copyright © 2011. university of california press. all

Frede, Michael. A Free Will : Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought, edited by A. A. Long, University of California Press, 2011. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/asulib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=631055.Created from asulib-ebooks on 2019-08-17 06:35:29.

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InhonorofbelovedVirgil—

“Odeglialtripoetionoreelume…”

—Dante,Inferno


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ThepublishergratefullyacknowledgesthegeneroussupportoftheClassicalLiteratureEndowmentFundoftheUniversityofCaliforniaPressFoundation,whichwasestablishedbyamajorgiftfromJoanPalevsky.


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SATHERCLASSICALLECTURESVolumeSixty-eight

AFreeWill


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AFreeWillOriginsoftheNotioninAncientThought

byMichaelFrede

EditedbyA.A.LongwithaForewordbyDavidSedley

UNIVERSITYOFCALIFORNIAPRESSBerkeleyLosAngelesLondon


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UniversityofCaliforniaPress,oneofthemostdistinguisheduniversitypressesintheUnitedStates,enricheslivesaroundtheworldbyadvancingscholarshipinthehumanities,socialsciences,andnaturalsciences.ItsactivitiesaresupportedbytheUCPressFoundationandbyphilanthropiccontributionsfromindividualsandinstitutions.Formoreinformation,visitwww.ucpress.edu.

UniversityofCaliforniaPressBerkeleyandLosAngeles,California

UniversityofCaliforniaPress,Ltd.London,England

©2011byTheRegentsoftheUniversityofCalifornia

LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData

Frede,Michael.Afreewill:originsofthenotioninancientthought/editedbyA.A.Long;withaforewordbyDavidSedley.p.cm.—(Satherclassicallectures;v.68)

“AneditedversionofthesixlecturesMichaelFrededeliveredasthe84thSatherProfessorofClassicalLiteratureattheUniversityofCalifornia,Berkeley,intheFallsemesterof1997/98”—Pref.Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.ISBN978-0-520-26848-7(cloth:alk.paper)1.Freewillanddeterminism—History.2.Philosophy,AncientI.Long,A.A.II.Title.B187.F7F7420111237'·5093—dc22 2010020858

ManufacturedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica

1918171615141312111010987654321

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http://www.ucpress.edu

CONTENTS

Foreword

Editor'sPreface

1.Introduction

2.AristotleonChoicewithoutaWill

3.TheEmergenceofaNotionofWillinStoicism

4.LaterPlatonistandPeripateticContributions

5.TheEmergenceofaNotionofaFreeWillinStoicism

6.PlatonistandPeripateticCriticismsandResponses

7.AnEarlyChristianViewonaFreeWill:Origen

8.ReactionstotheStoicNotionofaFreeWill:Plotinus

9.Augustine:ARadicallyNewNotionofaFreeWill?

10.Conclusion

Abbreviations

Notes

Bibliography

Index


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FOREWORD

Michael Frede's untimely death in 2007marked off a forty-year era in the study of ancientphilosophyuponwhichhehaslefthisuniquemark.Thisimprintowedmuchtohisintellectualpersona.AtGöttingen (1966-71),Berkeley (1971-76), Princeton (1976–91),Oxford (1991–2005),and,inhisfinalyears,Athens(2005–2007),hewasamagnettoyoungerscholars,manyofwhomhavegoneontobecomeleadersinthefield.Forthemandothershesetaninspiringexample by his dialectical practice of live discussion, which, provided that it wasaccompaniedbysufficientcoffeeandcigarettes,wasliabletocontinuehouruponhourwithoutlimit.Hewasunfailinglysupportivrreofhiscountlessformerstudents, inmanyofwhomthespiritandstyleofhisscholarshipliveon.Forthewiderworld,however,hiswritingsweretheprimaryconduitofhisinfluence.They

started with Prädikation und Existenzaussage (1967), his seminal monograph on Plato'sSophist, and continued through his superlative book on Stoic logic (1974), his celebratedcommentary (coauthored by Gunther Patzig) on Aristotle, Metaphysics Zeta (1988),innumerablearticlesandchapters,threeeditedcollections,atranslation(withRichardWalzer)ofThree Treatises on the Nature of Science by Galen, and a volume of Frede's reprintedpapers(1987),towhichfurthervolumesarenowtobeposthumouslyadded.Thepresentbookfurtherenlarges,perhapsevencrowns,thatremarkablecorpusofwork.FromthetwelvecenturiesduringwhichGreco-Romanphilosophyflourished,therearefew

thinkersor topicswhoseunderstandinghasnotbeenenrichedbyFrede'spublications.Afulllist would be tediously long. Plato and the dialogue form;Aristotelian category theory andmetaphysics; Stoic logic, grammar, ethics, and epistemology; Pyrrhonist skepticism; andGalen's theology are nomore than examples of the subjects whose understanding has beenpermanently transformed by Frede's now classic studies. I do not mean by this that he hasdefinitivelysolvedthemajorhistoricalorexegeticalproblems;hisviewshaveasoftenasnotgeneratednewcontroversy.Rather,hisexampleandcontributionhavedramaticallyclarifiedthe issues and raised the level of debate, introducing entirely new perspectives andinterpretativeoptions.Frede was invited to be the eighty-fourth Sather Professor of Classical Literature at his

former university, the University of California, Berkeley, in 1997-98. The professorshiprequires its holder to give six lectures that will later be published by the University ofCaliforniaPressinitsSatherClassicalLecturesseries,whichincludessuchcelebratedworksasE.R.Dodds,TheGreeks and the Irrational (1951), andBernardWilliams,Shame andNecessity(1993).AsTonyLongexplainsinhispreface,althoughthelectureswereextremelywellreceived,Frededidnotfeelreadytopublishthembeforeextendinghisresearchfurther.But as readers will quickly discover, the quality of the text that he has bequeathed fullymatchesthebrillianceandincisivenessforwhichallhisworkisadmired.The origin of the concept of will, and more specifically free will, has been endlessly


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debated,andtheinconclusivenessofthedebatehasmirroredthephilosophicalindeterminacyof theconcept itself.Frede's strategy is toavoidany initialpresuppositionsabout the term'sprecisemeaningandinsteadlethisunderstandingofitemergefromthetexts.ThisleadshimtosetAristotle aside (albeit in a characteristically illuminating chapter) and to shift the focusfirmly to Stoicism, arguing that it was in Epictetus that the earlier Stoic theory of assent,enrichedwithanowdevelopednotionofaninner life, ledtothefirstphilosophicalconceptplausiblyidentifiableasfreewill.MuchofFrede'spastworkonStoicpsychologyisfruitfullyredeployedinsecuringthisresult.LaterchaptersaredevotedtoshowinghowtheunderlyingStoic notion, despite not being able to commend itself in unmodified form toPlatonismandAristotelianism,wastheonethatultimatelyfounditswayintoChristiandoctrine.Inaddition to itspotential tobecomea landmark in thehistoriographyofphilosophy, this

book displays the familiar magic of Michael Frede's writing at his usual best. One of theearliestlessonshelearned,heoncetoldme,wasnottodressupascomplicatedanythingthatis fundamentally simple. And that capacity for putting across a powerfully illuminatingperspectivewithouttheleastpretension,butwithawinningcombinationoflucidity,patience,and penetratingly sharp vision,will be found to be on display oncemore in the pages thatfollow.

DavidSedley


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EDITOR'SPREFACE

ThisbookisaneditedversionofthesixlecturesMichaelFrededeliveredastheeighty-fourthSatherProfessorofClassicalLiterature at theUniversityofCalifornia,Berkeley,during thefallsemesterof1997–98.Fredeentitledhislectures“TheOriginsoftheNotionoftheWill.”They were well attended by the campus community and received with great interest andappreciation.TheDepartmentofClassicswaseagertopublishthelecturesassoonasFredewasreadytocommitthemtoprint,butheinsistedthat,beforedoingso,heneededtodiscussfurtherancientauthorsandrelatedtopics.Thisperfectionismwascompletelyincharacter,butbysummer2007wewerestillhopingtoreceiveatypescriptfromhimthatwecouldsendtothe University of California Press. Then, on August 11 of that year, during a triennialcolloquiumonHellenisticphilosophyatDelphi,FredediedunexpectedlywhileswimmingintheGulfofCorinth.Whatadditionsandchangeshemighthavemade,butforhisuntimelydeath,weshallsadly

neverknow. Inconversationwithme in theyears sincehedeliveredhisSatherLectures,hespoke eagerly about his interests inMaximus theConfessor and JohnChrysostomos; as thisbook's bibliography shows, in 2002 he published a substantial article entitled “John ofDamascusonHumanAction,theWill,andHumanFreedom.”WecanbefairlyconfidentthatByzantine philosophy and theology was the field in which he would have expanded hisresearchonthewill.But, thoughhehimselfwasnotreadytopublishhis lecture typescripts,theyalreadyform,asthisbookshows,acompletelycoherentandwell-fashionedwhole.HavingbeenfortunatetoknowMichaelFredeforaperiodofthirtyyears,Ireadilyagreedto

edit the lectureswhenKaterina Iorediakonou, his partner, askedme to do so. I realized ofcoursethatthetaskwouldbedaunting.Frede'scommandofancientphilosophywaslegendaryinitsrangeandsubtlety,andhisSatherLecturesdrewhimintoPatristicscholarship,whereIwas far from being at home. However, I knew I could count on help wherever my ownfamiliaritywiththematerialranout.Incompilingthenotes,whichwerenotpartoftheoriginaltypescript, Ihaveconsulted the following friends:AlanCode, JohnDillon,DorotheaFrede,James Hankinson, James O'Donnell, and Robert Sharples. George Boys-Stones deservesspecialmentionasheislargelyresponsibleforthenotesforchapter7,onOrigen.IamalsogratefultomycolleagueMarkGriffith,whowrotetheSathercommittee'sreportrecommendingthebook'spublication to theUniversityofCaliforniaPressandgavemeseveralsuggestionsandcorrectionsthatIhavegladlyincorporated.AsFredeindicatedinhisfirstlecture(chapter1),heconceivedhisproject,toquitealarge

extent, as a response to theSatherLectures delivered by his compatriot,AlbrechtDihle, in1974andpublishedin1982underthetitleTheTheoryofWillinClassicalAntiquity.FredefullyacknowledgesDihle'sextraordinarylearning,buthecontestshispredecessor'sthesisthattheeffectiveoriginatorof thenotionofa freewillwasAugustine.According toFrede, it islater Stoicism, as represented byEpictetus, thatwas chiefly responsible for developing the


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notionofafreewill,withAugustinehimselfoneofthechiefbeneficiariesofthisStoicnotion.Fredeentitledhislectures,asIhavementioned,“TheOriginsoftheNotionoftheWill.”In

fact, as hemakes plain in the introduction to this book, what chiefly concerns him are theoriginsofthenotionofafreewill.IneditinghisworkIdecidedthatitwouldbemuchmoreappropriatelypublicizedbystating“freewill” inthebook's titlerather thansimply“will.”Ihavealsoconvertedthefirstthreechaptersofhistypescript,whichwerelengthyandcloselypacked, into the first six chapters of this book.Chapters 1,3, and 5 retain Frede's originallecture titles, as do chapters 7 to 9. But chapters 2, 4, and 6, with titles I have invented,incorporatematerialFredeincludedinthesecondhalfofeachofhistypescriptchapters1,2,and3.Inediting thematerial Ihavebeenchieflyconcerned to smooth the flowof sentencesand

paragraphsinwaysthatstillrespecttheinimitabletoneofFrede'svoice.InafewinstancesIwasnotsureofhismeaning,andIhaveindicatedtheseinthenotes.MostoftenthechangesIhaveintroducedaretopunctuation,syntax,andwordorder,pruningsomeoftheprofuseusesofnow or and at the beginning of sentences and eliminating repetition that works better in alecture than in a text for reading. I have also introduced a few subheadings orwhite spacebetween paragraphs, in order to temper the density of some passages. Iwas greatly helpedwiththemechanicsofeditingbyNandiniPandey,agraduatestudentatBerkeley,whoputthepreliminarily edited typescript on line and spotted many necessary changes that I hadoverlooked. Iamalsograteful toDavidCrane,anotherBerkeleygraduatestudent,whoreadpartsofthetypescriptwithmeatanearlystageandmadehelpfuleditorialsuggestions.In most of his publications Frede was sparing in the use of notes and in references to

scholarly literature. This book departs somewhat from that practice, but I have beenencouragedbyfriends,amongwhomIamespeciallygrateful toCharlesBrittain, toannotateFrede'stexttotheextentthatIhavedone.Hisworkisofsuchhighqualityandofsuchgeneralinterestthatitdeservesalargereadership.Ihavecompiledthebook'snotesandbibliography,modestinscopeandquantitythoughtheyare,inthehopethattheywillbeofhelptoreaderswhoarerelativelynewtothismaterialandkeentopursueitfurther,asFredehimselfwouldhavewished.

AAL


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CHAPTERONE

Introduction

Thenotionofafreewillisanotionwehaveinheritedfromantiquity.Itwasfirstinantiquitythatonecametothinkofhumanbeingsashavingafreewill.But,aswithsomanyothernotionswe have inherited from antiquity, for instance, the notion of an essence or the notion of ateleologicalcause,wehavetoaskourselveswhetherthenotionofafreewillhasnotoutliveditsusefulness,hasnotbecomeaburdenratherthanofanyrealhelpinunderstandingourselvesandwhatwedo.Contemporaryphilosophers for themostpartdispensewith thenotionofafreewill,andthefewattemptswhicharestillmadetogiveanaccountofwhatitistohavefreewillseemratherdiscouraging.Inthissituationitmaybeofsomehelptoretraceourstepsandsee what purpose the notion of a free will originally was supposed to serve, how it wassupposedtohelpourunderstanding,andwhetheritwasflawedrightfromitsbeginnings,aswemightnowseeinhindsight.IntheselecturesitisinthisspiritthatIwanttopursuethequestion“Wheninantiquitydid

onefirstthinkofhumanbeingsashavingafreewill,whydidonecometothinkso,andwhatnotionofafreewillwasinvolvedwhenonecametothinkofhumanbeingsinthisway?”Toraise this question, though, is tomake a substantial assumption about the very nature of thenotion of a free will. I assume, and I will try to show, that this notion in its origins is atechnical,philosophicalnotionwhichalreadypresupposesquitedefiniteandfar fromtrivialassumptionsaboutourselvesand theworld. It is for this reason that Ipresume itshavinganidentifiablehistoricalorigin.In contrast, this is not the view scholars took until fairly recently. They went on the

assumptionthatthenotionofafreewillisanordinarynotion,partoftherepertoryofnotionsin termsofwhich the ordinary person thinks about things and in termsofwhich the ancientGreeksmusthavealreadybeenthinkingallalong.Andonthisassumption,ofcourse,thereisnoplaceforthequestionofwhentheancientsfirstcametothinkofhumanbeingsashavingafreewill.TheassumptionthattheGreeksallalongmusthavebeenthinkingofhumanbeingsashaving

afreewillseemstrulyastoundingnowadays.For,ifwelookatGreekliteraturefromHomeronwards,downtolongafterAristotle,wedonotfindanytraceofareferenceto,letaloneamentionof,afreewill.Thisisallthemoreremarkable,asPlatoandinparticularAristotlehadplentyofoccasiontorefertoafreewill.Butthereisnosignofsuchareferenceintheirworks.Scholarsdid indeednotice thiswitha certainamountofpuzzlement.But it didnotoccur to


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themtodrawwhatwouldseemtobe theobvious inference,namely, thatPlatoandAristotledidnotyethaveanotionofafreewillandthatitwasforthisreasonthattheydidnottalkofafreewill.AseminentascholarasW.D.RossagaincouldnotethatPlatoandAristotledonotrefer to a will, let alone a free will. But even Ross concludes that we must assume thatAristotle, as Ross puts it, “shared the plain man's belief in free will.”1 And he explainsAristotle'sfailuretorefertoafreewillexplicitlyasduetothefactthatAristotledidnotthinkhardandcarefullyenoughaboutthemattertoarriveataphilosophicalaccountofwhatitistohaveafreewill.But why should we assume in the first place that Aristotle believed in a free will? To

understand theassumptionRossandearlier scholarsmake,wehave to take intoaccount thefollowing.Letusassumethatitisafactthat,atleastsometimeswhenwedosomething,weareresponsibleforwhatwearedoing,asnothingornobodyforcesustoactinthisway;rather,weourselves desire or even choose or decide to act in this way. Let us also assume, as isreasonable enough, that this iswhat theGreeks believed all along. It certainly is somethingAristotle took to be a fact. The notion of a free will was originally introduced within thecontextofaparticular theory,namely,a lateStoic theory, inawayspecific to this theory, toaccountfor thispresumedfact.Butonce thisnotionhadbeen introduced intoStoicism,rivaltheories,eitherPeripateticorPlatonist,developedtheirownversionofanotionofafreewill,whichfittedinwiththeiroveralltheory.Infact,itwasanotionwhichwaseagerlytakenupbyChristians, too.And, largelydue to the influenceofmainstreamChristianity, it came tobeanotion which, in one version or another, gained almost universal acceptance. People quitegenerally, whether followers of Stoicism, Platonism, or mainstream Christianity, feltcommittedtoabeliefinafreewill.Eveniftheythemselveswerenotabletogiveatheoreticalaccountofwhatafreewillis,theyreliedonsuchanaccount'sbeingavailable.Thishadtheeffectthatthemereassumptionthatsometimesweareresponsibleforwhatwearedoing,sincewedoitnotbecauseweareforcedtobutbecauseweourselveswantto,cametoberegardedastantamounttoabeliefinafreewill.Fromhereitwasjustashortsteptotheassumptionthatthemerenotionofafreewillwasanordinarynotion,withphilosophicaltheorycominginonlytogiveatheoreticalaccountofwhatitistohaveafreewill.ThisiswhyRosscouldassumethatAristotlesharedtheplainman'sbeliefinafreewillbutfailedtogiveatheoreticalaccountofthat.Itseemstometobeclear,though,thatweshouldcarefullydistinguishbetweenthebeliefin

afreewillandtheordinarybeliefthatatleastsometimesweareresponsibleforwhatwearedoing,becausewearenotforcedormadetobehaveinthiswaybutreallywantorevenchooseordecidetoactinthisway.Thisbeliefinafreewillisinvolvedinsometheoreticalaccountsofwhatweordinarilybelieve.But it isnot tobe identifiedwith thisordinarybelief.Anditseems to me that Aristotle is a good example of a philosopher who is committed to theordinarybeliefbutdoesnotresorttothenotionofafreewilltoaccountforthisbelief.Hence,sinceevenAristotledoesnotyettalkofafreewill,weshouldassumethathedidnotyethaveanotionofafreewill.This indeed iswhat scholars nowadays aregenerally agreedon.The changeof scholarly

opinion is largely due to the fact that philosophical discussions, of the kind we find, forinstance,inGilbertRyle'sTheConceptofMind,havepersuadedscholarsthatthenotionofa


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freewillisatbestahighlycontroversialnotion.2Inlightofthis,Aristotle'sfailuretorefertoafree will is no longer regarded as a cause for puzzlement but by many is registered withoutrightrelief.OnceonefinallycomestoseethatitisnotthecasethattheGreeksallalonghadanotionof

afreewillandthatwedonotyetfindthisnotioneveninAristotle,thequestionnaturallyposesitself:Whendid thenotionofa freewillarise?Andsomore recent scholarshavebegun toinquireintothisquestion.

ByfarthemostsubstantialattempttoanswerthisquestionwasmadebyAlbrechtDihleinhisSatherLecturesof1974,whichwerepublishedbytheUniversityofCaliforniaPressin1982underthetitleTheTheoryofWillinClassicalAntiquity.Thisbookremainsthemostimportantcontributiontothesubject.Onemustadmirethewidelearningandinsightwhichwentintoitswriting.But,evenifonedoesnotdisposeofthekindoflearningDihledoes,onecannothelpbeingstruckbyonefactabouthisaccountwhichpervasivelyshapeshisbook.Itisanaccountwhichisfocusedonahighlyspecificnotionofafreewill.WhatDihleattemptstolaybareandtoshedlighton is theoriginof thisparticularnotionofafreewill.Hecalls it“ourmodernnotionofwill.”3Thiscannotfailtoprovoketworeactions.Tobeginwith,weshouldquery thephrase,“ourmodernnotionofwill,”especiallysince

Dihleassumesthatthisnotionofwillisanotionofafreewill.4Inlightofwhatwehavesaidbefore,hehardlyseemsentitledtotheassumptionthatthereisonenotionofawill,andafreewillatthat,whichweallshare.Dihletalksasifacertainnotionofthewill,thoughnotthereallalong,becamecommoncurrencyfromacertainpointonwardsup to thepresent.But thisdoesnotseemtobetrue.Heisofcourseperfectlyentitledtoaviewabouthowweallshouldorwouldconceiveofthewill,ifwehadproperlyunderstoodwhatawillis.But,ifwethenlookmorecloselyatwhatDihlehastosayaboutthewill,itturnsouttobeanotionofafreewillwhichisdangerouslyclosetothekindofnotionwhichphilosophershavebeenattacking,a notionwhich is supposed to do justice to the presumed fact thatwe can do something bysheervolition,byasheeractofthewill.Second, theveryphrase “ourmodernnotionofwill”quite rightly remindsus that history

presents us with a wide variety of versions of a notion of a free will, which differ quitesubstantiallyfromDihle'sfavorednotion,presumedtobeournotion.Inpartthesedifferinthat,asheputsit,theyaremuchtoo“intellectualistic”andnot“voluntaristic”enough.5Dihlepassesoverallsuchnotionswithlittleornodiscussion,astheycannotcountasnotionsofawillinwhathetakestobeoursenseoftheconcept.It seems tome thatDihle does indeed contribute a great deal to our understandingof the

historicaloriginsofaspecificnotionofafreewill—onethatisstillquitewidespreadandthatmanymay think captures thewaywe ought to conceive of thewill as such. Butmy aim iscompletelydifferentfromDihle's.Idonotaimtoelucidatetheoriginsofsomespecificnotionofafreewillwhichwemighthave,letaloneanotionImyselffavor.ForIregardmyinquiryaspurelyhistorical.Idonotwantittodependon,andbeshapedandslantedby,anotionofafreewillwhichatbest canbe regardedasphilosophicallyquite controversial.Rather, I aminterested,as I saidat theoutset, in trying to findoutwhenandwhyanotionofa freewillarose in the first place andwhat notion thiswas. Iwill then try to trace the history of this


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notiontoseewhetherandhowitchangedinthecourseofthediscussionstowhichitgaverisein antiquity. In this way, I hope, we shall also be able to identify the ancestor of Dihle'sfavorednotionofafreewillor,forthatmatter,theancestorsofanylaternotionofafreewill.ItisinthissensethatIplantotalkabouttheoriginsofthenotionofafreewill.

Now,thoughIdonotpresupposeaspecificnotionofafreewill,letalonewanttoendorseoradvocatesomespecificnotionofit,Idorelyonsomethinglikeageneralideaofafreewill,somethinglikeaschemawhichanyspecificnotionofafreewilloranyparticularversionofthenotionofafreewill,atleastinantiquity,willfitinto.Idonotarriveatthisgeneralideaorschemaon thebasisof somephilosophicalviewas towhatanynotionofa freewillhas tolooklikebutratherwiththebenefitofhistoricalhindsight.Thatistosay,Ihavelookedattherelevantancienttextsandhaveabstractedthisschemafromthosetextswhichexplicitlytalkofawill,thefreedomofthewill,orafreewill.Inhavingsuchaschema,weshallatleasthaveageneralideaofwhatwearelookingforwhenweinvestigatetheoriginsofthenotionofafreewillbutwithouthavingtocommitourselvestoanyparticularview,ancientormodern,astowhatafreewillreallyis.Itshouldbeclearthatinordertohaveanysuchnotion,onemustfirstofallhaveanotionof

awill.Asamatterofhistorical fact, it turnsout that anotionofawill isnotnecessarilyanotionofawillwhichisfree.Inanycase,inordertohaveanotionofafreewill,onemust,inadditiontothenotionofawill,alsohaveanotionoffreedom.Thesenotionsofawillandoffreedommustbesuchthatitmakessensetosaythatwehaveawillwhichisfree.In order to get any notion of awill at all, onemust assume the following.Unless one is

literallyforcedormadetodosomethinginsuchamannerthatwhatoneisdoingisinnowayone'sownaction(aswhenoneispushingsomethingoverbecauseoneispushedoneself),onedoeswhatonedoesbecausesomethinghappensinone'smindwhichmakesonedowhatonedoes.Moreover,onehastoassumethatwhathappensinone'smindwhichmakesonedowhatonedoesisthatonechoosesordecidestoactinthisway.Oratleastonehastoassumethatthere issomethinggoingonin themindwhichcanbeconstruedasachoiceordecision.Weneednotworryforthemomentaboutthisqualificationoritssignificance.Thus,forinstance,ifonefeelshungryorfeelslikehavingsomethingtoeat,onemightormightnotchooseordecidetohavesomethingtoeat.Ifonethendoeshavesomethingtoeat,itisbecauseonehaschosenordecidedtohavesomethingtoeat,sinceonefeelshungry.But thenotionof thewill,at least inantiquity, involvesanotionof themindsuch that the

merefactthatonefeelshungrywillnotyetexplainwhyoneishavingsomethingtoeat.Thisissupposedtobeso,because,evenifonedoesfeelhungryordoesfeellikehavingsomethingtoeat,onemightchooseordecidenottohaveanythingtoeatbecauseonethinksthatitwouldnotbeagoodthingtohavesomethingtoeatnow.Onemightalsodecidetohavesomethingtoeat,thoughonedoesnotfeelhungryatall,becauseonethinksthatitwouldbeagoodthingtohavesomethingtoeat.But, inanycase,for there tobeanactionthat isone'sownaction, there issupposedtobeaneventinone'smind,amentalact,achoiceordecisionwhichbringsaboutthe action. The notion of a will, then, is the notion of our ability tomake such choices ordecisionswhichmakeusactinthewaywedo.Itiscrucialforthenotionofthewillthatthisability differs greatly from person to person, as different people not only have different


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thoughtsaboutwhatisorisnotagoodthingtodobutalsohavequitedifferentfeelingsaboutdifferent things. This iswhy different people in the same situationwillmake very differentchoicesandhencewillactquitedifferently.Itisalsocrucialforthenotionofthewillthatitisanabilitywhichneedstobedeveloped,cultivated,andperfected.Onecangetbetterandbetteratmakingchoices,justasonecangetworseandworse.Onecanchooseordecidetoimproveone'swill,one'sabilitytomakechoices.The standardGreek term for thewill isprohairesis, literally, “choice”or “disposition to

choose.”Laterboulêsisand,inparticular,thelêsiswillalsobeusedinthissense,especiallyinByzantine times.The standardLatin term, of course, isvoluntas. TheGreek term for therelevantnotionoffreedomiseleutheria.Thistermprovidesuswithsomeguidanceastohowthenotionoffreedomweareinterestedinistobeunderstood.Astheverytermindicates, itmust be a notion formed by analogy to the political notion of freedom. According to thepoliticalnotion,oneisfreeifoneisacitizenratherthanaslaveandlivinginafreepoliticalcommunityratherthaninacommunitygoverned,forinstance,byatyrant.Thispoliticalnotionoffreedomistwo-sided.Itischaracterized,ontheoneside,bythelawswhichthecitizensofthecommunityhave imposedon themselvesand,on theother side,by therebeingno furtherexternalconstraintsonafreecitizenwhichwouldsystematicallypreventhimfromdoingwhathecouldreasonablywanttodoinpursuitofhisowngood,inparticularfromlivingthekindoflife he could reasonablywant to live. It is crucial that this freedom, to put thematter in agrosslysimplifiedform,almostinvariablyseemstobeunderstoodasafreedomfromexternalconstraints which go beyond the acceptable constraints involved in living in a politicalcommunity andwhichwould systematically prevent one from doingwhat it takes to have agoodlife.Livingunderatyrantandbeingaslaveareregardedasinvolvingsuchconstraints,asthe tyrant and the slavemaster, bydefinition, impose constraints onwhat one candowhichsystematically prevent one from having a good life, at least given a certain traditionalunderstandingofwhatagoodlifeamountsto.Thenotionoffreedomweareinterestedinisformedbyanalogytothispoliticalnotion,but

itspreciserelationtothepoliticalisneverdefinitivelysettled,ingoodpartforpoliticalandsocialreasons;beingformedbyanalogytothepoliticalnotion,italsoinheritsitsdouble-sidedcharacter.Thustheabilityofafreepersontohaveagoodlifeisunderstoodmorepreciselyastheabilitytoliveagoodlifeinwhatwe,notveryhelpfully,mightbetemptedtocallamoralsense. The lack of clarity about the relation between the political notion and this personalnotionoffreedominpartisduetoalackofclarityabouttherelationbetweenthegoodlifeoneisabletohavewhenoneispoliticallyfreeandthegoodlifeonecanliveifonehaspersonalfreedom.The tendencyamongancientphilosophers,needless tosay, is toclaimthatonecanliveagoodlifeevenunderatyrantorasaslave.What, then, are the external constraints which this personal notion of freedom envisages

whichcouldsystematicallypreventusfromdoingwhatweneedtodoinordertoliveagoodlife,assumingthattheconstraintsatyrantoraslavemastercouldimposeonusdonotcountassuch?Theanswer,inanutshellandagainverygrosslysimplified,isthatatthetimewhenthenotion of a free will arises, there are any number of views, some of them widespread,accordingtowhichtheworldwelivein,oratleastpartoftheworldwelivein,isrunbyatyrantoraslavemasterorawholegroupof them.Weshouldnotforget thatevenChristians


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like Augustine or John of Damascus had no difficulty in thinking that the right way tocharacterizeour relationship toGod is tosay thatweareslavesofGod.NowtheChristianGodisabenevolentagentwhoprovidesforhisslavesinsuchawayastoenablethemtoliveagoodlife.Evenonthisviewthereisanobvioustensionbetweenourbeingfreeandourbeingslaves,onemayevensayatleastanapparentcontradiction.Buttherewerelotsofotherviews,according to which those who rule the world, or our sublunary part of it, are far frombenevolent,farfromconcernedaboutourwell-being.Thereare,for instance, theso-calledarchontes, the rulersorplanetarygodswhorule the

sublunaryworldanddeterminewhathappensinit,includingourlives,soastofittheirdesignsandideasandtoservetheirinterestsastheyperceivethem.6Theydonotcareaboutwhatthisdoestoourlivesortoourabilitytohaveortoliveagoodlife.Indeed,theymighttrytodowhat they can tomake it impossible for us to live a good life.There is also awidespreadview,whichwefindamonggroups(followingsomeearlyChristianauthorslikeIrenaeus)wehavecometocall“Gnostics,”accordingtowhichtheagentwhocreatedthevisibleworldwelivein,thedemiurgeorcreator,isabeingwhichpursuesitsowninterestswithoutregardforwhatthisdoestous,abeinglackinginwisdomandgoodness,asonecanseefromthefactthatit deludes itself into thinking that it is God and demandingworship. This view, if held byGnostics, asa rule seems tobecombinedwith theview that thisGod is theGodof Jewishscripture,whocreatedthisworldwhichinallsortsofwaysreflectshislackofwisdomandgoodness,forinstance,inthatitputsatleastmany,ifnotallofus,intoapositioninwhichitisimpossibletoliveagoodlife.Itisagainstthebackgroundofalargenumberofsuchviewsthatthenotionoffreedomwe

areinterestedinemerges.Tosaythathumanbeingsarefreeistosaythattheworlddoesnotputsuchconstraintsonusfromtheoutsideastomakeitimpossibleforustoliveagoodlife.Theseviewswillstrikemostofusasextremelyfanciful.Butweshouldkeepinmindthatlateantiquitywasfullofsuchviews,whichexercisedanenormousattraction.Andweshouldalsokeep in mind that there were other views which, though much less fanciful, were alsoperceivedtoputatleastintoquestionwhetherwearefree.The views in question assume some kind of physical determinism, according to which

everythingwhichhappens,includingouractions,isdeterminedbyantecedentphysicalcausesand is thus predetermined. The nearest we ever get in antiquity to the kind of physicaldeterminismwearenowthinkingof,whenwetalkaboutdeterminism,isinEpicurus,ifonlyforEpicurustorejectitwithoutmuchofanargument.7Epicurusisconcernedthatthekindofatomism introduced by Democritus, and espoused by himself, might be misunderstood asentailing a view according to which everything which happens, including what we do, ispredeterminedbyanendlesschainofantecedentcauses.Ifthisweretrue,nothingthatwedowould in any substantial sense depend on us. For the conditions from which it wouldineluctably follow that onedayyouwould exist, that youwouldbe this sort of personwiththose beliefs and those desires, and that in a certain situation you would respond to thissituation in thisway,would already be there all along. These conditionswould have comeaboutwithout any thought of you,without any regard to you or your life, and you certainlywouldhavehadnoactivepartinbringingthemabout.Soyouractionwouldjustbeapartofhowtheworldineluctablyunfoldsfromantecedentconditionswhichhavepredeterminedyour


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actionlongbeforeyouexisted.It is almost impossible for us not to understandDemocritus in theway Epicurus rejects.

Democritusassumes thatall there isareatomsmoving inavoid.Theycollideandrebound,form transientcompounds, among themcompoundswhichare relatively stable,owing to theconfigurationoftheirconstituentatoms.Whatwecall“objects,”includingplants,animals,andhumanbeings, are suchcompounds.These entities, owing to theparticular configurationsoftheirconstituentatoms,displayacertainregularityintheirbehavior.Wecanhardly resist the temptation toassumewrongly thatDemocritusmusthave thought

thattheatomsmove,collide,orreboundaccordingtofixedlawsofnature,suchthateverythingwhichhappensultimatelyisgovernedbytheselaws.ButitisperfectlyclearthatDemocritushasnoideaofsuchlaws.Heisconcerned,rather,toresisttheideathattheapparentregularityinthebehaviorofobjectsbeunderstoodastheresultoftheirbeingdesignedtobehaveinthisfashion;forinGreekthoughtregularityofbehaviorasaruleisassociatedwithdesignbyanintellect.Theplanetsaretakentobesupremelyintelligent,ifnotwise,becausetheymovewithan extreme degree of regularity.8 If an object is not intelligent but displays regularity inbehavior,itisreadilythoughttodosobydesignofanintelligentagent.Democritus'spointisthat the apparent regularity in the world is not a work of design, say, by an Anaxagoreancosmic intellect but a surface phenomenon produced by the aimless, randommotion of theatoms. Thus apparent regularity is supposed to be explained in terms of randomness. ButalreadyinEpicurus'sdaytherewasthetemptationtothinkofthemotionoftheatomsasitselfregular.HenceEpicurus,toavoidthismisinterpretationofhisownatomism,triestoinsistontheirregularityofthemotionoftheatomsbyclaimingthattheyswervefromtheirpathswithoutcause.9Epicurus's doctrine of the swerve, it seems to me, has been widely misunderstood as a

doctrinewhichismeanttoexplainhumanfreedom,asifapostulatedswerveofatomsinthemind could explain such a thing. Epicurus's point is, rather, that, since the world is notdeterministicinthisway,itdoesnotconstituteathreattotheideathatsomeofthethingswedoaregenuinelyourownactions,ratherthansomethingwhichhappenstousorsomethingwearemadetodo.Buthereisatleastanenvisagedpossibleview,whichisnotfancifulatallbutisrather close to what we call physical determinism. According to that, the world putsconstraintsonwhatwecando,whicharesuchthatwecannotbutdowhateveritisthatwearedoing,andhencemightsystematicallypreventusfromdoingwhatwewouldneedtodotoliveagoodlife.Thedoctrinewhichinantiquitycomesnearesttophysicaldeterminisminoursense,andwas

actually espoused, is theStoicdoctrineof fate.10According to theStoics, everythingwhichhappenshasantecedentphysicalcauseswhichformachainreachingbackasfaraswecaretotraceit.Buteventhisformofuniversalphysicaldeterminismdiffersradicallyfromitsmoderncounterpart in three crucial respects. First, Stoic fate is theworkof an agent, namely,God,whoseplandictatesthewaytheworldevolvesandchanges,includingwhatweourselvesdo,downto thesmallestdetail.11Moderndeterminists, incontrast,donotnormallybelieve inacosmicagentwhodetermines things.Second, thisplan isprovidentialprecisely in thesensethattheStoicGodpredeterminesthingsinpartwithregardtous,takingintoconsiderationwhathisdeterminationdoestousandtoourlife.Moderndeterminists,however,willfinditnatural


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tothinknotonlythateverythingwedoispredeterminedbutalsothatourchoicesanddecisionsarepredeterminedentirelywithoutregardtous.Third,inacurioustwisttotheStoicposition(andwithnothingcomparableinthecaseofmoderndeterminism),thedivineplanitselfseemsto be contingent on our choices and decisions, in such a way that God anticipates them indeterminingthewaytheworldevolves.In any case, God in his providence sets the world up in such a way that there are no

constraintsimposedonusfromtheoutsidewhichwouldsystematicallymakeitimpossibleforus to do what we need to do to live a good life. So here we do have a form of causaldeterminism, but it was a matter of dispute whether it posed a threat to freedom or not.Tellingly, those who argued that it did, like Alexander of Aphrodisias, convenientlydisregarded the idea that, on this theory, our choices are not just the product of fate butthemselvestosomeextentdeterminefate.12

Universalcausaldeterminism,though,wasnotaviewwhichhadmanyadherentsinantiquity.Thiswasnotbecausetheancientsbelievedforthemostpartthatthingshappenwithoutacauseoranexplanation.Forthemostparttheycametobelievethatthingsdohaveanaturalcauseorexplanation.Buttheyhadaverydifferentconceptionfromoursofwhatconstitutesacauseorexplanation.Perhaps themostcrucialdifference is thatnobodyinantiquityhad thenotionoflawsofnature,meaningabodyoflawswhichgovernandexplainthebehaviorofallobjects,irrespectiveoftheirkind.Forthemostpart,at least,philosophersbelieved(andthisis true,though in different ways, of Aristotelians, Platonists, Stoics, and Epicureans alike) that themost important factor for one's understanding of the way things behave is the nature of anobject. If you wish, you can think of the nature of an object as something which could beexplainedbyasetofprinciplesand lawswhichgovernandexplain thebehaviorofobjectswith this nature, for instance, plants or stars. But they are principles and laws governing aspecificsetofitems.Thenatureofanobjectputscertaininternalconstraintsonwhatobjectsofthiskindornaturecando.Humanbeings,forinstance,cannotdoeverything;justbecausetheyarehumanbeings,theycannotfly,eveniftheywantedto.Buttherearealsolotsofthingsthenatureofanobjectenablesittodo.Forinstance,thenatureofasunflowerenablesittoturninthe direction of the sun. In fact, it makes the flower turn towards the sun, when the sun isvisible. Quite generally, the nature of an object is such that, given certain specifiableconditions,itcannotbutbehaveinacertainidentifiableway.Itisonlywhenwecometomorecomplexanimalsand,ofcourse,tohumanbeingsthatthe

behavior is not entirely determined by the nature of the object and the circumstances orconditions the object finds itself in.Animals can learn, be trained, or even be taught to docertain things.Different animalsof the samekindmightbehavequitedifferently in the samecircumstances.Theirbehaviorisnotentirelyfixedbytheirnatureorthelawsoftheirnature.And,notoriously,humanbeingshavetobetrainedandtaughtandeducated.Theyhavetolearnalotbeforetheyareabletoactinatrulyhumanandmatureway.Whatismore,andwhatiscrucially important, human beings have to actively involve themselves in acquiring thecompetence it takes to lead a truly human life. It is certainly not by their nature that humanbeingsactvirtuously.Givenaviewoftheworldinwhichwhathappensislargelyaccountedforintermsofthe


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natureofthings,theremaybenothingwhichdoesnothaveanaturalcauseandexplanation,but,giventhekindsofcausesandexplanationsappealedto, theworldmightremaininoursensecausallyunderdetermined,leavingenoughspaceforustoliveourlifeasweseefit.But,aswecome to late antiquity, there is a growing sense that at least the physical world may bedetermined.Yetbythen,ofcourse,thereisalsotheview,whichrapidlyspreads,thatthemindisnotphysical.Inanycase,thenotionoffreedomgetsitspointonlyfromthefactthatthereareavailableatthetimenumerousviewsabouttheworld,accordingtowhichweareundersuchconstraintsastopossibly,ifnotnecessarily,beunabletodowhatweneedtodotoliveagoodlife.Withthiswecometothecombinationofthetwonotionsofthewill,ontheonehand,andof

freedom,on theotherhand, in thenotionofa freewill.Given theview thatouractionsarecausedbyachoiceoradecisionof thewill,our freedomtodo the thingsweneed todo inordertoliveagoodlifemustinvolvethefreedomtomakethechoiceswhichneedtobemadeinordertoproducetheactionswhichneedtobetaken.This,however,isatrivialconnectionbetweenthewillandfreedom.Itwouldhardlyexplainthegreatemphasisonthefreedomofthewill.A less trivial connection is this.Wemight act under such constraints that the choiceswe

havearesolimitedthattheymightnotproduceagoodlife.Justthinkofacosmictyrantwhoagainandagainconfrontsyouwithachoicelikethis:havingyourchildrenkilledorbetrayingyourfriends;orkillingyourchildorbeingcondemnedfornotobeying theorder tokillyourchild.Thistoo,though,wouldhardlysufficetoexplaintheemphasisonfreedomofthewill.Astillmorepromisingconnectionisthis.Assoonaswethinkofaworldrunbyacosmic

tyrant—orbyplanetary intellects and theirdaemonicminionswhohaveaccess toourmind,perhapscanmanipulate it, andperhapscansystematically try topreventus fromgaining theknowledgewewould need to live a good life—we can see that there is a special point inemphasizingthefreedomofthewill.Nocosmicpowerhassuchaforceoverourmindsastopreventthewillfrommakingthechoicesitneedstomake.Thereis,though,yetafurtherconnection.Bythetimewecometolateantiquity,mostpeople

think that in one important sense our freedom is reduced to the freedomof themind and inparticular thewill.For,even ifwechoose toact inacertainway,wehavenocontroloverwhetherweshallsucceedindoingoutthereintheworldwhatwedecidedtodoinourmind.Wemaydecidetocrossthestreetbutberunoveraswetrytodoso.Wemaydecidetoraiseourarm,but thearmdoesnot rise.Thedoctrineofa freewill iscertainlynotadoctrine toexplainhowwemanagetoraiseourarmorcrossthestreet.Itis,rather,adoctrineofhowweare responsible for raisingour arm, ifwedo raiseour arm, irrespectiveof the fact that theworldoutthereispopulatedbyagentsofvariouskindswhomightthwartourendeavor.13AtleastforStoics,Christians,and,toalesserdegree,Platonists,thereisalsodivineprovidence,whichalreadyhassettledabinitiowhetherwhatwedecidetodofitsintoitsplanforthebestpossibleworldandhencewillbeallowedtocometofruition.This,then,isthegeneralschemaforanotionofafreewill.Ournextmajorstepwillbeto

seehowthenotionofaspecificandactualwillfirstemergedinStoicism.Butbeforewecanturntothis,wehavetotakealookatAristotle.


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CHAPTERTWO

AristotleonChoicewithoutaWill

ThereareatleastthreereasonswhyweshouldbeginourdetailedstudywithAristotle.First,theStoicscanonlydevelopanotionofawill,becausetheyhaveacertainnotionofthemind.ButtheyhavedevelopedthisnotionofthemindinoppositiontoPlato'sandAristotle'snotionof the mind, or rather of the soul. Second, we should reassure ourselves that we haveunderstoodnotonlythatAristotledoesnothaveanotionofafreewillbutalsowhyhedoesnothaveanotionofafreewill.Third,therewillcomeatimeinlateantiquitywhenAristotleis studiedagainwithgreat carebyphilosophers andwhenat least someofhiswritingsarerecommended, if not required, reading for any highly educated person.What we find as aresult, if we look at certain philosophical authors—but also at some influential ChristianwriterslikeNemesiusofEmesa—isthattheyreimportintoadiscussion,whichbythispointhasmovedfarbeyondAristotle,certaindoctrinesfromtheNicomacheanEthicsinawaythatconfused,ratherthanclarified,matters.NeitherPlatonorAristotlehasanotionofawill.Whattheydohave, though, isaclosely

relatednotion,namely, thenotionofsomebody'swillingorwantingsomething, inparticular,somebody's willing or wanting to do something, the notion of boulesthai or of a boul sis.Indeed, this notion plays a fundamental role in their thought about human beings and theirbehavior, and it will continue to play a crucial role throughout antiquity. But the termboulesthaiwillbeasourceofconfusion,andhenceit is important tobeclearaboutwhat itmeansinPlatoandinAristotle.ItwillbeasourceofconfusioninpartbecausethewordistheGreekversionofaverbwhichweseemtofindinmany,ifnotall,Indo-Europeanlanguages,for example, velle in Latin and its derivatives in the Romance languages, and wollen inGerman, or “to will” in English. These languages also form a corresponding noun, likevoluntasinLatin,or“will”inEnglish,whichfromacertainpointonwardswillalsobeusedtorefertothewill,thoughtheGreeksareratherlateandhesitantinusingboul sisinthisway.Yettheintimateetymologicalconnectionshouldnotconfuseusintothinkingthatboulesthai,

atleastasusedinPlatoandAristotleandinlaterGreekphilosophy,hasthesameratherbroaduseasLatinvelleorGermanwollenorEnglish“towill”inthesenseof“towant.”InPlatoandAristotleitreferstoahighlyspecificformofwantingordesiring,infact,aformofwantingwhichwenolongerrecognizeorforwhichwetendtohavenoplaceinourconceptualscheme.


