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UK Ministry of DefenceUK Ministry of Defence
CounterCounter--Improvised Explosive DevicesImprovised Explosive Devices
Lieutenant Colonel Peter Sonnex Royal EngineersLieutenant Colonel Peter Sonnex Royal Engineers
Commander Tim Peacock Royal NavyCommander Tim Peacock Royal Navy
UK Ministry of DefenceUK Ministry of Defence
““If you have ten thousand regulations you If you have ten thousand regulations you destroy all respect for the lawdestroy all respect for the law””
Winston Spencer ChurchillWinston Spencer Churchill
UK Ministry of DefenceUK Ministry of Defence
MenuMenu
IEDs and International Humanitarian LawIEDs and International Humanitarian Law
Humanitarian ImpactHumanitarian Impact
CC--IED Doctrine and UK CIED Doctrine and UK C--IED PolicyIED Policy
UK Approach and Lines of OperationUK Approach and Lines of Operation
Attacking the Network (AtN)Attacking the Network (AtN)
UK Ministry of DefenceUK Ministry of Defence
IEDs and IHLIEDs and IHL
Protection of combatants and nonProtection of combatants and non--combatants from combatants from
unnecessary suffering and to safeguard fundamental human unnecessary suffering and to safeguard fundamental human
rightsrights
Civilians shall not be the object of attackCivilians shall not be the object of attack
Restoration of peace and the resumption of friendly relations Restoration of peace and the resumption of friendly relations
between the belligerentsbetween the belligerents
Binding on States and individualsBinding on States and individuals
Requires knowledge of the law of armed conflictRequires knowledge of the law of armed conflict
IEDs are capable of being used lawfullyIEDs are capable of being used lawfully
UK Ministry of DefenceUK Ministry of Defence
IEDs and IHLIEDs and IHL
IEDs are capable of being used lawfully:IEDs are capable of being used lawfully:●●
By combatants in armed conflictBy combatants in armed conflict
-- Including Including ‘‘insurgentsinsurgents’’
in a nonin a non--international armed conflictinternational armed conflict
-- Against military objects in accordance with IHL principlesAgainst military objects in accordance with IHL principles
IEDs are unlawful when used indiscriminately or IEDs are unlawful when used indiscriminately or deliberately in attacks on civiliansdeliberately in attacks on civilians●●
By insurgents in ignorance, terrorists and criminalsBy insurgents in ignorance, terrorists and criminals
-- For intimidation and coercionFor intimidation and coercion
-- In publicity for a causeIn publicity for a cause
UK Ministry of DefenceUK Ministry of Defence
The IED ThreatThe IED Threat
A Global Threat
IED Attacks from January to November 2011
(outside IRQ and AFG):
•
6,832 IED events globally
•
621 IED average monthly events
•
12,286 casualties
•
111 Countries
UK Ministry of DefenceUK Ministry of Defence
Why IEDs?Why IEDs?
Simple to designSimple to design
Cheap Cheap
AdaptableAdaptable
Stand off capabilityStand off capability
A Tactical Weapon which can
have Strategic Effect
UK Ministry of DefenceUK Ministry of Defence
Number of Casualties caused by IEDs in Afghanistan
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800Ja
nFe
bM
arA
prM
ay Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep Oct
Nov
Dec Ja
nFe
bM
arA
prM
ay Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep Oct
Nov
Dec Ja
nFe
bM
ar
2010 2011 2012
Num
ber
of C
asua
lties
Civilian Casualties Security Forces Casualties
Security ForcesSecurity Forces CiviliansCivilians
20102010 54205420 24942494
20112011 62176217 32903290
20122012 880880 412412
UK Ministry of DefenceUK Ministry of Defence
Security ForcesSecurity Forces CiviliansCivilians
KilledKilled InjuredInjured KilledKilled InjuredInjured
20092009 738738 16201620 24982498 1009110091
20102010 592592 18901890 26102610 1055910559
20112011 13441344 30083008 31813181 1084810848
20122012 387387 652652 10391039 30033003
Number of Casualties caused by IEDs in Rest of World
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500Ja
nFe
bM
arA
prM
ay Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep Oct
Nov
Dec Ja
nFe
bM
arA
prM
ay Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep Oct
Nov
Dec Ja
nFe
bM
arA
prM
ay Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep Oct
Nov
Dec Ja
nFe
bM
ar
2009 2010 2011 2012
Num
ber o
f Cas
ualti
es
Civilian Casualties Security Forces Casualties
UK Ministry of DefenceUK Ministry of Defence
DiscriminationDiscrimination
The attack occurred in the Lashkari region at 1030am on 21 JanuaThe attack occurred in the Lashkari region at 1030am on 21 January 2012ry 2012
6 civilians were travelling to an unknown location when they dr6 civilians were travelling to an unknown location when they drove over a ove over a
pressurepressure--plate IEDplate IED
4 were killed instantly, 2 were injured4 were killed instantly, 2 were injured
It is believed the IED was planted to target Afghan Uniformed PIt is believed the IED was planted to target Afghan Uniformed Police or olice or
Afghan National Security ForcesAfghan National Security Forces
Neither the insurgency nor the IEDNeither the insurgency nor the IED
could ensure discriminationcould ensure discrimination
between the intended target(s)between the intended target(s)
and civiliansand civilians
UK Ministry of DefenceUK Ministry of Defence
Stage 3 (End 2015):Institutionalise C-IED capability,
matched in task, scale, concurrency and endurance as set by SDSR,
delivered through EP-funded, TLCM processes and mechanisms.
