counterfeit prevention & detection strategies - smta

1 9000 Virginia Manor Rd Ste 290, Beltsville MD 20705 | 301-474-0607 | www.dfrsolutions.com

Counterfeit Prevention & Detection

Strategies:

When To Do It, How to Do It

Cheryl Tulkoff

[email protected]

SMTA Empire Chapter

June 18, 2013

mailto:[email protected]


Nathan Myhrvold

“I want you to remember that everything I am

saying may be wrong and I want you to

question everything that I’m saying.”

Counterfeit landscape changes rapidly!


Abstract

o This workshop addresses the sources of counterfeit components and provides insights into how they occur.

o Counterfeit components are a rapidly growing area of concern. The Department of Commerce has identified a 141% increase in the last three years alone!

o Counterfeit Parts are no longer an emerging threat: they’re real, and they’re here to stay.

o A counterfeit is any item that is not as it is represented with the intention to deceive its’ buyer or user. The misrepresentation is often driven by the known presence of defects or other inadequacies in regards to performance. Whether it is used for a commercial, medical or military application, a counterfeit component can cause catastrophic failure at a critical time.

o Detection methodologies, such as visual inspection, mechanical robustness, X-Ray, XRF, C-SAM, electrical characterization, decapsulation, and marking evaluations will be compared and contrasted.

o Multiple examples of counterfeit parts identified using these techniques will be highlighted.


o State of Counterfeiting – Background, Facts & Statistics

o Counterfeits Defined

o Legislation, Standards & Databases

o Establishing an Anti-Counterfeiting Program

o Detection and Failure Analysis Techniques

o Case Studies and Examples

o Device Countermeasures

o iNEMI Counterfeit Calculators

o Summary

Topics


The State of Counterfeits

o Increasing concern across all electronics industries

o Department of Commerce measured 141% increase over past three years

o http://www.bis.doc.gov/defenseindustrialbaseprograms/osies/defmarketresearchrpts/final_counterfeit_electronics_report.pdf

o Recent DfR counterfeit activities o Military Communications

o Internet Routers

o Air Traffic Control

o Consumer (Repair)

http://www.bis.doc.gov/defenseindustrialbaseprograms/osies/defmarketresearchrpts/final_counterfeit_electronics_report.pdf







o Flood of counterfeits in the US Defense supply chain

o From 2009-2010, over 1800 suspect cases of counterfeit

electronic parts involving over 1 million parts!

o Data consistently points to China as the epicenter



o Electronic Component Counterfeit Incidents Continue Record Pace as the US Department of Defense Set to Update Acquisition Rules


Number of High Risk Suppliers, Including

Counterfeiters, Surges by More than 60% from

2002 to 2011



Recent Military Case Studies

o US Navy SH-60B Helicopter

o Counterfeit EIFs installed in FLIR (thermal imaging) units from

Raytheon

o US Air Force C-130J and C27-J

o Counterfeit memory in L3 Displays

o US Navy P8A Poseidon

o Reworked parts in Boeing ice detection module


Rank Commodity Type

% of Reported

Incidents

#1 Analog IC 25.2%

#2 Microprocessor IC 13.4%

#3 Memory IC 13.1%

#4 Programmable Logic IC 8.3%

#5 Transistor 7.6%

Source: IHS Parts Management 2012

Top 5 Most Counterfeited Semiconductors in

2011


o ICM7170 is a microprocessor-compatible real-time clock, manufactured by Harris/Intersil o ICM7170IPG:

o -40C to 85C Temperature Range

o 24-Lead Plastic Dual-In-Line Package (PDIP)

o 20uA Maximum Standby Current at 32kHz

o ICM7170AIBG:

o -40C to 85C Temperature Range

o 24-Pin Small Outline Plastic Package (SOIC)

o 5uA Maximum Standby Current at 32kHz

o ICM7170IPG

o Counterfeiter bought for $.02

o Sold for $38.00 each as ICM7170AIBG’s

o Built around 45k/month which equals a potential gross profit of $2,000,000 per month!

Lucrative Economics of Counterfeiting

DMSMS & Standardization 2011, http://www.dmsms2011.com

http://www.dmsms2011.com/

http://www.dmsms2011.com/


Counterfeit Parts Defined

o What are they?

o What is their impact?

o Where do they come

from?

o Identification

o Industry

Countermeasures

o Avoidance

o Mitigation


What are counterfeit parts?

o Any part or component that is not as represented

o Duplication of another manufacturer’s product

o Manufacturer’s product that failed test, inspection, or burn-in or was an engineering sample

o Empty package or wrong functionality

o Salvaged or reworked parts

o Trojans

o Parts being counterfeited include:

o Newest parts & components

o Obsolete parts

o Inexpensive parts as well as high value parts


o Used product marked as higher grade new product

o These types of counterfeits may work

o Will not operate at the same level as the higher grade part

o May fail under stress that would be expected under normal conditions.

o Electronics recycling or salvage sources

o Fake, non-working product

o Disguised parts

o Defective Scrap

o Inside sources

o New product re-marked as higher grade product

o Like used product, re-marked new product will work, but not at the desired level of functionality.

Top 4 Types of Counterfeits


Types of Confirmed Counterfeits

o Microcircuits o Microprocessors

o Other Microcircuits

o Memory

o Radio Frequency/Wireless

o Logic, Standard

o Special Purpose Logic

o Discretes o Electromechanical

o Thyristors

o Capacitors

o Other Discretes

o Circuit Protection/Fuses

o Diodes

o Resistors

o Sensors & Actuators

o Optoelectronics

o Power Transistors

o Rectifiers

o Small Signal Transistors

o Magnetics

o Crystals/Oscillators


Generators of Counterfeit Parts

o Inside Job

o Failed parts off the production line

o May operate in benign environment

o Competitors

o Unknown competitor may package and label the same as a known company

o May function as a direct replacement (may not)

o Money Makers

o Fraudulent: empty package or wrong chip

o Will fail immediately

o Hackers

o Trojans: malicious code

o Security threat


Primary Sources of Counterfeit Parts

o Most counterfeit parts come from parts brokers that deal in small and odd lots

o Low volume of obsolete parts bought off the internet

o Authorized parts distributors rarely have counterfeits because they receive them directly from the original component manufacturer (OCM)

o Regions with highest counterfeit activity:

o China

o Middle East

o Eastern Europe

o But truly a global problem!