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For Plato and Aristotle willing, as I will call it, is a form of desire which is specific toreason.1 It is the form inwhich reason desires something. If reason recognizes, or believesitselftorecognize,somethingasagood,itwillsordesiresit.Ifreasonbelievesitselftoseeacourseofactionwhichwouldallowustoattainthispresumedgood,itthinksthatitisagoodthing,otherthingsbeingequal,totakethiscourseofaction.And,ifitthinksthatit isagoodthingtodosomething,itwillsordesirestodoit.Thusitisassumedthatthereissuchathingasadesireofreasonandhencealsothatreasonbyitselfsufficestomotivateustodosomething.ThisisanassumptionwhichismadebySocrates,Plato,Aristotle, theStoics,andtheir laterfollowers.Theyallagree thatreason, justas it isattractedbytruth, isalsoattractedby,andattachedto,thegoodandtriestoattainit.In Plato and Aristotle but not in the Stoics, this view of willing, as a form of desire

distinctive of reason, is closely bound upwith the view that the soul is bipartite or, rather,tripartite,meaningthat,inadditiontoreason,itconsistsofanonrationalpartorparts.(Iwill,forourpurposes,disregardtheirspecificationoftwononrationalparts.)Thisdivisionofthesoul is based on the assumption that there are radically different forms of desire, andcorrespondingly radicallydifferent formsofmotivation,whichmayevenbe in conflictwitheachotherandwhichthereforemusthavetheiroriginindifferentcapacities,abilities,orpartsofthesoul.2Thusonemaybehungry,andinthiswaydesiresomethingtoeat,andhencedesireto get something to eat. This sort of desire is called appetite (epithymia). It is clearly anonrational desire.Onemay be hungry, nomatterwhat one thinks or believes.Onemay behungry,eventhoughonebelievesthatitwouldnotbeagoodthingatalltohavesomethingtoeat.Onemightberightinbelievingthis.Henceanonrationaldesiremaybeareasonableoranunreasonabledesire.Similarly,though,itmightbequiteunreasonableforonetobelievethatitwould be a good thing to have something to eat. Hence a desire of reason toomight be areasonable or an unreasonable desire. Therefore the distinction between reasonable andunreasonabledesiresisnotthesameasthedistinctionbetweendesiresofreason,orrationaldesires, and desires of the nonrational part of the soul, or nonrational desires. It is alsoassumed that, just asonemayactona rationaldesire, onemayactonanonrationaldesire.What ismore, onemay do so, even if this nonrational desire is in conflict with a rationaldesire.Now, the assumption that, if there is a conflict, onemay follow either reason or appetite

amounts, of course, to a denial of Socrates' claim that nobody ever acts against his betterknowledge or, indeed, against his mere beliefs. So, according to Socrates, if you reallybelieve,whetherrightlyorwrongly, that it isnotagoodthingtohavesomethingtoeatnow,you will not be driven by appetite, as if your reason were a slave dragged around by thepassions,andhavesomething toeat.3Plato'sandAristotle'sdoctrineofa tripartite soulanddifferentformsofmotivation,with theirpossibleconflictandtheresolutionofsuchconflict,constitutesanattempttocorrectSocrates'position,inordertodojusticetothepresumedfactthat people sometimes, in cases of conflict, do act, against their better knowledge, on theirnonrational desire. In any event, Aristotle in his famous discussion of this presumedphenomenon, called akrasia, or, rather misleadingly, “weakness of will,” is explicitlyattackingSocrates'position.4Now,inlookingatthisdiscussionintheNicomacheanEthics,itis important to notice that it is not focused, as modern readers apparently can hardly help


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thinking, on cases of acute mental conflict, that is to say, on cases in which we sit thereanguished, tormented, torn apart by two conflicting desires which pull us in oppositedirections,whilewetrytomakeupourmindwhichdirectiontotake.WetendtoreadAristotleinthisway,becausewehaveacertainconceptionofthemindwhichweprojectontoAristotle.ButthecasesonwhichAristotleisfocusingareratherdifferent.Takethecaseofimpetuousakrasia.Somebodyinsultsyou,andyougetsoupsetandangry

thatyouletyourangerpreemptanythoughtyouwouldhave,ifyoutooktimetothinkaboutanappropriate response. You just act on your anger. Once you have calmed down, youmightrealize that you do not think that this is an appropriate way to respond to the situation. Ingeneral,youthinkthatthisisnotagoodwaytoact.Butatthetimeyouact,youhavenosuchthought. The conflict here is a conflict between a nonrational desire and a rational desirewhichyouwouldhave,ifyougaveyourselforhadthespacetothinkaboutit.Orlookattheverydifferentcaseofakrasiaofappetite.Youhavetherationaldesirenottoeatanysweets.At somepointyoudecidednot tohaveanysweets.Butnowadelicious sweet isoffered toyou,andyourappetitemaybesuch that,at least for themoment, itdoesnotevencome intoyourmind that you do not want to eat sweets anymore. This again is not a case of acuteconflict.But,whichevercasesofakrasiaweconsider,Aristotle'sviewisneverthat,ifweareconfrontedwith such a conflict, whether it is acute or not, and act on a nonrational desireagainstreason,wedosobecausethereisamentalevent,namely,achoiceoradecisiontoactinthisway.Andcertainlyitisnotthecasethatonechoosesordecidesbetweenactingonone'sbeliefandactingonone'snonrationaldesire.For,aswehaveseen,thewayAristotledescribesthesecases,theyoften,ifnotforthemostpart,donoteveninvolveanoccurrentthoughttotheeffectthatitwouldnotbeagoodthingtoactinthisway.Moreimportant,Aristotlehimselfexplicitlycharacterizesthesecasesasonesinwhichone

actsagainstone'schoice(prohairesis),ratherthanascasesinwhichonechoosestoactagainstreason.5WhatinAristotle'sviewexplainsthatoneisactingagainstone'sownbeliefsisnotachoicewhichcausestheaction.Itis,rather,alongstoryabouthowinthepastonehasfailedtosubmitoneselftothetraining,practice,exercise,discipline,andreflectionwhichwouldensurethatone'snonrationaldesiresarereasonable,thatoneactsforreasons,ratherthanonimpulse,andhence that, if there isaconflict,one follows reason. It is thispast failure, rather thanaspecificmentalevent,achoiceordecision,whichinAristotleaccountsforakraticaction.ItshouldnowbeclearwhyAristotledoesnothaveanotionofawill.One'swilling,one's

desireofreason,isadirectfunctionofone'scognitivestate,ofwhatreasontakestobeagoodthingtodo.One'snonrationaldesireisadirectfunctionofthestateofthenonrationalpartofthesoul.Oneactseitheronarationaldesire,awilling,oronanonrationaldesire,anappetite.In thecaseofconflict, there isnota further instancewhichwouldadjudicateor resolve thematter.Inparticular,reasonisnotmadetoappearintworoles,firstaspresentingitsowncaseand then as adjudicating the conflict bymaking a decision or choice.How the conflict getsresolvedisamatterofwhathappenedinthepast,perhapsthedistantpast.WhatAristotledoeshaveisadistinctionbetweenthingswedohekontesandthingswedo

akontes.6Thedistinctionheisaimingatisthedistinctionbetweenthingswedoforwhichwecanbeheldresponsibleandthingswedoforwhichwecannotbeheldresponsible.Aristotletriestodrawthedistinctionbymarkingoffthingswedoonlybecauseweareliterallyforced


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todothemorbecauseweactoutofignorance,thatistosay,becausewearenotaware,andcouldnotpossiblybeexpectedtobeaware,ofacrucialfeatureofthesituation,suchthat,ifwehadbeenawareofit,wewouldhaveactedotherwise.Ifsomebodyoffersyouachocolate,he might not be aware, and there may have been no way for him to know, a crucial factinvolved,namely,thatthechocolateispoisoned,suchthat,ifhehadknownthis,hewouldnothaveofferedittoyou.Weare,then,responsibleforthosethingswedowhichwedoneitherbyforcenoroutofignorance.Putpositively,forustoberesponsibleforwhatwedo,ouractionhastosomehowreflectourmotivation.Wemusthaveactedinthisway,becauseinonewayoranother we were motivated to act in this way, that is, either by a rational desire or anonrationaldesireorboth.Traditionally, and highly misleadingly, Aristotle's distinction is represented as the

distinctionbetweenthevoluntaryandtheinvoluntary,andAristotle'stermshek nandak naretranslatedaccordingly.Thistraditionisancient.AlreadyCicerotranslateshek ninthisway.7ItreflectsaprojectionofalaterconceptionofthemindontoAristotle.Tobeginwith,wehavetokeep inmind thatAristotle's distinction is supposed to apply to all beings—for instance,domestic animals, children, andmature human beings—who have been trained or taught orhave learned to behave in a certainway andwhomwe can therefore expect to behave in acertainway.Ifweholdananimalresponsible,scoldandpunishit todiscourageitorpraiseandrewardittoencourageit,wedosonotbecausewethinkthatitmadetherightchoiceorthatithadanychoice.AtleastAristotleassumesthattheanimal,whateveritdoes,justactsona nonrational desire, albeit one whichmay be the product of conditioning and habituation,which may or may not have been fully successful. The same, more or less, according toAristotle,istrueofchildren.Butchildrenbegintohaveandactonrationaldesires,andmaturehumanbeingsshouldhave,andshouldacton,rationaldesiresratherthanonimpulse.Butwhenthey nevertheless do act on a nonrational desire, again it is not by choice. The nonrationaldesireinandbyitselfsufficestomotivateus,evenwhenwearegrownup.And,aswehaveseen,evenifweactagainstourrationaldesire,thisdoesnotinvolveachoice.Thusthereisnonotionofawill,orawilling,inAristotle,suchthatsomebodycouldbesaidtoactvoluntarilyor willingly, whether he acts on a rational or a nonrational desire. Hence for Aristotleresponsibilityalsodoesnotinvolveawill,sinceanyformofmotivationtoactinagivenwaysufficesforresponsibility.8

But,as Ihavealready indicated, thisdoesnotmean thatAristotledoesnothaveanotionofchoice.Forhesaysthatifoneactsonanonrationaldesireagainstone'sbetterknowledge,oneactsagainstone'schoice.Indeed,thenotionofachoiceplaysanimportantroleinAristotle.9For he thinks that if an action is to count as a virtuous action, it has to satisfy a number ofincreasinglystrictconditions.Itmustnotonlybetherightthingtodo,onemustbedoingithekn, of one's own accord; indeed, onemustwill to do it.What ismore, onemust do it fromchoice (ekprohairese s), that is, onemust choose (prohaireisthai) to do it, and the choiceitself must satisfy certain conditions. Hence Aristotle explains what it is to choose to dosomething.Indoingso,givenwhatwehavesaid,healsodistinguisheschoosingfromwilling.ThishascontributedtoawidespreadmisunderstandingofwhatAristotletakeschoosingtobe.It isoften thought thatwillingandchoosingare twoentirelydifferent things, thatchoice isa


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compositedesire,consistingofanonrationaldesiretodosomethingandabelief,arrivedatbydeliberation,thatitwouldbeagoodthingtoactinthiswayinthissituation.I hardly need point out that this interpretation in part is driven by a model of the mind

accordingtowhichouractionsaredeterminedbyourbeliefsandournonrationaldesires,andinanycasearemotivatedbyournonrationaldesires.ButthisclearlyisnotAristotle'sview,givenhisnotionofwilling.Thereasonwhyhedistinguisheswillingandchoosingisnot thatwilling and choosing are altogether different but that choosing is a very special form ofwilling.Onemaywillorwantsomethingwhichisunattainable.Onemaywilltodosomethingwhichone isunable todo.Onemaywill somethingwithouthavingany ideaas towhatoneshoulddotoattainit.Choosingisdifferent.Wecanchoosetodosomethingonlyif,asAristotleputsit,itisuptous(eph'h min),ifitisinourhands,ifwhetheritgetsdoneornotorhappensornotdependsonus.10Thusonecannotchoosetobeelectedtoanoffice,sincewhetheroneiselecteddependsonothers.Butonecanwillorwanttobeelectedtoanoffice.Yetchoosingstillisaformofwilling.InAristotle'sviewthereisacertaingoodwhichwe

allwillorwanttoattaininlife,namely,agoodlife.Asgrown-uphumanbeings,wehaveacertainconception,thoughdifferentpeoplehaveratherdifferentones,ofwhatthisfinalgoodconsistsof.Soinaparticularsituationweshall,asmaturehumanbeings,choosewhattodoinlight of our conception of this final good, because we think, having deliberated about thematter, thatacting in thiswaywillhelpus toattain thisgood.But this iswhatwilling todosomething is: desiring to do something, because one thinks that it will help one to attainsomething which one considers a good and which one therefore wills or wants. Hencechoosing is just a special form of willing. So in Aristotle's account choice does play animportantrole.Butchoicesarenotexplainedintermsofawillbutintermsoftheattachmentofreasontothegood,howeveritmightbeconceivedof,andtheexerciseofreason'scognitiveabilitiestodeterminehowinthissituationthegoodmightbestbeattained.11JustasthereisnonotionofawillinAristotle,thereisalsononotionoffreedom.Thisdoes

not at all mean that Aristotle has a view of the world which entails that we are not free.Aristotle's view of theworld is such that the behavior of things in the celestial spheres isgovernedbystrictregularitydictatedbythenatureofthethingsinvolved.Butoncewecometothesublunary,grosslymaterial sphere inwhichwe live, this regularitybegins togiveout. Itturnsintoaregularity“forthemostpart,”explainedbytheimperfectrealizationofnaturesingrossmatter.What ismore, these regularities, dictatedby thenaturesof things, even if theywereexceptionless,wouldleavemanyaspectsoftheworldundetermined.Thisisnottosaythatthereisanythingintheworldwhich,accordingtoAristotle,doesnothaveanexplanation.But the way Aristotle conceives of explanation, the conjunction of these explanations stillleavestheworldunderdeterminedinoursenseofcasualdetermination.SoinAristotle'sworldthereisplentyofspaceleftforhumanactionwhichdoesnotcollidewith,orisexcludedby,theexistingregularities.Aristotleappealstothis,forinstance,whenheexplainsthatchoosingpresupposesthatitisuptous,dependsonus,whethersomethinggetsdoneornot.Whetheritgets done or not is not already settled by some regularity in the world. What is more,Aristotle'suniverseisnotpopulatedbysinisterpowerswhotrytothwartusintryingtolivethekindof lifewhichisappropriateforbeingsofournature.There isaGodwhosethoughtdetermines thenaturesand thus the regularities in theworldas faras theygo,and thereare


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trulyangelicintellectswhomovetheplanets.12Theyshouldbeasourceofinspirationforus.Theycertainlyarenotahindrancetoourlife.Thisbrightviewoftheworldwithplentyofspaceforfreeactionshouldnotdeludeusinto

thinkingthatwehave,accordingtoAristotle,muchofachoiceindoingwhatwearedoing.LetuslookatAristotelianchoiceagain.Wecanchoosetodosomething,ifitisuptoustodoitornot to do it. This notion of something's being up to us will play a crucial role in all laterancientthought.Anditwilloftenbeinterpretedinsuchawaythat,ifsomethingisuptous,wehaveachoicetodoitornottodoit.But,ifwegobacktoAristotle,thisisnotquiteso.AllAristotleiscommittedtoisthat,ifsomethingisuptous,wecanchoosetodoit.Wecanalsofailtochoosetodoit.Buttofailtochoosetodoit,givenAristotle'snotionofchoice,isnotthesameaschoosingnottodoit.Wesawthisinthecaseofakrasia.Onecanchoosetofollowreason.Butifonefailstofollowreasonandactsonanonrationaldesire,itisnotbecauseonechooses not to follow reason and, rather, chooses to do something else. So the choice onemakesinAristotleisnot,atleastnecessarily,achoicebetweendoingXandnotdoingX,letaloneachoicebetweendoingXanddoingY.ItisamatterofchoosingtodoXorfailingtochoosetodoX,suchthatXdoesnotgetdone.

What ismore,Aristotle's and, for thatmatter, Socrates', Plato's, and theStoics' viewof thewiseandvirtuouspersonisthatsuchapersoncannotfailtoactvirtuouslyandwisely,thatistosay,failtodotherightthingfortherightreasons.ButthismeansforAristotlethatawiseandvirtuouspersoncannotbutmakethechoiceshemakes.Thisisexactlywhatitistobevirtuous.Hencetheabilitytoactotherwiseortheabilitytochooseotherwise,ifconstruedinanarrowor strong sense, isnotpresent in thevirtuousperson,because it is a signof immaturity andimperfectiontobeabletoactotherwise,narrowlyconstrued.Solongasonecanchooseandactotherwise,oneisnotvirtuous.SoAristotle'svirtuouspersoncouldactotherwiseonlyinanattenuatedsense,namely,inthesensethatthepersoncouldactotherwise,ifhehadnotturnedhimselfintoavirtuouspersonbymakingtheappropriatechoicesatatimewhenhecouldhavechosenotherwise in a less attenuated sense.Unfortunately, thismore robust, less attenuated,sense is not a senseAristotle is particularly concernedwith.And the reason for this is thatAristotle thinks rather optimistically that the ability to make the right choices comes withhuman nature and a good upbringing. But he also, given the age he lives in and his socialbackground,hasnodifficultywiththeassumptionthathumannatureishighlycomplexandthusextremely difficult to reproduce adequately in gross matter. Thus he has no difficulty inassumingthatmosthumanbeingsaresuchimperfectrealizationsofhumannaturethattheyhavelittleornohopeofbecomingvirtuousandwise.Healsohasnodifficultywiththeassumptionthatmost human beings lack a good upbringing.We shall see that thisway of thinkingwillincreasinglyoffendthesensibilitiesoflaterantiquity.Aristotle's view leaves plenty of space for unconstrained human action, but it is hardly

hospitable,eveninprinciple,toanotionofafreewill.Inanycase,helacksthisnotion.ForAristotleagoodlifeisnotamatterofafreewillbutofhardworkandhardthought,alwayspresupposingtheproperrealizationofhumannatureintheindividual,andagoodupbringing,whichunfortunatelymanyarewithout.


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CHAPTERTHREE

TheEmergenceofaNotionofWillinStoicism

UNIPARTITEPSYCHOLOGY:REASON,IMPRESSION,IMPULSE,ANDASSENT

Aswehaveseen,forAristotletohavehadanotionofthewill,hewouldhavehadtohavetheappropriatenotionofachoice.Althoughhedidhaveanotionofachoice,hedidnothavethekind of notion which would allow him to say that whenever we do something of our ownaccord(hekontes),wedosobecausewechooseordecidetoactinthisway.Aristotledidnothave such a notion of choice since he assumed thatwe sometimes just act on a nonrationaldesire(i.e.,adesirewhichhasitsorigininanonrationalpartofthesoul)withoutchoosingtoact in this way and in fact sometimes against our choice. He could assume this, since hesupposedthat therearenonrationalpartsof thesoulwhichgeneratesuchnonrationaldesiresandthatthesebythemselvessufficetomotivateustoact.Thecrucialassumptionisthatbeinghungrymaybeenoughtomakeyouhavesomethingtoeatandthatbeingangrymaybeenoughtomakeyoutakeoutyourangeronthepersonwhomadeyouangryoronsomeoneelse.The underlying conception of the soul as bi- or tripartite,whichwe find in Plato and in

Aristotle,wasrejectedbytheStoics.1PlatoandAristotlehaddevelopedtheirconceptionofthesoul inpart inresponsetoSocrates'denialofakrasiaandhisviewthat, inwhatwearedoing,we are entirely guided by our beliefs.TheStoics took themselves to be reverting toSocrates' view, as they saw it represented inPlato's earlier dialogues, in particular, Plato'sProtagoras.2Thereisnoindicationinthesedialogues,downtoandincludingthePhaedo,ofadivisionof the soul.Even in thePhaedo the soul in its entirety seems tobe an embodiedreason.SotheStoicstookthesoultobeareason.Theyalsocalledit,borrowingatermfromPlato's Protagoras 352b, to hegemonikon, the governing part of us.3 It is reason whichgovernsusandourentirelife.Thereisnononrationalpartofoursoultogeneratenonrationaldesireswhichwouldconstituteamotivationforustoactquiteindependentofanybeliefswehave and could even overpower reason and make us act against our beliefs. The way webehave is completely determined by our beliefs. If we act utterly irrationally, this is notbecause we are driven by nonrational desires but because we have utterly unreasonable


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beliefs.TounderstandfullywhytheStoicsrejectthepartitionofthesoul,wehavetotakeintoaccountthattheopposingview,thatthesoulhasanonrationalpart,naturallybringswithittwofurtherviews:(1)thatsinceitisbynaturethatthesoulisdivided,itisalsobynaturethatwehave thesenonrationaldesires,andhence it isperfectlynaturalandacceptable tohavesuchdesires,and(2) that thesedesires,at least ifproperlyconditionedandchanneled,aimat theattainmentofcertaingenuinegoods,likethefoodandthedrinkweneed,orattheavoidanceofcertaingenuineevils,likedeath,mutilation,orillness.Thisiswhywehavethesedesiresbynature.Against this theStoicsargue that thesesupposedlynaturaldesires,andquitegenerallyall

our emotions like anger or fear, are by no means natural. For it is not the case that theynaturallyaimattheattainmentofcertaingoodsandtheavoidanceofcertainevils.AccordingtotheStoics, it isnot truethat thethingsthesupposedlynaturaldesiresandemotionsaimtoattainortoavoidaregenuinegoodsorevils:theonlygoodiswisdomorvirtue,andtheonlyevilisfollyorvice.Everythingelseisindifferent.Soitcannotbethecasethatbynaturewehaveanonrationalpartof thesoul,soas tobemotivatedby itsappetitesandfears toattaincertain goods and avoid certain evils. The cause of these appetites and fears is not to belookedforinasupposedlynonrationalpartofthesoul,whosenaturalemotionstheyare,butratherinbeliefsofreason,namely,inthebeliefsthatthesethingsaregoodandhencedesirableandthatthosethingsareevilandhencerepulsive,when,intruth,theyareallneithergoodnorevilbutindifferent.According to the Stoics, the division of the soul threatens the unity of the person and

obscures the responsibility we have for our supposedly nonrational desires. It invites thethought thatwhatweareessentially isonly the rationalpartof the soul,whichneverthelesscohabitsinthebodywithanunruly,nonrationalanimalsoulanditsanimaldesires.It invitesthethoughtthatitisourresponsibilitytotamethisunrulyanimal,establishtheruleofreasoninourselves,andthuscreateaunifiedperson.Itisnotourresponsibility,butamerefactoflife,thatweareconfrontedandhavetodealwiththisoftenverystrongandbeastlyanimalsoulanditscrudedesires.AgainstthistheStoicsarguethatthissupposedlynonrational,animalpartofour soulwith its supposedly nonrational, animal desires is the creation of our mind in thefollowingsense.4Itisnotthatwehavethesedesiresnaturally,becausewehaveanonrationalpartofthesoul.Itisourmindwhichproducestheseirrationalandoftenmonstrousdesires.Itisasheerpieceofrationalizationtoinventanonrationalpartofthesoulandtodevolveonittheresponsibilityforsuchdesires.Theyareactuallyofourownmaking,becauseitisourmindorreasonwhichproducesthemasaresultofitsbeliefsandattitudes.Aristotle,unlikePlato,hadbelievedthatwearenotbornwithreasonbutwithanonrational

soulofthekindotheranimalshave,exceptthat(1)thisnonrationalsoulhasanextraordinarycapacity to storeandprocessperceptual informationand thus toaccumulate experience toadegreenootheranimalcan,andthat(2)itcannotonlydiscriminaterecurrentfeaturesbutalsocome to recognize themas such.Becauseof thisability,humanbeings in thecourseof theirnatural development also develop concepts and thus become rational. Reason, as it were,grows out of the nonrational soul with which we are born, to constitute together with thisnonrationalsoulabi-or tripartitesoul.5Ourupbringinghasalreadyinvolvedaconditioningandhabituationof thisnonrationalsoul, ideally insuchawayas tomakeithavereasonable


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desires.Oncewehavereason,thiswillgreatlyaffectthewayournonrationalsouloperates.Fornow,byhavingreasonourselves,wecanbringitaboutthatthenonrationalpartofthesoulgeneratesonlydesireswhicharereasonable.Orwecanat leastbringitabout thatwhenthenonrationalpartgeneratesdesireswhicharenot reasonable,wedonotacton thesedesires.But, howevermuch our nonrational desiresmay be in linewith reason, they in themselvesremainthedesiresoftheanimalwewereborn,thoughnowshapedandmoldedbyupbringingand by our own reason. And so long as reason has not acquired perfect control over thenonrationalpartofthesoul,weshallalsosometimescontinuetoactastheanimalswewereborn,namely,toactonmereimpulseoronanonrationaldesire,insteadofadesireofreason.6Incontrast, theStoicsbelievethatinthecourseofournaturaldevelopment,weundergoa

muchmoreradicalmetamorphosis.7Whenweareconceivedand inourembryonicstate,weareplantlike.Ourbehaviorisgovernedbyanature(physis),asthebehaviorofplantsis.Whentheembryoissufficientlydeveloped,theshockofbirthtransformsthisnatureintoanonrationalsoul.Webecomelikeanimals,actingonthepromptingofnonrationaldesires,onnonrationalimpulse.But, aswe grow up,we develop reason.We come to have concepts and begin tounderstandhowwefunctionandwhywebehavethewaywedo.Butthisreasonisnot,asinAristotle and in Plato, a further, additional part of the soul. It is the product of a completetransformationofourinnateandnonrationalsoulintoarationalsoul,areasonoramind.Thistransformationalsoturnsthenonrationaldesires,withwhichwegrewupandwhichmotivatedusaschildren, intodesiresof reason.Onceweare rationalbeings, therearenononrationaldesiresleft.Theyhaveallbecomesomethingquitedifferent.To say that these nonrational desires have become something quite different in becoming

desiresofreasonistoacknowledgethatthereissomecontinuity.Toseewhatthecontinuityis,wehavetolookbrieflyathowtheStoicsunderstandthedesiresorimpulsesofotheranimals.They view them very much as Aristotle does. Animals perceive things. This perceptioninvolves their havingan impression (phantasia) of the thingperceived.8 Now, animals alsoperceivethingsaspleasant,satisfying,andconducivetotheirmaintainingthemselvesintheirnatural state or as unpleasant, unsatisfying, or detrimental to theirmaintenance.And so theydevelop a liking for some things and a dislike of other things. This has an effect on theimpressions an animal has. If the animal now perceives something it likes or dislikes, theimpressionithastakesonacertaincoloring.Inonecaseitisanagreeableimpression,intheotheritisadisagreeableimpression.Dependingonthecomplexityoftheanimal,anagreeableordisagreeable impressionmayproducememoriesofpastencounterswith this sortof thingand expectations about the future. But, whether or not it does so, in the appropriatecircumstancestheimpressioninitself,givenitscoloring,willconstituteanimpulseeithertogoafterthethingperceivedortoavoidit.Ifacarnivorousanimallikealionfeelsdepletedorhungry,andithastheagreeableimpressionofanicepieceofmeatinreach,thisimpressioninitselfwillsuffice tomakeitgoafter themeat.If the littleanimal towhomthepieceofmeatbelongs in its turn has the disagreeable impression of a lion it is in easy reach of, thisdisagreeableimpressioninitselfwillsufficetoimpelthelittleanimaltoavoidthelionandrunaway.Such impressionsarecalled“impulsive” (hormêtikai), since they impel theanimal toact.9Itistheseimpressionswhichconstitutethedesireofananimalorachildtogetsomethingortoavoidsomething.


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According to the Stoics, there is thismuch continuity between being a child and being amature human being—that as grownup human beings we continue to have impulsiveimpressions.Thediscontinuity lies in the twofold fact that these impulsive impressionsnowhave a completely different character and that in themselves they no longer constitute animpulse sufficient to impel us to do something. To move us they require an assent of, oracceptance by, reason. It is only if reason accedes to the impulsive impression that it willconstituteanactualimpulse.Soahumanimpulse,arationalimpulse,willhavetwoelements:acertainkindofimpulsiveimpressionandanassentofreasontothat.Let us look at these two elements more closely and, to begin with, at the impulsive

impressions.AccordingtotheStoics,allhumanimpressions,whetherimpulsiveornot,differfromanimalimpressionsinthattheyarerational.10Animalimpressions,beingformedinandbyanonrationalsoul,lackacertaindistinctivecharacterwhichallmaturehumanimpressionshave, given that they are formed in and by reason: mature human impressions do not justrepresent something in some way or other but are articulated in such a way as to have apropositionalcontent.Theyareimpressionstotheeffectthatsomethingisthecase.Hencetheyaretrueorfalse.Theirformationinvolvestheuseofconcepts,waysofconceivingofthings.ThustheStoicsalsocallsuchrationalimpressions“thoughts”(noeseis).Eventheperceptualimpressionswehavewhenweseesomething,accordingtotheStoics,aresuchthoughts,albeitthoughtsproducedinacertainway,namely,throughthesenses.Thereisapointherewhichneedstobeemphasized.Clearly,theStoicideaisthatarational

impulse is a compoundwhichhas a passive element, namely, the impression, and an activeelement, theassent.Animpressionissomethingyoufindyourselfwith.Thequestioniswhatyoudowiththeimpressionyoufindyourselfwith,forinstance,whetheryougiveassenttoit.Tomark this passive, receptive character of an impression, Zeno, the founder of Stoicism,characterizeditasa typosis,animprintorimpression.11Hence,CicerosometimestranslatesthestandardStoictermforanimpression,phantasia,byimpressio (seeAcad.2.58).This ishowwehavecometousethetermimpression.AlreadyChrysippus (just two generations after Zeno) objected to this characterization of

impressions.12Itakeitthathedidsobecauseitisquitemisleadinginthefollowingrespect.Itis true that we do not actively form an impression, a certain kind of representation ofsomething,inthewayinwhichwepaintapaintingordrawamapordescribeaperson.Theimpressionisformedwithoutourdoinganything.Butthisshouldnotobscurethefactthatthewaytheimpressionisformedreflectsthefactthatitisformedinandbyamind.Thisiswhytheimpressionsanimalsformintheirsoulswilldifferfromoneanotherdependingonthekindof animal in which they are formed, and this is why our impressions differ from theimpressionsofanyotheranimalinhavingapropositionalcontent,becausetheyareformedinandbyamindorreason.But,giventhat,itisalsoeasytoseewhytheimpressionsevenofthesame object will differ among different people, reflecting the difference between differentminds.This isbound tobe thecase, for instance,becausenot allpeoplehaveprecisely thesameconceptsorthesamehabitsofthinkingaboutthings,thesameexperiences,orthesamebeliefs.Soit isperfectlytruethatanimpressionissomethingwhichwefindourselveswith.But it is by no means true that we are completely innocent of the particular details of theimpressionsweindividuallyform.Theyverymuchreflectthebeliefs,habits,andattitudesof


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theparticularmindinwhichandbywhichtheyareformed.What is true of impressions in general is also true of impulsive impressions. They are

thoughtswhichreflectyourwaysandhabitsofthinkingaboutthings.Letusnow,though,focuson their impulsive character.Supposeyou cut yourself badlywith a rustyknife.Givenyourbeliefs, the thought might occur to you that you got infected. And the further thought mightoccurtoyou thatyoumightdie fromthis infection.At thispoint this isamere impressionorthoughtwhichyoufindyourselfwith.Itisadisagreeable,perhapsevendisconcerting,thought;thatistosay,themerethoughtinitselfisdisconcerting.Thequestionthenarises:“Whatisthesourceandnatureofthisdisquietingcharacteroftheimpression?”Accordingto theStoics, thereare twopossibilities.Thefirst is this:youwronglybelieve

thatdeathisanevil,perhapsevenaterribleevil.Nowonder,then,thatthemereimpressionthatyoumightdieisverydisturbing.Thesecondisthis:yourightlybelieve,notthatdeathisanevilbut that it isnatural to try toavoiddeath, and thatnaturemeansyou,other thingsbeingequal,totrytoavoiddeath.Sotheimpressionthatyoumightdiehasanalarmingcharacter;itputsyouonalert.Thishasateleologicalfunction.Italertsyoutotheneedtobeonyourguard.And,byanaturalmechanism,yourwholebodywillgointoastateofalert,readytomoveasneeded.Buttheimpression,thoughalarming,isnotdeeplydisturbing.For,afterall,youhaveaclearmind, and you know that there aremany false alarms; and even if there is reason foralarm,youasaStoicknowthatallyouhavetodois trytodowhatyoucantoavoiddeath.Thisiswhatyouaremeanttodo.Youdonotactuallyhavetoavoiddeath.Thatisamatterofdivineprovidence.Sothequestionofwhetheryouaregoingtodieornotinthissensedoesnotaffectyouatall.ThisisGod'sproblem,asitwere.But in the case of the person who believes that death is a terrible evil, the alarming

characteroftheimpression,whichteleologicallyisjustasignaltobeonone'sguard,turnsintoadeeplydisturbingexperience,andasaconsequence thewholebodygoes intoadisturbed,perturbed,orexcitedstate,whichmightaffecttheoperationofreason.LaterStoicswillcallanimpressionwithsuchacoloring,andperhapswiththeattendantbodilystate,apropatheia,anincipientpassion.13Wehave to firmly remember, though thismight not be so clear to the person in a deeply

disturbedstate,thatsofarwearedealingwithamereimpressionorthought.Naturally,asthethoughtmayoccurtoyou,itmayalsobefalse.Afterall,wehavenotyetfoundout,ormadeupourmind,astowhetherweactuallygotinfected.Andwehavenotyetconsideredwhetherweshouldbelievethatonemaydiefromthisinfection.Sofarwehavejustthemerethought.Now,one cannot be afraid that onemight die from this infection unless one believes that one gotinfected and that one could die from this infection.We clearly have to distinguish betweenconcernandfear,ontheonehand,andthealarmingordisturbingcharacteroftheimpression,ontheotherhand.Thewisepersonwillbeconcerned,butthefoolishpersonwhobelievesthatdeathisanevilwillbeafraid.Thusfear,accordingtotheStoics,isnothingbutthefalsebeliefthat an evil is coming, or might come, one's way—a belief generated by assent to animpressionwhichisdeeplydisturbingbecauseonewronglytakesthesituationtobeanevil.SometimestheStoicsalsothinkoffearasthebeliefcoupledwiththeattendantbodilystate.InthesamewayinwhichtheStoicstreatafear,theyalsotreatanappetite,thesupposedly

naturaldesireofthenonrationalpartofthesoul.IntruthitisnothingbutabeliefofacertainFrede, Michael. A Free Will : Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought, edited by A. A. Long, University of California Press, 2011. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/asulib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=631055.Created from asulib-ebooks on 2019-08-17 06:35:29.

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kind,abeliefgeneratedbyassenttoahighlyagreeableimpressiontotheeffectthatsomethingone conceives of as a good is coming or might come one's way; the highly agreeable andimpulsivecharacteroftheimpressionistheresultofthismistakenbeliefthatitisagood.TheStoicstreatalltheemotions,likeanger,whicharesupposedbyPlatoandAristotletooriginateinanonrationalpartofthesoul,asmisguidedbeliefs.Theycallthempathe,passions,thatistosay,pathologicalaffections,producedby themind.TheStoicwisemandoesnotexperienceany such passion. He is apathes. But this does not at all mean that he does not have anyemotion. He knows concern, the counterpart of fear; he knows reasonable willing, thecounterpart of appetite; and he knows joy, the elated satisfaction at the attainment of a realgood,asopposedtogleefulnessattheattainmentofanimaginedgood.14Somuch,then,aboutimpulsiveimpressionsandthewaytheyheavilydependonone'sownmindandreason.Astoassent,wecannowbebrief.Animalscandonothing,oratleastverylittle,butrelyon

their impressions. They have little or no way to discriminate between trustworthy andmisleading instances. But our impressions are true or false. We also have reason, whichallowsustoscrutinizeourimpressionscriticallybeforeweacceptthemastrueandreliable.Hereitisimportanttorememberthatthereismoretoourimpressionsthantheirpropositionalcontent.This isobvious in thecaseofperceptual impressions.Butwehavealsoseen thatathoughtthatonemightdiefromacertaininfection,thoughithasthesamepropositionalcontent,might come in different colorings, and the coloring is regarded as part of the thought orimpression. So, to give assent to an impression, while primarily a matter of taking itspropositionalcontent tobetrue, isalsoamatterofacceptingit inall itsdetail,for instance,accepting it, though it isnotaclearanddistinct impression,andaccepting it in itscoloring.Given an impulsive impression, one might accept its propositional content but find itsimpulsive character inappropriate and therefore refuse to assent to the impression on thatground.There isone lastdetailwhich Iwillmerely touchon.Thenotion of assent, like its legal

counterpartofconsent,canbeconstruedquitegenerously.Justastacitacquiescenceinbeingruledorgovernedbysomebodycanbeconstruedasassentingtotheperson'srule,soassentingtoanimpressiondoesnothavetoinvolveanexplicitactofacceptance.Nottorevoltagainstanimpressionbutsimplyacquiescingtoitandinfactrelyingonitcanconstituteasmuchanassentasanexplicitacceptance.IfwenowreturntothequestionofhowtheStoicsthinkofthedesiresPlatoandAristotle

characterizeasnonrational,itshouldbeclearwhytheStoicsthinkthattheyareallrational,alltheproductofreason.FortheStoicsthereisanambiguityinthetermdesirehere.Ifbydesirewemeananimpulsewhichactuallymovesustoaction,then,accordingtotheStoics,wearedealingwith a belief of a certain kind that is constitutedby reason's assent to an impulsiveimpression. If, on the other hand, by desire we mean, as Plato and Aristotle obviouslysometimesdo,amotivewhichmightbeoverriddenbyaconflictingdesire,somethingwhichjustmightmoveustoactbutalsomayfailtodoso,then,accordingtotheStoics,wemustbetalking about an impulsive rational impression.And this impulsive impression is formedbyreason.Whateverwemakeofthedetailsofallthis,thereisonepointwhichisabsolutelycrucialfor

the emergence of the notion of the will. The case of the Stoics against Plato andAristotleFrede, Michael. A Free Will : Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought, edited by A. A. Long, University of California Press, 2011. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/asulib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=631055.Created from asulib-ebooks on 2019-08-17 06:35:29.

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wouldcompletelycollapsewithouttheassumptionthatanyaction,unlessoneisphysicallyandliterallyforcedintodoingsomething,presupposesanactofreason'sassenttoanappropriateimpulsiveimpression.Thisassentwillconstitutearationalimpulsewhichpromptsordrives,asitwere,theaction.Soanyhumandesire(orexis)isadesireofreason.Thusanydesireofagrown-uphumanbeing is awilling, aboulêsis.Here, therefore,wedohave thenotionof awillingwhichwaslackinginPlatoandAristotle,anotionwhichallowsustosaythat,whenaperson does not act by being forced or out of ignorance, the person acts voluntarily orwillingly.15Amongsuchwillings, though, theStoicsnowdistinguishbetweenbouleseis in anarrowersense,namely,reasonablewillings,thekindofwillingsonlyawisepersonhas,andappetites(epithymiai),unreasonablewillings,whicharewhatwewhoarenotwisehave.16Sonowwehavethenotionofassent,andhencetheappropriatenotionofawilling,butwe

donotyethavethenotionofachoice,letaloneofawill.Toseehowwegetthis,wehavetostepbackabit.Itisclearfromwhatwehavesaidthat,accordingtotheStoics,ourwholelifeisentirelyamatterofwhatweassenttoandwhatnot.Forourbeliefsareamatterofassent,andsoareourdesires,whicharejustspecialformsofbelief.Ensuringourlifewillcomeoutwellisentirelyamatterofgivingassentwhenthatisappropriateandrefusingtogiveassentwhenitisinappropriate.Thisfocusonourinternallifeissharpenedbythefactthat,accordingto theStoics,wisdom is theonlygood, that awise life is agood life, and thatnothingelsematters.Solongasoneactswisely,onelivesalifeof(forus)unimaginablesatisfactionandbliss,whatevermayhappentoone,whetheronegetstorturedormaimedorkilled.Thewisepersonwillnormallybeconcernedtoavoidsuchthings,but,iftheydohappen,theywillmakenodifferencetohim,asheisjustconcernedtoactwisely,bygivingassentwhenappropriateandrefusingassentwheninappropriate.Sothewholefocusofone'slifenowisonone'sinnerlife.Andthereisafurtherfactorwhichreinforcesthisfocus,namely,theassumptionthatthecourseoftheworldoutsideispredetermined.Allthewisepersoncandoistrytoavoiddeath,butifhedoesnotmanagethat,hetakesthisasasuresignthatnatureinherwisdommeanshimtodieandthatthereforeitisagoodthingforhimtodie.Allhehastodo,havingfailedinhisattemptstoavoidimpendingdeath,istogiveassenttothethoughtthatitmustbeagoodthingthatheisgoingtodie.Moreover,besidesthisincreasingfocusonone'sinnerlife,wealsohavetotakenoteofthe

emphasiswefindinlaterStoicsontheassumptionthatphilosophical theoryisnotanendinitselfbutameanstolivingone'slife,andtheirinsistencethattheapplicationofthistheorytoone's life requires a great deal of attention to, and reflection on, how one as an individualactuallydoesfunction,includingagreatdealofpractice(askêsis)andexerciseinlearningtothinkaboutthingsinappropriatewaysandtoactaccordingly.HencelaterStoicswillturntothisinnerlifeinawaywhichissupposedtohelpustolearntogiveassentappropriately.OneofthesephilosophersisEpictetusattheturnfromthefirsttothesecondcenturyA.D.,themostrespectedandinfluentialStoicofhistime

EPICTETUSANDTHEFIRSTNOTIONOFAWILL

InEpictetus'sDiscoursesthenotionofprohairesis(choice)playsperhapsthecentralrole.17Itis our prohairesis which defines us as a person, as the sort of person we are; it is our


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prohairesiswhichdetermineshowwebehave;itisourprohairesiswhichweneedtoconcernourselveswithmorethananythingelse;indeed,ourprohairesisistheonlythingwhichintheendmatters.Now,givenwhathasbeensaid,wemight think thatwereadilyunderstand this.Sinceweaimatagoodlife,ourconcernshouldbetogiveassenttotherightimpressionsandinparticular togiveassent to theright impulsive impressions,whichassentwillconstitutearational impulseordesireandmakeusact intheappropriateway.Thereforewemight thinkthattheassenttoourimpulsiveimpressionsconstitutesachoicetoactinacertainwayandthattheprohairesiswhichstandsatthecenterofEpictetus'sthoughtisthedispositionofthemindtomakethechoiceswhichitmakestoactinthewaywedo.Butthematterismorecomplicated.Thisisalreadysignaledbytheverytermprohairesis.It

shouldstrikeusascuriousthatEpictetusmakessuchprominentuseofatermwhichisstronglyassociatedwithAristotle and Peripateticism andwhich had played almost no role in Stoicthoughtup to thispoint.Weshouldalsoremember that inAristotlewillingandchoosingaredistinguishedbythefactthatchoosingisamatterofwillingsomethingwhichisuptousandinourpower.Clearly, this is highly relevant in Epictetus. In classical Stoicism the phrase “up to us”

(eph'h min)isusedinsuchawaythatanactionisuptousifitsgettingdoneisamatterofourgivingassenttothecorrespondingimpulsiveimpression.Thusitisuptometocrossthestreet,becausewhether I cross the street is amatter ofmy giving assent to the impression that itwouldbeagood thing tocross thestreet.ButEpictetususes“up tous” inamuchnarrowerway.18Heinsistsontakingaccountofthefactthatnoexternalactionintheworldisentirelyunderourcontrol.WemaynotsucceedincrossingthestreetforanynumberoftrivialreasonsbutultimatelybecauseitmaynotbepartofGod'sprovidentialplanthatweshouldcrossthestreet.ThishadbeenassumedbytheStoicsallalong,soEpictetus'snarrowingof theuseof“uptous”hardlyconstitutesachangeindoctrinebutratherashiftinemphasisorfocus.WhatEpictetuswants us to focus on is that it is up to us to give, or refuse to give, assent to theimpulsiveimpressiontocrossthestreetbutthatitisnotuptoustocrossthestreet.Sowecanchoosetogiveassent totheimpressiontocrossthestreet,andwecanthuswill tocrossthestreet,butwecannotchooseordecidetocrossthestreet.ItistomakethispointthatEpictetusresorts to Aristotle's terminology, with its distinction of willing and choosing, and talks ofchoosingtogiveassentbutofwillingtocrossthestreet.Thereisanotherimportantpointwhichweshouldtakenoteof.Itisconspicuousthatassent

does not play as central a role in Epictetus as we might expect. He prefers to talk moregenerallyofour“useofimpressions”(chr sist nphantasi n)orofthewaywedealwithourimpressions. Assenting to them is just one thing we can do with them, though the mostimportantone.Sonowitbecomesclear,andEpictetusmakesthisexplicit,thatwhatisuptous,what is amatterofour choice, ishowwedealwithour impressions.Wecan scrutinizethem, reflect on them, try to deflate and dissolve them, dwell on them, and, of course, giveassenttothem.Butgivingassentisjustoneofthethingswhichitisuptoustodo,whichwecanchoosetodo.Andourprohairesis,whichdefinesusasthekindofpersonweare,isnotadisposition,asweatfirstthought,tochoosetoactinacertainway,becausewedonothavethatchoice,butratheradispositiontochoosetodealwithourimpressionsinacertainway,most crucially to choose how to assent to impulsive impressions. This assent, which you


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choosetogive,willconstituteawilling,andthiswillingistheimpulsewhichmakesyouactinacertainway.Sothisabilityanddisposition,insofarasitaccountsforyourwillingwhateveritisthatyouwilltodo,canbecalled“thewill.”Butthewilliscalledprohairesis,ratherthanboulêsis,tomarkthatitisanabilitytomakechoices,ofwhichwillingsarejustproducts.Thisindeedisthefirsttimethatwehaveanynotionofawill.Thisnotionofawillisclearlydevelopedtopinpointthesourceofourresponsibilityforour

actionsand to identifypreciselywhat it is thatmakes themourowndoings.Chrysippushadsaid that it isup tous, for instance, tocross the streetornot.Andhehadexplained thisbysaying that it is up to us to give, or refuse to give, our assent to the appropriate impulsiveimpression.Wearenowtold,accordingtoEpictetus,thatthesenseof“uptous”involvedinthe two cases is different. The second case is a narrower and stricter sense of “up to us,”wherebyitisuptoustogiveornottogiveassenttotheimpression.Andwegetanexplanationofpreciselywhatthatmeans.Wecanchooseordecidetogiveassent,butwecanalsochooseor decide not to give assent.This choice is to be explained by thewill. In explaining yourchoices,italsoexplainsyourwillings.Butitisnotinthesamesenseuptoyoutodosomethingornottodosomething,sinceyoucannotchoosetodosomethinginthewayyoucanchoosetogiveassent.TherearevariousdetailsherewhichIwillnotgointoatthelengththeydeservebutwhichI

want tomentionat leastbriefly.Thewill thus conceivedcanbeagoodwillor abadwill,dependingonwhetherthechoiceswemakeinvirtueofitaregoodchoicesorbadchoices.Wemaynotlikethechoiceswemakeandthereforenotlikethewillwehave.Wemaywilltohaveawillwhichmakesdifferentchoices.Wemay,forinstance,willittonolongerchoosetogiveassenttothetemptingimpressionswehavewhenwearefacedbyadeliciouspieceofcake.Sotherearesecond-andhigher-orderwillingswhichcangivethewillagreatdealofstructureand stability.We should also note that thewill, as it is conceived here, can choose to giveassent to an ordinary nonimpulsive impression, like the impression that it will rain a lottomorrow,suchthat,giventhisassent,webelievethatitwillrainalottomorrow.Sointhissensewhatwebelieveisamatterofourwill,asthusconceived.However,thisdoesnotatallmeanthatwewilltobelievesomething.Wecanatbestbesaidtochoosetobelievesomething.For we get a willing only if the will chooses to give assent, not to an ordinary but to animpulsive impression which leads to action. Put differently, not every act of the will is awillingoravolition.Moreover,nothingwhichhasbeensaidsofarshowsthatthewillisfreeinitschoices.Itcanmakeaparticularchoiceorfailtomakeaparticularchoice.19Butthereisnothinginwhathasbeensaidwhichforcesustoassume,forinstance,thatitcanfreelychoosewhether to give assent or not, or whether to give assent to this impression or anotherimpression.Itcanchooseordecidetogiveassenttoagivenimpression,butitalsocanfailtodoso.Thisnotionofthewillasourabilitytomakechoicesanddecisionsincludestheabilityto

choose to give assent to impulsive impressions and thus to choose towill to do something.Thus in this complexway it accounts forwhatother ancientphilosophers andweourselveswouldcallourchoosingordecidingtodosomething.InwhatfollowsIshallforthemostpartfocusonlyonthewillasanabilitytomakechoicesanddecisionsastowhattodo.WithStoicism,then,wegetforthefirsttimeanotionofthewillasanabilityofthemindor


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ofreasontomakechoicesanddecisions.Thisability,though,whichweallshare,inthecaseofeachofusisformedanddevelopedindifferentways.Howitdevelopsiscruciallyamatterof the effort and care with which we ourselves develop this ability, which we also mightneglect to do. The will thus formed and developed accounts for the different choices anddecisionsdifferenthumanbeingsmake.Aswehaveseen,thepreciseforminwhichtheStoicsconceiveofthewilldependsontheirdenialofanonrationalpartorpartsofthesoul.HenceinthisspecificformthenotionofawillwasunacceptabletoPlatonistsandtoAristotelians,whocontinuedtoinsistonanonrationalpartofthesoul.