Stage 3 (End 2015):Institutionalise C-IED capability,
matched in task, scale, concurrency and endurance as set by SDSR,
delivered through EP-funded, TLCM processes and mechanisms.
Stage 1 (End 2010):To transform C-IED to an offensive
posture through delivering C-IED at THF BG level with sustainable capability,
focusing on robust IM/IX, improved IED Detection and empowering ANSF C-IED
capability.
Stage 1 (End 2010):To transform C-IED to an offensive
posture through delivering C-IED at THF BG level with sustainable capability,
focusing on robust IM/IX, improved IED Detection and empowering ANSF C-IED
capability.
Stage 2 (End 2011): Balance capability and capacity to fully support UK Ops, the Olympics
and contingent forces.
Stage 2 (End 2011): Balance capability and capacity to fully support UK Ops, the Olympics
and contingent forces.
The Plan - Institutionalising C-IED
Institutionalisation
ENDSTATE:A UK Defence
C-IEDcapability,
coordinatedacross
Government and with International
Partners,able to meet Defence’s Strategic
Objectives
ENDSTATE:A UK Defence
C-IEDcapability,
coordinatedacross
Government and with International
Partners,able to meet Defence’s Strategic
Objectives
Integrated government effectCOIN & CT synergies
MOUsUN
NATOISAF
Indigenous Forces
The Policy – The Defence Approach
Defence C-IED Framework Cross Government Effect International Engagement
Enabling Functions: Cross cutting activities: Preparing the Force, Equipment Capability, Operational Information Superiority, Science & Technology, Intelligence
DefensiveDeals with IEDs once they have been emplaced,
either by detecting and neutralising them or by mitigating their effects
OffensiveAims to disrupt enemy IED capability and
prevent the use of IEDs to the point when the device is emplaced
Enabling Functions: Cross cutting activities: Preparing the Force, Equipment Capability, Operational Information Superiority, Science & Technology, Intelligence
DefensiveDeals with IEDs once they have been emplaced,
either by detecting and neutralising them or by mitigating their effects
OffensiveAims to disrupt enemy IED capability and
prevent the use of IEDs to the point when the device is emplaced
C- IED STRATEGIC POLICY & PLAN
UK Ministry of DefenceUK Ministry of Defence
Lines of OperationLines of OperationAttack the Network:
Actions and activities designed to reduce the effects and interrupt the insurgent chain of IED activities through:
intel, surveillance, reconnaissance, information operations
counter-bomber targeting
device technical and forensic exploitation
influence and information operations
persistent surveillance
Defeat the Device:
Actions and activities designed to reduce the effects of IED detonations for safe operations, including:
route clearance
device detection and neutralization
military explosive ordnance disposal
vehicle and personnel protection
military working dogs
Prepare the Force:
Actions and activities designed to reduce the effects of insurgent IED employment through, but not limited to:
technology training
operations room simulators
ground sign awareness
tactics and procedures
threat awareness
UK Ministry of DefenceUK Ministry of Defence
Detonation
Post-Blast
Surveillance
Secondary Attack on 1st
Responders
Document Attack
Attack Video
IO Operations
Local IED Cell
Cell Leader
Intel Lead Operations Officer
Financier Logistician
IED Emplacer
Primary Recruiter
Security Lead IED Trainer
Surveillance Lead
Cell Members
Training Camp
Trainees
Local Support
Mosque
Local Hospital
Village
External Influence & Support
Foreign Support
Material Manufacturer
International Support
Regional Support
Funding
Bombmaker
IED Supplier
Regional Support
BombmakerTrainer
IED NetworkIED Network
H
UK Ministry of DefenceUK Ministry of Defence
TrainTrain
SupplySupply
DevelopDevelop
CollectCollect
CoCo--ordinateordinate
Facility (type)Facility (type)
StoreStore
FinanceFinance
EmplaceEmplace
ManufactureManufacture
RecruitRecruit
PlanPlan
TransportTransport
ProcureProcure
Network/SystemNetwork/System
18
Success achieved by cross-government/agency collaboration: 3 networks exposed and disrupted & 20+
detentions across six nations.
Transnational Threat NetworksTransnational Threat Networks
UK Ministry of DefenceUK Ministry of Defence
Lessons IdentifiedLessons Identified
CC--IED requires a comprehensive approachIED requires a comprehensive approach
●●
Sustained effort across all lines of operationSustained effort across all lines of operation
Needs to be institutionalised to be effectiveNeeds to be institutionalised to be effective
●●
Throughout the Armed ForcesThroughout the Armed Forces
●●
Across Government and internationallyAcross Government and internationally
●●
Enshrining what we have learned (and reEnshrining what we have learned (and re--learned)learned)
Requires common understanding and unified actionRequires common understanding and unified action
●●
Not a solely military challengeNot a solely military challenge
●●
Indiscriminate nature and humanitarian impactIndiscriminate nature and humanitarian impact
●●
Counter terrorist/criminal networksCounter terrorist/criminal networks