Climatic Change (2011) 104:169–197DOI 10.1007/s10584-010-9980-9

Multilevel risk governance and urban adaptation policy

Jan Corfee-Morlot · Ian Cochran ·Stéphane Hallegatte · Pierre-Jonathan Teasdale

Received: 28 July 2009 / Accepted: 6 July 2010 / Published online: 22 December 2010© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Abstract Despite a flurry of activity in cities on climate change and growing in-terest in the research community, climate policy at city-scale remains fragmentedand basic tools to facilitate good decision-making are lacking. This paper drawson an interdisciplinary literature review to establish a multilevel risk governanceconceptual framework. It situates the local adaptation policy challenge and actionwithin this to explore a range of institutional questions associated with strengtheninglocal adaptation and related functions of local government. It highlights the valueof institutional design to include analytic-deliberative practice, focusing on onepossible key tool to support local decision-making—that of boundary organizationsto facilitate local science-policy assessment. After exploring a number of examplesof boundary organisations in place today, the authors conclude that a number ofinstitutional models are valid. A common feature across the different approachesis the establishment of a science-policy competence through active deliberation andshared analysis engaging experts and decision-makers in an iterative exchange ofinformation. Important features that vary include the geographic scope of operationand the origin of funding, the level and form of engagement of different actors,and the relationship with “producers” of scientific information. National and sub-national (regional) governments may play a key role to provide financial andtechnical assistance to support the creation of such boundary organizations withan explicit mandate to operate at local levels; in turn, in a number of instancesboundary organizations have been shown to be able to facilitate local partnerships,

J. Corfee-Morlot (B) · P.-J. TeasdaleOrganization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, Francee-mail: jan.corfee-morlot@oecd.org

I. CochranCERNA—Mines ParisTech./CDC Climat Recherche, Paris, France

S. HallegatteCenter International de Recherche sur l’Environnement et le Développementand École Nationale de la Météorologie, Météo France, Paris, France

170 Climatic Change (2011) 104:169–197

engagement and decision-making on adaptation. While the agenda for multi-levelgovernance of climate change is inevitably much broader than this, first steps bynational governments to work with sub-national governments, urban authorities andother stakeholders to advance capacity in this area could be an important step forlocal adaptation policy agenda.

1 Introduction

The climate policy challenge for cities can be conceptualized as a two-way struggle toachieve climate change protection and socio-economic development simultaneously.One will affect the other—they are inseparable.

Just as cities are part of the problem, they are also part of the solution to climatechange. Cities concentrate economic activity, population and thus also sources ofenergy and waste-related greenhouse gas emissions (IEA 2008). Further, givenworldwide urbanization trends, urban development patterns as we currently under-stand them today are a main driver of vulnerability to climate change. However,these same characteristics suggest that local authorities and other decision-makersthat shape urban development may also play a central role in what is becomingan urgent agenda to adapt to climate change. The right choice of urban policiesis particularly important to ensure that long-lived infrastructures—commercial andresidential buildings, roads and ports, water and transport networks—are designed towithstand the expected increase in climate variability and mean change; these sameinvestments in the urban built environment may simultaneously improve the energyand emission performance of urban economies (Kirshen et al. 2008; Rosenzweig et al.2007). Integrated urban planning is thus central to both adaptation and mitigationefforts. For example, land use decisions and zoning may exacerbate or limit thevulnerability of urban dwellers and of infrastructures to the growing threat of climatechange (see, e.g., Hallegatte, Henriet, Corfee-Morlot, this volume).

Adaptation is necessarily local and will include disaster management to limitvulnerability to current and future hazards such as floods, water shortage or heatwaves (e.g. Satterthwaite et al. 2009; Schipper and Pelling 2006; UNISDR 2008).This will include actions to address the physical drivers of vulnerability, such asinfrastructure standards, and actions to alter more systemic drivers such as laws,urban planning or early warning systems as well as effort to build capacity to adaptthrough better education or information provision (Adger et al. 2007, 2009). Also, asHurricane Katrina reminded us, climate extremes often fall the hardest on the poor(Mathew 2007). The urban poor may be more exposed to climate change than theaverage urban dweller, since they are likely to occupy the cheapest land, sometimesillegally and often the most exposed, such as floodplain areas seen in the Dharavislums in Mumbai (Ranger et al., this volume) and the New Orleans’ 9th Ward (Logan2006). The poor thus also have comparatively lower adaptive capacity in part due tofewer resources to spend on either reactive or planned adaptation (Satterthwaiteet al. 2009; Mathew 2007; Solecki et al. 2005). The high vulnerability of often-largenumbers of urban poor to climate change and extremes makes urban policy andprocesses a key center for design and implementation of anticipatory adaptationaction, including disaster risk management.

Climatic Change (2011) 104:169–197 171

Inevitably, urban-scale and other local action is an important part of national andinternational policy agendas on climate change (Burton et al. 2007). If nothing else,urban actors will be the center of implementation through action on the ground(Moser 2009a; Wilbanks et al. 2007). There is also significant opportunity to integrateclimate change into ongoing centers of urban planning and management—such astransportation and land use planning, public housing for the poor, or disaster preven-tion and response—and this raises the potential for urban adaptation policy to havean impact (Carmin et al. 2009; Kamal-Chaoui and Robert 2009). Cities and othersub-national centers of governance also provide opportunities for experimentationand learning about climate change, acting as laboratories of change and testing newapproaches (Rabe 2004; Corfee-Morlot et al. 2009). Finally, local authorities workin close proximity with a multitude of key local decision-makers (Brunner 1996;Brunner et al. 2005; Grindle and Thomas 1991; Healy 1997)—such as households,community organizations or businesses as well as urban planners or water resourcemanagers—who will invest or not in adaptation (or mitigation) measures (Ostrom2009; Carmin et al. 2009). It is this multitude of decisions and actors that whencombined will comprise the collective response to climate change (Adger et al. 2007;Fankhauser et al. 2008).

Despite increasing levels of attention and action on climate change at the level ofthe city, much of the action to date has been largely decoupled from national policyframeworks. Similarly, national policy frameworks have not always been designedto incentivize and advance the effectiveness of local jurisdictions, even though theyhave potential to do so (DeAngelo and Harvey 1998). Moreover, relatively littleresearch has considered the issue of the multilevel risk governance of climate change,in particular with respect to adaptation, and the unique role of cities, and urbanauthorities in particular, within such a framework.1

This paper focuses in particular on the cross-scale, multilevel governance linkagesbetween national and local policy for adaptation, and draws out lessons from resultsof other papers of this issue as well as from an emerging literature in this area.Notably on the urban policy challenge, the focus is on: Why, what and how mightnational policy assist and empower local governments to become more ef fective actorsin the climate policy arena?

The paper begins by establishing a conceptual framework for understandingpolicy decision-making, and multilevel risk governance of climate change basedon an inter-disciplinary review of the academic literature (Section 2). Within thisframework, we elaborate a number of key institutional governance characteristicsthat will determine or limit the capacity for local authorities to exploit the potentialfor local policy to become a meaningful driver of change. Section 3 considers theneed for analytic-deliberative processes at local scale, starting with science-policyassessment that is framed locally; this suggests building institutional capacity at local

1For example, the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report acknowledges the role of cities in design anddelivery of climate responses and relevant academic literature reviewed, however it remains marginalto the full volume, which is largely focused on the global dimensions of the problem and its possiblesolutions. For chapters that address local dimensions of climate change and policy responses see:Wilbanks et al. (2007), Gupta et al. (2007), Sathaye et al. (2007), Bulkeley and Betsill (2005) andBetsill and Bulkeley (2007) are notable exceptions in bringing attention to multi-level governance.The UNFCCC (2006) in their review of progress in national policy under the Kyoto Protocol alsohighlight some trends for national governments to work more closely with local governments.

172 Climatic Change (2011) 104:169–197

levels to bring deliberation to analysis through engagement of different types ofstakeholders, including experts and policy makers as well as other non-governmentalactors to support adaptation decision-making. Section 3 also illustrates these issuesby examining other articles in this volume. In Section 4, we test this conceptualframework by examining these institutional features through the exploration anumber of practical examples of institutional models for boundary organizationsto support local vulnerability and impact assessment as well as adaptation decision-making. Finally we generalize conclusions from these selected examples to considerthe opportunities and challenges for “linked up” action across levels of governanceon climate change.

2 Towards multilevel climate risk governance: a conceptual framework

Despite growing recognition of global climate change, its understanding is neces-sarily characterized by broad uncertainty, hence the use of the terms risk and riskgovernance (De Marchi 2003; Renn 2001, 2008). This is because global climatechange encompasses a complex array of interactions between a large number ofhuman and natural systems across vast spatial and temporal scales, which in turnchallenges scientific assessments and policy efforts that aim to identify and managethese changes (Rayner and Malone 1998; Schellnhuber et al. 2004; Fisher et al. 2007).Framing climate policy decisions as a risk management issue has gained salience inpolicy circles over the last decade or more (IPCC 1996, 2007).

Notions in the risk governance arena stem from a wide variety of conceptualframeworks and competing social theories that attempt to characterize the rela-tionships between different centers of influence or different types of actors onenvironmental risk outcomes. Renn (2008) highlights broad agreement across suchframeworks on the rise of pluralism in today’s society and the need to focus ondecision-making processes (rather than only on decision outcomes) that embraceand use that pluralism. However social theories disagree widely about how to dothis and who or what are the main drivers of change. Social research literature onrisk governance and institutional questions can be organized around several maindimensions of theoretical influence (Krimsky 1992; O’Riordan and Jordan 1999;Renn 2008): i) the scale of decision-making ranging from individual to collectivedecision-making, ii) the dominance of technical or factual knowledge ranging fromrealist (i.e. where it dominates) to constructivist perspectives (i.e. where value-centered and/or cultural influences alter the perception of reality); iii) the extentof organizational or institutional influence versus the influence of individual humanagency on policy decisions.

Further, the issue of climate change is often presented in policy analysis as a classicproblem of collective action (e.g. Stavins 1997; Olson 1965), or a challenge of theglobal commons (e.g. Carraro 2003; Hardin 1968), where international cooperationis made difficult if not impossible due to asymmetry between who bears the costsof action and who benefits from action (Corfee-Morlot and Agrawala 2004; Ostrom2009; Stavins 1997). More recent empirical analysis challenges this view, which isbased on a rational actor paradigm. Citing extensive evidence, this research showsthat social cooperation does occur to resolve common resource problems when:i) the social dilemma is present in small or medium size problems; ii) there are

Climatic Change (2011) 104:169–197 173

multiple externalities associated to inaction, or alternatively multiple benefits ofaction (Ostrom et al. 2002; Ostrom 2009). Such co-benefits of climate action areparticularly visible at small and medium scales, which in turn alters the mix ofbenefits and costs and overall economic and social incentives for action (Hallegatte,Henriet and Corfee-Morlot, this volume; Ostrom 2009). Policies that deliver a rangeof different types of environmental, social and developmental benefits may be themost salient, particularly at local levels, as authorities strive to juggle a range ofcompeting policy objectives. This research sets the scene for understanding climatechange decision-making in the urban context where it is necessarily part of alarger local sustainability challenge and the benefits of climate change actions areintegrated with other local policy goals, such as providing clean air, safe streets andjobs for local residents.

