counter terrorism measures in southeast asia: how effective are they? by rommel c. banlaoi

Yuchengco Center – De La Salle University-Manila

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Counter Terrorism Measures in Southeast Asia:

How Effective Are They?

Rommel C. Banlaoi

Yuchengco Center De La Salle University

Manila

Counter Terrorism Measures in Southeast Asia: How Effective Are They?

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© Copyright 2009 by the Yuchengco Center Printed in the Philippines. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without the permission in writing from the Center. ISBN: 978-971-94089-2-5 Please address all inquiries to: Yuchengco Center 2nd Floor, Don Enrique T. Yuchengco Hall De La Salle University 2401 Taft Avenue, Manila 1004 Philippines email: [email protected] fax: (632) 525-3457 url: http://yc.dlsu.edu.ph


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Figures …………………………………………….….………………… iv List of Tables …………………………………………….…..………………… v List of Acronyms …………………………...…………….…..……………… vi Acknowledgement …………………………………………....……………… xi Foreword …………………………………………………….………………… xiii Abstract ………………………………………………………………………… xix Introduction …………………………………….……….……………………… 1 Chapter I: Conceptualizing Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Definition, Evolution and Causes ………………………..……………… 5 Chapter II: Terrorist Groups in Southeast Asia and Modes of Operation ……………….………………….….…....………… 31 Chapter III: Impact of Terrorism on Socio-Economic Development in the Region ………………...……….………………… 67 Chapter IV: National Responses to Terrorism ……………...…… 73 Chapter V: Regional Cooperation to Counter Terrorism…....… 89 Chapter VI: Support of Major Powers to Counter Terrorism in Southeast Asia …………………..…….…..… 95 Chapter VII: The Future of Terrorism in Southeast Asia ……………………………………………………………… 109 Summary and Conclusion …………………………...….…….……… 111 Bibliography ……………………………………………..…...…………… 113 Appendix: ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism……………….……… 135 About the Author…………..………………………..…...…..………… 149


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List of Figures Figure 1. Number of Published Books with “Terrorism” in Their Title ………………..……………………………… 7 Figure 2. Mantiqi Structure of Jemaah Islamiyah ……………… 34 Figure 3. Organizational Structure of Jemaah Islamiyah ……......……………………………………………… 35 Figure 4. Two Major Factions of Jemaah Islamiyah ……………………………………………………………………… 36 Figure 5. Dream Map of Daulah Islamiya Nusantara ………………………………………..…….…...……………… 37 Figure 6. ASG Organization Envisioned by Abdurajak Janjalani ………………………………………...….………… 50 Figure 7. Strength of the ASG, 2000-2008 …………………….… 52 Figure 8. ASG Current Organizational Structure ……………………………………………………...……………… 53 Figure 9. ASG Cellular-Type Organizational Structure ………………………………………………..……..…………… 54 Figure 10. ASG – Al-Qaeda Link Through Transnational Islamic Organizations ……………………...…...… 59 Figure 11. Philippines’ Most Wanted Terrorists ………………………………………………….......…………… 82


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List of Tables Table 1. UN Conventions’ Response to Various Criminal Acts of Terrorism in Southeast Asia …………..…….…… 11 Table 2. Four Class Divisions of Terrorism in Southeast Asia………………………………………………....…………… 18 Table 3. JI Regional Partners and Linkages in Southeast Asia………………………………………………………………… 21 Table 4. Major ASEAN Declarations and Conventions Against Terrorism After 9/11 …………………………….…..………… 26 Table 5. Australia’s Counter Terrorism Capacity Building Initiatives in Southeast Asia………………………………… 97 Table 6. Areas and Scope of ASEAN-India Counter Terrorism Cooperation ………………………….….……… 98 Table 7. Areas of Cooperation in ASEAN-Canada Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism……………………………….….... 99 Table 8. Japan’s Counter Terrorism Support to Southeast Asia ………………………………..……………….…..… 103


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List of Acronyms

ACCT ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism

ADB Asian Development Bank

ADMM ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting

AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines

AHAI Al Harakatul Al Islamiyyah

AMLO Anti-Money Laundering Office

AMMTC ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime

APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

ARF ASEAN Regional Forum

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

ASEM Asia-Europe Meeting

ASG Abu Sayyaf Group

ATA Anti-Terrorism Assistance

ATC Anti-Terrorism Council

ATTF Anti-Terrorism Task Force

BCTP Bali Counter Terrorism Process

BI Balik Islam

CATR Council for Asian Terrorism Research

CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear

CGCC Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation

CIDG Criminal Investigation and Detection Group

CITOC Counter International Terrorist Operations Center

COCIS Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Security

COCIT Committee of Counter-International Terrorism

CPP Communist Party of the Philippines

CRS Congressional Research Service


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CSTPV Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence

CTCB Counter Terrorism Capacity Building

CTFP Counter Terrorism Fellowship Program

DFAT Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

DI Darul Islam

DIN Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara

DJACT Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism

DND Department of National Defense

DOD Department of Defense

EG Executive Group

EU European Union

FDI Foreign Direct Investment

FMF Foreign Military Financing

FMS Foreign Military Sales

FRTFSI Fund for Regional Trade and Financial Security Initiative

FSDMF Fi-Sabilillah Da’wah and Media Foundation

FTO Foreign Terrorist Organization

GWOT Global War on Terrorism

ICC International Criminal Court

ICG International Crisis Group

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross

IDP Internally Displaced Persons

IEC Islamic Executive Council

IED Improvised Explosive Device

IIRO International Islamic Relief Organization

ILEA International Law Enforcement Academy

IMET International Military Education and Training

ISCAG Islamic Studies, Call and Guidance


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ISD Internal Security Department

JCTC Joint Counter Terrorism Centre

JI Jemaah Islamiyah

KMM Kampulan Mujahidin Malaysia

MALSINDO Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia

MBG Misuari Breakaway Group

MCFF Mujahideed Commando Freedom Fighters

MDT Mutual Defense Treaty

MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front

MMI Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia

MNLF Moro National Liberation Front

M1 First Mantiqi

M2 Second Mantiqi

M3 Third Mantiqi

M4 Fourth Mantiqi

NACTAG National Counter Terrorism Action Group

NADR Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Activities

NATCG National Anti-Terrorism Coordination Group

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NDF National Democratic Front

NICA National Intelligence Coordinating Agency

NII Negara Islam Indonesia

NISP National Internal Security Plan

NPA New Peoples’ Army

OMA Office of Muslim Affairs

PAS Islamic Party of Malaysia

PIPVTR Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research

PISCES Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System


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PNP Philippine National Police

PUPJI Pedoman Umum Perjuangan-Al-Jama-ah Al-Islamiya (The General Guide for the Struggle of Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyah)

ReCAAP Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia

RM Rabitatul Mujahidin

RSIM Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement

RSM Rajah Solaiman Movement

SEACAT Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism

SEARCCT Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counter Terrorism

SEC Securities and Exchange Commission

SOMTC Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crimes

UN United Nations

UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

UNSC United Nations Security Council

US United States

WOG Whole-of-Government


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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

In writing this work, I am extremely grateful to Yuchengco Center, particularly Dr. Trinidad Osteria, for the research grant. Without the generous support of Yuchengco Center, this work could not have been accomplished. I am also deeply appreciative of the friendship and encouragement of Dr. Rizal “Rollie” Buendia for opening my doors to the Yuchengco Center.

I sincerely thank my colleagues at the Council for Asian Terrorism Research (CATR), particularly RADM Richard Porterfield, Dr. Caroline Ziemke and Dr. Katy Oh Hassig, for putting me in the loop of terrorism scholars in the Asia Pacific. In CATR, I always enjoy the company of Hekmat Karzai, Praveen Swami and Ranga Kalansooriya. I also convey my sincerest respect to Ambassador Hussin Nayan, the founding head of the Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counter Terrorism (SEARCCT), and Major General Alexander P. Aquirre, Chairman of the Strategic and Integrative Studies Center where I had a pleasure of working as Executive Director. I acknowledge Dr. Andrew Tan, Dr. Peter Chalk, Dr. Carl Ungerer, Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, Dr. Kumar Ramakrishna, Dr. Kit Collier, Dr. Carlyle Thayer, Prof. Peter Anderson and Prof. Clive Williams for a very valuable intellectual exchange on terrorist threats in Southeast Asia.

At the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and

Terrorism Research (PIPVTR), the following colleagues are extremely helpful: “Boogie” Mendoza, “Bert” Ferro, Noor Muog, Billy Rodriguez and Diane Mendoza. From the military and police sector, I thank General Arturo Lomibao, General Juancho Sabban, General Nelson Allaga, General Ben Dolorfino, Col. Greg Catapang, Col. Dan Lucero, Col. Caloy Quita and Col. Ben Basiao. From the media, I thank Maria Ressa and Marites Vitug. From the Philippine academe, I thank Dr. Clarita Carlos, Dr. Renato de Castro and Prof. Raymond Quilop.


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Most importantly, I owe enormous debt to my wife, Grace, who always bears with me every time I write my piece. I deeply thank her for the patience and understanding. I also thank my two children, Zed and Zoe, for the reality check – that beyond books and papers, there are two growing human beings needing my greater attention.


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FOREWORD

Examining the effectiveness of counter terrorism

measures in Southeast Asia is indeed a daunting task on two grounds. First, the definition of the term “terrorism” is in itself controversial and contested because it is used by states to delegitimize political or foreign opponents and potentially legitimize the state's own use of terror against them. John Whitbeck, writing in the International Herald Tribune in 2004,1 says that virtually every recognized state confronting an insurgency or separatist movement has eagerly jumped on the “war on terrorism” bandwagon, branding its domestic opponents – if it had not already done so – “terrorists.” On the other hand, “terrorism” can also be seen as the only means available to the poor and repressed of the world to defend themselves against the overwhelming strength of their oppressors. The ambiguity in the term makes it hard to delineate the line that separates a terrorist act from an act that advances lawful dissent within the purview of defending democratic socio-economic, political and cultural rights and freedoms.

The conceptual and syntactical difficulty of the term led to the development of alternative concepts with more positive connotation, such as national liberation movements, resistance movements, freedom fighters, and others to describe and characterize the activities of terrorist organizations. By resorting to such tendentious nomenclatures such as “peoples’ movements,” some terrorist organizations and their supporters gloss over the realities of terrorism, establishing their activities on more positive and legitimate foundations. Moreover, terms not opposed to the basic values of liberal democracies, like “peoples’ revolutionary violence,” “national liberation,” etc., carry very few negative connotations than “terrorism.”

1John V. Whitbeck, “A world ensnared by a word,” International Herald Tribune, 18 February, 2004.


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Second, Southeast Asia is one of the most heterogeneous regions in the world. Although it is generally referred to as a region, the principal basis for this designation is the geographic propinquity of its component states and the fact that collectively, they occupy the territory between China and the Indian subcontinent. The fundamental strata of the traditional cultures of nearly all the peoples of Southeast Asia set them apart from those of India and China. The range of contemporary political systems in Southeast Asia is strikingly varied encompassing a spectrum as broad as the differing cultures and divergent historical conditionings that have profoundly influenced their character.

Given the complexity of terms and concepts and the intricacy of Southeast Asia, voluminous studies and researches have been undertaken to unravel the complexity of the issues as well as provide answers to the continuing questions haunting academic circles and policymakers concerned with security and conflict studies. Hence, an attempt to study the effectivity of counter terrorism measures in the region, as this research has done, is a challenging undertaking.

Professor Rommel Banlaoi’s efforts to examine terrorism as a concept, analyze terrorist groups in the region, assess the responses to terrorism of states (at least by the five founding members of ASEAN), gauge the regional cooperation to counter terrorism, investigate the support of major powers against terrorism in the region, and explore the future of terrorism in Southeast Asia is an audacious task to intelligently comprehend the intricacies of terrorism in the region and variations of policies against terrorism of countries which are heavily influenced by their own domestic politics. The study does not only serve the scholarly interests of the academic sector but also the pragmatic concerns of the policymakers of states both in the region and the world.

Definitely, this volume is a significant contribution to the literature on a range of research areas apart from terrorism and Southeast Asia. This includes the themes of regional cooperation, non-traditional security, conflict management and peace building, comparative politics, international relations, and policy research, to mention a few.


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Finally, the study reflects and advances the Yuchengco Center’s foremost objective of contributing to public knowledge and awareness of a topic that is extremely important and relevant to states of the region, and to academics and policy scientists. The Yuchengco Center as a regional think tank has enhanced its leadership in policy research and advocacy through this excellent piece of scholarly work of Professor Banlaoi.

Rizal G. Buendia, Ph.D. London, United Kingdom July, 2009


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The ink of the scholar is worth more than the blood of a martyr. -the Prophet Muhammad

The pen is mightier than the sword. -Jose Rizal


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ABSTRACT

When the United States declared the global war against

terrorism in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, Southeast Asia was named the “second front,” next to Afghanistan. The presence of Al-Qaeda linked and inspired terrorist groups in the region, notably the Jemaah Islamiyyah (JI) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), considered Southeast Asia as one of the world’s epicenters of terrorism studies and counter terrorism operations. Since 9/11, the region has seen the implementation of various counter terrorism measures at the national, bilateral, regional and multilateral levels. These measures resulted in the arrest, neutralization and even killings of key terrorist personalities in Southeast Asia. Some were convinced to disengage from the use of political violence and leave terrorism behind. Yet, terrorist threats continue to loom large in the security agenda of Southeast Asian states as surviving elements of JI and AS are still planning to and wreaking terrorist havocs. While many leaders have been killed in battle, executed, imprisoned or convinced to leave terrorism behind, there are still younger members willing to take the place of their predecessors. This is attributed to the fact that the ideology of Al-Qaedaism that informs the actions of terrorist groups in Southeast Asia remains alive. Moreover, terrorism in Southeast Asia has long standing underlying ideological origins that require comprehensive and more nuanced counter terrorism measures.


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Rommel C. Banlaoi

INTRODUCTION When the United States decisively launched the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) following the gruesome September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks on American soil, Southeast Asia quickly received the controversial label of being the GWOT’s “second front.”1 The presence of Indonesian-founded Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in the archipelagic Southeast Asia with the avowed mission to build a region-wide Islamic Caliphate and the reported existence of Al-Qaeda linked and Al-Qaeda inspired terrorist groups in Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand have convinced the security officials in Washington that the battleground against international terrorism next to Afghanistan is inevitably Southeast Asia. Counter terrorism measures in the region, therefore, were subsumed under this “second front” military doctrine making Southeast Asia one of the epicenters of terrorism studies and counter terrorism operations in the world. However, the idea of Southeast Asia as the “second front” in the fight against terrorism has been strongly contested by some scholars and analysts studying terrorist threats in the region beyond the hawkish and alarmist prism of 9/11.2 While the “second front” discourse triggered the significant flow of international counter terrorism assistance to Southeast Asia, it also led to some counter terrorism measures that were challenged globally, regionally and domestically. This present study is an attempt to take stock of almost a decade of counter terrorism measures in Southeast Asia after 9/11 and to critically

1The idea of Southeast Asia as a “second front” in the global campaign against terrorism was first articulated in John Gershman, “Is Southeast Asia the Second Front?” Foreign Affairs (July/August, 2002). 2For a more scholarly analysis, see Andrew T.H. Tan, “Southeast Asia as the Second Front in the War Against Terrorism: Evaluating the Threat and Responses,” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 15, no. 2 (Summer, 2003), pp. 112-138. For a more recent analysis of the issue, see Amitav Acharya and Arabinda Acharya, “The Myth of the Second Front: Localizing the War on Terror in Southeast Asia,” The Washington Quarterly, vol. 30, no. 4 (Autumn, 2007), pp. 75-90.


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examine how effective these measures are in overcoming the virulent terrorist threats that have been confronting the region.

This study is divided into seven chapters. Chapter I is conceptual and theoretical as it discusses some definitional issues surrounding terrorism discourse in Southeast Asia and elsewhere in the world. It describes the evolution of terrorism in the region and maps some known terrorist cells operating in the area. This chapter also briefly examines the various manifestations of terrorism in Southeast Asia and describes how they have changed overtime with the intention of analyzing the multidimensional causes of terrorism in the region. Chapter II identifies some terrorist groups and their modes of operation in Southeast Asia. It features some country case studies of selected groups accused of terrorism in Indonesia, the Philippines and Singapore focusing on their evolution, organizational structure, political and ideological adherence, links with foreign terrorist organizations, their main activities and targets of operations. This chapter only discusses terrorist organizations associated with Islamic extremism. Terrorist organizations like communist parties and non-Islamic insurgent groups are beyond the scope of this study.

Chapter III examines the impact of terrorism on socio-economic development of the region. It focuses on the impacts of terrorism on tourism, foreign investment and human security such as health, education, social welfare and displacements of persons. This chapter also describes the military costs associated with the fight against terrorism. Chapter IV is more country-specific as it discusses the national response against terrorist threats in Southeast Asia. Three countries are selected for this part of the study: Indonesia, the Philippines and Singapore.

Chapter V moves from country study to regional analysis by examining regional cooperation to counter terrorism in Southeast Asia. It assesses the state of regional cooperation against terrorism, the level of coordination to address the international menace and the quantity and quality of international assistance and support, particularly in the area of intelligence sharing and cross border collaboration.


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Chapter VI examines the role of extra-regional powers in counter terrorism in Southeast Asia. It focuses on the role of Australia, China, India, Japan and US in the fight against international terrorism in the region.

Chapter VII analyzes the future of international terrorism in Southeast Asia. It attempts to describe the configuration of terrorism in Southeast Asia in the coming years and to address how regional cooperation can be effectively forged to maximize the effects of counter terrorism in Southeast Asia.


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CHAPTER I

CONCEPTUALIZING TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: DEFINITION, EVOLUTION AND CAUSES

What is Terrorism in the Region’s Context?

Though terrorism has been a problem of the humanity

since the dawn of recorded history, it is regrettable that until now, there has been no clear-cut definition of the concept.3 It is said that the word terrorism originated after the French Revolution of 1789. It was first used during the “Reign of Terror” between 1793 and 1794. Yet, there has been no clarity on the meaning of terrorism. The US-based Terrorism Research Center laments that terrorism “by nature is difficult to define.”4 Even the Scotland-based Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) underscores the enormous dilemma in coming out with an iron-clad definition of terrorism.5 The Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (CGCC), an independent think-tank founded by members of the United Nations (UN), recognizes the arduousness of defining the term terrorism.6 The Council for Asian Terrorism Research (CATR), the largest network of terrorism think-tanks in the Asia Pacific, also admits the difficulty of coming out with a precise definition of terrorism.

As early as 1937, the defunct League of Nations

attempted to define terrorism as “all criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or groups of persons or the general public.”7 However, this definition failed to get wider

3Gus Martin, Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives and Issues (London and California: Sage Publications, Inc., 2003), pp. 1-10. 4Terrorism Research Center at http://www.terrorism.com/. 5Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~wwwir/research/cstpv/index.php. 6Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation at http://www.globalct.org. 7Quoted in Carlyle A. Thayer, “Political Terrorism and Militant Islam in Southeast Asia,” (Paper delivered at a Forum on Regional Security and Political Developments organized by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies at Grand Copthorne Water Front Hotel, Singapore on 24 July, 2003), p. 6.


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acceptance because of divergent national perspectives on the threat of terrorism.

In the mid-1980s, scholars listed a total of 109

definitions of terrorism with 22 different definitional characteristics. These definitions continue to be debated upon.8 In the mid-1990s, another scholar counted more than 100 definitions of terrorism but the search for a commonly accepted definition goes on.9 In 1999, the United Nations drafted a definition of terrorism but it also failed to reach global consensus because of different domestic considerations among member nations, particularly in the developing world.

In the aftermath of 9/11, the definitional problem of

terrorism continues to haunt scholars, experts and policymakers. This situation continues to make many counter terrorism measures not only problematic but also contested. An internet search of the phrase “definition of terrorism” yielded 6,630,000 results for Google while 25,400,000 result for Yahoo as of this writing. Even the term “terrorism” alone revealed 261,000,000 results for Yahoo while 49,100,000 results for Google. Using Google Book search results in 118,431 publications written on terrorism to date. One study shows that since 9/11, there has been a drastic increase in the number of published books with terrorism in their title.10 (Figure 1) This clearly indicates the overwhelming interests of readers and publishers on the topic of terrorism.

8Alex P. Schmid, Albert J. Jongman, et al., Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1988), pp. 5-6. 9Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 6. 10Dipak K. Gupta, “Toward an Integrated Behavioral Framework for Analyzing Terrorism: Individual Motivations to Group Dynamics,” Democracy and Security, vol. 1, no. 1 (January-July, 2005), p. 5.


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Figure 1 Number of Published Books with “Terrorism” in Their

Title

Source: Dipak K. Gupta, “Toward an Integrated Behavioral Framework for Analyzing Terrorism: Individual Motivations to Group Dynamics,” Democracy and Security, vol. 1, no. 1 (January-July, 2005), p. 6.

Among the many publications on the topic, the most widely-cited definition of terrorism is the one provided in 1983 by the US Department of State. It says that the term “terrorism” means “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”11 Yet, this definition is being contested because it eschews the state and its apparatuses in the definition considering that there are studies focusing on state terrorism and state-sponsored terrorism.12

11See United States Department of States, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 (Washington, DC: US Department of State, 2003), p. xii. 12See for example Tal Becker, Terrorism and the State: Rethinking the Rules of State Responsibility (New York: Hart Publishing, 2006) and Mark Selden, Alvin Y. So, War and State Terrorism: The United States, Japan, and the Asia-Pacific in the Long Twentieth Century (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004).


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There is no doubt, however, that terrorism is presently a highly pejorative term - it is something what “bad guys do.”13

Post-9/11 terrorism scholars strongly acknowledge the

changing face of terrorism14 by differentiating new from old terrorism.15 Whether old or new terrorism, there has been “no authoritative systematic guide to terrorism, no Clausewitz, not even a Jomini – and perhaps there never will be one simply because there is not one terrorism but a variety of terrorisms and what is true for one does not necessarily apply to others.”16 Thus, the worn-out saying, “a one person’s terrorist is the other one’s freedom fighter” still catches scholarly attention.

One thing in common among many scholars is the view

that terrorism is fundamentally a violent act.17 Terrorism is a politically motivated form of violence used by both non-state and state players.

Conceptually, acts of terrorism are special kinds of

violence compared to military activities or guerilla wars.18 Military activities, guerilla wars and terrorist acts are also forms of political violence but they can be distinguished in the following words:

Military activity was bound by conventions entailing moral

distinctions between belligerents and neutrals, combatants and non-combatants, appropriate and inappropriate targets, legitimate and illegitimate methods;

13Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Terrorist Threat (London: John Murray Publishers, 2006), p. 19. 14Rohan Gunaratna (ed), The Changing Face of Terrorism (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish International, 2004). 15Andrew Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna (eds), The New Terrorism: Anatomy, Trends and Counter-Strategies (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish International, 2002). Also see Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt and Michele Zanimi, Countering the New Terrorism (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1999). 16Walter Laqueur, No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century (New York and London: The Continuum International Publishing Group, Inc., 2003), p. 8. 17Cindy C. Combs, Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, Second Edition (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2000), p. 8. 18Alex P. Schmidt, “Frameworks for Conceptualizing Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 16, no. 2 (Summer, 2004), p. 203.


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Guerilla war was a special kind of military activity, in which hit-and-disappear tactics to disperse the enemy’s military forces were employed to wear down and gradually defeat the enemy; and

The traditional distinguishing characteristic of the terrorist was his explicit refusal to accept the conventional moral limits that defined military and guerilla action. Because a terrorist knew that others did think that violence should be limited, he exploited the enemy’s vigorous responses to his outrages. The terrorist perpetrated atrocities and manipulated reactions to them.19

Despite these distinctions, there are still many

challenges conceptualizing terrorism20 because the term “had appeared in so many forms and under so many different circumstances that a comprehensive definition was impossible.”21 The meaning and the usage of the word terrorism have, in fact, changed over time that making a consistent definition has proved increasingly elusive.22

Southeast Asia is not immune to the definitional problem

of terrorism. Immediately after 9/11, members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) signed on 5 November, 2001 the Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism (DJACT). However, this Declaration does not provide any clear definition of terrorism other than stating that terrorism is a “direct challenge to the attainment of peace, progress and prosperity of ASEAN.”23 There was even a deliberate attempt on the part of ASEAN not to provide a definition of terrorism because of the presence of Muslim communities in the region

19Ibid., p. 205. Also see David Rapoport, “The Politics of Atrocity” in Yonah Alexander and Seymour Maxwell Finger (eds), Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (New York: John Jay Press, 1977), p. 47. 20Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler, “The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 16, no. 4 (Winter, 2004), pp. 777-794. 21Ibid, p. 777. Also see Walter Laquer, Terrorism (Boston: Little Brown, 1977), p. 5. 22Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 28. 23For more discussions, see Rommel C. Banlaoi, War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia (Quezon City: Rex Book Store International, 2004), pp. 9-16.