China & US dominate but true origin is hard to identify

Counterfeit Origins


Environmental Legislation Impact

o Provides additional opportunities

o Recycling

o Need for obsolete SnPb parts


What is the Impact of Counterfeit Parts?

o Cost

o Reputation

o Security

o Failure

o Risk and impact varies based on type of counterfeit and

operational environment


o Visible Costs

o Revenue Loss

o Device level anti-counterfeiting measures

o Personnel measures

o Hidden Costs

o Avoiding potentially lower cost manufacturing companies

or regions of the world

o Reputation / Brand

o Loss of Credibility to buyers

Cost Impacts of Counterfeiting to

Semiconductor Manufacturers


o Training

o Tracking

o Inspection

o Testing

o Paperwork

o Control

o Analysis

o Procedures

Anti-counterfeiting Personnel Costs


o Procurement training

o Limiting potential sources and purchasing controls

o Staff/operator training

o Incoming product inspection

o Time, tracking, test equipment

o Control and testing of product sourced from non-approved or

infrequently used sources.

o Loss of manufacturing time and output while re-sourcing device

if counterfeits are found or delivered

o Costs if counterfeit gets into manufacturing process

o Rework or scrap

Equipment Producer Costs


End Component User Costs

o Additional servicing and spares

o Premature equipment failure

o Equipment downtime

o Defects or bugs causing malfunction

o Legal expenses: downtime, damage, failure to perform, injury, loss

o Military & national security


Counterfeit Databases, Standards, and

Legislation


o Founded in 1995, ERAI is an information services organization that monitors, investigates and reports issues affecting the global hi-tech electronics supply chain.

o ERAI provides tools to mitigate risks on substandard parts, counterfeit parts, vendors and even customers.

o Subscribers include OEMs, CMs, Distributors, OCMs, government agencies and industry associations.

o Founding participant in SAE International G-19 Counterfeit

o www.erai.com

ERAI (Electronic Retailers Association

International)

http://www.erai.com/


o Government - Industry Data Exchange Program

(GIDEP) is a cooperative activity between government

and industry

o Seeks to reduce/eliminate expenditures of resources by

sharing technical information.

o Maintains suspect counterfeit database

o www.gidep.org

GIDEP

http://www.gidep.org/


IDEA, IACC

o Independent Distributors of Electronics Association

(IDEA), www.idofea.org

o Non-profit trade association representing distributors of

electronic components

o IDEA-STD-1010-B: Acceptability of Electronic

Components Distributed in the Open Market

o International Anti Counterfeiting Coalition

o IACC is the world's largest non-profit organization

devoted solely to protecting intellectual property and

deterring counterfeiting

o www.iacc.org

http://www.idofea.org/

http://www.iacc.org/


US Government Legislation

o 2012 U.S. National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)

o Added regulations for counterfeit part detection and

avoidance.

o October 3, 2012 updates to the DFAR supplement

implemented portions of section 818 of NDAA that must add

definitions specific to counterfeit parts, define contractors'

responsibilities, and clarify the government's role.


Recent DoD Updates

o May 16, 2013: Long-awaited proposed Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement on detection and avoidance of counterfeit parts was released for comment.

o Required by Section 818 of the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, the DFARS was to have been in place by Sept. 27, 2012.

o Instead, a “proposed rule” with comments due on or before July 15, 2013.

o Little detail in the proposed rule.

o The statute clearly directed the U.S. Department of Defense to establish special requirements for contractor processes to avoid counterfeit parts

o Proposed rule largely avoids this

o Folds counterfeit parts prevention into obligations that govern contractor purchasing systems.


DoD Memorandum

o “Overarching DoD Counterfeit Prevention Guidance.’”

o In the memo, the department laid out an actionable

definition of counterfeit material and also emphasized

the importance of taking immediate action to apply

existing policy and procedures, prior to establishing new

DoD policy and procedures or waiting for forthcoming

changes to the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation

Supplement (DFARS).

o http://www.dmsms2012.com/images/Counterfeit-

Prevention-Guidance.pdf

http://www.dmsms2012.com/images/Counterfeit-Prevention-Guidance.pdf








DoD Definition of Counterfeit o Under the proposed regulations, a counterfeit part is:

o An unauthorized copy or substitute part that has been

identified, marked, and/or altered by a source other

than the part’s legally authorized source and has been

misrepresented to be from a legally authorized source;

o An item misrepresented to be an authorized item of the

legally authorized source; or

o A new, used, outdated, or expired item from a legally

authorized source that is misrepresented by any source

to the end-user as meeting the performance

requirements for the intended use.


o Director’s policy memo dated 21 July 2011

o Report suspect and confirmed counterfeits to the Government-Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP) as Agency Action Notices

o Notification of criminal investigative organization, identified users, & DLA’s Counterfeit Material Team

o “It is an unacceptable practice to report a suspect counterfeit item after a protracted period of time trying to conclusively determine an item is suspect or actually counterfeit”

Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)


o AS5553 “Counterfeit Electronic Parts; Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, and Disposition”

o Provides 7 basic requirements for controlling counterfeit part threat

o Control Plan, addressing

o Obsolescence management

o Purchasing Practices

o Purchasing Documentation

o Receiving Inspection

o In process investigation

o Material Control

o Reporting

SAE AS5553 – The Aerospace Standard


o ARP 6178-2011, ‘‘Fraudulent/Counterfeit Parts; Tool for Risk Assessment of Distributors’’

o Number of Standards now under development

o SAE AS 6081 ‘‘Counterfeit Electronic Parts; Avoidance Protocol, Distributors’’

o SAE AS 6174‘‘Counterfeit Materiel; Detection, Mitigation, and Disposition’’,

o SAE AS 6171 ‘‘Test Methods Standards; Counterfeit Electronic Parts’’

o SAE ARD 6884 ‘Terms and Definition – Fraudulent/Counterfeit Electronic Parts’’.