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CHAPTERFOUR

LaterPlatonistandPeripateticContributions

BythesecondcenturyA.D.AristotelianismandPlatonismhadbeguntoeclipseStoicism,andby theendof the third centuryStoicismno longerhadany followers.AllphilosophersnowoptedforsomeformofPlatonism,asaruleaPlatonismwhichtriedtointegratelargeamountsofAristoteliandoctrine, includingAristotle'sethicalprinciples.Hence thenotionof thewillmighthaveeasilydisappearedfromthehistoryofphilosophyifPlatonistsandPeripateticshadnotdeveloped theirownsuchnotion.This involved retaining the idea that the soul isbi-ortripartitebutalsotakingthecrucialstep,notenvisionedbyPlatoorAristotle,thateverythingwedoofourownaccord(hekontes)presupposestheassentofreason.Nowthewordhek nhasindeedcometomeanvoluntaryorwilling.ThischangewasgreatlyfacilitatedbycertainremarksinAristotleandparticularlyinPlato.

Wehaveatendency,oratleastforaverylongtimehavehadatendency,tounderstandPlatoandAristotle as if they claimed that itwere the task of reason to provide uswith the rightbeliefsor,betterstill,knowledgeandunderstanding,whilethetaskofthenonrationalpartofthe soul is to provide us with the desires to motivate us to act virtuously in light of theknowledgeandunderstandingprovidedbyreason.ButwehavealreadyseenthatthisisnottheviewofPlatoandAristotle.Accordingtothem,itisnotthetaskofreasontoprovideusonlywith the appropriate knowledge andunderstanding; it is also its task toprovideuswith theappropriatedesires.Toactvirtuouslyistoactfromchoice,andtoactfromchoiceistoactona desire of reason.The cognitive and the desiderative or conative aspects of reason are sointimatelylinkedthatwemaywonderwhetherinfactweshoulddistinguish,asIdidearlier,between thebeliefof reason that it isagood thing toact inacertainwayand thedesireofreasonwhichthisbeliefgivesriseto,orwhether,instead,weshouldnotjustsaythatwearemotivatedbythebeliefthatitisagoodthingtoactinthisway,recognizingthisasaspecialkind of beliefwhich canmotivate us, just as the Stoics think that desires are nothing but aspecialkindofbelief.Further, themodernscholarlyview, thataccordingtoPlatoandAristotle, reasonprovides

the beliefs and the nonrational part of the soul provides the motivating desires, is grosslyinadequateinthatitoverlookstheirviewthat,justasreasonhasadesiderativeaspect,sothenonrational part of the soul and its desires have a cognitive aspect. This should not be


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surprising,giventhatthenonrationalpartofthesoulissupposedtobeacloseanalogueofthekindofsoulanimalshave.Animalshavecognition.Indeed,Aristotleiswillingtoattributetoanimalssuchenormouspowersofcognitionthatsomeofthem,accordingtohim,candisplaygoodsenseandforesight.1HencewenaturallywonderwhyAristotledeniesreasontoanimals.Theanswer is thathe, likePlato,hasahighlyrestrictivenotionof reasonandknowledge, anotionwhichinvolvesunderstandingwhywhatonebelievesoneknowsis,andcannotbutbe,the way it is. Reason is the ability in virtue of which we have such knowledge andunderstanding. It is this kind of understanding which animals are lacking. Obviously, thisleavesa lotofconceptual space for lesselevatedcognitive stateswhichanonrational soul,andhenceananimal,iscapableof.2Weshallunderstand thisbetter ifwe take intoaccount thatPlatoandAristotledistinguish

threeformsofdesire,correspondingtothethreedifferentpartsofthesoul,andalso,atleastsometimes, seem toassume thateachof these formsofdesirehasanatural rangeofobjectswhich it naturally latches on to. Appetite aims at pleasant things, which give bodilysatisfaction;spirit (thymos) aims at honorable things; and reason aims at good things.SincebothPlatoandAristotle,unliketheStoics,assumethatpleasureandhonoraregenuinegoods,reasoncanalsoaimat them, insofaras theyaregoods.Theassumptionseems tobe that theappetitivepartof thesoul, thoughnonrational,candiscriminatebetweenthepleasantandtheunpleasant.This,presumably,issupposedtoserveapurpose.Byandlargeanorganismwhichisnotspoiledorcorruptedwillperceivewholesomefoodordrinkaspleasant,andunhealthyfood and drink as unpleasant. So the ability to discriminate between the pleasant and theunpleasantwillhelptheorganismtosustainitself,ifitisnotcorruptedinitstastes.Whenweseeadeliciouspieceof cake, itwillbeappetitewhichhas the impression that itwouldbeverypleasanttohavethispieceofcake.Sinceappetitelacksreason,ithasnocriticaldistancefromitsimpression.Forittohavethisimpressionamountstothesameasitshavingthisbelief.Similarly, the spirited part (thymos), being sensitive to what is honorable, will have theimpressionthatitwouldbeshamefultohaveyetanotherpieceofcake.WeshouldalsorememberthatAristotleexplainsnonrationaldesireasoriginatinginthefact

thatanimalsnotonlycanperceivethingsbutalsoperceivethemaspleasantorunpleasant.Soifyouperceivethekindofthingyouhaveexperiencedaspleasant,withouttheinterventionofreason you have the agreeable impression that there is something pleasant within reach,somethingwhichyouexpect togiveyoupleasureifyougetholdof it.This isanimpressionandanexpectationproducedbythenonrationalpartofthesoul.Inhisremarksonimpetuousakrasia—casesinwhichthespiritedpartofthesoul,forinstance,initsanger,rashlypreemptsthedeliberationofreason—Aristotlesaysthatthosewhoarepronetothiskindofconditiondonotwait for reason tocome toaconclusionbut tend to follow theirphantasia, that is, theirimpressionordisposition toformimpressions, rather thantheir reason(EN7,1150b19–28).Sotheakraticsortofpersonfollowsanimpressionformedbyorinthespiritedpartofthesoulratherthanreason.

LaterPeripatetics andPlatonists, then,were followingPlato andAristotle in thinking that anonrationaldesireconsistedofacertainkindofagreeableordisagreeableimpression,withitsorigin in a nonrational part of the soul. They could preserve the division of the soul by


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supposingthatdifferentkindsof impulsiveimpressionshavetheiroriginindifferentpartsofthesoul,ratherthaninreasonorthemind,astheStoicshadassumed.ButtheycouldnowagreewiththeStoics(thoughthisinfactmeantasignificantdeparturefromPlatoandAristotle)thatany impression, however tempting it may be, needs an assent of reason to turn it into animpulsethatcanmoveustoaction.Sonowreasondoesappearintworoles.Ithasorformsitsownviewastowhatwouldbeagoodthingtodo,anditjudgeswhethertoassentorrefusetoassent to the impulsive impressionswhich present themselves. Thuswe get the division ofreasonor the intellect into twoparts, aswe find in later traditions, for instance, inThomasAquinas:acognitivepartandthewill.Anotherfactorwhichcouldfacilitatethismove,asIindicatedearlier,isthatassentcouldbe

construed rather generously as involving simple acceptance of, or acquiescence to, animpression,cedingtoit,givingintoit,ratherthananactive,explicitactofassent.Thisiswhymany philosophers were now prepared to say that even nonhuman animals assent to theirimpressionsinthattheycedetothemandrelyonthemintheiraction.3There is an important development in the first century B.C.which further facilitated this

change.ItisusuallyclaimedthattheStoicPosidoniusearlyinthefirstcenturyB.C.criticizedChrysippus's doctrine that the passions of the soul have their origin in reason and that hereverted to a tripartite division of the soul. The evidence for this comes from Galen, inparticular,Galen'sDe Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis, but it has to be treated with greatcaution.4 Galen is an extremely polemical author who shows few scruples in defending oradvancingagoodcause.HeisfirmlysetagainstStoicismandeagertoshowthatonamatterdeartohim,suchasthedivisionofthesoul,thegreatauthorityoftheschool,Chrysippus,whodeniesthisdoctrine,hasbeencontradictedbyanothermajorStoic,Posidonius.HenceIhavegreatsympathywithJohnCooper'sattempttoshowthatGalenwassimplywrongtointerpretPosidoniusashavingthoughtthatthereisanirrationalpartofthesoul.5Ontheotherhand,itisobvious that Posidonius did criticize Chrysippus andmust have said things which allowedGalentointerprethiminthisway.WhatwasatissuebetweenChrysippusandPosidonius?From the information we have about Chrysippus and the earlier Stoics, we get the

impression that human beings in the course of their natural development would turn intovirtuousandwisehumanbeings, if only thisdevelopmentwerenot interferedwith from theoutsidethroughcorruptionfromthosewhoraiseusandbythesocietywegrowupin.6Asitis,though,we aremade to believe that all sorts of things are good and evilwhich in fact areneither,andsowedevelopcorrespondingirrationaldesiresfororagainstthesethingswhichareentirelyinappropriatebutwhichcometoguideourlife.ItakeitthatPosidoniusquestionedthispicture.Hehadaninterestinthehistoryofmankind,

andheseems tohaveassumed that therewasan idyllicoriginalstateof innocence inwhichpeoplelivedpeacefullytogetherwithoutcoercion,freelyfollowingthosewhowerewise.7Butthisoriginalparadisiacal statewas lost throughcorruption,greed,envy,andambition.Now,thiscorruptioncannothavecomefromtheoutside,fromsociety,associetywasnotyetcorrupt.Itmusthavecomefromtheinside,then.Ifwelookfortheweakspotontheinside,itmustliein themisguidedbut tempting impulsive impressionswhichwe findhard to resist.Take, forinstance,thecaseinwhichonewantstorunawaybecauseonefearsforone'slife.ForaStoicthis is an unreasonable, inappropriate, and misguided desire, because only evils are to be


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feared, and death is not an evil. According to the classic Stoic account, the source of thisinappropriate desire is the belief that death is an evil. This is not a belief we developnaturally.Weacquireitfromtheoutside,becausewegrowupinasocietywhichbelievesthatdeath is an evil. Given this belief, the impulsive impression that one might die from aninfectiontakesonaverydisturbingcoloringandisdifficultnottoassentto.Posidonius seems to have askedwhether the coloringof the impressionmust be due to a

beliefofreasonorwhether,instead,itcouldhaveitsorigininanonrationalpartofthesouloreveninthebodyanditsconstitutionandstate.Itcouldbeanatural,nonrationalreactionofanorganism which sees its life threatened. Similarly, it might be more plausible to refer thecoloring of the impulsive impression, not to the mistaken belief that this piece of cake issomething good but rather to the body of an organismwhich is depleted and craving somecarbohydrates. It does not matter for our purposes whether Posidonius believed in anonrationalpartof thesoul.Whatmatters ishissuggestion that the impulsivecharacterofatleast some of our impressions does not originate in reason's beliefs and thus, ultimately, insome sense, outside us but seems to have its origin in us, for instance, in the particularconstitution or state of our body which makes us crave certain things.8 Peripatetics andPlatonists would have gladly taken such considerations as a confirmation of the view thatnonrationaldesiresareconstitutedbyimpressionswhichhavetheiroriginnotinreasonbutinanonrationalpartofthesoul.Thesecond,probablycloselyconnected,developmenthastodowithStoicanalysisofthe

emotions.Ifwelook,for instance,atSeneca's treatiseonanger,weeasilygetconfused,andcommentatorsusedtogetconfused.Thisisbecauseanger(ira)andothertermsforemotions,desires, or passions of the soul, are systematically used ambiguously. In classical Stoicdoctrineangerreferstothedesireorimpulseonehaswhichmakesoneactinangerbecauseonehasassented to,accepted,andyielded to the relevant impulsive impression.ButSenecaalsouses ira to refer to themere impression.9 Later Stoics clarified this ambiguous use oftermslikeangerorfearbydistinguishingbetweenapropatheia,anincipientpassion,whichisthemereimpulsiveimpressionnotyetassentedto,andapathos,thepassioninfullforce,whenthe impulsive impression has received assent.10 This distinctionmay very well go back toPosidonius.Inanycase,itwouldallowPeripateticsandPlatonistsmoreeasilytoidentifytheirnonrationaldesireswiththeimpulsiveimpressionstheytooktobegeneratedbythenonrationalpart of the soul. They could do this all themore readily since for them, unlike the Stoics,having a desire in itself did notmean that one acted on it.11Otherwise they could not haveassumedthattherecouldbeanacuteconflictofdesiresandthatonecouldactinsuchacasebyfollowingeitherreasonorappetite.IhavesofartalkedonlyaboutwhatPlatonistsandPeripateticswouldhavehadtodotoget

anotionofthewillwhichpreservedtheirassumptionofabi-ortripartitesoulandhowtheycould easily have done this, once they accepted the assumption that any action, any doingwhich we are not made to do by force, presupposes an act of assent. I have not yet doneanything to show that this iswhatPlatonistsandPeripateticsactuallydid.Letusbeginwithassent.WefindthisStoicnotiontakenoverbyPlatonistsinmanytexts.Weknowfromafragmentof

Porphyry'sworkOnthePowersoftheSoul(ap.Stob.,Ecl.1349.19ff)thatLonginusdoubtedFrede, Michael. A Free Will : Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought, edited by A. A. Long, University of California Press, 2011. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/asulib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=631055.Created from asulib-ebooks on 2019-08-17 06:35:29.

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whethertherewassuchathingasthesoul'spowertogiveassent.ButitseemsthatLonginushere,as inother respects,was rathersingular inhisconservatism. I take it thatheknewhisPlato extremelywell and criticizedwhat his fellowPlatonists, likeNumenius, presented asPlato'sphilosophy.12 Itwas this, I assume,which earnedLonginus Plotinus's rebuke that hewas aphilologos, rather than a philosopher (Porphyry,VP 14). At a timewhen Platowasabout to become “the divine Plato,” Longinus still had no difficulty constantly criticizingPlato'sstyle (seeProclus, inTim.1.14.7).Longinuswas theonlysignificantPlatonist of histimewhoheldontoaunitarianratherthanabinitarianortrinitarianconceptionofGod.Andsowe should not be surprised thatLonginus, quite rightly, doubted that Plato's philosophy hadenvisaged a doctrine of assent.ButNumenius, themost important Platonist before Plotinus,adoptedsuchadoctrine(seeStobaeus),asdid,at leastat times,PlotinusandalsoPorphyry,thestudentofLonginusandPlotinus(seePorphyryap.Stob.,Ecl.II.167.9ff).13We also find this doctrine of assent in the Peripatetics. Thus, for instance, Alexander of

AphrodisiasintheDefato(XI,p.178,17ffBruns)explainsthathumanbeings,unlikeanimals,do not just follow their impressions but have reasonwhich allows them to scrutinize theirimpressionsinsuchawaythattheywillproceedtoactonlyifreasonhasgivenassenttoanimpression.Abit later in thesametext(XIV,p.183,27ff),Alexanderdistinguishesbetweenwhatwedoofourownaccord (hekousion)andwhatwedobecause it isup tous (eph' hmin).Obviously,hehasinmindAristotle'sdistinctionbetweenwhatwedoofourownaccord(hekontes)andwhatwedobychoice.Werememberthatthelatterclassisrestrictedtoactionswewillandchoosetodo,whereastheformeralsoincludesthoseactionswhichwedowhenmotivated by a nonrational desire (see p. 26). But Alexander now, unlike Aristotle,characterizes this former class as involving a merely unforced assent of reason to animpression,whereas the latter class is supposed to involve an assent of reason based on acriticalevaluationoftheimpression.SoitisclearthatAlexandertakesevenanactiondoneonimpulse, for instance, an akratic action, to involve the assent of reason to the appropriateimpression.LetusreturntothePlatonists.ThereareanynumberofpassageswhichshowthatPlatonists

construe following a nonrational desire rather than reason in a similar way. Thus Plotinus(Enn.VI.8.2)raisesthequestionofhowwecanbesaidtobefree, if itwouldseemthattheimpressionanddesirepulluswherevertheyleadus.ItisclearfromthecontextthatPlotinusisspeaking about nonrational desires. And it is clear from the curious expression (h tephantasia…heteorexis,withthesubsequentverbformsinthesingular)thatheisidentifyingthenonrationaldesirewithanimpression.Porphyry(ap.Stob.,Ecl.II.167.9ff)tellsusthatsomebodywhosenaturalinclinationslead

himtoactinacertainwaycouldalsoactotherwisesincetheimpressiondoesnotforcehimtogiveassenttoit.Calcidius,inhiscommentaryontheTimaeus,whichistakentoreflectapre-Plotiniansource,claims(insection156)thatthesoulisself-movedandthatitsmotionconsistsinassent(adsensus)ordesirebut that thispresupposesanimpression(or theability toformimpressions) which the Greeks call phantasia. Sometimes, though, he continues, thisimpressionisdeceptive,corruptsassent,andbringsitaboutthatwechoosethebadinsteadofthegood. In thiscase,Calcidiussays,weactbybeing luredby the impression toact in thisway,ratherthanbyvoluntas.SoCalcidius,justlikeAlexanderofAphrodisias(DefatoXIV,p.


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183)andotherPlatonistandPeripateticauthors,ispreservingthedistinctionbetweenwilling(boulêsis)todosomething,inPlato'sandAristotle'snarrowsense,andgivingassentinsuchawaythatonecanbesaidtodosomethingwillinglyinawidersense,simplybecauseonehasassentedtoit.It is this wider notion of willing, that is, assenting to an impulsive impression, whether

following reason or going against reason, which gives rise to the notion of thewill as theabilityanddispositiontodothingsbyassentingtoimpressions,whethertheyhavetheiroriginin reason or in the nonrational part of the soul and whether they are reasonable orunreasonable. In this way we come to have a notion of a will in Platonist and Peripateticauthorsas,forinstance,inAspasius(CommentaryonAristotle'sNicomacheanEthics).14Obviously, this change in the way of looking at nonrational desire has considerable

consequences.Itisonethingtothinkofhumanbeingsassometimesbeingoverwhelmedbyapowerful desire for something or even to think that reason sometimes is overwhelmed by apowerful desire for something; we readily understand, or believe we understand, how thismighthappen.Itisquiteanotherthingtorelocatethisconflictasaconflictwithinreasonorthemind.Thatrefocusesourattentiononthoughtsorimpressions.Butwhatissopowerfulabouttheseimpressionsthatreasonmaynotbeabletoresistthem?ClassicalStoicismhasarelativelyeasyanswer.Ifimpressionshavesuchapoweroveryou,

itisbecausetheyareformedbyreasoninawaywhichreflectsyourbeliefs,and,giventhesebeliefs,itisnotsurprisingifyouassenttotheseimpressions.Ifyouthinkthatdeathisaterribleevil,itisnotsurprisingthatyoucannotresistthethoughttorunasfastasyoucan,ifyouseedeath coming your way. It is your reason, your beliefs, which give your impressions theirpower.Butifyoudonotthinkthattheseimpressionshavetheirorigininreasonandthattheirpower isdue toyourbeliefs, itbecomes ratherdifficult tounderstandhowtheywouldhavesuchapoweroverreasonthat,eveniftheyhavelittleornothingtorecommendthemrationally,reasoncanbebroughttoassenttothem.Atthispointwehavetobewareofthedangerofjustcoveringuptheproblembyappealingtothefreewill,byclaimingthatthisispreciselywhatitis to have a freewill—to be able to give assent not only to impressionswhichwith goodreasonwe find acceptablebut also to impressionswhichhavenomerit rationally. Instead Iwanttolookbrieflyatsomeancientattemptstoexplaintheappealingortemptingcharacterofimpressionswewronglygiveassentto.Needlesstosay,wearetalkingabouttemptationsandabouttheoriginsoftheverynotionofatemptation.

We get a relatively simple and straightforward view inOrigen. It is based on the idea thatimpulsiveimpressionsinthemselveshaveanagreeableordisagreeablecharacterwhich,inthecaseofunreasonableimpressions,turnsthemintoincipientpassions(propatheiai).Theremaybesomething titillatingabout thevery impression itself.Origen (Deprinc. III.1.4) speaksofthetickles(gargalismoi)andprovocations(erithismoi)andalsothesmoothpleasureproducedbytheimpression.Now,youmightenjoytheimpressionanddwellonit.Andsoitwillretainitsforceorevengrowinforce.Itisperhapsnottoofar-fetched(thoughOrigendoesnotsaysoexplicitly)toassumethatyourabilitytoformimpressions,yourimagination,getsencouragedbythewayyoudwellontheimpression,toembellishitandmakeitseemevenmoreattractive.WhatOrigendoessay is that, ifyouhave theappropriateknowledgeandpractice (ask sis),


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then,insteadofdwellingontheagreeableimpression,youwillbeabletomaketheimpressiongo away and dissolve the incipient lust. So nonrational and indeed unreasonable impulsiveimpressionsgainsomeforcebyourdwellingonandenjoying theagreeablecharacterof themerefantasy.When we turn to one of the most influential ascetic writers among the Desert Fathers,

Evagrius Ponticus (whose allegiance to Origen stood in the way of his having a greaterinfluencein theologybutcouldnotpreventhis influenceasaspiritualguide), thesetemptingimpressions are referred to as logismoi(literally, “reasonings,” but here better translated as“thinkings” or “considerations”).15 This is extremely puzzling at first sight, as theseimpressionshave theirorigin in thenonrationalpartof the souloreven thebody,neitherofwhichcanreason.ButIhavealreadypointedoutthatwehavetobecarefulnottooverlookthefact thatAristotle, though he denies reason to animals, does not deny animals considerablecognitiveabilitiesandevensomethingwhichwewouldcallthinking,namely,inferencesbasedon experience. It is just that Aristotle, given his elevated notion of reason as involvingunderstanding,doesnotcallthis“thinking.”Somethingsimilar,mutatismutandis,canbearguedfortheStoicsandevenforPlato.Correspondingly,whilethenonrationalpartofthesoulhasnounderstandingorinsight,itissensitivetoexperienceandcanformaviewastohowpleasantitwouldbetoobtainsomethingandhow,tojudgefromexperience,onemightattainit.Whatitlacks is understanding, especially understanding of the good, which would allow it tounderstandwhyitwouldnotbeagoodthingtoindulgeinthispleasure.Howcantherebelogismoiwhichhavetheirorigininthenonrationalsoul,oreventhebody,

andareabletopersuadereason?Onewayinwhichthismighthappenisifreasonbelievesthatsomepleasuresareagoodbutisnotentirelyclearaboutwhetherthispleasureisagoodafterall.Whereasthenonrationalpartofthesoulisnotsensitivetoreasonsortoreasoninginthissense,reasonitselfissensitivetoexperienceandtoconsiderationsbasedonexperience.Still,thenonrationalpartofthesoulmaylearntobecomequitepersuasive.Itmightpointouthowpleasant itwouldbe toobtainacertainobjectandhoweasy itwouldbe toobtain it in thiscircumstance.Reason,asweknow,doesnotrequireproof,letalonethekindofproofwhichinvolvesunderstandingandinsight,tobepersuaded.16Sohereisthebeginningofaviewastohow reason might be persuaded to give assent to a nonrational and even unreasonableimpression.Thenonrationalpartofthesouloffersitconsiderations,thingstobeconsideredinmakingachoice,whichmightpersuadereason.There is still some puzzle as to how this is supposed towork.We have to explain how

reasoncanbepersuadedbecauseittakestheseconsiderations,offeredbythenonrationalpartofthesoul,tohavesomebearingonitsownviewthatitwouldnotbegoodtoindulgeinthispleasure.Totakethemostsimpleandstraightforwardcase,weneedtoseewhyreason,whenit thinks that itwouldnotbe agood thing to indulge in this pleasure, should in anywaybemovedbytheconsiderationthatitwouldbeverypleasanttoindulgeinthispleasure.Forittobemoved,thenonrationalconsiderationswouldhavetohave,orwouldhavetobethoughtbyreasontohave,somebearingonitsownview.Butnowit looksas if reason, togiveassent to thenonrational impression,wouldhave to

changeitsownview,inthesensethatitrationalizesintoarationalimpressionthenonrationalimpressionthatitwouldbepleasanttoindulgeinthispleasure—animpressionofreasonthatit


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wouldbegoodtoindulgeandsogiveassenttothisrationalimpressionandthus,indirectly,tothenonrationalimpression.17WedofindaviewlikethisinPlotinus(Enn.VI.8.2).Thequestionhereisinwhatsensewe

arefreetodowhatwewanttodoandarenotjustdrivenandmadetodowhatwedobythethingsaroundus.Ifthesethingsproduceimpressionsandnonrationaldesiresinus,andthesedesiresmakeusactthewaywedo,theseactionsarenotouractionsinanysubstantialsensebutthingswearemadetodo,thingswhichjusthappentous.Ifwesaythatouractionsarenotsimplytheproductofdesirebutalsooftheconsiderationsofreason(logismoi),wehavetoaskwhether the considerations of reasonproduce the desire orwhether the desire produces theconsiderationsofreason.Ifthelatter,ouractionagainwillnotbeoursinthesubstantialsensewearelookingfor,because, thoughit involvesrationalconsiderationsonourpart, thesearejust rationalizations of our nonrational desire, which in turn is produced by the object ofdesire.Thiswayof lookingat thingsproducesyetanothernotionof thewill: the impressions the

willassentsto,orrefusestoendorse,asinStoicism,areallimpressionsofreason.Butthereisacrucialdistinctionbetweentheseimpressions.Somearejustthereflectionofourgraspon,orour understanding of, our insight into reality, whereas others are the result of ourrationalizationofournonrationaldesires.Plotinuscallsthestateofthesoulinwhichwehavesuchpurerationalimpressions“intellectualization”(VI.8).18WeshallreturntoPlotinuslaterindetail.WhatisofinteresthereisthatPlotinus'sviewwouldmakeitintelligiblehowreasonwouldnotsimplyfallsilentandcaveintoanonrationaldesirebutwould,asthenotionofawillrequires,activelyendorseitbyassentingtoanimpressionwhichisduetorationalizationofthedesireorthecorrespondingimpulsiveimpression.

Theworldof laterantiquityispopulatednotonlybyall thethingswecanseeandtouchbutalso bymyriads of transparent and intangible beings or even incorporeal beings—in short,daemonsofvariouskinds.Theyarenotnecessarilyrationalbeings,butespeciallyiftheyare,theymighttakeaninterestinus,aswemighttakeaninterestinthem.For,giventheirmobilityortheirformofpresenceorjusttheirsheerpowerofmind,theydo,oreasilycan,knowlotsofthingshiddenfromus.Theycanalsobeextremelypowerful;giventheirknowledgeofhowthephysicalworldworks, they canmanipulate nature. Some of them are good and benevolent;these are angels.Others are downright evil andmalevolent.These daemonic beingsmayormaynothaveanydirectpoweroverourintellect,asourintellect(nous)isnotpartofnatureorat leastnotsubject tonaturalnecessity.But, thanks to theirknowledgeofhownatureworks,theydohavepoweroverourbodies.Andsinceinlateantiquityonemoreandmorecomestothinkthatthestateofthenonrationalpartofoursoulsnotonlytosomeextentdependsonone'sbodily statebut isevenmoreor lessa functionof it, thesedaemonsalsohaveconsiderablepowerover thenonrationalpartof thesoul.Theycan induce inyounonrational impressionsanddesires.Thesearethetemptationsofthedevil.Ifyourreasonworksinsuchawaythatitfollowsthesedesires,forinstance,byrationalizingthem,theycanalsointhiswaymanipulateyourreason.Andtheyareextremelygoodatthis,becauseyourmindoryoursoulisanopenbooktothem.Augustine(ContraAcademicos I.17) tellsus thefollowingstory.Therewas inhisstudent


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days inCarthageamancalledAlbicerius,whopossessedanuncannyknowledgewhichoneshould not confuse with wisdom. One could go and consult this man about where one hadmisplacedone'ssilverspoonorwhathappenedtomoneywhichhaddisappeared.Albiceriusalways knew the answer, though he had little education. One day Flaccianus, who did notbelieveinsuchsuperstition,wenttotestAlbicerius.HeaskedAlbiceriuswhathe,Flaccianus,hadbeendoinginthemorning.Stunnedbygettingthecorrectanswerinfulldetail,hewentontoaskAlbiceriuswhathe,Flaccianus,was thinkingrightnow.Albiceriuscould tellhimnotonly“averseofVergil”butalsowhichverse,uneducatedthoughhewas.Now one might think that Augustine, and his young friends too, especially after their

conversion, would not believe any of this. But, to the contrary, they, like most of theircontemporaries,hadnodifficultyinbelievingthatAlbiceriuswasavailinghimselfofdaemonswhohadaccess toone's thoughts. It isnowonder that inaworld like this, inwhichevenalittleinsignificantdaemonmighthavesuchpowers,peoplemightwonderwhetherourchoicesanddecisionswerefree.Andthisallthemoreso,astherewasalsothewidespreadbeliefthatwe,inturn,ifonlyweknewhow,mightmakedaemonsorevengodsdowhatwewantthemtodo,ratherthanwhattheywouldwanttodo,iftheyhadnotbeencoerced.Sowewillnextturntothequestionofhowthenotionsoffreedomandafreewillemerged.


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CHAPTERFIVE

TheEmergenceofaNotionofaFreeWillinStoicism

Stoicviews,aswehavealreadynoticed,oftenseemrathercounterintuitive in thesense thattheyflyinthefaceofwhatwecommonlybelievetobetrueandtakeforgranted.TheStoics,ofcourse,areperfectlyawareofthis.Theytakeallofus(andtheydonotexcludethemselves)tobe corrupted in our beliefs and attitudes, to be foolish. This is whywe find some of theirviewscounterintuitive.Byformulatingpithysayings,whichcametobeknownastheParadoxaStoicorum, theStoicsgooutoftheirwaytoshakeusoutofthecomplacencywithwhichwetakeourbeliefsforgranted,howeverfoolishtheymaybe.Onesuchparadoxisthis:Onlythewiseperson is free, everybodyelse is a slave.Obviously, theydonotmean thatweareallslavesinthelegalorpoliticalsenseorthatonlythewisepersonispoliticallyfree,justastheydonotmeanthatonlythewisepersonisakinginthepoliticalsense,whentheysaythatonlythewisepersonisaruler.Sowhatdotheymean,whentheysaythatonlythewisemanisfree?There isaStoicdefinitionof freedom (eleutheria)whichmaygoback toChrysippusand

cametobefairlywidespread(DL7.121[LS67M]).Accordingtothisdefinition,freedomisamatterofhavingtheabilitytoactonone'sown,toactatone'sowndiscretion,toactonone'sownaccount, to act independently.TheGreek isexousiaautopragias. It is not immediatelyclearfromthemerelanguagepreciselywhatismeant,especiallysincethewordautopragia,like itscognates,autoprageoandautopraktos, isextremelyrare. Italmostalwaysoccurs inthe context of this definition and apparently is aStoic coinage.Perhapswecanget a bettersenseofwhatitmightmean,atleastprovisionally,ifwelookatwhatitmightmeantosaythatpeoplewhoarenotwisearenotfreebutslaves.Hereitisrelativelyclearwhatisintended.According to theStoics, themarkof the foolishperson is thathe takes a lotof things tobegoods and evilswhich in truth are neither, for instance, life, health, strength, good looks, agoodreputation,power,wealth,andtheiropposites.Asaresultthefoolishpersondevelopsaninappropriate attachment to, or revulsion from, these things which he takes to be goods orevils.Thisattachmentorrevulsionconstitutesanenslavement,becauseitpreventsthefoolishpersonfromdoingwhathewouldreasonablywanttodoinpursuitofhisowngood.Itisthesepresumedgoodsandevilswhichbecomehismasters,runanddeterminehis life, in that theynowmakehimcompulsivelygoafterthemorrunawayfromthem,withoutregardforwhathewouldneedtodo ifhewere tofollowhisowntrue interest. It is theobjectsof theperson's


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fearsandappetites,andtheunrealisticfantasiestheygiveriseto,whichdeterminetheperson'sactionsandlife,ratherthanthepersonhimself.Aristotlehadinsistedthatoneisnotresponsibleforwhatonedoes,ifoneisliterallyforced

todoitormadetodoit.Andthismadegoodsense,sincesomethingwhichwearejustmadetodo isnotourownaction, since it isnot inanywaymotivatedbyadesireonourpart.Thismeant construing force quite narrowly, so that the paradigmwould be sheer physical force,physicalcompulsion.ButAristotlewaswillingtoextendthisnotionofbeingforcedtocasesofpsychologicalcompulsiontotheextentthatapsychologicalforcewhichnohumanbeingcouldpossibly resist counts as exculpating.1 For, if one acts under such force, this still does notrevealanythingabouttheparticularsortofpersononeis,aboutone'smotivation.WhatwenowgetwithStoicism,and in thewakeofStoicism, isanenormousexpansionofwhatcountsasbeing forced (biazesthai), or compelled, ormade to do something, and correspondingly anenormouscontractionofwhatcountsasanactionofone'sown,properlyspeaking,asanactionthe initiative forwhich lies in oneself, rather than on the outside in the presumed goods orevils.Thisshift,atleastinthecaseoftheStoics,doesnot,however,involveacorrespondingshift of the boundary between the responsible and the nonresponsible, especially since thepersonhimselfbyhisowndoinghasenslavedhimselfinthiswaysoastoacthenceforthundercompulsion.Sotheideawouldbethis:freedomistheabilitytoactonone'sowninitiative,asopposedtobeingcompelledtoactthewayonedoes,runningaftersomethingsandavoidingothers,becauseonehasenslavedoneselftothem.Notjustthetermautopragianeedssomeattentionbutalsothewordexousia.Ittooisnota

particularlycommonword,and,givenitsuses,itmightwellmeansomethingalotstrongerthantheblandabilityIhavespokenofsofar,suchasone'sfreedomofactionasauthorizedbylawortheauthorityofone'soffice.ThislatterisclearlywhatitdoesmeaninapassageinOrigen(Comm.inloan.I.4;II.16).2Origen tellsus that theStoicsclaimthatonly thewisearefree,sincetheyhaveattainedtheexousiaautopragiasbydivinelaw.Andheaddsthattheydefineexousiaaslawfullydelegatedpower.Sothereisdivinelaw,namely,theorderwhichGodhasimposedonthings,theorderaccordingtowhichthingshappenintheworld.Itispartofthisorder that, ifyoudonot sellyourself into slavery, thenyouareallowed toactonyourowninitiative.Ifyoudoenslaveyourself,youarenolongerable,giventhewayGodhasarrangedthings,todoso.YouarenolongerafreecitizeninGod'sworld,asitwere.There isaproblemhere.Thewisemanisfree,becausehehas liberatedhimselffromhis

falsebeliefsandinappropriateattachments.Butwhatarewetosayaboutthosewhoarenotyetwise but also have not yet enslaved themselves? Epictetus (1.19.9) considers the case ofsomebody who is threatened by a tyrant with the worst threats. If he values his will(prohairesis),Epictetusretorts,hewillsaytothetyrant,“Godmademefree.”Tounderstandthis,wehavetogobacktotheverybeginning,toGod'screationoftheworld.

God,givenhiswisdomandgoodness,couldnotbutcreatethebestpossibleworld.Buttherearevariouswaystounderstandwhatit isforaworldtobethebestpossible.Onewayistoassumethatthereare,independentofthecreatorordemiurge,acertainnumberofgoodsandacertainnumberofevils,andthataworldisthebestpossibleifithasaminimumoftheseevilsandamaximumofthesegoods.This,Itakeit,isnotapromisinglinetotakeifthecreatorisGodhimself,atleastifwetakeGodtobeafirstprincipleoreventhefirstprinciple,thatis,


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somethingintermsofwhicheverythingelseistobeexplainedbutwhichitselfdoesnotrequireanyexplanation.For,ifthecreatorisGod,therewillbenoanswertothequestionofwherethegoodsandevilswhichthecreatortriestomaximizeandminimize,respectively,comefromandhow they acquire their status as goods and evils.Theynow look as if theywere somethingantecedenttoGodbywhichGodisboundinhiscreation.This,though,wouldviolatenotonlytheideathatGodisafirstprinciplebutalsotheideathatGodisnotboundbyanyexternal,antecedentconstraintsinwhatheisdoing.Here,then,isanotherapproach.The creator is called a demiurge, that is to say,we are invited to look at theworld as a

pieceofcraftsmanship,likeahouseoracar.Nowwehavesomeideaofwhatitwouldmeantobuildaverygoodhouseoraverygoodcar.Wecanlookatahouse,atitsvariousdetails,toseehowwellthebuilderhasbuiltit,withinthelimitationsandspecificationswhichthepersonwho ordered the house set down in advance. Whichever detail we look at, we try to seewhether the builder could have done better. But however hard we think, and howeverknowledgeablewemaybeabouthousebuilding,wemayfindnothingtocriticize.Itseemstomethatitmightbepossibletodistinguishtwosensesinwhichahouseoracarmightbeagoodhouseoragoodcar.Suppose that,aftercheckingthebuilding,youfindthat thebuilderbuiltyouahouseexactlyaccordingtoyourspecifications.It isallverysolidlyandreliablydone.Youareperfectlycontentwithwhatthebuilderdid.Heobviouslyknowshiscraft.Youthinkitisagoodhouse.Butincheckingthehouseyoumightdiscoverthatitwasagoodhouseinnotjust this first sense; you might also come to marvel at the ingenuity, resourcefulness,thoughtfulness, andcreativitywithwhichall thishasbeendone.Thedifferencebetween thefirstandsecondassessmentsisnotnecessarilythat,onthesecondone,thehousecomesouttobe less expensive, more functional, or better serving the needs for which you wanted thebuilding.Thismaybetrue,too.Butitisnotcrucialformypoint.Whatiscrucial,rather,isthat,especiallyifyouknowsomethingaboutbuilding,youmightcometothink that thehouse isagenuinelywonderfulbuildingwhichinalldetails,asyoulookatthem,constantlysurprisesyouandmakesyoumarvelatthemasteryoftheartwhichhasgoneintoit.Itisarealjoytolookat.Thepointperhapsbecomesclearerifwelookatthematterfromthebuilder'spointofview.

Inthefirstcase,wehaveabuilderwhosetsouttobuildyouahouse,accordingtotherulesoftheart,whichwillfityourspecifications.Thisishisjob.Butlookatthesecondbuilderinthisway: for him building your house is just an occasion, a pretext, as itwere, to exercise hismasteryoftheart.Ofcourse,hecanbuildyouagoodhouseinthefirstsense.Thisisnottheslightestproblemforhim,andhecanbeabsolutelyreliedontodoso.Butforthisveryreason,thatalsoholdslittleinterestforhim.Whatheisreallyinterestedindoesnotlieinbuildingagoodhouseinthefirstsense.Hehassethisambitionhigher.Hewantstodowhathecandowellanywaybutwiththeutmostingenuity;hewantstoexercisehissuperbmasteryoftheart.Heactuallyenjoyshismasteryofthecraft.Withthis,itseemstome,wehavearrivedatamuchmoreelevatedsenseofagoodhouse.Wecannowgobacktotheworld.Wearenowsupposedtobelievethat,ifwescrutinizethe

detailsoftheworld,howevermuchwethinkaboutitinlightofwhatweknowabouthowonecouldorganizeaworld,wewillfindnothingtocriticize.Tothecontrary,thelongerwelookatit, and the better we understand it, we cannot but be overawed by the resourcefulness andcreativityofthemindthatcreatedit.Infact,wecometobelievethatitwouldnotbepossible


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tocreateaworldbetterthanthis.Wecometobesotakenwiththismarvelousarrangementandorder of things that we wish we could do something like this but also recognize what ourlimitedplaceinthisorderis.Beforeweproceedwiththisdoxology,letustakenoteofacorollary.Obviously,thisworld

wouldnotbemuchgoodif the livingbeings in itdidnothaveasufficientsupplyoffoodtokeep themgoing, if theygot so easily damaged that they couldnot functionproperly for themostpart,orif,attheslightestoccasion,theydroppeddead.Itwouldbeaworldwhichwouldbedifficulttomaintain.Onewouldconstantlyhavetore-createwholespecies.Weeasilyseenowwhy nature privileges supply of food over lack of food, health over illness, life overdeath, physical integrity over mutilation, and so on. This does not mean, though, that thesethingsaregoodsorevils.TheirstatusisjustaresultofthekindofworldGodcreated.Giventhiskindofworldwithlivingbeingsinit,itwouldnotbeagoodworldiflifeandhealthandtherestwerenot,otherthingsbeingequal,systematicallyfavoredovertheiropposites.Indeed,theStoicscallthem“preferred”things(pro gmena)andtheiroppo-sites“dispreferred”(aprogmena).3Buttobeapreferredthingisnottobeagoodthing.Afterall,thesepreferredthingscanbemisusedandwillbeofadvantagetotheirowneronlyifusedwisely.Soonewouldbeperfectly right tobelieve that it is agood thing to lookafterone'shealth.But there are twoways to believe this. One is to believe, as Plato generally andAristotle always does, thathealthisagoodandthereforeitisagoodthingtolookafterone'shealth.Theotherwayistobelievethathealthisapreferredthingandhencetobelievethatlookingafterone'shealth(asdistinct from health as such) is a good thing, since it contributes to the way the world issupposedtobe.4Therewillbeacorrespondingdifferenceinthedesireofreason,whichthebelief that it isagoodthingto lookafterone'shealthconstitutesorgivesrise to.In thefirstcase,itwillbeanirrationalappetite;inthesecondcase,itwillbeareasonablewilling.Now,ifwelookathowGodarrangedtheworld,weseethathehascreatedlivingthingsin

such a way that they largely manage to take care of themselves; they are self-maintainingsystems.Goddoesnothave tomaintain them;hehasarrangedthings insuchawaythat theymaintain themselves. As the complexity of the organism increases, this system of self-maintenance also becomes increasingly complex and sophisticated.Thus,whenwe come toanimals, they are constructed in such a way as to monitor their own state and have anawarenessofwhattheyneedtogetandwhattheyneedtoavoidtomaintainthemselves.Hence,when they encounter an object of a relevant kind in their environment, thiswill produce anagreeableordisagreeableimpressionintheanimal,andthisimpressioninturnwillcausetheanimaltomoveeithertowardstheobjectorawayfromit.5Sotheanimalisconstructedinsucha way that it, by and large, is made to do what it needs to do by the objects which areconduciveordetrimentaltoitsmaintenance.Inthecaseofhumanbeings,though,thearrangementisevenmoreingenious.Godconstructs

them in suchaway that theycan recognize for themselveswhat theyneed todo tomaintainthemselves (as long as they themselves are needed) and hencewillmaintain themselves oftheir own choice and understanding. He constructs them in such a way that they developreason,andwithreasonanunderstandingofthegood,andthuscometobemotivatedtodooftheirownaccordwhatneedstobedone.6So, insteadofconstructing theminsuchawaythattheyaremadetodowhattheyneedtodotomaintainthemselves,heconstructstheminsucha


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waythattheydothisoftheirowninitiativeandindeedcandoitwisely,showingpreciselythekindofwisdom,ingenuity,resourcefulness,andcreativityonasmallscale,namely,thescaleoftheirlife,whichGoddisplaysonalargescale.Inthisway,iftheyarewise,humanbeingsgenuinelycontribute to theoptimalorderof theworld,and theyfind their fulfillment in this.ThisiswhatthegoodlifefortheStoicsamountsto.Ifwenow lookbackat freedomas theexousiaautopragias, it shouldbeclear thatwhat

autopragiaherereferstoisourability,unlikeotheranimals',todothethingsthatneedtobedone,solelyguidedandmotivatedbyourownunderstandingof things,rather thanjustbeingmadetodothings.Andexousiaindicatesthatthisisaspecialgiftorprivilege.Foritanswersour naturalwish, oncewe come to have someunderstanding of theworld, that itwould bewonderfultobeabletoarrangethingsaswiselyandingeniouslyasGoddoes.Thiswishhasbeen granted in amodestway.We have been given the ability to arrange thingswithin thecontextofourlifewiselyandingeniously,resourcefullyandcreatively.Godhasleftittoourdiscretion how we wisely and ingeniously maintain ourselves. But there is the divine lawOrigenreferredto.Itispartoftheorderofthingsthatwehavethisability,thatwehavethisfreedom, only so long as we proceed wisely, in the way a wise person would do, inmaintainingourselves.Itwillbewise,ifweneedsomefood,togetthefoodweneed.Butitwillnotbewisetohavetwiceor thricetheamountoffoodweneed, tobecomeaddictedtofood, to enslave oneself to food. For then it will be the food which makes one eatcompulsively.Onewillhavelostone'sabilityofautopragia.ThereisanothertermwhichseemstobeofStoicoriginandreferstothisabilitytoactof

one's own initiative, namely, to autexousion. The term is twice found in the fragments ofMusoniusandthenmoreofteninEpictetus.ItcomestobeusedbyPlatonistsandPeripateticsbutalsofromJustinMartyronwardsveryfrequentlybyChristianauthors.7Notsurprisingly,thetermisoftentranslatedasifitmeant“havingafreewill.”But,strictlyspeaking,itjustreferstotheabilityofapersontodowhatneedstobedoneofhisowninitiative,ratherthanbeingmadetodoitororderedtodoit;itreferstothefreedomofthepersontoactasheseesfitinpursuitofthegood.Now,wealsohavetorememberthat,accordingtotheStoics,wearenotbornasrational

beings,thatwearenotbornwithreason.8Hencewearealsonotfreewhenwearebornbutfunctionlikeanimals,beingmadetodothings.So,whenitissaidthatwearecreatedfree,thismustmeanthatwearecreatedinsuchawaythatwewouldnaturallydevelopintofreeagents,aswedevelopreason.Sointhissenseallhumanbeingsarecreatedfree.Butitalsoturnsout,at least instandardStoicdoctrine, that,aswedevelopreasonundertheinfluenceofsociety,weimmediatelyespousefalsebeliefsaboutthevalueofthingsandthusenslaveourselves.9Soweneveractuallyare freebeforeenslavingourselves.For freedomrequires reason,and,aswe are acquiring reason, already in the process of acquiring itwe are enslaving ourselves.Thisiswhyonlythewisemaninfactisfree.One further point needs at least to be mentioned, though it deserves more detailed

consideration. It is clear from theStoicclaim thatonly thewiseare free, that freedom, likewisdomandvirtue,doesnotadmitofdegrees.10Ifyouadmitjustoneinappropriateattachment,you have lost your freedom.Ultimately, the reason for this is that the Stoics think all yourbeliefs,desires,andattitudesformonesystemandthattheinfluencewhichtheelementsinthis


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systemhaveonyouisinpartduetothepositiontheyhaveinthissystem,whichisdefinedbythelogicalrelationsbetweentheconstituentelements.Thus, ifyouaddafalsebelieftoyoursystem,itunderminesallthetruebeliefsyouhavewhichareincompatiblewiththefalsebelief.And if you add one inappropriate attachment, it undermines all the appropriate attachmentsincompatible with it. It affects your entire motivational system and thus the force of itsconstituentelements.Soevenyourbestmotivationalsysteminaparticularcasewillbetaintedbyyourinappropriateattachment,howeverlargethelogicaldistance,asitwere,betweenthetwomaybe.Yourwill,inordertobefree,hastobeabsolutelypure.Withthiswecanturntothefreedomofthewill.Forwenowhaveanotionofawillanda

notionoffreedom,andweneedtoseehowandwhythetwonotionscometobecombinedinthenotionofafreewill.