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that might perceive any definition as anti-Islamic in the context of the emergence of militant Islam in Southeast Asia.24 Nonetheless, the Agreement on Information Exchange and Establishment of Communication Procedures initially signed by Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines (The Trilateral Agreement) on 7 May, 2002 attempts to define terrorism as:

Any act of violence or threat thereof perpetrated to carry out within the respective territories of the Parties or in the border area of any of the Parties an individual or collective criminal plan with the aim of terrorizing people of threatening to harm them or imperiling their lives, honor, freedoms, security or rights or exposing the environment or any facility or public or private property to hazards or occupying or seizing them, or endangering a national resource, or international facilities, or threatening the stability, territorial integrity, political unity or sovereignty of independent States.25

Based on DJACT, the Trilateral Agreement and other ASEAN declarations related to terrorism, ASEAN reached a milestone in regional counter terrorism when members signed the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism (ACCT) on 13 January, 2007. The ACCT provides a definition based on various UN conventions that criminalize acts of terrorism. (Table 1) However, the ACCT is being criticized because ASEAN does not have yet the necessary institutions needed to enforce the Convention.26

24See Barry Desker, “Islam and Society in Southeast Asia After September 11,” IDSS Working Paper Series, no. 3 (September, 2002); Willem van der Geest, ed., “Mapping Muslim Politics in Southeast Asia After September 11,” The European Institute for Asian Studies Publications, vol. 2, no. 5 (December, 2002); and Harold Crouch, Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, Carmen A. Abubakar and Yang Razali Kassim, “Islam in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Recent Developments,” ISEAS Working Paper Series, no. 1 (January, 2002). 25Cited in Ibid., p. 9. 26International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, “Analysis: ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism” (31 January, 2006) at www.pvtr.org/pdf/Legislative%20Response/ASEAN%20Convention%20on%20Counter%20Terrorism.


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Table 1 UN Conventions’ Response to Various Criminal Acts of

Terrorism in Southeast Asia

a. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, concluded at Montreal on 23 September, 1971;

b. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, adopted in New York on 14 December, 1973;

c. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, adopted in New York on 17 December, 1979;

d. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, adopted in Vienna on 26 October, 1979;

e. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal on 24 February, 1988;

f. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, done at Rome on 10 March, 1988;

g. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, done at Rome on 10 March, 1988;

h. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted in New York on 15 December, 1997;

i. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted in New York on 9 December, 1999;

j. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, adopted in New York on 13 April, 2005;

k. Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, done at Vienna on 8 July, 2005;

l. Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, done at London on 14 October, 2005; and

m. Protocol of 2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, done at London on 14 October, 2005.

Source: “Article II,” ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism, 2007.


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Though ASEAN members already adopted a legal definition of terrorism as articulated in the ASEAN Convention, the scholarly community has little consensus on the definition of terrorism in the region. In Southeast Asia, terrorism has always been associated with domestic armed rebellions and local insurgencies with known deep historical, political, social and economic roots.27 Thus, a “more complete understanding of the terrorism phenomenon therefore requires the examination of terrorism from a more holistic and even historical perspective, in order to arrive at a more in-depth understanding of the complexities of this historical phenomenon, particularly the fundamental motivations or grievances that underlie the use of terrorism.”28 As such, terrorism in Southeast Asia “cannot be viewed in narrow definitional terms nor is it amenable to a set of generalizations, and hence narrow prescriptive countermeasures.”29 How and Where Did Terrorist Threats in Southeast Asia Evolve?

Terrorism in Southeast Asia predated the seminal events

of 9/11. The region has confronted several local armed rebellions, which used terrorism as a favored tactic. Most of these armed rebellions were in the form of communist insurgencies, ethnic conflicts or wars of national liberation.30 In recent years, Southeast Asia has seriously encountered terrorist threats emanating from violent extremist Islamic groups. Several studies have shown that the current terrorist threats in Southeast Asia have evolved from a complex mix of indigenous and external origins that date back to the colonial era.31 From the existing scholarly literature, there are three basic

27Andrew T.H. Tan, “Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia” in Andrew T.H. Tan (ed), A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia (Great Britain and Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., 2007), p. 5. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid., p. 6. 31Ibid. Also see Linell Cady and Sheldon Simon (eds), Religion and Conflicts in South and Southeast Asia: Disrupting Violence (London and New York: Routledge, 2007); David Martin Jones and Mike Lawrence Smith,“From Konfrontasi to Disintegrasi: ASEAN and the Rise of Islamism in Southeast Asia,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 25 (2002), pp. 343-356; S. Yunanto, et. al, Militant Islamic Movements in Indonesia and Southeast Asia (Jakarta: Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, 2003); and Andrew T.H. Tan,


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approaches that attempt to explain the evolution and dynamics of terrorism in the region: the globalist, the regionalist and the nationalist perspectives.32

The globalist or the international terrorism approach

traces the evolution of terrorism in Southeast Asia from the threat emanating from Al-Qaeda.33 This approach regards Al-Qaeda as the cornerstone of any meaningful analysis of terrorist threats in the region. It rests on “Al-Qaeda-centric paradigm” that strongly links terrorism in Southeast Asia with Osama bin Laden who provides the global leadership. The Afghan War of the 1980s was the turning point in the formation of Al-Qaeda’s global network of terror that included Southeast Asia.

Rohan Gunaratna has been recognized as the foremost

exponent of the globalist approach. In his book, Inside Al-Qaeda, Gunaratna pinpoints Al-Qaeda as the determining factor in the emergence of new terrorism in Southeast Asia.34 He regards terrorist groups in Southeast Asia as integral parts of the global network of terror with Al-Qaeda as the hub.35 Maria Ressa may also be considered as a globalist when she highlights the role of Al-Qaeda in her analysis of terrorist threats in Southeast Asia.36 She describes JI as the Al-Qaeda of Southeast Asia indicating her Al-Qaeda centered analysis.37 “Armed Muslim Separatist Rebellion in Southeast Asia: Persistence, Prospects and Implications,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 23, no. 4 (January, 2000), pp. 267-288. 32Carlyle Thayer popularized these three perspectives. See Carlyle Thayer,“New Terrorism in Southeast Asia” in Damien Kingburry (ed), Violence in Between: Conflict and Security in Archipelagic Southeast Asia (Victoria and Singapore: Monash University Press and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), pp. 53-74. 33For a good reference on Al-Qaeda, see Jane Corbin, Al-Qaeda: The Terror Network That Threatens the World (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 2002). 34Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). 35In my various conversations with Rohan Gunaratna from 2005-2008, he underscores the role of Al-Qaeda in understanding terrorist threats in Southeast Asia. 36Maria Ressa, Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al-Qaeda’s Newest Center of Operations in Southeast Asia (New York and London: Free Press, 2003). 37In my conversation with Maria Ressa on 30 May, 2009 in Singapore, she admits that she is a globalist for focusing her analysis on Al-Qaeda.


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From the globalist perspective, in short, the evolution of terrorism in Southeast Asia cannot be fully understood without a full grasp of Al-Qaeda’s origin and global expansion.38 Gunaratna argues that Al-Qaeda’s influence in Southeast Asia spread from the Philippines “where its network is long-standing, well-entrenched and extensive.”39 Through the machinations of Muhammad Jamal Khalifa, Osama bin Laden’s brother-in-law, Al-Qaeda penetrated the region in the mid-1980s using the Philippines as a springboard and logistical center. Gunaratna writes, “After establishing a logistics network in the Philippines from 1988-1993, Al-Qaeda launched Oplan Bojinka in 1994.”40 It is believed that Oplan Bojinka provided the blueprint for 9/11. Ressa echoed this view in her writings.

The regionalist or regional security perspective, on the

other hand, regards the evolution of terrorism in Southeast Asia as part and parcel of the evolution and development of JI. Though JI has established global links with Al-Qaeda in the 1990s, the regionalist approach regards it as “home grown” that pre-dated Al-Qaeda and 9/11. Southeast Asian rebels founded JI long before Al-Qaeda reached the region. JI emerged in Southeast Asia not because of Al-Qaeda’s global plan but in response to regional conditions and local grievances that existed even before Al-Qaeda was formed. In other words, JI, with its vision of Pan-Islamism in Southeast Asia, has evolution and dynamics of its own separate from Al-Qaeda. The regionalist approach in Southeast Asian terrorism studies is therefore JI-oriented rather than Al-Qaeda-centered.

The well-known disciple of regionalist approach is

Zachary Abuza who adopts a more JI-oriented paradigm in grappling with the evolution and development of terrorism in Southeast Asia. In his book, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror, Abuza explains that terrorist groups in Southeast Asia are indeed homegrown but “have effectively

38For excellent discussions of Al-Qaeda’s global expansion, see Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror (London: IB Tauris, 2003). Also see Jane Corbin, Al-Qaeda: The Terror Network that Threatens the World (London and New York: Simon and Schuster and Nation Books, 2002). 39Gunaratna, Inside Al-Qaeda, p. 175. 40Ibid.


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linked up with transnational organizations like Al-Qaeda.”41 The hub of terrorist groups in Southeast Asia is JI and not Al-Qaeda. However, Abuza also carries a globalist tone when he asserts that “JI must be seen as an integral part of Al-Qaeda.”42 Indeed, it was through JI that Al-Qaeda expanded its network in Southeast Asia.43 Understanding terrorism in Southeast Asia, therefore, requires a comprehension of JI origin, ideology and organizational dynamics.44

Finally, the nationalist approach or country studies

perspective is challenging the Al-Qaeda-centric and JI-oriented paradigms in Southeast Asian terrorism studies. It contends that terrorism in Southeast Asia can best be understood by analyzing the underlying domestic conditions and national state failures that provide the fertile environment for the emergence of terrorism. This approach regards terrorism as a symptom of state failure to address the domestic roots of various armed rebellions in the region.

Sydney Jones and Kit Collier45 are staunch advocates of

the nationalist or country studies approach.46 They pay attention 41Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2003), p. 1. 42Zachary Abuza, “Understanding Al-Qaeda and its Network in Southeast Asia” in Kumar Ramakrishna and See Seng Tan (eds), After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies and World Scientific Publishing, Co., Pte. Ltd., 2003), p. 144. 43For more discussions on this topic, see Zachary Abuza, “Tentacles of Terror: Al-Qaeda’s Southeast Asian Network,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 24, no. 3 (December, 2002), pp. 427-465. 44My interactions with Zachary Abuza on April 12-13, 2006 revealed his JI-centered analysis. See International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Threat and Response (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies and the Office of the Coordinator for Counter Terrorism, US Department of State, 12-13 April, 2006). 45My meeting with Kit Collier in March 2009 in Quezon City showed his great interests on country-study approach. 46Sidney Jones is the project director of various studies made by the International Crisis Group (ICG) on terrorism in Southeast Asia. See ICG Website at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm. Also see Sidney Jones, “The Changing Nature of Jemaah Islamiyah,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 59, no. 2 (June, 2005), pp. 169-178. Kit Collier, on the other hand, was also a consultant to the ICG and a research fellow at the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies at the Australian National University. He is regarded as one of Australia’s country studies


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to “local realities, not externally imposed organigrams.”47 Collier, for example, underscores that JI is “not an integral part of Al-Qaeda” but its roots “are thoroughly Indonesian” with the ultimate objective of establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia.48 He also argues that terrorist and insurgent groups in Southeast Asia “resemble bundles of personal associations more than integral corporate bodies.”49 Their ties to Al-Qaeda “are incarnate in individual associations, not bureaucratic flow charts.”50

John T. Sidel may also be categorized in the third

approach when he offers an “alternative” and more “country specific” perspective in analyzing Islamist terrorist threats in Southeast Asia. He vehemently rejects the alarmist views of the globalist and the regionalist for being exaggerated and fundamentally misleading.51 He presents a “more balanced, nuanced, and properly contextualized analysis” of terrorism situation in Southeast Asia by paying attention to local conditions rather than external influence.52 He examines terrorist threats in Southeast Asia in the context of domestic dynamics in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. He further contends that the turn towards terrorist violence by Islamist militants in Southeast Asia must be understood as “a symptom of and reaction to the decline, domestication, and disentanglement from state power of Islamist forces in the region.”53 In his study of Indonesia, he argues that the recent terrorist bombings in

specialists on the Southern Philippines. See Kit Collier, “Dynamics of Muslim Separatism in the Philippines,” in Kingsbury (ed), Violence in Between, pp. 155-174. 47Kit Collier, “Terrorism: Evolving Regional Alliances and State Failure in Mindanao” in Daljit Singh and Lorraine C. Salazar (eds), Southeast Asian Affairs 2006 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), p.27. 48Ibid., p. 33. 49Ibid., p. 34. 50Ibid, p. 33. 51John T. Sidel, The Islamist Threat in Southeast Asia: A Reassessment (Washington DC and Singapore: East West Center Washington and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), p. x. 52Ibid., p. 3. 53Ibid., p. 54.


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Indonesia are not a product of external influences but a result of domestic conditions, a recurring theme in Indonesian history.54

Greg Barton may also belong to the third category of

terrorism scholars in Southeast Asia when he examines JI as a manifestation of radical Islamism in Indonesia.55 Drawing from the research outputs of Sidney Jones, Barton presents the indigenous origins of JI as an Indonesian-based movement that spills-over to neighboring countries in Archipelagic Southeast Asia. He underscores that JI is not simply an imported problem but part of the continuation of the Darul Islam (DI) struggle of the 1950s.56

What are the Manifestations of Terrorism in Southeast Asia?

Terrorism in Southeast Asia has various manifestations because of its historical complexities and current political realities. Andrew T. H. Tan formulated a four-class division of terrorism and insurgency to highlight the complexities of terrorist threats in the region.57 (Table 2)

The first division consists of separatist insurgencies that utilize terrorism as part of their tactics. These separatist groups are marginalized and regarded as victims of political exclusion. They carry the features of long-running civil conflicts that pose great challenge to the legitimacy of existing regimes in the region.

The second division pertains to armed anti-government political opposition groups created to address some deeply-rooted political, economic and social grievances. These groups have “special operation units” that use terrorism to attract political attention.

54John T. Sidel, “It is Not Getting Worse: Terrorism is Declining in Asia,” Global Asia, vol. 2, no. 3 (Winter, 2007), pp. 41-49. 55Greg Barton, Jemaah Islamiyah: Radical Islamism in Indonesia (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2004). 56Ibid., p. 77. 57 Tan, “Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia,” p. 11.


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The third division refers to radical Islamist groups aiming to establish an Islamic State through the violent overthrow of the existing governments in the region. These groups justify the use of terrorism through its violent extremist ideology. Groups belonging to the third category are linked to Al-Qaeda and/or part of what is called the Afghan mujahedeen network.

Finally, the fourth division is largely based in Indonesia.

It pertains to overt and legitimate radical organizations that are sympathetic to radical Islamist groups. Though these groups assert their right to participate in the democratic political process, Tan argues that these groups have the potential to use violence because of their ideological and personal associations with groups involved in terrorist acts.

Table 2 Four Class Divisions of Terrorism in Southeast Asia

Category Groups Country

1. Separatist Insurgencies

Fretilin, Organisasi Papua Merdeka, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka Hmong rebels Karen National Union, Kachin Independence Organization, China National Front, Shan State Army, Rohingya Solidarity Organization Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Abu Sayyaf Group, Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement Pattani United Liberation Organization, Barisan Revolusi Nasional

Indonesia Laos Myanmar Philippines Thailand

2. Armed Anti-Government Political Opposition

Burma Student Democratic Front, National Council Union of Burma

Myanmar


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Groups Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army/National Democratic Front Communist Party of Thailand

Philippines Thailand

3. Radical Islamist Groups

Jemaah Islamiyah Kampulan Majahideen Malaysia Rohingya Solidarity Organization Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Abu Sayyaf Group, Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement Gerakan Majahideen Islam Pattani

Indonesia Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Thailand

4. Overt Radical Organizations

Majelis Muhajideen Indonesia (Laskar Jundullah, Laska Jihad, Front Permbella Islam and Komite Solidaritas Islam) Islamic Studies, Call and Guidance (ISCAG), Darul Hijra Foundation, Fi-Sabilillah Da’wah and Media Foundation (FSDMF)

Indonesia Philippines

Sources: Andrew T.H. Tan, “Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia” in Andrew T.H. Tan (ed), A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia (Great Britain and Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., 2007), pp. 11-13; Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Transnational Islam in the Philippines” in Peter Mandaville, Farish Noor, Alexander Horstmann, Dietrich Reetz, Ali Riaz, Animesh Roul, Noorhadi Hasan, Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, Rommel C. Banlaoi and Joseph C. Liow, Transnational Islam in South and Southeast Asia: Movements, Networks and Conflict Dynamics (Seattle, Washington: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2009), pp. 182-184.


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Mapping Terrorism Cells in Southeast Asia

The US State Department identifies only three groups in Southeast Asia listed as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs): JI (Indonesia), Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG, the Philippines) and the Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples’ Army (CPP/NPA, the Philippines).58

This paper will not cover terrorist organizations

emanating from communist parties and non-Islamic insurgent groups. Analysis is limited to militant or radical Islamic groups accused of terrorist acts: JI and ASG.

Among the listed terrorist groups in Southeast Asia, JI

has established various terrorism cells in the region. It received international notoriety because of its involvement in various terrorist attacks in the region. The well-known attack it perpetrated was the 12 October, 2002 Bali Bombing, considered as “the most devastating terrorist strike in the world since 9/11,” having killed 2002 civilians, most of whom were Australians.59 The 2002 Bali Bombing was, in fact, JI’s Plan B. Its Plan A was the bombing of Western targets in Singapore in December, 2001.60

It also masterminded the 5 August, 2003 car bombing of

JW Marriott Hotel in Jakarta where 11 people died and 150 others injured. The bombing of Australian Embassy in Jakarta on 9 September, 2004, which resulted in the death of 11 Indonesians and wounding of 160 others, was also blamed on JI. On 1 October, 2005, JI bombed Bali once again which killed 20 persons and injured 129 more.

Though JI originated in Indonesia, it has established

networks with groups and sleeper cells in Southeast Asia accused of various terrorist acts. Due to its existing regional networks, it is said to be behind the “Talibanization of Southeast Asia” and as such “has become an important and even key

58US Department of State, “List of Foreign Terrorist Organizations” at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/list/ (8 April, 2008). 59Kumar Ramakrishna and See Seng Tan, “Is Southeast Asia a Terrorist Haven?” in Ramakrishna and Tan, After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia, p. 1. 60For detailed discussions of Plan A, see Ressa, Seeds of Terror, pp. 143-163.


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element of the discourse on terrorism in Southeast Asia.”61 It is closely connected with Islamist extremist groups in Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines and Thailand.

Table 3 shows JI’s regional partners and linkages that

form terrorism cells in Southeast Asia.

Table 3 JI Regional Partners and Linkages in Southeast Asia

Country Terrorism Cells

Indonesia Majilis Mujahidin Indonesia, Laskar Jihad, Laskar Jundulla, GAM, FPI, DI, Jammah NIII, Laskar Mujahidin, Mujahidin KOMPAK, ABB, AMIN and RP11

Malaysia Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia, Al-Muanah

Myanmar Arakan Rohingya National Organization

Philippines Abu Sayyaf Group, Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Misuari Breakaway Group (MBG), Balik Islam/Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement (BI/RSIM)

Thailand Gerakan Mujahidin Pattani Islam

Source: Bilveer Singh, The Talibanization of Southeast Asia: Losing the War on Terror to Islamist Extremists (Connecticut and London: Praeger Security International, 2007), p. 86.

Common among these so-called terrorism cells

associated with JI is a fanatical adherence to a shared ideology called by different scholars as Islamic radicalism, Islamic extremism, Islamic fundamentalism, Islamic revivalism, Islamic renewal, Muslim radicalism, Muslim extremism, radical Islamism, militant Islam and others.62 All these terms have acquired

61Bilveer Singh, The Talibanization of Southeast Asia: Losing the War on Terror to Islamist Extremists (Connecticut and London: Praeger Security International, 2007), p. 51. 62For an excellent discussion on these different labels, see Angel Rabasa, Cheryl Benard, Peter Chalk, C. Christian Fair, Theodore Karasik, Rollie Lal, Ian Lesser and David Thaler, The Muslim World After 9/11 (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 2004). Also see Peter Mandaville, Farish Noor, Alexander Horstmann, Dietrich Reetz, Ali Riaz, Animesh


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pejorative, derogatory and sometimes anti-Muslim meanings in the Western world because they have been associated with political violence and terrorism. There is no doubt, however, that these terms are loosely lumped within the broad universe of political Islam.63

The origin of these terms is often attributed to the

Islamic preaching of Muhammad ibn Abd-al Wahhab, a Muslim scholar who popularized a theology that was later called Wahhabism. Abd-al Wahhab teaches the ‘purification’ of Islam based on Salafi faith. The word ‘Salafi’ means ‘righteous ancestors of Muslims’ in traditional Islamic scholarship. Salafism advocates a return to a Sharia-minded orthodoxy that aims to purify Islam from unwarranted accretions, heresies and distortions.

Thus, Wahhabism and Salafism are theologically

connected. They are systems of belief that are said to have vigorously informed the ‘terrorist acts’ of Osama bin Laden and other radical Muslim personalities. They fight for the jihad, seeking to re-create the Muslim umma and Sharia to build an Islamic community worldwide.64 Wahhabi or Salafi movements are found throughout the Muslim world.65 After 9/11, Islamic movements and organizations adhering to Wahhabism and Salafism, particularly those associated with Al-Qaeda, are labeled inaccurately as terrorists because of their vigorous involvement

Roul, Noorhadi Hasan, Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, Rommel C. Banlaoi and Joseph C. Liow, Transnational Islam in South and Southeast Asia: Movements, Networks and Conflict Dynamics (Seattle, Washington: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2009). For a very useful analysis of major ideological positions in Islam, see Cheryl Benard, Civil Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources and Strategies (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 2003). For a pre-9/11 discussion of the topic, see Dilip Hiro, Islamic Fundamentalism (London: Paladin Grafton Books, 1989); Chandra Muzaffar, Islamic Resurgence: A Global View, Social Issues in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1988); Lionel Caplan (ed), Studies in Religious Fundamentalism (Hongkong: Macmillan Press, 1987); John L. Esposito, Islamic Revivalism in the Muslim World Today (Washington: American Institute for Islamic Affairs, 1985); and G.H. Jansen, Militant Islam (London: Pan Book, Ltd, 1979). 63See Nazih Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World (New York: Routledge, 1991). 64Rabasa, et. al, The Muslim World After 9/11. See also GlobalSecurity.org, ‘Salafi Islam,’ www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/islam-salafi.htm. 65Ibid. Also see Sayyid Abul A’la Maududi, A Short History of the Revivalist Movement in Islam (Lahore: Islamic Publication Ltd., 1981).


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in a series of violent attacks, the largest of which was the 9/11 assaults on the United States.

Bilveer Singh calls the movement behind this Islamic

ideology in Southeast Asia as “Talibanization,” which is a political rather than religious Islamic movement. It refers to the “growing propensity to adopt extremist religious ideological interpretations and practices in Muslim societies, especially in Southeast Asia.”66

Talibanization comes from the word “Taliban,” a violent

extremist militia force based in Kandahar, Afghanistan founded by Mullah Muhammad Omar in September, 2004. The Talibans, which means students or children of Jihad, established an Islamic regime in Afghanistan that promoted rigid interpretation and extreme practice of Islam anchored on Islamic orthodoxy of Sunni Wahhabism and Salafism. This orthodoxy practices intolerance not only towards non-Muslim but also to Muslims who have failed in purifying their Islamic faith. In other words, Talibanization aims for the purification of Islam found in Wahhabi and Salafi faiths. Thus, it has become synonymous with extremism, which currently informs JI ideology.67 Details of this ideology will be discussed in the succeeding sections of this paper. A major terrorist group associated with JI is the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).

Have the Features Changed Over Time?

Since the launching of the Global War on Terrorism

(GWOT) after 9/11, existing terrorist cells in Southeast Asia have been disrupted. Many of the leaders and members of these cells have been neutralized, arrested or convicted. Some underwent “deradicalization” or “rehabilitation” programs to enable them to leave terrorism behind. Others remain at large and are still planning to wreak terrorist havocs.

Before 9/11, governments in Southeast Asia regarded terrorist threats in the region as low-level. Some governments were, in fact, in the utter state of denial on the existence of terrorist cells in their countries because of domestic political considerations. Other governments outside the region even 66Singh, The Talibanization of Southeast Asia, p. 11. 67Ibid., p. 12.


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viewed terrorist threats in Southeast Asia as only local in scope. Though some terrorist activities in the region in the 1980s and 1990s received international media attention, many governments inside and outside the region viewed terrorism as posing no clear and present danger to their countries’ over-all national security interests.68

For the US, for example, Southeast Asia was not the center of terrorist activities considering that prior to 9/11 incidents, the region only recorded a total of 186 international terrorist incidents from 1984-1996 compared to 2,073 attacks in Europe, 1,631 attacks in Latin American, 1,392 attacks in the Middle East and 362 attacks in Africa.69 After 9/11, however, the US radically altered its perceptions of Southeast Asian terrorism when its intelligence agencies unearthed various evidences linking terrorist groups in Southeast Asia with Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda Group.70 The US now views Southeast Asia as the major breeding ground for terrorism that has the capability to wreak havoc not only against America but also against substitute targets in Asia.

Though 9/11 shocked the world, Southeast Asian

governments were cautious in their response against terrorism perpetuated by Muslim extremists considering the significant number of Muslim communities in the region, particularly in Indonesia, with its largest Muslim population in the world; in Malaysia, where Islam is embedded in the Constitution; and in Southern Philippines and Southern Thailand where some Muslim groups are fighting for separatism. In fact, Southeast Asian governments expressed mixed reactions71 on the American-led global campaign against terrorism because of national sensitivities.72

68Banlaoi, War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia, p. 17. 69Ibid. Also see Mohammed Jawhar Hassan, “Terrorism: Southeast Asia’s Response,” PacNet Newsletters, no. 1 (4 January, 2002). 70Reyco Huang, “Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: Evidence and Response,” CDI Terrorism Project (8 February, 2002). 71Sheldon W. Simon, “Mixed Reactions in Southeast Asia to the US War on Terrorism,” Comparative Connections: An E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations (4th Quarter, 2001), p. 1. 72Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Security Cooperation and Conflict in Southeast Asia After 9/11: Constructivism, the ASEAN Way and the War on Terrorism” in Amitav Acharya and Lee


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With increasing hard evidences proving the existence of terrorist cells in the region, political leaders and law enforcement officials took the threat of terrorism more seriously and adopted cautious counter-terrorism responses to surmount the threat. Southeast Asian countries became more circumspect on terrorist threats facing the region when RAND Corporation, a US-based policy think-tank, revealed that between 1968 and 1985, Southeast Asia had recorded only 90 international terrorist attacks. Between 1986 and 2002, the region suffered 194 terrorist attacks, more than double than the previous period.73 Thus, governments in the region paid greater attention on counter terrorism.

