copp - darwinian skepticism about moral realism.pdf

Philosophical Issues, 18, Interdisciplinary Core Philosophy, 2008

DARWINIAN SKEPTICISM ABOUT MORAL REALISM∗

David CoppUniversity of Florida

1. Introduction

There appear to be plausible Darwinian evolutionary explanations of arange of psychological phenomena with moral import, phenomena that areboth conative and cognitive in nature. Call these the phenomena of moralpsychology. These phenomena include the fact that humans have a tendencyto develop and to become disposed to express a variety of conative states,including morally significant desires, sentiments, and emotions. There is, forexample, a tendency to develop moral attitudes that favor cooperation, atendency of parents to desire to care for their offspring, and a tendencyof those who have received goods from others to desire to reciprocate. Thephenomena I have in mind also include a variety of cognitive capacities,including those required to form moral beliefs, and they include a tendencyto form such beliefs. And they include the capacity for what Allan Gibbardcalls “normative governance” (1990, 61–80), which arguably depends on acapacity to feel shame and guilt, a capacity to understand social norms,and a capacity for complex practical reasoning. I will say more about thesephenomena in what follows. To simplify my task, I assume that the natureof these phenomena is not at issue.

Drawing on the work of evolutionary biologists, a number of philoso-phers have argued that Darwinian forces have strongly influenced thephenomena of moral psychology with the result that the nature of thephenomena, including the content of our moral beliefs, can be explained,at least in part, on the basis of evolutionary theory.1 Call this the Darwinianhypothesis. I assume for the sake of argument that it is correct. The Darwinianhypothesis is compatible with a variety of specific proposals about the exactway in which evolutionary pressures influenced the phenomena. And it is

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compatible with different views about how strongly the Darwinian forcesinfluenced the phenomena.

The question I am interested in is whether, if the Darwinian hypothesisis correct, there is then, on this basis, a solid argument, albeit not a conclusiveargument, against moral realism. I focus on an argument that I believe isespecially helpful in clarifying the nature of the challenge Darwinism posesfor moral realism. The argument is due to Sharon Street (2006). Elements ofit are found in the work of Richard Joyce (2006), Philip Kitcher (2006), andothers.

Street argues that the truth of the Darwinian hypothesis would pose adilemma for moral realism and also for realism about value in general.2 Forif evolutionary forces “played a tremendous role in shaping the content ofhuman [moral] attitudes,” realists must explain the relation between theseforces and the moral facts. The key question is whether evolutionary forcesdid or did not cause our psychology to be such that our moral beliefs tendto track the facts. If realists answer this question in the negative, she argues,they face the skeptical result that our moral beliefs are unlikely to be true.But if they answer in the affirmative, they are committed to the specificDarwinian hypothesis that “natural selection favored ancestors who were ableto grasp those truths.” This hypothesis, Street argues, is implausible. A moreplausible account of the evolution of the phenomena of moral psychology, theadaptive link account, does not postulate the existence of moral truths. Hence,Street argues, the Darwinian hypothesis forces realists to choose between animplausible skeptical result and a scientifically implausible explanation ofthe phenomena of moral psychology. To avoid both horns of the dilemma,one must deny moral realism.3

I begin by explaining the basic idea behind the Darwinian hypothesis. Ithen explicate the Darwinian dilemma in more detail and argue that realistscan escape it. Realists are not forced to choose between the skeptical resultand the implausible hypothesis. The remaining challenge for realists whoaccept the Darwinian hypothesis is to support the plausibility of a view ofhuman beings as having evolved and developed in such a way that theirmoral beliefs are responsive to facts that are moral facts. Toward the end ofthe paper, I illustrate how this picture can be supported. The upshot is thata successful argument against moral realism cannot rest on the Darwiniandilemma but must instead rest on philosophical objections of a more familiarkind.

2. Evolution and Moral Beliefs

Street, Joyce, and Kitcher offer similar elaborations of the Darwinianhypothesis. The basic idea is that tendencies to have certain kinds of evalua-tive responses rather than others promoted reproductive success among our

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remote ancestors because they “forged adaptive links between our ancestors’circumstances and their responses to those circumstances, getting them to act,feel, and believe in ways that turned out to be reproductively advantageous”(Street 2006, 127; Joyce 2006, 117; see Kitcher 2006, 175–181). This isthe adaptive link account. It seems clear, for example, that a tendency tocooperate with those who have a tendency to reciprocate would tend topromote reproductive success, as would a tendency to seek the good of one’skin, and a tendency to avoid those who would harm one (Street 2006, 129;Kitcher 2006, 166–174). According to the adaptive link account, a tendencyto have certain kinds of evaluative responses rather than others contributedto reproductive success in the ancestral environment and, as a result ofthis, human beings have a tendency to exhibit certain morally significantemotional and other conative tendencies (Joyce 2006, 13–142).