This paper focuses on collective decision-making as a central feature of thepolicy process and looks in particular at the urban scale adaptation policy challenge.It takes a “co-constructivist” view that acknowledges the need for and influenceof scientific and expert information to support decisions to manage global envi-ronmental problems such as climate change, as well as the need to couple thisinformation with contextual interpretation of the “facts”, including the integration ofscience and technical information with local knowledge (Benton and Redclift 1994;Herrick 2004; Lorenzoni et al. 2000; Stern and Fineberg 1996; Wynne 2002). Withthis co-constructivist approach, we assume that local climate policy decisions willneed to build on knowledge that is co-produced through local interpretation andinteractions with more formalized scientific and technical knowledge. Our approachalso emphasizes on the institutional structure of decision contexts and on the groupsof social actors that influence policy decisions (Hall 1993; March and Olsen 1984;O’Riordan and Jordan 1999). The institutional dimension is important because itintroduces a path dependency where (often pre-existing) institutions shape futureoptions.

2.1 Agency, networks and power in risk governance

Given this, it is necessary to explore briefly questions of institutions, agency andpower. In this area the Habermasian notion of circuits of power provides a usefulstarting point for a conceptual model (Habermas 1998: 354; Carvalho and Burgess2005). It highlights how deliberation and persuasion are a necessary componentof any policy process where a variety of actors mediate across different types ofscientific, expert and local knowledge to inform public policy decisions (Fig. 1;Corfee-Morlot 2009; Moser 2009a; Renn 2008).

An extension of Habermas’ communicative rationality, this model comprises threebasic layers of decision-making and influence. These are posited here to hold acrosslevels of policymaking (from local to national, as further described below):

• a “core area” of public decision-making with institutions that have formal gov-ernmental decision-making powers, e.g. governmental administrations includinglocal and city authorities, judicial system, and/or parliamentary bodies. Capacityto act varies with organizational form and complexity.

• an “inner periphery” operates close to the core and includes a range of insti-tutions that have a degree of autonomy and self-governance functions. Theseinstitutions are equipped with rights and self-governance delegated by the state

174 Climatic Change (2011) 104:169–197

Mitigation:How much & when?

Science, expert analysis &assessment

Adaptation:Where, how? Which priorities?

Mass media, andcivil-social infrastructure

as a translators,filters of substantive

knowledge

Deliberation, Argument

and Persuasion

Core activities:formal

governmentdecision-making

Inner periphery

Outer periphery

Fig. 1 Circulation of power for public decision-making on climate change

(i.e. universities, public insurance systems, professional agencies and associa-tions, charitable organizations and foundations).

• an “outer periphery” of policy action, which encompasses a wider variety of“suppliers” of information and ideas for policy decisions and “customers” whoare the target audience of decisions. This includes experts, businesses, andconsumers as well as the media; it is the civil-social infrastructure of the publicsphere.

This model emphasizes the social integration function of public discourse anddecisions, where the true outer periphery is part of the civil-social infrastructure ofthe public sphere, and is influenced by the mass media. To gain legitimacy, bindingdecisions “must be steered by communication flows that start at the periphery andpass through sluices of democratic and constitutional procedures...” (Habermas 1998:356). In the case of climate change, expert knowledge—from science to technicaland economic analyses—shape decisions, however socially mediated pathways forcommunication are also central (Fig. 1).

But these theoretical constructs do not say much about the role of different actorsin decision-making raising the question of: what role exists for different types ofactors to shape local climate policy decisions? Key actors in the policy process typ-ically fall into four key categories: state actors (governments or related institutions,including local governments), market actors (business and business institutions),scientific actors (including other expert domains such as economics), and civil society,

Climatic Change (2011) 104:169–197 175

which encompasses the media as well as social movement organizations (Fisher 2004;Social Learning Group 2001).

Many have argued that the authority of state actors is considerably weakertoday than it has been in the past on issues of public concern, giving rise to theinfluence of non-state actors and institutions (Corfee-Morlot et al. 2007; Levy andNewell 2005; Sathaye et al. 2007; Social Learning Group 2001). Most notably, civilsociety in the form of environmental social movement organizations have played anincreasingly large role in shaping practices on environmental policy and outcomesby championing ideas and providing platforms for dialogue and debate (Bramwell1989; Brulle 2000; Carpenter 2001; Gough and Shackley 2001; Hall and Taplin 2006;Yearley 1994). The business community has also had a growing influence on climatepolicy (Falkner 2003; Levy and Newell 2005; Newell 2000), and more recently thisincludes engagement spanning national to local levels of adaptation decision-making(Moser 2009b; McKenzie Hedger et al. 2006; UKCIP 2008). Aside from their directinfluence in shaping policy, non-governmental actors also play a “watchdog” role toassess how well policies are performing with respect to the stated goals (Brown andJacobson 1998; Levy and Newell 2005; Gough and Shackley 2001).

The expert community plays a particularly influential role in environmental policyprocesses, where science and economics have typically dominated (Layzer 2006),notably on the specific issue of climate change (Hart and Victor 1993; Kwa 2001;Miller and Edwards 2001). The notion of epistemic communities is relevant here,where authoritative experts operate within a common belief structure to collaborateboth within and outside of government to affect policy change (Haas 1990). Theinfluence of epistemic communities has been observed in the arena of national andinternational climate politics (Hart and Victor 1993; Agrawala 1998). However onthe issue of climate change adaptation, non-governmental networks of actors havebeen slow to mobilize support for action, in part due to a fear of weakening theargument for mitigation action (Burton et al. 2007; Pielke Jr 2006).

Finally, the media also shape discourse from the outer peripheries of any decisionprocess by influencing public perception and the call for social change (Habermas1998). Media coverage does not tell people what to think but it is able to directpublic attention toward specific policy concerns and influence agenda setting forsocial concerns and policy issues (Mazur and Lee 1993). Moser (2009b) demonstratesan explosion of interest in the issue of adaptation in the printed news coverage of theUnited States accompanying a rise in public interest. Film, television and the internetmay be even more powerful than newspaper coverage today, as they rely on visualinformation.2 Images help to relate distant, complex environmental concepts to aperson’s own experience and feelings to quickly bring meaning to them (Tverskyand Kahneman 1973; Leiserowitz 2006). The rise in visual media coverage of climatechange in the last decade—including images of melting mountain glaciers and Arcticice sheets, stranded polar bears and flooded river basins and coastal zones—suggestsa dramatic rise in the “availability” and “affect” heuristics on climate change, whichin turn has helped to raise awareness about the issue (Leiserowitz 2005, 2006).

2For example, widespread visual media coverage of climate change was in part stimulated by theinternational release of the documentary film An Inconvenient Truth by Al Gore and by a growingnumber of television documentaries on climate change at roughly the same time (Corfee-Morlot2009; Moser 2009a).

176 Climatic Change (2011) 104:169–197

Indeed, the media act as translators or filters of substantive expert knowledge andinfluence local understanding of the issue of climate change (Carvalho and Burgess2005). Different actors may also influence the media’s uptake of climate issues byactively cultivating their engagement; for example a number of individual scientistshave been effective in working with the media stimulate public attention in the past,helping to propel the issue onto the policy agenda (Hart and Victor 1993; Corfee-Morlot et al. 2007). Thus another dimension of a multilevel risk governance modelis the influence of, access to and ability to engage the media at different levels ofdecision-making to raise awareness and eventually help to engender a call for socialchange.

2.2 Multilevel climate risk governance

From an institutional perspective, understanding and acting to manage risk is ul-timately embedded in a multilevel governance context where decision-making atlocal scale is enabled and constrained by policy decisions and institutions at regionaland national level (Hooghe and Marks 2003; Betsill and Bulkeley 2004; Wilbankset al. 2007). A multilevel climate risk governance framework focuses on collectivedecision-making processes although it recognizes the influence of individual valuesand perceptions on these and the importance of values, culture and local context indecisions about how to respond to climate change. This framework is consistent withthat proposed by Moser (2009a), which situates adaptation decisions within a broadframework of cultural and scientific influence, and where politics and the economyin any particular location provide the contextual drivers for decisions. In turn thesedrivers will determine the particular communities of actors and the sectors eventuallyengaged, i.e. the companies, agencies, and other stakeholders who ultimately makedecisions.

Indeed, using a multilevel risk governance framework breaks down understandingof the state as a single actor to better characterize the relationships between differentlevels of governance and between the different types of actors within each ofthese. Paterson (2008) suggests that the state is embedded in a number of complexand often contradictory social relationships that structure action and responses toenvironmental issues. These relationships can also be seen to span multiple levels ofgovernance, involving different configurations of actors and priorities depending onthe level and type of decision-making. Multilevel governance establishes a flexibleconceptual framework to understand the relationships between cities, regions andnations across mitigation and adaptation policy issues as well as across a wideningrange of governmental and non-governmental actors (Betsill and Bulkeley 2004;Cash et al. 2006; Bulkeley and Schroeder 2008).

Any multilevel risk governance framework will encompass at least two differentdimensions of action and influence, and both warrant attention: the vertical orhierarchical dimension across levels of governance and the horizontal dimension,or inclusive nature, of governance (Betsill and Bulkeley 2004; Hooghe and Marks2003).3 With respect to the vertical dimension, adaptation (or mitigation) may be

3The diffusion of authority across and between levels bears similarity to other theories such aspolycentric, multi-perspective or multi-tiered governance (Hooghe and Marks 2003; Ostrom 2009).

Climatic Change (2011) 104:169–197 177

guided or constrained through top-down mandates or national policy, but its imple-mentation will be inevitably local in character (Pelling 2006; Urwin and Jordan 2008).In a recent example of such a multilevel information exchange on adaptation alongthe vertical dimension, the French government is defining a national adaptation planusing an open consultation approach, where local governments have been invitedtogether with other representatives of the government, business, scientists and civilsociety to provide inputs.4 Such an exchange is necessarily two-way as informationand specific knowledge gained from local experience and experimentation willinevitably also contribute to the design of policy at the central level (Corfee-Morlotet al. 2009; Folke et al. 2005; Moser 2006a, Vogel et al. 2007).

Within the horizontal dimensions is the key role of an open, participatory decisionprocess. This puts emphasis on “governance” rather than on “governments” as acenter for decision making and includes giving “voice” or influence in the policydialogue process to business, research and environmental non-governmental organi-zations.5 From a policy perspective, a key advantage of working at local levels is thatauthorities have good proximity to local stakeholders and it is possible to generategood understanding of local contextual factors that will matter to decisions abouthow to manage climate change (Healy 1997; Ostrom 2009). Local governments, inparticular, can help to build a “policy space” for a deliberative-analytical exchangethat links local stakeholders and the expert community in an effort to create acommon vision of the future (Brunner 1996; Brunner et al. 2005; Cash and Moser2000; Grindle and Thomas 1991). Further, preferences of actors tend to be morehomogenous across smaller than larger units (Ostrom 2009). Thus, if the goal is aresilient, safe, and clean city, having a common understanding or vision of what sucha future might comprise and the influence of climate change at urban scale is a firststep to achieving it (Corfee-Morlot et al. 2009; Moser 2006a; Moser and Dilling 2006).