One of the milestones in Southeast Asian counter

terrorism drives was the discovery of JI cells in Singapore. In December, 2001, the Singapore Internal Security Department (ISD) arrested 15 persons suspected of planning a series of bomb attacks. Of the 15 persons arrested, 13 were detained for being JI members. The remaining 2 were released. The detention of 13 JI members revealed the plot to bomb water pipelines, radar stations, train stations, the international airport and some government buildings like the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Education.74

In August, 2002, the ISD arrested another 21 persons,

19 of whom were identified as JI members while 2 as members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). According to the Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs, these two major arrests “exposed the most serious direct threat posed by any terrorist organization to Singapore’s security” emanating from JI.75 Since JI operates in Southeast Asia, it also poses a direct threat to regional security.

Lai To (eds), Asia in the New Millennium (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2004), pp. 32-55. 73For more details, see RAND, Data Base of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents at http://www.rand.org/ise/projects/terrorismdatabase <accessed on 10 June, 2009>. 74For detailed discussion on this topic and specific list of targets, see Ministry of Home Affairs, White Paper: The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism (Singapore: Ministry of Home Affairs, 2003). 75Ibid., p. 2.


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Another landmark event in counter terrorism in

Southeast Asia was the 12 October, 2002 Bali Bombings. According to Ambassador Alfonso T. Yuchengco, if 9/11 was for the US and the West, 10/12 was for Indonesia and Southeast Asia.76 From a state of denial, the Bali Bombings “have awakened Southeast Asia to the threat of Islamist terrorism.”77

Since the 2002 Bali Bombings, Southeast Asia has been

involved in a variety of counter terrorism initiatives to combat the terrorist threat confronting the region. These initiatives led to the adoption of various ASEAN declarations and plans of action against terrorism culminating with the signing of the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism in January, 2007. (Table 4)

Table 4

Major ASEAN Declarations and Conventions Against Terrorism After 9/11

Title Year

ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism

5 November, 2001

Joint Communiqué of the Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Terrorism

21 May, 2002

Declaration on Terrorism by the 8th ASEAN Summit

3 November, 2002

Bali Regional Ministerial Meeting on Counter Terrorism

5 February, 2004

ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism 13 January, 2007

Source: ASEAN Secretariat, 2009.

Aside from regionwide collaboration, ASEAN members also pursued bilateral and trilateral cooperation. In fact, ASEAN is viewed as complex web of bilateral relations among ten

76Alfonso Yuchengco, “Islamist Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” Issues and Insights, no. 1-03 (Honolulu: Pacific Forum CSIS, January, 2003), p. 1. 77Ibid.


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Southeast Asian countries. Bilateral meetings of ASEAN heads of states “are perceived to be useful to ASEAN and to its regional objectives of peace, progress and security” including intra-ASEAN collaboration against international terrorism.78 States in ASEAN also have trilateral security arrangements among them like the Agreement on Information Exchange and Establishment of Communication Procedures signed by Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines (later joined by Cambodia and Thailand) and the Trilateral Coordinated Patrol Agreement among Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia (codename MALSINDO) to protect the Straits of Malacca against piracy and terrorism. ASEAN also has existing counter terrorism cooperation measures with its dialogue partners like Australia, China, European Union, India, Japan and the United States.

What are the Multidimensional Causes of Terrorism?

Terrorism in Southeast Asia, and elsewhere in the world, has complex and dynamic underlying causes. Though poverty (economic marginalization) and ignorance (lack of education or illiteracy) have always been identified as its major causes, this view is being challenged by some scholars, as there are countries in the region where poverty and illiteracy abound but terrorist threat is low, if not totally absent. Moreover, the profile of notorious terrorist personalities in Southeast Asia and elsewhere indicated that they were not poor or marginalized in economic sense but rather well-to-do, educated and relatively had a comfortable life.

Thus, pointing at poverty as the root cause of terrorism, though still popular, does not have convincing empirical evidence from a strictly scholarly perspective. In fact, a review of existing evidence offers little reason for optimism that poverty reduction or an increase in educational attainment would meaningfully reduce the threat of international terrorism.79 It is argued that:

78Estrella Solidum, “Bilateral Summitry” in The ASEAN Reader (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992), p. 76. 79Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection? Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 17, no. 4 (Fall, 2003), pp. 119–144.


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Any connection between poverty, education and terrorism is indirect, complicated and probably quite weak. Instead of viewing terrorism as a direct response to low market opportunities or ignorance, we suggest it is more accurately viewed as a response to political conditions and long-standing feelings of indignity and frustration that have little to do with economics.80 Although economic marginalization has not provided

compelling evidence as the major cause of terrorism, governments in Southeast Asia continue to regard poverty as the root cause of terrorist threats. This view is evident from the greater emphasis of ASEAN states to prioritize regional economic integration rather than regional counter terrorism cooperation. While terrorism may have several causes beyond the issue of poverty, there is a strong belief in the region on the need to pursue development intervention and promote socio-economic reforms in order to ensure that the root causes of terrorism and insurgency are adequately addressed.81 A scholarly study asserts that while poverty as the root of terrorism is under question, a global quantitative analysis of relevant factors indicates that the root causes of terrorism are indeed related to poverty and lack of democracy.82

Political exclusion and concomitant state repression also

provide a convincing explanation on the causes of terrorism emanating from Islamist forces in Southeast Asia. This view is gaining adherents among terrorism scholars and experts as this cause is also found throughout the Muslim world. In his study of Islamic violence in the Muslim world, for example, Muhammed Hafez observes:

Muslims become violently militant when they encounter exclusionary states that deny them meaningful access to political institutions and

80Ibid. 81Andrew T.H. Tan, “The New Terrorism: How Southeast Asia Can Counter It?” in Uwe Johannen, Alan Smith and James Gomez (eds), 9/11: September 11 & Political Freedom, Asian Perspectives (Singapore: Select Publishing, Pte., Ltd, 2003), p. 108. 82Timo Kivimäki, “Can Development and Democratization Address the Root Causes of Terrorism in Southeast Asia?” The Pacific Review, vol. 20, no. 1 (March, 2007), pp. 49-73.


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employ indiscriminate repressive policies against their citizens during periods of mass mobilization. Political exclusion and state repression unleash a dynamic of radicalization characterized by exclusive rebel organizations that isolate Islamists from their broader society and foster anti-system ideologies that frame the potentially healthy competition between secularism and Islamism as a mortal struggle between faith and impiety. The cumulative effect of political repression, exclusive organizations and anti-system ideologies is protracted conflicts against secular ruling regimes and ordinary civilians who are perceived as sustaining those regimes.83

Historical factors caused by Western colonialism and the

forcible subjugation of Islam in Southeast Asia have also been identified as causes of current Islamist terrorist threats in the region. John T. Sidel’s alternative approach in understanding Islamist threat in Southeast Asia underscores these historical factors when he writes that the intrusions of the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, British, French and American empires in Southeast Asia “divided Muslims through the erection of state borders and other barriers that divided them administratively” and “reinforced existing linguistic and cultural differences among them.”84 Legacies of Western colonialism created social and political cleavages in a region already marked by diversities.

There is a need to point out that those specific causes of

current Islamist terrorist threats in Southeast Asia vary in every country in the region.

In Indonesia, for example, which is home to the largest

Muslim population in the world, the rise of Islamist terrorism is attributed to the emergence of global jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s and the fall of the Suharto regime in the 1990s. Though Islam in Indonesia is generally peaceful and tolerant, a

83Muhammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), pp. xv-xvi. Quoted in Sidel, The Islamist Threat in Southeast Asia, p. 10. 84Sidel, p. 11.


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militant brand of Islam has penetrated the country through the veterans of the Afghan war who became very active in the country in the Post-Suharto era.85

In the Philippines, on the other hand, radical Muslim

terrorism is traced to the four centuries of struggle of the Bangsamoro people for self-determination.86 The threat emanating from the ASG is also traced to the Afghan war. When Muslim resistant groups from the Philippines sent fighters to Afghanistan, they acquired a violent extremist ideology of Al-Qaeda, which also penetrated Muslim radicals in Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand.

85Noorhaidi Hasan, “Transnational Islam in Indonesia” in Peter Mandaville, Farish Noor, Alexander Horstmann, Dietrich Reetz, Ali Riaz, Animesh Roul, Noorhadi Hasan, Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, Rommel C. Banlaoi and Joseph C. Liow, Transnational Islam in South and Southeast Asia: Movements, Networks and Conflict Dynamics, p. 123. 86See Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Radical Muslim Terrorism in the Philippines” in Andrew T.H. Tan, Handbook on Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia, pp. 194-224.


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CHAPTER II

TERRORIST GROUPS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND MODES OF OPERATION

The US Department of State listed only two foreign terrorist organizations in Southeast Asia with militant Islamic ideology: JI and ASG. Though other academic studies listed other groups, this paper only focuses on the JI and the ASG as case studies since terrorist activities of these two groups generated greater impact on national, regional and global security. The Jemaah Islamiyah a) Evolution

Though many works have already been written about

the JI, there has been no single literature describing its precise origin.87 Most studies traced its origin from the Darul Islam (DI or “House of Islam”), a separatist rebel movement organized in 1948 in Indonesia by Soekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo who is said to have a dream of establishing an Islamic state in the archipelago (Negara Islam Indonesia or NII). The demise of DI in 1962, as result of vigorous counter rebellion operations by the Indonesian military, prompted its remaining members to hide using several Islamic schools as cover.

In 1972, two DI leaders, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu

Bakar Bashir, established the Pesantren al-Mu ’min —an Islamic boarding school in Solo, Central Java. This school continued the propagation of DI ideology, particularly the concept of NII. In 1973, the school was transferred to the village of Ngruki to escape police and military surveillance in Solo. It was in Ngruki

87See for example Greg Barton, Jemaah Islamiyah: Radical Islamism in Indonesia (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2005); Kumar Ramakrishna, Constructing the Jemaah Islamiya Terrorist: A Preliminary Inquiry (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2004); International Crisis Group, Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous (Jakarta and Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2003); and Barry Desker, “Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) Phenomenon in Singapore,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 25, no. 3 (December, 2003), pp. 489-407.


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where the school became popularly known as Pondok Ngruki.88 Due to continued persecution of remaining DI members, particularly during the repressive Suharto Regime, Sungkar and Bashir fled to Malaysia where the original plan to establish JI was said to have taken place. These two DI leaders returned to Indonesia after the fall of Suharto in 1998. However, Sungkar died in 1999 and left the leadership to Bashir. Due to his fanatical adherence to Wahhabi/Salafi ideology of Al-Qaeda, Bashir was regarded as the “Osama bin Laden of Southeast Asia.”89

Sungkar and Bashir were considered as key JI founders.

They were accused by Indonesian intelligence agencies as responsible for establishing JI ties with Al-Qaeda.

However, the evolution of JI as a “terrorist movement”

remains obscure to date. Even JI terminologies vary as it is sometimes called Jama’ah Islamiyah, Ja’maah Islamiyyah, Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyyah, and Jemaah Islamiah.90 Some scholars refer to DI and the Ngruki network as forerunners of JI.91 It may be argued that JI is the reincarnation of DI in the post-9/11 era.

One study reported that Sungkar and Bashir organized

the JI sometime in 1993-1994.92 Another study mentioned that JI was founded in 1996.93 There are, therefore, competing claims on the exact founding of JI. When Sungkar died in 1999, it is argued that Bashir took the helm of JI leadership using the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), a legal Islamic organization, as cover. While heading the MMI, Bashir organized a regional coalition of jihadist groups in Southeast Asia called Rabitatul Mujahidin (RM).

88Peter Chalk and Carl Ungerer, Neighborhood Watch: Evolving Terrorist Threats in Southeast Asia (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2008), pp. 9-10. 89Banlaoi, War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia, p. 24. 90Singh, The Talibanization of Southeast Asia, p. 51. 91See International Crisis Group, Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of “Ngruki Network” in Indonesia (Jakarta and Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2003). 92Chalk and Ungerer, Neighborhood Watch: Evolving Terrorist Threats in Southeast Asia, p. 8. 93Hasan, “Transnational Islam in Indonesia,” p. 128.


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Among scholars writing on JI, Elena Pavlova provided the most accurate description of the origin of the group. She wrote that JI was founded on 1 January, 1993 as result of factionalism within DI.94 Its first recorded terrorist attack was the bombing of Medan church on 28 May, 2000. Its involvement in terrorist activities prompted Bashir to resign as Amir in 2000. Abu Rusdan, who believed that JI should wage armed Jihad, took over. He masterminded the Medan church bombing in 2000, supported by Hambali, Azahari and Noordin Top who all endorsed JI’s terrorist operations.95 Abu Rusdan was eventually replaced by Abu Dujana.96

The Internal Security Department (ISD) of Singapore

discovered the existence of JI in Southeast Asia only after 9/11 with the arrest of 15 Muslim militants in December, 2001 and the arrest of 21 others in August, 2002. These two major arrests yielded significant information on the JI and its regional network. This information is found in Singapore White Paper on JI.97 It has been argued that the Singapore White Paper “missed many other important developments that eventually led the DI elements” to establish the JI.98

b) Organizational Structure

There is scholarly difficulty in describing the organizational structure of JI being a clandestine organization. Its known organization structure is based on the Singapore White Paper. The discovery of a JI document entitled “The General Guide for the Struggle of Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyah Pedoman Umum Perjuangan-Al-Jama-ah Al-Islamiya” (PUPJI) also gave insightful information on the origin, organization and ideology of JI.

94Elena Pavlova, “Jemaah Islamiah According to PUPJI,” in Tan, Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia, p. 76. 95Ibid., p. 77. 96Zachary Abuza, “Abu Dujana: Jemaah Islamiyah's New Al-Qaeda Linked Leader,” Terrorism Focus, vol., 3, issue 13 (4 April, 2006), p. 2. 97Ministry of Home Affairs, The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism, pp. 3-11. 98Singh, The Talibanization of Southeast Asia, p. 62.


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The Singapore White Paper and PUPJI state that JI is headed by an Amir who is guided by the members of Regional Shura or the Regional Consultative Council. Below the Regional Shura are four Mantiqis spanning the whole archipelagic Southeast Asia including Australia and Southern Thailand, to wit:

1. First Mantiqi (M1) based in Malaysia, Singapore and

Southern Thailand; 2. Second Mantiqi (M2) based in the whole of Indonesia

(except Sulawesi and Kalimantan) particularly in Solo and Central Java;

3. Third Mantiqi (M3) based in Southern Philippines (particularly in Maguindanao), Brunei, Indonesia (particularly Sulawesi and Kalimantan) and Malaysia (particularly in Borneo, Sabah); and

4. Fourth Mantiqi (M4) based in Irian Jaya and Australia.

Figure 2 depicts the JI Mantiqi structure based on the interrogation of JI personalities arrested and detained by Singaporean authorities:

Figure 2

Mantiqi Structure of Jemaah Islamiyah

M1 - MalaysiaSingaporeSouthern Thailand

M2- SoloCentral JavaWhole of Indonesia except Sulawesi and Kalimantan

M3- BruneiEast Malaysian States of Sarawak and SabahKalimantan and Sulawesi, IndonesiaSouthern Philippines

M4- Irian JayaAustralia

MANTIQI STUCTURE OF JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH

Sources: Various police and intelligence briefings, 2009.


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It is interesting to note that the Manitiqi structure of JI coincides with JI’s idea of Islamic State in Southeast Asia. Each Mantiqi, divided into different wakalahs or branches, also has its own consultative council called Majilis Shura. Figure 3 shows the organizational structure of JI as described in the Singapore White Paper. This organizational structure was adopted from a Hezbollah model of social organization “in which most of the group's activities are overt charitable work and provision of social services even as a component of the organization clandestinely pursues terrorism.”99

Figure 3 Organizational Structure of Jemaah Islamiyah

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs, The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism, p. 10.

Recent discoveries, however, have indicated that the JI’s Mantiqi structure has been dissolved as a result of various police and military operations against the group. According to the revelations of Zarkasih and Abu Dujana, who were arrested in Indonesia in March and June, 2007, respectively, JI is now organized into the following functional groups:

Dakwah (Islamic proselytization and outreach)

99Zachary Abuza, “Jemaah Islamiyah Adopts the Hezbollah Model Assessing Hezbollah's Influence,” Middle East Quarterly (Winter, 2009), pp. 15-26.

AMIR

MANTIQI 1

REGIONAL SHURA

MANTIQI 4 MANTIQI 2 MANTIQI 3

Majilis Shura Majilis Shura Majilis Shura Majilis Shura

Wakalahs Wakalahs Wakalahs Wakalahs


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Education Logistics or Economics Information or Media Military Affairs100

At present, JI has two major factions: the structured

faction, also known as the mainstream group and the unstructured faction, otherwise known as the “bombing” group. The structured faction has concentrated on ideological outreach, proselytization and recruitment. Thus, the structured faction is also called the Propagation Group or the “trainors.” The unstructured faction, on the other hand, remains involved in bomb-making operations, thus members are called the “bombers.” Figure 4 presents the two JI factions based on the revelations of arrested JIs in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.

Figure 4

Two Major Factions of Jemaah Islamiyah

Sources: Present JI Structure and Activities (Intelligence Briefing, National Counter Terrorism Action Group, Philippines, 2008) and Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Threat and Response (Report of an international conference organized by the Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies and the US Department of Defense Office of the Coordinator for Counter Terrorism, 12-13 April, 2006).

100National Counter Terrorism Action Group, “Present JI Structures and Activities” (Briefing Manuscript, December, 2008), p. 2.

Jemaah Islamiyah

Structured JI

Emphasizes Islamic propagation

Engages in military education and training of members

Rejects violence against non-combatants

Unstructured JI

Engages in bombing operations

Emphasizes the need for violence

Advocates extreme actions against enemies of Islam


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c) Political/Ideological Adherence

JI ideology is based on Wahhabi or Salafi Islam, which believes in the concept of Islamic state and the implementation of Sharia. Informed by Wahhabi/Salafi ideology, JI aims to establish an Archipelagic Islamic State in Southeast Asia called Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara, which connects the four JI Mantiqis (Figure 5). Maria Ressa calls Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara as the realization of the JI dream of the Islamic Caliphate of Southeast Asia.101

Figure 5 Dream Map of Daulah Islamiya Nusantara

Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara

Source: Central Intelligence Agency Fact Book, 2004.

Based on the idea of an Islamic state in Southeast Asia, JI adopted 10 major ideological principles in which all of its activities are said to be based:

1. Our aim is to seek Allah’s pleasures in the ways prescribed

by him and his messenger; 2. Our Aqidah (belief) is based on the Aqidah of the Sunnis

subscribed by the Salafus Solih (Pious predecessors); 101Ressa, Seeds of Terror, pp. 124-142.


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3. Our understanding of Islam is comprehensive based on the understanding of Salafus Solih;

4. Our objective is to make man submit to Allah only by resorting to Khalifah (Caliphate) on earth;

5. Our path is Imam (faith), Hijrah (migration), and Jihad Fie Sabilillah (Jihad in the cause of Allah);

6. Our resources are: knowledge and taqwa (piety), confidence and tawakkal (resign to the will of Allah), thankful and perseverance, leading zuhud (renunciation of worldly life and pleasures) and giving priority to the hereafter, and Jihad Fie Sabilillah and martyrdom;

7. Our love is for Allah, the messenger and the faithful; 8. Our enemies are Satan and evil men; 9. Our Jama’ah is bound by unanimity of objective, Aqidah and

understanding of Islam; and 10. Our practice of Islam is pure and total starting from the

Jama’ah followed by Daulah and Khilafah.102

Abdullah Sungkar, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Hambali, Abu Jibril, Mukhlas, Dulmatin, Omar Patek, Zulkarnean and Dujana are known key JI ideologues.103 All of them are avid disciples of Wahhabi/Salafi Islam, which is advocating for the purification of Islamic faith not only in Southeast Asia but also in the entire world. Thus, JI ideology is closely connected with the global jihadist ideology of Al-Qaeda aiming to establish an Islamic state worldwide.

The main document articulating JI ideology is the PUPJI

or the General Guide for the Struggle of JI.104 Believed to be written in the early 1990s, PUPJI reveals JI desire to establish a puritanical Islamic organization in Southeast Asia. Issued by JI’s Central Executive Council, the PUPJI urges its members to wage armed Jihad against the infidels in order to realize their vision of creating a pan-regional Islamic caliphate in Southeast Asia.

Scholars analyzing the ideology of JI contend that JI’s

philosophical and religious beliefs are hallmarks of Al-Qaedaism,

102Quoted in Singh, Talibanization of Southeast Asia, p. 73. 103Ibid, p. 76. 104Elena Pavlova, “From Counter-Society to Counter-State: Jemaah Islamiya According to PUPJI,” Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Working Paper, no. 117 (14 November, 2006), pp. 15-36.


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a politico-religious thought preaching Jihad as an obligation of each capable individual Muslim.105 Al-Qaedaism is derived from the Islamic religious interpretations of Abdullah Azzam, a famous Palestinian Islamic scholar regarded as the mentor of Osama bin Laden. Azzam wrote a fatwa (religious proclamation) entitled Defense of the Muslim Land where he urged all Muslims in the world to wage Jihad against the enemies of Islam.106 Azzam also wrote Join the Caravan to explain the following reasons for Jihad:

In order that the Disbelievers do not dominate Due to the scarcity of men Fear of Hell-fire Fulfilling the duty of Jihad and responding to the call of the

Lord Following in the footsteps of the Pious Predecessors Establishing a solid foundation as a base for Islam Protecting those who are oppressed in the land Hoping for martyrdom A shield for the Ummah, and a means for lifting disgrace off

them Protecting the dignity of the Ummah, and repelling the

conspiracy of its enemies Preservation of the earth, and protection from corruption Security of Islamic places of worship Protection of the Ummah from punishment, disfiguration and

displacement Prosperity of the Ummah and surplus of its resources Jihad is the highest peak of Islam Jihad is the most excellent form of worship and by means of

it the Muslim can reach the highest of ranks107

105Edwin Bakker and Leen Boer, The Evolution of Al-Qaedaism: Ideology, Terrorists and Appeal (Amsterdam: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2007), p. 25. 106Abdullah Azzam, Defense of the Muslim Land at http://www.religioscope.com/info/doc/jihad/azzam_defence_1_table.htm <accessed on 11 June, 2009>. 107Abdullah Azzam, Join the Caravan at http://www.religioscope.com/info/doc/jihad/azzam_caravan_3_part1.htm


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d) Links with Foreign Terrorist Organizations JI has established strong linkages with various terrorist

cells in Southeast Asia particularly in Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore. JI also had close links with Al-Qaeda, which regarded Southeast Asia as one of the major areas of operations.

JI-Al-Qaeda Link. JI is widely known for its strong

linkage with Al-Qaeda. While the regionalist claims that JI is a reincarnation of DI that originates in Indonesia, the globalist contends that JI is the creation of Al-Qaeda. There is even a view that JI is an appendage of Al-Qaeda. As such, JI members think and act like Al-Qaeda and they shared Al-Qaeda’s vision of a global jihad.108 It is also argued that JI is an Al-Qaeda affiliate terrorist group in Southeast Asia, to wit:

Jemaah Islamiyah had become an Al-Qaeda affiliate, receiving financial and material support from the group. Several top Jemaah Islamiyah operatives even received instruction in Afghan training camps. Soon after its founding, Jemaah Islamiyah became an Al-Qaeda affiliate.109

JI links with Al-Qaeda were forged following the

meeting between Sungkar and Bin Laden in 1993. The key link that strongly bound JI and Al-Qaeda was Riduan Ismuddin, more known in the intelligence community as Hambali, an Afghan war veteran who assisted Baasyir in various JI terrorist activities. Hambali was the operation commander of JI while serving as the logistical coordinator of Al-Qaeda’s terrorist operations in Southeast Asia.

Police investigators claimed that Hambali organized

travel itineraries and accommodations for two of the 9/11 hijackers. He was also a major suspect in the bombing of the

108Rohan Gunaratna, “Ideology in Terrorism and Counter Terrorism: Lessons from Combating Al-Qaeda and Al Jemaah Al Islamiyah in Southeast Asia” in Abdul Halim Bin Kader (compiler), Fighting Terrorism: Preventing the Radicalization of Youth in a Secular and Globalized World (Singapore: Singapore Malay Youth Library Association, 2007), p. 69. 109Abuza, “Jemaah Islamiyah Adopts the Hezbollah Model Assessing Hezbollah's Influence,” p. 15.