WehavenotedhowEpictetusadmonishesustoconcentratealloureffortsonourwill,onthewaywemake choices and decisions. The goodness or quality of people is amatter of thegoodnessorqualityoftheirwill(1.29.1).Tobegoodthewillhastobesuchthatitaccordswithnature, that is to say, ithas tobesuchas it is intended tobebynatureorGod.Butbynature,wearetold,thewillisintendedtobefree(1.4.18).Epictetusclaimsthathewishesittobehismainconcern,uptotheverylastmomentofhislife,thathiswillbefree(3.5.7).Whatisitforthewilltobefree?Epictetusexplainsagainandagainthatthisisamatterofthewill'snotbeingpreventedfrom

makingthechoicesitseesfit tomake,ofitsbeingimpossibletoforceit tomakeanychoiceother than itwouldwant tomake (1.12.9; 1.4.18; 3.5.7).There is no force or power in theworldwhichcanforceyourwillso longas it is free.Theplanetscannotforceyourchoice.Even God cannot take away your free will and force your choice (1.1.23). Nor, Epictetusexplains(3.3.8–10),wouldGodwant todoso.For,afterall,hehasgivenyouawillof thekindhehimselfhas,awillwhich,solongasitisfree,cannotbeforcedorhinderedinmakingchoices.The situation completely changes oncewe attach our hearts to things in theworld,makeourselvesdependentonthem,becomeaddictedtothem,enslaveourselvestothem.Thentheworldbeginstohaveanenormouspoweroverus,andwebegintoactundercompulsion.Webecomedependenton,orthevictimsof,thecoursetheoutsideworldtakesinpresentinguswithsupposedgoodsandevils.Soherewehaveourfirstactualnotionofafreewill.Itisanotionofawillsuchthatthere

isnopowerorforceintheworldwhichcouldpreventitfrommakingthechoicesoneneedstomaketoliveagoodlifeorforceittomakechoiceswhichwouldpreventusfromlivingagoodlife.Butitisanotionsuchthatnotallhumanbeingsinfacthaveafreewill.Theyareallmeantbynaturetohaveafreewill, that is,eachhumanbeingiscapableofhavingafreewill.Buthuman beings become compulsive about things and thus lose their freedom.Hence only thewisepersonhasafreewill.11Togetcleareraboutthisparticularnotionofafreewill,ifwerememberourgeneralschema

foranotionofafreewill(seechapter1,p.7),wehavetoclarifyonefurtherdetail.Wearefree tomake thechoicesweneed tomake to liveagood life,unlessweenslaveourselves,becausetheworldisnotsuchthatthereareanyforcesorpowerswhichcanforceourchoices,solongasweretainthefreedomofthewill.But,wehavetoask,doesnotGodconstrainwhat


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wecandoandatleastinthisindirectway,ifnotdirectly,constrainwhatwecanchoose?Howcanwebefreetochoosewhatwecouldreasonablywanttochooseorevenwhatwewouldneedtochoosetohaveagoodlife,ifGodhaspredeterminedallalongwhatisgoingtohappenand hence alsowhatwe are going to do?How can thewill be free, if all our actions arepredetermined?Only ifwe pursue this question in some detailwillwe get at some furthermassiveassumptionswhichunderliethisfirstnotionofthefreewill.TheStoicsassumethateverybodyiseitherwiseandfreeorfoolishandenslaved.Thecase

ofthefoolishperson,becausehiswillisnotfree,ashehasenslavedhimself,isnotaproblem.Still, it isworthourwhilebriefly toconsider it.Thepersonwho is foolishwilldo foolishthingsorwilldotherightthingsbutforfoolishreasons.Whatwehavetofocusonhereiswhatthe fool actually does in theworld,what happens in theworld.We have to set aside, as adifferentproblem,howitcanbepartofthebestpossibleworldthatfoolishthingsgetdone,forinstance,thatsomebodykillssomebodyfornogoodreasonandthattherearefoolishpeople.But,given that the foolishpersondoesnothavea freewill,heposesnoproblemforGod'sarrangingtheworldasheseesfit,sofaraswhathappensintheworldisconcerned.Whetheritispartofthedivineplanthatthefoolishpersondoessomethingfoolishorwhetheritispartoftheplanthatthepersondoessomethingwhichisnotfoolish,Godhaswaystobringthisabout,giventhatthepersondoesnothaveafreewill.Godjusthastosetupthecircumstancesinsuchawaythatthepersonwillbeforcedtodowhatheismeanttodo.Ifitdoesnotfitthedivineplanthatthefoolishpersondoessomething,whetheritisfoolishornotfoolish,Godhasonlytosetupthecircumstancesinsuchawaythateitherthefoolishpersoninthesecircumstanceshasnomotivationtodowhatheisnotmeanttodoor,thoughheismotivatedtodowhatheisnotmeanttodo,circumstancesinterferewithhiscarryingoutwhatheismotivatedtodoandhencetriestodo.Thefoolishpersongoesouttodosomething,butheisrunover(letussay)byacar.Now,ifweturntothewiseperson,thesituationisradicallydifferent,sincehiswillisfree.

Inhiscase,toensurethattheworldproceedsaccordingtothedivineplansothatitwillbethebestpossibleworld,Godcannotsimplysetupthecircumstancesinsuchawaythatthepersonwillbeforcedtoactinthedesiredway.ButGoddoesnothavetodoanythingtobringaboutthewiseandfreeperson'scompliance.Foritispartofthewisdomofthatpersontoknowthegoodthingtodoinagivencircumstanceandtobemotivatedtodoit,givenhisattachmenttothegood.AndsincethegoodthingtodoinagivencircumstanceiswhatnaturemeansonetodoorwhatGodwillsonetodo,thewisepersonwilldowhat,accordingtothedivineplan,heismeanttodo,namely,thebestpossiblethingtodointhissituation.SoGodwilldonothingtothwartthewiseperson'sactionorpreventitfrombeingcarriedout.Actions like this are the only free actions which ever occur out there in the world, as

opposedtothingswhichhappeninourminds.Butweneedtolookmorecloselyathowtheyareexplained.Theyaremotivatedbyanunderstandingandanattachmenttothegood,meaningthewiseorderoftheworld,andtherecognitioninaparticularsituationthat,tocontributetoand to maintain this order, a certain course of action will be the most appropriate. Suchunderstandingandrecognition,atleastinthispureform,wouldnotbepossibleifthewillwerenotfree.Forone'sattachmenttothingsotherthanthegoodwouldblurone'srecognitionofthebestthingtodoinagivencircumstance.Sothewisepersonissolelymotivatedbyhiscorrect


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understandingofthegoodandhisattractiontoit.Whathechoosesordecidestodo,becauseitisthebestthingtodo,iswhatGodwillshimtodo.However,hisactionisnotmotivatedbywhatGodwillsbutbyhisrecognitionandunderstandingthatthisisthebestthingtohappeninthesecircumstances.And,becauseGodhimselfalsoseesthatthisisthebestthingtohappeninthese circumstances,Godwills it to happen. So thewise person'swill and the divinewillcoincide.ButitisnotthecasethatwhatmotivatesafreeactionisthatGodwillsit.Thingsarecomplicated,however,bythefactthathumanwisdomislimited.Eventhewise

personisnotomniscient.Eventhewiseperson,thoughhewillhaveagoodunderstandingofthenaturalorderofthings,throughnofaultofhisownisofteninaconcretesituationwherehewillnotknowthebestthingtohappenandwhythiswouldbeso.Eventhewisepersonisoftenlimitedtoconjecture.Thushemightstill lookafterhishealth,when,accordingto thedivineplan,heisalreadyabouttodie.Butthewisepersonwillrecognizefromthefutilityofhisbesteffortstorestorehisfailinghealththatheisabouttodie.Hestillmightnotunderstandwhyitwouldbethebestthingforhimtodiesoon.Inthiscase,hewillassumethatitmustbethewillof God that he die soon, and he will act accordingly. He will want to die, because herecognizesthatthisiswhatGodwills.ButagainitisnotthesheerrecognitionofGod'swillwhichmakeshimwilltodie.Itis,rather,hiscountingonthefactthattherearegoodreasonswhyGodwillshimtodie,albeitreasonswhichhehimselfcannotclearlyidentify.Itisagainstthis background that we have to understand Epictetus's repeated remarks that our willingshouldaccordwithGod'swill,thatweshouldwillwhatGodwills.12Butletusreturntofreeaction.Thisisaccountedforintermsofafreechoiceofthewill.

Doesthismeanthatthefreechoiceofthewilldoesnothaveanyexplanation?Notatall.Thefreeagentfreelygivesassent,freelychoosestogiveassenttotheimpressionthatitwouldbeagoodthingtoactinthiswayinthissituation.Andthereisanexplanationforthischoice.Itliesin the fact that theagentunderstandswhy itwouldbeagood thing toact in thisway in thissituationandhe isutterlyattached to thegood. Is thereanexplanationfor thisunderstandingandthisattachment?Yes,thereisanexplanationintermsofantecedentcausesofhowtheagentcametohavethisunderstandingandattachment.Itisastorywhichgoesbacktothebirthofthepersonandbeyond,asfaraswecaretotraceit.Buthow,inthiscase,canthechoiceofthepersonbesaidtobefree?Atthispointweagainhavetostepbackalittlebit.Already,accordingtoChrysippus,who

didnotyethaveanotionoffreewill,weareresponsibleforwhatwedoifouractionhasitsorigin in the fact thatwe give assent to the appropriate impression.13The fact that we giveassent,ratherthanrefusetogiveassent,reflectsonusinsuchawaythatweareresponsibleforwhatwedid.Chrysippusinsiststhatwecannotsaythattheimpressionofanobject,howevertemptingitmaybe,necessitatesourassenttoit,andhenceourchoice.Forhumannatureisnotsuchthatanyhumanbeing,justbecauseheisahumanbeing,willgiveassenttotheimpression.Itisnotalawofhumannature,asitwere,togiveassenttothissortofimpression.Weknowthis becauseother humanbeingsmaynot give assent to such an impression.So, if yougiveassent,itmustbebecauseyouarethepersonyouare.Henceitisuptoyoutogiveassentornotinthesensethatitdependsonyou,onthekindofpersonyouare,whetheryougiveassent.Andthe claim that the impression does not necessitate your assent is backed up by a bit ofChrysippeanmodallogic.Chrysippusdefinespossibilityinsuchawaythatastatementofthe


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form“ItispossiblethatAisF”istrue,preciselyifthenatureofAdoesnotexcludeitsbeingF,and if the circumstances inwhichA finds itself donot preventA frombeingF.14Hence, incertaincircumstancesyougiveassenttothisimpression,itisalsopossibleforyounottogiveassent to this impression. For human nature does not exclude your not giving assent to theimpression,aswecanseebecauseotherhumanbeingsdonotassenttothissortofimpression.Nor are the circumstances such as to prevent a human being from not giving assent to thisimpression.So, inanycase, theassent thepersongivestoanimpressionisnotnecessitated,given that, on this notion of possibility, it is possible for the person not to give assent andhencenottoactinthisway.But, having moved beyond Chrysippus, we now also, in addition to the notion of

necessitation,havethenotionofbeingforced.Giventhisnotion,weshallsaythattheassentofthepersonwhosewillisnotfree,thoughitisnotnecessitated,isneverthelessforced.Apersonwhodoesnothaveafreewillisforcedtoassent;iftheappropriateobjectofdesireshowsup,itprovokestheappropriatekindofimpressionwhichwillmaketheagentassenttoit.Hereisacausalsequencewithalawlikeregularity.Butthecaseofthefreepersonisentirelydifferent.Anyobjectmayshowup;itmayproduceanimpressioninhim,butthisimpressionisnotgoingtoforcehimtogiveassent.Forwehavealreadyseenthatwhatmakeshimgiveassentisnottheimpressionbuthisunderstandingthatitwouldbebesttopursueortoavoidtheobject,andhisattachmenttothegood.But,ifthisiswhatmakeshimgiveassent,whyshouldwenotsaythatitforceshimtogiveassent,sothatthefreeperson'sassentisasmuchforcedastheunfreeperson's?Todosowouldbehighlymisleading.Tobeginwith,theunfreeperson'sassentisforcedby

the impression, whereas the free person's assent, if at all forced, is not forced by theimpression.Itisbroughtabout,rather,bythefreeperson'sunderstandingandinsight.Thefreepersoncouldnot,giventhisunderstandingandinsight,chooseotherwise,exceptbysacrificinghisrationality,whichheisnotpreparedtodo.Somebodywhoisperfectlyrationalwillsimplychoosethisway.Wecan,ofcourse,saythatsomebodywhoacceptscertainpremisesandseesthatacertainconclusionfollowsfromthemisforcedtoaccepttheconclusiononpainofgivingup his rationality. But this sense of forced is entirely different from the sense inwhich theunfreeperson'sassentisforced.Whatismore,thissenseofforceddoesnotstandinthewayofsayingthatapersonwhoisfreehasawillwhichisfreetochoosewhatonewouldreasonablychoose,thatistosay,isinnowayhindered,hampered,orpreventedfrommakingthechoiceswhichonewouldreasonablywanttomake.Hisunderstandingandhisinsightmightmakethefree person choosewhat he does, but they certainly do not prevent himor hinder him frommakingthereasonablechoiceorforcehimtomakeachoicewhichisnotreasonable.We can explain the free person's understanding and insight in a similarway, in terms of

antecedentcauses,for instance,ofhiscomingtohavecertain truebeliefs.Thesetruebeliefswerenotforcedonthisperson,nordidhishavingthesetruebeliefsforcethisunderstandingonhim. Indeed, there is a long story, beginningwith theperson's birth,which explainshowhecametohavethesetruebeliefsandhowhecametohavethisunderstanding.Itis,intheancientunderstanding,acausalstory.Butitdoesnotinvolvereferencetoanyforcewhichwouldmakeus question whether the choice of the free person was free, given that it had this chain ofantecedentcauses.


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Butbeforeweturntothisstory,wehavetotakeintoaccountanotherfact.Bythetimewecome to Epictetus, it is thought that there are three crucial factors involved in one's birth,namely, human nature, one's individual nature and constitution, and the circumstances intowhichoneisborn.15Now,iftheStoicswanttoassumethatallhumanbeingsarefreebynature,theymustalsoassumethatnoneofthesefactorsissuchthatit,separatelyorinconjunctionwiththe others, will prevent us from developing in such a way as to have the insight and theunderstandingittakestomaketherightchoices.ThisisasubstantialassumptionaboutGod'screation.Godmust set thingsup in such away that neitherhumannaturenorour individualnaturenor thecircumstances intowhichweareborn,either separatelyor jointly,preventusfrombecomingwiseand free. Indeed, theStoicsnotonlyassume this, theyalsoassume thatGodsetsthingsupinsuchawaythatweall,inthecourseofournaturaldevelopment,couldacquire the understanding and the insight to make the right choices. God constructs humanbeingsinsuchawaythattheycouldnaturallyacquiretruebeliefs.ItisnotthatGodconstructshumanbeingssoastohavebeliefs,anditjustsoturnsoutthat

someofthemarefalseandsomeofthemaretrue.Rather,Godconstructshumanbeingsinsuchawaythatwearehighlysensitive to truthandpredisposedtoformbeliefs thatarenaturallytrue.Henceourhavingthetruebeliefswehavedoesnotrequireanexplanation,thoughwecanspecify the mechanisms by means of which we come to have them. What does requireexplanationisourhavingfalsebeliefs.Theymustbeduetothefactthatsomethingwentwrong,interferingwiththenaturalprocesswhichwouldhaveledtoourhavingjusttruebeliefs.AndtheStoics identifywhatwentwrongwith our giving assent to a false impression,whenweshouldgiveassentonlytothosetrueimpressionswhicharerecognizablytrue.Moreover,weare constructed in suchaway that, oncewehave the appropriate truebeliefs,wewill alsonaturally come to have sufficient understanding of the world and thereby a sufficientunderstandingofthegood,soastobeattractedbyitandmaketherightchoices.Again,whatneedsanexplanationisnothowwegetthere,thoughonecanspecifythemechanismsinvolved.Whatneedsanexplanationiswhywedonotgetthere,becausesomethinghasgonewrong.Andtheansweragainisthatweourselvesabortthisnaturaldevelopmentbybeingrash,careless,orimpatientinthewaywegiveassent.Here,then,wehave,forthefirsttimeinhistory,anotionofafreewill,awillwhichisnot

forced in its choices and decisions and hence is free tomake the right choices. It is not anabilitytomakechoiceswhichnosanepersonwouldwanttomake.Butweshouldnotethatitisdeeply embedded in a theory which makes massive assumptions about the world, aboutourselves, andaboutourposition in theworld.Theassumptionsaboutourselvesaremainlyembodiedinthenotionofthewill.ButthereisinadditiontheassumptionthattheworlddowntothesmallestdetailisgovernedbyagoodandprovidentGodandthatthisGod,increatingtheworld,hasmadesurethatneitherhumannaturenorourindividualnatureandconstitutionnorthecircumstancesintowhichweareborn,northeconjunctionofthesethreefactors,wouldpreventusfromdevelopinginsuchawayastobeabletomaketherightchoicesanddecisionsin our life.He has also arranged things in such away that, unlesswe are going to enslaveourselves,noforceorpowerintheworldcanforceourwillnottomaketherightchoices,notevenGodhimself.Thesearemassiveandpowerfulassumptionswhichonewoulddowellatleasttoquestionandwhichcertainlywerenotsharedbyeverybodyinantiquity.Thiscaninno


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waybeanordinarynotionwhicheverybodyhadhadallalong.Howsubstantialitiswecanseefromthefactthat,consideredinhindsight,Aristotle'sview

isincompatiblewiththeassumptionthathumanbeingsbynaturehaveafreewilloratleastthisnotionofafreewill.For,inAristotle'sview,manyhumanbeingsarebarredbytheirnaturalconstitutionandthecircumstancesintowhichtheyarebornfromeverhavingafreewill.Wealso immediately seewhy thiswas acceptable forAristotle, and to a lesser extent for laterPeripatetics, but would not be acceptable for Stoics. Unlike the Stoics, Aristotle did notbelieveinabenevolentGodwhoseprovidencereachesdowntothesmallestdetails.FortheStoicsthethoughtthathumanbeingsbybirthmightbeexcludedfromfreedom,wisdom,andagoodlifewasintolerable.ButforAristotlethiswasperfectlyacceptable.Afterall,Aristotlewas evenwilling to justify the social institution of slavery on the ground thatmany humanbeingsbynatureareslaves.16WhileheinsistsonthegoodnessoftheworldandtheclaimthatGodisthesourceofthisgoodness,17Aristotlealsoseemstothinkthat thegoodorderof theworld naturally starts to give out at the point where the details are too trivial to affect itsgoodnessoverall.

Oncewehaveisolatedtheassumptionsandconcernswhichgiverisetothisfirstnotionofafreewillandthequestionsitwasmeanttohelpusanswer,wehavetoaskwhetherthesearetheassumptions,concerns,andquestionsweourselveshaveandhencewhetherwehaveanyneedforsuchanotion.Atfirstsightitmightseemthattheanswerprettyclearlywouldhavetobenegative.Butonfurtherreflection itseemstomethat,evensettingasideallassumptions,concerns,andquestionswhichwemightthinkbelongtoabygoneage,therearetwoideasweshouldnotthrowoutwithoutgivingthemfurtherthought.Thefirstideaisthis.Clearly,theStoicsthinkweshallnotunderstandhumanbeingsunless

weassumenotonlythattheyareguidedinwhattheydobywhattheytaketobethetruthbutalsothattheyareconstructedinawaythatmakesthemhighlysensitivetothetruth.Thatistosay, they are pretty good at discriminatingwhat is true and in understandingwhy it is true.HencetheStoicsbelievethatideallywewouldbeguidedinwhatwedonotjustbywhatwetaketobethetruthbutbyourknowledgeandunderstandingofwhattheworldisactuallylike,bywhat the truthactually is.Whatstands in thewayof this,according to theStoics,are thefalse beliefs and misguided attitudes which we individually have about things. Because ofthesefailingswemakechoiceswhicharenotsolelydeterminedbytheactual truthabout theworldbutingoodpartbyourfalsebeliefsandourmisguidedattitudes.ItseemsfairtosaythattheStoicnotionofafreewillisthenotionofanabilitytomakechoiceswhichareresponsivetohow things are, not distortedby falsebeliefs andmisguided attitudesor by fantasies andwishfulthinking.Thisideadoesnotseemhopeless.Thesecondideaisthis.TheStoicsbelieve,justlikeAristotleand,Itakeit,Plato,thatthere

isnoclosedsetofgeneralrulesortruthssuchthat,ifonlyyouknewthem,youcoulddeducefromthemtherightthingtodoinanygivensituation.18Whatthereisconsists,inprinciple,ofan open set of general truths, ofwhich youmay know any number. In a given situation thenumberyouknowwillsuffice todeterminewhat is theright thingtodo.Soin thissensethesituationwillnotposeaproblem.But,becausethesetinprincipleisopen,youmayoften,ifyouarewise,getintoasituationwheretherelevanttruthsyouknowdonotsufficetoenable


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you tomakeachoicewhichdoes justice to the situation.Nevertheless thewisepersonwillmaketherightchoice.Andhewillbeabletoexplainthischoiceinawaywhichwillsatisfyany reasonablepersonbyadding to the setofgeneral truthswhichguidehisbehavior somefurther truth or truths, thus enriching the repertory of relevant considerations. Solving theproblem he is facing in this way requires precisely the kind of ingenuity, creativity,thoughtfulness, and insight which the Stoic wise person wants to display in his actions, inimitationofGod.Andthisidea,thatawillisfreeifitcanmakesuchchoices,doesnotseemtometobehopeless,either.


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CHAPTERSIX

PlatonistandPeripateticCriticismsandResponses

If we now look at how the Stoic notion of a free will was received by the Stoics'contemporaries, wemight think that, given themassive assumptions involved, it would nothavemuchchance tobeacceptedatall.But it turnsout thatChristians justafter the timeofEpictetuswerebeginning toarticulate theirbeliefs inwhat they themselvesoften thoughtof,andcalled,anewphilosophy.Forthemostparttheyfoundtheseassumptionshighlycongenial.Almost immediately, with somemodifications they adopted the Stoic notion of a freewill.Thereisnodoubtthatthebeliefinafreewillbecamesowidespread,indeedforalongtimealmostuniversal,thankstotheinfluenceofChristianity.But we shall have occasion to consider this in detail when we discuss Origen and

Augustine.FornowIwillrestrictmyselftoaconsiderationoftheStoics'mainphilosophicalrivals, thePlatonistsandthePeripatetics.Theywerepreparedtoaccept,aswehaveseen,anotionofawill.Theywerealsopreparedtoacceptanotionoffreedomand,withagreatdealmorehesitation,thelanguageofafreewill.Buttheywerenotpreparedtoacceptmanyoftheassumptions which went with this notion in Stoicism. So these rivals had at best a highlymodifiednotionofafreewill.ThemainstumblingblockwastheStoicdoctrineoffateandanall-encompassingdivineprovidence,or,asweregularlyputthematter,theStoicassumptionofauniversaldeterminism.To understand the ensuing disputewe have to go back a long time before therewas any

notion of a freewill. The dispute started as a debate aboutwhether it can be said that ouractionsareuptous(eph'h min),orinourpower,ifthey,likeeverythingelsewhichhappensintheworld,aredeterminedbyfate.Andforthemostpart itcontinuedtobeadebateaboutthispoint.But theStoics' opponents completelydisregarded thedistinctive featuresofStoicdeterminism,treatingitasifitwerethekindofdeterminismEpicurushadrejected(seep.12).Inparticular,theypaidnoattentiontotheprobablyChrysippeandistinctionbetweenanactionwhichisfree(autopragia),andanactionwhich,thoughnotfree,wearestillresponsibleforbecauseitwasuptoustodoitornottodoitandwhichdependedforitsgettingdoneonourbeingthissortofperson.Presumably, the opponents disregarded these particular features of Stoic determinism,

becausetheyallrejecteduniversaldeterminismassuch,andsotheparticularforminwhichitFrede, Michael. A Free Will : Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought, edited by A. A. Long, University of California Press, 2011. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/asulib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=631055.Created from asulib-ebooks on 2019-08-17 06:35:29.

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camedidnot seem tomattermuch.Also, theparticular featuresofStoicdeterminismaresotiedupwithspecificallyStoicbeliefs,whichtheopponentswouldrejectanyway,thattheysawlittlereasontopayparticularattentiontothem.Finally,becausetheStoicsthemselvesadmittedthat there are practically no wise people, the distinction between free actions and forcedactions,whichweareneverthelessresponsiblefor,seemedratheracademic.ForallpracticalpurposestheStoicsseemedtoclaimthat,thoughouractions(inasmuchaswearefools)arenotfree but forced by fate through the external objects of our desire, we are neverthelessresponsible for these actions. That is because, being the peoplewe have become,we gaveassenttothecorrespondingimpressions.Theopponentsfoundthisobjectionable.Theyarguedthatitwasamisuseofthenotionsof“uptous”(eph'h min)or“inourpower”

(innostrapotestate)toapplythemtocaseswhereourassentisforced.AndtheyclaimedthatthisStoicsenseof“uptous”wastooweaktojustifyattributionofresponsibilitytoaperson.Forhowcanapersonbeheldresponsibleforsomethingthepersonisforcedtodo?We can already seewhich direction the debatewas bound to take. The opponents of the

Stoicswouldtry tospecifyastrongernotionofwhat isuptous,whichin theirviewwouldjustifyourattributionofresponsibilitytoaperson.Butintheend,toelucidatetheirnotionofaresponsibleaction,theywouldintroducenotionsoffreedom,freeaction,andfreewill,whichinonesensearemuchweakerthanthecorresponding,incrediblystrong,Stoicnotions.Ifwetrytotracethedebate,wecanfollowitfromCarneades'time,thatis,themiddleofthe

secondcenturyB.C.1 Itneeds tobesaid, though, thatourevidenceconcerning thisdebate isextremelymeageruntilwecometoAlexanderofAphrodisiasattheendofthesecondcenturyA.D.OurmainpieceofevidenceforCarneadesand the interveningperiod isCicero'sshortworkDefato,which,moreover,isextantonlyinahighlymutilatedform.OntheevidenceofCicero, it seems thatCarneades tried todopreciselywhat theopponentshad todo,namely,giveanew,alternativeaccountofwhatit isforsomethingtobeuptous,whichmadethisastrongernotion.In considering Carneades' account, we have to keep in mind that he was an Academic

skeptic,andthatthekindofAcademicskepticismheespousedexcludesthepossibilitythathehimselfendorsedhisaccount.Thiswaspartofadialecticalargument toneutralizewhateverinclinationonemayhavetoaccepttheStoicaccountandsowasofferedasanequallyviablealternative. According to Cicero (XI. 23), Carneades criticized Epicurus for introducing amotion without a cause, namely, the swerve of the atoms. In common parlance, Carneadesargues, we do say that something happens without a cause or even that somebody wantssomethingordoesnotwantsomethingwithoutacause.Butthisisjustamannerofspeaking.Whatwemeanisthatthereisnoexternalantecedentcauseforwhatoneisdoing.Thisdoesnotmeanthatthereisnocauseatall.Thereisalwaysacause.Itisjustthatsometimesthecauseisinternal.Forinstance,inthecaseofatomsitistruethattheydonotneedanexternalantecedentcause tomove, let us say, somethingwhichgives thema push; rather, they canmove all bythemselves. But this motion, when they move by themselves, is not without a cause andexplanationaltogether.Thecauseliesinthenatureoftheatom,whichissuchthattheatomcanmovebyitself,onaccountofitsweight.And,Carneadescontinues,accordingtoCicero(XI.25),theresimilarlyarevoluntarymotionsofthesoul.Thesearenotmotionswhichhavetheirexplanationinsomeantecedentexternalcausebutinsomeinternalcause.


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Now,giventheanalogyoftheatoms,Ciceroissurelywrongwhenheidentifiesthisinternalcauseasthenatureofthesevoluntarymotions.Giventheanalogyoftheatoms,Carneadesmusthave said that these voluntary motions have their origin in the nature of the soul or theorganism. It is easy to see what his point must have been. The nature of the soul or theorganismissuchthat,iftheorganismisdepleted,itwillwanttohavesomethingtoeatordrinkandhencewillgotolookforsomethingtoeatordrink.If,ontheotherhand,theorganismissatiated,itnaturallywillnotwanttohavesomethingtoeatordrink,and,accordingly,itwillnotgoouttolookforsomething.Sotheorganism'sorthesoul'swantingtohavesomethingtoeat and its going to get something to eat are not due to any external antecedent cause, anappetizingobjectoutthere,whichmakesitwanttohavesomethingtoeat.In trying to interpret these remarks, we should not be misled by Cicero's term motus

voluntarii.Thisexpressiondoesnotrefertoawill,letaloneafreewill,whichcausesthesemotions.Forwearetoldwhatcausesthem:thenatureofthesoulortheorganism.Iftheyarecalledvoluntary(IpresumetheGreekwouldbehekousioi),itisbecausetheyarenotproducedby an external, antecedent cause and in this sense forced on us. They are produced by thenatureoftheorganism.Andtheyareinthatsenseuptous(seeCicero'sexpressioninnostrapotestate).Ifweneedsomethingtoeat,ournatureissuchthatwewillwanttohavesomethingtoeatandwillgoandgetsomethingtoeat;ifwedonotneedsomethingtoeat,ournatureissuchthatwewillnotwanttohavesomethingtoeat,andwewillnotmove.2But,toreturntoCarneades,havingaroughideaofhisdialecticalposition,wenexthaveto

see how this is supposed to constitute a challenge toChrysippus's view.Thewaywe havecharacterized theStoic view, as described inCicero'sDefato and thewayCarneadeswillhave understood it, is this: An appetizing object is out there; this object is an external,antecedentcause,foritevokesinusanagreeableimpression;thistooisanantecedentcause,foritevokesinusanassenttotheimpression;andweareresponsible,because,giventhesortofpersonweare,wegiveassent,whetherwecanhelpitornot.Carneades cleverly shifts the Chrysippean paradigm.3 Having already, in reference to

Epicurus,drawnacleardistinctionbetweenforcedandnaturalmotionsofatoms,heseemstoassumesimilarlythatthemotusvoluntariiofthesoulortheorganismaretobecontrastedwithforcedmotions,meaningmotionscausedbyanexternalantecedentcause.WhereasChrysippushadsaidthatgivingassenttotheappropriateimpressionmakesallensuingactionsuptousorin our power,Carneades distinguishes between those actions inwhich assent is forced andthoseinwhichassenthasitsorigininournature,namely,thoseinstancesinwhichitisnaturalfor us towant a certain kind of object.He thus considerably restricts the scope ofwhat ishekousion, or voluntary, and thereby reduces the scopeofwhatwe are responsible for, notonly in comparison with Chrysippus but also in comparison with Aristotle. In effect,Carneades allows for psychological compulsion to be exculpating in a way it was not forAristotle.In this way Carneades also narrows the notion of what is up to us, in relation to both

AristotleandChrysippus.WhenAristotlehadsaidthatyoucanonlychoosetodowhatitisuptoyoutodoornottodo,whathehadinmindwassimplythatinthesecasestheworldissuchthatitdependsentirelyonyou,iscompletelyinyourcontrol,whethersomethinggetsdoneornot done. For this it was entirely irrelevant whether you were or were not under such


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psychologicalcompulsionthatyoucouldnotbutchoosetodowhatyoudid.Allthatmatteredwasthatitwouldnotgetdoneunlessyoudidit.ButthisisnowruledoutbyCarneades.Forsomethingtobeuptoyou,tobeinyourpower,youmustnotbeunderthespelloftheobjectofyourdesire.Andthiscorrespondinglynarrowsdownthenotionofachoice.Younowhaveachoiceonlyifyouarenotcompelledtowantsomething.ButthereisstillnosigninCarneadesofanotionofawilloranotionoffreedomoranotionoffreewill.ThingsaredifferentwhenwenowmakeajumpandlookatAlexanderofAphrodisiasatthe

endof thesecondcenturyA.D.4BothCarneadesandChrysippus, it seems,had regarded thenotionofwhatisuptousandthenotionofthevoluntary(hekousion)ascoextensive,exceptthat Carneades had limited both notions by excluding actions done under psychologicalcompulsion.InthecaseofAlexander,wehaveaphilosopherwhocanlookbackonmorethantwocenturiesofseriousandalmostscholasticstudyofAristotlebyphilosopherswhoregardhimasanauthority.Aristotle,aswehaveseen(p.26),clearlydistinguishesbetweenwhatwedoofourownaccord(hekontes)andwhatwedobychoice,becauseitisuptous.Hence,ofcourse, Alexander will also insist on this distinction, which non-Peripatetics by now hadforgottenandwereeasilyconfusedabout.ThuswefindAlexanderdrawingthedistinctioninapassagewehavelookedatbefore(DefatoXIV,p.183,2yff;seep.57).Butnowweshouldnotethathecharacterizesanactionasvoluntary(hekousion)ifitisduetoanunforcedassent(abiastossynkatathesis)toanimpression.ThisisclearlyCarneades'notionofthevoluntary.Furthermore Alexander proceeds to characterize “what is up to us” (to eph' h min) morenarrowly,asamatterofassentbasedonarationalevaluationofone'simpression.Hence,forAlexander,something'sbeinginourpowerinvolvesnotonly,asinCarneades,ourassent'snotbeingforced,italsoinvolvesacriticalscrutinyofourimpression.Alexander's argument against the Stoics crucially relies on the claim that, given their

doctrineof fate, they abuse thenotionof “what is up tous”bydisregarding the fact that, ifsomethingisuptous,itshappeningornothappeningcannotalreadybesettledbythestateoftheworld;inthisregardtheyrelyonAristotle'sviewofchoice.Buthealsoarguesthat,sincetheStoicsusethenotionof“whatisuptous”evenwhenassentisforced(as,accordingtotheStoics,itinvariablyis,solongaswearefools),theyaremisusingtheexpression“uptous”(De fato XXXVIII, p. 211, 27ff) and doing away with freedom (to eleutheron). In thisconnectionAlexanderrepeatedlyalsousesthetermautexousion.Histreatisealmostendswiththeremarkthatapersonisincharge(kyrios)ofonlythoseactionsofwhichhehimself(autos)also has the power (exousia) not to do them. So Alexander explicitly makes freedom acondition for voluntariness and thus for responsibility. In fact, he does so in the sentencereferredtointheverytermstheStoicsusetodefinefreedom.Hetherebyalsomakesfreedomacondition forwhat is up to us.This freedom, though, is not the freedomof theStoics.Thatfreedompresupposesthatnothingwhatsoevercanforceone'sassent.Thisiswhyonlythewisemanisfreeandwhy,asAlexandernotes(DefatoXXVIII,p.199,i6ff),fortheStoicsonlyoneor twopeoplehaveeverbeenwise and free. In contrast,Alexander's freedom isof amorelimitedkind.Forhimitsufficesthatoverasufficientlylargerangeofobjectswhichwetrytoattainoravoid,ouractionisnotcompelledbythem,andthatourassent,insuchcases,isnotforced.Thenotionoffreedominvolvedhereisarelativeone.Toberesponsibleforgoingaftera


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certainobjectofdesire,onemustbefreerelativetothatobjectofdesire.Thereis,ofcourse,nothinginthenotionoffreedomthatAlexanderisusingwhichwouldpreventsomebodyfrombeingfreerelativetoallobjectsofdesire.ThenwewouldhaveawillwhichisentirelyfreeinAlexander's sense of free. But this is not the Stoic sense of free. For in the Stoic sense offreedom,anyinappropriateattachmentwoulddepriveyouoffreedomaltogether.Nevertheless,onemight think thatAlexander's notionwasmore realistic in that it allowed for degrees ofbeingfree.Whatismoreproblematicishowhetriestogivepositivecontenttohisnotionoffreedom.If

wearenotforcedbytheobjectofdesiretogoafterthatobject,whatarewepositivelyfreetodo?HereagainAlexanderreliesonAristotle'snotionthatsomethingisuptousifwhetheritgetsdoneentirelydependsonus.5Butthisclaimadmitsoftwointerpretations.WealreadysawinthecaseofAristotlethatthefactthatitisuptoyoutodoornottodosomethingdoesnotmeanthatyouhaveachoice.Itmeansthatyoucanchoosetodosomethingbutcanalsofailtochoosetodoit,andfailingtochoosetodosomethingdoesnotmeanthatyouchoosenottodoit. Yet Alexander now, in explicating his notion of freedom, seems to understand freedompreciselyinthissense:youcanchoosetodoit,andyoucanalsochoosenottodoit.In trying to explicate this, Alexander seems to be driven into a hopeless tangle. He is

perfectlyawarethat,accordingtoAristotle,thevirtuouspersoncannotchooseotherwise.Thisiswhatitistobevirtuous,tohavenotraceofamotivationlefttoactotherthanvirtuously.SoAlexanderrecurstothefactthattherewasapointbeforethevirtuouspersonwasvirtuousatwhichhecouldhavechosenotherwise.Butthishastheconsequencethatnowhumanfreedom,ifitinvolvestheabilitytochooseotherwise,lookslikeasignofhumanweakness,aninferenceactuallydrawnbyafollowerofAlexander's,theauthoroftheMantissa(chapterXXII).6 It isclear, at least in part, what motivates Alexander's position. He is so eager to rejectdeterminismthathenotonlywantstorejectdeterminismfromtheoutsideintheformofobjectswhichforceourassent.Healsowantstorejectdeterminismfromtheinside.Andso,promptedby aStoic claim to the contrary, he iswilling to claim that under identical conditions, bothinternalandexternal,thatistosay,underthesameexternalcircumstancesandthesameinternalconditions of the mind, it is still possible to choose and to act otherwise (De fato 192,22ff).7Herewe have comevery close toDihle's favored notion of awillwhich decides orchoosesinsomemysteriouswaythatisindependentnotonlyoftheexternalobjectsofdesirebutalsoofthedesiresandbeliefsoftheperson.8Iaminclinedtothink,though,thatAlexander'spositionisalsotheresultofwhatItaketobe

another confusion. Alexander lived in an age in which there was an enormous concern forjustice, a concern that each getwhat he deserves, instead of some gettingwhat they do notdeserveandmostnotgettingwhattheydeserve.WhenwegobacktoAristotle,responsibility,praise,blame,reward,andpunishmentwerenotamatterofdesertinthewaythiscametobeunderstoodlater.Aristotle'sidea,likeChrysippus's, isclearlythatwetakesomebodytotaskforwhathe isdoing,becausewewant tochangehismotivation.For thispurpose it isquiteirrelevanthowthepersoncametobe thusmotivatedorwhetherhecouldhavehelpedbeingthusmotivated.WehavetokeepinmindthatAristotle'snotionofresponsibilityalsoappliestochildrenandtoanimals.Andwesurelyarenotconcernedaboutwhethertheanimalhadmuchchoiceindoingwhatitdid.Weareconcernedthatithasstillnotlearneditslesson.Wedonot


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askhowitcameaboutthatithasfailedtodoso.Wegiveitanotherlesson.Weencourageanddiscourageanimals,children,andgrown-upsforaslongasitisappropriate.Thatisnolongerappropriateforthepersonwhoiswiseandvirtuous,whohaslearnedhislesson,butthisdoesnotmeanthatwecannotfindwhatthevirtuouspersonisdoingquitewonderfulandadmirableorthathisactionlacksmerit,justbecausethereisnolongeranyneedforencouragement.Whenweencourageachild,wearetellingthechildthatitisdoingprettywell.Bythiswe

meanthatitiswellonitswaytobecomingwiseandvirtuous.Indeed,thechild'sactionisafurthersteponthisroad.Thisiswhyithasmerit.Wethinkthatthechildforitsageisdoingadmirably.Andwethinkthisagainstthebackgroundofwhatotherchildrenofthisageinthissituationmighthavedone.Thisdoesnotatallmeanthatwethinkthatthechild'smeritliesinthefactthatitcouldalsohavebehavedmiserably,asotherchildrenmighthavedone,butchosenot to behave in this way. It might not even have occurred to the child that it could actotherwise. The merit does not lie in its having made the right choice, when it could havechosenotherwise,letaloneinitschoicenottoactotherwise.Themeritliesinitshavingdoneremarkablywellforachildofthisageinthissituation,raisingexpectationsaboutthefuture.Thisiswhyweencourageandrewardit.Justthinkofabuilderwhohasstillnotquitemasteredtheart.Yetthehousehehasnowbuilt

isactuallyprettygood,andsowemightpraiseandrewardhim.Themerit liesinhishavingdoneanadmirablejobforsomebodyathisstageofmasteringtheartofbuilding.Wearenotgoingtoaskwhetherhecouldhavehelpeddoingthis.Andwewouldbepositivelystunnedifhecametoaskarewardforhavingnotbuiltabadhouse,whenhecouldhavechosentodoso.ButthenotionAlexanderseemstohaveispreciselythis—thatthereisnomeritordemeritin

what you are doing, unless you could have acted otherwise, indeed unless you could havechosentoactotherwise.Younowearnpraiseandareward,becauseyouchosetoact in therightway,whenyoucouldhavechosentoactinthewrongway.Andfromhereitwillnotbealongsteptothecompletelyun-Aristotelian,orun-Platonic,ideathatwhatmakesyouractionsovirtuousandpraiseworthyisthatyoudidnotchoosesuchatemptingandappealingalternative,whenitwasonoffer.Indeed,itseemstobeAlexander'sviewthatwhatismeritoriousaboutthevirtuousperson'svirtueandvirtuousactionisthatitisaproductofthemeritoriouschoicesthepersonmadeearlierinhislife,whenhecouldstillhavechosenotherwise.Thisissimplywrong.Themeritofthevirtuousactionliesintheaction, thechoicewhich

led to it, and themotivationwhich led to this choice.Any earlier actions havemerit to theextent that they show the person to be well on the way towards becoming virtuous. Theydecidedlydonotderivetheirmeritfromthefactthatatthispointthepersondidnotchoosetotakeanalternativecourseofactionwhenitwasopenforhimtodoso.HenceitseemstomethatAlexander'snotionoffreedomasamatterofbeing,inthesame

circumstances,abletoactandtochoosetoactotherwiseisdueingoodparttohismistakennotionofduedesert.Inanycase,itisinAlexanderthatwefindtheancestorofthenotionthattohaveafreewillistobeable,intheverysamecircumstances,tochoosebetweendoingAand doingB.Unfortunately, though, but also aswewould expect, Alexander is not able toprovideacoherentaccountofhowsuchafreewillissupposedtobepossible.Alexander got into this tangle mainly for two reasons. First, he did not sufficiently

understandStoicdeterminism,sohedidnotseethatachoicemightbenolessfreeforhavingaFrede, Michael. A Free Will : Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought, edited by A. A. Long, University of California Press, 2011. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/asulib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=631055.Created from asulib-ebooks on 2019-08-17 06:35:29.