The Darwinian hypothesis also claims, importantly, that the content ofour moral beliefs has been affected by Darwinian forces. This can seempuzzling. For one thing, as Street notes, our remote ancestors likely did nothave the cognitive capacity to form moral beliefs (2006, 118–119). Moreover,it is difficult to see how the content of moral beliefs we currently have couldhave been affected by the working of natural selection on the properties ofsuch distant ancestors. Street’s idea, however, is that the content of our moralbeliefs might have been indirectly influenced by Darwinian forces as a resultof its more direct influences on primitive pre-conceptual states of mind ofour remote ancestors (2006, 118–120).

She seems to have in mind a process that we can factor into roughlythree stages. First, natural selection led to the development of some basicpsychological capacities and dispositions in our remote ancestors that ledthem to develop a tendency to have dispositions to form certain evaluativeattitudes. There are certain kinds of behavior that we have reason to believewould have been adaptive among our ancestors. In this first stage, humansevolved to be disposed to form evaluative attitudes that tended to lead themto these kinds of behavior (Street 2006, 129; Joyce 2006, 13–50; Kitcher2006, 166–174). Second, the capacities and dispositions that developed inthe first stage affected to some extent the development of the conceptualrepertoire of less remote ancestors in a way that affected the content ofevaluative judgments they came to be disposed to make. Street holds thatthe adaptive link account can explain in this way why human beings evolvedto be disposed to make judgments favoring behavior of the above kinds. Forexample, she holds it can explain why humans evolved to have a tendencyto judge that the fact that someone has helped one is a reason to help thatperson in return (Street 2006, 127; Joyce 2006, 50–57). Third, as a result of allof this, we have a non-reflective tendency to form certain basic moral beliefs.

Kitcher adds to this picture an account of the evolutionary function ofa capacity for normative governance along with an account of the impact of“cultural evolution.” He suggests that the evolutionary function of a capacity


for normative governance was “to promote social cohesion” by counteringthe pressures of selfish and antisocial desires with “pressures that wouldreinforce the social fabric” (2006, 172). He argues that “hominids with thetendency to act on the altruistic [and cooperation inducing] dispositionswould have fared better than those without” since it would have given themeasier access to “advantageous coalitions” (2006, 172; see also Gibbard 1990).He suggests, moreover, that an evolved capacity for normative governancewould have enabled our ancestors to develop a “proto-morality” that wouldreinforce such dispositions and be passed down over generations. A processof cultural evolution could then develop, in which certain normative systemswould be more successful than others in surviving into following generations.Certain kinds of norms would be expected to survive and to becomemore widely accepted. These would include, for example, norms designedto promote social stability, peacefulness, and cooperation (2006, 173). Theadaptive link account therefore appears able to explain why humans wouldhave developed a capacity for normative governance, involving a tendencyto accept norms that have currency in the local culture and to govern theirbehavior in accord with such norms. It also seems to able to explain whythere would be a robust tendency for norms with currency in a culture tofavor ‘prosocial’ behaviors, including behavior that favors one’s offspring andrelatives, that reciprocates benefits received, and that favors cooperation.

On Kitcher’s proposal, then, there was a fourth stage in the process.In this stage, due to a process of cultural evolution, norms that promotesocial stability, peacefulness, and cooperation tended to become more widelyaccepted, thus tending to lead humans with a capacity for normativegovernance to form moral beliefs that favor these forms of behavior. Forconvenience, I will take the above account of the four-stage process to bepart of the adaptive link account.

The key point is that moral belief, together with the other phenomenaof moral psychology, such as our emotions and desires, tends to motivatebehavior. It is because of this that the phenomena of moral psychology couldhave evolved in order to provide motivation for adaptive behavior. Nothinghere requires or implies that the capacity to form moral beliefs evolved inorder to enable us to detect the moral facts (Joyce 2006, 131; Kitcher 2006,176).