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USS Cole in Yemen.110 Investigators also revealed that Hambali organized most of the JI’s terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia. As the chief operative of terrorist network in Southeast Asia, Hambali planned a coalition of Islamic extremist groups with roots in at least five Southeast Asian countries to transform their separate local struggles into a systematic regional campaign for the establishment of a single Islamic state in the region.111

JI and Al-Qaeda have overlapping agendas. They even

shared their members in Southeast Asia. As such, they have a very symbiotic relationship. The US-based Congressional Research Service (CRS) states that JI and Al-Qaeda have shared training camps in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Mindanao.112 A CRS study observes:

Though most of JI’s funding appears to have come from local sources, Al-Qaeda has provided JI with financial support. They shared personnel, such as when JI sent an operative with scientific expertise to Afghanistan to try to develop an anthrax program for Al-Qaeda. The two networks have jointly planned operations — including the September 11 attacks — and reportedly have conducted attacks in Southeast Asia jointly.113 JI Cell in Malaysia. It is reported that JI cell in

Malaysia was the largest in Southeast Asia with an estimated 200 members during the 9/11 incident. Abu Hanifah and Faiz bin Abu Bakar Bafana were known leaders of Malaysian JI cell. JI worked very closely with Kampulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) 110“Militant Leader Met Terrorists in Selangor, “Strait Times (12 January, 2002), p. 23. For detailed discussions, also see very good press summary at “Jemaah Islamiaj (JI)” in Virtual Information Center Press Summary: Special Report, Impact and Implications of Bali Summit at http://www.vicnfo.org/RegionsTop.nsf/81e4712fc4dc16ef8a25699f00062d91/e09ae7b7a63c20020a256c55001a0b8a?OpenDocument <accessed on 22 October, 2002>. 111Alan Sipress and Ellen Nakashima, “Militant Alliance in Asia Is Said to Seek Regional Islamic State,” Washington Post Foreign Service, (20 September, 2002), p. 16. 112Mark Manyin, Emma Chanlet-Avery, Richard Chronin, Larry Niksch and Bruce Vagn, Terrorism in Southeast Asia (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2004), p. 6. 113Ibid.


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founded in 12 October, 1995 by Zainon Ismail, an Afghan War veteran. KMM’s main conduit with JI was Abu Jibril, regarded as KMM’s spiritual leader. In fact, KMM and JI membership overlapped. JI cell in Malaysia was responsible for establishing JI cell in Australia.114

JI-MILF-ASG Links in the Philippines. JI cell in the

Philippines was considered to be the smallest in Southeast Asia numbering not more than 100 members on 9/11. As of May, 2009, not more than 30 JI members in the Philippines were identified by law enforcement agencies.

JI established links with Islamic groups in the Philippines

known for some terrorist acts: the ASG and the MILF. JI links with ASG will be discussed in the next section of this paper.

Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi was identified as JI’s liaison

with the MILF. Al-Ghozi went to MILF headquarters in Camp Abu Bakar in December, 1996 to train MILF and JI operatives in bomb-making.115 Philippine Police authorities arrested Al-Ghozi on charges of illegal possession of explosives just three hours prior to his scheduled flight to Bangkok on 15 January, 2002.

In July, 2003, Al-Ghozi escaped from his prison cell in

Manila. Through intensified manhunt and joint military-police operations, he was killed in a shootout in Mindanao on 12 October, 2003, a date coinciding with the first year anniversary of the 2002 Bali Bombing.

MILF leader, Eid Kabalu, said that the MILF-JI link is a

recycled allegation and a black propaganda lodged against their organization. An MILF ideologue even underscored that the JI-MILF-ASG links are government ploys to justify the label of MILF as a terrorist organization.116

The International Crisis Group (ICG) based in Brussels

released a report describing this so-called link. The ICG states, ‘While the MILF leadership continues to deny any ties, all

114Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, p. 136. 115Ibid., p. 137. 116Salah Jubair, The Long Road to Peace: Inside the GRP-MILF Peace Process (Cotabato City: Institute of Bangsamoro Studies, 2007), p. 61.


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evidence points to operational and training links. What is uncertain is whether top leaders are aware of the activity and are unwilling to admit it.’117 The MILF even earmarked a training camp, called Camp Hodeiba, for JI.118 Constructed in 1994, JI reportedly used Camp Hodeiba to train MILF members in urban terrorism, particularly in bomb making. Nassir Abbas, an Indonesian member of JI, also admitted that he went to MILF Camp Abu Bakar in order to set-up Mantiqi 3 in the Philippines and to train MILF fighters.

JI Cell in Singapore. JI cell in Singapore was headed

by Ibrahim bin Maidin who underwent Jihad training in Afghanistan in 1993. He was assisted by Mas Salamat Kastari, regarded as JI’s operational leader in Singapore. The cell played a vital role in fund-raising of Al-Qaeda operatives in Southeast Asia.

Members of this cell had either participated in the

Afghan War or had received training in Al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan.119 Some of them were blood relatives while others had familial relations with JI members in Malaysia and Indonesia.120 It was in Singapore where JI caught worldwide attention through the uncovering in December, 2001 of a terror plot to bomb several targets like the US Navy vessels docked at the Changi Naval Base, the Singapore Ministry of Defense office, the British and Australian High Commissions offices, American and Israeli Embassies, and critical infrastructures like subways and pipelines. e) Terrorist Activities Targets and Victims

JI is regarded as the most notorious terrorist organization in Southeast Asia with regionwide reach. Its terrorist operations and activities were not only limited in Indonesia but also in countries in Southeast Asia, particularly in areas under JI’s Mantiqi structure. JI, particularly the

117International Crisis Group “Southern Philippine Backgrounder: Terrorism and the Peace Process,” ICG Asia Report, no. 8, (13 July, 2004), p. i. 118Ressa, Seeds of Terror, p. 7. 119Desker, “The Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) Phenomenon in Singapore,” p. 501. 120Ibid., p. 502.


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unstructured faction, endorses the targeting of civilians who are believed to be enemies of Islam. Since 2000, JI has been involved in various terrorist attacks. It was responsible for the following terrorist activities:

An assassination attempt of Leonides Caday, Philippine

Ambassador to Indonesia, on 1 August, 2000 using an Improvised Explosive Device (IED). The incident resulted in the killing of two people and injury of 21 others, including Ambassador Caday;

Christmas Eve Bombings on 24 December, 2000 that involved a series of coordinated bombings of churches in Jakarta and eight other cities. These bombings killed 18 people and injured many others;

The Rizal Day Bombing on 30 December, 2000 in various areas of Metro Manila. The Rizal Day Bombing led to the death of 21 victims and injury of more than 100 persons;

The Kidapawan Bombing in the Southern Philippines on 10 October, 2002 which killed six people and injured 24 others;

The Bali Bombing on 12 October, 2002, which as stated earlier, resulted in the death of more than 200 persons and injury of 300 victims;

The JW Marriott Hotel Bombing in Jakarta on 5 August, 2003. It killed 12 persons and injured more than 150 others;

The Australia Embassy Bombing in Jakarta on 9 September, 2004. It killed 9 people and injured around 150 others; and

The Second Bali Bombing on 1 October, 2005 resulting in the death of 20 persons and injury of 129 others.

Targets of JI’s terrorist activities, therefore, were critical

infrastructures like embassies, hotels and beach resorts. Most of the victims were civilians, both locals and foreigners. In the case of the 2002 Bali Bombing, most of the victims were Australians.


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The Abu Sayyaf Group (or Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyyah)121 a) Evolution

Though it is widely known that Ustadz Abdurajak Janjalani founded the ASG, there is no uniform account of its exact origin being a clandestine organization like the JI. Based on the various documents of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Department of National Defense (DND), the formation of the ASG could be traced to the disgruntled members of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) over the dormant secessionist movement in the late 1970s.122 The late Khadaffy Janjalani, ASG’s second Amir, claimed that the group was officially founded in 1993 with the name Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyyah (AHAI).123

Media reports said that the military formed the ASG in

early 1990s to penetrate the ranks of Muslim radicals in the Southern Philippines. The ASG was said to have acted as an agent provocateur of the AFP.124 Edwin Angles (a.k.a. Ibrahim

121This part of the study is an updated version of various works of Rommel Banlaoi on the ASG. See Rommel C. Banlaoi, Al-Harakatul Al Islamiyyah: Essays on the Abu Sayyaf Group revised and updated edition (Quezon City: Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research, 2009). Also see Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Leadership Dynamics in Terrorist Organizations in Southeast Asia: The Abu Sayyaf Case” in John T. Hanley, Kongdan Oh Hassig and Caroline F. Ziemke, eds., Proceedings of the International Symposium on the Dynamics and Structures of Terrorist Threats in Southeast Asia (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2005); Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Abu Sayyaf Threat,” Naval War College Review, vol. 58, no. 4 (Autumn, 2005), pp. 63-80; Rommel C. Banlaoi, “The Abu Sayyaf Group: From Mere Banditry to Genuine Terrorism” in Daljit Singh and Lorraine Salazar (eds), Southeast Asian Affairs 2006 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), pp. 227-246; and Rommel C. Banlaoi, “The Abu Sayyaf Group: Threat of Maritime Piracy and Terrorism” in Peter Lehr (ed), Violence at Sea: Piracy at the Age of Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 121-138. 122See for example Department of National Defense, Info Kit on the Abu Sayyaf Group (Presented before the hearing of the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security at the Philippine Senate, Pasay City on 30 August, 2001); and Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Knowing the Terrorists: The Abu Sayyaf Study (Quezon City: General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, 2002). 123Khadaffy Janjalani, “A Brief History of the Al-Harakatul Islamiyyah” at http:www.geocities.com/ghrabah101. 124See Eusaquito P. Manalo, Philippine Response to Terrorism: The Abu Sayyaf Group (MA Thesis: Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, California, December 2004), p. 3 and Mark Turner, “The Management of Violence in a Conflict Organization: The Case of the Abu Sayyaf,” Public Organization Review, vol. 3, no. 4 (December, 2003), p. 394.


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Yakub), suspected to be Janjalani’s co-founder of the ASG, was disclosed as the deep cover agent of the military and the police intelligence units.125 Some sources revealed that the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA) facilitated the establishment of the ASG.126 A MNLF leader in Basilan even confessed that the ASG enjoyed the support of the military assigned in the area.127 The International Peace Mission that went to Basilan on 23-27 March, 2002 found that there were “consistent credible reports that the military and the provincial government are coddling the Abu Sayyaf.”128

The AFP, the DND and NICA, though, denied all these

allegations. ASG leaders even argued that the group was a creation of the military. Abu Abdu Said, then known as the ASG Secretary General, issued on 18 November, 1994 an important document entitled “A Voice of Truth” to describe the origin of the ASG. In this document, the ASG strongly denied that it was created by the military. It argued that the ASG was a radical movement aiming to pursue the establishment of an Islamic State in the Southern Philippines.

The military establishment said that in 1990, Janjalani

formed the Mujahideed Commando Freedom Fighters (MCFF) to wage jihad against the Philippine government. The Philippine military regarded the MCFF as the forerunner of the ASG. When the MCFF attracted some “hard core” followers in Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Zamboanga, it was later called the ASG. According to Noor Muog, one of the key leaders of the ASG now working with the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research (PIPVTR), an independent terrorism think

125Dorian Zumel Sicat, “Transcript of Interview with Elmina Abdul, widow to Edwin Angeles” (10 March, 2002) at http://www.okcbombing.org/News%20Articles/deathbed_confession.htm <accessed 14 November, 2005>. 126Mirian Coronel Ferrer, (ed), Peace Matters: A Philippine Peace Compedium (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies, 1997), p. 218. 127Marites D. Vitug and Glenda M. Gloria, Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao (Quezon City: Ateneo Center for Social Policy and Public Affairs, Institute for Popular Democracy and Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 2000), p. 217. 128For a complete copy of the report, see Basilan: The Next Afghanistan? (Report of the International Peace Mission to Basilan, Philippines, 23-27 March, 2002) at http://www.bwf.org/pamayanan/peacemission.html <accessed on 30 August, 2004>.


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tank in the Philippines, the MCFF was a misnomer. The forerunner of the ASG was the Jamaa Tableegh, an Islamic propagation group established in Basilan in the early 1980s by Abdurajak Janjalani. This group conducted seminars, symposia and small-group discussions to propagate Islam. It was also through this group where Abdurajak delivered some of his Islamic discourses. Due to the charismatic lectures of Abdurajak, the Jamaa Tableegh gained popularity not only in Basilan but also in Zamboanga and Jolo.129 The involvement of some of its followers in anti-government rallies prompted the military to put the group under surveillance. Key followers of Jamaa Tableegh formed the nucleus of the ASG, which Abdurajak Janjalani initially called AHAI or the Islamic Movement.

A recent study states that the ASG first emerged in

1989.130 Based on existing records of the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP), Janjalani renamed the ASG as AHAI in 1994 to receive international funding and support.

Though Janjalani was a known mujahedeen by its

followers, his reputation of being a veteran of Afghan War is now being challenged. There is no evidence showing that he actually fought in the Afghan War. There was no doubt, however, that he was trained in Afghanistan. He was described as a charismatic and serious Muslim scholar who ironically attended high school in Claret College, a Catholic-run school in the Basilan capital of Isabela. He also received a very good Islamic education in Saudi Arabia in 1981 and was sent to Ummu I-Qura in Mecca where he seriously studied Islamic jurisprudence for almost three years.131 He was later attracted deeply to the concept of jihad when he conscientiously studied in Pakistan. Heavily armed with Islamic thoughts, Janjalani went back to his homeland in Basilan in 1984 to preach in various mosques.

129Abu Hamdie, “The Abu Sayyaf Group” (undated and unpublished manuscript). 130Eusaquito P. Manalo, Philippine Response to Terrorism: The Abu Sayyaf Group (MA Thesis: Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, California, December, 2004). p. 31. 131Gloria, p. 2.


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While formally establishing the ASG, Janjalani became an avid preacher to limited audiences in Santa Barbara madrassah in Zamboanga City in the early 1990s. During his preaching, he released different theological statements and public proclamations revealing his deep grasp of Islamic religion, particularly the Wahhabi Islamic theology. Wahhabism brands other Muslim sects as heretical. He delivered at least eight discourses or Khutbah within a radical framework based on the Quranic concept of Jihad Fi-Sabil-lillah (the fighting and dying for the cause of Islam).132

To advance his fanatical belief, Janjalani convinced some

Muslim leaders in Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga City and General Santos City to join the Juma’a Abu Sayyap movement, now rendered in English as the ASG. Most of his recruits were disgruntled members of the MNLF and the MILF. When Janjalani attended an Islamic course in Tripoli, Libya in 1987, he met like-minded Muslim Filipino students who eventually helped Janjalani to form the ASG. These students had common grievances against the Philippine government based in Manila and against “heretic” leadership of the MNLF and the MILF. Many scholars and journalists mistranslated ASG to mean “bearer of the sword.”133 It really means in Arabic, “Father of the Swordsman.”134

b) Organizational Structure

When Abdurajak Janjalani formed the ASG, his original

vision was to form a highly organized, systematic and disciplined organization of fanatical secessionist Islamic fighters in the Southern Philippines. Janjalani recruited younger and more passionate Muslim leaders who studied Islamic theology in Saudi Arabia, Libya, Pakistan and Egypt. These young Muslim leaders had common remorse against the MNLF, which entered into peace agreement with the Philippine government in 1996. These leaders also shared common anger against the Philippine government based in Manila.

132Tan, “The Juma’a Abu Sayyap: A Brief Assessment of its Origin, Objectives, Ideology and Method of Struggle,” p. 3. 133See for example, Turbiville, Jr., pp. 38-47. 134Jose Torres, Jr., Into the Mountain: Hostages by the Abu Sayyaf (Quezon City: Claretian Publications, 2001), p. 35.


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To achieve his vision of a truly organized Muslim resistant group in the Philippines, he made a detailed organization of the ASG.135 The Islamic Executive Council (IEC) was composed of fifteen Amirs. He chaired the IEC to serve as the main planning and execution body of ASG. Under the IEC were two special committees. The first committee was the Jamiatul Al-Islamia Revolutionary Tabligh Group in charged of fund raising and Islamic education. The second committee was the Al-Misuaratt Khutbah Committee in charged of agitation and propaganda activities.136

The ASG also established a military arm called

Mujahidden Al-Sharifullah whose members came predominantly from disgruntled members of MNLF and the MILF. This military arm had three main units to carry out all terrorist activities of the ASG: the Demolition Team, the Mobile Force Team and the Campaign Propaganda Team. The Demolition Team composed mostly of trained fighters, had the capability to manufacture its own mines and explosives used in the bombing operations of the group. The Mobile Force Team - composed mostly of affiliates of radio clubs, traders, businessmen, shippers and professionals – was in charged of collaboration and coordination activities of the ASG. The Campaign Propaganda Team – composed of professionals, students and businessmen – was in charged of gathering vital information necessary to carry out the mission of Mujahidden Al-Sharifullah.137

Figure 6 is the organizational structure of the ASG as

originally envisioned by Janjalani.

135Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, J3, Knowing the Terrorists: The Abu Sayyaf Study (Quezon City: Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, undated). 136To know more about the strategy of the ASG, see Office of the Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Field Handout: Doctrinal Extract for the Abu Sayyaf Group (Headquarters of the Philippine Marine Corps, 21 January, 2002). 137Ibid. Also based on various intelligence briefings obtained by the author.


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Figure 6 ASG Organization Envisioned by Abdurajak Janjalani

Fund raising Agitation Islamic propagation Propaganda Source: Armed Forces of the Philippines, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, J3 (2002).

However, the original organizational set-up of ASG was

short-lived. When the combined forces of the Philippine police and the military killed Janjalani in a bloody encounter in December, 1998 in Lamitan, Basilan, the ASG suffered a severe leadership vacuum. This led to the discontent of some of its original members. The organization set-up by Janjalani crumbled rapidly with him. The IEC headed by him also suffered an untimely demise. With no overall Amir at the helm of the organization, the group became a mere network of various armed groups with their own respective Amirs commanding their own respective loyal followers operating mainly in Sulu, Basilan and Tawi-Tawi.

With the death of Janjalani, remaining leaders, however,

reluctantly selected Khadaffy Janjalani, a younger brother, as his successor in July, 1999. The ASG under the younger Janjalani had lost its original organization set-up and Islamic theological zeal. Unlike the older Janjalani, the younger Janjalani did not have the theological passion of his brother. Lacking strong ideological guide, most of its members resorted to banditry, piracy, kidnap-for-ransom and other terrorist activities. The ASG was also heavily factionalized. Khadaffy Janjalani attempted to revive the Islamist agenda of the ASG. His confirmed death in January, 2007 aborted his plan.

ISLAMIC EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

Jamiatul Al-Islamia Revolutionary Tabligh Group

Al-Misuaratt Khutbah

Committee

Mujahidden Al-Sharifullah


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According to various AFP reports, there are two major factions of the ASG operating independently in two major areas in the Southern Philippines: Basilan and Sulu. Khadaffy Janjalani, also known as Commander Moktar, used to head the Basilan-based ASG. Galib Andang, otherwise known as Commander Robot, headed the Sulu-based ASG. When these two leaders died, they were replaced by remaining ASG leaders. At present, the Sulu faction is believed to be headed by Radullan Sahiron while the Basilan faction is believed to be headed by Kaier Mundos. There is also a reported faction in Zamboanga City engaged in covert operations.

There is a need to underscore that the ASG is not a

homogenous organization. Rather, it is a very loose coalition of many groups of radical Muslim leaders and bandits commanding their own loyal followers in the Southern Philippines. These groups have mixed objectives from Islamic fundamentalism to mere banditry. Members of these groups pay allegiance mostly to their respective leaders rather than to ASG doctrines. Not all groups are truly committed to the idea of a separate Islamic state in the Southern Philippines, though there is no doubt that some groups are really committed to the cause. Some Muslim bandit groups in the Southern Philippines want to be associated with the ASG for prestige, political expediency and economic gains. The dynamics of these groups shares common feature: they are highly personalistic rather than ideological groups of Muslim radicals.

Due to the intensified military campaigns of the

Philippine government, some factions of the ASG were dismantled as a result of the capture, neutralization or death of the leaders. Based on intelligence reports, the ASG strength has been reduced to 400 as of the second quarter of 2009 (Figure 7).


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Figure 7 Strength of the ASG, 2000-2008

383452

510

420

480

460

1,270

400

800

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Source: Armed Forces of the Philippines, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, February, 2009.

According to the Department of National Defense (DND), the ASG has been factionalized since 2004 and its remnants have splintered and are constantly on the move due to continued military pressures.138 Based on the various ASG factions, the organizational set-up of the ASG was far from that envisioned by Abdurajak Janjalani.

Figure 8 is the organizational structure of the ASG as of

June, 2009.

138Department of National Defense, Defense Planning Guide, 2006-2011 (Quezon City: Department of National Defense Office of the Undersecretary for Policy, Plans and Special Concerns, December, 2004). This document is classified confidential.


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Figure 8 ASG Current Organizational Structure

Source: Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research Data Bank, 2009.

The ASG is believed to be currently led by Yassir Igasan,

a close associate of the Janjalani brothers. Igasan joined the ASG soon after his graduation in 1993 from the Darul Imam Shafee, an Islamic training institution believed to be established by Mohammad Janmal Khalifa in Marawi City in 1988. He also worked at the Sulu branch of the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), also established by Khalifa. He studied in Libya, Saudi Arabia and Syria where he acquired deep Islamic propagation skills as a Muslim scholar and got his title as Ustadj.139 He is also known to be a veteran of the Afghan War against the former Soviet Union where he acquired his military skills. Igasan is also known for his skills in grassroots organizing and resource mobilization, which he developed when he was working with the IIRO. Thus, Igasan represents the more radical Islamist faction of the ASG compared to the most members of the ASG whose leanings are more towards banditry. As a charismatic leader, Igasan may be viewed as the reincarnation of Abjurajak Janjalani.

139Taharudin Piang Ampatuan, “Abu Sayyaf’s New Leader: Yassir Igasan the Religious Scholar,” RSIS Commentaries (Singapore: S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 9 July, 2007).

ISLAMIC EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

(Shura)

Basilan-Based

(Kaier Mundos)

Sulu-Based

(Radullan Sahiron)

AMIR

(Yassir Igasan)

Zamboanga-Based

(still unknown)


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Because of military operations against the ASG, the formal organizational set-up of the group is not being strictly followed. Instead, the ASG is working on a cell-type organizational set-up. As of June, 2009, the ASG is believed to have 18 cellular organizations with Igasan as the overall head or Amir.

Figure 9 shows the current cellular-type organization of

the ASG.

Figure 9 ASG Cellular-Type Organizational Structure

Isnilon HAPILON

Furudji INDAMA

DR ABU/ PULA

Juhurim HUSSEIN

Ibno ACOSTA ABDUWA Asman WADJAN

Ikit JULIEJahid SUSUKAN

Binang SARIUL

Jul-AsbiJALMAANI

Sulaiman PATTAH Nurhassan JAMIRI

Suhud TANADJALIN

Kirih Hamid SAHIRONSULU-BASED ZAMBOANGA-BASED

BASILAN-BASED

Abdullah AJILULAlbader PARAD

Yassir Igasan

Radullan SAHIRON

Source: Police and military intelligence sources, June, 2009.

c) Political/Ideological Adherence ASG’s original ideology was anchored on Abdurajak

Janjalani’s religious and political thinking. ASG followers did not only recognize Janjalani as their spiritual and military leader but also their foremost ideological beacon.140 As an ideologue, he was well-informed by the historical, religious, economic, political

140Nathan G. Quimpo, “Dealing with the MILF and Abu Sayyaf: Who’s Afraid of an Islamic State?, Public Policy, vol. III, no. 4 (October/December, 1999), p. 50.


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and social conditions in which Muslims in the Philippines find themselves.

When he formed the ASG, his intention was to create a

group of Muslim Mujahedeen committed to Jihad Fi-Sabil-lillah, a “struggle in the cause of Allah” or “fighting and dying for the cause of Islam.” Before Janjalani died in December, 1998, he delivered eight radical ideological discourses called Khutbah, which may be considered as primary sources of his radical Islamic thoughts. These discourses explained his Quranic perspective of Jihad Fi-Sabil-lillah, which he lamented, was misinterpreted by many Muslims. He even denounced the ulama (Muslim scholars) for their little knowledge of the Quran and lamented that most Muslims in the Philippines calling themselves as Moros were not really practicing the true meaning of Islam compared with their counterparts in West Asia. These eight discourses also revealed his deep grasp of Wahhabi Islam, which considered other Muslims heretical. The Islamic theology of Wahhabism greatly informed Janjalani’s radical ideology.

In his analysis of Philippine society, Janjalani was aware

of the injustices committed against Muslim communities. Thus, he purportedly founded the ASG to vigorously seek kaadilan or justice for Muslims through jihad. For Janjalani, jihad is the highest form of struggle for justice or cause. He classified jihad into two: jihad al-akbar (greater Jihad) and jihad al-asgar (lesser jihad). He failed to elaborate these two forms of jihad. He only argued that they “are the same in Divine assessment but are merely differentiated in human terms and conditions.”141 He contended that the “surest guarantee of justice and prosperity for Muslims” is the establishment of a purely Islamic state that can only be achieved through jihad. Janjalani even urged Muslims in the Philippines to pursue their jihad to the highest level in order to fulfill their paramount duty of martyrdom for the cause of Allah. His appeal for martyrdom also means endorsement of suicide terrorism. Though there has been no recorded incident of suicide terrorism in the country, Janjalani was aware of the value of suicide terrorism as a favored tactic of radical Muslims pursuing jihad. In fact, the bombing of

141Samuel K. Tan, “Beyond Freedom: The Juma’a Abu Sayyaf (Assessment of its Origins, Objectives, Ideology and Method of Struggle” in his Internationalization of the Bangsamoro Struggle (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies, 2003), revised edition, p. 94.


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Superferry 14 on 28 February, 2004 was originally planned by ASG as a suicide mission.