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perfectlygoodexplanationintermsofantecedentcauses.Thewisepersonwouldhavetobecrazynottomakethechoicehedoes,eventhoughthatchoiceisnotimpossible.Butthisdoesnotmakehischoiceunfree.Second,Alexanderhasamistakennotionofmerit,asifmeritwereamatterofnotchoosingtoactotherwise.Ifsomebodydoessomethingremarkable,surelythemerit lies in the accomplishment, not in the fact that the person could have chosen to dosomethingquite unremarkable instead. If onewrites a reviewof a book, it surelywouldbemisunderstood ifonesaid that themeritof thebooklay in thefact that theauthor, insteadofchoosingtowritethisbook,couldhavechosentospendthetimeonthebeach.Wedeservenocredit fornotbeingcrazyor fornotchoosing todocrazy things,andwehavenoreasonforcomplaint,ifwearenotfreetodocrazythings.


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CHAPTERSEVEN

AnEarlyChristianViewonaFreeWill:Origen

Itisquitestrikingthat,oncewemovebeyondtheageoftheNewTestamentandtheapostolicfathers,Christianliteraturesoonbeginstoaboundinreferencestofreedomandtoafreewill.Thereferencesarenotquiteasabundantasalookat translationsandcommentariesonearlyChristianliteraturemightmakeusbelieve.Theyoftenrelyonavagueandsupposedlyordinarynotionofafreewill,andtheyalsotranslateorparaphraseexpressionslike“whatisuptous”in terms of “free will,” a phenomenon we have already noticed in the case of how paganphilosophical texts are treated. But even restricting oneself to unambiguous and explicitreferences to freedom,a freewill,or the freedomof thewill,one finds them inabundance,beginningslowlyinthemiddleofthesecondcenturyA.D.,butthen,bythenextcentury,turningintoatorrent.ThusJustinMartyrrepeatedlyusesthetechnicaltermautexousiontorefertoourfreedom.1Thefirstpersonever,whetherpaganorChristian,tousetheexpression“thefreedomofthewill”(eleutheriat sprohairese s)isTatianinhisOratioadGraecos(chapter7.1)inthe third quarter of the second centuryA.D. Thereafter these terms becomemore andmorefrequent,relativelymuchmoreso,itseems,thanincontemporarypaganliterature.Obviously,somedoctrineofa freewill came tomattergreatly toChristians.There isnodoubt that thenotionofafreewillfoundalmostuniversalacceptanceowingtotheinfluenceofChristianity.We have to ask ourselves where the Christians got this notion, whether and how they

adaptedit incertainwayssoas tofit theirChristianbeliefs,andwhether thosebeliefsevenallowed them to find or see a radically new way of understanding human beings, humanfreedom,andthewill.Theanswertothefirstquestionseemsrelativelyeasy.TheChristiansgottheirnotionofa

freewill fromPlatonismand,most of all, fromStoicism.Manyof themassive assumptionsassociated in Stoicism with the doctrine of free will, for instance, the assumption of auniversal divine providence and a divine order regulating everythingwhich happens in theworlddowntothesmallestdetail,wereutterlyunacceptabletoPeripatetics,acceptableonlywith serious qualifications byPlatonists, but apparently quite congenial toChristians. IfwelookatscriptureintheformoftheSeptuagintorattheNewTestamentasitwasbeginningtoevolve,thereisnoauthorityforthelanguageofeitherhumanfreedomorafreewillor,sofarasIcansee,for theassumptionofafreewill.When,earlyinthethirdcenturyA.D.,Origen


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collects passages from scripture to support the doctrine of a free will, all he can find arepassageswhichyoumighttaketoimplythatthereisafreewillbutonlyifyoualreadybelievethatthereissuchathingorthatGodwouldnotorderustodocertainthingsunlesswehadafreewillwhichallowedustocomplywiththesecommands.2HencetheChristiannotionofafreewillmustcomefromsomewhereelse.SowheredoesTatian,forinstance,gethisnotionofit?At this point we should note that Tatian (ca. A.D. 110–180) must himself have been a

philosopher before his conversion.3He seems to hint at this,when in the introduction toAdGraecos he says farewell to pagan wisdom, though not without remarking, with a certainsatisfaction,thathehimselfhadacquiredsomereputationforit.4Laterinhisorationhetellsus thathehadwrittenabookonanimals,andachapter laterheseemstorefer toabookondaemons.5Sinceinhisbookonanimalsheclaimstohaveattackedtheviewthatanimalslackreasonandintelligence,hecannothavebeenaPeripateticoraStoic.Sinceheseemstohavewritten a bookondaemons, he cannot havebeen anEpicurean.Hencehemust havebeen aPlatonist. This is confirmed by the fact that the closest parallel to his view on animalintelligenceistobefoundinthesecond-centuryPlatonistCelsus,againstwhomOrigenwrotehisContraCelsum.6 It also fits the fact that Tatian was a follower of JustinMartyr, who,before his conversion, had been a Platonist and continued after his conversion to presenthimselfasaphilosopher,advancinganewChristianphilosophy.7AsInotedearlier,Justinacoupleoftimesreferstohumanfreedom,usingthephilosophicaltermautexousion.WeshouldalsonotethattheAlexandrianschoolofChristiantheology,fromwhichOrigenwastocome,hadbeenfoundedbyPantaenus,whowasoriginallyaStoicphilosopher.8Soitisnotsurprisingthat in Origen's famous student, Clement of Alexandria, who was heavily indebted toPantaenus,thereisagooddealofreferencetothefactthattherearethingswhichitisuptous(toeph'h min) todoornot todo. It isnoteworthy, though, that thediscussion inClement isstillintermsofthatwell-wornphilosophicalexpression.Origen is important tomyargument for several reasons.First,because, aswe shall study

shortly,hehasagooddealtosayaboutfreedomandthefreewill.Heevenhasasmalltreatiseonthesubject,aspartofhisgreatandambitiousworkDeprincipiis,whichunfortunately isextantinitsentiretyonlyinaLatintranslationbyRufinus.9Ipresume,infact,thatOrigenwasthefirstChristianauthorevertowriteindetailandsystematicallyaboutthefreewill.Second,Origenhimselfhadhadtrainingasaphilosopher.Hepresumablyhadbeenastudent

ofAmmoniusSaccas,whohadalsobeentheteacherofPlotinus.10AccordingtoEusebius(HEVI.1.1), Origen enjoyed a considerable reputation among philosophers. Porphyry seems tohavebeenfamiliarwithhisworkandevenclaimedtohaveknownhim.Inanycase,PorphyrysupposedlycouldfindnofaultwithOrigen'sdoctrinesbutfounditall themorepuzzlinganddisingenuoushowOrigencouldbeaChristianandclaimtofindthesedoctrinesinbarbarianscripture,whentheysoobviouslyhadtheirsourceinGreekphilosophy.11WealsoknowfromGregoryThaumaturgus'sPanegyricus(xiii)thatOrigeninstructedhisstudentsinphilosophy.12Part ofOrigen's programwas to develop a theory about theworldwhich,while remainingfaithful to the fundamental tenetsofChristianity,wouldmake themintelligibleandrationallyacceptableandmoreoverwouldanswerall thequestionsareasonableChristianwouldhave


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which had not yet been settled by the doctrine of the church. Origen, as far as I can tell,constitutes an enormous advance in the detail, systematism, and sophistication with whichquestionsofChristianityweredealt.Allfuturetheologywouldowehimagreatdebt, thoughthiswas rarelyacknowledged.Already inOrigen's lifetimehis ambitious speculations,withtheirobvious source inPlatonism, frightenedsomechurchauthorities. Ithelped little thathewas a man of singular piety, who died a confessor and was defended in writing by asunquestionableanauthorityasPamphilius.ThusGregoryofNyssa,whowasonlytooawareofhis indebtedness toOrigen,both in theconversionofhis familybyOrigen'sstudentGregoryThaumaturgusandalso in theology,carefullyavoidsmentioningOrigenexcept inoneor twoplaces.Third,evenOrigen'sfiercestcritics,likeMethodius,couldfindnofaultwithhisviewson

thefreewill.13 In fact, theseviewsgained an authoritative status from the fact thatBasil ofCaesarea, Gregory of Nyssa's brother, and Gregory the Theologian, that is, Gregory ofNazianzus, in theirPhilocalia (chapters21 to27) anthologized the little treatiseon the freewill,or,rather,onfreedom,fromthebeginningofbookIIIoftheDeprincipiis,thuspreservingthe original Greek version of the text for us.14 They also excerpted other texts by Origenbearingonthedoctrineofafreewill,forinstance,apassagefromtheContraCelsum,anotherfromtheCommentaryonGenesis,andyetanotherfromtheCommentaryontheLettertotheRomans.SinceBasilandGregorytheTheologianacceptedthesetextsasusefulreadingonourquestions about the free will, we have to assume that they took them to reflect Christianorthodoxyonthematter.HencewemaytreatOrigen'spositionasfairlyrepresentativeoftheChristianposition in theEast in the thirdandfourthcenturiesA.D., thoughIhave toquicklyadd that some of the inferences Origen drew from his doctrine of free will were alreadyopposedbythemandcametobeanathematizedlater.WegetameasureoftheimportanceOrigenattributestothedoctrineofafreewill,ifwesee

thatintheCommentaryonJohn(adXIII.19.12.16)he tellsus that,asChristians,wehavetobelieveinourGod,inJesusChrist,intheHolySpirit,andinthefactthatwewillbepunishedorrewardedaccordingtothewaywehavelived,becausewearefree(eleutheroi)15Itshouldstrikeusascurious thatbelief inhumanfreedomas thepresuppositionofdivinepunishmentandrewardshouldtakefourthplaceafterbeliefinGod,JesusChrist,andtheHolySpirit.Butthis isnotasliponOrigen'spart.ForintheprefacetoDeprincipiis,4–5,wearesimilarlytoldthattherearecertainbasictruthsaboutwhichapostolicteachingdoesnotleaveanyroomfor doubt or lack of clarity. The list of these truths, which any theory will have toaccommodate,beginsthus:(1)thereisoneGod;(2)ChristisbornoftheFather;(3)thereisthe Holy Spirit; and (4) the soul has a life of its own: it will be punished or rewarded,accordingtoitsdesert,butalsoanyrationalsoulisendowedwithafreewill.Iwanttoaddquickly,forthosewhoarenotinterestedinChristianfundamentaltenets,that,

asfarasmybriefparaphraseofOrigen'slistisconcerned,manyapaganPlatonistinOrigen'stimewouldhavegladlysubscribedtosomeofitsitems.Whatmatters,though,forourpurposesisthattheassumptionofafreewillisagainpresentedasoneofthemostfundamentalpartsoftheteachingofthechurch.Weshouldalsonote,however,thatintheDeprincipiisIII.1.1,atthevery outset of the treatise on free will, Origen expresses himself much more carefully. Itbecomes clear from Origen's remarks there that, while it is a crucial part of the church's


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teaching that we will be judged, and judged justly, he himself is inferring that we mustthereforeassumeourfreedom;forotherwisewecouldnotbemaderesponsibleforwhatwehavedone,atleastnotifGod'sjudgmentisjust,aswehavetotakeittobe.Thisassumptionthat responsibilitypresupposes freedomorevena freewill,ofcourse, isnotnew.WehaveencountereditinAlexanderofAphrodisias,andwefinditalreadyinTatian.NeverthelessitisremarkablewithwhateaseitismadebyOrigen.ThebeliefinafreewillwouldbeofficiallyrecognizedaschurchdoctrinebyasynodinCarthageonlyatthebeginningofthefifthcentury.Here,then,wehaveonereasonwhyOrigenissointerestedinthedoctrineoffreedomanda

freewill.Acrucialpartofthedoctrineofthechurchisthatwewillbepunishedorrewardedforourdeeds,andhetakesitasobviousthatthispresupposesourfreelychoosingtoactinthisway.Thereisanother,lessobviousreasonwhyfreedomissoimportantforOrigen.Hebelieves

that theworld aswe know it, though created byGod, is a result of the usewhich rationalcreatureshavemadeofthefreedomwithwhichGodendowedthemwhenhecreatedthemafterhisimage.Godoriginallycreatedfreeintellectsorminds,allofwhichwereequal.16At thispointwemaywonderwhatdisembodied intellectsuseawill for.Hereweshould

rememberthecomplexStoicnotionofawillasanabilitytomakechoicesanddecisions,thatis, not just choices to give assent to impulsive impressions (to will to do something) butchoices to give assent to impressions quite generally. Even disembodied intellects dosomething: they think.This iswhat they already do inPlato andAristotle.Hence they havethoughtsorimpressions,andtheyhavetochoosewhichonestogiveassenttoandwhichonesnottogiveassentto.This,though,presupposesthattheydonotalreadyknoweverything.Andthis,indeed,iswhatOrigendoesassume.Itisperhapsnotentirelyclearwhyheassumesit.TounderstandhispointwehavetotakenotethatwhatthereistoknowfortheintellectsisGod,themselves, and the other intellects. To knowGod is to know the Trinity, and to know theTrinityistoknowtheFather,thatistosay,theGood;theSon,thatistosay,thedivineintellectandhenceeternaltruth;andtheHolySpirit.Sothereisagreatdealtoknow.ThereisonenotoriousproblemhereforanyPlatonist.Platoin theRepublic (6.509b)had

claimedthattheGoodistranscendent:itisbeyondbeingandtheintellect,sinceitisthesourceofallbeingandallintelligibilityandhencenotitselfabeingandintelligible.ThereforeGod,orat leastGodtheFather,beingtheGood, is transcendentandhencebeyondthe intellectualunderstanding of even the purest intellect.17 Nevertheless there must be some kind ofunderstandingof theGood, if it is also true that everything is supposed tobeunderstood intermsof theGoodas thefirstprinciple.This isakindofunderstandingwhichthePlatonistshave inmindwhen they talkabout thedifferentways inwhichonemaycome tounderstandGod,howeverinadequately,forinstance,bynegativetheology.Sothecreatedintellectsarenotomniscient, not only in the ordinary sense that they do not know everything but also in thedeeper sense that there is something which, in principle, they cannot know at all but onlyunderstandmoreorlessadequatelyonthebasisofwhattheyknow.On theotherhand,wehave topresume that theyarecreatedwith someknowledge, since

otherwisetheywouldnotbeinapositiontothinkaboutthingsatall.Sotheywillhaveinbornnotionswhich incorporate a basic knowledgeof reality of thekindPlato,Aristotle, and theStoics ascribe to anybody who has reason. So they are created free, with this knowledge,


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whichenablesthemtoadvanceintheirunderstandingandtogetabettergraspofGodortheGood, if they properly put their minds to it.18 Now the more they advance in theirunderstandingoftheGood,themoretheirmindswillbeareflectionofGodandthemoretheywillbelikeGod,inthewayanimageinanondistortingmirrorcanbeliketheobjectseeninit.PlatointheTheaetetus(176b)hadclaimedthattheendoflifeconsistsinbecominglikeGod(homoi sisthe i).ThisistakenupbyPlatonistsintheimperialperiodastheformulaforwhatweshouldaimatinlife.AndthisisalsowhatOrigenbelievesandhowheinterpretsit.But,Itakeit,Origenalsobelieveshimselftobefollowingscripturewhenitsaysthatmaniscreatedintheimageandinthelikeness(homoi sis)ofGod.19Maniscreatedasafreeintellectsothathecanbecomeas likeGodas ispossible for a creature.Now,as the intellectgets abetterunderstanding of the Good, and the more clearly one sees it, the Good seems ever moreattractive,andthisconstitutesaneverstrongermotivationtounderstanditandbecomelikeit.But this, of course, presupposes that one proceedswith great care and diligence in these

difficultmatters,soastogiveassentonlytoimpressionsorthoughtswhichdeserveit;foronemayatsomepointlackattentionorcareandgiveassenttoafalsethought.Thisimmediatelyhastheconsequenceofblurringone'sviewofthetruth,andhenceone'sabilitytoseetheGood,howeverminute the blurmight be.Once error has crept in, it ismore difficult not tomakefurthermistakes.Andasthemistakespileup,one'sviewofthetruthgetsseriouslydistorted,one'sunderstandingoftheGoodseriouslytainted,andasaresulttheGoodseemslessandlessattractive.Metaphoricallyspeaking,insteadofrisingupwards,onesinksdownwards.Ihavegoneintothisinsomedetail,becauseweshallneedthedetaillater.Butwhatweneed

for themoment isOrigen's view that these intellects,which are created equal, through theirownbehaviorandtheuseoftheirwilltogiveassentorrefusetogiveassent,fallintovariousdegrees of error. In thisway the intellects come to be separated into a hierarchy of angels,human souls, and daemons. Origen assumes, moreover, that God anticipated this fall, andthereforecreatedthevisibleworldwithbodies,sothathumansouls,whenembodied,mightbeabletoundotheconsequencestheirmistakeshadhadontheirminds.Thishastheresultthatthewholematerialworld, asweknow it, including thevisibleworld, is contingent on the freewillofcreatures.20TheseideashaveanimportantbearingonthemeaningofthetitleofOrigen'streatise.Ithas

beensuggestedthat thetitlemightrefertotheprinciplesofreality, theprinciplesintermsofwhich reality is tobeunderstood.21This seems tome tobe almost certainly right.The titlePeriarch n is a typical title forPlatonist treatiseson theprinciplesof reality.WeknowofsuchworksbyLonginusandPorphyry,andwestillhaveDamascius'sOnPrinciples.This ishowMarcellus of Ancyra understoodOrigen's title, when he criticizedOrigen for not firsthavingstudiedscripturesufficientlybuthavinginsteadturnedtowritingonsacredmattersbyrelyingontheworksofthePlatonists,asMarcellussupposedtobeevidentalreadyfromthemeretitle.EusebiusrespondedtothiscriticismnotbyclaimingthatOrigen'stitlehadnothingto do with these Platonist treatises but by denying that the word principles in any waycontradictstheassumptionthatthereisoneultimateprinciple,theFather.22Thisunderstandingof Origen's titlemakes all themore sense once we see that in Origen's view the world isintelligibleonlybybeing,insomesense,theproductofthefreedomofcreatures.Conversely,thisunderstandingof the titleunderlines the importanceOrigenattributes to freedomand the


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freewill.Itis,aftertheTrinity,thenextmostimportantprinciple.At this point we should take a brief look at Origen's short treatise “On Freedom” (Peri

autexousiou)inDeprinc.III.1.AsIhavealreadysaid,Origenbeginsbypointingoutthatweshallbe judged justly forwhatwedid, andpunishedor rewardedaccordingly, and that thisobviouslypresupposesthatwearefree,meaningthatitisuptousanddependsonus(eph'hmin)whetherornotwedothethingswhichmeritpraiseorvituperation.Origenheresimplyidentifiesfreedomwiththerebeingthingswhichareuptoustodoornottodo.SobytheendofIII.1.1heannouncesthatheisfirstgoingtosetoutthenotionofwhatisuptousandthen,onthebasisofhavingexplicatedthisnotion,clarifymatters.Accordingly,inIII.1.2–3hesetsoutthenotionofwhatitisfortheretobethingswhichareuptous.ThisexplicationproceedsalongstandardStoiclines.And,onthebasisofthis,inIII.1.4–5,

first part, he argues that somebodywhomaintains that he couldnot helpbut act thewayhedoes,because theexternalcircumstancesmakehimact thewayhedoes (for instance, in theformofanattractivewoman),obviouslyhasnotunderstoodwhatitisforsomethingtobeuptous.Suchapersonhasadeviantnotionoffreedom,becausehethinksoneisfreetodothingstotheextentthatonecandowhatoneintendstodo,ifthecircumstancesdonotprovokeoneintodoingsomethingelse(III.1.5).Origendutifullypointsoutthatallthecircumstancescandoisproduceanimpressioninyou

towhichyoucanrefusetoassent,thoughyoucanalso,becauseofitstitillatingcoloring,assenttoit.InIII.1.5,secondpart,hebrieflyturnstothepossibilitythatsomebodymightarguethatheis not to blame for what he is doing, because, given his congenital or natural constitution(kataskeu ),hecannotactotherwisethanhedoes.AgainOrigendutifullypointsoutthatmanypeople have managed to overcome their congenital dispositions. By III.1.6 he turns to thescriptural passages which are supposed to confirm freedom, and at III.1.7–24 he finallycomments on scriptural passageswhichmight be taken to show thatwe are not free in ouractionsoreveninourdecisions.At firstsightall thisseemsratherdisappointing,especially ifwehadexpectedsomenew

viewsaboutfreedomandthefreewill.Thesystematicaccountat theoutsetcouldhavebeentakenstraightfromalateStoichandbook.WedonotevenlearnfromthislittletreatisethatforOrigenfreedom(toautexousion)isamatterofhavingafreewill(prohairesiseleuthera).Forthiswehave to turn to other parts of theDeprincipiis and otherwritings ofOrigen.23 Theterminologyandtheclaims,withtheexceptionofourcrucial implicitclaim,arethroughandthroughStoic,withtheterminologyalmostinvariablybeingfoundinEpictetusandalmostallthemajorclaimshavingtheirparallelsinhim,too.SomeofOrigen'sexplicationsofscripturaltextsbecomeintelligibleonlyagainstthebackgroundofthekindoftheorywehaveascribedtoEpictetus.Henceonethingisobvious:OrigenisveryheavilyrelyingonthelateStoicdoctrineoffreewill;ifthereissomedeviationfromit,Origen'sremarksonfreedomarecertainlynotmeanttobedirectedagainsttheStoicstoputthemright.Nevertheless it is pretty clear thatOrigen's remarks aredirected against opponents.After

all, theverypointof theDeprincipiis,as theprefacesays, is toclarifycertain fundamentalmatterswhicharenotsettledbyapostolic teachingbutaboutwhich there isdisagreementorcontroversyamongthosewhoprofesstobelieveinJesusChrist.Notethelanguage“professtobelieve” (secredereprofitentur).24This suggests thatOrigen is relyingonabasicallyStoic


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doctrineofafreewilltocriticizecertain,inhisview,heterodoxviewswhichmanyChristiansholdor at least are temptedby. Iwant to argue that theseviewsare astraldeterminismandvarious formsofwhatwenowcall “Gnosticism,” though forOrigenhimself the “Gnostics”werejustoneparticulargroupamongthem(seeCC5.61).Herewehave tokeep inmind that thedoctrineof the church emerged slowly, starting in

aboutA.D.150,andonlybecamefullydefinedcenturieslater.Wealsoneedtokeepinmindthatwhat,bythelightoflatercenturies,wouldcountasorthodoxmainstreamChristianitywaspretty fluid even inOrigen's day andhadbeen evenmore so before his time. In the secondcenturybothValentinusandMarcioncould live formanyyearsasmembersof thechurch inRome before being expelled.25We have to remember too that when lines were drawn, thevariousGnosticgroups,aswelearn,forinstance,fromTertullian'sInHermogenem,managedtodrawlargenumbersofChristianstotheirside.EveninOrigen'sday,then,largenumbersofChristians were Gnostics even within the church, members of the church were tempted byGnosticism,andtheschismaticGnosticshadtobepersuadedtoreturntothetruth.InoneformoranotherGnosticismcontinuedtobeathreattothechurchforalongtime.Alsoastraldeterminism,tobedistinguishedfromtheviewthattheconstellationofthestars

is a sign of what is to come (a view shared by the Stoics and Origen), proved to be asattractive to Christians as to non-Christians.26 Sometimes, in fact, as in theApocryphon ofJohn,astraldeterminismwaspartofaGnosticviewoftheworld.27Aswecanseefromthechurch fathers (for instance, Eusebius,Gregory ofNyssa, orAugustine), astral determinismcontinuedtobetemptingtoChristiansforalongtimetocome.AugustineinasermontellsusthatmanyhesitatetoconverttoChristianitybecauseoftheirastrologicalbeliefs.28WecanseehowseriouslyOrigentookthisviewbecausehereferstoitinhisprefacetoDeprincipiis(5)as a view incompatiblewith the church's teaching thatwe are free and also because in hisCommentaryonGenesisheattacked it in somedetail. It isameasureof the importance thechurchcontinuedtoattributetothispointthatBasilandGregoryNazianzusalsoincorporatedthistextintheirPhilocaliaaspartofthesectiononfreedom.29Onceweseethisbackground,manyofthedetailsofOrigen'sviewonfreedomandafree

will, andalsomanyof thedetailsofhis little treatiseon freedom, appear in anew light. Itimmediately becomes clear why nearly four-fifths of this rather short text is taken up by adiscussionof scripturalpassageswhichseem todenya freewill, someof themostdifficultones coming fromSt. Paul, especially theLetter to theRomans.Obviously, thesewere thetextsthatOrigen'sGnosticopponentswererelyingon.LetuslookatthisinsufficientdetailtoconvinceourselvesthatOrigen'sviewsonfreedomwereshapedbytheseopponents.LiketheStoics,hebelievesthattheworlddowntoitssmallestdetailsisgovernedbydivine

providence. But for him there is the troubling fact that human beings are born with verydifferent endowments, or natural constitutions, and that they are born into very differentcircumstances. Indeed, the congenital constitution and the circumstancesmay be such that itwillbeexceedinglydifficult,ifnotimpossible,tofollowGod'sordersorcommandments.Aswehaveseen,thisdoesnotbotherAristotle,butithastoconcernOrigenbecausehebelievesindivineprovidenceandafairandjustGodwhoisomnipotent.HenceGodcannothavesetupthe world in such a way that some (if not most) human beings find it difficult, or evenimpossible,tofollowGod'scommands.


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Origen'ssolutiontothisproblem,aswehavealreadyseen,istoassumethatGodcreatedallhumanbeingsentirelyequal,withentirelyequalabilitiesandpossibilitiesas free intellects.Hecanthusclaimthatallfurtherdifferentiationsanddifferencesinourdestiny,includingourphysicalconstitutionandthecircumstancesintowhichweareborn,aretheproductofourownchoices, theself-inflictedpunishmentwhichGod,inhisprovidence,hasarrangedtotaketheparticular formitdoes,because itwill thusallowus to remedy theparticulardefectswhichbroughtaboutourfall(seeDeprinc.II.9.6).ButwecanseefromDeprinc.II.9.5andI.8.2thatothers drew a very different conclusion from the agreed fact that we are born with verydifferentnaturalconstitutionsandinverydifferentcircumstances,whichmightbeexceedinglydifficulttodealwith,andthatOrigenisaddressingtheseopponents.InII.9.5henotesthatthefollowersofMarcion,Valentinus,andBasilides(allimportantGnosticheresiarchs)objecttothe view that a God who is just and good (aequissimus) could create people of differentnaturesornaturalconstitutionsandcreateangelsofdifferentorders.Theyalsoobject,asfarasrationalcreatureshereonEarthareconcerned,thatagoodGodwouldnothavearrangedforhuman beings to be born under such radically different circumstances which make such adifferencetothelifetheycanlive.InI.8.2Origen'sopponentsarguethatitdoesnotmakeanysensetothinkthatasinglecreatorwouldcreaterationalbeingswithdifferentkindsofnatures.Origenwholeheartedlyagreeswiththem.ButwhereasheconcludesfromthisthatGodcreatedall rational beings equal and that the differences between them are of their own doing, hisopponentsinferthatatleastsomerationalcreaturesaretheworkofaninferiorcreator.It ispertinenttonoteherethatOrigen,earlyintheprefacetoDeprincipiis, in thesecond

paragraph, explains that thedisagreements among thosewhoprofess tobeChristiansdonotjustconcernsmalland trivialmattersbut fundamentalmatterssuchasGod,JesusChrist, theHolySpirit,andalsocertaincreatures,namely,thepowers(dominationes)andsacredvirtues(virtutessacrae),accordingtoRufinus'stranslation(forthispartofthetextwedonothavetheGreekoriginal).ItisthesedisagreementsthattheDeprincipiisisprimarilymeanttoshedlightonortoresolve.WhatOrigenmustbethinkingofhereareGnosticviews.30Inanycasethedisputeseemsto

be about the nature and origin of certain spiritual beings, regarded byOrigen as the angelscreated by God through Christ but regarded by different Gnostics in a variety of differentways.31ThepointwhichmattersisthatitisadisputewiththeGnostics.Anditis,aswehavealreadyseen,theGnosticswhoareindisagreementabouttheFatherofJewishscripturewhocreatedtheworldwelivein.Accordingtothem,hecannotbegoodandjustandhencecannotbeGod.ThedisagreementaboutChristatthispointmuststillbeadisagreementwithGnostics.ForinGnosticsystemsChristtooisafairlysubordinatebeingwhoissenttosaveusbutwhoisfarremovedfrombeingthemindofGodthroughwhichGodcreatedthisworld.With this we can return to the question of why Gnosticism raised such big problems

concerningthefreedomofthewill.HereIwanttosayfromtheoutsetthatIamnotconcernedto identify the truth about theGnostic positionsOrigen attacks.Whatmatters is thatOrigenunderstandstheminacertainway,thoughIwanttoaddthatIgivegreatweighttotheevidencewhichOrigenhastoofferonGnosticism.Ifwenowreturntoourshorttreatiseonfreedom,wenotethattwoparagraphs,III.1.4and5,separateOrigen'sexplicationofwhatitisfortheretobe thingswhichareup tous andhisdiscussionofbiblicalpassages.These twoparagraphs


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seematfirsttodealwithtwolameexcusesforone'sactions.Oneisthat,givenone'snaturalconstitution,onecannotbutactinthewayonedoes;theother,thatthecircumstancesorobjectsofdesireinone'ssurroundingsmakeoneactthewayonedoes.Butitbecomesclear,giventheGnosticbackground,thatthismustberelatedtotheGnosticcomplaintthatagoodGodwouldnever create human beings with such a physical constitution or expose them to suchcircumstanceswhichmakefailurepredictable.Infact,OrigenmustmeantoanswertheviewheattributestoMarcion,Valentinus,andBasilidesinDeprinc.II.9.5,thathumanbeingshavebybirthdifferentnatures,suchthatsomeareessentiallygoodandhencewillbesavedandsomeareessentiallyevilandhencewillbedamned.Similarly,inCCV.61,Origenreportstheview,whichhenowmorespecificallyattributestotheValentinians,thattherearehumanbeingswhoarespiritualandhumanbeingswhoarepsychicintheirconstitutionandthatthesebeingsaresaved or lost depending on their natural constitution. In reporting this here, as inDe princ.III.1.5,heuses the same term,kataskeu , for constitution.Wealsoknowof aGnosticviewaccording towhich there are three constitutions, a carnal, a psychic, and a spiritual one, ofwhich the first guarantees damnation, the last salvation,whereas the psychic constitution atleastallowsonetoescapefromdamnation.WhenOrigeninIII.1.4–5attackstheviewthatexternalobjectsmighthavesuchpowerover

onethatoneisforcedtoactinthewayonedoes,hemustberespondingtotheclaimthatthecircumstances intowhichone isputby therulerof thisvisibleworld inwhichwelivemayforceus toactotherwise thanweshould. It is tellinghowOrigenat thebeginningof III.1.6introducesthediscussionofthescripturalpassagesinawaywhichmightaswellserveasasummaryoftheprecedingdiscussion:itshouldbeclearthatitisourtask(ergon)tolivewell,andGodexpectsthisfromus,asthisisnothistask,norwillitcomeaboutthroughtheagencyofsomebodyorsomethingelsenor,assomebelieve,throughfate.SoourlifeisnotdeterminedbyGodorbyanyotherpowerorforcewhichmightsetusupinacertainwaynorbyfateas,forinstance,thedeterminationoftheastralpowers.Withthiswecanturntotakeatleastabrieflookatthescripturalpassageswhichputafree

will into question and at Origen's treatment of these. Let us consider the following twopassages(III.1.7):“Itisnotamatterofsomebody'swilling(thelontos)orsomebody'sstriving,butofGod'smercy”(Rom.9.i6),and“boththewilling(thelein)andthedoingcomefromGod”(Phil.2.13).Onemightwellinterpretthesepassagesassayingthatallthingswhichhappeninthe world, including our own actions, are the work of God or at least do not come aboutwithouthismercy.ButtheyalsoseemtobesayingthatourwillingisnotoursbutGod's,whoat best in hismercywill arrange things in such away that some of uswillmake the rightchoices.Onereadilyunderstandshowthesepassagescouldberelieduponbysomebodywhowanted to argue that our life is a function of the physical constitutionwhichwe have beengiven or the circumstances to which we have been exposed, or both. Discussing the firstpassage in III.i.i8, Origen explicitly says that his opponents adduce it to show that oursalvationdoesnotdependontherebeingthingswhichitisuptoustodoornottodo,thatis,onour freedom,buton thephysicalconstitutionwithwhichwehavebeencreatedoron thewill(prohairesis)ofhimwho,ifhewills,willhavemercyandprovidentiallyarrangeourlifesoastobesaved.The way Origen in response interprets these passages again reflects his indebtedness to


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Stoicism.He is quite prepared to say that the doing in some important sense in any case isGod's,partof theprovidentialunfoldingof thecourse theworld takes.Hence, if ahouse isfinallybuiltorifacaptainmanagestosteerhisshipthroughabadstormintoasafeharbor,thisinsomesensereallyisGod'sdoing.ButOrigenisquiteuncompromisingaboutthewill.Ratherimplausibly,hedeclaresthatPaulmustmeanthatweoweourwilltoGodbutcannotmeanthateachparticularwillingisduetoGod.Itakeit,then,thatOrigenintegratesaratherdetailed,butbasicallyStoic,viewoffreedom

into his otherwisePlatonist outlook on theworld, because this Stoic view ideally providesmoreor less readyanswers toavarietyofviewswhichOrigenandmainstreamChristianitylaterfoundunorthodoxbutalsoparticularlythreatening.IfwebrieflygobacktoTatian'ssparseremarks,wecanseethattheseviewsmustalreadyhavebeenhisconcern.32ForTatianinsiststhatonlyGodisgoodbynatureoressentially.Hencenohumanbeingisessentiallygoodandhencebound tobe saved.According toTatian,wehave received the freedomof thewill toattaintheperfectionpossibleforahumanbeing.Thereforenohumanbeingisessentiallyevilbyhisnaturalconstitutionandboundtobedamned.Whetherwearesavedordamneddependson what we do, on the use wemake of our freedom. And Tatian immediately proceeds toreflectonthekindoffatalismordeterminismwhichwouldstandinthewayofourbeingabletodowhatweneedtodoinordertobesaved.My claim is that Christianity's interest in freedom and a free will was motivated by a

concernwithvariousformsofGnosticismandastraldeterminism,thatabasicallyStoicviewonafreewilladmirablyservedthepurposeofcombatingtheseunorthodoxviews,andthatwethereforehavenoparticularreasontoexpectaradicallynewnotionofafreewill'semergingfromChristianity.33This, though, is not at all to say that Origen's doctrine of a free will was just the Stoic

doctrine. There are important differences. Perhaps we best begin with the one we notedearlier. Origen, unlike Chrysippus and Epictetus, but like Alexander, identifies freedom (toautexousion)with there being thingswhich are up to you to do or not to do, that is to say,things such that you are responsible for doing them. He does not think that freedom issomethingwewouldnaturallyhave ifnothingwentwrongwithourdevelopment,andwhichwelose themomentwe takeawrongstep.ForOrigenwearefreefromthemomentwearecreated,andthisfreedomispartofournatureasrationalbeings,suchthatwecanneverloseit.Even thedaemonsor thedevil retain a freewill.Thus inparticular forOrigen the smallestmistakedoesnothavethedisastrousconsequencesithasfortheStoics.FortheStoicsallsinsareequal,becausetheyare,atleastinclassicalStoicism,alwaysoneandthesamesinintheend, namely, giving one's assent to an impressionwhich does notmerit assent. For Origenmistakeshave theireffect ingeneralbyaccumulation.Youcanbeanangel,makeamistake,andstillremainanangel.34There is another important difference between the Stoic notion of freedom and Origen's

notionwhich goeswithwhat I have just said. In Stoicism the personwho iswise and hasliberated himself from all inappropriate desires and attachments can nevermake amistake.Thereisnothingleftinhismotivationwhichcouldaccountforhisgoingwrong.Heunshakablyknowswhatthegoodis,andinlightofthisheactsaswisely,givenhislimitedknowledge,ashe can be expected to act. But Origen's created free intellects do not unshakably know the


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good.Theyarecognitivelyseparatedfromitbyagapwhichcanneverbecompletelyfilled,whichmayget smaller,as itmaygetbigger,butneverdisappears.HenceOrigen's intellectscanmakemistakes,howeverfartheyhaveadvancedinwisdom.Thereisneverastate,asinStoicism,inwhichthereisnopossibilityofamistake,andwithitasaconsequencethereisalways thepossibilityofa fall.Theother sideof the samemedal is that thedaemonsneverlosetheirfreewillandtheknowledgewithwhichtheywerecreated.Thissufficesforthemtofreethemselvesfromtheirdaemonicqualitiesandtoreturnultimatelytoanangelicstatus.This is Origen's famous doctrine of the apokatastasis, which for orthodox Christians

becamean anathema, althoughnoneother thanGregoryofNyssa also espoused it in hisDeanimaetresurrectione.35Infact,itseemsthatOrigen'sviewwasatleastsometimesthattheascentanddescentofrationalbeingswentonforever.Ithastobesaidthatthisdoctrinecouldeasilyunderminethecentralimportanceoftheredemptionasauniquehistoricalevent.WecanseewhatlaterChristianshadtododoctrinallytostopthisnever-endingascentanddescent,tomakesurethatthedamnedremaindamnedforeverandtheblessedenjoyeternalbliss.WecanseeitmostclearlyinAugustine.Itisthegraceofperseverancewhichallowstheblessednottofallagain,andsimilarlyGoddeclinestocontinuetoextendhisgracetothosewhohavefallenforever,withoutwhichtheycouldnotrecover.Indeed,OrigenhimselfalreadyofferstheviewinDeprincipiis1.3.8thatGodbyhisgracemayarrangethingsinsuchawaythatoneeternallyretainsthevirtueandwisdomonehasattained.Inanycase it is true thatOrigen'sviewof freedomisnotquite theStoicview.Thereare

importantdifferences.ButthesedonotseemtohavetheirsourceinOrigen'sChristianity.TheypresumablyderivefromhisPlatonism,aPlatonismheavilyindebtedinthisregardtoStoicism.WiththisinmindletuslookagainathowOrigenexplainsthefalloftheintellect.In the De principiis he mentions three possible explanations which, I take it, are not

supposed tocompetewithoneanother.Thefirst issatiety.36The intellecthashadenoughofcontemplatingthetruth,oftoilingtodistinguishthetruefromthefalseamongitsthoughts(Deprinc. I.3.8).The second explanation is carelessnessor negligence (inRufinus's translation,neglegentia);onedoesnotattendsufficientlytoone'simpressionsandcarelesslygivesassent(I.4.1).Thethirdislaziness(desidiaetlaboristaedium,II.9.2);onehashadenoughofallthetoil involved in always being concerned with the good: again one seems not to show therequireddiligenceandenthusiasminconsideringwhattotaketobetrueandgood.Sothewillmakesthewrongchoices.Butnotetheexplanationgivenforthesechoices.Or,rather,firstofallnotethatanexplanationisgiven.Thechoiceofthewillisnotasheeractofvolitionwithnocauseorexplanation.Thewrong

choice is explained as due to lack of the appropriate care.And also note the nature of thechoice.Youchoosetoassentwhen,ifyouhadbeenmorecareful,youwouldnothaveassented.Thechoiceisnotevenrepresentedasachoicebetweentwothings.Fornottochoosetogiveassenttoathoughtisnotatallthesamethingaschoosingtoassenttothecontradictorythought.Thatyourefusetobelievethat“p”doesnotmeanthatyoudecidetobelievethat“notp.”Itisalsonotthecasethattheintellect,atleastattheseearlystagesofitsdescent,hastheresourcesto decide to believe something altogether different. So there is nothing mysterious aboutOrigen'swill.Itisanabilitytomaketherightchoices.Butwehavethisabilityataprice.Thepriceisthatifwedonotexercisetherequiredcareinmakingchoices,wemayfailtomakethe


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rightchoices,failtogiveassentwhenweshould,orgiveassentwhenweshouldnot.Butthereis an explanation of why this happens: our carelessness, laziness, satiety. And there is anexplanationforthis,too.AccordingtoChristiansandalsoaccordingtoOrigen,everythingwhichiscreatedissubject

to change, indeed liable to pass away. This is just a version of the ancient philosophicaldoctrinethateverythingwhichcomesintobeingissubjecttochangeandwillpassaway.Platoin theTimaeusmodified this doctrine for the purposes of his creationmyth,whichmany inantiquity, among them, the Platonists Plutarch and Atticus, believed to reflect his own realview.Accordingtothisstory,Goddecreesthateverythingwhichhehimselfhascreated(andthis includes the rationalpartof the soul)will, thoughby itsnaturedestructible,neverpassaway.37 This is an act of divine grace. However, Plato's doctrine as so understood led toconsiderableconfusion in lateantiquity, evenamongChristians, concerning thenatureof thesoul'simmortality.In any case,Origen's intellects, including theirwill, are subject to change. This is just a

consequence of their being created. And so Origen inDe princ. I.6.2 points out that theseintellects,becauseitisnotpartoftheirnaturetobegood,astheyarenotGod,soonerorlater,toagreaterorlesserdegree,willcease,ifonlymomentarily,topayattentiontoTruthandtheGood.ButPlato'smoveintheTimaeusindicatestheremedy.Godbyhisgracecouldpreserveusnotonly inourexistencebutalso inourunfailingconcernforTruthandtheGood.SothequestionarisesofwhyGoddoesnotdothis.TheorthodoxChristianansweristhatinthiscasetherewouldbenomeritonourpartforwhichwewouldearnthisgrace.WhetherthisisalsoOrigen'sanswerdepends ingoodpartonwhetheroneassumes thathedidbelieve inafinalapokatastasis—astateinwhichallrationalcreatureshavebeensavedandwillbepreservedin this blessed state—or whether one thinks that Origen really thought that all intellectsdescendandascendforever.