Given this, and given a functionalist account of the distinction betweenbelief and desire, the adaptive link account might seem to undermine moralrealism by providing support for noncognitivism, the view that the stateof mind of a person who accepts a (pure and basic) moral claim is not abelief, but is instead a kind of conative state. Kitcher argues that this is so(2006, 175–176). His idea seems to be that, on the adaptive link account, theevolutionary function of the phenomena of moral psychology is to motivateadaptive behavior. Hence, even if it is plausible that we evolved to tend tohave an adaptive repertoire of emotional and behavioral dispositions and

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attitudes, there is little plausibility to the idea that we would have evolvedto form evaluative beliefs properly so called, in addition to this repertoire ofnoncognitive states. I cannot pursue this argument here. It seems to me thateven if the evolutionary function of the phenomena of moral psychology isto motivate adaptive behavior, it is arguable that such motivation is broughtabout in a standard way by a combination of belief and conation. Theadaptive link account does not force us to noncognitivism.4

The adaptive link account is obviously speculative. It is also speculativeto hold, as Street does, that Darwinian forces “strongly affected” our moralpsychology including the content of our moral beliefs (2006, 109; also 113,121). We could agree that these forces had an effect without agreeing thatthe effect was especially strong. Nevertheless, for the sake of argument, Ishall follow Street in assuming that the adaptive link account is at leastapproximately true and that Darwinian forces have had a significant impacton human moral psychology. I shall assume that something like the four-stageprocess did occur and that it explains to a significant degree the content ofour moral beliefs. This is not to deny, of course, that our moral beliefs havebeen affected by a variety of factors in addition to Darwinian pressures,including culture as well as deliberation and reflection.5

3. The Darwinian Dilemma

The distinctiveness of Street’s argument can be brought out by contrast-ing it with a more direct Darwinian argument against moral realism. Thisargument rests on the premise that the most plausible Darwinian explanationof the phenomena of moral psychology does not require the assumptionthat any moral beliefs are true. The argument claims, in light of this, thatconsiderations of ontological parsimony give us reason to suppose there areno moral truths.6

This argument does not successfully undermine moral realism, however,for at least two reasons. First, the most plausible Darwinian explanationsof our capacities to have beliefs about the “big bang” and about stringtheory also do not postulate the existence of truths in these areas, but thisdoes not give us reason to conclude there are no such truths. Indeed, wehave independent reasons to suppose there are such truths. For all that theDarwinian story shows, we also might have independent reason to supposethere are moral facts (See Joyce 2006, 182–184; Kitcher 2006, 176). Second,as Joyce points out (2006, 188–189), if the moral facts are “reducible” tonon-moral facts of the kind that are invoked in the Darwinian hypothesis,there is no loss of parsimony in supposing that there are moral facts. In thiscase, Occam’s Razor would have no work to do.7

Street herself accepts a version of naturalistic reductionism, a versionthat she describes as “constructivist” and “antirealist,” to contrast it with


the “realist” positions her argument is intended to attack.8 We might insteadcategorize her constructivism as a kind of realism, but nothing depends onour choice of terminology. The key point is that Street does not intendto argue against constructivist theories, according to which the moralfacts are reducible to, or are “a function of,” facts about our “evaluativeattitudes”—where our “evaluative attitudes” include all the phenomena ofmoral psychology, both conative and cognitive, including “consciously andunconsciously held evaluative judgements” (2006, 111).

The defining claim of evaluative realism, she says, “is that there areat least some evaluative facts or truths that hold independently of all ourevaluative attitudes,” including evaluative attitudes that we might have, “uponreflection,” as well as attitudes that we do have (2006, 110–111). A moralrealist holds, then, that there are some moral truths that hold independentlyof our evaluative attitudes. The relevant kind of ‘independence’, Streetexplains, is what Russ Shafer-Landau has called “stance-independence”(2006, 111; Shafer-Landau 2003, 14). As Shafer-Landau explains, moralfacts or truths are “stance-independent” if and only if it is not the case thatthey are “constituted” by facts about the “stances” of persons. For Street,these are facts about the phenomena of moral psychology.

Let me turn now to Street’s Darwinian dilemma argument. The argu-ment’s basic structure is captured by Joyce, who suggests that, given theDarwinian hypothesis, unless “natural selection is likely to have producedtrue [moral] beliefs,” there is reason to think our positive moral beliefs areunjustified (2006, 179–182). Street’s central claim is then that the moralrealist, unlike the constructivist, cannot make good on the proposition thatnatural selection is likely to have produced true moral beliefs—except bytaking up an implausible account of the way in which natural selectionaffected our moral psychology, an account that conflicts with the adaptivelink account.

This is a much more complex argument than the direct argument fromontological parsimony with which we began. It helps to formulate it as posinga dilemma. Realists must either affirm or deny a thesis I will call the trackingthesis, the thesis that natural selection so affected our psychology that ourmoral beliefs tend to track the moral facts.9 On one horn of the dilemma,the “tracking horn,” realists affirm the tracking thesis. But, Street contends,the tracking thesis is untenable because affirming it commits realists todenying the adaptive link account. On the other horn of the dilemma, the“non-tracking horn,” realists deny the tracking thesis. But, Street contends,given the Darwinian hypothesis, if realists deny the tracking thesis they arecommitted to an implausible skeptical result. If Street is correct, realists arein difficulty whether or not they affirm the tracking thesis.