One of Janjalani’s Khutbahs revealed his deep

resentment against Christian missionaries in Mindanao, particularly those severely maligning Islam. Janjalani said that the aggressive preaching of Christian missionaries in Mindanao gravely insulted Islam and severely provoked Muslims to respond violently. The bombing of M/V Doulos in August, 1991 was ASG’s retaliation against Christian missionaries who used derogatory words against Islam and called Allah a false God.

d) Links with Foreign and Local “Terrorist”

Organizations

The ASG continues to wreak terrorist havocs because of its superb ability to establish strong linkages with foreign and local terrorist groups operating in the Philippines. These groups are the Al-Qaeda, JI, the MNLF, the MILF and the Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM). The ASG also has creative and sophisticated means to solicit local support, which undoubtedly contribute to its resilience as a terrorist organization. According to Philippine intelligence reports, the ASG also drew its support from the extremist element in Iran (Hezbollah), Pakistan (Jamaat-Islami and Hizbul-Mujahideen), Afghanistan (Hizb-Islami), Egypt (Al Gamaa-Al-Islamiya), Algeria (Islamic Liberation Front) and Libya (International Harakatul Al-Islamia). This paper will focus only on ASG links with Al-Qaeda, JI, the MNLF, the MILF and the RSM.

ASG Linkages with Al-Qaeda. The ASG reportedly established links with Al-Qaeda through Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, the brother-in-law of Osama bin Laden. Through several Islamic charities, Khalifa penetrated the Philippines to plant the seed of Al-Qaedaism in the Philippines. The IIRO was Khalifa’s most important cover in the Philippines. Officially registered at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on 20 October, 1991, the IIRO established a central office in Makati City and provincial branches in Mindanao.

The IIRO was the main financial conduit of Al-Qaeda in

the Philippines. The IIRO constructed several mosques and Islamic schools in Mindanao, particularly in areas controlled by the ASG. Khalifa even married a Filipina, Alice Yabo, to deepen


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his personal network in the country. Yabo’s brother, Abu Omar, had close ties with the MILF. This also cemented ties between Al-Qaeda and the MILF.

It was Ramzi Yousef who was said to have deepened

the ASG’s ties with Al-Qaeda. The ASG links with Al-Qaeda relationship were facilitated by the personal friendship between Janjalani and Bin Laden. Both stayed in Peshawar, Pakistan in the 1980s. Though Jason Burke argued that Bin Laden did not directly provide funding support to Janjalani during the mid-80s,142 what is clear is that the ASG played a supporting role in Yousef’s Bojinka Plot that was foiled in 1995.143 The Bojinka plots aimed to bomb eleven US jetliners and assassinate Pope John Paul II, who visited Manila in 1995.144

The ASG fully established closer link with the Al-Qaeda in

the 1990s.145 The ASG founder, Ustadz Abdurajak Janjalani, befriended Bin Laden while in Peshawar, Pakistan. Janjalani also became a very close friend of Ramzi Yousef. It was Yousef who propagated the seeds of Al-Qaedaism in the Philippines.

Based on various police reports, Yousef formed a

terrorist cell in the Philippines in 1994 using some transnational Islamic non-governmental organizations while planning the Bojinka Plot with Khalifa (Figure 10).146 Among the identified members of Yousef cell in the Philippines were the following:

142Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror (London: I. B. Tarus, 2003), p. 101. 143See Rommel C. Banlaoi, Prototype 9/11: The Bojinka Plot in the Philippines (Quezon City: Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research, forthcoming 2010). 144For a brief account of Bojinka Plot, see Peter Lance, 1000 Years for Revenge: International Terrorism and the FBI, The Untold Story (New York: Harper and Collins Book, 2003), pp. 216-217, 254-256 and 283-284. Also see Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Vintage Book, 2006). 145See Zachary Abuza, “Tentacles of Terror: Al-Qaeda’s Southeast Asian Linkages” (Paper presented in the conference “Transnational Violence and Seams of Lawlessness in the Asia Pacific: Linkages to Global Terrorism” held at the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii on 12-21 February, 2002), p. 6. Also published in Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 24, no. 2 (December, 2002), pp. 427-466. 146Banlaoi, “Transnational Islam in the Philippines,” p. 188.


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Wali Khan Amin Shah. A “Pakistani-Afghan” national reported to be a very close associate of Yousef. As stated earlier, Wali Khan had extensive travels to the Philippines, Malaysia, Hong Kong and Thailand using 7 passports with different names but bearing the same picture. He was believed to have been the overall financial manager of Yousef cell. While in the Philippines, he was reported to have used an automated teller machine card using the name of Carol Santiago, reported to be Wali Khan’s girlfriend. He also reported to have participated in the plot against Pope John Paul II.

Abdul Hakim Ali Hasmid Murad. A Pakistani national reported to have arrived in the Philippines between November, 1990 and February, 1991. In December, 1994, he returned to the Philippines to participate in the Bojinka plot aimed to assassinate the Pope. He was trained in bomb making and flying commercial plane. He was arrested in 1995 having been convicted for the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing.

Abu Omar. A Filipino national who became the brother-in-law of Khalifa. Omar reportedly used a charitable organization as a front organization to channel money and fund the terrorist activities of the local Muslim militants.

Munir Ibrahim. Reported to be a wealthy Saudi Arabian from Jeddah who came to the Philippines to support terrorist activities in the country.

Salem Ali/Sheik Mohammad. Claimed to be a plywood exporter who befriended Rose Mosquera, a bargirl in Quezon City, who opened a bank account for him at the Far East Bank at the SM Megamall. Salem Ali was said to have also supported terrorist activities in the Philippines.

Mohammed Sadiq Odeh. He admitted to be a member of Al-Qaeda. Reported to have participated in various terrorist operations in the Philippines, particularly in Davao City, in the early 1990s and was convicted for his participation in the 1988 US Embassy Bombings in Kenya. He was suspected of masterminding the 1993 San Pedro Cathedral Bombing. In 1995, Filipino law enforcement agency arrested him for illegal possession of explosive devices. 147

147Ibid. Also see Ma. Concepcion B. Clamor, Terrorism and Southeast Asia: A Philippine Perspective” (Paper presented in the conference “Transnational Violence and Seams of Lawlessness in the Asia Pacific: Linkages to Global Terrorism” held at the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii on 12-21 February, 2002).


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Figure 10 ASG – Al-Qaeda Link Through Transnational Islamic

Organizations

ASG Linkages with JI. ASG linkages with JI have already been discussed by various authors.148 Although the organizational dynamics of JI and ASG underwent dramatic changes in the midst of a post-9/11 national and regional security environment, latest developments indicate that JI-ASG linkage remains intact and operational. Intelligence sources reveal that the number of JI members in the Philippines collaborating with ASG was placed at around 30-50 as of May, 2009. These JI operatives continue to exploit local Muslim secessionist rebels in the Philippines by sharing their demolition skills.

148See Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Zachary Abuza, “Tentacles of Terror: Al-Qaeda’s Southeast Asian Network,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 24, no. 3 (December, 2002), pp. 427-465.; Maria Ressa, Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al-Qaeda’s Newest Center of Operations in Southeast Asia (New York: Free Press, 2003) and Rommel C. Banlaoi, War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia (Manila: Rex Book Store International, 2004).

Transnational Islamic NGOs Associated with Al-Qaeda, 1994-1995

Source: PIPVTR Data Bank, General Boogie Mendoza, Jr., 2008.


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The arrest of Fathur Rahman Al-Ghozi on 15 January, 2002 unearthed the link between JI and ASG. Also known as “Mike the Bomb-maker,” Al-Ghozi admitted that he participated in the 2000 Manila Rizal Day Bombing and shared to ASG members his bomb-making skills.

The arrest of Rohmat alias “Zaki” on 16 March, 2005

also gave more substantial information about the recent JI-ASG linkages. Zaki, an Indonesian national, confessed to several crimes involving the ASG since 2000, including training members to make bombs in JI-run camps.149 Known as “ASG the bomb trainer,” Zaki admitted that he trained ASG members in bomb making, particularly the use of mobile phones as detonating devices and the use of toothpaste as bomb paraphernalia.150 He also admitted to have coordinated the 2005 Valentine’s Day Bombing, which resulted in the brutal death of 10 people and the serious wounding of at least 150 others. JI-ASG link was further confirmed by Mohammed Nassir bin Abbas who confessed to have led the Mantiqi Three based in Camp Hodeiba in the Southern Philippines to train both ASG and MILF fighters.

The estimated number of JI members operating in the

Philippines as of June, 2009 was reported to be 24 together with at least 30 personalities described by the intelligence establishment as foreign military jihadists.151 Their frequent areas of operations in Mindanao are believed to be Camp Hodeiba, Mount Cararao; Mount Piagayongan, Butig, Lanao del Sur; Barangay Kamanga, Isulan, Sultan Kudarat; Barangay Kamanga, Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat; Mount Magaturing, Maguindanao; Sitio Katol, Barangay Damading, Salipada K. Pendatun, Maguindanao; Barangay Bagoinged, Pagalungan, Maguindanao; and Barangay Nangaan and Simone, both in Kabacan, Cotabato. Two JI personalities (Dulmatin and Umar Patek), known suspects for the October, 2002 bombings in Bali,

149“Alleged bombs expert for Jemaah Islamiyah regional network arrested in Philippines,” Channel News Asia at http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/southeastasia/view/138779/1/.html <accessed on 12 April, 2005>. 150Interview with General Marlu Quevedo, Chief of the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, held at Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City on 29 March, 2005. 151Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Briefing on National Security Situation (Quezon City: Armed Forces of the Philippines, 24 February, 2009).


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Indonesia are reported to be hiding in Mindanao with key ASG leaders.

ASG Linkages with the MNLF. It is already well-

known that most ASG members are disgruntled members of the MNLF. Their links go beyond that. ASG members continue to connive with MNLF members to plant bombs, kidnap people and commit murder.

A police intelligence report reveals that ASG has forged

alliances with some gunmen loyal to jailed MNLF leader Nur Misuari.152 Chief Police Superintendent Rodolfo Mendoza of the PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) says that alliance between ASG and the MNLF were formed two to three years ago. According to Undersecretary Ricardo Blancaflor of the Philippine Anti-Terrorism Task Force (ATTF), this alliance is on a tactical or operational level.153

Ruland Ullah, a former ASG member and now a state witness to the April, 2000 Sipadan hostage crisis, confirms these observations when he said that ASG has hired MNLF fighters to mount terrorist attacks. MNLF members have even acted as mercenaries of the ASG for an amount of at least $1,000. They also provide sanctuary for ASG members when the need arises.154 They also share fighters to mount terrorist attacks not only in the Southern Philippines but also in Metro Manila.

ASG Ties with the MILF. ASG ties with the MILF are

complicated. Aside from ethno-linguistic ties among their members, their links were also formed through their common aspiration for Bangsamoro self-determination in Mindanao. Family relations, intermarriages and complex interpersonal relationships among their members have also strengthened ASG-MILF link.

152Jim Gomez, “Filipino Terror Group’s Reach Grown Nationally,” Associated Press (8 March, 2005). 153Interview with Undersecretary Ricardo Blancaflor of the Philippines Anti-Terrorism Task Force held at Malacañang Palace, Manila on 21 March, 2005. 154Jomar Canlas, “State Witness Bares MNLF, MILF Links with Abu Sayyaf,” The Manila Times (28 March, 2005).


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Former President Joseph Estrada tried to explore the organizational link between the ASG and the MILF. There was no clear evidence of the organizational link, however, during his time.

Recent evidence indicates that the ASG has strongly established tactical alliance with the MILF. Although former Secretary of National Defense Eduardo Ermita argued that MILF members have not shown any proof that they have helped the ASG, new intelligence sources revealed that ASG and MILF members have shared fighters in their operations.155 According to Ullah, “Sometimes the MILF would plant a roadside bomb against soldiers and the Abu Sayyaf would shoot the soldiers wounded in the blast.”156 MILF and ASG members also receive joint training with JI operatives, particularly in the area of bomb making. A paper obtained from the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines mentioned that “during explosives training, JI teaches the MILF or ASG skills in the making of bombs with cell phones, in the identification of the different types of explosives and paraphernalia like TNT, black powder, PETN, Ammonium Nitrate, C4, Detonating Cords and Detonators.”157

ASG Linkages with the RSM. One of the ASG’s strong local links is with the Rajah Solaiman Movement or RSM (otherwise known as Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement or RSIM). Intelligence documents describe the RSM as part of the Balik Islam Movement (Return to Islam Movement).158 The RSM is a clandestine Muslim organization in Manila collaborating with the ASG in waging urban terrorism.159 The group is named after Rajah Solaiman, the last king of Manila before the Spanish

155“They [MILF] have not shown any proof that they have helped,” Newsbreak (10 May, 2004). 156“Gunning for Glory,” op. cit. 157A paper obtained from the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on 29 March, 2005. 158According to Undersecretary Ricardo Blancaflor of the Philippine Anti-Terrorist Task Force, the difference between the RSM, the Balik Islam Movement and the Fi Sabililah is hard to distinguish. 159Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Terrorist Group Behavior in the Philippines: The Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement” (Paper presented to the international conference of the Council for Asian Terrorism Research (CATR) held in Philippine Plaza Hotel, Manila, Philippines on 27-29 March, 2007).


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conquest in the 1500s. Most of its members are Muslim converts. Like the ASG, the converts claim that they want to remake the country into an Islamic state.160 It was estimated that the RSM had at least 30 members as of February, 2009. The Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA), on the other hand, reported that more than 110,000 Filipinos converted to Islam as of 2005 and the conversion continues.

Hilarion Del Rosario, Jr. (also known as Ahmed Santos) was the identified leader and founder of the RSM. Santos ran a madrassah or Islamic school in Pangasinan, which was raided by Philippine law enforcement operatives in May, 2003. An intelligence report states that the RSM was founded in 2002 to “Islamize” the whole Philippines based on the belief that before the Spaniards came with Christianity, there were already Muslims in the archipelago.161

The blasting of the Superferry 14 on 26 February, 2004

has been described as the handiwork of ASG-RSM conspiracy. Redento Cain Dellosa, an RSM member, confessed that he deliberately planted a bomb on Superferry 14. The Marine Board Inquiry in charge of investigating the Superferry 14 incident confirmed that the ASG masterminded the explosion with the assistance of RSM. The media even involved the RSM in the 2007 Glorietta Makati Bombing but it was later discovered that the report was a hoax.162

Interestingly, ASG links with RSM also run in the family. Amina Lim Dungon, one of the wives of ASG spokesman Abu Sulaiman, is the sister of Lorraine Lim Dungon, who is a wife of

160Joe Cochrane, “Filipino Authorities Say The Newest Threat To The Country Is A Shadowy Terror Group Made Up Of Radical Muslim Converts,” Newsweek International Edition (17 May, 2004) at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4933472/ <accessed on 28 August, 2004>. 161“Summary of Report on Rajah Solaiman Movement” (12 April, 2004) at http://www.westerndefense.org/articles/PhilippineRepublic/may04.htm <accessed 31 August, 2004>. 162Rommel C. Banlaoi, “The Use of Media in Terrorism in the Philippines: The Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement,” (Paper delivered during the Sixth Biannual International Symposium of the Council for Asian Terrorism Research (CATR) with a theme, “Understanding the Role of the Media In the Spread of Ideological Extremism” held on 5-7 November, 2007 at JW Marriott Hotel, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia).


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RSM leader Ahmed Santos. ASG leader Khadaffy Janjalani’s wife, Zainad Lim Dungon, is a sister of Amina and Lorraine. These make Sulaiman, Santos and Janjalani not only “brothers-in-arms” but also brothers-in-law. Some ICC officers are also kin to Fi-Sabilillah and RSM leaders.163 According to Chief Police Superintendent Mendoza of the PNP, “If you make an extended family tree of top Islamic radicals, you will come out with something like a tightly woven spider’s web.”164 e) Terrorist Activities, Targets and Victims

From 1991 to 2000, the ASG reportedly engaged in 378 terrorist activities, which resulted in the death of 288 civilians.165 The most notorious ASG activity during this period was the Sipadan kidnapping of 10 foreigners and 11 resort workers on 23 April, 2000. The ASG also masterminded the following major terrorist activities from 2001 to 2009:

Pearl Farm Beach Resort Kidnapping on 22 May, 2001

involving 20 hostages; Jehovah’s Witnesses Kidnapping in August, 2002 involving

six members. Two of them were beheaded; Zamboanga City Bombing in October, 2002 killing an

American soldier; Davao International Airport Bombing on 5 March, 2003

killing 21 persons and injuring 148 others; Superferry 14 Bombing on 24 February, 2004 killing 116

people and injuring 300 others. This incident was regarded as the worst man-made disasters in Philippine waters since 9/11 and the worst terrorist attack in Asia since the 2002 Bali Bombing;

Valentine’s Day Bombings on 14 February, 2005 in Makati City, Davao City and General Santos City. These bombings resulted in the death of 11 people and injury of 93 others;

Kidnapping of TV journalist, Ces Drilon, and her crew on 23 September, 2008;

163Inday Espina-Varona, “Brothers in Arms,” Philippine Graphics, vol. 15, no. 38 (28 February, 2005), p. 24. 164Ibid. 165Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Knowing the Terrorists: The Abu Sayyaf Study (Quezon City: General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, 2002.), p. 1.


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International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Kidnapping on 15 January, 2009 involving three personnel; and

Sri Lankan Peace Worker Kidnapping on 13 February, 2009.

The ASG is currently involved in many kidnapping incidents in Mindanao involving businessmen, farmers and teachers. In 2008 alone, it was involved in 15 kidnapping cases obtaining a ransom of P28 million or more than $500,000. In mid-2009, the ASG was involved in at least three kidnapping cases including the three ICRC workers and a Sri-Lankan peace volunteer. Due to its kidnapping activities, the Philippine government preferred to call the ASG a mere bandit group. There was even a view that “the ASG is a mere homegrown criminal gang that employs terror tactics as its modus operandi.”166 Most of its members have become “militants for hire” whose prime motivation is money and not ideology.167

166Carlyle Thayer, “Political Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” Pointer: Quarterly Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces, vol. 29, no. 4 (October-December, 2003), p. 58. 167Manny Mogato, “Ransom from Kidnapping May Revive Abu Sayyaf,” ABS-CBN News (11 December, 2008) at http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/regions/12/11/08/ransom-kidnappings-may-revive-abu-sayyaf <accessed on 17 June, 2009>. Also see Rommel C. Banlaoi, Militants for Hire: Crime-Terrorism Nexus in the Philippines (An on-going research project of the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research, 2009).


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CHAPTER III

IMPACT OF TERRORISM ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE REGION

Terrorism has social, economic and military costs. The 9/11 terrorist attacks alone suffered financial losses and repercussions costing $80-$90 billion.168 This section discusses the impact of terrorism on the socio-economic development of Southeast Asia particularly in the area of tourism, investment, social welfare and the military sector.

Decline of Tourism

One of the major sectors harshly affected by terrorist

threats is the tourism business. Since tourism thrives in a peaceful environment, terrorism drives it out of business. One study notes:

Terrorism can hurt the tourism sector by reducing tourist arrivals. Over time, continued terrorist attacks may also reduce FDI [foreign direct investment] significantly. Besides such direct short- and long-term costs, indirect costs of terrorism include the need for greater advertising expenses to attract new or more tourists, reconstruction costs for damaged tourist facilities and security enforcement expenses to lessen terrorist threats.169 In most developing economies, tourism is a critical

source of revenue generation and therefore, a major component of economic development.170 Thus, “the impact of terrorism on a state’s economy may be enormous, leading to unemployment,

168Peter Rosendorff and Tod Sandler, “The Political Economy of Transnational Terrorism,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 49, no. 2 (April, 2005), p. 171. 169Konstantinos Drakos and Ali M. Kutan, “Regional Effects of Terrorism on Tourism,” Working Paper: Center for European Integration Studies (Bonn: Bonn University, 2001), p. 1. 170Jonathan Essner, “Terrorism’s Impact on Tourism” (Unpublished Manuscript, December, 2003), p. 2.


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homelessness, deflation, crime and other economic and social ills.”171

The 2002 Bali Bombing in Indonesian tourism was an

excellent example.172 Before the 2002 bombing, Bali was a tourist center in Indonesia. After the bombing, Bali became practically a ghost town.173 Demands for local hotels dropped to 27 percent after the bombing and most major foreign tourist agencies quickly put travel to Bali on hold.174

A year after the Bali Bombing, the Asian Development

Bank estimated that tourist arrivals in Indonesia fell by 38 percent. Tourism recovery became one of the major priorities of Southeast Asian states after 9/11. Though tourism figures in Bali showed some improvements in 2006 and 2007, the whole Indonesian economy still needs to further recover to cushion the impact of terrorist threats, particularly in the aftermath of the 2003 Jakarta Marriott Bombing.

The threat of terrorism also affected the Philippine

tourism industry. The Philippine Department of Tourism noted a large drop in the volume of tourist arrivals in the Philippines after 9/11, particularly in the aftermath of the 2000 Sipadan Kidnapping by the ASG.175 Thus, the Philippine government hosted on 8-9 November, 2002 the International Conference on Anti-Terrorism and Tourism Recovery attended by representatives of all the 10 ASEAN countries, Australia, Britain, China, Japan, South Korea and the United States, as well as the World Tourism Organization and the International Police Organization.

171 Ibid. 172See I Nyoman Darma and Putra and Michael Hitchcock, “Terrorism and Tourism in Bali and Southeast Asia” in Michael Hitchcock, Victor T. King and Michaeil Parnwell, Tourism in Southeast Asia: Challenges and New Directions (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2008), pp. 83-98. 173For more discussion, see International Crisis Group, “Impact of the Bali Bombings,” Indonesia Briefing (24 October, 2002). 174Ibid., p. 7 175MCA Limited, “The Philippine Tourism Industry After the September 11 Terrorist Attacks,” Virtual Asia Philippines Special Report (October, 2001), pp. 1-5.


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Loss of Domestic and Foreign Investment Aside from its impact on tourism, terrorism has also affected foreign direct investments (FDI) in Southeast Asia. Existing empirical studies, however, showed that the correlation between terrorism and investment yielded mixed results. In the study made by the Asian Development Bank:

Empirical studies examining the link between perceived political risk, terrorism and FDI flows have yielded contradictory results. Some have found linkages, while others have not. Those that have found linkages tended to be older studies. Some of the newer studies challenge the previous results. Some empirical studies tended to put more emphasis on macroeconomic variables as explanatory factors in FDI flows, while others stress the importance of political variables. In practice and in theory, it appears difficult to make a clear-cut distinction between political and economic variables as definitive sources of influence, and it is reasonable to conclude that FDI decisions in developing countries are determined both by political and economic factors.176

Another study indicates that terrorist incidents “do not produce any statistically significant effect on the likelihood that a country will be chosen as an investment destination, or on the amount of FDI it receives.”177 It also further argued that “unanticipated acts of terrorism do not generate any changes in investor behavior, either in terms of investment location choice or the amount of investment.”178

176Daniel Wagnes, “The Impact of Terrorism on Foreign Direct Investment,” FDI Magazine (April/May, 2006), p. 4. Also found at http://www.irmi.com/expert/articles/2006/wagner02.aspx <accessed on 7 June, 2009>. 177Ibid. 178Ibid.


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In Southeast Asia, however, terrorism unleashed some shocks in investments. Terrorism caused economic shocks resulting in lower output for periods of up to 10 years or more.179 Foreign investors were scared to go to Southeast Asia because of terrorist threats. Some foreign companies even retreated to invest in Southeast Asia because of reported terrorist cells in the region.180 Then ASEAN Secretary-General Ong Keng Yong lamented that as a result of terrorist threats, foreign investments have declined in recent years as investors transferred to other regions.181 There is, therefore, a strong resolve among governments in the region to fight the economic menace brought by terrorism.

Conflict Casualties and Rise in Number of Displaced Persons

The fight against terrorism has social and human costs.

Military operations against terrorist groups in the region brought civilian casualties and led to a large number of internally displaced persons (IDPs). The United Nations estimated that there are 25 million IDPs in 40 countries as a result of internal armed conflicts and war against terrorism.

In Southeast Asia, 600,000 IDPs were recorded in

Burma, 750,000 in Indonesia and 500,000 in the Philippines.182 The Philippines got the reputation of having the most number of IDPs in Southeast Asia due to the war against terrorism alone, not to mention other counter-insurgency operations.183 In

179Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Combating Terrorism in the Transport Sector - Economic Costs and Benefits (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2004), p. 16. 180“Retreat from Terror” (30 September, 2004) at http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/09/30/1096401700732.html?from=storylhs <accessed on 7 June, 2009>. 181“ASEAN and EU to Enhance Efforts to Fight Terrorism,” ASEAN Secretariat News Release (24 January, 2003) at http://www.aseansec.org/14022.htm <accessed on 6 June, 2009). 182Zaff S. Solmerin, “Armed Conflicts Displaced 150,000 Folks,” Asian Tribune (21 November, 2002) at http://www.asiantribune.com/oldsite/show_news.php?id=1228 <accessed on 7 June, 2009>. 183Jason Gutierrez, “PHILIPPINES: More suffering, displacement feared in Mindanao before Arroyo term ends, say analysts,” IRIN News (11 November, 2008) at http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=81394 <accessed on 7 June, 2009>.


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Indonesia, several thousands of IDPs were recorded in Maluku as a result of the fight against jihadist groups in the area.184 At the end of 2008, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre based in Norway revealed that that there were around 3.5 million IDPs in Southeast Asia, with 400,000 increases compared to the end of 2007.185 These IDPs were victims of counter-insurgency operations and war on terrorism. Decline in Income and Access to Basic Services: Health, Education and Social Welfare Other costs of terrorist threats and their concomitant counter measures include declines in income and decreases in access to basic services such as health, education and other social welfare services. Terrorist attacks on tourist spots, hotels, transport systems and communication structures resulted in the decline of income. The effect of the war on terrorism, for example, resulted in a loss of almost 3 percent growth in the developing world particularly in Southeast Asia where major terrorist attacks occurred after 9/11.