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CHAPTEREIGHT

ReactionstotheStoicNotionofaFreeWill:Plotinus

GREEKPHILOSOPHICALANDJUDAEO-CHRISTIANCONCEPTIONSOFGOD

It isoftensupposedthat traditionalversionsof thenotionof thewillweremadehistoricallypossibleonlybytheJudaeo-ChristianconceptionofGodwithitsemphasisonGod'swillanditsabsolute,unconditionedcharacter.1ThisJudaeo-ChristianconceptionissupposedtodifferradicallyfromtheGreekconceptionofGod,inparticulartheconceptionGreekphilosophershadofGod.WhereasGreekphilosophers, it is said, conceivedofGodas awise andgoodbeing,which in itswisdom and goodness could not but create the best possibleworld, theemphasisinJudaeo-ChristianthoughtisnotonGod'swisdomandunderstandingbutonGod'swill.Theworldisthewayitis,notbecauseGodinhiswisdomandunderstandingsawthat,forittobethebestpossibleworld,ithadtobethiswayandhencebecauseofhisgoodnesshadtocreateorarrangeitinthisway.Rather,theworldisthewayitisbecauseGodjustwillsit tobe thisway. In fact, it isoftenclaimed that it isamerelycontingent fact that there isaworldinthefirstplace.Itissupposedtobeacontingentfact,becauseGodcreateditbyafreeactofwill,whenhecouldequallyhavechosennottocreateaworld.Incontrast,itisclaimed,the God of Greek philosophy, given his nature, cannot but create or arrange and order theworld.Thus,itisclaimed,forGreekphilosopherstheworld'sexistenceisanecessaryfact.TheChristianview,followingGenesis,isalsothatmaniscreatedintheimageofGod,and

thisisunderstoodascruciallyinvolvingtheideathatmanhasafreewillintheimageofGod'swill.Henceitisassumedthatthehumanwill,tobeproperlyunderstood,hastobeunderstoodbyanalogywiththedivinewill.Andthis,Itakeit,isinterpretedassomehowmeaningthatwetoocandothingsbyasheeractofthewill,perhapsevenasheeractofthewillwhichdefiesexplanation.There is a lot to question about thisway of thinking. Iwant at least to point out thatwe

shouldnotidentifywhatsomeormanyChristiansthinkwithwhatallChristiansalwayshavethought,letalonewithChristianity,nottomentionJudaism.Ihardlyhavetonote,furthermore,that generalizations about the Greek conception of God, or even just the God of Greekphilosophers, are rather hazardous. But I want to begin by briefly remarking that we have


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alreadycomeacrosstheideainpaganphilosophythatthehumanwillislikethedivinewill.ThisiswhatEpictetusexplicitlysaid,namely,thatGodhasgivenusawillwhichislikehis(see p. 77). I have also indicated that we shall understand the Stoic doctrine of the bestpossibleworldonly ifwesee that theStoicGoddoesnotcreate theworld in lightofsomeantecedentgoodheistryingtorealizeaswellashecan,becauseheisattachedtothisgoodand has the wisdom to realize it as well as it can be realized. Rather, he himself is theparadigmof thegood inhisperfectly rationalactofcreation,andbyhiscreationhedefineswhatistocountasaso-calledgoodandaso-calledevil.Far down into antiquity, to be sure, there is a contrast betweenhowPlato,Aristotle, and

otherphilosophersconceiveofGodandhowJewsandChristiansconceiveofGod.Alreadyinthe second century A.D. Galen notices this.2 He does so while giving a teleologicalexplanationofhumaneyelashesand their features. In thecourseof this accounthecomes todistinguish three kinds of explanation. There is (1) the kind of explanation atomists likeEpicurushavetooffer,accordingtowhichultimatelyeverythingistheproductofchance.Butmuchbetter,Galenthinks,is(2)thekindofexplanationMosesoffers.ForMosesatleasttakesintoaccountthatwecannotunderstandthewaytheworldisunlessweassumethatthereisanultimateorfirstmovingcause,whichmakestheworldtobethewayitis,namely,ademiurgeorcreator.Unfortunately,accordingtoGalen,MosesalsotalksasifthewaytheworldiswerejustamatterofGod'swill,asifGodcouldwillanything,absolutelyanything,anditwouldbethis way. Hence, Galen thinks, another view is yet superior, namely, the view (3) that thedemiurgeconsiderswhatcanbedone;fornoteverythingcanbedoneevenbythedemiurge;and so thedemiurgewill choose todo thebest that canbedone.Even thedemiurge cannotprovidehumanbeingswitheyelasheswhichstandup,astheyshould,iftheyaretofulfilltheirfunction,unlesshealsoprovidestheeyelidswithcartilaginoustissueinwhichthelashescanbe firmly set.This,Galen says, is theviewofPlatoand theGreekswho followed the rightmethodintheexplanationofnature.Dihleopenshisbookwithareferencetothispassageandsomeremarksonitwhichsetthe

toneanddirectionforwhatfollows.3Here,fromtheactualpenofanextremelylearnedpagandoctorandphilosopher,weseemtohaveacontrastbetweenan“intellectualistic”Greekwayof looking at things and a “voluntaristic” Judaeo-Christianway of doing so,with the lattershapedbyaweatanall-powerfulGodwhoisnotconstrainedinanywayinwhathecando,andthusisnotconstrainedinanywayinwhathecanchooseorwilltodo,andtherealizationofwhosewillcannotbethwartedorimpededbyanything.It is clear from Galen's reference to Plato and the demiurge that Galen was thinking of

Plato'sTimaeus.GalenhimselfwasaPlatonist, thoughhedidnotwant tocallhimselforbecalled in this way. He had written several books on the Timaeus.4 He was also veryconservative.HencehetooktheviewthatthedemiurgeofPlato'sTimaeus isGod.Inthishewasnotinbadcompany.5ButevenbyGalen'stimetherehadbeenagoodnumberofPlatonists,for instance, Numenius, who denied this.6 And, in part under the influence of Numenius,Plotinuswasgoingtodenyit,too.SoonafterwardseveryPlatonistwouldfollowsuit.Thereasonforthis,towhichIwillturnshortly,isverysimpleandhighlyrelevantforour

purposes. But I want first to note that Galen, though a great physician and perhaps also aphilosopher of some importance, was hardly a theologian or even someone with strong


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interestsintheology.Perhaps,infact,heshowedgoodsenseinthinkingthatthenatureofthesoulandthenatureofGodarethingswecanonlyspeculateabout,withspeculate (the rein)here having a pejorative sense. Apart from this, however, there is a problem in taking thedemiurge of theTimaeus to beGod, if we assume that God is the source and principle ofeverythingthereis.AsdescribednotonlybyGalenbutalsobyPlatohimself,thedemiurge,increatingtheworld,looksuptotheeternalparadigmconsistingoftheFormsandeternaltruthsthat they define, and he acts in light of his conception of theGood.7 But, aswe readers ofPlato'sRepublicknow,theGoodisthesourceandprinciplealsooftheFormsandinthiswayofallthatthereis.8SothedemiurgeisatbesttworemovesfromGod,thefatherofall.Hence,itisnotsurprisingthatthedemiurgecannotdoeverythingbutisconstrainedinwhathecando,not only bymatter but also by antecedent reality, consisting of first the Good or God, andsecond the forms or eternal truths.Accordingly,Numenius, Plotinus, and all later PlatonistsdistinguishGodfromthedemiurge.IfwecomparetheGodofMoseswiththeGodoflateancientphilosophers,weshouldtake

theGodofNumeniusortheGodofPlotinusasourGreekobjectofcomparison,ratherthantheGodofGalen.Unfortunately,weknowverylittleaboutNumenius.Wedoknow,however,thathe discussed Moses's conception of God in rather complimentary terms and that he hadconsiderableinfluenceonthetheologyofbothOrigenandPlotinus.9 InthecaseofPlotinus'sconceptionofGod,weareinthegoodpositionofhavinghistreatise“OnVoluntarinessandtheWill of the One,” where Plotinus gives up much of his usual reticence about the ultimateprinciple. Right at the outset (Enn. VI.8.1.5–6), he claims that God can do absolutelyeverythingandthatabsolutelyeverythingisuptohimtodoornottodo.10Plotinusproposesthatthewholeofrealityoriginatesinanabsolutelyfreeandunconditioned

actofdivinewillandthatthefreewillofembodiedhumanbeingshastobeunderstoodasafaintimageofthisdivinewill.Needlesstosay,IdonothavetheambitiontoestablishthetruthofPlotinus'sview.WhatIhopetobeabletodoissimplytoshowthatPlotinushasthisview.Fromthiswecaninferthatitisnotquiterighttoholdthatsuchawayoflookingatthehumanwill is specificallyJudaeo-Christianor thatbecauseof itChristianswereable tocome toaconceptionorunderstandingofthewillfromwhichpaganswerebarred.IndiscussingPlotinusweshallalsohaveachance,whichwehavenothadsofar,tolookinsomedetailatthewayaPlatonistreceivedtheoriginallyStoicnotionofafreewill.

PLOTINUS:“ONVOLUNTARINESSANDTHEWILLOFTHEONE”

Plotinusbeginshis inquirywith thequestionofwhetheronecanalsoask, in thecaseof thegods,ifthereisanythingwhichisuptothemtodoornottodo,whichtheyarefreetodoornottodo,orwhetherthisquestionarisesonlyinthecaseofhumanbeings,whosepowerlessnessissomanifest thatonemightwellwonderwhether there isanythingwhich it isup tohumanbeingstodoornottodoandwhethertheyhaveanyfreedomatall.Incontrast,onemightthinkthatthegodshavecompletefreedomandthatthereforethequestiondoesnotevenariseintheircase.PlotinusquicklyanswersthisinitialquestionbyreplacingthesimpleantithesisbetweengodsandhumanbeingswithamorecomplexcontrastbetweentheOneorGod,thegods,and


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humanbeings.HealsoobservesthatthereareconsiderableproblemsaboutthesenseinwhichsomethingcanbesaidtobeuptoGodoruptothegods.IntheensuingdiscussionitwillturnoutthatthismorecomplexcontrasthastoberefinedintoacontrastbetweentheOneorGod,intellects (for the gods are intellects), rational souls, and human beings insofar as they areembodied.InPlotinus'smindwearedealingherewithahierarchyof itemswhichrepresentdifferent

levelsofreality.ThereistheOneorGodortheGood,whichissupposedtobethesourceandexplanation of all reality. There is the intellect, which represents the level of immutable,eternaltruths.Thereisthesoul,whichismeanttogiveconcretestructuretophysicalrealityinlight of these abstract eternal truths. And there is the embodied human being, which is theproductofsuchastructuring.Foritemsateachofthesefourlevelswewanttoknowinwhatsenseonecansaythatthereissomethingwhichitisuptothemtodoornottodo.In fact, Plotinus's treatise is concernedmainlywith the freedomofGod and the sense in

whichsomethingcanbesaidtobeuptoGodtodoornottodo.Onecaneasilyseewhythiswouldhave tobehismain concern.Plato sometimes, for instance, in theTimaeus, presentsthingsasifthecontentsofthesensibleworldwerebestunderstoodasthemirrorimageofanimmaterial,purelyintelligible,reality,albeitanimagesomewhatdistortedbytheinadequaciesof themirror.Correspondingly,Plotinusassumes that thecharacteristicfeaturesof itemsatalowerlevelofrealityreflectthewaytheitemsatahigherlevelarerepresented,mirroredorimaged at a lower level. Thus what is an intellect at a higher level, unconcernedwith thevagariesofthephysicalworldandfocusedoneternaltruth,willappearatalowerlevelintheimageofarationalsoulthatisconcernedwiththevagariesofthephysicalworldandtheneedsthatlifeinitentails..Indeed,justasyoudonotseetwothingswhenyoulookatapersonandwhenyouthenlook

attheimageofapersoninamirrorbutonlyoneandthesamething,namely,theperson,sotherational soul is nothing but the intellect as it appears at a lower level. Hence, if it is animportantcharacteristicofembodiedhumanbeingsthattheyare,oratleastcanbe,freeanditispartoftheirnaturetobefreeoratleasttobeabletobefree,thischaracteristicmusthaveitssource in a corresponding characteristic at the next higher level, a counterpart to humanfreedomattheleveloftherationalsoul.Thisinturnmusthaveitscounterpartatthenexthigherlevel,thelevelofthepuredisembodiedintellect,andthisinturnmusthaveitssourceinsomefeature of theOneor theGood.Hencewhatwe are interested in is this feature of theOne,whichistheultimatesourceofallfreedom,includingourfreedom.ItisonlyifweunderstandtheOneas thearchetypeofallfreedom,to theextent thatwecanunderstandit, thatwewillunderstand our freedom for what it is, a reflection of a reflection of a reflection of divinefreedom.Itisbecauseofthisthatinchapter7,whenheturnstodiscussingthefreedomoftheOne,PlotinuscansaythatallotherthingsreceivefromtheOnethepowersorabilitieswhichputthemintoapositioninwhichonecansayofthemthattheyarefree.NeverthelessthefreedomoftheOnecannotbethestartingpointofourinquiry.Itisadark

andobscurematterforus.Thisiswhyitneedstobeclarified.Sowehavetostartfromwhatisfamiliartous—fromthefamiliarfactthatthereissomesenseinwhichtherearethingswhichitisuptoustodoornotdo.OurprocedurehereistypicallyAristotelian.Westartfromthingswithwhichweare familiar; though theyarenotveryclear,weat leasthavesome intuitions


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aboutthem.And,ontheirbasis,wetrytoadvancetotheprinciplesunderlyingthem.Theyturnouttobeveryclear,oncewehavetakenholdofthem.Withtheseprinciplesinhandwereturntolookat thefamiliar thingswestartedoutfrom.Now,viewedinlightof theprincipleswefound,wealsocomereallytounderstandthefamiliarthings.HencePlotinus'sassumptionmustbethatthesenseandthewayinwhichwearefreeultimatelybecomeintelligibleonlyinlightofourunderstandingofdivinefreedom.Andwehaveseenwhyinhisviewthismustbeso:ourfreedomisbutareflectionorimageofGod'sfreedom.Morespecifically,Plotinusdoesnotjustbeginwithsomethingwearefamiliarwith,namely,

thepresumedfactthatwearefree,butwiththenotionwehaveofsomething'sbeinguptous,whenwethinkthattherearethingswhichitisuptoustodoornottodo.Andwethenworkourwayupwards.Welookatthewayandthesenseinwhichindividualhumanbeingscanbesaidtobefree,atthewayandthesenseinwhichsoulscanbesaidtobefree,andthewayandthesenseinwhichintellectscanbesaidtobefree.Forweshouldnotexpectthatthetermfreeappliesatalllevelsinthesamesenseandway.WearefamiliarfromAristotlewiththisideaofahierarchyofsenses.Aristotlestartsouthiscareerbythinkingthattherearelotsofsubstancesin theworld,amongthem,Socratesandotherhumanbeings,plants,animals,stars,andGod.Aristotleatthisearlypointtalksasifalltheseweresubstancesinthesamesenseandway.11ButlaterAristotlemadethefirstmovestocorrectthismistake.Hisownmatureviewseemstohave been thatGod is a substance in a different sense andway from the sense andway inwhichcorporealbeingsaresubstances.Indeed,heseemstohaveassumedthat thesenseandwayinwhichcorporealsubstancesaresubstanceshastobeunderstoodasaweakenedversionofthesenseandwayinwhichGodisasubstance,justasAristotlealsothinksthatthewayanartifactisasubstanceisaweakenedversionofthewayanaturalbodyisasubstance.Plotinusthinks of freedom analogously. As we move up the hierarchy, we have to look for theappropriate sense and way in which things at this level can be said to be free, such thatfreedomatalowerlevelcanbeunderstoodasaweakenedanalogueoffreedomatthehigherlevel.Hecalls thisprocessof suitably changing the senseof “free”or “up tous”metaphor(metapherein,1.19–20).The notion of something's being up to us from which Plotinus starts is this (1.31–33):

somethingisuptous,ifitisobedient(douleuei)toourwilling,andwhetheritcomesaboutordoesnotisamatteroftheextenttowhichwewillit.This,asitstands,isfarfromtransparent;indeed, there is a textual difficulty.12 But the context makes it very clear that for Plotinussomethingwhichisuptousmustsatisfytwoconditions:first,itmustsatisfytheconditionthat,whether it comes about or does not come about, is not already settled by the course of theworld, independent of us; and, second, whether it does comes about depends on us, morespecifically,onourwillingtodoit.Something like the first condition is necessary because, as Plotinus pointed out in the

previous line (1.30), we may will to do something, but the circumstances prevent us fromdoingitandstandinthewayofitsgettingdone,thoughwewanttodoit.Somethingwhichwearepreventedfromgettingdone,eventhoughwewilltodoit,maybeevenstronglywilltodoit,issurelynotsomethingwhichisuptous.Sothefirstconditionissupposedtoensurethatnothingintheworldstandsinthewayofourdoingit.To understand the second condition, we have to see, as becomes apparent from the


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immediately following lines, that Plotinus, like Alexander of Aphrodisias, is trying todistinguishbetweenwhatisvoluntaryandwhatisuptous(seep.95).Plotinuscharacterizesthevoluntary(hekousion)aswhatwedoknowingfullwellwhatwearedoingandnotbeingforcedtodoit.Thisroughlycorresponds,andobviouslyismeanttocorrespond,toAristotle'scharacterization of things for whichwe can be held responsible (hekontes). So, if you aremildlyhungryandyouseeapieceoffood,youmighthaveanappetiteforthispieceoffoodwhichmakesyougetthepieceoffoodandeatit.Thisisvoluntary,becausenothingforcesyoutoeatthefood,andyouknowperfectlywellwhatyouaredoing.Butinrequiringthatanaction,inordertobeuptous,beduetoawilling,Plotinusrequiresthatsuchanactionbemotivatednotbyanykindofdesirebutbyadesireofreason,asopposedtoanonrationaldesire,asintheexamplejustconsidered.Thisrequirementseemsplausibleenoughand,onthefaceofit,seemsreasonablycloseto

Alexander'sconceptionofwhat isuptousanditsdifferencefromwhat ismerelyvoluntary.But now Plotinus (in the immediately following lines 1.33–34) contrasts the voluntary andwhatisuptousbysayingthatthevoluntaryisthatwhichwedoknowinglyandwithoutbeingforcedtodoit,whereassomethingisuptousonlyifwearemasters(kyrioi)overwhetheritgetsdoneornot.Thischaracterizationwillbe theopeningwhichallowsPlotinus todriveadeepwedge betweenAlexander's and his own conception ofwhat is to count as an actionwhichisuptous,anactionwhichisfree.BythetimePlotinushasfinishedwiththisoperation,weshallhaveanotionof freedomwhich is remarkablyclose to theStoicnotionand inanycaseagreatdealstrongerandmoredemandingthanAlexander'snotion.Tosee the forceof thisnewcharacterizationofwhat isup tousasbeingamatterofour

being masters and of our being in charge of what we are doing, consider the following.Supposeyouaretheslave, theservant,orthesubordinateofsomebodywhohasauthorityorpoweroveryou.He ismaster (kyrios), andhedecideswhatgetsdone. It ishiswillwhichdecideswhethersomethinggetsdone.Soheordersyoutodosomething.Youdoit.Youdoitvoluntarily.Hedoesnotforceyoutodoit,andyouknowwhatyouaredoing.Butitisnotthecasethatyoudowhatyoudo,becauseyouyourselfdecidedorwilledthatthisshouldgetdone.Itwasratherthewillofyourmasterthatitshouldgetdone,indeed,thatitshouldgetdonebyyou.Perhaps, left toyourowndevices,youwouldratherhavedonesomethingelse.Perhapsyoudonotevenparticularlylikedoingwhatyouaretoldtodo.Inanycase, itwasnotyourwill,yourdecision,oryour idea that thisshouldgetdone.ThusPlotinus is requiring, foranaction to be up to us, that it bewe ourselveswhowill to do it. There is a crucial shift ofemphasis here from “Is this something youwill to do, as opposed to something youmerelydesire todo?” to“Is this reallywhatyouwill todo,asopposed to somethingsomebodyorsomethingelsewantsyoutodo?”AndPlotinusisgoingtoexploitthisshiftinwhatfollows.Inchapters2and3hearguesthatforyouractiontobeuptoyou,itmustbethecasethatyour

impulse, or your desire, to do it must be of a certain kind. It cannot be mere appetite(epithymia).Foranappetitehasitsorigininimpressionswhichdonotentirelydependonus,becausetheyareproducedbythebody,inparticularthebodilyfluids.13Somethinganalogouscanbearguedforthedesireofspirit(thymos).Thus,ifwerememberthethreetypesofdesirePlato andAristotledistinguished,weare leftwith thedesireof reason,or, asPlotinusnowputsit,aconsiderationofreason(logismos),combinedwithadesire.Sowemightthinkthat


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Plotinus isnow referring to thebeliefonehas come to, that itwouldbe agood thing todosomethingorother,andthedesireofreasonthisbeliefgivesriseto.HencewemightalsothinkthatwehavenowidentifiedforPlotinushowanactionmustbemotivatedinordertocountasfree. But there is good reason why Plotinus prefers to talk about a rational considerationcombinedwithdesire.Foritnowturnsoutthatitisnotgoodenoughforanactiontocountasfreethatitbeanactionwhichismotivatedbyadesireofreason.Plotinusinsiststhatthedesireinquestionshouldbeadesirewhichhasitssourceinyourrationalconsiderations,ratherthanthereverse.Thatistosay,thedesirehastobegeneratedbyyourrationalconsiderationsastowhatwouldbeagoodthingtodo.Onlythenwillthedesirebeawilling,properlyspeaking.The reverse case, I take it, is this. We have an appetite, and this generates a rational

considerationtotheeffectthatitwouldbeagoodthingtoactaccordingly.Thisrationalizationinturnproducesawilling.Butthiswilling,givenitsorigininanappetite,willnotsufficetoqualifytheactionasfree.Ratherthanbeingcontentwiththisrestriction,Plotinusasks:Whatifyour rationalconsideration ledyou to thewrongconclusionandhence thewrongdesire, thewrongwilling?Accordingtohim,theensuingactionisnotfreeinthiscaseeither,becauseyoudowhatyoudoonlybecauseyoumadeamistakeandweremisledbysomethingorother.Fortheactiontocountasfree,yourconclusionmustbetherightconclusionandthedesiretherightdesire tohave.Buteventhis isnotgoodenough.Forsupposeitwasjustbychancethatyouhappenedontherightconclusion.Aschancehadit,youmadetwoterriblelogicalhowlersinyourconsiderations,whichcancelledeachotherout.Soitischancewhichmadeyoudowhatyoudo.Butwesurelydonotwantthefreedomofouractionstobeamatterofchance.Plotinusthencomestotheconclusionthattheactionisfreeonlyifithasitssourceinknowledge,thatis, in thekindof insightandunderstandingwhichcharacterize thewiseperson.AndthuswearebacktoStoicism,almost.Isayalmostbecause, thoughPlotinusandtheStoicsagree thatonlythewisepersonisfree,thereisconsiderabledisagreementbetweenthemconcerningthenatureofthisfreedom.ThefreedomwhichPlotinusallowstoahumanbeinginthefleshishighlyqualifiedintwo

ways.Onequalificationhasitsorigininthefactthatwehaveanonrationalpartofthesoulanda body.Hencewe have certain desires by nature.We cannot help having them.As a resulthowevermuchwemaywanttohavesomethingtoeat,becauseweunderstandthatitwouldbeagoodthingtoeatandhencehavethedesireofreasontohavesomethingtoeat,wealsoineatingaregenerallyactinguponanaturalnonrationaldesireandthusfollowingthenecessityofnature (2.13–15). Thus in eating, even if we are wise and virtuous, we are generally notentirelyfree.Ourmotivationismixed.Thesecondqualificationonourfreedomaccruestotheembodiedhumanbeingfromthesoul.Soweshouldnowturntothesoulanditsfreedom,toseewhatthisqualificationis.

Aswemayhaveimagined,thesoulisfreeifitiswiseandvirtuous.Itsfunctionistoprovidetheembodiedhumanbeingwithacharacteristicallyhumanlife,ideally,agoodlife.Thusthesoulalsohastoconcernitselfwiththemaintenanceandwelfareofthebody.AwisePlotiniansoulisnothostiletothebodyortothevisibleworld.Althoughdivineprovidenceinhisviewdoesnotreachdownintoallthevisibleworld'sdetails,astheStoicsassume,itsgeneralorderisprovidential,anditispartofthisorderthattherebesuchaworldwithlivingbeingsinit,


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animatedbysouls.Foranysoulwhichcansee,thisvisibleworldhasitsgenuine,bynomeansmeretricious,charms.Afterall,itisareflectionofeternaltruthsandthegoodnessandbeautyofitssource.Thevisibleworldisadmittedlyafaintreflection.Andyouhavetokeepinmindthatyoucannotexpectbodies,includingthebodyyouyourselflookafter,tobeanybetterthanabody can be. What else can your body do, devoid of reason as it is, but clamor for thesatisfactionofitsneeds?14Thatthesoullooksaftertheconcernsofthebodydoesnotmean,though,thatitmakesthese

concernsitsown,becomesenamoredwiththebody,oranybody,andbecomesattachedtoitorenslavedtoit.Itdoesnotmeanthatthesoulhastoletitselfbeconfusedinsuchawayastorationalizethedesiresofthebody,asifthegoodofthebodywereitsowngood.Thebody'sgoodconsistsinitsbeinginagoodfunctionalstate.Thesoul'sgoodconsistsinitsbeingwiseandvirtuous.Hencethesoul'sinterestliesinattainingandmaintainingitswisdomandvirtue.And if acting wisely and virtuously involves giving up one's life, one's possessions, one'schildren,andevenone'scountry,sobeit(6.14–17).Thiswillsufficetoexplainthesecondqualificationonourfreedom.Eventhesoul'sfreedom

is rather tenuous and qualified. Given the needs and desires of the body and all the morecomplexdesirestheydrawintheirtrain,thesoulconstantlybecomesperturbed.Itmaycometobeinabadway,evenifitisvirtuous,andhavetostraightenitselfouttomaintainitsvirtueandfreedom.HencePlotinus'svirtuoussoulisnotunchallengedinitsfreedominthewaytheStoicwiseman is. Nor, it seems, does his virtuous person fit the image of Plato's or Aristotle'sparagon, who has no source of motivation, no inclination left to act other than virtuouslywithoutanydifficultyorconflictwhatsoever.ForPlotinus,itseems,thesoul'sunionwiththebodyinevitablypresentsathreat(5.27ff)toitsvirtueandhenceitsfreedom.Thereisyetanotherqualificationonthefreedomofthesoul.Isitreallyfreetochoosetoact

inavirtuousway?Plotinustakesupthisquestioninchapter5,wherewegetananswerwhichisrathersimilartotheStoics'andOrigen'sanswer,thoughfordifferentreasons.TheStoicsandOrigenwenton theassumption that theway theworldunfolds isdeterminedbyprovidence.Andthis,inturn,requiredaqualificationofthesenseinwhichwearefreetoactintheworld.This is not Plotinus's problem, since, as we have already noted, he does not believe thatprovidencedeterminesallthathappens,includingouractions.Buthestillhastheproblemthat,eveninhisviewoftheworld,itisnotcompletelyunderourcontrolwhetherweshallsucceedindoingwhatwesetouttodo(5.4–5).Sointhissenseforhimtooitisnot,strictlyspeaking,amatter of our choice whether something gets done by us which we will to do.We are notmasters(kyrioi)overwhetherwesucceed indoingwhatwesetout todo(5.5): it isnotwewhodecidewhether somethinghappens togetdone.Allwecando isourbest (5.6–7).ButthenPlotinushasanotherworry.Ifwearevirtuous,wewilltoactvirtuously,eventhoughitisnotuptouswhetherweshallsucceedin theseactions.AndnowPlotinusquestionswhetherwecan reallybe said towill orwant todowhat is virtuous.LookatHippocrates, he says(5.20).Heisawonderfuldoctor,and,needlesstosay,hewillbegladtocurehispatientsoftheirafflictions.Butsurely,itisalsothecasethatHippocrateswouldpreferthathispatientsnotbeillinthefirstplaceandthathenotbeputinapositionwherehehastocuresomebody.Inthissensehisactionisforcedonhimbythewaytheworldis.Considervirtuousaction.Ifyouarewiseandvirtuous,youwillbecourageousinwar.But


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surely, itwould be perverse towish there to be awar so that you can be courageous.Youwouldratherthattherebenowarinthefirstplaceandhencenoneedforyourcourage.Youwillbejustinrenderingjustice.Butsurely,youwouldrathertherebenoneedtorenderjusticeor to right wrongs. Seen in this light, even virtuous actions, for all the purity of theirmotivation,nolongerseemtobereallyandunqualifiedlyfree.Theyareinsomesenseforcedonyouby theway theworld is. Ifyoudo themnevertheless, it isbecauseyoursoul, if it iswiseandvirtuous,isattachedtothegood,realizesthatthisiswhatneedstobedone,and,onpainofbecomingirrational,willstodowhatneedstobedone.Butwhatitisreallyinterestedinisbeingrational,inhavingunderstandingandinsight,andinitsattachmenttothegood.Thisiswhatitsgoodliesin,anditwillbewareofjeopardizingthisgoodbylettingitselfbecomeconfusedinsuchawayastomakeyouactnonvirtuously.Plotinusinfersfromthisthatthefreedomofthesoulisnotprimarilyafreedomtomakeus

dothingsintheworldbutisratheraninternalfreedomtothinktherightthoughtsandformtherightdesires,basedonaninsightintorealityandanunconfusedunderstandingofthegood.ThisstateofthesoulPlotinuscallsasecondintellect(noustisallos),andhesaysofthesoulinthisstatethatithasbeen“intellectualized,”asitwere(no th nai;5.34–36).Inthisstatethesouldoesnotallowustobeslaves.

With thiswe can now turn to the intellect.We have to understand that Plotinus's intellects,unlikeOrigen's,arenotcreated.Theyareeternal.Theyknowtheeternaltruths.Theyhaveasgood and firm an understanding of the good as a perfect intellect can have. They eternallycontemplatethetruth.Theyunderstandthattheirgoodconsistspreciselyintheircontemplatingthetruth.Sothisiswhattheywanttodo.Thisiswhattheyimmenselyenjoydoing.Andtheyenjoyitallthemore,sincetheyinvariablysucceedinwhattheyaredoing.Theyareperfectlyfree.Theycandowhatevertheywanttodo,giventhatthisisalltheyeverwanttodo.Itisalsoguaranteed that their being able to do whatever they want to do does not lead to anyundesirable consequences. All they ever want to do, inasmuch as they are disembodiedintellects,istoknowandunderstandthetruthanditssourceingoodness.Thereisnothingtodistractthemfromthis,nothingtomakethemwanttodoanythingelse,nothingtopreventthemfromdoingwhattheywanttodo.Wemustfindthisarathercuriousformoffreedom,givenourmodernnotions.Theintellects,

quite literally,candonothingexceptwhat theyaredoing; theycannotchoose todoanythingelse. If we remember Alexander's notion of freedom as involving the ability to chooseotherwise, many ancients must already have seen a difficulty here. Plotinus addresses thisdifficulty invariousways.Hesays(4.4ff) thatonemightworrywhether the intellect isfree.For,thoughitisuptotheintellecttodowhatitdoes,itisnotuptoitnottodowhatitdoes.Andonemight argue (4.23ff) that the intellect, given its nature, cannot but dowhat it does.AgainstthisPlotinusarguesthattheintellectandthenatureoftheintellectarenottwodifferentthings,such that thenatureof the intellectdecidesordetermineswhat the intellecthas todoandtheintellectthendoesit.ForPlotinus(inthis,followingAristotle),thenatureoressenceofimmaterialobjectsisidenticaltotheobjectsthemselves.Sotheintellectcannotbesaidtobeforcedbyitsnaturetodowhatitdoessincetheintellectisitsownnature.Buttellingly,themain drift of Plotinus's argument is to invert things against our modern expectations. The


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intellectisunqualifiedlyfreepreciselybecausethereisnochancewhatsoeverthatitmightactotherwise,thatitmightchooseotherwise, thatitmightevenbetemptedtochooseotherwise.Tothinkdifferently,Plotinusclaims(4.20–23),istothinkthatwhatisbadaboutslaveryisthatoneisnotfreetodoevilthingsortodothingswhichitisnotinone'sinteresttodo.Whatisbadaboutslavery,rather, is thatonedoesnothavetheability(exousia) topursueone'sowngood.Insteadtheslaveissupposedtopursuethegoodofsomebodyelse.Buttheintellectsarefreetodopreciselythosethingswhichitisintheirinteresttodo,whichtheyardentlywanttodo,andwhichtheyenjoydoing.Theyarenotforcedbyanythingoranybodyelsetodothis.Sowhatisunfreeaboutthem?Incontrast,thisfreedomoftheintellectshowsthetenuousnessofthesoul'sfreedominthat,

evenifthesoulisvirtuous,itisconstantlytemptedbythebodytoactotherwise,mightchoosetoactotherwise,andcouldactotherwise.Thelimitationsofhumanfreedomareevidentinthefactthatweorthesoul,solongaswearenotvirtuous,constantlydoactotherwise,evenifwestrivetoattainourgood,namely,virtueandwisdom.Alexanderhadlocatedfreedomandmeritprimarilyinthisstateofnotyetbeingfullyvirtuousbutstrivingtobevirtuous(p.100).But,Plotinusargues,strivingforagoodwhichonedoesnotyethaveorwhichoneislackingisjustanothersignoflackingfreedomandnotbeingself-determined.For,inthiscase,oneisdrivenbysomethingoutsideoneself.Freedom,forPlotinus,wouldratherseemtobeamatterofthesecurepossessionandcontroloverwhatonewillsandwants.Inanycase,weseesufficientlybynowwhyhethinksthatanintellectisunqualifiedlyfree,butasoulisfreeonlyinsofarasithas become like an intellect with its freedom qua soul something highly tenuous andqualified.15Finally,weseethattheembodiedhumanbeingisfree,insofarasitssoulisfree,butthatitsfreedomtodothingsintheworldissohighlyqualifiedthatfreedomhardlyseemstherightwordforit.

With this, then, we can at last turn to God. It is often said that Jews and Christians weremonotheists, whereas pagans were polytheists. I am inclined to think that almost allphilosophersinlateantiquityweremonotheists.16Theydistinguishedbetweenhotheos (GodortheGod)andthegods—beingssuperiortohumans,which,becauseoftheirgoodness,enjoyeternalblissor,inthecaseofStoicism,enjoyblissuntilthenextworldconflagration.Ifyoudonot like thewordgods,Porphyry tellsus tocall themangels.17Plotinusat theoutsetof thetreatiseveryclearlymakesthesamedistinction(compare1.4with1.6andwith1.18–19).Thegodsaretheintellects.Theydoindeedenjoyalifeofeternalbliss,buttheywouldneverdreamof thinking of themselves asGod. It is sometimes said that, even ifGreek philosophers didbelieve in one thingwhich they called “God,” thiswas an abstract principle, rather than apersonalGod.Nowit isperfectly true that theGodofPlotinusandPlatonists likehimisanexceedinglyabstractprinciple.Yetabstractdoesnotseemtobequitetherightword,becauseitstillsuggeststhatGodissomethingorotherwhichonecanabstract.Therightword,rather,istranscendent.Still,itiseasytoseewhyonemightgettheimpressionthattheirGodisnotapersonalGod.ThePlatonistsdorefertothistranscendentprincipleofallthereis,butasaruletheysteadfastlyrefusetosayanythingaboutit.Andthereasonforthisissimpleandshouldbeeasily understood by any Christian, especially by those devoted to the spiritual life. TherequiteliterallycannotpossiblybeanythingwhichitwouldbetruetosayaboutGod.ForGodis


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thesourceandoriginofalltruthandexistedbeforealltruth.Sotheappropriateattitudeisoneof silence. Thus in our treatise (11.1–2) Plotinus, having raised the question of what thisprincipleis,asks,“Orshallwe,havingfallensilent,justleave?”Ennead.VI.8 is the only treatisewherePlotinus breaks this silence systematically and at

great length. All of a sudden we are confronted with a God nobody could possibly denypersonhood to,except,ofcourse, that it isnot true to say,either, thatGod isaperson.WhydoesPlotinusbreakthissilence?Onereason is thatPlatonismsuffers fromadeepstructuraldifficulty,whichIalludedtoearlier.Everythingissupposedtobeunderstoodintermsofoneultimateprinciple,butthisprinciple,beingultimate,isitselfbeyondintellectualunderstandingand beyond truth. But, if we want to understand freedom, we have to understand how thefreedom of the intellect, and subsequently all other freedom, has its source in this firstprinciple.Sowehavetoresorttolanguage,knowingfullwellthatwearemisusinglanguage.Theproblemisnotthatthereisanythinginadequateaboutourlanguageorthattheseobjectsforwhich we use this language are too elevated for our pedestrian discourse, which wedeveloped, after all, to talk aboutmoremundane things.Theproblem is that no language inprinciple,howeveridealitisbywhateverstandards,willbeapplicable.This, of course, does not exclude the possibility of our saying that one should not say

anythingaboutGod,andthisisliterallytrue.NordoesitexcludethepossibilityofoursayingthatonecansaythattherearecertainthingsinparticularwhichitwouldbequitemisleadingtosayaboutGod.Wecan,for instance,saythat itwouldbeblasphemoustosay that theworldconsistedofsomanytrees,somanytigers,somanyhumanbeings,etcetera,etcetera,andoneGod.PlotinusattheveryoutsetofhisdiscussionofGod'sfreedom,in7.11ff,referstojustsuchaterriblethingtosay(hotolm roslogos),ashecallsit.TheterriblethingtosayisthatGodjusthappenstobethewayheis,and,giventhatheisthisway,hecannothelpbutactthewayhedoes;putdifferently,heisforcedtoactthewayhedoesbythewayheis,andthewayheis,hejusthappenstobelike.It iseasytoseewhyPlotinus,andindeedanyGreekphilosopherfromPlatoandAristotle

onwards,would find this amonstrous thing to say.The search for ultimateprinciples is thesearchforprinciplesintermsofwhicheverythingcanbeunderstoodandexplainedbutwhichdonotthemselvesrequireanyfurtherexplanation.Butwhatwegetin“theterriblethingtosay”istheassumptionthathowtheworldishasitssourceinabrutefactwhichdoesadmitofanexplanation,totheextentthatwecansaythatitisbychancethatGodisthiswayandhencetheworld is this way: we could have had a different God, and the world could have beenotherwise.Thisview,whichisevidentlysoabhorrenttoPlotinus,sharesatleastonefeaturewith theviewChristiansoftenattribute tohimandPlatonists likehim,namely, theviewthatGoddoeswhathedoesofnecessity,becauseitishisnaturesotoact.ThisissupposedtostandinstarkcontrasttotheChristianviewthatGodcreatedtheworldbyafreeactofthewill,asaresultofwhichtheworldiscontingent,thoughGodhimselfisanecessarybeing.HerewefindPlotinusvehementlyrejectingtheviewthatGodisnotfreebecausehehadno

sayinwhatheislikeorbecauseitwasnotuptohimtobelikethis,andbecause,beingathinglike this,he is forcedtoact thewayhedoes.Perhapswegetclearerabout thenatureof themonstrousclaimifwetakeintoaccountthatitisthemorespecificclaimthatitjusthappenstobe the nature of God to be good and so he cannot but act well.18 But God (so the claim


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continues)hadnohandinhisbeinggood,sinceitwasnotuptoGodtobegoodbydoingwhatittakestobecomevirtuousorwise;ifthiswereso,wemightalsosaythathisactions,oncehewasgood,werefree,ratherthannecessitatedorforced,becausetheyatleastwerebasedonearlier free choices, asGodwas trying to becomegood.ButGod is not like this.His verynatureistobegood.Andsothereisnothingfreeabouthisgoodactionsorabouthiscreation.Plotinuscontinuesformanychapterstodemolishthisterribleclaim,forinstance,byarguing

thatatGod'slevelthereexistsnochance,becausechancealreadypresupposesacertainkindofpluralityandregularity,againstthebackgroundofwhichsomethingcanbesaidtobe,ortohappen,bychance,whichwefindonlyattheleveloftheworldwelivein.Healsoarguesthatthere can be no necessity atGod's level, because necessity appears for the first time at thelowerlevelofnecessarytruths.Whatwearehereinterestedin,though,iswhatPlotinushastosayintheend.I noted earlier that in the case of the intellects Plotinus is heavily relying on Aristotle.

AccordingtoAristotle,inthecaseofindividualhumanbeingswecandistinguishbetween(1)thehumanbeingassuch;(2)theintellect,whichistheabilityorpotentialitytothink,whichwemay,ormaynot,exercise;and(3)anexercisingofthisabilityinanactualthought.Acrucialpart ofAristotle's theory is that the intellect, being themere possibility that onemay think,existsonlyactuallyasanactualthought.19Whenwenowcometotheeternal,disembodied,andimmaterialintellectsofPlotinus,thereisnolongeranythingwhichhasanintellectasdistinctfromactuallybeinganintellect.Andsincethereisnothingherewhichhasthisintellect,thereisalsonothingwhichcouldexerciseorfailtoexercisethisability.Theseintellectseternallythink.Andsincetheintellectexistsonlyasathought,theseintellectsarejustthoughts.Whatismore,sincetheyareimmaterial,theyareidenticaltotheirnatureoressence.Sointhecaseoftheseintellects,theintellectassuch,thenatureoftheintellect,andtheactivityoftheintellectallcoincideinonething,namely,athought.Neverthelesswecanstillmakeformaldistinctions.We can still say that the intellect thinks theway it does because it lies in the nature of theintellecttothinkinthisway.Ontheotherhand,wecandenythatitsnatureforcestheintellecttothinkinthiswayandthatthereforetheintellectisnotfreebecausethenatureoftheintellectisnotonethingwhichcoulddecide,thewayaslavemastercould,whattheintellecthastodo.IfwenowturntoGod,becauseofGod'sabsolutesimplicity,eventhisformaldistinctionis

gone. It is not that in the case of God we could still, at least formally or conceptually,distinguishbetweenGod,hisnature,andhisactivity.HenceitdoesnotmakeanysensetosaythatGodisforcedbyhisnaturetodowhathedoes.Thisdidnotevenmakesenseattheleveloftheintellect.Hence,afortiori,itdoesnotmakeanysenseinthecaseofGod.Whatismore,it doesnotmakeany sense to say thatGod just happens tohave thisnature.For thatwouldpresupposeourbeingabletodistinguishbetweenGodandthenaturehehappenstohave.But,wemayask,howdoesthisshedanylightonGod'sfreedomand,moreimportantinaway,onfreedomingeneral?WehavearguedthatitcannotbeultimatelybychancethatGoddoeswhathedoes,byhappeningtobethesortofthingheis,andbyactingasthissortofthingnaturallydoes.Inanycase,wecertainlydonotwanttosaythatitisbychancethatGoddoesthisratherthanthat.WehavealsoarguedthatitisnotbynecessitythatGodactsthewayhedoes.Thereisnothingwhichcouldforcehimtoactthewayhedoes.Wecertainlycannotsaythathisnatureforceshimtodoso.Whatotherpossibilityisleft,then,buttosay,ifoneistosayanything,that


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Godactsthewayhedoesbecausehehimselfwillstoactthisway?Now, this, thoughnot literally true, isenlightening in the followingway.Fornowwesee

whattheessenceoffreedomis—theabilitytodosomethingbecauseonewillsorwantstodoitoneself,ratherthanbecausesomethingorsomebodyelsemakesonedoitorevenmakesonewanttodoit.Andwealsoseehowthisfreedomatdifferentlevelswouldtakedifferentformsandbecomediminished.For,onceweturntotheintellects,thereisatleastaformaldistinctionbetweenthemandtheirnature.Andsowecansaythatitistheirnaturewhichmakesthemdowhat theydo,namely,contemplate thetruth.But theyarebynaturegood.Theyhaveanaturesuchthattheycannotdoanythingelsebutwhatanintellectismeanttodo,namely,contemplatethe truth.Nevertheless theyare free,because theydowhat theydo,because they themselveswilltodoit,andnobodyornothingelseforcesthemtodoit.Indeed,theyaresecureintheirfreedomtodowhattheywanttodo.Whenweturntosouls,thematterisdifferent.Foritisnotthenatureofthesoultobegood,

tobewiseandvirtuous. Ithas toacquirea stateofwisdomandvirtueoutofwhich itdoesthings, because itwills to do them.And this state is not secure. This iswhy it can chooseotherwiseandactotherwise.Thisisnotindicativeofahigherdegreeoffreedombutratherofadiminishedfreedom.In thecaseof theembodiedhumanbeing,notonlydoes itssoulhavethis diminished freedom at best, its body does not even have any freedom. It is bound bynaturalnecessity.Hence,forinstance,ahumanbeingcannotdowhateveritwantstodo,unlikeintellects.Let us return toGod'swill.We shouldnot categorically say thatGod is freeor thatGod

wills anything. For neither expression is strictly true. We use them to fend off amisunderstandingofGodand,atthesametime,tokeepourmindsopentotheideathatGodisthesourceofourfreedom.But, ifwesaythisatall,wealsohavetoremember that inGod,givenhisabsolutesimplicity,thereisnodistinctionbetweenGod'snatureandGod'sactivity.So,ifwesaythatGoddoeswhathedoesbecausehewillstodoit,wemightalsosaythatGodis thewayhe isbecausehewillsorwants tobe thisway.And thismakessomesense.For,afterall,PlotinusinsiststhatGodisbeautiful(kalos)andlovable(erasimos),indeedthatheisloveandloveofhimself(15.1–2).So,ofcourse,hewouldwanttobethewayheis.Butweshould also note that there is no distinction between thiswilling andwhatGodwills. Thatdistinctionhasaplaceonlyatthelowerlevels,mostconspicuouslyatthelevelofthesoulandofembodiedhumanbeings,wherewillingandbeingacertainwayordoingsomethingmightbeentirelyseparated.Wemightwilltodosomethingbutbeunabletodoit.Wemightwishtobeacertainwaybutbeunabletobelikethis.20Hence,ifwedospeakofGod'swillingatall,whatwehavehereisanactofthedivinewill

withwhichthewholeofreality,fromtheintellectsdownwards,begins.Anditisnotaforcedactofthewillbutafreeactofthewill.Thereforeitcannotbetruethattheworld'sdependenceonGod'swillisaspecificallyJudaeo-Christianidea.Italsocannotbetruethat,accordingtoPlotinus,andthePlatonistslikehim,theexistenceoftheworldanditsgeneralcharacterareanecessaryconsequenceofGod'snature.IhavetoaddatthispointthatPlotinus'sviewonthisquestioncomesasagreatsurprise foranybodywhoseunderstandingofGreekphilosophy isformedbythestudyofPlatoandAristotle.ButwehavetorememberthatPlotinuswaswritingthistreatiseabout590yearsafterAristotle'sdeath.


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Nevertheless one eminent Plotinian scholar, A. H. Armstrong, tried to persuade us thatPlotinus was writing under Christian influence.21 Armstrong starts out by claiming that thequestion of God's freedom did not seriously occupy philosophers until roughly the time ofPlotinusandthat,whenitcametooccupythem,itwas“probablyduetoJewishandChristiancontacts”(399).Andhegoesontosuggestthat“themonstrousclaim”haditssourceactuallyinanobjectionmadeagainstPlotinusbyaChristianacquaintancewhoclaimedthat,accordingtoPlotinus,thecreationisanecessaryconsequenceofGod'snature.ThisobjectionissupposedtohavemadePlotinusrethinkhisposition.Ifindthisincredible.OnereasonisthatPlotinus'sGodhadallalongbeenalevelaboveany

necessity.SotherecanneverhavebeenanyneedforPlotinustotakethiscriticismseriously.Armstronghimselflateracknowledgesthathissuggestionhasnotgenerallybeenaccepted.22 Idwellonthispointbecauseitisbecomingincreasinglyclearthatthereisverylittletotheso-called Judaeo-Christianwayof thinkingabout thingswhich is specifically Judaeo-Christian.WhatprimarilyspringstomindisthePharisaean-Christiandoctrineoftheresurrectionofthebody. Not surprisingly, given that Christianity is a historical phenomenon, there are paganparallelsforalmosteverythingelse.Henceweshouldresistthetemptationtothinkthatstrikingsimilarities,asweslowlybecomeawareofthem,eitherarenotsimilaritiesatallorareduetoChristianinfluence.Inanycase,wehaveseenthattherearedeep-rootedreasonsinPlotinus'sphilosophywhich

makehimsaythatGodhasawillwhichisfree.MoreoverwealsofindinPlotinustheviewthatourwillandourfreedomareintheimageofGod'swillandGod'sfreedom.Itisacrucialpartofthepointofthewholetreatisetoshowthis.Finally,itseemstomethatPlotinusdoesnotmakethemistakewhichsomeChristiansseem

to be so eager to make. God's will, by definition, is absolute and unconditioned.Anthropomorphicallyspeaking,thereisnothingwhichGodcouldorienthimselfbyinwillingwhathedoeswill.ButnowtheChristianideaseemstohavearisenthatourwillisintheimageofGodpreciselyinthatwearefreetomakeabsoluteandunconditionedchoiceswhichhaveno further explanation. This surely is a terrible mistake. Our freedom must consist in thefreedomtomake thechoiceswhichareappropriate in the lightofwhat theworld is likebyGod'swill.Ourchoicesare,orrathershouldbe,conditionedbytherealityGodcreated.ThatGod'swill is unconditioned is just due to the fact that there is no reality antecedent toGodwhichcouldconditionorevendeterminehischoice.Thisisonemorereasonwhyweshouldkeepinmindthatitisnotstrictlyspeakingtruethat

Godhasafreewill.But,settingthisaside,wearenotGod.Thereisarealityintowhichweareborn,whichwehavetodealwith,andinthelightofourunderstandingofwhichwehavetomake our choices. To think thatwe can justwill something by a sheer act of volition isratherclosetodeludingoneselfintothinkingthatoneisGod.


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CHAPTERNINE

Augustine:ARadicallyNewNotionofaFreeWill?