SAE: The Aerospace Standard Series


o SEMI® is the global industry association serving the manufacturing supply chain for the micro- and nano-electronics industries

o www.semi.org

SEMI Anti-

Counterfeiting

Standards

http://www.semi.org/

http://www.semi.org/


EIA/G-12 JEDEC

o EIA/G-12 Recommendation

o “only procure from the Original Component Manufacturer (OCM)

that makes and warranties the part or material or their designated

franchisees.”

o Procuring from OCM’s

o Unrealistic for Military / Government programs

o Volumes too low

o Procuring from designated franchisees

o Component availability from designated franchisees is often

similar to that of OCM


EIA/G-12 Committee Strategy

o TB-0003-2009: Counterfeit Parts & Materials Risk

Mitigation

Prevention

Detection

Mitigation


EIA/G-12 Statistical Analysis

o A Destructive Physical Analysis (DPA) should be

conducted in accordance with MIL-STD-1580 on a

random sample with a minimum of a 90% confidence

level (i.e. 22 piece sample, C =0) at a program

approved laboratory. A sample (22 pieces) should be

selected from each lot / date code

o EIA now rolled into JEDEC


o Suspect Counterfeit Material Product Quality Deficiency Reports (PQDRs):

o Total Reported

o Total Closed and Verified

o Total Closed Other (i.e., final investigation showed they were not counterfeit)

o Federal Stock Code Identifier

o Source of supply of counterfeit material

o Location where suspect counterfeit material was detected

o Criticality of Item (Safety of flight, SUBSAFE, etc.)

o Action taken (e.g., stock screen, purge stock, suspend)

Counterfeit Metrics: NAVSEA Example


Counterfeit Reporting

o For counterfeit or suspect counterfeits:

o Do not return parts!

o Segregate, quarantine, recall

o Report to stakeholders and GIDEP, ERAI databases

o Report to authorities


Establishing an Anti-Counterfeiting

Protection and Detection Program


Obstacles to a Successful Anti-Counterfeit

Program

o Complacency

o Won’t or can’t happen here

o Hasn’t happened yet

o Unclear ownership of issue

o Not understanding or underestimating the threat

o Only expensive parts are counterfeited

o Buy from an “American” company

o Parts use latest design

o Distributor provides a Certificate of Conformance (C of C)

o Receiving inspection or test process will catch fakes



Program

o Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)/ Defense (DFAR) issues

o FAR/DFAR says use the lowest bidder

o Need to meet Small Disadvantaged Business quota

o If I restrict where I buy from, I will pay more money

o Supply chain excuses or push back

o Expensive: here’s the bill for it, $$$

o “You want to know every time I buy a high risk part?”

o Other customers don’t have the requirement

o Liability


o Affordability is key

o No one size fits all strategy

o Mitigations must pass the cost versus outcome test

o Counterfeit Parts are no longer an emerging threat.

They’re real, and they’re here to stay.


Program


o Research

o Carefully Select Sources

o Implement Purchasing Best Practices

o Perform Lot Validation Testing

Cost-Effective Counterfeit Protection

Approach


o Do Your Homework

o Contact Original Component Manufacturer (OCM) and

franchise distributers first

o Confirm product status

o Is the product end of life (EOL)?

o Check for authorized aftermarket sources

o Determine if/when the product went EOL

o Determine EOL production lot date codes

o Try to locate a known good device

o Check with industry sources like ERAI or GIDEP for

counterfeit activities of the product needed.

Counterfeit Protection Strategies


o Choose Sources Wisely

o Don’t use cost as sole/primary criteria for purchase

o Quality Product is goal

o Use industry sources to evaluate potential suppliers

o Ask for accreditations, certifications & memberships like ISO9011, AS9120, IDEA-1010, ERAI or IDEA Members

o Audit sources

o Purchase only from suppliers who have implemented and are committed to counterfeit avoidance practices

o Understand warranty and payment terms

o Create a list of approved, trusted suppliers and use them

Counterfeit Protection Strategies -

Continued


o Clearly communicate objectives and needs

o Create company policy on counterfeits

o Look for product in stock, not just availability

o Ask if the product is traceable back to the OCM

o Don’t buy COD

o Negotiate terms or use escrow services.

o Allows time for authenticity checks & testing to be

performed before paying

Purchasing Best Anti-Counterfeiting Protection

Practices


o Before buying, ask for photos and evidence

o Images of component front and back

o Compare date codes and EOL date for product

o Compare marking with known-good product

o Do research now as it will save money later

o Understand the product warranty

o Anything less than 30 days is a RED flag

o If supplier does not have confidence in the product,

why would you?

Purchasing Best Anti-Counterfeiting Protection

Practices


Complex Supply Chains

μcircuit

design

Fab

Avionics

OEM

Ass’y

Dist.Test

•Multiple points of entry

• Porous return policies

Lloyd Condra, Boeing


o Broker or Independent Distributor Basics

o Not all Brokers & Independent Distributors are the same

o Many have minimal Quality Systems and no ESD, storage, or

handling controls.

o Some have no experience with semiconductors

o The Internet has created virtual companies

o Traceability back to the original OCM is unavailable

o Limited or no product warranty or support

o Buying obsolete products requires more diligence, not less

Broker 101


o Define Test Plan based on your level of risk

o What is your application? Commercial? Military?

o Define your test plan to meet risk mitigation needs

o Put requirements in writing and be as detailed as

possible

o Require documented reports of all validation tests

o Copy of lot information detailing all tests performed and

results

o Die ID Photos, X-Ray Photos, etc.