Horizontally, there is also increasing evidence of multilevel governance throughtransnational networks on climate change, where actors work across organisationalboundaries to influence outcomes (Bulkeley and Betsill 2005; Bulkeley and Moser2007). At the sub-national level, some of these horizontal relationships have beencreated through formalised information networks and coalitions acting both na-tionally and internationally, including ICLEI’s Cities for Climate Protection, theClimate Alliance, the C-40 Large Cities Climate Leadership Group, and the UrbanLeaders Adaptation Initiative in the US, among others.6 These groups have given aninstitutional foundation to concerted effort and collaboration on climate change atcity level (Aall et al. 2007).

4See details in the website of the French National Adaptation Plan (in French) on http://www.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/Le-lancement-de-la-concertation,11584.html, accessed May10, 2010.5These are also fondly known as BINGOs, RINGOs and ENGOs, representing business andindustry, research and environmental non-governmental organizations, respectively.6These networks have received increasing attention in social research on climate policy. For example,ICLEI’s Cities for Climate Protection network has been extensively analyzed in the literature (Aallet al. 2007; Betsill and Bulkeley 2004, 2007; Lindseth 2004). The focus of such networks has typicallybeen on mitigation however attention to adaptation is growing. See for example Lowe et al. (2009)on the US Urban Leaders Adaptation Initiative. Analysis such networks and their influence on localadaptation is beyond the scope of this paper.

178 Climatic Change (2011) 104:169–197

Table 1 Key obstacles to local adaptation action

Jurisdictional and institutional Lack of mandate to address climate issuesNational or regional laws, rules or regulations that lead to

mal-adaptation to increase vulnerability over timeIll-adapted institutional designs to convene or coordinate across

relevant issues (vertically and/or horizontally)

Political Local authorities “too close” to different interestsPressures of short-term electoral cycles on effective risk

management and long time lag to reap full adaptation benefitsLack of willingness to accept costs and behavioral changePressure to maintain BAU development pathways

Economic and budgetary Distribution of perceived and real costs and benefitsLack of resources or funding to address the problems identified

Technical or scientific Scientific uncertaintyInadequate understanding or ignorance of climate change risksLack of technical capacity or access to expertiseLack of scale relevant scientific or technical information

After Adger et al. (2009), Bulkeley et al. (2009), Carmin et al. (2009), Moser (2006a, 2009a), Sippeland Jenssen (2009), Ostrom (2009), Qi et al. (2008)

The multilevel risk governance conceptual framework presented above can pro-vide important insights when applied to an analysis of the institutional capacities toovercome the obstacles to good local level climate governance. Key obstacles to localdecision-making on climate change, and more particularly adaptation are outlined inTable 1.

These different barriers are often intertwined and it is useful to illustrate thisbefore moving on to possible remedies. For example, let us consider the jurisdictionaland policy barriers that make it difficult for local decision-makers to go against po-litical pressure to alter development patterns away from business-as-usual pathways.Often, some share of long-term climate change risk at urban scale is managed by localauthorities, who cannot easily oppose short-term pressure of the local constituencyrepresenting her or his voters. The local incentives to act may be even more limitedwhere risks are shared at higher levels (e.g., through a national insurance scheme,or through inter-region financial fluxes) unless such programs are designed with thisin mind (e.g. as with the US National Flood Insurance program). This is becauseclimate-related crises or disasters can lead to external aid after they hit, whileprevention has often to be funded locally and may be difficult to implement withouta clear understanding of the local benefits of such action. A strong mandate foraction may be necessary from the national or regional government, so as to give localdecision-makers an official framework within which to act as well as the possibilityto ‘pass’ any political blame and possibly costs upwards (Betsill 2001; Bulkeley andKern 2006; Carmin et al. 2009; Sugiyama and Takeuchi 2008).7

7For example, this is what has occurred in France through the “Plan de Prévention des Risques”,which requires city-scale governments to work with sub-national regional governments (at préfec-tural levels) to develop plans aiming to prevent or to limit risks of natural disasters e.g. flood risk.Under this framework, some areas have been identified as banned for (further) development.

Climatic Change (2011) 104:169–197 179

Developing capacity to address these barriers is an essential part of moving localclimate policy ahead. Capacities to meet the climate policy challenge can be clusteredalong the same dimensions as the barriers outlined above. Table 2 considers keycapacities for action according to a range of institutional drivers that operate acrossscales of governance to shape local decisions to address climate change. The key

Table 2 Institutional capacities and other drivers of local scale climate action

Capacities and drivers of

change

Jurisdictional and political capacity

Financial capacity Coordination / planning capacities (including technical capacity)

Local authorities: Public: city, county or other public authorities

Implement local decisions as foreseen under national or regional law

Establish local climate policy framework – near & long-term goals – to coordinate strategically across sectoral and with other local jurisdictions in the same metropolitan area

Seek new authority where necessary to achieve goals

Seek and establish support for locally adapted policies and measures e.g. public private partnerships and local fiscal policies

Identify local priorities – enhance local/regional understanding by working with local actors

Where authority exists – act autonomously e.g. through land use planning, decisions on local infrastructure (e.g. local roads, urban planning and zoning, flood control – storm water drainage systems, water supply, local parks/reserves/green-spaces, sanitary and waste management)

Raise awareness, create deliberative “space” for participatory decision-making

National and/or regional authorities: state or provincial governmental authorities

Government functions

Clear delineations of jurisdiction.

Adjust the degree of decentralisation of necessary policy competencies and authorities

Prioritise & set out time frames for local action (e.g. by sector)

Centre-region (local) contracts

Provide incentives and funding to enable local action on climate change

Fund core analytic inputs to facilitate local decision-making, including scientific research

Ensure that local decision-makers have the tools, information & appropriate institutional context to deliver good decisions

Semi-autonomous public research or technical institutions (e.g. national universities or research institutions; water resource management boards)

Private sector: local industry & business, tourists, households

Other non-governmental actors

Local environmental or consumer organizations

Local & regional experts (universities, consultants)

Dri

vers

Tools to support decision-making

Legal advise and contractual tools

Robust contractual mechanisms for public-private investment (e.g. for infrastructure development)

Economic and financial assessment information and tools

Local vulnerability mapping or full climate risk assessment

Deliberative and processes designed to support local decision-making (e.g. analytic-deliberative model)

Link scientific and economic assessment of climate impacts with ongoing urban planning processes (e.g. land use and infrastructure development);

180 Climatic Change (2011) 104:169–197

drivers are: government functions and roles; key actors and institutions; tools fordecision-making (Adger et al. 2009; Moser 2009a; Bulkeley et al. 2009; Betsill 2001;Carmin et al. 2009; Qi et al. 2008; Schreurs 2008; Sugiyama and Takeuchi 2008).How each of these different drivers join up to work across levels of governance willdetermine the boundaries for local decision-making and alter the range of possiblelocal outcomes.

3 Analytic-deliberative process to support local adaptation decisions

Lack of scale relevant technical and scientific information, and capacity to usesuch information at local levels, remains an important barrier to adaptation actiontoday. To understand and properly assess adaptation options, urban decision-makersrequire information about how climate change may play out in local contexts toimpact people, urban settlements and infrastructure. What will the temperatures ofthe 2020s or 2030s be? How will flood risk change in the coming half a century ormore, or even more pertinently, over the life of the infrastructure built today? Andhow will these climate changes interface with urban environments?

This information is often produced through specifically funded applied researchprojects. Examples of such projects are the Urban Climate Change ResearchNetwork (UCCRN) at Columbia University, the Australian RMIT Global CitiesResearch Institute, or research programs like the program “Villes Durables” (Sus-tainable cities) or the French National Research Agency. But to inform decision-makers, academic research projects—even very applied ones—are often insufficient.

Any such climate risk assessment must necessarily include some form of analytic-deliberation to help local communities co-produce relevant information and use thisto make decisions about adaptation. The basic stages of analytic-deliberation are(NRC 2009): i) broad-based effort to frame the decision problems, identify stakesand interests of those affected; ii) assessment; iii) evaluation; iv) policy decisionand implementation; v) monitoring and feedback, and back again to (re-)frame theproblem based on the new state of play. These can be seen to work in an on-goingand iterative manner, across changing decision contexts and evolving understandingof different dimensions of dealing with climate change. When designed well, sucha process will help to build trust and understanding across affected stakeholders,experts and policy communities (Folke et al. 2005; NRC 2008, 2009, Stern andFineberg 2006).

A number of tools, technical knowledge and institutional mechanisms can be en-visaged to help build the capacity of local authorities to plan and coordinate climatepolicy. Just as local GHG inventories and projections are an essential tool to evaluateand support mitigation decisions, vulnerability, impact and risk assessment will beneeded to support adaptation decisions. Economic and demographic projections willalso be needed to bring the socio-economic dimension of the climate problem tomeet the more technical scientific questions presented by climate change (NRC 2007,2009). Such assessments comprise the knowledge base or foundation that can be usedin a local decision process to work closely and effectively with local constituencies tounderstand and inform decisions about risks of climate change.

Yet gathering sufficient and appropriate types of information remains a chal-lenge for local level action (Betsill 2001, Bulkeley et al. 2009, Carmin et al. 2009,

Climatic Change (2011) 104:169–197 181

Satterthwaite 2008, Hallegatte, Henriet and Corfee-Morlot, this volume). Recently,new methods and tools have been developed to provide relevant local informationto support local adaptation planning. These include, for example, the World BankScreening Tool ADAPT and the SERVIR toolkit (developed by USAID, NASAand others).8 Further, tools developed for other policy questions (e.g., land-useplanning, risk management), can be adjusted to include climate change and used foradaptation policy design. These tools and others build on spatial analysis, geographicinformation systems and improved computing ability to offer decision support ona local scale. However, such tools do not yet offer comprehensive coverage andthey are research-oriented rather than policy-oriented. Using such new methods andtools, still takes time, expertise and money.

3.1 Criteria for successful science-policy assessment

An important step in local climate risk governance is to structure science-policyassessment to function well across and within different jurisdictional contexts—whether it be international, national or local level—to provide usable information fordecision-makers, within an iterative and interactive deliberative process to supportdecision-making (Clark and Majone 1985; Mitchell et al. 2006; NRC 2007, 2009; Sternand Fineberg 1996; Vogel et al. 2007).

Three central performance criteria are relevant to any sustainability science-policyassessment: the credibility, the legitimacy and the salience of the assessment (Cashet al. 2003; NRC 2007). Taking each of these briefly in turn, credibility is aboutwhether the science assessment has met acceptable quality standards as judged byother scientists or the peer expert community (Cash et al. 2003; Mitchell et al. 2006;NRC 2009).