Budget for counter terrorism measures, on the other hand, competes with the allocation for health, education and other social welfare services. While budget for counter terrorism is essential, a study laments that budgetary allocation to fight terror also comes with an opportunity cost.186 Resources allotted for counter terrorism “are not available for other purposes, from spending on health and education to reductions in taxes. A higher risk of terrorism, and the need to combat it, simply raises that opportunity cost.”187

184Badrus Sholeh,”Jihad in Maluku” in Tan, A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia, p. 162. 185International Displacement Monitoring Centre, “International Displacement in Asia and the Pacific” at http://www.internal-displacement.org/ <accessed on 7 June, 2009>. 186Amy Zalman, “Economic Impact of Terrorism and the September 11 Attacks” at http://terrorism.about.com/od/issuestrends/a/EconomicImpact.htm <accessed on 8 June, 2009>. 187Ibid.


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Military Costs

Aside from socio-economic costs, terrorist threat and counter terrorism in Southeast Asia also had its toll on the military. In the aftermath of 9/11, world defense spending increased dramatically to fight terrorism. The US, alone, spent around $500 billion annually for counter terrorism operations. In a testimony before US Senate Budget Committee, Steven M. Kosiak, Vice President for Budget Studies of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, lamented that the “GWOT has proven very costly in budgetary terms, and those costs have grown dramatically over time.”188 Kosiak reported that since 2001, the US Congress has appropriated about $502 billion for GWOT. In 2008, the requested fund for GWOT was $737 billion, which was more expensive than the Korean War ($460 billion) and the Vietnam War ($650 billion).189

In Southeast Asia, military spending increased to 9

percent after 9/11.190 Though increased military spending was not totally about terrorism, the war on terrorism provided ASEAN countries strong justification to allocate more budgets for defense.

188Steven M. Kosiak, “The Global War on Terror (GWOT): Costs, Cost Growth and Estimating Funding Requirements,” Testimony (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 6 February, 2007), p. 1. 189Ibid., p. 2. 190Heda Bayron, “Southeast Asian Nations Increasing Spending on Defense,” Voice of Asia News (17 July, 2002) at http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2002-07/a-2002-07-17-2-Southeast.cfm?moddate=2002-07-17 <accessed on 9 June, 2009>.


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CHAPTER IV

NATIONAL RESPONSES TO TERRORISM This chapter provides a snapshot of counter terrorism responses of selected countries in Southeast Asia namely Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.191 Indonesia

Indonesia is the most troubled country in Southeast Asia

having been victim of two major terrorist bombings. Although critical of the US-led global war against terrorism, Indonesia condemned the 9/11 attacks and expressed its readiness to cooperate with any UN collective action against terrorism.

President Megawati Sukarnoputri was the first Muslim

leader in Asia who visited the White House right after 9/11. On 19 September, 2001, President Megawati met President Bush where they exchanged pledges to strengthen existing cooperation in the global effort to combat international terrorism. Bush also promised to lift the embargo on commercial sales of non-lethal military items to Indonesia.192

Indonesia, however, demanded that US should not to

target a specific country in the campaign against terrorism arguing that it would affect US investments in that country.193 As a matter of fact, Jakarta did not officially endorse US military operations against the Taliban government in Afghanistan and called on all parties “to avoid open war.” When the US urged all

191Some portions of this section is an updated version of Banlaoi, “Security Cooperation and Conflict in Southeast Asia After 9/11: Constructivism, the ASEAN Way and the War on Terrorism,” pp. 32-55. This article also appeared in Rommel C. Banlaoi, Philippine Security in the Age of Terror: National, Regional and Global Challenges in the Post-9/11 World (London and New York: CRC Press, Routledge, Taylor and Francis, 2009). 192Kurt Biddle, “Indonesia-US Military Ties: September 11th and After,” Inside Indonesia, (April-June, 2002), p. 1. Also at http://www.insideindonesia.org/edit70/kurtedit_a.htm. <accessed on 25 July, 2002>. 193Christoffersen, “The War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Search for Partners, Delimiting Targets,” Center for Contemporary Conflict Strategic Insights: East Asia (March, 2002) at http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/rsepResources/si/mar02/eastAsia.asp <accessed on 11 July, 2002>.


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“civilized states” to block financial support for terrorist movements, Indonesia also displayed a lukewarm reaction because of thousands of Islamic charities in Southeast Asia.194 To scrutinize those charities in its own country would risk a significant Muslim backlash, not to mention Indonesian ill-capacity to monitor thousands of financial transactions coming from overseas and non-governmental organizations.195

One of the major reasons for the critical support of

Indonesia to the US war on terrorism is the presence of Islamic radicals in the country. Indonesia is the world’s largest country in terms of Muslim population. Thus, Jakarta tempered its support to the US anti-terrorism campaign to avoid tensions with militant Islamic elements of Indonesian population.

Despite the critical support of Indonesia, the global

campaign against terrorism led to the improvement of US-Indonesia military relations.

In the early 1990s, Indonesian-American military ties

were suspended due to the 1992 Santa Cruz massacre in Dili and the perceived human rights violations in East Timor. Driven by the US war on terrorism in Southeast Asia, the American and Indonesian governments found the opportunity of rebuilding their military ties.196 The US Department of Defense openly pursued the restoration of full military-to-military relations with Indonesia.197 The US Congress even passed a bill in December, 2001 allowing Indonesian military to participate in the US-initiated counter terrorism training and programs. Indonesia, on the other hand, regarded the US war on terrorism as an opportunity to resume US-Indonesia military relations, especially in the light of separatist and sectarian violence in Aceh, the Moluccas, Sulawesi and Irian Jaya. Jakarta knew that the US can be of great assistance in combating its own terrorism problems.

194Sheldon Simon, “Mixed Reactions in Southeast Asia to the US War on Terrorism,” Comparative Connections (4th Quarter, 2001). 195Ibid. 196International Crisis Group, “Resuming US-Indonesia Military Ties,” Indonesia Briefing (21 May, 2002), p. 1. 197Reyko Huang, “Priority Dilemmas: US-Indonesia Military Relations in the Anti-Terror War,” Center for Defense Information Terrorism Project, 23 May, 2002 at http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/priority-pr.cfm. <accessed on 24 July, 2002>.


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However, it did not want this assistance to justify American intervention in Indonesian domestic affairs.

Under the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono,

Indonesia pursued a more decisive campaign against terrorist groups in the country. Since he assumed office in 2004, the Yudhoyono government arrested several suspected terrorists including six key individuals and the field lieutenant of the 2004 Australian Embassy Bombing.198 On 3 March, 2005, Indonesian courts sentenced suspected JI Emir Abu Bakar Ba’asyir to 30 months in prison for his involvement in the 2002 bombings, though he was not convicted on any terrorism charges.199 Bashir was released on 14 June, 2006 for good behavior. On 8 November, 2008, the Indonesian government executed the three convicted Bali Bombers namely Imam Samudra, Amrozi Nurhasyim and Ali Ghufron (Mukhlas).

Despite its accomplishments in countering terrorism, the

government still received criticism for its weak institutional mechanism to address terrorist threats. The US Department of State Office of Coordinator for Counter Terrorism bewailed:

Indonesian counter terrorism efforts remain hampered by weak rule of law, serious internal coordination problems, and systemic corruption that further limits already strained government resources. Lawmakers and other senior elected officials continue their slow pace toward needed legal reforms that could strengthen the country’s counter terrorism posture.200

The Netherlands, Indonesia’s erstwhile colonial power, recognized Yudhoyono government’s improving capacity to fight terrorism. The Dutch government said that that there was still a

198US Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counter Terrorism, “Indonesia Counter Terrorism Report 2006” (1 May, 2006) at http://www.indonesiamatters.com/302/indonesia-counterterrorism-report/ <accessed on 17 June, 2009>. 199Ibid. 200Ibid.


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lot of work to be done.201 Notwithstanding these limitations, the Indonesian government has arrested since the 2002 Bali Bombing at least 420 suspects, of whom approximately 250 have been tried and convicted. These efforts have effectively crippled JI as a terrorist organization. Malaysia

Malaysia’s support to the American-led war on terrorism

was quite ambivalent. It supported ASEAN declaration on anti-terrorism but critical of the US-led war in Southeast Asia. Malaysia also opposed the US-initiated military campaign in Afghanistan. Its ambivalent response was based on the apprehension that the US anti-terrorism campaign might trigger militant activities in Kuala Lumpur considering the presence of militant Muslims in the country. Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad has used the anti-militant Muslim campaign to crack down the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS), the strongest Islamic opposition party in the country.202 To prevent the unintended consequence of its support to the war on terrorism, Mahathir carefully supported the war on terrorism with no anti-Islamic undertone.

Despite this ambivalent support, the Malaysian government took the lead in Southeast Asia in sponsoring an Islamic Conference on Terrorism in April, 2002. Malaysia also ordered its local banks to freeze the assets of organizations found to be sponsoring or connected with terrorism. It arrested around 60 suspected terrorists since 9/11 because of their alleged membership in the Malaysian Militant/Mujahidin Movement (KMM). This organization reportedly established link with Al-Qaeda. Malaysian police authorities arrested these people on the basis of the Internal Security Act.

Malaysia implemented stricter measures to crack down on groups with links to extremism and enforced more rigid policies on visas to deter people using the country as a transit point for terrorist activities. It also formulated a new law prohibiting the use of religious schools as fronts for terrorist

201Michael Vincent, “Indonesia’s Counter Terrorism Abilities Improving: The Netherlands,” ABC Local Radion (29 April, 2005) at http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2005/s1356777.htm <accessed on 18 June, 2009>. 202Simon, p. 4.


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activities. It enforced an integrated curriculum for religious schools to assure that no school curriculum would be used for terrorist indoctrination. Malaysian police authorities, on the other hand, created Special Forces deployed in various universities to monitor covert terrorist activities in the campuses and to identify foreign students trying to recruit students in the terrorist front organizations. Its Immigration Office required all Malaysian students planning to study abroad to register before departure.

The war on terrorism created an opportunity for the

country to improve its strained bilateral relations with the United States. Malaysia-US bilateral ties improved in the aftermath of 9/11 when Mahathir visited President Bush in Washington on 13-15 May, 2002. In this meeting, both leaders agreed to enhance their cooperation in combating terrorism in Southeast Asia. They also signed an agreement calling on both countries to coordinate law enforcement, share intelligence information and strengthen border security.

Under the leadership of Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad

Badawi, Malaysia called for a more systematic study of the multifaceted causes of terrorism. Hence, Kuala Lumpur vigorously conducted training and research on counter terrorism through the Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counter Terrorism (SEARCCT). Launched in July, 2003, the SEARCCT has “been actively involved in attempting to change the mindset and paradigm of those who believe that the war on terror can only be won through military means.”203 The Center is offering various training courses, conferences, seminars and forums “to discuss and disseminate the root causes of terrorism, arguing that the campaign against terrorism requires a multi-pronged and multi-faceted approach.”204

Since August, 2003, SEARCCT has conducted at least 40

training courses involving around 1,300 participants not only in Southeast Asia but also outside of the region. Malaysia, through

203See Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter Terrorism (SEARCCT) at http://www.searcct.gov.my/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=30&Itemid=272#Background <accessed on 18 June, 2009>. 204Ibid.


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the SEARCCT, was commended by the US for taking the lead in Southeast Asia in counter terrorism training.205 Philippine Response to Terrorism

The Philippines was the first ASEAN state to declare

strongest support to the US war on terrorism. Manila even expressed willingness to deploy Philippine troops to Afghanistan once approved by the Philippine Congress. The Philippines also offered its territory to the US as transit points or staging areas of troops fighting the war on terrorism in Afghanistan. When President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo visited the US in November, 2001, she reiterated the administration’s full support to the US war on terrorism. Prior to the visit, the Philippine government formed the Inter-Agency Task Force Against International Terrorism on 24 September, 2001. It aims to coordinate intelligence operations and facilitate the identification and neutralization of suspected terrorist cells in the Philippines. To freeze the financial assets of international terrorists, the Philippine Congress passed the Anti-Money Laundering Act on 29 September, 2001. President Arroyo also announced on 12 October, 2001 its 14-pillar approach to combat terrorism. On this basis, the Philippine government issued General Order No. 2 on 9 May, 2002 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in Mindanao. Together with General Order No. 2, the Philippine government also issued the Memorandum Order No. 61 to provide measures in quelling the acts of terrorism in the Southern Philippines. Through the Operation Center of the Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Security (COCIS), the Philippine government has drafted the National Plan to Address Terrorism and its Consequences as Annex to the third version of the National Internal Security Plan (NISP). The Philippine government approved the NISP on 26 November, 2001 through Memorandum Order 44.

205US happy with Malaysia’s role in counter-terrorism,” Star On Line (23 April, 2008) at http://thestar.com.my/fightcrime/story.asp?file=/2008/4/23/fightcrime/21030375&sec=fightcrime <accessed on 18 June, 2009>.


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As part of its support to the American-led global campaign against terrorism, the Philippines hosted the American troops to conduct joint-military exercises in the Philippines dubbed as Balikatan 02-1.206 The Philippines and the US launched the Balikatan 02-1 in February, 2002 with the official goal of enhancing the capability of Philippine and US forces to combat international terrorism.

The Philippines heavily supported the war on terrorism

because it wanted to reinvigorate its security ties with the United States for strategic and economic reasons. When the United States forces withdrew from Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base in 1992 as a result of the termination of the Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the “once-strong” and “once-special” Philippine-American security relations became practically moribund.207 The war on terrorism in Southeast Asia revived the security ties between the two countries.208

Due to staunch Philippine support to the war on

terrorism, Manila was able to solicit military assistance from Washington. President George Bush pledged in 2002 a total of $100 million in military aid to enhance not only Philippine ability to combat terrorists but also to increase its wherewithal to fight local insurgents.209 During the conduct of Balikatan 02-1, Filipino troops received training in special operations, air night operations, maritime operations, patrol craft maintenance and civil-military operations.

206Rommel C. Banlaoi, “The Role of Philippine-American Relations in the Global Campaign Against Terrorism: Implications for Regional Security,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 24, no. 2 (August, 2002), pp. 278-296. 207Richard D. Fisher, Jr., “Rebuilding the US-Philippine Alliance,” The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, no. 1255 (22 February, 1999). 208See Renato Cruz De Castro, “The Revitalized Philippine-US Security Relations: A Ghost from the Cold War or an Alliance for the 21st Century,” Asian Survey, vol 43, no. 6 (November/December, 2003), pp. 971-988. Also see his “21st Century Philippines-US Security Relations: Managing an Alliance in the War of the Third Kind” in Abinales and Quimpo, The US and the War on Terror in the Philippines, pp. 13-45. 209Steven Mufson “US to Aid Philippines' Terrorism War Bush Promises Military Equipment, Help in Freezing Insurgents' Assets” in http://www.washingtonpost.com/. <accessed on 27 April, 2002>.


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During the commemoration of the 50th Anniversary in 2001 of the signing of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), the US promised to assist the Philippines in acquiring new military equipment that will include a C-130 transport plane, eight Huey helicopters, a naval patrol boat and 30,000 M-16 rifles plus ammunitions. In addition to training and $100 million military aid, the Bush Administration also pledged an additional $150 million anti-terrorism assistance package to the Philippines.

On 28 June, 2002, President Bush signed a

memorandum ordering the release of $10 million worth of defense articles and services from the inventory of US Department of Defense to the Philippine government. During President Arroyo’s stop-over in Hawaii on 25 October, 2002 on her way to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Mexico, he met Hawaii Senator Daniel Inouye who reassured President Arroyo the restoration of the US congressional cut on the $30-million military assistance by the US government to the AFP.

Following the 19 May, 2003 meeting between Bush and

Arroyo in Washington, DC, the United States designated the Philippines as a major non-NATO ally. According to Bush, making the Philippines a major non-NATO ally will allow the two countries “to work together on military research and development, and give the Philippines greater access to American defense equipment and supplies."210 With American military assistance, Philippine counter terrorism efforts made significant progress, specifically against the ASG. However, there was a tendency for the Philippine government to confuse counter terrorism and counter insurgency, particularly with the MILF.211

Aside from the US, the Philippines also received counter

terrorism assistance from Australia through AusAID. The focus of this assistance was on port security involving $1.3 million in 2003. Australia also provided assistance to Philippine law enforcement authorities in 2004 with the amount of $3.65

210Jim Garamone, “Philippines to Become Major non-NATO Ally, Bush Says,” American Forces Press Service at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2003/n05192003_200305193.html 211International Crisis Group, The Philippines: Counter Insurgency Versus Counter Terrorism In Mindanao, Asia Report no. 152 (14 May, 2008).


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million. These financial supports were part of AusAID’s $5 million Philippines Counter Terrorism Assistance initiative.212

In March, 2007, the Philippine government signed into

law Republic Act 9372, otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007. It serves as the country’s Anti-Terrorism Law. This Law created the Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC), the Philippine’s counter terrorism super body. The ATC has an operational arm called the National Counter Terrorism Action Group (NACTAG) mandated to "develop good intelligence and identify would-be terrorists, (and) conduct follow-up action to prevent the conduct of any terroristic activities," as well as to provide "enough evidence and witnesses so that the cases will stand in court.”213

At present, the Philippine government is implementing

the “Whole-of-Government” (WOG) approach to counter terrorism. Adopted in 2006, the WOG aims to address the root causes of internal security challenges facing the Philippine state.214 It was also in 2006 when the AFP launched the Oplan Ultimatum to finally crush the ASG with the deployment of 6,000 Philippine troops. Oplan Ultimatum led to the killing of ASG Amir, Khadaffy Janjalani, and ASG spokesman, Jainal Ante Sali, Jr. or Abu Sulaiman. As a result of the overall Philippine government’s campaign against terrorism, out of 24 most wanted terrorists in the country, 15 were either already killed in battle or arrested. Figure 11 shows the status of the Philippine’s most wanted terrorists.

212AusAid, “Reducing Terrorism Risks in the Philippines” (27 April, 2004) at http://www.ausaid.gov.au/media/release.cfm?BC=Media&Id=7540_4789_3694_2613_1112 <accessed on 18 June, 2009>. 213National Counter Terrorism Action Group, 214Department of National Defense, Defense Planning Guidance, 2008-2013 (Quezon City: Department of National Defense, November, 2006), p. 1.


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Figure 11 Philippines’ Most Wanted Terrorists

Source: Armed Forces of the Philippines, Civil Relations Service, May, 2009. Singapore

As a close strategic partner of the United States in

Southeast Asia, Singapore immediately extended its strong support to the US-led war on terrorism. The Singapore Parliament also passed the Anti-Terrorism Regulations Act, which came into force on 13 November, 2001. The Anti-Terrorism Regulations Act criminalizes “the direct or indirect provision of economic or financial assistance to the terrorists and provide for specific punishment for perpetrating a hoax of a terrorist act.”215

To intensify its counter-terrorist campaign, the

Singapore government formed the Executive Group (EG), a national security secretariat with decisionmaking power tasked to respond to complex emergency situations. The government

215Soo Seong Theng, “New Anti-Terrorism Laws in Singapore” at http://www.lawgazette.com.sg/2002-6/June02-focus2.htm <accessed on 10 March, 2003>.


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also directed its Police and Armed Forces to increase its defensive security measures at vital installations and facilities like airports, border checkpoints, government offices and commercial buildings. It also imposed strict visa requirements on foreigners coming from Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Sudan.

Singapore played a pivotal role in unearthing pertinent information on terrorist activities in Southeast Asia through its arrest of suspected terrorists connected with JI and Al-Qaeda. Like its Indonesian and Malaysian counterparts, however, the Singaporean government is careful in its anti-terrorist campaign in order not to alienate its Muslim population. In fact, Abdullah Tarmugi, the Minister in-charge of the government’s Muslim Affairs, urged Singaporeans not to identify Muslims with terrorism. In 2004, National Security Coordination Center of Singapore published the Fight Against Terror: Singapore National Security Strategy. This document declares transnational terrorism as a serious threat to Singapore national security.216 To fight and defeat terrorism, Singapore adopted a “multi-Ministry networked approach” to enable interagency coordination.217 As such, the Singapore government also developed a defense strategy based on integrated, layered method that is structured around the Prevention, Protection and Response domains.218 To implement Singapore strategy against terrorism, Singapore created the Joint Counter Terrorism Centre (JCTC). It is a multi-agency body that aims to: 1) provide strategic analysis of terrorism-related issues to support policymaking for the development of counter terrorism capabilities; and 2) provide strategic early warning of terrorism-related developments.219

216National Security Coordination Center, Fight Against Terror: Singapore National Security Strategy (Singapore: National Security Coordination Center, 2004), p. 7. 217 Ibid., p. 35. 218 Ibid, p. 43 for elaboration of these three domains. 219Joint Counter Terrorism Center at http://app-stg.nscc.gov.sg/frmaboutus.asp <accessed on 18 June, 2009>.


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Singapore’s counter terrorism efforts led to the discovery of JI cells not only in the country but also in other countries in Southeast Asia. The arrest of several JI members in Singapore in 2000 and 2001 gave Southeast Asia a better understanding of terrorist threats in the region. Thus, it is argued that Singapore’s response against terrorism has been the most vigorous of the states in Southeast Asia.220

Thailand221 Although Thailand joined the international community in condemning the terrorist attacks on America, the Thai government expressed reluctance in joining the American-led global campaign against terrorism. It even declared “neutrality” in this campaign. The Thai parliament also expressed caution and urged its members to be critical in the anti-terrorist campaign of the United States. Despite this expression of reluctance, Thailand intensified its efforts to implement the United Nations' resolutions related to counter terrorism. As part of its national counter terrorism measures, the Thai government formed the Committee of Counter-International Terrorism (COCIT) chaired by the Prime Minister. The COCIT serves as a focal point for policy formulation on anti-terrorism. Thailand also has the Counter International Terrorist Operations Center (CITOC) directed by COCIT. The CITOC is responsible for the coordination between the policy level and operational units on anti-terrorism. To suppress the funding of international terrorist activities, Thailand supported the US call to block the funding of terrorists. As early as 1999, the Thai government established the Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO) to take effective countermeasures against money laundering and other illegitimate financing. On 11 December, 2001, the Thai Cabinet approved the two draft amendments of the Penal Code and the

220Andrew Tan, “Terrorism in the Asia Pacific: Threat and Response – the Singapore Experience” in Rohan Gunaratna (ed), Terrorism in the Asia Pacific: Threat and Response (Singapore: Eastern University Press, 2003), p. 242. 221Based on “Progress Report on Thailand’s Implementation of Counter-terrorism Activities” at http://www.mfa.go.th/internet/document/Terrorism%20Report.doc <accessed on 19 March, 2003>.


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Anti-Money Laundering Act to prescribe financing of terrorism as a serious offense under the Thai criminal law and to empower AMLO to freeze terrorist funds as mandated by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1373. To shore up its campaign against international terrorism, the Thai government also intensified its international cooperation program against terrorism. On 10 September, 2002, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the European Commission signed the Memorandum of Understanding on Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Anti-Money Laundering Project to promote international cooperation against money laundering as a way of combating transnational crime including international terrorism. On 3 October, 2002, Thailand and Australia also signed the memorandum of understanding between the two countries to develop more effective counter terrorism policies and legal policies through the exchange of terrorist financing information, training and education. Although critical of American campaign against terrorism, Thailand has been conducting joint military exercises with the United States through the Cobra Gold Exercise, a “series of US-Thai military exercises designed to ensure regional peace and strengthen the ability of the Royal Thai Armed Forces to defend Thailand or respond to regional contingencies.”222 On 14-28 May, 2002, both forces conducted the Cobra Gold Exercise on anti-terrorism. Aside from the Cobra Gold Exercises, Thailand also hosted the Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism (SEACAT) held in March, 2002. The SEACAT aimed to establish a regional coordination infrastructure for information sharing and exchange supporting a multinational response to combat terrorism and other transnational crimes in the region. In 2004, Thailand experienced a dramatic upsurge of terrorist attacks emanating from Islamic extremist groups, particularly in areas bordering Malaysia. According to some reports:

222For further information on Cobra Gold 2002, see “Exercise Cobra Gold 2002” at http://www.cobragold2002.okinawa.usmc.mil/cg2002-news.html. For more update on Cobra Gold Exercises, see “Cobra Gold Exercises” at http://www.apan-info.net/exercises/default.asp.


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From January, 2004 until December, 2007, there had been an average of 160 terrorist incidents (assassinations, bombings, etc.) per month in the Deep South, but this declined significantly to less than 60 incidents per month in the first 6 months of 2008. The number of killed or injured individuals gradually increased from 120 in 2004 to 200 a month in 2007, but this halved to 100 per month in the first 6 months of 2008.223 Since 9/11, the Thai government has been waging a

vigorous military campaign against terrorist groups in the country, especially in the southern part.224 Thailand also enhanced its border security system through the installation of the Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES) at major airports to track movement of passengers. PISCES aimed to prevent the entry of transnational terrorist and criminal groups. Thailand, like some other countries in Southeast Asia, has also introduced the issuance of electronic passports, each with an embedded microchip containing biometric information.225 To facilitate law enforcement operations against terrorism, Thailand acceded in January, 2006 to the ASEAN Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty. Thailand also passed the Computer Related Crime Act of 2007 to address the threat of cyber-terrorism. The Bangkok-based International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) also played a vital role in regional counter terrorism training by offering various modules like post-blast and crime scene investigation courses, and the Anti-terrorism Executive Forum.

