counterrevolution in the gulf toby jones

8/6/2019 Counterrevolution in the Gulf Toby Jones

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UNITED STaTES INSTITUTE of pEacE

USIP 2011 All rights reserved.

[I]t is Saudi Arabia and itsArab allis that ar infamingstarian nmity. By rojt-

ing thir anxitis rgionally,

Saudi Arabia has raisd th

staks and rovokd a

otntial rgional showdown

with Iran. Fars o dning

starian tnsions in th Gul

ar now bing ralizd.

April 15, 2011

Counterrevolution in the Gulf

SummarySaudi Arabia is pursuing a combination o domestic and regional policies that risk destabiliz-

ing the Persian Gul and that risk undermining the United States interests there.

Amid calls or political change, Saudi Arabia is ailing to address pressing concerns about its

political system and the need or political reorm. Instead o responding avorably to calls ormore political openness, the Kingdom is pursuing a risky domestic agenda, which ignores th

social, economic, and political grievances that might uel popular mobilization.

Saudi Arabias military intervention into Bahrain has escalated sectarian tensions in the Gul.

The crackdown in Bahrain is not only provoking Iran and creating the conditions or a regiona

crisis, but it is also creating new opportunities or Iran to expand its sphere o inuence.

The United States has reasons to maintain a strong relationship with Saudi Arabia. It also has

the leverage to encourage the Kingdom to rerain rom escalating tensions in the Gul and

urther inaming sectarian anxieties.

Unnerved by changes taking place across the Middle East and North Arica, Saudi Arabia hassought to undertake drastic measures to ensure its security at home and in the region. However,

measures are in act achieving the opposite. Rather than dealing with the political aspirations o

own citizens or those in neighboring Bahrain, where Riyadh has intervened militarily to help cru

pro-democracy protests, Saudi Arabia is turning back the clock at home and provoking a potent

crisis with Iran.

Recent tactics used by this key American ally may be exacerbating security risks and creating

environment that will make it more dicult or the United States to secure its interests. Whether

Washington is prepared to accept Saudi Arabias strategy in the Gul is a critical question. On on

hand, the United States needs the kingdom, not least or their oil. On the other, the price o that

alliance has increased signicantly in recent weeks.

Saudi Arabias current strategy and the potential risks it entails is partly the result o its ears ov

Irans growing hegemony in the region. But it is also partly the result o a shiting domestic balan

o power, a renewed sectarian approach to politics and a continued reluctance to pursue politica

reorm.

Evading ReformIn recent years, Saudi citizens have pressed to reorm a system that they believe is subject to roya

amily abuse, rie with corruption, and one that encourages discrimination against religious mi-

norities and women. When King Abdullah ascended to the throne in 2005 many believed he was

TobyC. Jones

E-mail: [email protected]

Phone: 570.994.2870

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USIP 2011 All rights rese


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a committed reormer, but he has demonstrated to be mostly committed to protecting the pow

o the royal amily. But even though he has not proven interested in creating space or greater

participation, Abdullah has ushered in signicant changes. Most importantly, he has devoted

considerable energy to marginalizing religious hardliners and checking the power o some o th

Kingdoms most odious religious gures.

While it is widely believed that the Al Saud has always ruled with the close cooperation o the

religious establishment, the relationship between the ruling amily and the Kingdoms senior

religious scholars has oten been strained. Because prominent religious gures regularly clashed

with the Kingdoms rulers on matters o domestic and oreign policy, Saudi elites struggled to

minimize the role o the clergy over the course o the 20th century. As oil revenues skyrocketed i

the 1970s, Riyadh ound itsel less dependent on the scholars or their support.

But at the end o the decade, domestic conicts, including the seizure o the Grand Mosque in

Mecca by religious rebels in 1979, changed the balance o power in the Kingdom. In exchange

or a religious ruling allowing authorities to send security into the Grand Mosque to root out the

rebels, Riyadh was compelled to promise renewed inuence or the religious establishment. In

the 1980s, the Kingdom pumped hundreds o millions o dollars into Islamic oundations, schoo

and causes, including the anti-Soviet jihad in Aghanistan and Iraqi leader Saddam Husseins wa

against Shiite Iran. Over the last three decades, religious scholars have exercised considerable

cultural and political power, oten to the rustration and embarrassment o the Kingdoms rulers

King Abdullah has taken signicant steps to restore the pre-1979 balance o power by sacking

controversial religious gures, seeking to centralize control over the judiciary, and challenging th

clergy on matters o womens rights. The efect had been to rein in some o the Kingdoms most

important religious institutions, including the notorious religious police.

Many Saudi citizens have respect or the king, but they remain rustrated with the glacial pace

o reorm. Recent events in the Middle East -- most importantly the popular uprisings that topple

governments in Tunisia and Egypt -- inspired some Saudi citizens to renew calls or change. So a

eforts to seize upon regional momentum have resulted not in reorm, but in the strengthening

hardliners within the royal amily.