A different set of questions surround the need for legitimacy. Providing use-able scientific information and assessment is only one part of the challenge tosupport climate change decision-making (NRC 2008, 2009; Stern and Fineberg1996). When a policy challenge combines broad uncertainty with potentially highdecision-stakes for society as a whole, political legitimacy requires special attentionto how decisions are made and who is engaged in the decision process (Funtowiczand Ravetz 1993; Jasanoff 1990; Ostrom et al. 2002). While science and othersubstantive expert knowledge remains important, it is not sufficient to provide apolitical basis for policy decisions (Jasanoff 1990; Moser 2009a; Renn 2001, 2008;NRC 2007, 2009). This procedural question will be as important to determining thesuccess of climate policy over time as what the decisions are (Dietz et al. 2003;Dietz 2003; Hajer and Wagenaar 2003). Empirical research suggests the value of“deliberative spaces” to raise stakeholder awareness, build trust and understandingand ultimately facilitate collective decision-making to protect common environmen-tal resources (Folke et al. 2005; Ostrom 1990, 2000; Ostrom et al. 2002; Vogelet al. 2007). This contributes to problem solving over time through meaningfulexchange and dialogue among affected stakeholders and experts, to build human

8For a recent review of such tools see GTZ, “Mainstreaming tools and methods” http://www.gtz.de/en/themen/umwelt-infrastruktur/umweltpolitik/27678.htm [accessed 20 May 2010].

182 Climatic Change (2011) 104:169–197

and social capital to support decision-making (Bohman 1996; Dietz 2003; Healy 1997;Rydin 2003).

On the issue of salience, the ambiguity and complexity of the science of climatechange raises the need for mediation between the credibility of scientific activityon the one hand, and the interpretation of the science to bring closure for policydecisions on the other (Clark and Majone 1985; NRC 2007). Framing science-policyassessments in consultation with users of the assessments can also increase thesalience of the results.

3.2 The role of boundary organizations

An important notion in the area of social research dealing with science-policy interac-tions is that of “boundary work” or “boundary organizations” (Gieryn 1983; Jasanoff1990; Guston 2001; Cash et al. 2003; Moser and Tribbia 2006). Originally introducedby Gieryn (1983), boundary work describes actions that demarcate the differencesand competing authority between scientists and others. Jasanoff’s work and morerecent research shows an essential blurring of the boundary between science andpolitics, which allows for essential negotiation and reconciliation between theseperspectives, for example, in the definition of “acceptable risk” (Jasanoff 1990:18;see also a more recent review of the literature in NRC 2009). Negotiation amongscientists to bring together divergent technical opinions is a necessary, but notsufficient condition to bring closure on a public policy issue; defining acceptable riskis necessarily a socio-political decision even if it is couched in technical evidence(Jasanoff 1990; Guston 2001, Cash et al. 2003; NRC 2009). There is a need tobalance the inevitable trade-offs between credibility, legitimacy and salience ineffort to build knowledge systems to support sustainability decision-making andboundary organizations can play a role to facilitate this (Cash et al. 2003; Vogel et al.2007).

A number of authors have suggested the possible value of boundary organizationsto facilitate negotiation between science assessment and decision-making and in thecontext of regional and local adaptation (Vogel et al. 2007; Moser and Tribbia 2006;NRC 2009). The literature suggests that boundary organizations can be structuredto help co-produce credible scientific and socio-economic analytical extensions ofglobal and regional assessments to local contexts in consultation with local stake-holders (Cash et al. 2003; NRC 2009). Boundary organizations may also have a keyrole to play in providing a face-to-face or more direct two-way exchange betweenthe expert community producing such information on the one hand, and publicofficials and other decision-makers who are potentially users of such informationon the other, building networks of relationships, trust and understanding so as tofacilitate decision-making over time (Folke et al. 2005; Moser and Tribbia 2006). Abasic challenge is also to better frame the questions for assessment such that theyare informed by local concerns and thus likely to render results that are also morelegitimate and salient in a local context (Vogel et al. 2007). Finally, such organizationsmay also provide essential communication functions to help mediate, popularise andrender more accessible and salient scientific information about climate change in apolitical context and promote action across different types of local decision-makers(Corfee-Morlot 2009; Moser 2006a; Vogel et al. 2007).

Climatic Change (2011) 104:169–197 183

3.3 Science-policy and analytic deliberation in practice—this volume

Drawing on other articles in this volume, it is possible to illustrate the inter-playacross the criteria noted above and the need for an analytic-deliberative mechanismin local adaptation decision contexts. Climatic changes are increasingly observed inreal time, and projections on a regional scale have become more readily available(even if still highly uncertain). Hunt and Watkiss (this volume) provide a reviewof recent analyses of climate change impact at city scale, and show there is a smallbut growing body of science and economic analysis in this domain. The two casestudies on Copenhagen and Mumbai are illustrative of an emerging local integratedassessment literature that offers much local scale scientific and economic data andinformation (Hallegatte, Ranger et al. and Ranger et al., respectively, this volume).The availability of results such as these should increase the potential to make gooddecisions about adaptation today, particularly at local levels (Cash and Moser 2000;Cash et al. 2006).

Yet supporting actual adaptation and related management decisions will undoubt-edly require not only additional scientific and/or economic analysis but also dialoguearound this information. To be usable and fully credible for adaptation planning,projections of climate change require careful coupling with local socio-economicscenarios. They also require extension with specific models, like hydrological modelsto anticipate the effects on freshwater flows to anticipate economic consequences inthe urban context, (NRC 2007, 2009; see also a methodological analysis in Hallegatte,Henriet and Corfee-Morlot, this volume). For example, in urban coastal locations,consideration of sea level rise will need to be based not only on population and urbandevelopment patterns but also on local physical conditions such as coastal land areasubsidence, which in turn may relate to groundwater conditions and demographictrends that drive the demand for freshwater (Hanson et al. this volume). Yet dueto lack of data or projections, or time and resources to tackle complex local issues,many assessments make simplifying assumptions and ignore one or more of theseelements. This was the case in the local assessments of Mumbai and Copenhagen inthis volume, for example, where socio-economic projections were omitted due to lackof reliable local projections. While these assessments are scientifically credible andprovide first insights into possible cost-effective adaptations, they are not sufficientlycomplete or legitimate to have direct influence on policy or practitioner decisions inthese urban locations.

Moreover a key issue is how local decision-makers access and use scientific andexpert information about climate change—such as that contained in this volume.Moser and Tribbia (2006) explore this with respect to coastal zone issues in Californiato show that coastal zone managers, and other relevant decision-makers, simply donot use climate change information from scientific journals; instead they rely uponother more informal sources and formats including in-house experts and colleagues,the media or internet and they prefer easily accessible formats (e.g. maps or GPStools). Accessing decision-makers, engaging in dialogue and rendering informationaccessible extends beyond the traditional technical boundaries of science-policyanalysis or assessment; seriously tackling these steps implies the need for additionaltime, effort and resources.

Beyond additional scientific work, indeed, there is also a need to couple scientificor other expert assessment with a means for dialogue and exchange between the

184 Climatic Change (2011) 104:169–197

producers and the users of such information so as to render the information moresalient and legitimate. In another illustration, Hanson et al. (this volume) applya simplified methodology to assess 136 major port cities with respect to coastalflood risks. Although credible from a scientific standpoint to identify “hot spots”of localities or regions with high exposure to coastal flooding from climate extremes,the information provided by this assessment is not functionally useful to support localdecisions.

Understanding and managing vulnerability, in this case to coastal flood risk, willrequire additional detailed analysis, informed by local knowledge, and reflectionacross a range of different types of decision-makers in these cities (Vogel et al.2007). The Copenhagen and Mumbai case studies in the present volume representintermediate cases, in which more detailed analyses provide spatially explicit infor-mation about changing risks and adaptation benefits. This information helps localstakeholders and decision-makers assess the need for action and envisage possibleadaptation options. But these studies require additional analysis to lead to actualmeasures, like specific investments or regulation changes. Such additional analysiswill need to engage coastal zone managers, urban planners and local residents aroundsound science and economic assessment (Moser and Tribbia 2006).

Indeed, adaptation policy decisions will require careful negotiation between themore political policy process—that will necessarily make judgments about “ac-ceptable risk”—and the scientific and economic domains. The Mumbai case study(Ranger et al., this volume) illustrates this, revealing highly uncertain results dueto lack of data and model uncertainty, combined with high decision stakes from aneconomic and human point of view (see also Bhagat et al. 2006; OECD 2010). In thatcase, scientific results are important, but are clearly insufficient to inform a decisionin the absence of a strong political process to assist with the interpretation of theuncertain science in the local political context.

One advantage of more detailed local and/or sub-national impact or risk assess-ments combined with deliberative process is that it can be expected to positivelyinfluence the political capacity of local governments to act on climate change(Harris 2001; Shackley and Deanwood 2002; Corfee-Morlot 2009). Raising politicalawareness and capacity to act should in turn facilitate the ability to put deliberative-analytic policy processes in place at local levels to advance adaptation. However,while we know that such processes are widely advocated to and by governments (e.g.see OECD 2009), it is less clear whether and how they are developing or functioningin practice.

4 Adaptation boundary organizations and analytic deliberation in practice

This section explores the need for analytic-deliberative approaches to shape science-policy assessment such that it provides useable information and meets the threequality criteria laid out above. As noted, boundary organizations may help to fillthe gaps between the production of credible scientific/technical assessments andthe need for also more salient and legitimate science-policy assessments at localscales to support sustainability decisions (Folke et al. 2005; Cash et al. 2003). Othersauthors have pointed to the contribution that boundary organizations could maketo support local adaptation decisions in particular, possibly to include a role to

Climatic Change (2011) 104:169–197 185

create “deliberative spaces” to build understanding and capacity for action overtime (Moser and Tribbia 2006; Vogel et al. 2007). We also argue that establishingan ongoing local science-policy exchange, and more generally deliberative-analyticcapacity, is one core activity that national and/or regional governments could helpto organize and fund to establish a stable institutional setting and support for morecost-effective and timely local adaptation decisions.

4.1 Boundary organizations for adaptation: examples

This section takes a closer look at alternative models of “boundary organizations” asan essential part of the toolbox to support urban adaptation planning. It considersthese in a multilevel governance context. We briefly examine four different exam-ples:

• New York City Climate Change Program, the adaptation part of which is basedon a science-policy collaborative exchange that has operated in various forms forabout a decade and has successfully co-produced scientific assessments (NRC2009; NYC 2007, 2010; Rosenzweig et al. 2007).9 Despite the bottom-up natureof the collaborative, it has drawn extensively on prior work conducted at thenational level, notably on the knowledge and the network of experts that wascreated through an US national assessment effort (NRC 2009; Rosenzweig et al.2007; USNAST 2001).

• Ouranos is a Quebecois regional science-policy boundary organization that wascreated in 2001 through an initiative of the provincial government of Quebec,Hydro-Quebec (a publicly owned power generation and distribution company)and other regional partners (e.g. academic institutions). It aims to developand use climate change knowledge to inform local and regional decisions onadaptation (Ouranos 2008, 2010; Vescovi et al. 2007).

• Club ViTeCC, is a French organization that was launched in 2008 by the MissionClimat of Caisse des Dépôts (CDC, a national institutional investment bank thatalso manages public infrastructure investment), in cooperation with two Frenchorganizations—Météo-France and the French National Observatory on ClimateChange Impacts (ONERC). Focused on cities, territories and climate change,Club ViTeCC’s main objective is to provide local authorities, stakeholders,private and public sectors and citizens with information on their role in climatechange mitigation and adaptation (APREC 2008; CDC 2008).