Evaluate & Validate ALL broker material


o Chose a reputable Test Lab/Partner based on

accreditations and capabilities, not on price alone.

o Ask for details of test plan prior to starting test

o If your supplier provides Lot Validation Testing in the

purchase price:

o Provide your test requirements to your supplier

o Compare their test plan against your risk mitigation

needs

o Understand what you are paying for

o Ask who will be performing the testing on your material

Evaluate & Validate ALL broker material


Designated Franchisees

o Military / Government contractors standardizing sourcing plans

o Lists of approved sources (Authorized Source Directory)

o Other sources by exception and with specific approvals

o Approval process

o Audit based on quality system

o Risk assessment to the program

o Development of an inspection / test plan

http://www.authorizedcomponents.com/manufacturers.html

Use of Authorized Franchisees does not eliminate risk


o Many unsafe part & supplier sources

o Online Broker Search Engines

o Maverick procurement methods or spending limits

o Google

o These are counterfeit ports of entry

o Rapid access to millions of parts

o Minimal membership requirements

o Quick & easy access to a large audience of buyers

Counterfeit Sources


o Direct from the Factory (Original Component

Manufacturer, OCM)

o Approved Vendor / Manufacturer (AVL / AML)

o Franchised and Authorized Sources

o Approved Independent Distributors

o ERAI Members

o Qualified Sources of Supply

o Suppliers

o Manufacturers

o Parts (or alternates meeting the above criteria)

Trusted Supply Chain


Qualified Supplier Resources

o Use industry resources!

o DSCC QSLD

o Pre-qualified distributors

o Semiconductors and Microcircuits

o Distributors with demonstrated

quality assurance practices

o http://www.dscc.dla.mil/downlo

ads/VQGeneral/QSLD_Booklet.

pdf

http://www.dscc.dla.mil/downloads/VQGeneral/QSLD_Booklet.pdf





Decision Process

o If prevention is not realistic, when to detect?

o How to mitigate?

o Entry for counterfeit components is cost

o Cost to procure < cost of redesign (+ requal, etc.)

o If cost to mitigate is too high, then redesign

o How to determine the appropriate cost to detect and

mitigate?

o Driven by probability / mission risk / volume matrix


Decision Matrix

Probability of

Counterfeit


Threat Evaluation

o THREAT ASPECTS

o Probability

o Knowledge of Part

o Timing of Effect

o Where Part Can be

Found

o Destructiveness

o OBSERVABILITY

o Measureable

o Accessible

o No damage

o Intermittent

o Unknown Latency

o Provokable


Counterfeit Probability

o Probability of counterfeit (per shipment) tends to display

order of magnitude dependence on component source

o May vary based on supply chain and component technology

Known: Existing business relationship

Unknown: No existing business relationship (e.g., eBay)


Case Study

o Telecom OEM procures one reel of capacitors from known broker

o End-of-life (EOL) product

o Decision Matrix

o DfR recommended that $10K to $100K should be spent on counterfeit detection and mitigation

o Industry ROI can be 1:1 to 10:1

Probability is 2% Volume is 4000 parts

Mission Risk is $5M Eight capacitors per CCA (500 CCAs)

$10K cost of quality ($5K COGS + $1K service + $4K loss of market)


Counterfeit Component Inspection &

Detection Techniques Explained


Detection of Counterfeits

o Counterfeiters are increasingly sophisticated

o Use of actual parts at the start and end of a reel

o Challenges sampling techniques

o Inspection and comparison of known-good to possible counterfeits

o Markings

o Internal structure

o Performance measurement


Detection Techniques

T. Apple 610-531-5484 5

Risk Mitigation Methods

Visual /

Marking

Inspec-

tion

Verificati

on of

Manuf.

LDC,

SNs, etc.

Mater-ial

Analy-sisSeal Test

Radio-

graphicDPA

Minimal

Electrical

Test

Full

Electri-

cal Test

(Am-

bient)

Full

Electrical

Test (Hot

/ Cold Am-

bient)

Test &

Burn-in

Test,

Burn-in

and QCI

No Die / Non-

functionalNo No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Material Content P No Yes No No Yes No No No No No

Wrong Die P P No No P Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Re-used /

Repaired /

Salvaged

P No P P P P No No No No No

Scrapped /

RejectP No No P P P P P P Yes Yes

Mechanical

DamageYes No No P P Yes P P P P P

Mis-Handling /

StorageNo No No P No P P Yes Yes Yes Yes

Manufacturer

ChangeP P P No P Yes P P P P P

Less Reliable

PartsP P P No No P No P P P P

Reliability /

Quality IssueNo No No No P P No P P Yes Yes

ESD / EOS

DamageNo No No No No P P P P Yes Yes

Counterfeit with

functional dieP P P No P P P P Yes Yes Yes

Temperature

Range

Upmarking

No P No No No P No No Yes Yes Yes

Code:

This chart was developed from one created by Mark Marshall of Integra Technologies.

No = Unlikely to Find

Shading:

Green = Low Cost / Easily Accomplished

Yellow = Moderate Cost / Some time involved

Red = High Cost / Significant time to accomplish

Dotted Pattern = Will be found at first electrical test

Co

un

terf

eit

Co

nce

rn

P = Possibly Find

Yes = Probably Find

Detection/Risk Mitigation Methods


Detection Techniques (cont.)

Add material check / seal test /

radio-graphic or do basic electrical

testing

Add full ambient electrical tests

Moderate cost / repairable-

replaceable / non-mission critical

Add QCI and other

lot acceptance

testing

Add QCI and other

lot acceptance

testing

Risk Mitigation Techniques

Selection Guide C

os

t &

Sc

hed

ule

Co

st

& S

ch

ed

ule

The more spent, the more time taken, the more confidence in reliability

Add DPAAdd DPA

Add full electrical tests

over temperature

Add full electrical tests

over temperature

Add burn-inAdd burn-in

T. Apple 610-531-5484

[email protected]

3/27/2007Item End-Use Requirements

Low cost / repairable

/ redundant systems

High cost / non-repairable /

mission critical

Reliabilit

y (Pro

bability o

f Dete

ction)

Add post burn-in full electrical

tests over temperature

Add post burn-in full electrical

tests over temperature

C of C Only

Check Alerts

Visual InspectionVisual Inspection


Commonly Requested Tests for Counterfeits

o General product review

o Paperwork Check

o External visual inspection

o Inspection for remarking/resurfacing

o X-ray

o Lead finish exam

o Internal verification

o Basic electrical testing


Missile Defense Agency (MDA) Desired:

o Documentation check

o Visual Inspection

o Marking Permanency

o Surface Finish Permanency

o Aggressive Solvents Test (destructive)

o X-Ray Fluorescence

o X-Ray

o Die Verification (destructive)