Shutting Down the Day of RagePro-reorm activists launched calls to hold a Day o Rage on March 11, in which they hoped citize

would turn out or demonstrations in cities across the country. Alarmed by Hosni Mubaraks all

rom power in Egypt, Saudi authorities responded anxiously and harshly to stave of a similar

outcome at home. They sought various ways to outmaneuver their critics and crush any potentia

popular uprising beore it got started. To do so Riyadh dusted of a amiliar playbook. In late

February, King Abdullah promised a multibillion dollar nancial aid program in an efort to

co-opt dissenters. The regime also threatened would-be protesters. In early March, Saud al-Faisathe Saudi oreign minister, warned that authorities would cut of any nger raised against the

government in protest. Authorities also threatened nes and imprisonment or demonstrators.

Riyadh also enlisted the religious establishment or support. On March 7, the Senior Council o

Ulama, Saudi Arabias highest ranking religious authority, issued a statement declaring protests t

be un-Islamic. Considering Abdullahs past eforts to curtail the power o the clergy, their renewe

support or the monarchy was a signicant development.

On March 11, a heavy police presence made it virtually impossible or Saudi citizens to organi

publicly. Less than a week later the Saudi government announced a second sweeping package o

nancial inducements, including housing subsidies, a jobs creation program, and unemploymen


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assistance. Flush with cash rom high oil prices, Riyadh can aford to throw money at its deeply

rooted problems. It is a amiliar strategy. While buying avor will likely quell dissent in the short

term, its longer-term efectiveness is uncertain.

A New Balance of PowerOne o the most important outcomes o the result struggle to end of public pressure appears to

be the reconguration o the Kingdoms balance o power and the emergence o hardliners with

the royal amily, most notably the controversial Minister o the Interior Prince Naye, third in line

the throne. As minister o the Interior and commander o Saudi Arabias domestic security orces

Naye was responsible or dispatching thousands o police to prevent demonstrations.

The decision to enlist the support o religious scholars indicates a reversal o Abdullahs eforts

marginalize the clerical establishments inuence. Recent moves to support the clergyand side

line moderatesreinorce this conclusion. On March 18, alongside the announcement o mater

support or Saudi citizens, the government also announced signicant new levels o spending

on religious schools and institutions and expanded powers or the countrys religious police. On

April 2, the government sacked Ahmad al-Ghamdi, the head o the Meccas branch o the religiopolice who last year claimed that Islam does not mandate gender segregation.

The potential renewal o clerical power in Saudi Arabia, particularly its most conservative

elements, is cause or concern. It is worth recalling that the ascendance in the 1980s o a genera

tion o politically motivated clergy helped radicalize some Saudi citizens and contributed to the

globalization o violent extremism in subsequent decades.

Stoking Sectarian TensionsThere has also been a sectarian element to Saudi Arabias handling o its domestic crisis. In the

week leading up to the March 11 Day o Rage, small protests took place in Shiite neighborhood

across the Eastern Province. Shiite demonstrators called or minor concessions, such as the end

o discrimination and the release o political prisoners. Saudi rulers seized on these small dem-

onstrations to cast the entire opposition as beholden to Iran and pursuing a sectarian agenda.

Prince al-Faisal remarked that the regime would not tolerate any intererence in our internal

afairs by any oreign party . . . and i we nd any oreign intererence, we will deal with this deci

sively. It is hard to tell i the regimes attempt to portray their critics as agents o Iran succeeded

in dissuading protesters rom taking to the streets. Anti-Shiism is deeply rooted in Saudi Arabia

society and may have convinced some not to throw their lot in with the Kingdoms most despis

religious minority.

More importantly, the pretense o oreign meddling and the sectarian gambit allowed the

Kingdoms rulers to justiy their heavy-handed approach more generally as an efort to protectnational security rather than as an attempt to ignore the substance o the reormers agenda.

Regional ImplicationsThe domestic anxieties on display in Riyadh have shaped the regimes decision making in

neighboring Bahrain, another close American ally in the Gul, as well. On March 14, in response t

mounting pressure on the Bahraini regime by tens o thousands o opposition protesters, Saudi

Arabia sent a contingent o around 1,000 military personnel (along with a small orce rom the

United Arab Emirates) into Manama to support eforts to crush the popular uprising there. The

resulting crackdown has been violent and brutal.


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The Saudis have many reasons or not wanting to see the ruling al-Khalia toppled rom powe

in Bahrain. The most important has to do with the possibility o a Shiite government taking over

in Manama. While Bahrains opposition is largely committed to democratic reorm, it is true that

the vast majority o those protesting against the government come rom the countrys majority

Shiite community. For the most part, however, Bahrains opposition has careully avoided ramin

their demands in sectarian terms. Whatever the actual substance o their oppositions platorm, tgovernments in Riyadh and Manama have used religious aliation and regional sectarian anxiet

ies as an excuse to crackdown violently.