223“Counter Terrorism: Surge in Thailand,” Strategy Page (19 August, 2008) at http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htterr/20080819.aspx <accessed on 19 June, 2009>. 224 For detailed discussion, see Arabinda Acharya, Sabrina Chua and Rohan Gunaratna, Conflict and Terrorism in Southern Thailand (Singapore: Eastern University Press/Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2006). 225“Cooperation on Counter Terrorism in the Region: Threats, Measures and Strategies” (Briefing notes of Thai delegation on counter terrorism measures in Thailand, 2007) at http://74.125.153.132/search?q=cache:pwedYciEXn4J:www1.apan-info.net/<accessed on 19 June, 2009>.


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As a result of its counter terrorism operations, Thailand was able to arrest several suspected terrorists including the arrest in 2003 of Nurjaman Riduan bin Isomuddin (a.k.a. Hambali), JI's operations chief and the architect behind the 2002 Bali Bombings.226

226For more discussion on Thailand’s counter terrorism accomplishments, see “Country Reports on Terrorism 2008: Thailand” (30 April, 2009) at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,,THA,4562d8cf2,49fac688c,0.html <accessed on 19 June, 2009>.


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CHAPTER V

REGIONAL COOPERATION TO COUNTER TERRORISM Though terrorist threats confronting Southeast Asia predated 9/11, regional cooperation against terrorism became more pronounced only after 9/11. Countries in Southeast Asia were even initially in denial that terrorist threats existed in the region despite the strong American declaration immediately after 9/11 that Southeast Asia was the second front in the GWOT. It was only after the 2002 Bali Bombing that Southeast Asian countries paid closer attention to the virulent terrorist threats facing the region. Despite the limitation of ASEAN in addressing regional security threats, it remains the pivotal organization in Southeast Asia tasked to tackle issues of regional cooperation to counter terrorism. ASEAN since 9/11 has adopted several declarations and statements about the region’s commitment to fight terrorism. However, ASEAN countries do not have a very good track record in translating these declarations and statements into concrete collective actions because of a long-standing norm in the region to strictly adhere to the principle of non-interference to the internal affairs of its members. They have even adopted several plans of actions that its member-states have a problem in implementing. Thus, regional cooperation to counter terrorism in Southeast Asia has been largely limited to bilateral and trilateral efforts. Unfortunately, multilateral efforts on counter terrorism only involved few ASEAN members.227 As deeply lamented by the Center for Global Counter Terrorism Cooperation:

Cooperation in fighting terrorism in Southeast Asia has largely been limited to bilateral or trilateral efforts, involving only a few of the ten ASEAN countries. As an organization, ASEAN has made numerous statements and adopted many declarations about its intentions to prevent and combat terrorism. Its members have a mixed

227Center for Global Counter Terrorism Cooperation, Implementing the United Nations General Assembly’s Global Counter Terrorism Strategy in the Asia Pacific (New York: Center on Global Counter Terrorism Cooperation, 2007), p. 7.


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record, however, in incorporating these decisions or commitments into their respective national legislation or practice. They do not have a strong track record when it comes to implementing the existing UN global counter terrorism legal framework.228

Nonetheless, ASEAN contributed to the reinforcement of international counter terrorism norm in Southeast Asia through various declarations and statements. Its first major contribution towards these efforts was the signing of the 2001 Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, which provided the important building blocks for the signing of the 2007 ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism. Cooperation and Coordination Agreements

ASEAN signed several declarations, statements and plans of actions related to countering terrorism. Even before 9/11, ASEAN already signed declarations that have bearing on counter terrorism. These counter terrorism declarations, however, were subsumed under the rubric of transnational crimes. The 1997 Declaration on Transnational Crime and the 1999 ASEAN Action Plan to Combat Transnational Crime are pre-9/11 ASEAN documents that have counter terrorism implications. Prior to 9/11, ASEAN regarded international terrorism as just one of the many issues of transnational crimes facing the region. However, 9/11 provided a strong impetus for ASEAN to promote regional cooperation against terrorism beyond the prism of transnational crimes. Thus, on 5 November, 2001, member countries adopted the ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism at their Seventh ASEAN Summit in Brunei Darussalam. In this declaration, ASEAN members are urged to ensure that in observing “all cooperative efforts to combat terrorism at the regional level,” each member shall “consider joint practical counter terrorism measures in line with specific circumstances in the region and in each member country.”229 To implement this declaration, ASEAN provides the

228Ibid. 229ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism (Brunei Darussalam, 5 November, 2001).


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following specific measures to promote regional cooperation to counter terrorism: Review and strengthen national mechanisms to combat

terrorism; Call for the early signing/ratification of or accession to all

relevant anti-terrorist conventions including the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism;

Deepen cooperation among ASEAN’s front-line law enforcement agencies in combating terrorism and sharing "best practices";

Study relevant international conventions on terrorism with the view of integrating them with ASEAN mechanisms on combating international terrorism;

Enhance information/intelligence exchange to facilitate the flow of information, in particular, on terrorists and terrorist organizations, their movement and funding, and any other information needed to protect lives, property and the security of all modes of travel;

Strengthen existing cooperation and coordination between the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) and other relevant ASEAN bodies in countering, preventing and suppressing all forms of terrorist acts. Particular attention would be paid to finding ways to combat terrorist organizations, support infrastructure and funding and bringing the perpetrators to justice;

Develop regional capacity building programmes to enhance existing capabilities of ASEAN member-countries to investigate, detect, monitor and report terrorist acts;

Discuss and explore practical ideas and initiatives to increase ASEAN's role in and involvement with the international community including extra-regional partners within existing frameworks such as the ASEAN + 3 (China, Japan and the Republic of Korea), the ASEAN Dialogue Partners and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), to make the fight against terrorism a truly regional and global endeavor; and

Strengthen cooperation at the bilateral, regional and international levels in combating terrorism in a comprehensive manner and affirm that at the international level, the United Nations should play a major role in this regard.


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However, regional norms in Southeast Asia and ASEAN institutional structure prevent member countries to effectively implement the above measures. Though ASEAN has adopted regional action plans against terrorism, their implementation still depend on voluntary participation of members. Because of existing norms of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia anchored on the principle of non-intervention, there is no way for ASEAN to discipline “non-cooperative” member, except through “peer-pressure.” Thus, ASEAN members are too cautious in their approach in regional counter terrorism in order to maintain ASEAN solidarity.

As a result, counter terrorism in Southeast Asia rests on the capacity of individual members to act. Inter-state coordination against terrorism remains voluntary and non-binding. This limits the role of ASEAN to actually address terrorist threats in the region. ASEAN’s stand against terrorism has not moved beyond the level of political rhetoric because of the perennial absence of strong institutional framework. Assistance and Support: Intelligence Sharing, Cross Border Apprehension Intra-ASEAN assistance and support against terrorism continue to be limited as most members in ASEAN rely on the support of major powers. Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines signed the Trilateral Agreement on Information Exchange and Communication Procedures on May, 2002 to enhance intelligence sharing for regional counter terrorism purposes. Cambodia and Thailand eventually joined the three countries. However, actual intelligence sharing on terrorist threats in Southeast Asia remains dismal because of sensitive issues of national sovereignty.

Though efforts have been exerted to build greater trust and confidence among ASEAN members through various regional mechanisms, ASEAN intelligence officials have not reached enough comfort levels to freely share information. As bewailed by one official of the Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counter Terrorism based in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, “national intelligence agencies of the ASEAN states sometimes refuse to share information.”230 The issue of national sovereignty is

230Quoted in Jorn Dosch, “Sovereignty Rules: Human Security, Civil Society, and the Limits of Liberal Reform” in Donald K. Emmerson (ed), Hard Choices: Security,


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repeatedly raised when the problem of intelligence sharing in Southeast Asia is discussed. Thus, intelligence sharing in Southeast Asia, though being strongly encouraged, is not a must and is guided by the “need-to-know basis.” This old habit of not freely sharing intelligence information because of sovereignty issues prevented ASEAN to detect and prevent the evolving threat of terrorism in Southeast Asia.231 Thus far, the most successful regional cooperation among ASEAN states is the MALSINDO of Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia established on 20 July, 2004. Though MALSINDO primarily aims to secure the Straits of Malacca against international piracy through coordinated patrols, it also pursues preventive measures against maritime terrorism. Through the MALSINDO and other regional efforts, piracy in Southeast Asia has declined from 189 attacks in 2003 to only 84 in 2005. Piracy threats in Southeast Asia continued to subside from 2006 to 2008.

In 2006, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) came into force. ReCAAP is a government-to-government agreement that aims to enhance multilateral cooperation among sixteen countries, including ASEAN countries, Bangladesh, China, India, Japan, South Korea and Sri Lanka. ReCAAP also helped reduce piracy attacks in Southeast Asia prompting the International Maritime Bureau to declare that the region was no longer the world’s piracy hotspot.232 The success of MALSINDO and ReCAAP strongly demonstrated that closer regional coordination could reduce security threats facing the region.233

Democracy and Regionalism in Southeast Asia (Singapore and Stanford, CA: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia Pacific Research Center, 2009), p. 86. 231David Martin Jones and Michael Smith, “The Perils of Hyper-Vigilance: The War on Terrorism and the Surveillance State in Southeast Asia,” Intelligence and National Security, vol. 17, no. 4 (Winter, 2002), pp. 31-54. 232Junko Kobayashi, “Piracy Trends in Southeast Asia and Africa” (20 March, 2008) at http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?ID=585 <accessed on 10 June, 2009>. 233Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Maritime Security Threats in the Post-9/11 Southeast Asia: Regional Responses” in Rupert Herbert-Burns, Sam Bateman and Peter Lehr (eds),


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Assessment

Though ASEAN has already numerous frameworks to facilitate regional cooperation to counter terrorism, the organization remains weak in implementing these frameworks. Even if its members have strongly expressed their commitment to fight terrorism in the region, they still have tremendous problems in fulfilling this because of national sensitivities.234 While regional counter terrorism cooperation in ASEAN has improved since 9/11, countering terrorism at the operational level is not yet well-coordinated and it remains to be ad hoc “due to the constraints of conflicting national interests and mutual suspicions.”235 The unresolved bilateral tensions “have stymied security cooperation at both bilateral and multilateral levels.”236 At present, there are only two mechanisms in ASEAN where member countries can pursue regional cooperation against terrorism: the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) and the Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crimes (SOMTC). While these mechanisms provide opportunities for ASEAN members to exchange views and information on issues related to counter terrorism, the AMMTC and SOMTC remain bound to the regional norm of non-interference, which limits ASEAN to effectively counter terrorism at the operational level. The annual ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting (ADMM) also tackles regional terrorism issues. However, the ADMM activities are limited to confidence-building rather than threat prevention.

Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security (London and New York: CRC Press/Taylor and Francis Group, 2009), pp. 253-270. 234Kavi Chongkittavorn, “The Campaign Against Terrorism: An ASEAN Perspective” (Paper delivered at 21st Asia Pacific Roundtable held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on 4-8 June, 2007. 235Tan, “The New Terrorism: How Southeast Asia Can Counter It?” p. 107. 236Ibid.


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CHAPTER VI

SUPPORT OF MAJOR POWERS TO COUNTER TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Since intra-ASEAN regional cooperation against terrorism is very limited, countries in Southeast Asia cautiously rely on the support and assistance of major powers. This section discusses the role of major powers in building the capacity of ASEAN states in counter terrorism. Major powers included in this paper are Australia, India, Canada, China, Japan and the United States.

There are also ASEAN-United Nations, ASEAN-European Union and other inter-regional cooperation against international terrorism. However, this topic is beyond the scope of this study. A separate study is needed to examine the achievements and challenges of inter-regional cooperation against international terrorism.

Types of Support

Major powers have different types of support to Southeast Asian countries in the area of counter terrorism. Support ranges from development aid, capacity building training and technical assistance as well as transfer of military technologies. a) Australia

Australia has been a target of terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia. Many Australians were victims of the 2002 Bali Bombing. Australia is also included in the four-Mantiqi structure of JI. Thus, Australia implemented various counter terrorism assistance to the region in building the capacity of Southeast Asian governments in fighting terrorism.

Canberra has strongly promoted cooperation with key

governments in Southeast Asia in order to bring terrorists to justice and prevent further terrorist attacks in the region.237 Australia’s counter terrorism assistance to Southeast 237Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “International Counter Terrorism” at http://www.dfat.gov.au/globalissues/terrorism.html <accessed on 9 June, 2009>.


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Asia includes capacity building assistance and information sharing that are focused on law enforcement, intelligence, border and transport security, diplomacy, defense, terrorist financing, legal capacity, countering the threat of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism, and promoting inter-faith understanding.238

To pursue bilateral counter terrorism cooperation among

Southeast Asian countries, Australia signed memorandum of understanding on counter terrorism with Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. Australia and ASEAN even signed the Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism on 1 July, 2004 in order to reaffirm their determination to prevent, suppress and eliminate international terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.

Australia also supported the Bali Counter Terrorism

Process (BCTP) launched in 2004. The BCTP aims to bring together an ad hoc group of states and pertinent organizations and groups inside and outside Southeast Asia for the improvement of cooperation in law enforcement, information sharing and strengthening legal frameworks against terrorism.239 Table 5 shows Australia’s Counter Terrorism Capacity Building Initiatives in Southeast Asia (focused on Department of Defense and Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade).

238Ibid. 239“Bali Counter Terrorism Process” at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/terrorism/report0608.html <accessed on 9 June, 2009>.


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Table 5 Australia’s Counter Terrorism Capacity Building

Initiatives in Southeast Asia (Focused on Department of Defense and Department of

Foreign Affairs and Trade)

Department of Defense (DOD)

Budget measure: Investing in Australia ’s Security —enhanced regional consequence management training Funding: $0.7 million under the 2004-05 budget; absorbed for expenditure over four years (to June 2008) Description: To provide counter terrorism consequence management training with regional countries Budget measure: Investing in Australia ’s Security - enhanced regional cooperation Funding: $0.8 million under the 2004-05 budget; absorbed for expenditure over four years Description: To enhance cooperation with regional counterparts on regional counter terrorism issues

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)

Budget measure: National Security - strengthening regional counter terrorism Funding: $35 million under the 2006-07 budget over four years -lapses June, 2010 Description: To improve coordination with counter terrorism partners; work against the threat of terrorists acquiring, developing or using chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons; build regional emergency response coordination mechanisms; and work with regional governments to promote tolerance and counteract terrorist propaganda

Source: Peter Chalk and Carl Ungerer, Neighborhood Watch: Evolving Terrorist Threats in Southeast Asia (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2008), pp. 38-39. b) India

India and ASEAN share common security predicaments in countering international terrorism because of interconnection of jihadi terrorism between Southeast Asia and India.240 Thus, on

240Sudhire Devare, India and Southeast Asia: Towards Security Convergence (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), p. 62.


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8 October, 2003, India and ASEAN signed the Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism. Table 6 shows the areas and scope of India-ASEAN counter terrorism cooperation:

Table 6

Areas and Scope of ASEAN-India Counter Terrorism Cooperation

Continue and improve intelligence and terrorist financing information sharing on counter terrorism measures, including the development of more effective counter terrorism policies and legal, regulatory and administrative counter terrorism regimes.

Enhance liaison relationships amongst their law enforcement agencies to engender practical counter terrorism regimes.

Strengthen capacity-building efforts through training and education; consultations between officials, analysts and field operators; and seminars, conferences and joint operations as appropriate.

Provide assistance on transportation, border and immigration control challenges, including document and identity fraud to stem effectively the flow of terrorist-related material, money and people.

Comply with United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1373, 1267, 1390 and other United Nations resolutions or declarations on international terrorism.

Explore on a mutual basis additional areas of cooperation.

Source: ASEAN-India Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism (8 October, 2003). c) Canada

Canada’s counter terrorism support to Southeast Asia is part of the country’s Counter Terrorism Capacity Building (CTCB) Assistance Program. The CTCB Program was created in 2005 in order to provide training, funding and equipment, technical and legal assistance to other states and enables them to prevent and respond to terrorist activity in a manner consistent with international counter terrorism and human rights norms,


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standards and obligations.241 Through this program, it implemented several counter terrorism assistance projects in Southeast Asia, particularly in the area of maritime, aviation, border and transportation security, criminal justice, institution building, human rights, legislative drafting, counter terrorist financing, and responding to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attacks. Canada’s support to Southeast Asia in the area of counter terrorism is further cemented by the signing of ASEAN-Canada Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism on 28 July, 2006. Table 7 shows areas of cooperation listed in the Declaration.

Table 7

Areas of Cooperation in ASEAN-Canada Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism

Exchange of information on the organization, activities, methods, arms used, financing and movement of terrorists and counter terrorism measures, including the development of more effective policies and legal, regulatory and administrative counter terrorism regimes, in accordance with relevant international and domestic law;

Greater cooperation on law enforcement measures, including those aimed at prevention, investigation, apprehension and prosecution of terrorist activities via regional initiatives such as the Law Enforcement Working Group established by the Bali Regional Ministerial Meeting on Counter Terrorism and other ASEAN mechanisms;

Strengthened capacity building efforts, including training and technical assistance, seminars, workshops and the exchange of best practices, as appropriate;

Improved border control, customs and immigration and transport security procedures to ensure the integrity of travel documents, prevent document and identity fraud, and stem the flow of terrorist-related material, money and people;

241Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Counter Terrorism Capacity Building Assistance Program (CTCB)” at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/internationalcrime-old/ctcbp/menu-en.asp <accessed on 8 June, 2009>.


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Enhanced legal cooperation in criminal matters to bring terrorists to justice, including streamlining the procedures for seeking and granting mutual legal assistance and extradition, where necessary, via regional initiatives such as the Legal Issues Working Group under the framework of the Bali Regional Ministerial Meeting on Counter Terrorism;

Strengthened measures to prevent illegal manufacture, possession or trafficking in weapons, ammunition, explosives and other potentially destructive materials or substances;

Wider exchange of information on best practices and on measures and procedures to strengthen counter terrorism capability and cooperation as well as practical cooperation on measures to suppress the financing of international terrorism;

Compliance with all the relevant UN resolutions and declarations on international terrorism, including relevant UN Security Council Resolutions;

Cooperation to support development initiatives aimed at enhancing quality of life, rule of law, good governance and community awareness in order to reduce the conditions that terrorists seek to exploit;

Implementation measures contained in the ARF’s Statement on Cooperative Counter Terrorism Action on border security, the ARF Statement on Cooperation Against Piracy and Other Threats to Maritime Security, the ARF Statement on Transport Security Against International Terrorism and other relevant ARF statements where appropriate; and

Joint exploration, as appropriate, of additional areas of cooperation.

Source: ASEAN-Canada Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism (28 July, 2006).

In July, 2007, ASEAN and Canada held a joint workshop on preventing bioterrorism. Canada shared counter terrorism-related training, resources and expertise with ASEAN partners to enable effective prevention of and response to terrorist attacks, in a manner consistent with international human rights norms


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and standards. In 2005-2007, Canada funded counter terrorism projects with ASEAN on maritime security, consular capacity building, anti-terrorism financing, human rights and counter terrorism legal assistance and explosive ordinance disposal.242 d) China

China’s counter terrorism support to Southeast Asia is pursued through the broader framework of China-ASEAN Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity inked in Bali, Indonesia on 8 October, 2003. This strategic partnership framework urges both parties to promote non-traditional security issues, which include terrorism. On 30 October, 2006, China and ASEAN met in Nanning, China to enhance their strategic partnership and intensify their cooperation in combating transnational crimes.

China has a serious stake in the terrorism situation in

Southeast Asia because of the links between Uyghur Islamic separatists in China’s Xinxiang Province and some terrorist groups in Southeast Asia. Thus, immediately after 9/11, China formed the National Anti-Terrorism Coordination Group (NATCG) and organized the anti-terrorism bureau of National Ministry of Public Security to conduct research, planning, guidance, coordination and undertaking of the national anti-terror agenda of the Chinese government.243

Though Beijing has improved its military relations with

Southeast Asian countries after 9/11 through military-to-military initiatives like joint military exercises with the Philippines and Thailand, its counter terrorism assistance to Southeast Asia was channeled largely through non-military inducements like trade, investments and foreign development assistance. After 9/11, China improved its bilateral ties with Southeast Asian states and deepened its dialogue partnership with ASEAN using its “soft

242Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Canada-ASEAN, 1997-2007: Celebrating 30 Years of Partnership” at http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/geo/asia-pacific-asie-pacifique-news-actualites-en.aspx?id=10355 <accessed on 9 June, 2009>. 243Pan Guang, “China's Anti-terror Strategy and China's Role in Global Anti-terror Cooperation,” Asia Europe Journal, vol. 2 (2004), pp. 523-532.


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power” diplomacy.244 China’s use of “soft power” reinforced by a new policy of multilateralism created a benign image of Beijing in ASEAN in the age of global terrorism.245

e) Japan

Japan has two major frameworks to pursue counter terrorism assistance to Southeast Asia: Japan International Counter Terrorism Cooperation and ASEAN-Japan Counter Terrorism Dialogue.

Its counter terrorism support to Southeast Asia is part of

Tokyo’s international counter terrorism cooperation program. It has extended capacity building assistance to combat terrorism in Southeast Asia in the following areas: 1) immigration control; 2) aviation security; 3) port and maritime security; 4) customs cooperation; 5) export control; 6) law-enforcement cooperation; 7) anti-terrorist financing; 8) counter-CBRN terrorism; and 9) international counter terrorism conventions and protocols.246 Table 8 is a list of some examples of Japan’s counter terrorism support to Southeast Asia.

244Thomas Lum, Wayne M. Morrison, and Bruce Vaughn, “China’s Soft Power in Southeast Asia,” CRS Report for Congress (4 January, 2008). Also see Eric Teo Cheow, “China’s Rising Soft Power in Southeast Asia,” PacNet 19A, (3 May, 2004). 245Kuik Cheng-Chwee, “Multilateralism in China's ASEAN Policy: Its Evolution, Characteristics, and Aspiration,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 27, no. 1 (April, 2005), pp. 102-122. 246“Japan’s International Counter Terrorism Cooperation” at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/terrorism/cooperation.html <accessed on 9 June, 2009>.


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Table 8 Japan’s Counter Terrorism Support to Southeast Asia

Technical Assistance to introduce computer system identifying

finger print, for the purpose of enhancing criminal investigation and counter terrorism capacity (about 1 billion yen, in 2003).

Seminar on Prevention and Crisis Management of Chemical

Terrorism as a part of cooperation for SEARCCT (about 50 officials from ASEAN countries, China and Korea participated in Malaysia in July, 2004).

Grant assistance of equipment to strengthen airport and port

security in Indonesia (about 747 million yen, decided in 2004). Contribution to Fund for Regional Trade and Financial Security

Initiative (FRTFSI) of Asian Development Bank (ADB), which was agreed to be established in the APEC summit in 2003 (1 million US dollar, in 2004).

Seminar on the Promotion of Accession to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (about 50 officials from ASEAN and Pacific countries participated in Tokyo in December, 2004)

Source: “Japan’s International Counter Terrorism Cooperation” at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/terrorism/cooperation.html <accessed on 9 June, 2009>.

Japan also promotes counter terrorism cooperation with

ASEAN through the ASEAN-Japan Counter Terrorism Dialogue. This dialogue mechanism is a product of the ASEAN-Japan Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism signed at the ASEAN-Japan Summit Meeting in Vientiane, Lao People's Democratic Republic in November, 2004. Japan and ASEAN first held the ASEAN-Japan Counter Terrorism Dialogue on 28-29 June, 2006 in Tokyo. During this dialogue, Japan and ASEAN discussed and identified areas of cooperation in combating terrorism, which included the following: Transport Security; Border Control Immigration; Law Enforcement; Maritime Security; Public Involvement in Countering Terrorism; and Capacity-Building on Legal


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Affairs.247 Japan also provided financial contribution to the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) for the strengthening of the legal framework of Indonesia for counter terrorism. This contribution amounted to US$30,000 in 2005, US$50,000 in 2006 and US$46,000 in 2007.248

f) United States

Among the major powers, the US extended the largest form of counter terrorism assistance to Southeast Asia. The US supported the establishment of SEARCCT in Malaysia and ILEA in Thailand. The US also reinvigorated its security alliance with the Philippines and rebuilt its defense relations with Indonesia while enhancing its long-standing strategic partnership with Singapore.

US counter terrorism assistance to Southeast Asia

largely falls under its Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) Program. Since 1983, this program has assisted 141 countries and trained around 50,000 security personnel worldwide in counter terrorism capacity-building. In 2009, requested budget for ATA amounts to more than $140 million compared to almost $129 million actual budget in 2008.249 Through this program, the US provided technical assistance to individual countries in Southeast Asia in the area of law enforcements, bomb detection, crime scene investigation, airport and building security, maritime and VIP protections.250 ATA trainings to Southeast Asian countries also included the following:

Protecting national borders; Protecting critical infrastructure; Protecting national leadership; Responding to and resolving terrorist incidents; and

247Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “ASEAN-Japan Counter Terrorism Dialogue” at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/dialogue/summary0606.html <accessed on 9 June, 2009>. 248“Japan’s Counter Terrorism Assistance (2004-2007)” at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/terrorism/assist0710.html <accessed on 10 June, 2009>. 249“Reforming Counter Terrorism Assistance Program,” Counter Terrorism Blog (12 February, 2008). 250 US Department of State, “Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program” at http://www.state.gov/m/ds/terrorism/c8583.htm <accessed on 9 June, 2009>.