MDA Example Desired Inspection & Test

Requirements


Counterfeit Analysis Techniques

• Analysis always starts with Non-Destructive Evaluation (NDE) • Designed to obtain maximum information with minimal risk of

damaging or destroying physical evidence

• Emphasize the use of simplest tools first

• Generally non-destructive techniques:

• Visual Inspection

• Electrical Characterization

• Acoustic Microscopy

• X-ray Microscopy

• X-Ray Fluorescence

• Destructive evaluation techniques

• Decapsulation

• Cross-sectioning

• SEM/EDX

72 9000 Virginia Manor Rd Ste 290, Beltsville MD 20705 | 301-474-0607 | www.dfrsolutions.com 72

Electrical Characterization • Parametric characterization

• Comparison of performance to datasheet specifications

• Curve tracer

• Applies alternating voltage; provides plot of voltage vs. current response

• Valuable in characterizing diode, transistor, and resistance behavior

• Time domain reflectometry (TDR)

• Release and return of electrical signal along a given path

• Measurement of phase shift of return signal indicates potential location of electrical open

• Other characterization equipment

• Inductance/capacitance/resistance (LCR) meter

• High resistance meter (leakage current < nA)

• Low resistance meter (four wire; < milliohms)

• Use of additional environmental stresses

• Semiconductor-based devices

• Temperature rise or temperature/humidity could trigger elevated leakage current

• Passive components


Visual Inspection Cost & Benefit

o Cost: $1K to $3K

o What to look for:

o Part marking, date codes

o Color differences in parts

o Marking imperfections, changes, blacktopping, “ghost”

images

o Lead finish, plating variability, exposed copper, excess

solder, co-planarity of leads, bent leads

o Residues & contamination

o Package variation, thickness, radii


Visual Inspection

o Which is counterfeit?

o The one with markings? Or the two that seem to have none?

o Two samples are non-functional and one functions

1 2 3


Visual Inspection

o Five different capacitor types in one reel!

Capacitor Group 1,

Fluorescent Light -

Dark Brown

Capacitor Group 2,

Fluorescent Light -

Pink

Capacitor Group 3,

Fluorescent Light -

Greenish Gray

Capacitor Group 5,

Fluorescent Light -

Light Brown

Capacitor Group 4,

Fluorescent Light -

Bluish Gray


Date Code Marking - Differences

2.22

12.00

3.18

12.00

Smooth

Even

Textured

Uneven

Registration (mm)

Surface

Lettering

Uniform

depth

Uneven

depth


Samsung Marking Information

(1) SAMSUNG logo : SAMSUNG or SEC

top marking

type mark criteria package

SAMSUNG

marking >11.2mm

U-BGA,

W-BGA,

TBGA, FBGA

etc

(2) Year & Week

(3) Part Number : Refer to Part No. decoder page

(4) Lot Number

Country of origin not a standard Samsung marking feature

http://www.samsung.com/global/business/semiconductor/partnumberDecoder.do


Visual Inspection

Identical part numbers different marking styles


Visual Inspection

Real or Fake? The Counterfeit Chip Conundrum, Hal Rotchadl, Premier

Semiconductor Services, Tempe, AZ, USA, IPC Printed Circuit Expo, APEX &

Designer Summit Proceedings.

Observed differences on lid corners. Part A has chamfer, and part B has

dimple


Visual Inspection




Observed side view differences. Left part has a thin lid and

right part has a thick lid


o Blacktopping is a counterfeiting technique where the

counterfeiter:

o Takes components, usually real, but discarded

o Sands them to remove the original component marking

o Blacktops them in order to hide the original marking

o Prints them with fake markings.

o Dissolve the blacktop with a solvent / acetone that reveals

the true identity of the components.

o But, methods used to blacktop sanded parts improve

daily so the acetone test is no longer reliable

Blacktopping


Examples of Blacktopping

Just under top surface, date code mismatch and hynix part

L01, remarked date code, VC36 changed to GC33 L011, hynix part


Blacktopping & Acetone Wipe Test

Appearance After Acetone Wipe: change in texture and finish

Evidence of Sanding: Visible after blacktopping is removed

Photos courtesy of Oxygen Electronics


X-Ray Cost & Benefit

o Cost: $1K to $3K

o Verification of die and wire bonding pattern

o Internal construction of component

o Die bonding delamination issues

o Die attach voiding


X-Ray Microscopy

Allows for internal inspection

Latest innovations

Digital detectors

Laminography (‘virtual’ cross-

sectioning)

Produces CT models for 3D

sample analysis, virtual

micro-sectioning and

internal dimensional

Nanofocus resolution

Oblique viewing

Agilent 5DX

Nordson Dage X-Ray with 3D m-CT


X-Ray Inspection

o Inspect for: o Extra wire bonds o Wrong configuration of bond pads o Different die sizes o Extra heat capacity (large paddle) o Different lead frames


X-Ray Inspection

Different die sizes L01 L011


X-Ray Inspection

Same part but a better remarking, same die sizes, Hynix mark visible


X-Ray Inspection

Same part


Case Study: Counterfeit FETS-X-Ray

o Customer had an issue

with DC to DC

converter failures

o Simulation models did

not predict the failures

o X-ray inspection of the

failed units

Parallel FETS


X-Rays of Loose Parts

EZ609

Z436, Z536 Z536 Z536

Z536

Differences noted in:

-Lead frame

-Wire bonding

-Molding


X-Ray Technique: Automation?

o ChipCheck Project, www.smartgroup.org

o Move focus from sampling and problem to resolution

http://www.smartgroup.org/


X-Ray Technique: Automation?

o ChipCheck Project

o Creation of an inspection system for automatic detection

of counterfeit components at incoming

o Creation of counterfeit component detection software for

fast and automatic sentencing of components. A

component database storing details of known, good,

components for comparison included


Electrical Characterization Cost &

Benefit

o Cost: $3K to $6K – passives, simple actives

o One temperature for evaluation

o Cost: $15K to $80K – characterization of complex IC,

fixturing, test equipment

o Potential for circuit board design, layout and fabrication costs

to enable testing

o COMMENT: You can’t afford the risk associated with

buying expensive ICs from unknown suppliers


Electrical Characterization

o Limitations of physical characteristic testing

o Parts may be re-manufactured or factory rejects in what

appears to be authentic packaging

o No conclusive identification information on the die once

decapsulated

o Therefore, some electrical analysis is helpful in determining

authenticity.

o Although full datasheet testing is highly recommended for

high reliability applications, a curve trace on each lead is a

very effective way to begin an electrical examination of the

parts.

o A known good or reference component is required.