Leaders in both Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have warned against Iranian meddling and have

cynically suggested that the uprising in Bahrain was orchestrated by Tehran. Ater Saudi Arabias

intervention and the resort to violence to clear Manamas streets, Bahrains King Hamad declared

that their coordinated eforts had succeeded in oiling a oreign plot against him and his Sunni

supporters. Tensions with Iran have spread across the Gul. On April 2, Kuwaiti authorities an-

nounced they would expel several Iranian diplomats or allegedly being involved in a spy-ring.

Following a meeting o their oreign ministers in Riyadh on April 3, the Gul Cooperation Council

sued a statement that they were deeply worried about continuing Iranian meddling and accus

Iran o plotting against the Arab monarchies. They condemned Irans intererence in Bahrains

internal afairs, in violation o international conventions.

Iran has responded predictably to the crackdown in Bahrain and to the increasingly shrill anti-

Iranian rhetoric. In mid-March, Iran withdrew its ambassador rom Bahrain and blasted Manama

not accommodating the demands o its citizens. Iranian ocials have also engaged in the escala

ing war o words.

Claims o Iranian meddling have been mostly unounded until now. While some members

o Bahrains opposition have invoked the possibility o Iranian intervention, they have repre-

sented a marginal ringe. Instead, it is Saudi Arabia and its Arab allies that are inaming sectar

enmity. By projecting their anxieties regionally, Saudi Arabia has raised the stakes and provok

a potential regional showdown with Iran. Fears o deepening sectarian tensions in the Gul arenow being realized.

One o the potential tragedies o the current situation in the Persian Gul is that Saudi Arabias

and Bahrains manipulation o sectarian anxieties may ultimately prove sel-ullling. With nowh

else to turn and little support or their cause, it is likely just a matter o time beore Bahrains

opposition does look to Tehran or guidance. And although Irans leaders insist they will rerain

rom intervening in the internal afairs o Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, the current crisis has created

an opening or Tehran to become more assertive and inuential.

Implications for the United States

The evolving crisis in the Gul represents a clear risk to regional security, one o the United Statesmost important global strategic priorities. The United States is understandably concerned abou

the prospect o greater Iranian inuence and the threat it poses in the region, and yet it is two o

the United States closest regional allies that are leading the Gul down the path o an enduring

crisis in which Irans power will almost certainly grow.

Washington should increase pressure on the governments in Riyadh and Manama to change

their current posture and nd a more constructive way orward. This means dealing seriously wit

the challenges o reorm at home, putting an end to the violence against their own citizens, and

reraining rom urther manipulating and exacerbating sectarian anxieties.


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AbouT This brief

Toby C. Jones has lived andworked in Saudi Arabia andBahrain. Formerly the Gulf Analystwith the International Crisis Group,

he is assistant professor of MiddleEast history at Rutgers University.He is the author of Desert King-dom: How Oil and Water ForgedModern Saudi Arabia (HarvardUniversity Press, 2010). The viewsexpressed here are his own.

So ar, American attempts to resolve the crisis in the Gul have ailed. Calls or restraint have be

ignored. The situation is increasingly urgent, especially given the intensication o acrimony be-

tween Iran and its Arab neighbors. And it demands a greater American role, lest the United State

get dragged into another military conict. The United States possesses considerable leverage in

the Gul, particularly with Saudi Arabia.

The most signicant source o U.S. leverage comes rom its security relationship with the

Kingdom and the other Arab states in the Gul. Saudi Arabia has long been a vital strategic and

economic partner. It has also long been dependent on the United States or security assurances.

Those assurances should not include allowing the Kingdom to risk destabilizing the region. The

United States should make clear to Riyadh that the American military presence in the region, an

its policy o selling weapons to regional allies, is not a cover or the Kingdoms current reckless

strategy. Hardliners in Riyadh and Bahrain not only take the American military commitment to th

Gul or granted, but have also turned that commitment into a source o leverage or themselves

Should Riyadh continue on its current path, the U.S. should make clear that a reconsideration

o U.S. military commitments may be necessary. The United States has in the past and can in the

uture monitor its interests in the Gul rom over the horizon. While it seems counterintuitive,

compelling regional actors to deal with one another on even ground will ultimately produce a

more durable political outcome. The United States impulse is to continue to play the balance o

power game and to seek advantages or itsel and its allies. This approach is not working. In act

is creating new opportunities or Iran. While it may be desirable to maintain a strong relationship

with Saudi Arabia going orward, the risks o doing so may quickly outweigh the benets.


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counterrevolution in the gulf toby jones

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