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Managing critical terrorists incidents having national-level implications.251

Aside from ATA, the US also used the US Foreign Military

Sales (FMS) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) to Southeast Asia as part of the American campaign against international terrorism. The US resorted to arms sales and foreign military training as a reward to its allies in the “war on terror.”252

The Philippines, for example, received in 2004 over $400

million of military assistance from the US to enhance the capability of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to fight international terrorism.253 The US also provided military helicopters and other military equipment and arms to the Philippine troops to fight insurgents. The Philippines became the largest recipient of IMET funds in 2003 in the whole Southeast Asian region amounting to $2.3 million. This was, in fact, the second largest IMET fund to developing country worldwide.254

As one of the American’s Major Non-NATO allies, the

Philippines also received from the US several counter terrorism assistance funds after 9/11.255 The Pentagon provided the Philippines with several sources of counter terrorism training and funding. The Philippines was a beneficiary of the Regional Defense Counter Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) and received $200,000 in 2006, with $175,000 appropriated for 2007. Since 2003, the Philippines has received funding for counterterrorism training through the Foreign Operations

251Ibid. 252Rhea Myerscough and Rachel Stohl, US Arms Exports and Military Assistance in the “Global War on Terror,” 25 Country Profile (Washington DC: Center for Defense Information, 2007), p. 1. 253“Arroyo Bares US aid for Philippine Military Modernization,” People’s Daily (6 March, 2004), p. 10. 254Myerscough and Stohl, US Arms Exports and Military Assistance in the “Global War on Terror,” 25 Country Profile, p. 120. 255See Rommel C. Banlaoi, “The Role of Philippine-American Relations in the Global Campaign Against Terrorism: Implications for Regional Security,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 24, no. 2 (August, 2002), pp. 278-296.


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Budget’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program (ATA), which is part of the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Activities (NADR) account. The Philippines received over $4 million in 2006 alone and was slated to receive a similar amount in 2007 and $3.5 million for 2008.256

Indonesia also received substantial counter terrorism assistance from the US after 9/11.257 Though there were restrictions barring Indonesia from US military assistance programs, Washington resumed and gradually increased military assistance to Jakarta as part of the global campaign against terrorism.258 Indonesia received funding from the US to expand Jakarta’s counter terrorism capabilities. Indonesia received nearly $6 million in 2005 and was slated to receive $5.5 million in 2006 and $6.1 million in 2007.259 As the largest Muslim nation in the world, Indonesia was also a beneficiary of the CTFP, receiving $600,000 in 2005 and $700,000 in 2006.260 As a Major Non-NATO ally, Thailand also benefited from US counter terrorism assistance.261 Thailand received substantive IMET funding from the US, with $3.5 million requested in 2007 and 2008. In 2006, Thailand received $2.4 million in IMET and $1.5 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF).262 Though the US suspended its assistance to Thailand on 26 September, 2006 to pressure Bangkok to democratize, Thailand was a beneficiary of the CTFP and received $200,000 in 2006 and $175,000 in 2007.263

256Myerscough and Stohl, US Arms Exports and Military Assistance in the “Global War on Terror,” 25 Country Profile, p. 120. 257See Anthony L. Smith, “A Glass Half Full: Indonesia-US Relations in the Age of Terror,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 25, no. 3 (December, 2003), pp. 449-472. 258Myerscough and Stohl, US Arms Exports and Military Assistance in the “Global War on Terror,” 25 Country Profile, p. 63. 259Ibid. 260Ibid., p. 64. 261See Paul Chambers, “US-Thai Relations after 9/11: A New Era in Cooperation?” Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 26, no. 3 (December, 2004), pp. 460-479. 262Myerscough and Stohl, US Arms Exports and Military Assistance in the “Global War on Terror,” 25 Country Profile, p. 128. 263Ibid., p. 129.


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How Effective Are They? With the counter terrorism assistance from the major powers, Southeast Asian countries were able to improve their national capacities to fight terrorism. Foreign assistance enabled ASEAN members to bridge the budgetary gap in the campaign against terror. Support from external powers also provided ASEAN members to learn from the various exemplary practices in counter terrorism and offered smaller states to make their existing practices inter-operable with the bigger states.

However, various counter terrorism assistance to Southeast Asia were largely short-term remedies to long-standing sources of political violence and terrorism in the region. While the American-led war on terrorism led to the arrest, neutralization and killing of several terrorist personalities in the region, threats from existing terrorist groups in the region undoubtedly remain. The ASG and JI, two major foreign terrorist organizations in Southeast Asia, continue to operate and are still growing in strength despite the vigorous counter terrorism campaign against them. The ASG, for example, has grown in strength from around 300 in 2008 to more than 400 as of June, 2009. Though the current figure is already small compared in 1998 when the ASG strength reached its all-time high of 1,300, its growing number since January, 2009 indicates the resilience of ASG as a terrorist organization.264 The JI, on the other hand, continues to pose a threat not only to Indonesia but also in the whole of Southeast Asia, considering that around 900 members are still at large. Though JI is presently divided between the “bombers” who endorse political violence and terrorism, and the “preachers” who want to concentrate on Islamic propagation, the two JI factions continue to assist each other. Since 9/11, there have been several arrests of JI members and leaders including Abu Dujana, Zarkashih and Aris Widodo. JI as a whole has not been neutralized as it maintains significant cells in other parts of 264Rommel C. Banlaoi, “The Abu Sayyaf Group and Terrorism in the Southern Philippines: Threat and Response” in Patricio N. Abinales and Nathan G. Quimpo (eds), The US and the War on Terror in the Philippines (Pasig City: Anvil, 2008), pp. 113-150.


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Indonesia, particularly in Sumatra.265 JI master bombers, Dulmatin and Omar Patek, are still hiding in the Southern Philippines with the help of ASG and the MILF personalities.

265Tim Huxley, “Southeast Asia in 2007: Domestic Concerns, Delicate Bilateral Relations and Patchy Regionalism,” Southeast Asian Affairs 2008 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), p. 16.


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CHAPTER VII

THE FUTURE OF TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

As this paper demonstrates, terrorism in Southeast Asia has long standing underlying origins. It is a product of grievances of Muslims in the region clamoring for their right to practice their Islamic way of life. Threats emanating from JI date back to the post-colonial ideology of DI, which advocates for the establishment of Islamic state in Indonesia. Those emanating from ASG, on the other hand, are reflections of the four hundred years of struggle of Muslim communities in the Philippines for self-determination. The association of JI and ASG with Al-Qaeda gave these two groups a global ideology shared by other violent extremist groups in the world.

There is no doubt that the GWOT has successfully

destroyed the global infrastructure of Al-Qaeda. The war on terrorism in Southeast Asia, on the other hand, has weakened the JI. The Philippine campaign against terrorism has also crippled the original organizational set-up of the ASG.

However, Al-Qaeda, JI and ASG remain capable of

mounting terrorist attacks as destructive as 9/11, the two Bali Bombings and the Superferry 14 Bombing. While many leaders have been killed in battle, executed, imprisoned or convinced to leave terrorism behind, there are still younger members willing to take the place of their predecessors. This is due to the fact that the ideology of Al-Qaedaism that informs the actions of these terrorist groups remains alive and continues to inspire younger generations of jihadist or Mujahedeen.

With the ideology of Al-Qaedaism reinforced by the underlying conditions that propel groups to resort to various terrorist acts, terrorism in Southeast Asia will continue to pose a threat to global, regional and national security. While military campaigns against terrorism groups in Southeast Asia may provide short-term remedy to current threats, long-term solutions against terrorism need non-military approaches. Military approaches can kill terrorists but not the ideology that justifies terrorism.


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Since the Second Bali Bombings in Indonesia and the Valentine’s Day Bombings in the Philippines in 2005, there has been no major terrorist attack in the region, except for some kidnap-for-ransom activities in the Southern Philippines perpetrated by the combined operations of JI and ASG. This has been interpreted that security authorities in Southeast Asia have dealt a number of severe blows to terrorist groups in the region.266

However, there is no reason to be complacent as surviving elements of JI and ASG are still planning future attacks. Remaining leaders of JI and ASG are also engaged in vigorous recruitment activities to lure younger Muslims to join their cause through ideological indoctrination and material inducement.

In the coming years, terrorist threats will remain. The

current terrorism situation in Southeast Asia, however, offers ground for cautious optimism as the JI and ASG have limited capacity at present to mount large scale terrorist operations.267

266International Risk, Terrorism Trends in 2009 (Hong Kong: International Risk Company, 2009), p. 5. 267Ibid., p. 6.


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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION The American-led international coalition against terrorism made Southeast Asia the second front in the GWOT. Though the idea of the second front was contested by some scholars and analysts, this label has put Southeast Asia in the counter terrorism radars of major powers prompting ASEAN states to take decisive actions against terrorism. Understanding terrorism in Southeast Asia may be viewed from the globalist, regionalist and nationalist perspectives. Though these perspectives stand on their own, they are, however, complimentary and offer us a better understanding of the multifaceted dimensions of terrorist threats. Combining these three perspectives in their proper contexts will give a more holistic and comprehensive view of terrorism issues in the region. Though many groups have been labeled as terrorist organizations in the region, JI and ASG receive international notoriety because of their various terrorist attacks that caught the attention of the global community. ASEAN, however, failed to prevent many terrorist attacks of JI and ASG due to limited information sharing and weak mechanism for regional coordination. Nonetheless, assistance and support from major powers have enhanced the capacity of ASEAN governments to address terrorist threats. This resulted in the organizational weakening of JI and ASG with the arrest, execution and neutralization of their key leaders and followers. However, terrorist threats in Southeast Asia are far from over as the ideology that justifies terrorism continues to live in the hearts and minds of remaining members. Moreover, the political, economic and social conditions conducive to the emergence of terrorism continue to exist in Southeast Asia.

While military campaigns against terrorist groups in the region have weakened the physical infrastructure of terrorism, there is a larger challenge to defeat the ideology of terrorism. This requires more than military solutions. There is, therefore, a need to counter the ideology of terrorism through social, political and economic approaches.


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In short, an effective approach to counter terrorism in Southeast Asia is to address the underlying conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism.


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APPENDIX


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ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism Member Countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) - Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Republic of Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Union of Myanmar, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Kingdom of Thailand, and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, hereinafter referred to as “the Parties;” RECALLING the Charter of the United Nations and relevant principles of international law, the relevant international conventions and protocols relating to counter terrorism and relevant resolutions of the United Nations on measures aimed at countering international terrorism, and reaffirming our commitment to protect human rights, fair treatment, the rule of law, and due process as well as the principles enshrined in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia done at Bali on 24 February, 1976; REAFFIRMING that terrorism cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nationality, civilisation or ethnic group; RECALLING also the ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism and the Declaration on Terrorism adopted at the ASEAN Summits in 2001 and 2002, respectively; REAFFIRMING our commitment to the Vientiane Action Programme done at Vientiane on 29 November, 2004, particularly its thrust on “shaping and sharing of norms” and the need, among others, to work towards the conclusion of an ASEAN Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement, and an ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism, and the establishment of an ASEAN Extradition Treaty as envisaged by the 1976 Declaration of ASEAN Concord; DEEPLY CONCERNED over the grave danger posed by terrorism to innocent lives, infrastructure and the environment, regional and international peace and stability as well as to economic development;


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REALISING the importance of identifying and effectively addressing the root causes of terrorism in the formulation of any counter terrorism measures; REITERATING that terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, committed wherever, whenever, and by whomsoever, is a profound threat to international peace and security and a direct challenge to the attainment of peace, progress and prosperity for ASEAN and the realisation of ASEAN Vision 2020; REAFFIRMING our strong commitment to enhance cooperation in countering terrorism which covers the prevention and suppression of all forms of terrorist acts; REITERATING the need to improve regional cooperation on counter terrorism and undertake effective measures through deepening cooperation among ASEAN law enforcement agencies and relevant authorities in countering terrorism; ENCOURAGING the Parties to become parties as soon as possible to the relevant international conventions and protocols relating to counter terrorism; Have agreed as follows:

Article I Objective

This Convention shall provide for the framework for regional cooperation to counter, prevent and suppress terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and to deepen cooperation among law enforcement agencies and relevant authorities of the Parties in countering terrorism.

Article II Criminal Acts of Terrorism

1. For the purposes of this Convention, “offence” means any of the offences within the scope of and as defined in any of the treaties listed as follows:

a. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on 16 December, 1970;


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b. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, concluded at Montreal on 23 September, 1971;

c. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, adopted in New York on 14 December, 1973;

d. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, adopted in New York on 17 December, 1979;

e. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, adopted in Vienna on 26 October, 1979;

f. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal on 24 February, 1988;

g. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, done at Rome on 10 March, 1988;

h. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, done at Rome on 10 March, 1988;

i. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted in New York on 15 December, 1997;

j. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted in New York on 9 December, 1999;

k. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, adopted in New York on 13 April, 2005;

l. Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, done at Vienna on 8 July, 2005;

m. Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, done at London on 14 October, 2005; and

n. Protocol of 2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, done at London on 14 October, 2005.

2. On depositing its instrument of ratification or approval, a Party which is not a Party to a treaty listed in paragraph 1 of this Article may declare that, in the application of this Convention to that Party, that treaty shall be deemed not to be included in


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paragraph 1 of this Article. This declaration shall cease to have an effect as soon as the treaty enters into force for the Party having made such a declaration, which shall notify the depositary as stated in paragraph 2 of Article XX of this entry into force. 3. When a Party ceases to be a party to a treaty listed in paragraph 1 of this Article, it may make a declaration as provided for in this Article, with respect to that treaty.

Article III Sovereign Equality, Territorial Integrity and Non-

Interference

The Parties shall carry out their obligations under this Convention in a manner consistent with the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States and that of non-interference in the internal affairs of other Parties.

Article IV Preservation of Sovereignty

Nothing in this Convention entitles a Party to undertake, in the territory of another Party, the exercise of jurisdiction or performance of functions which are exclusively reserved for the authorities of that other Party by its domestic laws.

Article V

Non-Application

This Convention shall not apply where the offence is committed within a single Party, the alleged offender and the victims are nationals of that Party, the alleged offender is found in the territory of that Party and no other Party has a basis under this Convention to exercise jurisdiction.

Article VI Areas of Cooperation

1. The areas of cooperation under this Convention may, in conformity with the domestic laws of the respective Parties, include appropriate measures, among others, to:


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a. Take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts, including the provision of early warning to the other Parties through the exchange of information;

b. Prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from using their respective territories for those purposes against the other Parties and/or the citizens of the other Parties;

c. Prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts; d. Prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by

effective border control and controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and through measures for preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel documents;

e. Promote capacity-building including trainings and technical cooperation and the holding of regional meetings;

f. Promote public awareness and participation in efforts to counter terrorism, as well as enhance inter-faith and intra-faith dialogue and dialogue among civilisations;

g. Enhance cross-border cooperation; h. Enhance intelligence exchange and sharing of information; i. Enhance existing cooperation towards developing regional

databases under the purview of the relevant ASEAN bodies;

j. Strengthen capability and readiness to deal with chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) terrorism, cyber terrorism and any new forms of terrorism;

k. Undertake research and development on measures to counter terrorism;

l. Encourage the use of video conference or teleconference facilities for court proceedings, where appropriate; and

m. Ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice.

2. Subject to the consent of the Parties concerned, Parties shall cooperate to address the root causes of terrorism and conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism to prevent the perpetration of terrorist acts and the propagation of terrorist cells.


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Article VII State Jurisdiction

1. A Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences covered in Article II of this Convention when:

a. The offence is committed in the territory of that Party; or

b. The offence is committed on board a vessel flying the flag of that Party or an aircraft which is registered under the laws of that Party at the time the offence is committed; or

c. The offence is committed by a national of that Party.

2. A Party may also establish its jurisdiction over any such offence when:

a. The offence is committed against a national of that Party; or

b. The offence is committed against a state or government facility of that Party abroad, including its embassy or other diplomatic or consular premises; or

c. The offence is committed in an attempt to compel that Party to do or to abstain from doing any act; or

d. The offence is committed by a stateless person with habitual residence in the territory of that Party.

3. A Party shall likewise establish its jurisdiction over the offences covered in Article II of this Convention in cases where the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite that person to any of the Parties that have established their jurisdiction in accordance with paragraph 1 or 2 of this Article. 4. This Convention does not exclude the exercise of any criminal jurisdiction established by a Party in accordance with its domestic laws.

Article VIII Fair Treatment

1. Any person who is taken into custody or regarding whom any other measures are taken or proceedings are carried out


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pursuant to this Convention shall be guaranteed fair treatment, including enjoyment of all rights and guarantees in conformity with the laws of the Party in the territory of which that person is present and applicable provisions of international law, including international human rights law. 2. Upon receiving information that a person who has committed or who is alleged to have committed an offence covered in Article II of this Convention may be present in its territory, the Party concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary under its domestic laws to investigate the facts contained in the information. 3. Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, the Party in whose territory the offender or alleged offender is present shall take the appropriate measures under its domestic laws so as to ensure that person’s presence for the purpose of prosecution or extradition. 4. Any person regarding whom measures referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article are being taken shall be entitled:

a. To communicate without delay with the nearest appropriate representative of the State of which that person is a national or which is otherwise entitled to protect that person's rights;

b. To be visited by a representative of that State; c. To be informed of that person's rights under

subparagraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 4 of this Article.

5. The rights referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the Party in the territory of which the offender or alleged offender is present, subject to the provision that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under paragraph 4 of this Article are intended. 6. When a Party, pursuant to the present Article, has taken a person into custody, it shall immediately notify, directly or through the Secretary-General of ASEAN, the Parties which have established jurisdiction in accordance with paragraph 1 or 2 of Article VII, and, if it considers it advisable, any other interested


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Parties, of the fact that such person is in custody and of the circumstances which warrant that person’s detention. The Party which is carrying out the investigation referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article shall promptly inform the said Parties of its findings and shall indicate whether it intends to exercise jurisdiction over the said person.

Article IX General Provisions

1. The Parties shall adopt such measures as may be necessary, including, where appropriate, national legislation, to ensure that offences covered in Article II of this Convention, especially when it is intended to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organisation to do or to abstain from doing any act, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature. 2. Pursuant to Article VI of this Convention, the Parties shall, where possible, establish channels of communication between their competent agencies to facilitate the exchange of information to prevent the commission of offences covered in Article II of this Convention. 3. The Party where the alleged offender is prosecuted shall, upon the request of the other Parties claiming jurisdiction over the same, communicate the status of the case at any stage of the proceedings to those other Parties.

Article X Status of Refugees

The Parties shall take appropriate measures, in conformity with the relevant provisions of their respective domestic laws and applicable international law, including international standards of human rights, before granting refugee status, where the Parties recognise and grant such status, for the purpose of ensuring that the asylum seeker has not planned, facilitated or participated in the commission of terrorist acts.


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Article XI Rehabilitative Programmes

The Parties shall endeavour to promote the sharing of best practices on rehabilitative programmes including, where appropriate, social reintegration of persons involved in the commission of any of the offences covered in Article II of this Convention with the objective of preventing the perpetration of terrorist acts.

Article XII Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters

1. The Parties shall, in conformity with their respective domestic laws, afford the widest measure of assistance in connection with investigations or criminal proceedings brought in respect of the offences covered in Article II of this Convention. 2. The Parties shall, where they are parties to the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters done in Kuala Lumpur on 29 November, 2004, carry out their obligations under paragraph 1 of this Article in conformity with that Treaty.

Article XIII Extradition

1. The Party in the territory of which the alleged offender is present shall, in cases to which Article VII of this Convention applies, if it does not extradite that person, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed in its territory, to submit the case without undue delay to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings in accordance with the domestic laws of that Party. Those authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any other offence of a grave nature under the domestic laws of that Party. 2. The offences covered in Article II of this Convention shall be deemed to be included as extraditable offences in any extradition treaty existing between any of the Parties before the entry into force of this Convention. The Parties undertake to include such offences as extraditable offences in every extradition treaty to be subsequently concluded between them.


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3. When a Party which makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another Party with which it has no extradition treaty, the requested Party may, at its option, and in conformity with its domestic laws, consider this Convention as a legal basis for extradition in respect of the offences covered in Article II of this Convention.

Article XIV Political Offences Exception

None of the offences covered in Article II of this Convention shall be regarded for the purposes of extradition under Article XIII of this Convention or mutual legal assistance in criminal matters under Article XII of this Convention as a political offence or as an offence connected with a political offence or as an offence inspired by political motives. Accordingly, a request for extradition or for mutual legal assistance in criminal matters based on such an offence may not be refused on the sole ground that it concerns a political offence or an offence connected with a political offence or an offence inspired by political motives.

Article XV

Designation of Central Authorities or Coordinating Structures

Each Party shall designate, as appropriate, a central authority or coordinating structure to enhance cooperation under this Convention.

Article XVI

Implementation, Monitoring and Review

The relevant ASEAN sectoral bodies involved in ASEAN cooperation on countering terrorism shall be responsible for monitoring and reviewing the implementation of this Convention.


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Article XVII Confidentiality

1. Each Party shall preserve the confidentiality and secrecy of documents, records and other information received from any other Party, including the source thereof. 2. No document, record or other information obtained pursuant to this Convention shall be disclosed to or shared with any other Party, State or person except with the prior written consent of the Party which provided such document, record or information.

Article XVIII Relationship with Other International Instruments

This Convention shall not derogate from obligations subsisting between the Parties pursuant to other international agreements nor, where the Parties agree, shall it prevent the Parties from providing assistance to each other pursuant to other international agreements or the provisions of their respective domestic laws.

Article XIX Settlement of Disputes

Any difference or dispute between the Parties arising from the interpretation or application of the provisions of this Convention shall be settled amicably through consultation and negotiation between the Parties through diplomatic channels or any other peaceful means for the settlement of disputes as agreed upon between the Parties.

Article XX Ratification, Approval and Depositary

1. This Convention shall be subject to ratification or approval in accordance with the internal procedures of the Parties. 2. The instruments of ratification or approval shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of ASEAN who shall promptly inform the other Parties of such deposit.


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Article XXI Entry into Force and Amendment

1. This Convention shall enter into force on the 30th (thirtieth) day following the date of the deposit of the 6th (sixth) instrument of ratification or approval with the Secretary-General of ASEAN in respect of those Parties that have submitted their instruments of ratification or approval. 2. For any Party ratifying or approving this Convention after the deposit of the 6th (sixth) instrument of ratification or approval, but before the day the Convention enters into force, the Convention shall also apply to that Party on the date the Convention enters into force. 3. In respect of a Party ratifying or approving this Convention subsequent to its entry into force pursuant to paragraph 1, it shall enter into force for that Party on the date its instrument of ratification or approval is deposited. 4. This Convention may be modified or amended at any time by mutual written consent of the Parties. Such modification or amendment shall enter into force on such date as shall be mutually agreed upon by Parties and shall form part of this Convention. 5. Any modification or amendment shall not affect the rights and obligations of the Parties arising from or based on the provisions of this Convention before the entry into force of such modification or amendment.

Article XXII Withdrawal

1. Any Party may withdraw from this Convention at any time after the date of the entry into force of this Convention for that Party. 2. The withdrawal shall be notified by an instrument of withdrawal to the Secretary-General of ASEAN. 3. The withdrawal shall take effect 180 (one hundred and eighty) days after the receipt of the instrument of withdrawal by the Secretary-General of ASEAN.


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4. The Secretary-General of ASEAN shall promptly notify all the other Parties of any withdrawal.

Article XXIII Registration

This Convention shall be registered by the Secretary-General of ASEAN to the United Nations Secretariat pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. DONE at Cebu, Philippines, this Thirteenth Day of January in the Year Two Thousand and Seven, in a single original copy in the English language.

For Brunei Darussalam: HAJI HASSANAL BOLKIAH Sultan of Brunei Darussalam

For the Kingdom of Cambodia: SAMDECH HUN SEN

Prime Minister

For the Republic of Indonesia: DR. SUSILO BAMBANG YUDHOYONO

President

For the Lao People’s Democratic Republic:

BOUASONE BOUPHAVANH Prime Minister

For Malaysia: DATO’ SERI ABDULLAH AHMAD BADAWI

Prime Minister


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For the Union of Myanmar: GENERAL SOE WIN

Prime Minister

For the Republic of the Philippines: GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

President

For the Republic of Singapore: LEE HSIEN LOONG

Prime Minister

For the Kingdom of Thailand: GENERAL SURAYUD CHULANONT (RET.)

Prime Minister

For the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam: NGUYEN TAN DUNG

Prime Minister


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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

The author is Chairman of the Board and Executive

Director of the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research (PIPVTR) and Head of its Center for Intelligence and National Security Studies. He is also currently the Chairman of the Council for Asian Terrorism Research (CATR), the largest association of terrorism think tanks in the Asia Pacific region. He is also a Senior Fellow of Yuchengco Center.

The author became a Professor of Political Science at the National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP), Assistant Professor of International Studies at De La Salle University (DLSU), Instructor of Political Science at the University of the Philippines, Los Baños (UPLB), University Research Associate at the University of the Philippines, Diliman and Director for Research and Publications of the World Citi Colleges. He was also the founding Director of the Mayor’s Development Center of the League of Municipalities of the Philippines (LMP) and served as a member of the Board of Regents of the University of Eastern Pangasinan (UEP). He currently teaches at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and other training schools of the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP). He has authored several books, which include War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia (Rex Book Store, 2004) and Philippine Security in the Age of Terror: National, Regional and Global Challenges in the Post-9/11 World (CRC Press/Taylor and Francis/Routledge, 2009). He is currently involved in two book projects: Militants for Hire:


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Crime-Terrorism Nexus in the Philippines and Prototype 9/11: The Bojinka Plot, Made in the Philippines.

He is married to Grace Quilitorio with two children: Rome Melchizedek and Ronaiah Gail. They presently live in Diliman, Quezon City.