Case Study – Capacitor Electrical

Characterization

Suspect capacitor - group 3

9.720E-10

9.730E-10

9.740E-10

9.750E-10

9.760E-10

9.770E-10

9.780E-10

9.790E-10

9.800E-10

9.810E-10

9.820E-10

-60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100 120

Temperature (°C)

Cap

acit

an

ce (

F)

C7 SN2854 - 0632

limit 1

limit 2


0.0E+00

2.0E-04

4.0E-04

6.0E-04

8.0E-04

1.0E-03

1.2E-03

-60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100 120

Temperature (°C)

Dis

sip

ati

on

fa

cto

r

C7 SN2854 - 0632


1.049E-09

1.050E-09

1.051E-09

1.052E-09

1.053E-09

1.054E-09

1.055E-09

1.056E-09

1.057E-09

-60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100 120

Temperature (°C)

Cap

acit

an

ce (

F)

Cap 4 - Bag 10

limit 1

limit 2


0.0E+00

1.0E-04

2.0E-04

3.0E-04

4.0E-04

5.0E-04

6.0E-04

7.0E-04

8.0E-04

9.0E-04

1.0E-03

-60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100 120

Temperature (°C)

Dis

sip

ati

on

fa

cto

r

Cap 4 - Bag 10

o Top

o Within spec

o Bottom

o Out of spec


Electrical Characterization of Counterfeit

Diodes

Breakdown:

280V

250V

Breakdown:

50V

420V


Electrical Characterization of Counterfeit

Diodes

Acceptable Waveform Counterfeit Waveform

Recovery measurements


This is not an authentic STS25NH3LL Part, does

not meet resistance specifications.

Its higher drain to source resistance will cause its

parallel FET partner to carry all the current.

FETs with large die have

similar resistances and

electrical performance,

regardless of lead frame

style

Electrical Characterization


Mechanical Robustness - Cost & Benefit

o Cost: $2K to $5K

o Thermal cycling or other testing to verify component is

not counterfeit


Counterfeit Mechanical Risk o Thermal Shock Test

o Visual Inspection (EIA-595 allows for 5 mil depth)

o 8 of 32 counterfeit capacitors had acceptable chip-outs

o 12 of 32 counterfeit capacitors had unacceptable chip-outs

o 8 of 32 Taiyo Yuden capacitors had acceptable chip-outs (very small)

Pictures of chip-outs of counterfeit capacitors (left) and Taiyo Yuden

capacitors (right)


Destructive Physical Analysis (DPA)

o Cost: $7 to $10K passives

o Cost: $8 to $12K actives

o Step by Step analytical approach to identifying

whether a device is counterfeit using all tools

available.


Decapsulation and Cross Sectioning

o Allows direct inspection of circuits and identification of

o Extra circuitry

o Extra layers

o Extra interconnects


o Decapsulation is a very valuable

tool for determining authenticity

of difficult parts.

o After performing non destructive

tests, the part may be opened for

die verification

o Does not guarantee all of the

parts in the lot are the same

o Typically cheaper than electrical

testing

Decapsulation

Plasma Etcher

Wet Etch Tanks


Decapsulated Parts Inspection




Observed internal differences on lids. Part on left has flat lid, and

part on right has a cavity lid


Decapsulated Parts Inspection




Chip capacitors are missing (bare pad site) on left part and

mounted on right part


Cross-Sectioning

o Standard method for destructive subsurface evaluation

o Method:

o Sawing to approximate area of interest

o Potting in epoxy resins to aid polishing

o Polishing medium dependent upon materials: typically diamond, SiC, or alumina suspensions & embedded polishing cloths

o Coarse to fine (600 grit to 0.05 um) grinding sequence to eliminate damage from previous step

o Final etch often used for microstructural relief

o Optical/electron microscopy for inspection

Images courtesy of

Buehler


o Customer experienced two failures

o Left: known good part; center and right: bad parts

o Center part: no die; right part: cracked die

1 2 3


Higher Risk Non-Destructive Inspection

• Important to understand that NDE equipment is not completely non-destructive

• Acoustic microscopy

• Can remove residues/contaminants when product is submerged in water

• Selection of bath fluid is key (distilled/deionized water; IPA; oil; etc.)

• Issue for moisture sensitive components

• X-ray microscopy

• Elevated exposure, especially with laminography, can induce damage in sensitive

components (EEPROM)

• SQUID (Superconducting QUantum Interference Device) microscopy

• Sensitivity allows for use of very low voltages; mostly non-destructive

• Thermal imaging

• Temperature rise can damage or mask fragile conductive filaments (joule heating, thermal runaway, evaporation of retained moisture)


H2O or other

fluids

Transducer

Receiver

Method for inspecting internal structures

through the application of high frequency

(>20 kHz) sound waves

Requires immersion in water (acoustic

signals reflected by air)

Allows for very accurate detection of

voids and delaminations

Options

Frequency

Transmission mode

Imaging

Acoustic Microscopy


Acoustic Microscopy: Transducer Frequency

High frequency

Short focus

Low frequency

Long focus

1. Higher resolution

2. Shorter focal lengths

3. Less penetration

(Thinner packages)

1. Lower resolution

2. Longer focal lengths

3. Greater penetration

(Thicker packages)

General rules:

• Ultra High Frequency (200+ MHz) for flip chips and wafers.

• High Frequency (50-75 MHz) for thin plastic packages. (110MHz-UHF) for

flip chips.

• Low Frequency (15-30 MHz) for thicker plastic packages.