• UKCIP is one of the older institutions reviewed here, having been created in1997 to help co-ordinate scientific climate change impacts research into the UK,and to help organizations—including but not limited to local authorities—tounderstand and adapt to impacts (UKCIP 2001, 2005, 2008). UKCIP is not aproducer of scientific information but a user: it works as an advisor mediatingbetween scientists and other technical experts on the one hand, and policymakers and stakeholders on the other, to co-ordinate and influence climateresearch and to share the useful outputs with stakeholders (McKenzie Hedgeret al. 2006; LCCP 2002, 2005, 2007).

9See also Hunt and Watkiss, this volume.

186 Climatic Change (2011) 104:169–197

Tab

le3

Exa

mpl

esof

diff

eren

tins

titu

tion

alm

odel

sfo

rbo

unda

ryor

gani

zati

ons

tosu

ppor

tloc

alad

apta

tion

deci

sion

s

Exa

mpl

ein

stit

utio

nsG

eogr

aphi

csc

ope

and

key

Scie

nce

prod

ucer

sD

elib

erat

ive-

anal

ytic

prac

tice

/F

undi

ngso

urce

and

host

and

date

ofor

igin

func

tion

s,go

als

orus

ers/

sour

cead

apta

tion

outc

omes

?in

stit

utio

n(i

nth

eca

seof

ofex

pert

ise

ongo

ing

inst

itut

iona

lcap

acit

y)

New

Yor

kC

ity

Clim

ate

Lar

geur

ban

scal

e:N

ewY

ork

Cit

yP

rodu

cers

/Sou

rces

ofD

irec

tint

erac

tion

betw

een

Fun

ding

sour

ces

Cha

nge

Pro

tgra

me

Dev

elop

usea

ble

loca

lsci

enti

fic

expe

rtis

e:lo

cala

utho

riti

esan

dde

cisi

on-

Pub

lican

dpr

ivat

ese

ctor

s:(a

ndit

spr

edec

esso

rkn

owle

dge

Urb

ango

vern

men

tal

mak

ers

and

scie

ntis

ts(u

sers

New

Yor

kC

ity

gove

rnm

ent

acti

viti

es)

(1)—

late

Co-

ordi

nate

inte

r-di

scip

linar

yau

thor

itie

san

dag

enci

esan

dpr

oduc

ers)

.Loc

alau

thor

itie

sde

part

men

ts(e

.g.w

ater

1990

sre

sear

chfo

cuse

don

NY

CL

ocal

and

nati

onal

com

mis

sion

and

fram

ere

sear

chau

thor

ity)

clim

ate

risk

asse

ssm

ent

univ

ersi

ties

–sci

enti

fic

ques

tion

sin

cons

ulta

tion

wit

hF

ound

atio

nsvi

aun

iver

sity

and

plan

ning

com

mun

ity

scie

ntif

icco

mm

unit

yre

sear

chfu

ncti

ons

Hel

pde

cisi

onm

aker

sto

Loc

alad

apta

tion

outc

omes

:in

tegr

ate

adap

tati

onto

Mul

ti-p

rong

edad

apta

tion

agen

dacl

imat

ech

ange

into

urba

nun

der

deve

lopm

enti

nN

YC

deci

sion

sre

gion

—no

tyet

afu

llad

apta

tion

plan

buta

tim

ebo

und

proc

ess

inpl

ace

tose

tgoa

lsan

dm

onit

orpr

ogre

ssO

uran

os(2

)—20

01R

egio

nal:

Qué

bec,

Can

ada

Pro

duce

rs/s

ourc

esof

Ori

gina

lsci

enti

fic

rese

arch

onF

undi

ngso

urce

sD

evel

opkn

owle

dge

expe

rtis

e:re

gion

alcl

imat

olog

y,im

pact

Pub

lican

dpr

ivat

ese

ctor

s(a

bout

Co-

ordi

nate

mul

tidi

scip

linar

yF

eder

alag

enci

esas

sess

men

tand

adap

tati

onas

-$1

2M

/yea

r—co

rebu

dget

)in

itia

tive

sL

ocal

and

nati

onal

sess

men

t,be

nefi

ting

from

cons

ul-

Gov

ernm

ento

fQue

bec

Hel

pde

cisi

onm

aker

sto

univ

ersi

ties

tati

onw

ith

“use

r”co

mm

unit

ies

Val

oris

atio

n-R

eche

rche

inte

grat

edad

apta

tion

toN

atio

nalr

esea

rch

cent

ers

(loc

alan

dre

gion

algo

vern

men

t,Q

uebe

ccl

imat

ech

ange

into

thei

rO

uran

os’o

wn

tech

nica

lre

gion

albu

sine

sses

part

ners

)H

ydro

-Qué

bec

deci

sion

proc

esse

san

dsc

ient

ific

staf

fL

ocal

adap

tati

onou

tcom

es:

Hos

tins

titu

tion

:Our

anos

—a

Gui

danc

edo

cum

entf

orlo

cal

self

-sta

ndin

gin

stit

utio

ngo

vern

men

tsto

plan

adap

tati

on

Climatic Change (2011) 104:169–197 187

Clu

bV

iTeC

C—

Nat

iona

l:F

renc

hlo

cala

utho

riti

esU

sers

/sou

rces

ofex

pert

ise:

Dir

ecti

nter

acti

onbe

twee

nlo

cal

Fun

ding

sour

ces

Vill

es,T

erri

toir

esan

dke

ybu

sine

ssst

akeh

olde

rsP

riva

te/p

ublic

serv

ices

auth

orit

ies

and

deci

sion

-mak

ers

Pub

lic(s

eebe

low

)an

dpr

ivat

eet

Cha

ngem

ent

for

loca

linf

rast

ruct

ure

Nat

iona

lmet

eoro

logi

cal

and

scie

ntis

ts(u

sers

and

Con

trib

utio

nsfr

ompr

ivat

eC

limat

ique

(4)—

Pro

vide

info

rmat

ion

tost

ake-

cent

erpr

oduc

ers)

.How

ever

user

sdo

sect

orpa

rtic

ipan

ts20

08ho

lder

s,in

stit

utio

nsan

dN

atio

nala

ndin

tern

atio

nal

notf

ram

eth

ean

alyt

ical

wor

kH

osti

nsti

tuti

on:

priv

ate

sect

oron

thei

rro

les

inun

iver

siti

esan

dit

isno

tloc

atio

nsp

ecif

icC

aiss

ede

sD

épôt

scl

imat

ech

ange

adap

tati

onL

ocal

,nat

iona

land

Loc

alad

apta

tion

outc

omes

:M

étéo

Fra

nce

Ret

hink

the

infr

astr

uctu

re-

inte

rnat

iona

lexp

erts

Adv

ice

tolo

calg

over

nmen

tsan

dO

NE

RC

rela

ted

deci

sion

-mak

ing

busi

ness

part

ners

onpr

iori

ties

proc

ess

for

adap

tati

on—

nosp

ecif

icM

ake

scie

ntif

ican

dte

chni

cal

adap

tati

onpl

ans

orac

tion

info

rmat

ion

unde

rsta

ndab

leor

ient

edou

tcom

esto

date

tolo

cald

ecis

ion

mak

ers

and

deve

lopi

ngth

epr

oper

deci

sion

tool

sU

KC

IP—

Uni

ted

Nat

iona

l:U

nite

dK

ingd

omU

sers

/sou

rces

ofex

pert

ise:

Dir

ect,

loca

tion

spec

ific

inte

ract

ion

Fun

ding

sour

ces

Kin

gdom

Clim

ate

loca

litie

sO

xfor

dU

nive

rsit

yC

ente

rbe

twee

nlo

cala

utho

riti

esan

dP

ublic

&lo

calr

esou

rces

(abo

utIm

pact

Pro

gram

me

Dev

elop

and

com

mun

icat

efo

rth

eE

nvir

onm

ent

deci

sion

-mak

ers

and

scie

ntis

ts1.

25M

/yea

r—fu

ndin

gin

divi

dual

(3)—

1997

scal

ere

leva

ntin

form

atio

nT

ynda

llC

ente

r(u

sers

and

prod

ucer

s).L

ocal

asse

ssm

ents

rais

edlo

cally

)on

clim

ate

chan

geim

pact

sto

Res

earc

hgr

oups

wit

hin

auth

orit

ies

com

mis

sion

and

UK

Dep

artm

entf

orst

akeh

olde

rs,i

nclu

ding

but

univ

ersi

ties

acro

ssth

efr

ame

rese

arch

ques

tion

sin

Env

iron

men

t,F

ood

notl

imit

edto

loca

laut

hori

ties

UK

cons

ulta

tion

wit

hsc

ient

ific

and

Rur

alA

ffai

rsP

rovi

depo

licy-

mak

ing

tool

sto

Pri

vate

labo

rato

ries

com

mun

ity

UK

’sK

now

ledg

eT

rans

fer

deci

sion

mak

ers

Loc

alad

apta

tion

outc

omes

:P

artn

ersh

ipsc

hem

eE

stab

lish

on-g

oing

rela

tion

-Si

gnif

ican

tupt

ake

and

adap

tati

onH

osti

nsti

tuti

on:

ship

sbe

twee

nre

sear

cher

spl

anni

ngoc

curr

ing

inke

yur

ban

Oxf

ord

Uni

vers

ity

and

deci

sion

mak

ers

area

se.

g.L

ondo

n

Com

pile

dby

auth

ors

from

vari

ous

sour

ces

asfo

llow

s:(1

)N

ewY

ork

Cit

y:N

RC

(200

9),N

YC

(201

0),R

osen

zwei

get

al.(

2007

),se

eal

so:w

ww

.nyc

.gov

/Pla

NY

C20

30;

(2)

UK

CIP

:McK

enzi

eH

edge

ret

al.(

2006

),U

KC

IP(2

005,

2008

),se

eal

so:h

ttp:

//ww

w.u

kcip

.org

.uk/

;(3)

Our

anos

:Our

anos

(200

8,20

10),

Ves

covi

etal

.(20

07);

see

also

:ht

tp://

ww

w.o

uran

os.c

a/;

(4)

Clu

bV

iTeC

C:

AP

RE

C(2

008)

,C

DC

(200

8);

see

also

http

://w

ww

.cai

ssed

esde

pots

.fr/e

n/ac

tivi

ty/f

ight

ing-

agai

nst-

clim

ate-

chan

ge/r

esea

rch-

on-t

he-e

cono

mic

s-of

-clim

ate-

chan

ge.h

tmla

ndht

tp://

ww

w.c

dccl

imat

.com

/inde

x_en

.htm

l

188 Climatic Change (2011) 104:169–197

These examples were selected to span a range of bottom-up versus top-downinstitutional models where the origin of the government support for the organizationdiffers (i.e. locally driven, sub-nationally or regionally driven, or nationally driven).Table 3 highlights several key features: i) governmental and other institutionalfunctions with an emphasis on multilevel governance characteristics (including therole of funding); ii) key actors—i.e. engagement of different actors in the productionand use of scientific information and assessment and more generally in deliberative-analytic practice to link technical assessments to adaptation planning and decisions;iii) adaptation planning outcomes, such as the development and use of specific toolsand methods, adaptation plans or planning processes.10

4.2 Discussion

These examples demonstrate broad variation in their geographic scope as well asinstitutional features such as proximity to “local” clients, levels of organization andsources of funding. All four organizations have a common feature of attempting toprovide a boundary organization function to inform decision-making through provi-sion of credible, legitimate and salient scientific and technical assessment. They allpractice some form of analytic-deliberation with analysis developed in consultationwith a mix of sub-national and local governmental and non-governmental actors.Ouranos, Club ViTeCC, and the UK are essentially public–private partnerships andthus are examples of multilevel and multi-scale institutions. This organizational struc-ture demonstrates the explicit and growing interest in the private sector to identify,understand and carefully manage the business and investment risks presented by achanging climate.