AgenerationortwoagoAugustineappearedinaverydifferentlightfromwhathewould,orshould,appearinnowadays.Iffiftyoreventhirtyyearsagooneknewsomethingaboutancientphilosophy,onehadfor themostpartstudied thepre-Socratics,Plato,andAristotleandhadenjoyedreadingauthorslikeLucretius,Cicero,andPlutarch.Ifonethenwentfurtherdownthecanonical list of outstanding philosophers living after Aristotle and turned, as one likelywould, toAugustine, one could not fail to be struck by his radical difference of outlook inalmosteverydetail.Itwastemptingtoassumethatthisradicaldifferencehadagreatdeal,ifnot everything, to do with Augustine's Christianity. So it is not surprising that accounts ofmedieval philosophy often begin with Augustine, as if, being a Christian, he were almostalreadyamedievalfigure.Infact,Augustine isverymuchanancient figure.Thedifference inoutlookbetweenPlato

andAristotle,on theonehand,andAugustine,on theotherhand, isnot, in the firstplace, amatter ofAugustine'sChristianitybut of his being a late ancient figure.This is true even ofAugustine's religiousoutlook, forevenChristianity itself isverymuchaphenomenonof lateantiquity. Itwas, of course,well known thatAugustinewas heavily indebted to the kind ofPlatonismwe find in Plotinus and in Porphyry. This is obvious from his own remarks, forinstance, in theConfessionsVIII.2.But a fewdecades agovery littlewasunderstoodaboutthis Platonism and about the views of Plotinus and Porphyry. The extent of Augustine'sindebtednesstothisPlatonism,whetherdirectorindirect,remainedunclear.Todaythingshavechanged,oratleasttheyshouldhavechanged.Wearenowbeginningto

haveamuchbetterunderstandingofthePlatonismAugustinewassoindebtedto.WealsohaveamuchbetterunderstandingofStoicism,thoughtheextentofStoicism'spervasiveinfluenceonAugustine is still insufficiently appreciated.Nor is it fully clear throughwhat channels thisStoicismreachedAugustine.Inlargepart,ofcourse, itcamethroughCicero,who, thoughhewasanAcademicskeptic,hadespousedthekindofPhiloneanskepticismwhichallowedforthequalifiedadoptionofphilosophicalviews;these,forthemostpart,turnedouttobeStoicorinspiredbyStoicism.1In Augustine's time the study of Cicero was perhaps themost crucial part of any higher

education forWesterners, especially for a professional rhetorician, asAugustinewas in hisFrede, Michael. A Free Will : Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought, edited by A. A. Long, University of California Press, 2011. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/asulib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=631055.Created from asulib-ebooks on 2019-08-17 06:35:29.

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early career. But we also have to remember in this context that by his time Platonism hadabsorbedlargedosesofStoicism.TheultimatedividinglinebetweenthetwoschoolswasthePlatonist belief in a transcendent God and an immaterial realm of reality, as opposed inStoicism toapurelymaterial realitywithGod immanent therein.Below thisdividing lineaPlatonistcouldaffordtoborrowalmostanythingfromStoicism.ThusPorphyry(VP17)talksofaphilosopher,Trypho,whomhecallsaStoicandPlatonist.MuchoftheStoicinfluenceonAugustinewill have beenmediated by Platonist sources. Finally, it seems thatAmbrose, inwhose circle in Milan Augustine became familiar with Platonism, was himself heavilyindebtedtoStoicism,especiallyStoicethics.2BeyondAugustine's heavy indebtedness toPlatonismandStoicism,weneed to remember

thathewasjoiningatradition,morethantwocenturiesold,ofsystematizingChristianbelief.While thiswasheavily indebted toPlatonismandStoicism, itwas alsonowdeveloping itsownmomentum.Here it is important to remember thatAugustine studiedMariusVictorinus,followingtheadviceofSimplicianus,aPlatonizingpriestwhohadbaptizedAmbroseandwhowashimselftobecomebishopofMilan.3VictorinushadbeenahighlysuccessfulrhetoricianwholateinlifehadconvertedtoChristianity.HehadtranslatedlogicalwritingsofAristotleandalso,itseems,sometreatisesofPlotinus'sandPorphyry's,presumablythePlatonici libriwhichhadsuchanimpactonAugustine.4HealsowrotebooksontheTrinity,andexegeticalworks, remarkably all of them on Paul'sEpistles.Augustine became eager to follow in hisfootsteps(seeConf.VIII.5.10).What is trueofAugustine's thought ingeneral is true inparticularabouthis thoughtonthe

will.HisviewofthewillispervasivelyStoicbutembeddedinaPlatonistnotionoftheworld.ItisalsoresponsivetoanowquitesubstantialChristiantraditionofthoughtonthematterand,notleastinmyopinion,toVictorinus.Henceweshouldfromtheoutsetbehighlysuspiciousofany claim thatAugustine initiated a radically newnotion of thewill thatwas inspired by aJudaeo-ChristiantraditionofthinkingaboutGodandtheworld.Afterall,weshouldnotforgetthateversinceJustinMartyr'sdays,oratleastsincethetimeofOrigen,therehadbeenagooddealofChristianthoughtonthematter,andthat,forOrigen,givenhislifefirstinAlexandriaandespeciallylaterinCaesarea,Judaismwasaverypowerfullivingreality,inwhichhetookanactiveinterestandforwhichhehadalevelofrespectsuchas,Isuspect,israthermissinginAugustine. Inanycase, itshouldstrikeusascurious thatmanygenerationsof rathereminentChristianauthorsshouldhavemissedoutonadistinctivefeatureofJudaeo-Christianthoughtconcerningamatter towhich theyattributedsuchgreat importance. It seemsmorepromisinginsteadtoexpectAugustine,givenhisoriginality,tohavesomethingnewtosayonthewillbutnewonamuchmoremodestscaleandwithintheconfinesofanevolvingChristianposition.WehavealreadyconsideredOrigen'sview.Notsurprisingly,giventhetraditionAugustineisworking in, there are striking similarities between his andOrigen's positions.But there arealso noteworthy differences. Hence it seems tome to bemost promising to focus on thesesimilaritiesanddifferencesandtoseewherethedifferencescomefrom.Iwillarguefortheconclusionthat,toalargeextent,thedifferencesareduetothefactthat

AugustinefollowstheStoicviewonfreedommuchmorecloselythanOrigendoes.ButIwanttoanticipatethisproposalbyaddressingimmediatelywhatItaketobethemainargumentforthe claim thatAugustine's notion of thewill is radically different from anythingwe find in


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Greekphilosophy.

The argument is this. InGreekphilosophy, it is claimed, intention orwilling appears eitherbeforeoraftercognitionasitsresultorby-product.Wereadilyseewhatismeant.IarguedinthesecondofthesechaptersthatPlatoandAristotledonothaveanotionofawill,sinceforthemawilling, a desire of reason, is a direct result of one's cognitive state: onceone seessomething to be good, onewills it. And, of course, it is also true that, according to Plato,Aristotle,andtheStoics,onenaturallywillsorwantstohavecognitionorknowledge.Soourlifeseemstoturnaround,anddependon,ourcognitivestate.Augustine's alleged difference from this position is that he, supposedly, separateswilling

fromcognition:ratherthanwilling'sbeingmadeadirectfunctionofcognition,itisitselfmadetobeacrucialfactorinvolvedincognition.Augustine'swilliseveninvolvedineveryactofperception.DihleexplicitlycontrastsStoic andPlatonicpsychologywithAugustine's “new”psychology.Forthem“theelementofwilloccursbeforeandaftertheveryactofintellectualperception.…IntheviewofSt.Augustine,willindeedpartakesintheveryactofcognitionandis by nomeans restricted to preliminary and subsequent activities.”5 Dihle also points out,quite rightly, the strong connection Augustine sees between the will and faith and howAugustine again and again insists that you first have to believe on faith, before you canunderstand(p.129).NowthiscertainlyisnotanotionofawillwefindinPlatoorAristotleoronethatwefindinPeripateticsorinmostPlatonists.But,infact,itispreciselyaversionofthemorecomplexnotionofthewillwhichwefoundinEpictetus,anotionwhichOrigenwasalreadydeploying,exceptthatAugustineexploitsitspossibilitiesmuchmorefullythanOrigeneverdid.Letusbrieflyrecallthedistinctionwemadebetweenalesscomplexversionofthenotionof

a will and the fuller and more complex version we actually find in Epictetus. In the lesscomplexversion,whichwastheoneforthemostpartadoptedbyPeripateticsandPlatonists,our will is responsible for only some of our choices and decisions, namely, those thatconstitutewillings,one'swillingtodosomething.Butinthemorecomplexnotion,thewillisresponsibleforallofourchoicesandallofourdecisionsconcerningour impressions.Thusthe will is also responsible for our choice to give assent to an ordinary, nonimpulsiveimpression,liketheimpressionthat2+2=4.Suchanassentdoesnotconstituteawillingbutabelieving.Thisdistinctionbetweenthekindsofchoicesforwhichthewillisresponsibleiscrucialalso in the following regard.Aswesaw, it is important for thisdoctrineof thewillthat,properlyspeaking,youcannotchoosetocrossthestreetbutonlywilltocrossthestreet,since inprinciple it isnotentirelyunderyourcontrolwhetheryoumanage toget across thestreet.Incontrast,youcanchoosetogiveassenttoanordinarynonimpulsiveimpression,andthusyoucanchoosetobelievesomething,sinceinprinciple it isentirelyunderyourcontrolwhetheryougiveassentornottoanimpression.Soyoucanchoosetobelievesomething,butyou cannotwill to believe something, because towill is towill to do something. This lastdistinction, though, gets lost in Augustine, because Augustine renders both willing andchoosingbyvelle.Now,givenwhatwehavejustsaid,itshouldbeobviousthatforalateStoiclikeEpictetus

thewilliscruciallyinvolvedineveryactofcognition.Itis,afterall,standardStoicdoctrineFrede, Michael. A Free Will : Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought, edited by A. A. Long, University of California Press, 2011. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/asulib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=631055.Created from asulib-ebooks on 2019-08-17 06:35:29.

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that even perception (aisth sis) involves an act of assent to a perceptual impression.Whatholdsforperceptionsholdstrueforallcognitions(katal pseis),whichareconstitutedbyanact of assent to a cognitive impression (phantasiakatal ptik ),6 and indeed for all beliefs,whetherperceptualornot,whether cognitiveornot,whether trueor false.Theyall involveassent,andhencetheyinvolvebothachoicetogiveassentandawilldisposedtochoosetogiveassent.ForthisreasontheStoicsalsohavenodifficultywiththeideathatonechoosestobelieve

something,evenwithoutknowingittobethecaseorwithoutunderstandingwhyitisthecase.Theybelieve inoracles and indivination.So they think thatyouought to choose tobelievewhatthegodtellsyou,evenifyouhavenoindependentmeansofverifyingitstruth,letaloneareabletounderstandwhythingsarethewaythegodtellsyou.ThustheStoicnotionofthewillleavesampleroomfortheideathatonechoosestobelievesomethingontrustoronfaith.Hence also in this regard Augustine's notion of the will as something which is centrallyinvolved in any cognitive act is nothing new. It is just the Stoic notion of the will. And,incidentally,thisStoicnotionisalsosupposedtoaccountforwhetheryoucanholdontoyourbeliefsorareeasilytalkedoutofthemandwhetheryoutooquicklyandeasilyespousebeliefswhichyouarethennotabletoholdonto.

Having clarified the fact that Augustine's notion of the will is just a version of the morecomplex Stoic notion of thewill, let us now,more systematically, consider his doctrine offreedom and a free will. We get his most detailed and systematic exposition in the earlytreatiseDeliberoarbitriovoluntatis,whichwaswrittenintwostagesbetween388and395.7Thisisalso,inasense,theauthoritativeexpositionofhisview.WhenAugustine,attheendofhislife,reviewshiswritingsintheso-calledRetractationes,hetalksinsomedetailabouttheDe libero arbitrio and insists that it still fully represents his view, even though in certainplaceshewouldnowchooseadifferentformulation.IntheRetractationes(2)wealsolearn,aswemay already have gathered from theDe libero arbitrio itself (I.10), that the treatise isdirected against theManichaeans, who attribute the origin of evil to God, the Cre ator, inhavingcreatedusinsuchawaythat,becauseofhavingabody-dependentsoul,wecannotbutdoevil.8It isquitestrikinghowmuchofAugustine'sliteraryoutputispolemicalinnature,directed

againstschismaticsorheretics.Aheresywhichwasgoingtopreoccupyhimincreasinglyforalmost the last twenty years of his life was Pelagianism. It is a matter of great scholarlycontroversywhatPelagiusactuallyhadtaught.9Augustine,likemostlateancientauthors,wasnotparticularlyeagertodojusticetohisopponents.IntheRetractationeshecharacterizestheManichaeansasiftheybelievedinanevilcreatoroftheGnostickind.InfacttheManichaeancreatorisgood,thoughnotallpowerful;heisconfrontedwithaforceofdarkness,andbyhiscreationheistryingtoliberatewhatislightandgoodinus.InthesameveinAugustinealsopresents the Pelagians as if they believed that ourwill is so free that there is no room fordivinegrace(Retr.3).ItseemsobviousthatinfactPelagiussimplyemphasizedtheabilityofhumanbeingstoattainthegoodlife,todosomethingofmeritwhichwouldearnthemagoodlife,withoutdenyingtheneedfordivinegracealtogether.Sotheissueis,rather,whetherthePelagians leftmore room for the contribution human beings can, and need to,make to their


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attainmentofthegoodlifethanAugustinewaswillingtoallowfor,givenhisinsistenceonthepervasiveneedforgrace.One might think that this controversy would lead to a further evolution of Augustine's

doctrineofafreewill.ButintheRetractationes(3–6)heexplainsindetailthattheDeliberoarbitrio already, at least implicitly, if not explicitly, contains his answer to Pelagianism.Hence, inhisviewof thematter, therewasnoneed tochangehispositionon the freewill.Whattherewasneedforwasasystematicdoctrineofgraceanditsrelationtofreedom.Ithastobesaid,though,thattheDeliberoarbitriodoesnotgiveoneasclearaviewasonewouldlikeofwhat,accordingtoAugustine,theroleofgraceis.PartofthereasonforthispresumablyisthatAugustineatthisearlypointhadnotyetfullythoughtthroughthesematters.WemaybestunderstandAugustine'sthoughtaboutfreedomandafreewillinthisworkifwe

view it largely as a response to Manichaeism, in a way analogous to our taking Origen'sdoctrineofafreewilltobearesponsetoGnosticismandastraldeterminism.10Theirpointofdeparturewastheundeniablefact thatwearebornwithanaturalendowmentorconstitutionandincircumstanceswhichseemtomakeitimpossibleformost,ifnotallofus,toliveagoodlife.BothOrigenandAugustinefoundthemselvesconfrontedwithdoctrineswhichexplainedthisstateofaffairsbymakingacreator,orrulerorrulers,ofthisworldultimatelyresponsiblefor our misdeeds. They both had to reject this view as incompatible with the Creator'sgoodness.Theydidso,relyingonadoctrineoffreedomandfreewill,byattributingtohumanbeingsthemselvesthedifficulties theyfindthemselvesinasaresultof theirownchoiceanddoing.Buttheydisagreedontheparticularwayinwhichtheyanalyzedthesituationinwhichwe find ourselves, how we got into it, and how we may get out of it. Even here, in thisanalysis,thereremainsastrikingamountofagreement.Letusbeginwiththesituationinwhichwefindourselves.Augustine'spictureofitisagreat

dealgloomier thanOrigen's.ForOrigenthesituationis thatwefinditvery,verydifficult toresist sin, so difficult as to lend plausibility to the view that perhaps many of us are inprincipleunablenot to sinand inprincipleunable toattain thegood life.ForAugustine thepicture is that theworld is fullofevil,not just fullofwrongdoing,butalsofullofsufferingwrong. And not just this. Catastrophes overcome us in the form of floods, droughts, pests,wars,famines,andpersonaldisasters.Theyseemtohitinnocentandguiltyalike.Inanycase,thereisnoapparentconnectionbetweenwhatsomebodydidandtheevilthatbefallshim.Thisismostobviousinthecaseofinfants.Formorethanthenexthundredyearsparticularattentionwillbegiventothefateofnewlybornchildrenwho,surely,haddonenothingtodeservethemisery and the suffering towhich they oftenwere exposed. It is this evilwe are born intowhose source and origins theDe libero arbitrio formally sets out to identify. And in I.77Augustinedescribes lovinglyhowweall in this lifeareconstantly tornapart anddrivenbyfearsanddesireswhichmakeourlifemiserable.Itisdifficult,indeed,toseehowinthisstateonecouldliveagoodandwell-satisfiedlife.WearenotsurprisedtohearthatAugustinethinks,likeOrigen,thatitisnotGodwhoisto

blameforthisbutthatwehavebroughtitonourselvesbyourowndoing,byourchoice,byourownfreechoice.Thisishowthedoctrineoffreedomandafreewillcomesin.Buttherearetwodifferences.Wenoted that inOrigen the intellectswentwrongthroughcarelessness.Buttheseseemedtobeminormissteps,asitwere,whichcouldberectifiedandwhichonlyintheir


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accumulationwouldleadtograveconsequences.Andeventheseconsequences,thoughgraveindeed,inthecaseofhumansoulswerenotpaintedinsuchrelentlesslygloomyanddepressingcolorsasinAugustine.SoAugustineprepareshimselfandustoexpectthatwemusthavedonesomething terrible indeed to deserve as miserable a life as this. And there is anotherdifference.InOrigenitisperfectlyclearinwhatsenseweall,eachandeveryoneofus,areresponsibleforthesituationwearein.Allofuswholiveinthisphysicalworldareintellectswhofell.However,wedidnotfallbadlyenoughtobecomedownrightviciousbutonlyenoughtodeservethisremedialpunishment.InAugustineitisnotsoclearwhodidwhat,asaresultofwhichweallsufferthispunishment.ThereasonforthisisthenotoriousdifficultyAugustinehadwiththequestionoftheoriginof

thesoul,which, itseems,hefeltunable toresolvefully tohissatisfactionfor therestofhislife.Heconsideredfourpossibilities.11First,therationalsoulpreexistsourearthlyexistencebut falls through sin and ends up as a soul attached to a body. Second, the rational soulpreexists,itissenttotakecareofabody,butinthecourseofitsmissionbecomesculpable.Third, each soul is created ad hoc by God to ensoul the body generated through sexualprocreationbytheparents.Fourth,thesoulitselfistransmittedbysexualprocreation.Thislastview,called traducianism, thoughnotuncommon,wasquiteunsatisfactory, since itbasicallyinvolved the assumption that the soul is a function of the body; that might account for anonrational soul but not for a rational soul, at least given a Platonist's, and Augustine's,dualisticviewofthelatter.It has been argued, rather pervasively, byO'Connell, that the first viewwas the position

Augustine favored at least when he wrote theDe libero arbitrio.12 This is a view whichPlotinushadentertainedasapossibility(Enn.IV.8.4).AnditisOrigen'sview,ifwedisregardthefinedifferencebetweenintellectsandrationalsouls.ButAugustinedidnotfirmlycommithimselftothisviewevenintheDeliberoarbitrioorlater.Infact,insomeplacesheclearlyseems to reject the assumption of preexisting souls. But as soon aswe reject the first twooptions, we are faced with the difficulty that it cannot be literally true that each of usindividuallybrought it uponhimself tobeborn into thisworldofmisery.For ifwedidnotexist before our birth even as rational souls, how could we have done sufficient wrong todeserve being born into this misery? In this case, the terrible deed which got us into thepositionweareincannotbesomethingweindividuallydid.Itmust,then,besomethingliketheoriginalsinofAdam.ButthisraisesthequestionofwhyweshouldbeheldresponsibleandsufferforsomethingdonebyAdam.Thereareanswerstothis,bothintheEastandintheWest.Theyinvolvethedevelopmentof

appropriate metaphysical theories with very different conceptions of individuals and kindsfromtheonesweareusedto.ItwastheoriesofthissortwhichlaterintheWestgiverisetotherealism-nominalismdebate.13Inbrieftheideaisthis.Manormankindisarealthing,ofwhichweareparts in thewaysomethingispartofacollective,say,asoldierpartofanarmy.WeassumethatGoddidnotcreateaparticularman,Adam,butManormankind,justasGoddidnotbecomeaman,butManormankind.ButmankindexistsonlyasacollectionofpartslikeAdamorJesus.So,whenGodcreatedMan,hecreatedsuchacollectionorcollective.Anditwasthiscollective,mankindasawhole,whichsinnedwhenAdamsinned.Henceitismankindasawholewhichisresponsibleforthissin.Needlesstosay,suchatheorywouldneedagreat


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dealofwork.But,whatever thedifficulties involved,Augustinebecameincreasingly inclined tobelieve

that the terrible deed for which we are held responsible was not something which weindividuallyactuallyhaddone.Presumably,hedidsounder the influenceofPaul'sLetter totheRomans,5:12ff,accordingtowhichsincameintotheworldthroughonehumanbeing.There is another wavering onAugustine's part in theDe libero arbitrio. Throughout the

treatise he is inclined to think that this terrible deed, whether we are responsible for itindividuallyor collectively,wasdonebya rationalbeingwhowaswise andvirtuous. It iseasytoseewhyhewouldbeinclinedtothinkso.IfGodhadcreatedusinastateofignoranceandlackofvirtue,itwouldnotbesurprisingifwegotconfusedandmadeamistake.Butthen,forthisveryreason,itwouldalsobedifficulttounderstandwhyGoddidnotcreateuswithabasicunderstandingoftheworldandofthegood.Moreover,ifwewerecreatedinastateofignorance and lacking virtue, it would be difficult to see what was so terrible about thisterribledeed.WhatelsecouldGodexpect?Whatwouldmakeitsuchaterribledeedwouldbeprecisely this, that humanbeings had thewisdomand the virtue thatwere needed not to gowrong (see I.79–81). So this again sounds very much like Origen with his assumption ofvisibleintellectswhichwerecreatedwiseandvirtuoustoasufficientdegreenottofall.Butinthisverycontextwhere(I.81)Augustinesuggests thatperhapsourpresentsituation isdue tothe fact that, as preexisting rational souls, we deserted the safe stronghold of virtue (arxvirtutis)tosubmitourselvestotheslaveryofappetitebyourownchoice—inthisverycontextAugustinemakesamovewhichopensup,orratherindicates,awideriftbetweenhimselfandOrigen.HerelieshereontheStoicdivisionofmankindintothewiseandvirtuousandfree,onthe

oneside,andthefoolishandviciousandunfree,ontheotherside.Wewerewiseandvirtuousandfree,andnowwearefoolishandviciousandenslaved.Butthiscannotbequiteright.For,although,accordingtotheStoics,weindeedarenowfoolish,vicious,andenslaved,weneverwereactuallywise,virtuous,andfree.Moreover,accordingtothestandardStoictheory,once,byliberatingyourself,youarewise,virtuous,andfree,youwillneverofyourownwillgiveupthisfreedom.ForthisreasonIarguedthatthewisdomandthevirtueOrigenattributedtohisintellects was in principle a wisdom and virtue which, though it admitted of furtherimprovement,wasneverentirelyperfect.Thisiswhytheintellectscouldfall.Sothewisdom,virtue,andfreedomofOrigen's intellects in theiroriginalstatewerenot thewisdom,virtue,and freedomwhich the Stoicwise person enjoys.Origen's freedom in this initial statewasrathertheStoicfreedomwewouldallhaveenjoyedbeforebeingwise,ifwehadnotalreadyinthecourseofacquiringawillenslavedourselves.Analogously,IarguedthatOrigendoesnotbelievethatanymissteptheintellectstaketurnsthemimmediatelyintofoolishandviciousbeings,altogetherdeprivedoffreedom.Afterall,wewouldnotwanttosaythatanangel,eventhoughhehadsunk toa lowerrank,wasfoolish,vicious,andcompletelyenslaved.But it isthisstockStoiccontrastofwisdomandfollywithwhichAugustineoperateshereinthefirstbookandrepeatedlythroughoutallthreebooks.This lineof thinking,forobviousreasons,getshimintogreatdifficulties inthethirdbook

(240ff), when he tries to explain how the terrible misdeed actually came about. He is notconsideringjustthepossibilitythathumanbeingsintheiroriginalstatewerewiseinthestrong


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sense,whichcreatesall sortsofdifficulties, ashehimself sees,butalso thepossibility thattheywerelikeStoicchildren,neitherfoolishnoryetwisebutcapableofadvancingtowisdom.SoAugustineatleastconsidersreplacingthestockStoiccontrastbetweenthewise,virtuous,andfreeandthefoolish,vicious,andunfree,asfarasthefirstmemberofthepairisconcerned,withaweakerthoughstillStoicallyinspiredcontrastbetweenhumanbeingsnotyetenslaved,but also not yet really virtuous and wise, and human beings who are foolish, vicious, andenslaved.Heisadamantaboutthesecondmemberofthecontrastingpair.AccordingtoAugustine,as

inStoicism,thisterribledeedcostusourfreedom(libertas)altogether.Wearenowenslavedbyour libido,byour inappropriateattachments.And,as inStoicism, ifwearenotvirtuous,wise,andfree,nothingwecandoisright.Evenifwedotherightthing,itwillbedoneatleastpartly with the wrong motivation. It is only if we are liberated that we shall recover thisfreedomtoactrightlyanddotherightthingwiththerightmotivation(II.43).So,accordingtoAugustine,inourpresentstatewearenotfree.Wedonothaveafreewill

in the sense that we have a will which is actually free to choose. Unfortunately, this issomewhatobscuredintheDeliberoarbitriobythreefacts.First,thetreatiseisnotconcernedwith the explanation of each and every sin we commit but rather with the propercharacterization and explanation of the original misdeed which we, collectively orindividually,committedandwhichisthesourceofalltheevilweareborninto,includingourinability not to sin. It is crucial for Augustine's position that we committed this originalmisdeedofourownfreechoice.This,though,doesnotmeanthatalloursinsareamatterofourfreechoice.Theyarenot.Exceptfortheoriginalsin,theyaretheproductofthechoicesofouralreadyenslavedwill.IfGodisnotresponsibleforthissinning,itisbecausewebyourfirstsinenslavedourselves,andthus,evenifwenowcannotchoseotherwisethantosin,wehavebroughtthisuponourselvesthroughouroriginalsin.Second,thoughAugustinedoesdenyusfreedominourpresentstate,thelanguageheusesto

markthefactthatwearestillresponsibleforwhatwearedoingisratherconfusing.Hetalksas if thechoicesanddecisionswemakeevenafter thefallwereanexerciseofour liberumarbitrium.Andthiscannotbutcreatetheimpressionthat,evenafterthefall,weretainafreewill.Butthisisnotso.Itis,forAugustine,onethingtohavefreedom(libertas)andhenceafreewillandanotherthingtohave liberumarbitrium (seeCD I.25).By the latterAugustinemeans that it is up tous, that it is in ourpower togive assent or not, that it dependsonuswhether or not we choose to act in a certain way. That is to say, Augustine's notion of aliberumarbitriumistheequivalentoftheStoicnotionofsomething'sbeinguptous(eph'hmin).AndjustasinStoicism,soalsoforAugustine,thefactthatweenslavedourselvesdoesnotmeanthatitnolongerdependsonushowwechoose.Hencewecontinuetoberesponsibleforwhatwearedoing,andthustobeculpable,evenifnowourchoiceisnolongerfreebutforced. In contrast, our original wrong choice was not forced (non cogitur, II.200) but“voluntary”andhencedeservedlysubjecttopunishment.Third, ifwedonot see theStoicbackgroundofAugustine's position,we aregoing tobe

encouraged in thefalsesupposition that,according toAugustine,ourwill is freeeven in thefallen state, because of his repeated remarks that ourwill is in our power, and that indeednothingisasmuchinourpowerasourwill(seeDelib.arI.86):“Wejusthavetowilltohave


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agoodwill.”Weneedtoremember,though,thatthiswaspreciselyEpictetus'sdoctrine:wedonothaveachoiceastowhathappensintheworld,butwedohaveachoiceastowhatwewill,achoiceastowhatkindofwillwewanttohave.Thisdoesnotmean,eitherforEpictetusorforAugustine,thatthischoicewehaveisfree.ThatitdoesnotmeanthisforAugustineisclearbecausehealsoexplicitlytellsus(II.205)

that,thoughwewerefreetodowhatbroughtaboutourfall,wearenotfreetodowhatwouldbringabouttherestorationtoouroriginalstateoffreedom.Oncewehavefallen,wearenotfree to liberateourselves.OnlyGodcanliberateusfromtheconditionofsin intowhichwehavefallen(II.143).Ourrestorationwouldrequireacompleteconversion,aturningawayfromwhatwe have enslaved ourselves to and a turning instead to the good, fromwhichwe hadturnedawayinsinning.Thisconversionminimallyrequiresagoodwill,thatistosay,thewilltoactrightly,todorightthingswiththerightmotivation.But,accordingtoAugustine,wearenotevenablewithoutdivinegracetowilltohaveagoodwillonceweareenslaved,thoughnothingissomuchinourpowerasourwill.And,needlesstosay,justtohavethewilltohaveagoodwillisnotyetactuallytohaveagoodwillandtohaveagoodwillisnotyettobeabletodowhatonewills todowith thebestof intentions.Soevenwith thewill tohaveagoodwill,onlyabeginningismade.AugustinegraphicallydescribesthisintheConfessions(VIII.5–9)asabattlebetweentwo

wills, a newwill and the old enslavedwill.Theonlyway the newwill has any chance toovercometheoldwillisbybeingwholehearted,notdithering,uncompromising.Buteventhisisnotgoingtorestorethefreedomweoriginallyenjoyed.Foritwillremainaconstantbattlefortherestofthislife.Itwillstillbethecasethatwehaveenormousdifficultiesindoingtherightthings,andevenifwemanage,itwillnotbeentirelyfortherightreasons.SoherewedohaveamajordifferencebetweenAugustineandOrigen. It results fromthe

fact that Augustine, like the Stoics, but unlike Origen, denies any freedom, once we havesinned.Andthedifferenceshowsupintheirdifferentunderstandingsof thepassagesinPaulwhichseemtodenyusafreewill,passageslikeEp.adRom.9.6andEp.adPhil.2.13,whichascribe both the doing and the willing to God. We saw how Origen, relying on the Stoicdoctrineofauniversaldivineprovidence,wasreadytoacceptthatouractionsoutintheworldinsomesenseareGod'sdoing,becauseGodallowsustosucceedinwhatwearedoingonlyifitfitsinwithhisplan.ButOrigenwasquiteunwillingtoacceptPaul'sclaimthatourwillingtoo is God's. We saw how he tried in vain to interpret Paul as saying something whichpreservedthefreedomofourwill,ifnotthefreedomofouractions.Augustine,however,hasnodifficulty inacceptingthePaulineclaims.Hisviewis thatevenifwemanagetowill therightthinginourfallenstate,thisissoonlybydivinegracebecauseGodsetthingsupinsuchawaythatwewillorwanttherightthing.Inthissense,alsoforAugustine,boththedoingandthewillingareGod's.ThusGodcansetthingsupinsuchawaythatsomeofuswillbeledtowilltohaveagoodwill,towilltofreeourselvesofourenslavementsandtosucceedinourstruggles.This is thestoryofAugustine'sconversionin theConfessions(VIII.12).Godmadeachild

shouttolle,lege!tolle,lege;therewasacopyofPaul'sEpistleslyingreadythere;heopeneditandreadatrandomEpistletotheRomans13:13,“Norevelingordrunkenness,nodebaucheryorvice,noquarrelsorjealousies!LetChristJesushimselfbethearmorthatyouwear;giveno


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more thought to satisfying the bodily appetites.” So God set things up in such a way thatAugustinefinallycametoseethathewouldgainhisfreedomonlythroughChrist.But,oncewehave forfeitedour freedom,God isundernoobligation to set thingsup in suchawayas toallowus to regain it. If he does so, this is by a pure act of grace for nomerit of our own,neitherofourownwillingnorofourowndoing.TojudgeAugustine'soriginalityitiscrucialtoseethathediffersfromOrigenatleastinpart

because, unlike Origen, he follows the Stoic view that we have entirely lost our freedom.AccordingtotheStoicposition,asIexplicateditbefore,humanviciousnessandfollyarenoimpedimenttoGod'sexecutionofhisprovidentialplan,becausetheenslavementfromwhichhuman beings suffer is self-inflicted.AllGod has to do is set things up in such away thathumanbeingswillhavethewilltodowhatGodwantsthemtodo.Sincethischoiceorassentisnotfreebutenslaved,hesimplyhas toput themintocircumstanceswhichwill force theirassent.So,evenonthisStoictheory,boththewillingandthedoinginthecaseoftheenslavedpersonareGod's.ButwealsoneedtokeepinmindthatAugustine'sinterpretationofPaulseemstoberather

likeMariusVictorinus'sinterpretation.Unfortunately,Victorinus'scommentaryonPaul'sLetterto the Romans is lost. But we do have Victorinus's commentary on the Letter to thePhilippiansand thusononeof thepassagesOrigenhadsuchdifficultieswith(Phil.2.13).14ThereVictorinustakesthepositionthat,asPaulsays,Godoperatesinussoastomakeuswillwhathewantsustobutalsoarrangestheworldinsuchawaythatourwillingisefficacious,thatistosay,thattheactionmanagestogetdone.SoforVictorinusalreadyboththewillingandthedoingareGod's.Hence,ifwedosomethingwhichleadstooursalvation,itneverthelesshasitsorigininGod'sconditioningourwillandourcircumstancesappropriately.LetusalsonotethatinAugustine'saccountsofarthereisnotatraceofvoluntarism.Itistruethatwecanwilltohaveadifferentwillandthatwecanwilltohaveagoodwill.Butthisisnotduetoavoluntaristicconceptionofthewill.Itisdue,rather,tothefactthat,inthefallenstatewearein,ourwillisnolongerfreebutforthisveryreasoncanbemadetowilltohaveadifferentwill,byGod.With thiswecan return to the“terribledeed”which lostusour freedom.Howarewe to

explainthisdeed?AttheendofbookIIoftheDeliberoarbitrioAugustineclaimsthathedoesnotknowtheanswer to thisquestion.Thismightbeunderstood invariousways. Itmightbetaken straightforwardly as a confession of ignorance concerning such darkmatters. Itmightalso be taken as an acknowledgment on Augustine's part that, given the corner he has puthimselfintowithhisconceptionofouroriginalstateinwhichourwillwasnotenslaved,heisnowunabletoexplainoriginalsin.Butwhathemeansisclearlysomethingelse.Hemeanstosay that he does not know the answer, because there is nothing there to be known, to beunderstood.Somebodywhointhisoriginalstatefreelychoosestoactwronglybythisveryactputs himself outside the intelligible, rational order of things and does something which isunintelligible,utterlyirrational.InbookIII.240ff,aswehaveseen,Augustinetriestoprovideanexplanationfortheoriginal

sinbysuggestingthatperhapsmanwasnotcreatedfoolishbutalsonotcreatedwise,either.InthisstatehewouldhaveenoughunderstandingtolistentoandunderstandGod'sprecepts.Andinthisstateitwouldbereasonableforhimtofollowthesepreceptstogaintheunderstanding


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andwisdomhedoesnotyethave(III.244–45).Thus,onthisassumption,manin theoriginalstate,ifheisnotyetwise,cansinintwoways.Hecaneitherfailtoacceptapreceptorhecanfailtofollowit(III.246).ThissuggestedaccountnowlooksverymuchlikeamixtureoftwoStoictheories.Inpartit

followstheStoicaccountofhowchildren,whoarenotyeteitherwiseorfoolish,areraisedbymeansofpreceptswhosewisdomtheywillonlybeable tounderstandoncetheythemselveshaveacquiredreason.15AndinpartitseemstobepatternedonwhatItaketobePosidonius'saccountofthecorruptionofmankind.16Therewasatime,agoldenage,whenwelivedhappilyin a state of nature andwhen thosewhowere notwisewere not foolish, either, but freelyfollowedthepreceptsofthosewhowerewise.Atthispointtherewasnoneedforapoliticalcommunity, for a temporal law, for coercion. But then people became corrupted, selfish,greedy, jealous, aggressive, each one looking out for what, in his lack of wisdom, heconsideredtobehisowngoodratherthanthecommongood.Theynolongerfreelyfollowedthewise.Hencethenaturalauthorityofthewisehasbeenreplacedbythepoliticalauthorityofrulers,backedupbycoercivelaws.Augustine in fact suggests that the original sin may consist in man's failing to remain

completely focused on, and enamored with, the Good or God, turning away from God tohimself, becoming enamored with himself and concerned with his own good, incontradistinction to the Good (III.255; see also II.199). This inappropriate attachment tooneselfandone'sowngoodAugustinecallspride (superbia, III.263). It is the inappropriatecounterparttothedesireofthespirittorespectoneselfandothers.Againinall thisattempttoexplainoriginalsinthereisnotraceofvoluntarism.It isclear

thatinAugustine'svieworiginalsinispossibleonlybecauseofalackofwisdom,oratleastafailure to exercise wisdom. There is no suggestion that the original sin consisted ofdisobedience to God's precepts or commands, because one has to obey God's commands,whatevertheymaybe,byasheeractofthewill.Tothecontrary,itclearlyisalsoAugustine'sviewthat,iftheoriginalsinconsistedofanactofdisobedience,whatwassinfulaboutitwasthatitissingularlyunwisenottofollowthepreceptsofGod,whoiswiseandgood,solongasonehasnotacquiredthewisdomtoseeforoneselfthatthisishowoneshouldbehave.On the whole, then, it does seem to me that Augustine's account differs markedly from

Origen's,mainly by beingmuch closer to Stoicism in its doctrine of freedom thanOrigen'saccountwas.ThisallowsAugustinealsotofollowPaulmuchmorecloselyalonglinesalreadysuggestedbyMarcusVictorinus.ButitalsosaddlesAugustinewithanaccountoftheoriginalsinwhich seemsmuch less satisfactory thanOrigen's andwhich creates tensions in variousregards which threaten to make the account, if not unintelligible, then at least ratherimplausibleandartificial.WhateverwethinkofthemeritsofAugustine'saccount,itdoesnotrelyonanewnotionof

free will. It rather relies very extensively on the Stoic notion of a free will, andcorrespondinglyofanenslavedwill,andonhowintheStoicuniverseGodmakesuseoftheenslavedwilltodirectthecourseofeventsprovidentially,exceptthatinAugustinethisturnsintoadoctrineofgraceforthosewhobenefitfromGod'spredetermination.


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CHAPTERTEN

Conclusion

Wesetouttoinquire,first,whenpeoplestartedtothinkofhumanbeingsashavingafreewill;second,whatwasinvolvedinthinkingofhumanbeingsinthisway;and,third,whyonefoundthiswayofthinkingabouthumanbeingshelpful.Butwealsoraisedafourthquestion,whetherthis notion of a free will, however helpful one may have found it in late antiquity, wasbasically flawed right from thebeginning.Wehave tried togiveananswer to the first threequestions.ThenotionofafreewillfirstarisesinlateStoicisminthefirstcenturyA.D.Itisanotion

weclearlyfindinEpictetus.The notion is the conception of an ability to make choices and decisions, in particular

choices and decisions which amount to one's willing to do something. And this ability issupposed to be potentially or actually free in the sense that, if it actually is free, there isnothingintheworld,noforceorpowerintheworldoutsideuswhichcanpreventusinvirtueofthisabilityfrommakingthechoicesordecisionsweneedtomaketoattainagoodlife.Itisan abilitywhich at least is potentially free in the sense that one in principle can attain thisfreedom. Whether we have a will which actually is free depends on our not enslavingourselves to theworld and in thisway giving theworld, and the powers and forceswhichgoverntheworld,poweroverus,powerevenoverourchoicesanddecisions.The notion was regarded as helpful, because there was a widespread but vague fear,

especiallyasantiquityadvanced,toputitinPlotinus'sterms,that“wemightbenothing”(mepote ouden esmen,Enn.VI.8.1.26–27) and ultimately have no controlwhatsoever over ourlife.Thisfearwasfedbythebeliefthatonelivedinaworldfullofforcesandpowers,many,ifnotmost,ofthemhiddenfromus,whichseemedtoleavelittleornoroomforthefreepursuitof our own interests. These were either blind forces or forces which pursued their owninterests without regard to us or downright hostile and malicious forces, out to tyrannize,enslave, or seduce us. The Stoics themselves had greatly contributed to giving somerespectabilitytosuchfearsbydevelopingatheorythateverythingwhichhappensintheworld,including our actions, happens according to a divine providential plan. So it seemedparticularly incumbent upon the Stoics to explain how such a seamless divine providentialorderwascompatiblewithhumanchoices.Theytriedtodothiswiththeirdoctrineoffreedomandafreewill.PlatonistsandPeripateticsadoptednotionsofawill,offreedom,andofafreewillsuitably


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modifiedtofit their theories.Butthosewhowereparticularlyeagertoadoptadoctrineofafreewillwere theChristians. Ihave tried toexplainwhy thiswasso.Theysharedwith theStoicstheviewthattheworlddowntothesmallestdetailisgovernedbyadivineprovidentialorder. So they too had to explain how this left any room for human freedom. But, moreimportant,theywereconfronted,oftenwithintheirownranks,with theories that theorderoftheworldweliveincannotbeduetoGod,preciselybecauseitsystematicallypreventsmanyofusfromattainingagoodlife,whereasotherscannotfailtoattainagoodlife.WefoundthatinanswertosuchviewstheChristiansbynomeansdevelopedadistinctive

doctrineofafreewilloftheirown,letalonearadicallynewview.TheylargelyreliedontheStoic view. And whereas Origen had a position which differed from the Stoic view quitesignificantly,inthatheassumedallhumanbeingstobeactuallyfreeandabletoretainadegreeof freedom, Augustine turns out to differ from Origen, not by moving further away fromStoicismbutbyadheringtoitmuchmorecloselythanOrigendid.InpartAugustinemayhavechosenthispathundertheinfluenceofPaul.ItneverthelesswastheStoicpositiontodenyus,aslongaswearenotfree,awillingofourown,asopposedtoawillingbygrace.This,givenAugustine'sinfluence,hadenormousconsequencesfordoctrinaldevelopmentintheWest.WewouldgetameasureofthisifwelookedatJohnofDamascusattheturnfromtheseventhtotheeighthcenturyintheEast;Johnhasalottosayaboutthewill,buthehasmovedfarawayfromStoicismandreliesonaPlatonistviewenrichedbyagooddoseofAristotle'sethics.1InsteadofturningtotheenormoushistoricalconsequencesofAugustine'sposition,Iwant,at

least briefly, to address the last questionwe raised initially: “Was thenotionof a freewillflawed from its very beginning?” The answer seems tome to be negative in the followingsense.Ofallthemajorancientphilosopherswehavecomeacross,onlyAlexanderofAphrodisias

letshimselfbedrivenintoacceptingaconceptionofafreewillwhichisveryclosetothekindofconceptioncriticizednowadaysbyphilosophers.Alltheotherauthorswehaveconsideredseemtometohavenotionsofafreewillwhich,perhapsforgoodreasons,wemightnotwanttoacceptbutwhichdonotseemtobebasicallyflawedinthewayanotionlikeAlexander'sis.To thecontrary, considered froma sufficientlyabstract level anddisregarding theparticularfeatureswhichreflecttheirparticularhistoricalcircumstances,theyseemtometomoreorlessshareonefeaturewhichIfindratherattractive.Theyallinvolvetheideathattohaveagoodlifeonemustbeabletomakethechoicesoneneedstomakeinordertohavesuchalife.Theyalsoinvolvetheideathatwhatpreventsonefrommakingthesechoicesisthatoneformsfalsebeliefs or irrational attachments and aversions which are in conflict with the choices onewouldhavetomake.Giventhesefalsebeliefsandinappropriateattachmentsoraversions,oneisnotfreetomakethechoicesonewouldreasonablywanttomake.So,tobefree,tohaveafree will, we have to liberate ourselves from these false beliefs and from attachments andaversionswhicharenotgroundedinreality.Wecandothis,moreover,becausetheworlddoesnotsystematicallyforcethesebeliefs,attachments,andaversionsonus.This does not seem to me to be a basically flawed idea at all, but also, without being

developedappropriately,itisnotmuchofanidea.Explainingthat,however,isnotataskforahistorian.


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ABBREVIATIONS

Acad. Cicero,AcademicaAdv.haer. Irenaeus,AdversushaeresesANRW AufstiegundNiedergangderrömischenWeltCC Origen,ContraCelsumCD Augustine,DecivitateDeiConf. Augustine,ConfessionsDean. Aristotle,DeanimaDelib.ar. Augustine,DeliberoarbitrioDeprinc. Origen,DeprincipiisDL DiogenesLaertius,LivesandDoctrinesofEminentPhilosophersEN Aristotle,NicomacheanEthicsEnn. Plotinus,EnneadsEp. Seneca,EpistulaemoralesFat. AlexanderofAphrodisias,DefatoHE Eusebius,EcclesiasticalHistoryPE Eusebius,PraeparatioEvangelicaLS A.A.LongandD.N.Sedley,TheHellenisticPhilosophers(Cambridge,1987)PG PatrologíaGraecaPhd. Plato,PhaedoPHP Galen,OntheDoctrinesofPlatoandHippocratesRep. Plato,RepublicRetr. Augustine,RetractionesTim. Plato,TimaeusStob.,Ecl. Stobaeus,EclogaeSVF StoicorumVeterumFragmenta,ed.H.vonArnim(Leipzig,1903-1905)VP Porphyry,VitaPlatonis


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NOTES

Occasionally,whereFrede'spoint inhis typescriptwasclearlyanannotationorparenthetical, Ihave transferred thepassagetoanote.However,mostofthesenotesaremineandaredesignatedassuchbytheanglebrackets(<…>)thatintroduceandendthem.