Acoustic Microscopy: Transmission Mode

Pulse-Echo: One Transducer

• Uses ultrasound reflected from the sample

• Can determine which interface is delaminated

• Requires scanning from both sides to inspect

all interfaces

• Provides images with high degree of spatial

detail

• Peak amplitude, time of flight (TOF), and phase

inversion measurement

Through Transmission: Two Transducers

• Uses ultrasound transmitted through the

sample

• One scan reveals delamination at all

interfaces

• No way to determine which interface is

delaminated

• Less spatial resolution than pulse-echo

• Commonly used to verify pulse-echo

results

Through Transmission

Transmit

&

Receive

Transmit

Receive

Pulse-Echo


Acoustic Microscopy

Missing die, missing bond wires and

different internal structure

Electrical shorting within the package

(delamination, electro-chemical

migration)

Electrical opens (delamination, wire

bond failure)

Insufficient thermal performance

detected (i.e. die attach, voids and

delamination)


X-Ray Fluorescence (XRF) Analysis

o XRF widely used determine:

o Elemental composition of components

o Lead content for compliance to the RoHS directive.

o A newer use for XRF:

o Compare a known good component to a suspect component by comparing the elements of the leads as well as the packaging.

o Software developed to compare the two in order to assist in authenticity verification.


X-Ray Fluorescence (XRF) Spectroscopy

X-ray emission signature from

x-ray source

Portable models available

Crystallographic analysis of

solid samples


Example of SAC part labeled SnPb o Use XRF gun to scan

incoming BGAs to

verify Pb or Pb-free

balls

o Verify lead finish on

other parts

Pb-free Part failed to solder in Sn-Pb Process


Scanning Electron Microscopy

Sample rastered with an electron

beam

Emitted electrons sorted by delay

and quantity


Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS)

• Used with SEM

• X-ray emission signature

from electron source

• Elemental analysis of

solid samples

• Identification based on

multiple emission lines (K,

L, M)

• Can’t detect light

elements: H, He, Li, Be

EDS scan of

elemental

copper

Monte Carlo

simulation of Si K-a

X-rays in an SiO2

matrix at 5 keV

(Vanderlinde, 2004)


EDS of Ceramic Capacitor

o Materials

Characterization

o Bismuth 7% to 23%

o Palladium 4% to 9%

o Silver 7% to 14%

o Titanium 26% to 34%

o Neodymium 29% to 46%


Suspect Counterfeits

o Not all suspect counterfeits are counterfeits

o Company changed the size of the chip without a

product change notice (PCN)

o Original components that appear to be fake

New Old

Both components have the same part number


Avoiding Counterfeits

Activity Relative Cost

Custom fabrication $$$$

Lifetime Buy $$-$$$

Modernize/Rev $$$$$$$$$

Screen Incoming $$

Screen Outgoing $-$$$

Buy from origin & verify $


Testing & Reporting Recommendations

o Choose an analysis lab carefully

o No industry standards or accreditation for counterfeit

analysis

o Rapidly changing counterfeit landscape

o Wide variations noted among labs

o Identify the information desired from analysis


Key Analysis Report Elements

o Image List – as needed

o Packaging images

o X-ray images

o XRF images

o EDS images

o Acoustic microscopy images

o Overall images of part

o Observation images

o Lead condition images

o Solvent testing images

o Internal images

o Corner radius images

o Incoming information

o Investigator & lab name

o Datasheet information

o Assessment Checklist

o Analysis & test descriptions & tools

o Electrical test results

o Overall Comments

o Results

o Summary


Device Countermeasures:

Design for Counterfeit Avoidance


o Encryption on a chip

o Often cited as one of the answers to cybersecurity woes

o Difficult for small components to handle

o Intel announced a process that allows the random-number generator, which is the basis for encryption, to be made with the same semiconducting material and at the same feature size now used for modern processors.

o Smart Marking

o INK CONTAINING DNA OR OTHER BIOLOGIC MARKER FOR PREVENTION OF COUNTERFEITING AND PRODUCT DIVERSION PERCEPTIBLE WITH INFRARED LIGHT

o RF tagging

o Package Authentication - This method makes it extremely difficult to counterfeit the data on RFID tags

o Data acts as an electronic security marker to automatically authenticate genuine product packaging.

o Shipment tracking

Examples of Device Level Countermeasures


o Physically unclonable functions (PUFs) provide one way to tie a device to its mark of authenticity.

o Each IC is subtly different to its peers on wafer, even though all that make it through test will operate in the same manner.

o For example, internal srams have subtle biases such that, when they are first powered up, they contain a pattern of 1s and 0s that is essentially random from die to die, but which is consistent from power cycle to power cycle for that die. Repeatability can be as high as 80% under different test conditions.

o This pattern can be used as an unclonable device 'fingerprint' that, together with a digital certificate stored as part of the manufacturing and test process, guarantees authenticity

o With the necessary hardware in place, a secret key can be injected into the device at wafer test.

o Followed by injection of a digital certificate bound to the secret key at the assembly and binning stage.

o Provides a certificate that has been securely signed by the OCM and which supports all downstream anti counterfeiting measures.

o Certificate, which can be interrogated at any point, provides traceability for suppliers and end users, providing a way of guaranteeing a counterfeit free supply chain downstream.

Encryption on a Chip


o The U.S. Army Research Laboratory‘s (ARL), Army Research Office‘s (ARO)

o Exploring DNA as a tagging and tracking method

o optical scanning technology that can identify counterfeit electronic components

o ChromoLogic developed a tag with a biomimetic barcode that can be aligned in the proper order and decoded by an optical reader, similar to how the sequence of a DNA molecule can be read.

o http://chromologic.com/technologies-2/

o Discovered that the optical scanning technology developed to decode the biomimetic tag is capable of mapping the intrinsic surface of electronic components, providing a type of fingerprint to distinguish authentic or counterfeit circuits.

Government / Research Countermeasures

http://chromologic.com/technologies-2/





o ChromoLogic has developed this

surface-scanning technology into

the DTEK system, which provides

quantitative optical inspection of

integrated circuits

Government / Research Countermeasures

The DTEK system outputs

quantitative information

about the surface of

electronic components for

use in comparative analysis.