In addition, the organizations have different ways of interacting with the expertcommunity, i.e. acting either as “producers” or as “users” of new scientific informa-tion. In only one instance is the boundary organization actually producing the sciencein locally relevant scientific assessment (i.e. Ouranos). Instead, the relevant scientificwork can be usefully carried out or commissioned from research communities oruniversities based in the region or location of assessment. This allows the “boundaryorganization” to focus on facilitating the interaction between user and producercommunities, and to help package or translate information in a non-technical, userfriendly manner so as to better reach the policy community and other decision-makers (e.g. business or households).

Communication strategies are also important in the effort to understand andreflect about climate change and will benefit from the use of image and metaphorto connect climate change to local geography and culture along side of good scienceand expert analysis (Corfee-Morlot 2009; Leiserowitz 2005; Moser 2006a; Moser andDilling 2006; Vogel et al. 2007). Information on climate change impacts providesa means for lay people to understand and “care” about the issue and participate

10It is beyond the scope of this paper to conduct an in-depth review or analysis of these organizations.A more in-depth assessment could yield additional insights. In particular it would be interesting toexplore perceptions and understandings of the effectiveness of these different organizational ap-proaches to compare performance from the perspective of local participants and decision-makers andto explore why some of these organizations have been comparatively more effective in influencingadaptation decisions.

Climatic Change (2011) 104:169–197 189

in efforts to respond. It brings the abstract and distant problem of climate changeinto a local context and helps people—investors and consumers alike—to relateit to their daily lives and think about how to address it. Some of the institutionalmodels explicitly include a communication function in their design (e.g. UKCIP andOuranos) whereas others do not.

This review demonstrates the value of framing local science-policy assessmentaround themes that are identified by affected stakeholders, to deepen knowledge andpromote strategies for adaptation that resonate from the bottom up (Moser 2006b).Equally, there is a need to couple impact assessment with technically sound economicanalysis of response options, i.e. to examine the local costs and benefits of differentadaptation options. Adaptation will also be generated through a multitude of privateand public sector decisions to invest differently than today to manage the risks ofclimate change, such as on choice of location and investment in built infrastructure(Fankhauser et al. 2008). These decisions represent different entry points for policyand both scientific and economic assessment can inform decisions about how todesign such policies.

Where adaptation strategies have an immediate cost, they will be accepted only ifclimate change and its impacts are well understood by the population. For instance,banning urban development today where climate change may increase future risklevels will be strongly opposed in the absence of a wide consensus on the need toreduce vulnerability to future climate change (see the recent and unsuccessful Frenchexperience to use expert knowledge alone to justify a strategic retreat from high-risk areas following the coastal floods caused by the storm Xynthia).11 Similarly, itmay be desirable to elevate houses that may be at risk of flood in the future or bybuilding houses that are more resilient to high temperature events, thus incurringincreased construction costs. Such increases in construction costs have to be justifiedthrough detailed information on the benefits that the population can expect shouldsuch policies be implemented. Climate change information, therefore, needs to betailored to local context and communicated as widely as possible, and not only todecision-makers, to make it possible to implement the most efficient policies.

Yet this review suggests that boundary organizations have typically been designedwith limited capacity at best to layer in economic assessment of adaptation. In theexamples examined, only Club ViTeCC and UKCIP appear to have begun to fullyintegrate economic assessment. Instead the focus has been largely on getting the“science” right, despite the equally challenging economic dimension of adaptationdecisions.

In looking at how to expand on these examples to provide more systemic supportfor local decision-makers, it is important to ask the question of who should pay tosupport the research component of deliberative-analytic work on climate change.Funding for such work could usefully come from either national or regional (sub-national) governments, with the intent to support adaptation decisions across allmajor urban regions in an entire nation or sub-national region (NRC 2009). Asnoted above, funding may also come from private sector actors or local authoritiesthemselves (resources permitting) who are keen to have up-to-date local informationon which to base long-lasting investment decisions. However, given the public good

11See “Après Xynthia, Oléron ne décolère pas”, Le Monde, April 14, 2010.

190 Climatic Change (2011) 104:169–197

aspects of the climate change problem, and the fact that local governments may notunderstand why it is in their interest to be concerned about climate change, there isa strong argument to centrally co-fund such research and information, at least at theoutset. Even in the case of the NYC program, central support was provided indirectlythrough the US national assessment, which was conducted with strong engagementof local and regional stakeholders and had established lasting epistemic networks onwhich local and regional authorities could eventually build.

Importantly, both the New York City program and the UKCIP have succeededin facilitating key outcomes in the form of urban adaptation plans or planningprocesses. The varied success of these boundary organizations to influence locallevel adaptation decisions may be at least in part due to their different structures,working modes (i.e. proximity to local partners), mandates and sources of funding.Both NYC and UKCIP are to a large extent locally driven as they rely uponspecific local framing, mandates and to some extent funding to support relevantscientific assessment. By contrast, ViTeCC and Ouranos have significantly morecentralized funding and autonomy, and as a result their existence is not depen-dent on the development of close working relationships or contracts with localpartners.

This raises another important question: what is the most appropriate scale at whichto organize deliberative-analytic processes, including scientific-policy assessmentcapacity, to support adaptation decision-making over time? While the New YorkCity example appears to have delivered impressive results in the form of a strongprocess to integrate adaptation within local sustainability planning for a mega-citylocation, it may not be widely replicable elsewhere. This is because it is a modelthat requires significant local resources, interest and technical capacity—featuresthat may not exist in many other cities across the world today. Also, there willbe important economies of scale to developing science-policy capacity at the sub-national scale such that it serves multiple cities and localities within a given region.There is thus an economic argument in favor of centralized support for capacityto facilitate or coordinate assessment while also prioritizing the development ofanalytic-deliberation in location specific contexts.

The evidence suggests that boundary work can usefully facilitate partnershipsand collaborative networks to co-produce local science policy assessments. Suchwork may also aim to launch local networks to coordinate relevant local sup-port functions (if they do not already exist), partnerships that could eventu-ally design, help to implement and monitor local action plans. The examples ofgreater London and New York, show that tailoring analysis to questions andneeds of a single (greater) urban area, when combined with local leadership andstrong local demand for such information, yields adaptation results. Ultimatelythe effectiveness of such boundary organizations may depend upon developinglasting relationships with local authorities and other local and regional partners andstakeholders to support an iterative analytic-deliberative local policy process overtime.12

12See also Vogel et al. (2007) for an interesting discussion of nodes of connectivity and “complexlabyrinths of communication and engagement.”

Climatic Change (2011) 104:169–197 191

5 Conclusion

Despite a flurry of recent activity in cities on climate change and growing interest inthe research community, the basic tools and scale relevant information to facilitategood decision-making in urban contexts are still lacking, and urban adaptation policyremains weak and fragmented. Urban climate policy is also largely decoupled fromnational policy frameworks, even if local authority to act is necessarily nested inthe authority of national and/or sub-national regional governments. In most cases,national governments have only just begun to take notice of the importance of cityauthorities in their efforts to advance adaptation policy.

Urban risk governance processes are central to our efforts to understand, commu-nicate, act to limit vulnerability and adapt to climate change. Climate change cannotremain a specialist issue; it needs to become a community issue, along with safestreets, clean air, a strong economy and good schools. A key to good local decision-making is civic engagement and understanding about the issue of climate changeas well as credible, legitimate and salient science-policy assessment. Understandingclimate change in local contexts, in turn, will bring political support for action,local know-how and ideas about how to address it to the table. It will also leadto more serious efforts to develop local climate response plans, helping to gatherexperience and learn, such that successful approaches can be refined and more widelydisseminated.

Urban governance of climate change offers a number of unique advantages in thedesign and implementation of responses. These include: i) the ability to work closelywith local stakeholders and in context specific ways to make climate change moretractable for decision makers; ii) the possibility to incorporate climate change intoreform of pre-existing local policies and practices (e.g. land use and urban planning);and iii) the ability to experiment with and learn about a range of possible responsesto cost-effectively adapt to inevitable climate changes.

This paper develops a multilevel climate risk governance framework to considerhow to better support urban decision-making on adaptation. It suggests the needto design policy processes across levels of government to enable and learn fromsuccessful local action over time. In particular, there is value in explicitly examininghow different levels of government, types of actors and institutions and tools enableor limit local capacity to adapt to climate change.

Within this multilevel risk governance framework, the paper examines the role ofscience-policy assessment, the use of analytic-deliberative approaches, and “bound-ary organizations” as an essential part of the toolbox to support urban adaptationplanning. It reviews several institutional examples that provide such services to localauthorities. These examples reveal a number of common features, including thecreation of local epistemic networks, which draw on regional and local researchinstitutions, and direct engagement with local businesses and other key stakeholders.

We have argued that one priority action is for national or sub-national regionalgovernments to empower city authorities by providing institutional support for thedevelopment of credible, legitimate and salient (e.g. scale relevant) science-policyassessment and deliberative-analytic processes. National and regional governmentsare well placed to help create the technical and institutional capacity needed forthis. They can provide both financial and technical support to establish “boundaryorganizations” that have a mandate to work with local communities and urban

192 Climatic Change (2011) 104:169–197

authorities. These organizations will ideally be inter-disciplinary to also ensure theapplication of relevant economic and communication tools in local deliberative-analytic processes. However, advancing adaptation decisions may hinge upon a closecoupling of science assessment to the needs of local partners and an iterative back-and-forth between these users and producers of any assessment in a deliberative-analytic process. Thus this review also suggests there may be large benefits inestablishing access to these tools within a single “boundary organization” with nodesof access and activity established at the even more local level.

Given the long start up times, national or regional governments will need toact start today to ensure that urban authorities have access to the information andresources required for good adaptation decisions. While the agenda for multilevelgovernance of climate change is inevitably much broader than this, these first stepsby national governments or sub-national governments to work with city authoritiesin this way could boost adaptation policy. If tackled today, the creation of enablingnational and regional policy frameworks could help to carry cities forward to deliveron the promise of climate protection over the decades to come.

Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank Susanne Moser and an anonymous reviewerfor commenting on this article. The views presented here represent those of the authors alone anddo not represent those of the OECD or its Member Countries.