CHAPTER1.INTRODUCTION

1.<W.D.Ross,Aristotle(London,1923),201.>2.<Inchapter3ofTheConceptofMind(London,1949)Ryleundertakestorefutenotonlythenotionofafreewillbut,first

andforemost,thenotionthatthereexistsanymentalfacultyofthewill.BernardWilliams,inchap.2ofShameandNecessity(1993; repr., Berkeley 2008), argues that the absence of the “will” from Homer's epics should be applauded rather thanregretted.Williams'sbookisbasedonthelectureshegaveatBerkeleyasSatherProfessorin1989.>3.<Frede'stypescriptsays,“Dihlecallsit‘ournotionofthewill,'”butIhavenotfoundthatexactphraseinDihle'sbook.On

thelastpageofhisbook'smaintext,Dihlewrites:“St.Augustinewas,infact,theinventorofourmodernnotionofwill.”(Dihle,TheTheory ofWill inClassical Antiquity [Berkeley, 1982], 144). For further discussion and criticism ofDihle, seeC.H.Kahn, “Discovering the Will: From Aristotle to Augustine,” in J. M. Dillon and A. A. Long, eds., The Question of“Eclecticism”:Studies inLaterGreekPhilosophy (Berkeley,Calif., 1988), 236–38, and J.Mansfeld, “The Ideaof theWill inChrysippus,Posidonius,andGalen,”ProceedingsoftheBostonAreaColloquiuminAncientPhilosophy7(1991):108—I0.>4.<IthinkFredeisrighttotakemuchofDihle'sdiscussionof“will”tobeabout“anotionofafreewill,”thoughDihledoes

notsaythisinsomanywords.Ratherthanspeakingof“freewill,”hetendstoreferto“purewill”or“sheervolition”or“clear-cutnotionofwill.”Frede'sreading,however,isstronglysupportedbywhatDihlewritesattheendofhischapter“TheGreekViewofHumanActionI”:“Freewilldoesnotexistinitsownright[intheGreekview]asitdoesaccordingtoSt.Augustine'santhropology“(TheoryofWill,45).>5.<PagesinDihle'sTheoryofWillthatFredemayhavehadinmindinclude15–16,51,63–65,134–35,and,esp.,20:“The

word‘will'…asappliedtothedescriptionandevaluationofhumanactiondenotessheervolition,regardlessofitsoriginineithercognitionoremotion.”DihleisprimarilyinterestedinarguingthatearlyChristiantheologiansdevelopedanewpsychologyandanthropologyinordertoregisteraperson'sindividualcommitmenttoGod.>6.<FortheuseinGnostictextsofthewordarchontes,seeR.A.BullardandB.Layton,“TheHypostasisoftheArchons,”

inJ.M.Robinson,ed.,TheNagHammadiLibraryinEnglish(SanFrancisco,1988),161–69.FredeexpandshistreatmentofGnosticpowersinchap.7,p.114>7.<FredewasprobablythinkingofEpicurus,LettertoMenoeceus,134>8.<TheplanetsweresonamedinGreekbecausetheywerepopularlythoughttowander.The“extremeregularity”(perfect

circularity) of planetarymotionswas a special cosmological theory that corrected their erratic positions as perceived by thenakedeye.>9. <The main evidence concerning this swerve comes from Lucretius (De rerum natura 2.225–93), who is generally

assumedtodependonthelostwordsofEpicurus.>10.<Fortheevidenceanddiscussion,seeS.Bobzien,DeterminismandFreedominStoicPhilosophy(Oxford,1998).>11.<FortheidentityofGodandfateinStoicism,seeDL7.135(LS46B).>12.<AlexanderofAphrodisiasmakesthisargumentinOnFate.>13.<Ihavesubstitutedthewords“irrespectiveofthefactthat”forFrede'stypescript,whichbeginsanewsentenceafter

“raiseourarm”withthewords“Itisnotjustthattheworldoutthere.”>

CHAPTER2.ARISTOTLEONCHOICEWITHOUTAWILL

1.<SeePlato,Rep.8,577e,ps.-Plato,Definitions413c8;Aristotle,EN3,1113a15—b2;EN5,1136b6–7.>2.<SeePlato,Rep.4,439a—441c,andAristotle,EN1,1102b13–1103a3>3.<FredereferstocommentsonSocratesbyAristotle,EN7,1145b23–27,1147b13–19.>4.<Aristotle,EN7,1145b21–1146b5.>


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5.<Ibid.,1148a9.>6.<Ibid.,3,1110b18–111a21.Conventionaltranslationsare“ofone'sownaccord,”“onpurpose,”“deliberately,”“willingly,”

“intentionally,”andtheconverse.>7.<FredewasprobablythinkingofCicero,Acad.1.40,whereCicerodescribestheStoicZeno'sdoctrinethatassent is in

nobisetvoluntariam(inusandvoluntary).>8. <For further discussion see A. Kenny, Aristotle's Theory of the Will (New Haven, Conn., 1979); C. H. Kahn,

“Discovering theWill:FromAristotle toAugustine,” in J.M.Dillon andA.A.Long, eds.,TheQuestion of“Eclecticism“:Studies in Later Greek Philosophy (Berkeley, Calif.), 239–41; and S. Broadie, “The Voluntary,” chap. 3, in Ethics withAristotle(Oxford,1991).>9.<AristotleprincipallydiscussesprohairesisinEN3,111b5–11a33,and6,1139a31—b13>10.<Aristotle,EN3,111b29–30.>11.<Ibid.,3,1112b11–24.>12.<SeeAristotle,Metaphysics12,7–9,withcommentary inM.FredeandD.Charles,eds.,Aristotle's “Metaphysics”

Lambda:SymposiumAristotelicum(Oxford,2000).>

CHAPTER3.THEEMERGENCEOFANOTIONOFWILLINSTOICISM

1.<EvidenceonStoicpsychology,physiology,andethics,towhichFrederefersinthefirstpagesofthischapter,istranslatedanddiscussedinLS39,58,60,61,63,and65.FordetailedtreatmentsseeM.Frede,“TheStoicConceptionofReason,”inK.J.Boudouris,ed.,HellenisticPhilosophy(Athens,1994),2:50–63,and“TheStoicDoctrineof theAffectionsof theSoul,” inM.Schofield andG.Striker, eds.,TheNormsofNature (Cambridge, 1986), 93–112;B. Inwood,Ethics andHumanAction inEarlyStoicism(Oxford,1985),chaps.2and3;andA.A.Long,StoicStudies(Berkeley,Calif.,1996),chaps.10andI2.>2.<Prot.352b—c.>3.<ForStoicuseoftheterm,seeDL7.159andAetius4.21.1–4(LS53H).>4.<SeePlutarch,Devirtutemorali441c—d(LS61B,9—II).>5. <To fitAristoteliandoctrine, I takeFrede's statementabout the“growthof reason“to refernot to theoriginofhuman

rationalcapacitybuttothepostnataldevelopmentofreasoning;seeMetaphysics1.1,98oa29—b13;andPosterior Analytics1.1and2.19.ThankstoAlanCodeandDorotheaFredefordiscussionofthispoint.>6.<Seep.21.>7. <Essential evidence in LS 39E, 53B, 57A. For discussion that amplifies the points made here, see Frede, “Stoic

ConceptionofReason,”50–53,andFrede'sessay“OntheStoicConceptionoftheGood,”inK.Ierodiakonou,ed.,Topics inStoicPhilosophy(Oxford,1999),73–75.>8. <Evidence on Stoic “impressions” is translated and discussed in LS 39. Frede's treatment of the theory here can be

supplemented with his essay “Stoics and Skeptics on Clear and Distinct Impressions,” inM. Burnyeat, ed.,The SkepticalTradition (Berkeley,Calif., 1983), 65–93, also published as chap. 9 in Frede'sEssays inAncientPhilosophy (Minneapolis,Minn.,I987).>9.<ForthetermseeStobaeus,Ecl.2.86–87(SVF3.169),andEpictetus1.1.12,andfordiscussionseeInwood,Ethicsand

HumanAction,55–03.>10.<DL7.51(LS39A).>11.<SVF1.58.>12.<DL7.50(LS39G)andSextusEmpiricus,Adversusmathematicos7.229–31.Accordingtothesesources,Chrysippus

wasobjectingtoaliteralinterpretationofthetermimpression,whichwouldexcludethemindfromexperiencingamodification(hispreferredterm),consistingofrepresentationofmultipleobjectsatthesametime.>13.<Fredeiscertainlyrighttoattributetheideaof“incipientpassion”tolaterStoics,buttheactualterm,propatheia,isfirst

connectedwiththisideabyPhiloofAlexandriaandthereafterbyOrigenandJerome.SeeM.Graver,“PhiloofAlexandriaandtheOriginoftheStoic ,”Phronesis44(1999):300–25.>14.<TheStoicscalledtheemotionalresponsesofthewisemaneupatheiai,“goodfeelings”(DL7.116[LS55F]).>15.<Aristotletoocallsactingnotundercompulsionorignorancehekon(EN3,1111a22–24),asFredesaysonp.24,butin

Frede'sinterpretationthetermtherelacksthevoluntaristconnotationsitwillacquirelater.>16.<DL7.115.>Thisdistinctionshouldnotobscurethefact(whichisnotapparentwhenone,forinstance,readsStobaeus,

Ecl.II,87,I4ffinisolation)thatfortheStoicsallappetitesarealsowillings.17.<See,forinstance,1.4.18–21,1.17.21–28,2.2.1–7,3.5.3,3.6.4,3.9.11.DiscussionsofEpictetus'sconceptofprohairesis

includeC.H.Kahn,“DiscoveringtheWill:FromAristotletoAugustine,”inJ.M.DillonandA.A.Long,eds.,TheQuestionof“Eclecticism”:Studies inLaterGreekPhilosophy (Berkeley,Calif., 1988), 251–55;R.Dobbin, “Prohairesis inEpictetus,”AncientPhilosophy11(1991):111–35;A.A.Long,Epictetus:AStoicandSocraticGuidetoLife(Oxford,2002),chap.8;andR.Sorabji,Self(Oxford,2006),chap.I0.>


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18. <This is the topic of Epictetus 1.1. For extensive discussion, see S. Bobzien,Determinism and Freedom in StoicPhilosophy(Oxford,1998),chap.7>19.<Ihaveaddedparticularbeforechoiceinthissentenceandfreelyinthenextsentence,inthebeliefthattheseadditions

mayclarifyFrede'sintendedpoints.>

CHAPTER4.LATERPLATONISTANDPERIPATETICCONTRIBUTIONS

1.<SeeEN6,114M27–28.Ihaveaddedthewords“someofthem,accordingtohim.”>2.<Ihavedeletedthefollowingparagraphbecauseitseemsintrusive:“Infact,ifwelookatPlato'sdivisionofthesoulinthe

Republic, though the argument for it is based on the assumption that there can be conflicts of desire which can only beexplainedintermsofdifferentpartsofthesoulasthesubjectsofthesedesires,itturnsoutthattheconflictisasmuchaconflictofdesiresasitisaconflictof<whattheStoicscall>impressions(phantasiai)orevenbeliefs(doxat).”3. <For instance,Nemesius,Denaturahominis291,1–8 (LS53O)and,muchmore fully,AlexanderofAphodisias,Fat.

182,16–183,24.>4.<SeeL.EdelsteinandI.G.Kidd,eds.,Posidonius(Cambridge,1972),I:FI57-69.>5.<SeeJ.Cooper,“PosidoniusonEmotions,”inReasonandEmotion(Princeton,1999).>6. <SeeDL7.89withother texts cited atSVF 3.228–36, and I.G.Kidd, “Posidonius onEmotions,” inA.A.Long, ed.,

ProblemsinStoicism(London,1971),206–207.>7.<SeeSeneca,Ep.90.>8. <Thewords“insomesense,outsideus”areobscure ingrammarandsense. I takeFrede tomean that, in theposition

Posidonius contested, our impressions “originate in reasons' beliefs, and thus” are “ultimately” the result “in some sense” offactors“outsideus,”namely,themistakenbeliefsofsociety.>9. <If Frede was thinking of Seneca,De ira 2.1.1–2.3.5, as is probable, his observation about Seneca's systematically

ambiguous use of terms for emotions is hardly borne out by the Latin text. In fact, Seneca is at great pains to distinguishinvoluntary impressions or impulses from anger, which requires the mind's voluntary assent. However, his discussion issometimeslooseandmorerhetoricalthanconsistent;seeM.Graver,StoicismandEmotion(Chicago,2007),chap.4.>10.<ThebestGreekevidenceforFrede'spointisEpictetus(thoughhedoesnotusethetermpropatheia),ascitedbyAulus

Gellius19.1.14–21.>11.<Ihaveinsertednot.>12. <ForLonginus, seeL.Brisson andM.Patillon inANRW II 36, no. I (1994): 5214–99, and forNumenius,M. Frede,

ANRW1136,no.2(1987):1034–75.>13.<FrededidnotgiveanyreferencetoPlotinus.IhavefoundjustoneinstanceintheEnneadsoftheStoictermforassent

(synkatathesis),atEnn.I.8.I4>14. <Frede did not complete his reference to Aspasius. I asked Robert Sharples if he could supply some appropriate

passage(s), towhichhereplied:“Theproblemhereisthatonedoesn't(I think)findAspasiussayingpreciselythis(ifonedid,much of the scholarly debate about the origins of the notion of will would have been less necessary); rather, it is that inparaphrasingAristotleAspasiuschangesoraddstosomeoftheformulations(perhapsunderStoicinfluence)inwaysthatcanbeseenaspointinginthisdirection,whetherornothewasawareofit.ThepassageshavebeendiscussedfromthispointofviewbyAntoniniAlberti,‘IlvolontarioelasceltainAspasio,'inA.AlbertiandR.W.Sharples,eds.,Aspasius:TheEarliestExtantCommentaryonAristotle'sEthics(Berlin,1999),107–41.”>15. <Frede probably had chiefly inmind thework ofEvagrius (b. ca.A.D. 345) entitledOn Thoughts (Peri logism n).

ThereEvagriusdistinguishesbetweenangelic,human,anddemonicthoughts,takingthelattertobegeneratedbyactualdemons.Fordiscussion,includingEvagrius'sendorsementofthePlatonictriparitedivisionofthesoul,seetheintroductorychapterofR.E.Sinkewicz,EvagriusofPontus:TheGreekAsceticCorpus(Oxford,2003).>16.<Ihaveletthissentencestand,butIhavelittleideaofwhatFrede'spointis.>17.<Ihaveaddedindirectly.>18.<FredereferstoEnn.VI.8.5.35,wheretheGreekwordisno th nai.>

CHAPTER5.THEEMERGENCEOFANOTIONOFAFREEwILLINSTOICISM

1.<SeeEN3,1110a23–26.>2.<SVF3.544.>3.<SeeSVF3.127-39andLS58EF.>4.<Ihaveaddedthewordsinparentheses,bywayofclarification.>


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5.<ForevidenceonthisStoictheory,seeLS53PQ.>6. <See Cicero,De finibus 3.17–22 (LS 59D) and Epictetus, 1.6.12–22 (LS 63E). Frede's thoughts on rationality and

goodness are amplified in his essay “On the Stoic Conception of the Good,” in K. Ierodiakonou, ed., Topics in StoicPhilosophy(Oxford,1999),71–94.>7. <Musonius, fr. 12Hense, and Epictetus 4.1 (his discourse on freedom). For uses of the term in laterwriters, see S.

Bobzien,DeterminismandFreedominStoicPhilosophy(Oxford,1998),355.>8.<Seep.34>9.<Seep.54>10.<SeeLS59FGIT.>11.<SeealsoA.A.Long,Epictetus:AStoicandSocraticGuidetoLife(Oxford,2002),221–22.>12.<See,forinstance,1.17.28;2.7.13;2.16.16;1.17.22;2.19.24.>13.<SeeLS62CD.>14.<Fortheevidenceanditsinterpretation,seeBobzien,DeterminismandFreedom,112—I6.>15.<Frede'sreferencetothese“three”factorsindicatesthathemusthavehadsomequitespecifictextortextsinmind.His

three“crucialfactors”preciselymatchthefirstthreepersonaeCiceroenumeratesinDeofficiis1.107–16,whicharegenerallytaken to be derived from the Stoic Panaetius (late second century B.C.). Epictetusmaywell have been influenced by thisscheme,but,ifso,hisdeploymentofitismorefluid:cf.Long,Epictetus,256–57.>16.<Politics1.5>17.<Metaphysics12,i075a11–24.>18. This is why Aristotle answers the general question “What is the right thing to do.?” not by giving us a list, like the

decalogue,butbysayingwhat“thepracticallywiseman”woulddo.

CHAPTER6.PLATONISTANDPERIPATETICCRITICISMSANDRESPONSES

1.<Forfurtherdiscussion,seeA.A.Long,HellenisticPhilosophy:Stoic,Epicureans,Sceptics,2ded.(Berkeley,Calif.,1986),101–104,andR.J.Hankinson,“Determinismand Indeterminism,” inK.Algraetal., eds.,TheCambridgeHistory ofHellenisticPhilosophy(Cambridge,1999),519–22,529–34.>2.<Itseemsentirelyreasonabletosaythattherearecertainthingsthatwenaturallywillorwantandthatitisournatureto

will or want certain things, like food and drink or, for that matter, a good life. This idea will later play a prominent role inMaximusConfessorand in JohnofDamascus in their rejectionofmonotheletism, that is, theview that JesusChristhas twonaturesbutonlyonewill.TheywillarguethatChristasGodandChristasmanhavetwowills,bothnaturalwills(i.e.,willsinvirtueofwhichonewillsorwantswhatitisone'snaturetowant)butthatChrist,unlikeotherhumanbeings,doesnothaveagnomicwill, that is,hisownjudgmentas towhathewillsordoesnotwill,whichgoesbeyond,orevencounter to,whatone,givenone'snature,naturallywillsorwants.This creates the impression that there is justonewill inChrist, since thenaturalhuman will naturally goes along with the natural divine will. <See A. Dihle, The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity(Berkeley,Calif.,1982),243n.112.>3.<IomitthefollowingtwosentencesinFrede'stypescript:“Afterall,wearenotjusthungryandwantsomethingtoeat,if

thereissomethingtoeatinsightwhichcouldarouseourinterest.Buthealsodoessomethingelse.”>4. <ForAlexander's text, translation,andcommentary, seeR.W.Sharples,AlexanderofAphrodisiasonFate (London,

1983).>5.<IomitthefollowingsentencesinFrede'stypescript:“Alexander,whoexplicitlysetsouttorejectuniversaldeterminism,

followsAristotle.So,according toAlexander,wedeterminewhetherwedosomethingornot,whether thisgetsdoneornot.Alexander,notbelievinginuniversaldivineprovidence,hasnodifficultyinclaimingthis.”>6.<ThistextisincludedinSharples'seditionofAlexander.>7. <IconsultedRobertSharplesaboutFrede's referencehere toAlexander'sDefato. Sharples responded: “The passage

Frede cites refers to the Stoic claim rather than toAlexander's denial of it. The problem is thatAlexander doesn't, I think,explicitlyclaiminsomanywordsthat‘underidenticalconditions,bothinternalandexternal…itisstillpossibletochooseandtoactotherwise.'Rather,thewayheformulatesthecaseagainstwhichheisarguingshows(thoughnottoeveryone'ssatisfaction)thatthisiswhathehimselfwantstoclaim.”SeeDefato190,8;206,22;207,27,citedbySharples,AlexanderofAphrodisiasonFate,21,wherehesaysthatAlexander“objectsnotjusttodeterminationofouractionsbyexternalcausesalone,buttothatresultingfromacombinationofinternalandexternalfactors.”>8.<FrededoesnotgiveanypagereferencetoDihle.Itakehimtohaveinmind,forinstance,“theideaofpurevolitionas

separatefrombothcognitionandemotion”(Dihle,TheoryofWill,135).>

CHAPTER7.ANEARLYCHRISTIANVIEW


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ONAFREEWILL:ORIGEN

1.<11Apology7.5.1;Dialogue88.5.2;102.4.2,4,6;141.1.6.>2.<SeeDeprincipiisIII.1.Thetext,editedbyP.Koetschau,appearsinOrigenesWerke,vol.5(Leipzig,1913).>3.<AfternamingTatian,Frede'stypescripthasanincompletesentencethatIhaveomittedbecauseIdonotknowhowto

completeit:“WhoamongEasternChristianauthorsofHelleniccultureandGreekphilosophy,paganwisdom.”>4.<AdGraecos1.3.5–6.>5.<AtAdGraecos15.2–3–4Tatianascribestheviewthatanimalshaverationalitytocertainunnamedphilosophers.Ifheis

tobecountedintheirnumber,asFredesuggests,thenhisuseofthetermaloga(nonrational)torefertoanimals(hereandalsoatAdGraecos25.1–7–8)mustberegardedaspurelyconventional.WhatFredecalls“abookonanimals”wouldmoreliterallybetranslatedas“abookonlivingbeings.”Forthereferencetothebookondaemons,seeAdGraecos16.1–6,whereTatiansaysthathehas“elsewhere”shownthatdaemonsarenothumansouls.>6.<SeeFrede,“CelsusPhilosophusPlatonicus,”ANRW1136,no.7(1994):5183–5213at5211,withreferencestoOrigen,

CC4.79,84,88,96,97.Anothersecond-centuryPlatonistwhochampionstheviewthatanimalshaveintelligenceisPlutarch,Desollertiaanimalium;seevol.12oftheLoebeditionofPlutarch,Moralia.>7. <See Justin,Dialogue 2.6. The literal historicity of the intellectual autobiography Justin presents here is sometimes

doubted, but either way this passage is testimony to his belief that Platonism is the closest of the philosophical systems toChristianity.ForTatian'srelationshipwithJustin,seeIrenaeus,Adv.haer.1.28.1.>8.<SeeEusebius,HE6.10.1.>9.<RufinusofAquileia(fl.fourth-centuryA.D.).>10.<ThesourceforthisclaimisPorphyry,asreportedbyEusebius,HEVI.19.2–8.ButFrede'suseofpresumablybeliesa

long controversy about whether Porphyry can have gotten things quite right here: many scholars think that he might haveconfused twoquitedifferentOrigens.M.J.Edwards thinkshehasconfused twodifferentAmmoniiaswell;see“Ammonius,TeacherofOrigen,”JournalofEcclesiasticalHistory44(1993):1–13.>11.<Eusebius,HEVI.I9.2–8.>12. <Gregory (b. ca. A.D. 213) studiedwithOrigen (the subject of his panegyric) in Caesarea, where he subsequently

becamebishop.>13.<OnMethodius(d.ca.311),aChristianbishopandfierceopponentofOrigen'sdoctrineoftheResurrection,seeL.G.

Patterson,MethodiusofOlympus:DivineSovereignty,HumanFreedom,andtheLifeofChrist.(Washington,D.C.,1997).>14.<ThetextiseditedintheSourcesChrétiennesseriesbyE.Junod(Paris,I976).>15. <Frede's Origen reference should seemingly read Commentary on John 32.16, 451.30–32, in E. Preuschen, ed.,

OrigenesWerke,vol.4(Leipzig,1930.>16.<Deprinc.II.9.6,esp.169.25–170.2Koetschau.SeeG.R.Boys-Stones,“HumanAutonomyandDivineRevelationin

Origen,”inS.Swain,S.Harrison,andJ.Elsner,eds.,SeveranCulture(Cambridge,2007),488–99.>17.<OntheimpossibilityofdirectcognizanceofGod(theFather),seeDeprinc.1.1.5.Frede'scomparisonofOrigen'sGod

withPlato'sFormoftheGoodisencouragedbytheimageofthesunusedbybothOrigenandPlatointhiscontext,aswellastheconsiderationthatcontemporaryPlatonistsregularlyidentifiedtheFormoftheGoodwiththeircreatorgod.>18.<OrigenintheDeprinc.consistentlytalksasifwithdrawalfromGodistheonlyintellectualdirectionthattheintellects

(other thanChrist'ssoul)could take, if theychangeatall (e.g., II.9.2).Theproposal that intellectsmight in theirprelapsarianstateadvance inknowledgemoreor less, evenwhilemaintainingequalitywitheachother, is adistinctive featureofFrede'saccount.>19. <Origen is actually careful to distinguish the idea that intellects are created “after the image of God” (kat' eikona

theou), that is, in imitationofChrist,who is the imageofGod:Deprinc.1.2.6;11.6.3–6;CommentaryonJohn 1.17 (104–105),22.20–26Preuschen),fromtheideaof“likeness”toGod(homoiosis),whichistherewardforsouls(understoodasthosesameintellects in theirfallenstate)whentheyachieverestorationtotheiroriginalcondition.See,onthisdistinctionespecially,Deprinc.III.6.1andCC4.30,andfurtherH.Crouzel,Théologiedel'imagedeDieuchezOrigène(Paris,1956)(esp.pt.II,chap.3). It is adistinction thatFrededoesnotobservehere,butperhapshispointdoesnot requirehim to.Afterall,onanyaccount,intellectsintheiroriginalstatearecruciallythoughtofasfreelymaintainingtheirunionwithChrist(i.e.,fullyrealizingtheirnatureascreaturesmade“aftertheimageofGod”)justassouls,lateron,freelychoosethepaththatwillleadthembacktothisunion(whichiswhentheywillachieve“likenesstoGod”aswell).Thecontinuitybetweenthesetwophasesofactivityisall themoreevident ifoneacceptsFrede'sproposal that intellectsarecreatedin thefirstplacetoprogress inknowledgeandunderstanding.>20.<Seeesp.Deprinc.II.1.1.>21. <For example, H. Koch, Pronoia und Paideusis. Studien über Orígenes und sein Verhältnis zum Platonismus

(Berlin,1932),251–53>22.<Forbothcriticismandreply,seeEusebius,ContraMarcellum,1.4.24–27.>23.<ByotherpartsofDeprincipiisFredeperhapsreferstoIpref.5,andfor“otherwritingsofOrigen,”mostexplicitly,see

FragmentainevangeliumJoannis(incatenis),437>Frede, Michael. A Free Will : Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought, edited by A. A. Long, University of California Press, 2011. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/asulib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=631055.Created from asulib-ebooks on 2019-08-17 06:35:29.

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24.<SeeI.pref.2(8.14Koetschau).>25.<FormoreonValentinus,seeA.Dihle,TheTheoryofWillinClassicalAntiquity(Berkeley,Calif.,1982),150–57.>26.<Seeesp.Philocalia23.14—I6.>27.<TheApocryphonofJohnistranslatedinJ.M.Robinson,ed.,TheNagHammadiLibraryinEnglish(SanFrancisco,

1988),104–23>28.<FredewasprobablyreferringtoanewlydiscoveredsermonpublishedbyF.DolbeauinVingt-sixSermonsaupeople

d'Afrique(Paris,1996),557–59.IowethisreferencetoJamesO'Donnell.>29.<TwolengthyextractsfromBook3ofOrigen'slostCommentaryonGenesisaregivenatPhilocalia23.1–11and14–

21(also,inparts,atEusebius,PE6.11).>30. <Take the reference to be a dispute about the lordships and divine powers. This must refer to the kyriot tes and

dynameismentioned byPaul inCol. 1, 16 and inEph. 1, 21, respectively, as angelic orders (seeOrigen,De princ. 1.5.1),except that thepowersherearequalifiedassacrae(dynameistheiai, it seems).This in turnssuggests thatwehavehereareference to the theotêtes, or divinitieswhich arementioned in conjunctionwith the kyriotêtes in Irenaeus's account of theValentinians(Adv.haer.1.4.5)andalsointheGnosticEpistulaadRheginum44,37–38,translatedinRobinson,NagHammadiLibrary, 52–57> perhaps based on an interpretation of Paul in 1 Cor. 8:5; see also Clement of Alexandria, Excerpta exTheodoto43,2.<FortheseGnostictextsseeB.A.Pearson,Gnosticism,Judaism,andEgyptianChristianity(Minneapolis,Minn.,I990).>31. <Basilides,forinstance,willregardthemascreationsofamuchinferiorbeing,whoactuallyfalls,namely,Sophia(see

Irenaeus,Adv.haer.1.24.3–5).32.<Tatian,AdGraecos7.1.>33.<AsDihle,TheoryofWill,143,concludes.>34.<SeeDeprinc.1.3.8and1.4.1.>35.<See,forexample,PG46,145.44–148.2,oragainat156.30–32,wherethis“restoration”toourpristinestateissaidtobe

whatthedoctrineoftheresurrectionofthebodyamountsto.>36. <In Rufinus's translation satietas; presumably, the Greek is koros, but see for comparison Justinian, Epistola ad

Menam,anathema1.>37. < Tim. 41ab describes created beings whose continued existence is entirely dependent on, but by the same token

guaranteedby,thegoodwillofthedemiurge.>

CHAPTER8.REACTIONSTOTHESTOICNOTIONOFAFREEWILL:PLOTINUS

1.<ThusDihlesays,“Itisgenerallyacceptedinthestudyofthehistoryofphilosophythatthenotionofwill,asitisusedasatoolofanalysisanddescriptioninmanyphilosophicaldoctrinesfromtheearlyScholasticstoSchopenhauerandNietzsche,wasinventedbySt.Augustine”(A.Dihle,TheTheoryofWillinClassicalAntiquity[Berkeley,Calif.,1982],123).>2. SeeR.Walzer,GalenonJewsandChristians (Oxford,1949), IIff,whocitesGalen,DeusupartiumXI,14, for this

contrast.FredediscussesGalen'stheologyin“Galen'sTheology,”inJ.BarnesandJ.Jouanna,eds.,GalienetlaPhilosophie.Entretienssurl'antiquitéclassiquedelaFondationHardt(Vandoeuvres,Switz.,2003),49:73–129.>3.<Dihle,TheoryofWill,I.>4.<Thereferenceistothefour-volumeCommentariesontheMedicalDoctrinesofPlato'sTimaeus(Lib.Prop.XIX46);

fragmentsareprintedinCorpusMedicorumGraecorumSupp.I(1934),andcontroversial“new”fragmentsappearedinC.J.Larrain, Galens Kommentar zu Platons Timaios(Teubner, Stuttgart, 1992). Thanks to J. R. Hankinson for supplying thisinformation.>5.<Ammonius,Plotinus'steacher,tookthisview,aswouldLonginusinhisconservatism.<OnbothfiguresseeJ.Dillon,The

MiddlePlatonists(London,1977),380–83.>6.<OnNumenius,seeDillon,MiddlePlatonists,366–72,andM.Frede,“Numenius,”ANRWII36,no.2(1987):1034–75.>7.<Plato,Tim.28a,29a,30c.>8.<Rep.6,509b.>9.<ThemainsourceforNumenius'streatmentofMosesandtheBibleisEusebius,PEIX.6.9.ForfurtherdiscussionseeM.

F.Burnyeat,“PlatonismintheBible:NumeniusofApameaonExodusandEternity,”inR.Salles,ed.,Metaphysics,Soul,andEthicsinAncientThought(Oxford,2005),143–70.>10.<ThemostaccessibleGreektextandtranslationareinvol.7oftheLoebClassicalLibraryeditionbyA.H.Armstrong

(Cambridge,Mass.,1988).ThereisacommentaryonthistreatisebyG.Leroux,Plotin.Traitésurlalibertédelavolontédel'Un(Paris,1990).>11.PlotinustookAristotletotaskforthisinEnn.VI.I.12.<FredeevidentlyacceptsKirchoff'semendationtosoutoninsteadoftouton,etc.,inthemanuscriptreadings.>13.Iwanttonoteinpassinghere,thoughthisagainwoulddeservemoreextensivetreatment,thatinPlotinus'stimenotmuch


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distinctionseemstobemadebetweenthenonrationalpartofthesoulandthebody.Thestateofthenonrationalpartofthesoulseemstobetakentobelargely, ifnotentirely,afunctionofthestateof thebody.ThisisaviewwefindinGalenbutalso, itseems, in Alexander of Aphrodisias. For Galen, see PHP V, 464; and for Alexander,De anima 24.21–23, andMantissa104.28–34.ThankstoR.W.Sharplesforsupplyingthelatterreferences.>Weshallhardlyerrinassumingthatthisisinlargeparttheresultoftheinfluenceofmedicine.ButweshouldalsorememberthatalreadyinPlato'sPhaedo,64d—65d,perceptionandnonrationaldesireareamatterof thebody.Inanycase, ifwearemotivatedbyappetite,Plotinustakesit thatsomethingotherthanus,namely,ourbody(nottomentiontheexternalobjectsofdesire),isdecidingwhatweareafter.<Ihavesuppliedafterbecausethesenseseemstorequiresomesuchconclusiontothesentence.>14.OneofPlotinus'slongestandmostimportanttreatises(Enn.II.9)isdirectedagainsttheGnosticsandtheirdemonization

ofthevisibleworld.15.<Ihavesubstituted“withitsfreedomquasoulsomethinghighlytenuousandqualified”forFrede'soriginalwording“,has

beenintellectualized,butthatitsfreedomisahighlytenuousandqualifiedfreedom.”>16. <See Frede, “Monotheism and Pagan Philosophy in LaterAntiquity,” inM. Frede and P.Athanassiadi, eds.,Pagan

MonotheisminLateAntiquity(Oxford,2006),4I—69.>17.<AgainsttheChristians,fr.76Harnack.>18.Thefeminineparticiplesin7.12,13,15gobacktothefeminine“thenature(physis)ofthegood“in7.3.19.<SeeAristotle,Dean.3.4.>20. <Note, though, one consequence of there being no distinction inGod betweenwilling and doing: Itmeans thatGod's

willingin itselfamounts tosomething'sgettingdone.It is this that is,orshouldbe,meantbysayingthatGoddoesthingsbyasheeractofwill;seeMethodius,Decreatis15.21.A.H.Armstrong,“TwoViewsoffreedom,”StudiaPatristica18(1982):397–46.22.SeePlotinus,trans.A.H.Armstrong,LoebClassicalLibrary,7:224.

CHAPTER9.AUGUSTINE:ARADICALLYNEWNOTIONOFAFREEWILL?

1.<OnCiceroandPhilo,seeC.Brittain,PhiloofLarissa(Oxford,200l).>2.<Ambrose'sStoicismismostevidentinhisworkDeofficiis,whichwasheavilyinfluencedbyCicero'sworkofthesame

name:seeAmbrose,Deofficiis,ed.I.F.Davidson(Oxford,2001).>3.<SeeConfVIII.2.>4.<SeeP.Hadot,MariusVictorinus(Paris,1971).>5.A.Dihle,TheTheoryofWillinClassicalAntiquity(Berkeley,Calif.,1982),126.<IncontrastwithDihleandinaffinity

withFrede,GauthierarguesthatAugustine'snotionofthewillisalreadycompletelypresentintheStoics.SeeR.A.Gauthier,introductiontoAristote:l'ethiqueàNicomacheI,2ded.(Louvain,Begium,1970),1:259.IowethisreferencetoC.H.Kahn,“Discovering theWill:FromAristotle toAugustine,” in J.M.Dillon andA.A.Long, eds.,TheQuestion of“Eclecticism”:StudiesinLaterGreekPhilosophy(Berkeley,Calif.,1988),238.>6.<Fortheevidenceanddiscussion,seeSVF2.70,74,and90,andLSchap.40.>7.<III.200.ThisreferenceistoG.M.Green'seditioninCorpusScriptorumEcclesiasticorumLatinorum(Vienna,1956),

vol. 74, sect. VI, pt. III. For a recent study see S. Harrison, Augustine's Way into the Will: The Theological andPhilosophicalSignificanceofDeLiberoArbitrio(Oxford,2006).>8.ThereasonforAugustine'sparticularconcernwithManichaeismiseasytosee.Thisreligion,soonafteritsriselateinthe

thirdcenturyA.D.,hadrapidlyspreadinNorthAfrica,whereAugustinehimselfhadbeenstronglyattractedtoitforabouteightyears.Whenhewrote theDeliberoarbitrio, ithadbeen justa fewyearssincehehadfinally rejectedManichaeism.Now,afterhisconversion,heturnswithavengeanceagainsttheManichaeans.BythetimehehadfinishedtheDeliberoarbitrio,hehadalreadywrittentwotreatisesagainsthiserstwhilebrethren,andmanymoreweretofollow.9.<SeeJ.Ferguson,Pelagius.AHistoricalandTheologicalStudy(Cambridge,1956).>10. The main difference is that in Augustine's case the topic was made more urgent by his earlier involvement in

Manichaeismandhisconvertingpeople,likehisbenefactorRomanianus,toit.11.<III.I98–202.ForAugustine'smuchlaterinsistenceonhisignoranceaboutthesoul'sorigin,seeRetr.1.1.3,areferenceI

owetoJamesO'Donnell.>12.<Frede'stypescriptnamesO'Donnell,butIhavecorrectedthenametoO'Connell,inreferencetoR.J.O'Connell,The

OriginofSoulinSt.Augustine'sLaterWorks(NewYork,1987).IowethiscorrectiontoJamesO'Donnell.>13.<Thedebatewasaboutwhether,forexample,“man,”signifiesanactualuniversalorcommonnature(realism),existing

independentofparticularsorminds,or, rather,ageneral termorconcept thathasnoextramentalcorrelate (nominalism).Fordetails see N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, and J. Pinborg, eds., The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy(Cambridge,1982).>14.<ThePaulinetext,intheRevisedEnglishBibleedition(Oxford,1989),reads:“ForitisGodwhoworksinyou,inspiring


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boththewillandthedeed,forhischosenpurpose.”MariusVictorinusistheearliestLatincommentatoronthePaulineepistles.>15.<FredewasprobablythinkingofPhilo,Leg.Alleg.1.93(SVF3.519),whichislikelytobeofStoicorigin.Plutarchalso

advocatestheuseof“precepts”intheeducationofchildren(Delib.educ.I2).>16.<“Posidonius'saccount“isanallusiontoSeneca,Ep.90.>

CHAPTER10.CONCLUSION

1.<SeeFrede'sdiscussionin“JohnofDamascusonHumanAction,theWill,andHumanFreedom,”inK.Ierodiakonou,ed.,ByzantinePhilosophyandItsAncientSources (Oxford,2002),63–96.Frede's study isoutlinedby Ierodiakonouas follows(11–12):“[Frede]focuses…inparticularonhis[John's]attempttointegrateanotionofawillintoAristotle'smoralpsychologyandtheoryofaction.TheproblemhereistoexplainwhyGodwouldcreatehumanbeingsiftheysoonerorlaterwouldsin,butalso togetabettergraspof theprocessofhowwecome tomakeachoice.According toMichaelFrede,John'saccountofhuman freedom is quite novel in someways, and this noveltyhad an important impact onThomasAquinas, and thuson thefurtherdevelopmentofthoughtaboutthewillintraditionalwesternphilosophy.”>


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BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Brisson,L.,andM.Papillon.“Longinus.”ANRWII36,no.1(1994):5214–99.Brittain,C.PhiloofLarissa.Oxford,2001.Broadie,S.EthicswithAristotle.Oxford,1991.Bullard,R.A.,andR.Layton.“TheHypostasisoftheArchons.”InJ.M.Robinson,ed.,TheNagHammadiLibraryinEnglish,161–69.SanFrancisco,1988.

Burnyeat,M.“PlatonismintheBible:NumeniusofApameaonExodusandEternity.”InR.Salles,ed.,Metaphysics,Soul,andEthicsinAncientThought,143–70.Oxford,2005.

Cooper,J.“PosidoniusonEmotions.”InJ.Cooper,ReasonandEmotion,449–84.Princeton,N.J.,1999.Crouzel,H.Théologiedel'imagedeDieuchezOrigène.Paris,1956.Dihle,A.TheTheoryofWillinClassicalAntiquity.Berkeley,Calif.,1982.Dillon,J.TheMiddlePlatonists.London,1977.Dobbin,R.“ProharesisinEpictetus.”AncientPhilosophyII(1991):III–35.Edwards,M.J.“Ammonius,TeacherofOrigen.”JournalofEcclesiasticalHistory44(1993):1–13.Ferguson,J.Pelagius:AHistoricalandTheologicalStudy.Cambridge,1956.Frede,M.“CelsusphilosophusPlatonicus.”ANRWII36,no.7(1994):5183–5213.—.EssaysinAncientPhilosophy.Minneapolis,Minn.,1987.—.“Galen'sTheology.”InJ.BarnesandJ.Jouanna,eds.,Galienetlaphilosophie.Entretienssurl'antiquitéclassiquedelaFondationHardt,49:73–129.Vandoeuvres,Switz.,2003.

—.“JohnofDamascusonHumanAction,theWill,andHumanFreedom.”InK.Ierodiakonou,ed.,ByzantinePhilosophyandItsAncientSources.Oxford,2002.

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—.“Numenius.”ANRWII36,no.2(1987):1034–75.—.“OntheStoicConceptionoftheGood.”InK.Ierodiakonou,ed.,TopicsinStoicPhilosophy,71–94.Oxford,1999.—.“Origen'sTreatiseagainstCelsus.”InM.EdwardsandM.Goodman,eds.,ApologeticsintheRomanEmpire,131–56.

Oxford,1991.—.“TheStoicConceptionofReason.”InK.J.Boudouris,ed.,HellenisticPhilosophy,2:50–63.Athens,1994.—.“TheStoicDoctrineoftheAffectionsoftheSoul.”InM.SchofieldandG.Striker,eds.,TheNormsofNature,93–112.

Cambridge,1986.—.“StoicsandSkepticsonClearandDistinctImpressions.”InM.Burnyeat,ed.,TheSkepticalTradition.Berkeley,Calif.,

1983.Frede,M.,andD.Charles,eds.Aristotle's‘'Metaphysics”Lambda:SymposiumAristotelicum.Oxford,2000.Gauthier,R.A.Aristote:L'éthiqueàNicomache1.1,2ded.Louvain,Belgium,1970.Graver,M.“PhiloofAlexandriaandtheOriginoftheStoicπροπ θειαι.”Phronesis44(1999):300–25.—.StoicismandEmotion.Chicago,2007.Hadot,P.MariusVictorinus.Paris,1971.Hankinson,R.J.“DeterminismandIndeterminism.”InK.Algra,J.Barnes,J.Mansfeld,andM.Schofield,eds.,TheCambridgeHistoryofHellenisticPhilosophy,513–41.Cambridge,1999.

Harrison,S.Augustine'sWayintotheWill:TheTheologicalandPhilosophicalSignificanceofDeliberoarbitrio.Oxford,2006.

Inwood,B.EthicsandHumanActioninEarlyStoicism.Oxford,1985.Kahn,C.H.“DiscoveringtheWill:FromAristotletoAugustine.”InJ.M.DillonandA.A.Long,eds.,TheQuestionof“Eclecticism”:StudiesinLaterGreekPhilosophy.Berkeley,Calif.,1988.

Kenny,A.Aristotle'sTheoryoftheWill.NewHaven,Conn.,1979.Kidd,I.G.“PosidoniusonEmotions.”InA.A.Long,ed.,ProblemsinStoicism,200–15.1971.Reprint,London,1996.


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O'Connell,R.J.TheOriginofSoulinSt.Augustine'sLaterWorks.NewYork,1987.Patterson,L.G.MethodiusofOlympus:DivineSovereignty,HumanFreedom,andtheLifeofChrist.Washington,D.C.,

1997.Pearson,B.A.Gnosticism,Judaism,andEgyptianChristianity.Minneapolis,Minn.,1990.Robinson,J.M.,ed.TheNagHammadiLibraryinEnglish.SanFrancisco,1988.Ross,W.D.Aristotle.London,1923.Ryle,G.TheConceptofMind.London,1949.Sharples,R.W.,ed.AlexanderofAphrodisiasonFate.London,1983.Sinkewicz,R.E.EvagriusofPontus:TheGreekAsceticCorpus.Oxford,2003.Sorabji,R.Self.Oxford,2006.Walzer,R.GalenonJewsandChristians.Oxford,1949.Williams,B.ShameandNecessity.Berkeley,1993.ReprintwithanewforewordbyA.A.Long,Berkeley,2008.


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INDEX

TheindexthatappearedintheprintversionofthistitledoesnotmatchthepagesinyoureBook.PleaseusethesearchfunctiononyoureReadingdevicetosearchfortermsofinterest.Foryourreference,thetermsthatappearintheprintindexarelistedbelow.

akrasiaAlexanderofAphrodisiasAmbroseAmmoniusSaccasanimalbehaviorAquinas,ThomasarchontesAristoteliansAristotleArmstrong,A.H.assentAugustineautexousion

BasilidesBasilofCaesareabeliefboul sis

CalcidiusCarneadesCelsuschoiceChristianityChrysippusCiceroClementofAlexandriaconflictofdesiresCooper,J.

daemonsDamasciusdemiurgeDemocritusdesiredesiresofreasondeterminismDihle,A.

eleutheria,eleutherosembodiment


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emotionsenslavementeph'hem nEpictetusEpicurusepithymiaEusebiusEvagriusPonticus

faithfall,thefate,seedeterminismfreedom:asabilitytochooseotherwise,asabsenceofexternalconstraint,asautonomousaction,Alexanderon,Augustineon,

Origenon,PlotinusonStoicsonfreedom,politicalnotionoffreewill,andresponsibility,inAugustine,inearlyChristianliterature,inOrigen,inStoicism,modernobjectionsto,notin

Aristotle,schemaof

GalenGnosticism,GnosticsGod,inAristotle,inPlotinus,inStoicismgood,thegoodlifegrace,divineGregoryNazianzusGregoryofNyssaGregoryThaumaturgus

humannature

impressionsindifferenceintellects,inOrigen,inPlotinusIrenaeus

JohnofDamascus,nJudaismjusticeJustinMartyr

Longinus

ManichaeansMarcellusofAncyraMarcionMariusVictorinusMaximustheConfessorMethodiusmind,notionsofmonotheismMosesMusoniusRufus

natureNemesiusofEmesanonrationaldesires


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Numenius

O'Connell,R.J.One,thePlotinianOrigenoriginalsin

PamphiliusofCaesariaPantaenusparadoxes,StoicPaul,St.PelagianismPeripatetics,seeAristoteliansphantasiaplanetsPlatoPlatonism,PlatonistspleasurePlotinusPorphyryPosidoniusprohairesispropatheiapropositionalcontentprovidence

reasonresponsibilityRoss,W.D.RufinusRyle,G.

Senecaslavery,seeenslavementSocratesStoicismsoulinChristianthought,inPlotinussoul,partsof

Tatiantranscendencetruth

uptous,seeeph'hem n

Valentinusvirtuevoluntas

wantingwill,emergenceofinStoicism,inAugustine,inOrigen,inPlatonistsandAristotelians,inPlotinus,inThomasAquinas,minimal

notionof,notinAristotle,termsforwilling,inAristotle,inPlotinus,inStoicismwisdomworld,bestpossible


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Zeno

Text: 10.75/15JansonDisplay: JansonMTPro

Compositor: BookMatters,BerkeleyPrinterandbinder: SheridanBooks,Inc.


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