Manufacturers Countermeasures

o Complex markings on the package

o Ultra-violet ink in package marking

o Symbols or identifiers etched in the die

o Difficult to alter parts

o Traceability

http://www.metronusa.com/marker1.htm


Countermeasures (cont.)

o Latest technique involves etch depth analysis

o Use of digital light processing (DLP) to rapidly scan surfaces for highly accurate depth measurements

o Compare to either manufacturer’s spec or known good part


Mitigating Effects of Counterfeits

o Full performance screen

o Test to or beyond spec

o Test to detect fraudulent parts

o I.e., empty packages or wrong functionality

o Factory-failed parts

o Competitors parts may prove to work

o Will not detect parts with latent defects or those with

additional circuitry


Prevention

o Comprehensive audit of the distributor based on their

quality system

o Risk assessment to the program

o Development of an inspection / test plan


o The finished product can look like the original. Once the components are complete they may undergo a simple electrical test, such as a curve trace, but the stresses from reclaiming and die harvesting can induce severe damage causing;

o Lower life expectancy

o Curve trace irregularities

o Out of specification

o Continuity failures

o Unknown reliability

Finished Product and Dangers of

Manufactured Counterfeits


o iNEMI White Paper: Development of a Methodology to

Determine Risk of Counterfeit Use

o http://thor.inemi.org/webdownload/projects/Miniaturizatio

n/Counterfeit_Whitepaper.pdf

o Risk of Counterfeit Use

o Risk of Untrusted Sources

o Counterfeit Loss & Total Cost Estimation

iNEMI Counterfeit Risk Calculators

http://thor.inemi.org/webdownload/projects/Miniaturization/Counterfeit_Whitepaper.pdf




o Counterfeit Loss & Cost

iNEMI Counterfeit Calculators


o Risk of Counterfeit Use



o Risk of Untrusted

Sources


Rating IDEA GIDEP ISO 9000 SEMI T20 AS 6081

In House

Testing

using AS

6171 (after

release of

standard)

Rating = 1 - - -

Certification as a trusted

vendor (on a white list,

such as ones required

under SEMI T20.2)

Accredited Accredited

Rating = 2 Member Member CertifiedSet of infrastructure for

authentication via web-

Not

Accredited

Rating = 3No

Member- -

Serialization when

breaking down batches- -

Rating = 4 -No

Member

Not

Certified- - -

Rating = 5 - - - No Serialization Not Accredited -

Memberships and Accreditations

Rating Inspection

Environmental

conditions for

handling, shipping,

storage

Insurance / WarrantyPolicy in case of

counterfeit occurrence

Policy in case of

suspect parts but no

actual proof of

counterfeit

Rating = 1More stringent than IDEA

recommendations

Well established controls

for adequate limits on

exposure to ESD,

moisture, dust and

mechanical stress

Full coverage of

consequential cost,

including field returns

Agreement with certified

destruction of batch,

refund and full disclosure

of source and history

Refund for returned

batch upon customer's

request

Rating = 2

As in IDEA

recommendations or

equivalent

-

Refund and

reimbursement of rework

cost

Agreement with certified

destruction of counterfeit

batch and refund

Refund for returned

batch upon suspicious

observations

Rating = 3Less stringent than IDEA

recommendationsPartial controls

Only refund for returned

suspect batchesNo policy No policy

Rating = 4Documents, shipment

packaging, labels only-

Replacement of batch or

refund for returned

components only after

proven failures


refund for returned


proven failures


refund for returned


proven failures

Rating = 5None (e.g. because of no

regular inspection)

No controls of ESD,

moisture, dust or

mechanical stress

No warranty Refuses refund Refuses refund

Mitigation and Controls

RatingNumber of

employees

Number of

locations in

different

countries

Business Scale Supplier History Commodity Expertise

Rating = 1 > 100 >4Annual revenue > 100

MUS$

No known Counterfeit

incidents

All Sales, Procurement,

Quality staff specializes

in this commodity only

Rating = 2 30 - 100 4Annual revenue

10 -100 MUS$

Counterfeit supply

suspected

Range of Commodity

Specialists with

> 5 years experience


1 - 10 MUS$

1 counterfeit supply

confirmed

Some Commodity

Specialists with

< 5 years experience


0.1 - 1 MUS$

2 - 10 counterfeit

supplies confirmed

New Commodity Supplier

with commodity

specialists

Rating = 5 <4 1Annual revenue

< 0.1 MUS$

> 10 counterfeit supplies

confirmedNo Specialist Staff

Company Characteristics


Conclusions

o Counterfeits are a real threat and growing

o Complex supply chain provides multiple entry points

o Risk needs to be managed through a decision matrix

o Probability / Mission Risk / Volumes

o Helps provide clear boundaries and guidelines for mitigation practices

o Costs are not prohibitive and should be chosen as a function of risk mitigation


Instructor Biography Cheryl Tulkoff has over 22 years of experience in electronics manufacturing with an emphasis

on failure analysis and reliability. She has worked throughout the electronics manufacturing

life cycle beginning with semiconductor fabrication processes, into printed circuit board

fabrication and assembly, through functional and reliability testing, and culminating in the

analysis and evaluation of field returns. She has also managed no clean and RoHS-compliant

conversion programs and has developed and managed comprehensive reliability programs.

Cheryl earned her Bachelor of Mechanical Engineering degree from Georgia Tech. She is a

published author, experienced public speaker and trainer and a Senior member of both ASQ

and IEEE. She has held leadership positions in the IEEE Central Texas Chapter, IEEE WIE

(Women In Engineering), and IEEE ASTR (Accelerated Stress Testing and Reliability) sections.

She chaired the annual IEEE ASTR workshop for four years, is an ASQ Certified Reliability

Engineer, and a member of SMTA and iMAPS.

She has a strong passion for pre-college STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math)

outreach and volunteers with several organizations that specialize in encouraging pre-college

students to pursue careers in these fields.


Contact Information

• Questions?

• Contact Cheryl Tulkoff, [email protected],

512-913-8624

• www.dfrsolutions.com

• Connect with me in LinkedIn as well!