References

Aall C, Groven K, Lindseth G (2007) The scope of action for local climate policy: the case of Norway.Glob Environ Polit 7(2):83–101

Adger WN, Agrawala S, Mirza MMQ, Conde C, O’Brien K, Pulhin J, Pulwarty R, Smit B, TakahashiK (2007) Assessment of adaptation practices, options, constraints and capacity. In: Parry MLet al (eds) Climate change 2007: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. Contribution of WorkingGroup II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Adger WN, O’Brien KL, Lorenzoni I (2009) Adaptation now. In: Adger WN et al (ed) Living withclimate change: are there limits to adaptation? Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 1–22

Agrawala S (1998) Structural and process history of the intergovernmental panel on climate change.Clim Change 39:621–642

APREC (2008) ViTeCC: villes, territories et changement climatique. Choix et gestiondes infrastructures. http://www.aprec.net/documents/plaquette_club_vitecc_2008.pdf. Accessed20 October 2008

Benton T, Redclift M (1994) Introduction. In: Redclift M, Benton T (ed) Social theory and the globalenvironment. Routledge, London

Betsill M (2001) Mitigating climate change in US cities: opportunities and obstacles. Local Environ6(4):393–406

Betsill MM, Bulkeley H (2004) Transnational networks and global environmental governance: thecities for climate protection programme. Int Stud Q 48:471–493

Betsill M, Bulkeley H (2007) Looking back and thinking ahead: a decade of cities and climate changeresearch. Local Environ 12(5):447–456

Bhagat RB, Guha M, Chattopadhyay A (2006) Mumbai after 26/7 deluge: issues and concerns inurban planning. Popul Environ 27(4):337–349

Bohman J (1996) Public deliberation: pluralism, complexity, and democracy. MIT, CambridgeBramwell A (1989) Ecology in the twentieth century: an introduction. Yale University Press, LondonBrown W, Jacobson HK (1998) Engaging countries: strengthening compliance with international

environmental accords. MIT, CambridgeBrulle R (2000) Agency, democracy and nature. MIT, CambridgeBrunner R (1996) Policy and global change research: a modest proposal. Clim Change 32:121–147

Climatic Change (2011) 104:169–197 193

Brunner R, Steelman T, Coe-Juell L, Cromley C, Edwards C, Tucker D, Ronald D (2005) Adap-tive governance: integrating science, policy, and decision-making. Columbia University Press,New York

Bulkeley H, Betsill M (2005) Rethinking sustainable cities: multilevel governance and the ’urban’politics of climate change. Env Polit 14(1):42–63

Bulkeley H, Kern K (2006) Local government and the governing of climate change in Germany andthe UK. Urban Stud 43:2237–2259

Bulkeley H, Moser S (2007) Responding to climate change: governance and social action beyondKyoto. Glob Environ Polit 7(2):1–10

Bulkeley H, Schroeder H (2008) Governing climate change post-2012: the role of global cities.Tyndall Center for Climate Change Research, London

Bulkeley H et al (2009) Cities and climate change: the role of institutions, governance and urbanplanning. Presented at the world bank urban symposium on climate change, Marseille, 28–30June 2009

Burton I, Bizikova L, Dickinson T, Howard Y (2007) Integrating adaptation into policy: upscalingevidence from local to global. Climate Policy 7:371–76

Carmin J, Roberts D, Anguelovski I (2009) Planning climate resilient cities: early lessons from earlyadapters. Presented at the world bank urban research symposium on climate change, Marseille,28–30 June 2009

Carpenter C (2001) Businesses, green groups and the media: the role of non-governmental organiza-tions in the climate change debate. Int Aff 77:313–328

Carraro C (2003) Governing the global environment. Edward Elgar, CheltenhamCarvalho A, Burgess J (2005) Cultural circuits of climate change in the UK Broadsheet press,

1985–2003. Risk Anal 25(6):1457–1470Cash D, Moser S (2000) Linking global and local scales: designing dynamic assessment and manage-

ment processes. Glob Environ Change 10(2):109–120Cash DW, Clark WC, Alcock F, Dickson NM, Eckley N, Guston DH, Jaeger J, Mitchell RB (2003)

Knowledge systems for sustainable development. PNAS 100(14):8086–8091Cash DW, Adger WN, Berkes F, Garden P, Lebel L, Olsson P, Pritchard L, Young O (2006) Scale

and cross-scale dynamics: governance and information in a multilevel world. Ecology and Society11(2):8

CDC (2008) Finance carbone: Mission Climat. http://www.caissedesdepots.fr/spip.php?article647.Accessed 20 October 2008

Clark WC, Majone G (1985) The critical appraisal of scientific inquiries with policy implications.Sci Technol Human Values 10(3):6

Corfee-Morlot J (2009) California in the greenhouse: regional climate change policies and theglobal environment. PhD dissertation, Geography Department, University College London,London

Corfee-Morlot J, Agrawala S (2004) The benefits of climate policy—editorial. Glob Environ Change14:197–199

Corfee-Morlot J, Maslin M, Burgess J (2007) Global warming in the public sphere. Philos Trans RSoc Ser A 365:2741–2776

Corfee-Morlot J, Kamal-Chaoui L, Donovan M, Cochran I, Robert A, Teasdale PJ (2009) Cities,climate change and multi-level governance. OECD Environmental Working Papers OECD,Paris

DeAngelo BJ, Harvey LDD (1998) The jurisdictional framework for municipal action to reducegreenhouse gas emissions: case studies from Canada, the USA and Germany. Local Environ:The International Journal of Justice and Sustainability 3(2):111–136

De Marchi B (2003) Public participation and risk governance. Sci Public Policy 30(3):171–176Dietz T (2003) The Darwinian trope in the drama of the commons: variations on some themes by

the Ostroms. Paper prepared for the academic conference in honor of the work of Elinor andVincent Ostrom. George Mason University, Arlington

Dietz T, Ostrom E, Stern PC (2003) The struggle to govern the commons. Science 302:1907–1912Falkner R (2003) Private environmental governance and international relations: exploring the links.

Glob Environ Polit 3(2):72–87Fankhauser S, Agrawala S, Hanrahan D, Pope G, Skees J, Stephens C, Yasmine S (2008) Economic

and policy instruments to promote adaptation in economic aspects of adaptation to climatechange. OECD, Paris

Fisher DR (2004) National governance and the global climate change regime. Rowman andLittlefield Publishers, Inc, Lanham

194 Climatic Change (2011) 104:169–197

Fisher BS, Nakicenovic N, Alfsen K, Corfee-Morlot J, de la Chesnaye F, Hourcade J-C, Jiang K,Kainuma M, La Rovere E, Rana A, Matysek A, Riahi K, Richels R, Rose S, van Vuuren D,Warren R (2007) Issues related to mitigation in the long-term context. In: Metz B et al (eds)Climate change 2007: mitigation. Contribution of working group III to the fourth assessment re-port of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridgeand New York

Folke C, Hahn T, Olsson P, Norberg J (2005) Adaptive governance of social-ecological systems.Annu Rev Environ Resources 30:441–473

Funtowicz S, Ravetz J (1993) Science for a post-normal age. Futures 25(7):739–755Gieryn T (1983) Boundary-work and the demarcation of science from non-science: strains and

interests in professional ideologies of scientists. Am Sociol Rev 48(6):781Gough C, Shackley S (2001) The respectable politics of climate change: the epistemic communities

and NGOS. Int Aff 77(2):329–346Grindle M, Thomas J (1991) Public choices and policy change: the political economy of reform in

developing countries. Johns Hopkins University Press, LondonGupta S et al (2007) Policies, instruments and co-operative arrangements. In: Metz B et al (eds)

Climate change 2007: mitigation. Contribution of working group III to the fourth assess-ment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press,Cambridge

Guston D (2001) Boundary organizations in environmental policy and science: an introduction.Sci Technol Human Values 26(4):399–408

Haas P (1990) Saving the Mediterranean: the politics of international environmental cooperation.Columbia University Press, New York City

Habermas J (1998) Between facts and norms: contributions to a discourse theory of law and democ-racy. MIT, Cambridge

Hajer M, Wagenaar H (eds) (2003) Deliberative policy analysis: understanding governance in thenetwork society. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Hall P (1993) Policy paradigms, social learning and the state: the case of economic policymaking inBritain. Comp Polit 25(3):275–296

Hall N, Taplin R (2006) Confronting climate change: a review of theoretical perspectives on envi-ronmental NGOs and their campaign effectiveness. Griffith Journal of the Environment 2:1

Hardin G (1968) The tragedy of the commons. Science 162:1243–48Harris P (2001) Assessing climate change: international co-operation and predictions of environmen-

tal change. Politics 21(1):11–22Hart D, Victor D (1993) Scientific elites and the making of US policy for climate change research,

1957–74. Soc Stud Sci 23(4):643–680Healy P (1997) Collaborative planning: shaping places in fragmented societies. Macmillan,

LondonHerrick C (2004) Objectivity versus narrative coherence: science, environmental policy, and the U.S.

Data Quality Act. Environ Sci Policy 7:419–433Hooghe L, Marks G (2003) Unravelling the central state, but how? Types of multi-level governance.

Am Polit Sci Rev 97(2):233–243IEA (2008) World energy outlook 2008. International Energy Agency (IEA), ParisIPCC (1996) Intergovernmental panel on climate change, second assessment report. Cambridge

University Press, CambridgeIPCC (2007) Summary for policymakers. In Climate change 2007: synthesis report. Fourth assess-

ment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press,Cambridge

Jasanoff S (1990) The fifth branch: science advisers as policymakers. Harvard University Press,Cambridge

Kamal-Chaoui L, Robert A (eds) (2009) Competitive cities and climate change. OECD, ParisKirshen P, Ruth M, Anderson W (2008) Interdependencies of urban climate change impacts

and adaptation strategies: a case study of Metropolitan Boston USA. Clim Change 86:105–122

Krimsky S (1992) The role of theory in risk studies. In: Krimsky S, Golding D (eds) Social theoriesof risk (pp 3–22). Praeger, Westport

Kwa C (2001) The rise and fall of weather modification: changes in american attitudes towardtechnology, nature, and society. In: Miller CA, Edwards PN (eds) Changing the atmosphere:expert knowledge and environmental governance. MIT, Cambridge

Layzer J (2006) The environmental case: translating values into policy, 2nd edn. CQ, Washington

Climatic Change (2011) 104:169–197 195

Leiserowitz A (2005) American risk perceptions: is climate change dangerous. Risk Anal 25(6):1433–1442

Leiserowitz A (2006) Climate change risk perception and policy preferences: the role of affect,imagery and values. Clim Change 77(1–2):45–72

Levy D, Newell P (eds) (2005) The business of global environmental governance. MIT, CambridgeLindseth G (2004) The cities for climate protection campaign (CCPC) and the framing of local

climate policy. Local Environ 9:325–336Logan JR (2006) The impact of Katrina: race and class in storm-damaged neighborhoods, Hurricane

Katrina project. In: Initiative on spatial structures in the social sciences. Brown University,Providence

London Climate Change Partnership (LCCP) (2002) London’s warming. Greater London Authority,London. http://www.london.gov.uk/lccp/publications. Accessed 12 May 2010

London Climate Change Partnership (LCCP) (2005) Adapting to climate change: a checklist fordevelopment. Guidance on designing developments in a changing climate. Greater LondonAuthority, London

