hundred supporters, witha smaller number of hard-core activists. Policecounterterrorist operations and internal feuding have re-duced the group’s strength and capabilities.

Location/Area of OperationNorthern Ireland. Some support on the UK mainland.

External AidSuspected in the past of receiving funds and arms fromsympathizers overseas.

United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)

DescriptionNortheast India’s most prominent insurgent group, ULFA— an ethnic secessionist organization in the Indian stateof Assam, bordering Bangladesh and Bhutan — wasfounded on April 7, 1979 at Rang Ghar, during agitationorganized by the state’s powerful students’ union. Thegroup’s objective is an independent Assam, reflected inits ideology of “Oikya, Biplab, Mukti” (“Unity, Revolu-tion, Freedom”). ULFA enjoyed widespread support inupper Assam in its initial years, especially in 1985-1992.ULFA’s kidnappings, killings and extortion led New Delhito ban the group and start a military offensive against it in1990, which forced it to go underground. ULFA beganto lose popularity in the late 1990s after it increasinglytargeted civilians, including a prominent NGO activist.It lost further support for its anti-Indian stand during the1999 Kargil War.

ActivitiesULFA trains, finances and equips cadres for a “liberationstruggle” while extortion helps finance military training

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and weapons purchases. ULFA conducts hit and run op-erations on security forces in Assam, selectiveassassinations, and explosions in public places. Duringthe 1980s-1990s ULFA undertook a series of abductionsand murders, particularly of businessmen. In 2000, ULFAassassinated an Assam state minister. In 2003, ULFA killedmore than 60 “outsiders” in Assam, mainly residents ofthe bordering state of Bihar. Following the December2003 Bhutanese Army’s attack on ULFA camps in Bhutan,the group is believed to have suffered a setback. Someimportant ULFA functionaries surrendered in Assam, butincidents of violence, though of a lesser magnitude thanin the past, continue. On August 14, one civilian waskilled and 18 others injured when ULFA militants trig-gered a grenade blast inside a cinema hall at Gauripur inDhubri district. The next day, at an Indian IndependenceDay event, a bomb blast in Dhemaji killed an estimated13 people, including 6 children, and injured 21.

StrengthULFA’s earlier numbers (3,000 plus) dropped followingthe December 2003 attack on its camps in Bhutan. Totalcadre strength now is estimated at 700.

Location/Area of OperationsULFA is active in the state of Assam, and its workers arebelieved to transit (and sometimes conduct operations in)parts of neighboring Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya andNagaland. All ULFA camps in Bhutan are reportedly de-molished. The group may have linkages with other ethnicinsurgent groups active in neighboring states.

External AidULFA reportedly procures and trades in arms with otherNortheast Indian groups, and receives aid from unknownexternal sources.

country reports on terrorism 2004 · 2019-09-06 · country reports on terrorism 2004 april 2005....

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