London Climate Change Partnership (LCCP) (2007) Adapting to climate change: a casestudy companion to the checklist for development. Greater London Authority. http://www.london.gov.uk/lccp/publications/. Accessed 12 May 2010

Lorenzoni I, Jordan A, Hulme M, Turner RK, O’Riordan T (2000) A co-evolutionary approachto climate change impact assessment: Part 1, Integrating socio-economic and climate changescenarios. Glob Environ Change 10:57–68

Lowe A, Foster J, Winkelman S (2009) Asking the climate question: lessons learned in effectiveadaptation from urban leaders partners. Center for Clean Air Policy, Washington. June.http://www.ccap.org/docs/resources/674/Urban_Climate_Adaptation-FINAL_CCAP%206-9-09.pdf. Accessed 23 May 2010

March J, Olsen JP (1984) The new institutionalism: organizational factors in political life. Am PolitSci Rev 78(3):734–749

Mathew RA (2007) Climate change and human security. In: DiMento JFC, Doughman P (eds)Climate change: what it mean for us, our children, and our grandchildren. MIT, Cambridge

Mazur A, Lee J (1993) Sounding the global alarm: environmental issues in the US National News.Soc Stud Sci 23(4):681–720

McKenzie Hedger M, Connell R, Bramwell P (2006) Bridging the gap: empowering decision-makingfor adaptation through the UK Climate Impacts Programmeme. Climate Policy 6:201–215

Miller C, Edwards P (eds) (2001) Changing the atmosphere: expert knowledge and environmentalgovernance. MIT, Cambridge

Mitchell RB, Clark WC, Cash DW, Dickson N (eds) (2006) Global environmental assessments:information, institutions, and influence. MIT, Cambridge

Moser SC (2006a) Talk of the city: engaging urbanites on climate change. Institute for the Study ofSociety and Environment, Boulder

Moser SC (2006b) Climate change and sea-level rise in Maine and Hawai’i: the changing tides ofan issue domain. In: Mitchell RB, Clark WC, Cash DW, Dickson N (eds) Global environmentalassessments: information, institutions, and influence (pp 201–239). MIT Press, Cambridge, MA

Moser SC (2009a) Whether our levers are long enough and the Fulcrum Strong?—Exploring the softunderbelly of adaptation decisions and actions. In: Adger WN et al (eds) Living with climatechange: are there limits to adaptation? Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 313–343

Moser SC (2009b) Good morning, America! The explosive US awakening to the need for adaptation.California Energy Commission and NOAA-Coastal Services Center, Sacramento. Available at:http://www.csc.noaa.gov/publications/need-for-adaptation.pdf

Moser S, Dilling L (eds) (2006) Creating a climate for change: communicating climate change andfacilitating social change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Moser SC, Tribbia J (2006) Vulnerability to inundation and climate change impacts in California:Coastal managers’ attitudes and perceptions. Mar Technol Soci J 40(4):35–44

National Research Council (2007) Analysis of global change assessments: lessons learned. NationalAcademies, Washington

National Research Council (2008) Public participation in environmental assessment and decisionmaking. National Academies, Washington

National Research Council (2009) Informing decisions in a changing climate. National Academies,Washington

Newell P (2000) Climate for change: non-state actors and the global politics of the greenhouse.Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

196 Climatic Change (2011) 104:169–197

NYC (New York City Mayor’s Office of Long Term Planning and Sustainability) (2007) PlaNYC:a greener, greater New York. City of New York, New York City. www.nyc.gov/PlaNYC2030.Accessed 20 May 2010

NYC (2010) PlaNYC Progress Report 2010. New York City. www.nyc.gov/PlaNYC2030. Accessed20 May 2010, pp 79

OECD (2009) OECD policy guidance on integrating climate adaptation into development co-operation. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris

OECD (2010) Mumbai, climate change and future flood risk: exposure, economic losses and adapta-tion options. Environment Working Paper. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-opment, Paris

Olson M (1965) The logic of collective action: public goods and the theory of groups. HarvardUniversity Press, Cambridge

O’Riordan T, Jordan A (1999) Institutions, climate change and cultural theory: towards a commonanalytical framework. Glob Environ Change 9(2):81–93

Ostrom E (1990) Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action.Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Ostrom E (2000) Collective actions and the evolution of norms. J Econ Perspect 14(3):137–158Ostrom E (2009) A polycentric approach for coping with climate change. Background paper for the

WDR 2010Ostrom E, Dietz T, Dolsak N, Stern PC, Stonich S, Weber E (eds) (2002) The drama of the commons.

National Academy Press, WashingtonOuranos (2008) Consortium on regional climatology and adaptation to climate change. http://www.

ouranos.ca/en/pdf/ouranos_brochure-2008_en.pdf. Accessed 15 May 2010Ouranos (2010) Ouranos in short and mission. http://www.ouranos.ca/en/our-organisation/ouranos-

in-short.php. Accessed 15 May 2010Paterson M (2008) Global governance for sustainable capitalism: political economy and environmen-

tal governance. In: Adger NW, Jordon A (eds) Governing sustainability. Cambridge UniversityPress, Cambridge

Pelling M (2006) Adaptation and disaster management: scales issues, workshop background note.In: McKenzie Hedger M, Corfee-Morlot J (eds) Adaptation to climate change: what needs tohappen next? Report of a Workshop in the UK EU Presidency. UK Environment Agency andDEFRA, London

Pielke RA Jr (2006) Misdefining ‘climate change’: consequences for science and action. Environ SciPolicy 8:548–561

Qi Y, Ma L, Zhang H, Li H (2008) Translating a global issue into local priority: China’s localgovernment response to climate change. J Environ Dev 17:379–400

Rabe B (2004) Statehouse and greenhouse: the emerging politics of American climate change policy.Brookings Institution, Washington

Rayner S, Malone EL (eds) (1998) Human choice and climate change: what have we learned? vol 4.Batelle Memorial Institute

Renn O (2001) The role of social science in environmental policy making: experiences and outlook.Sci Public Policy 28(6):427–437

Renn O (2008) Risk governance: coping with uncertainty in a complex world. Earthscan,London

Rosenzweig C, Major DC, Demong K, Stanton C, Horton R, Stults M (2007) Managing climatechange risks in New York City’s water system: assessment and adaptation planning. Mitig AdaptStrategies Glob Chang 12(8):1391–1409

Rydin Y (2003) Conflict, consensus, and rationality in environmental planning: an institutional dis-course approach. In: Clark G, Goudi A, Peach C (eds) Oxford geographical and environmentalstudies. Oxford University Press, Oxford

Sathaye J et al (2007) Sustainable development and mitigation. In: Metz B et al (eds) Climatechange 2007: mitigation. Contribution of working group III to the fourth assessment report ofthe intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Satterthwaite D (2008) Cities’ contribution to global warming: notes on the allocation of greenhousegas emissions. Environ Urban 20(2):539

Satterthwaite D, Huq S, Reid H, Pellin M, Romero Lankao P (2009) Introduction. In: Bicknell J,Dodman D, Satterthwaite D (eds) Adapting cities to climate change: understanding and ad-dressing the development challenges. Earthscan, London

Schellnhuber HJ, Crutzen PJ, Clark WC, Claussen M, Held H (eds) (2004) Earth system analysis forsustainability. MIT, Cambridge

Climatic Change (2011) 104:169–197 197

Schreurs MA (2008) From the bottom up. Local and subnational climate change politics. J EnvironDev 17:343–355

Schipper L, Pelling M (2006) Disaster risk, climate change and international development: scope for,and challenges to, integration. Disasters 30(1):19–38

Shackley S, Deanwood R (2002) Stakeholder perceptions of climate change impacts at the regionalscale: implications for the effectiveness of regional and local responses. J Environ Plan Manag45(3):381–402

Shimoda Y (2003) Adaptation measures for climate change and the urban heat island in Japan’s builtenvironment. Building Research and Information Journal 31(3–4):222–230

Sippel M, Jenssen T (2009) What about local climate governance? A review of promise and problems.MPRA Working Paper

Social Learning Group (SLG) (ed) (2001) Learning to manage global environmental risks: a compar-ative history of climate change, ozone depletion and acid precipitation, 2 vols. MIT, Cambridge

Solecki WD, Rosenzweig C, Parshall L, Pope G, Clark M, Cox J et al (2005) Mitigation of theheat island effect in urban New Jersey. Global Environmental Change Part B: Environ Hazards6(1):39–49

Stavins R (1997) Policy instruments for climate change: how can national governments address aglobal problem? University of Chicago legal forum: rethinking environmental protection for the21st century, pp 293–329

Stern PC, Fineberg HV (eds) (1996) Understanding risk: informing decisions in a democratic society.National Academies, Washington

Sugiyama N, Takeuchi T (2008) Local policies for climate change in Japan. J Environ Dev 17:424–441

Tversky A, Kahneman D (1973) Availability: a heuristic for judging frequency and probability. CognPsychol 5:207–232

UK Climate Impacts Programme (UKCIP) (2001) Socio-economic scenarios for climate impactassessment: a guide to their use in the UK climate impacts programme. UKCIP, Oxford,p 127

UK Climate Impacts Programme (UKCIP) (2005) Programme: UKCIP 2005–2010. http://www.ukcip.org.uk/images/stories/About_UKCIP/workprogrammemeforag.pdf. Accessed 17 October2008

UK Climate Impacts Programme (UKCIP) (2008) About UKCIP. http://www.ukcip.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=18&Itemid=123. Accessed 17 October 2008

UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) (2008) Links between disaster riskreduction, development and climate change. Report prepared for the Commission on ClimateChange and Development, Sweden

UNFCCC (2006) Synthesis of reports demonstrating progress in accordance with Article 3, para-graph 2, of the Kyoto Protocol. Note by the secretariat. In FCCC/SBI/2006/INF.2. UnitedNations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Bonn

Urwin K, Jordan A (2008) Does public policy support or undermine climate change adaptation?Exploring policy interplay across different scales of governance. Glob Environ Change 18(1):180–191

US National Assessment Synthesis Team (USNAST) (2001) Climate change impacts on the UnitedStates: the potential consequences of climate variability and change. Cambridge University Press,Cambridge

Vescovi et al (2007) Climate change science knowledge transfer in support of vulnerability, impactsand adaptation activities on a North American regional scale: Ouranos as a case study. IPCCRegional Expert Meeting: Meeting Report papers

Vogel C, Moser SC, Kasperson RE, Dabelko G (2007) Linking vulnerability, adaptation, and re-silience science to practice: pathways, players, and partnerships. Glob Environ Change 17:349–364

Wilbanks TJ, Romero Lankao P, Bao M, Berkhout F, Cairncross S, Ceron J-P, Kapshe M, Muir-Wood R, Zapata-Marti R (2007) Industry, settlement and society. Climate change 2007: im-pacts, adaptation and vulnerability. Contribution of working group II to the fourth assessmentreport of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press,Cambridge

Wynne B (2002) Risk and environment as legitimatory discourses of technology: reflexivity insideout? Curr Sociol 50(3):459–477

Yearley S (1994) Social movements and environmental change. In: Redclift M, Benton T (eds) Socialtheory and the global environment. Routledge, London