It is interesting to consider why constructivism might be immune tothe argument. Constructivism maintains that the moral facts are reducibleto the phenomena of moral psychology that, according to the Darwinian

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hypothesis, can be explained, in part, as resulting from Darwinian influences.We need to ask whether constructivism can make good on the propositionthat Darwinian forces are likely to have produced true moral beliefs andwhether it can do so without adopting a version of the Darwinian hypothesisthat conflicts with the adaptive link account. The answer seems to be thatit can. The moral facts are facts of a kind that would make our moralbeliefs true. According to constructivism, such facts are constituted by thephenomena of moral psychology. Hence, according to constructivism, theDarwinian forces that influenced the phenomena of moral psychology alsothereby influenced which moral facts obtain, and whether the moral facts thatobtain are such as to make our moral beliefs true. Given this, it seems thereshould be a way to formulate a constructivist theory such that the moralfacts that it postulates, given the nature of the psychological phenomenapredicted by the adaptive link, are such as to make true the moral beliefsthat the adaptive link account predicts we will tend to have.10 I leave asidethe question of how plausible such a theory would be.

If this argument about constructivism is correct, then an appropriatelyformulated constructivist theory can combine its account of the truthconditions of moral beliefs with the adaptive link account to explain whythe tracking thesis holds. It is moral realists who, Street argues, cannot usethe adaptive link account to explain why the tracking thesis holds. I willargue, however, that this is a mistake. Given an appropriate account of thetruth conditions of moral beliefs, a realist theory can accept the adaptivelink account and use it to underwrite the tracking thesis.

4. The Non-Tracking Horn of the Dilemma

On the non-tracking horn of the dilemma, realists deny that naturalselection affected our moral psychology in such a way that our moral beliefstend to track the moral facts. Street contends that, on this position, “theforces of natural selection must be viewed as a purely distorting influenceon our evaluative judgements, having pushed us in evaluative directions thathave nothing whatsoever to do with the evaluative truth” (2006, 121). Wehave been “evolving towards” having moral beliefs with whatever contenttended “to promote reproductive success.” We have been “guided by thewrong sort of influence.” But then, barring “a fluke of luck,” it is very likely“that many or most of our evaluative judgments are off track.” Hence, arealist who accepts the Darwinian hypothesis and takes the non-trackinghorn of the dilemma is committed to “the far-fetched skeptical result” thatit would be “purely a matter of chance” if any of our moral beliefs weretrue (2006, 121–122). To avoid this skeptical result, Street argues, while alsoaccepting the Darwinian hypothesis, realists must accept the tracking thesis(2006, 134–135).


Joyce offers a similar argument but reaches a different conclusion.Street thinks that realists who accept the Darwinian hypothesis but denythe tracking thesis are committed to the position that our moral beliefsare unlikely to be true. Joyce argues that such realists are committed tothe position that our positive moral beliefs may be unjustified. He pointsout that if we know our beliefs on a given topic have been influenced byfactors that do not tend to track the truth, then we ought rationally tobe less confident in those beliefs. For example, if I know my beliefs aboutsomeone’s job qualifications have been influenced by my anger with him,then I ought rationally to be less confident than I otherwise would be.The stronger that I think such influences have been, the less confident Iought to be (2006, 179–182; see Street 2006, 155; Sober 1993, 107). Hence,realists who accept that Darwinian forces have had a significant effect onthe content of our moral beliefs, and who deny the tracking thesis, oughtto have a significantly reduced level of confidence in their moral beliefs. Ontheir position, there is reason to think that our positive moral beliefs areunjustified.

One might object that rational reflection can correct for the potentiallydistorting influence of natural selection on our moral beliefs. Street respondsthat unless the evolutionary forces that affected the content of our moralbeliefs in some way tracked the truth, the moral views with which reflectionwould begin are likely off track. Hence, if rational reflection in moral mattersconsists in seeking a “reflective equilibrium” among our moral views, rationalreflection is unlikely to get us closer to the truth (2006, 124). Many realistswould object that rational reflection can lead to significant change in ourmoral views and take us beyond merely seeking a reflective equilibriumamong antecedently given views. Nevertheless, it would be difficult to denythat the results of rational reflection would be strongly influenced byour starting points as well as by our evolved intellectual and conceptualcapacities. If we reject the tracking thesis, it is not clear what reason we haveto think that the exercise of these capacities in reflecting on our initial moralbeliefs would enable us to get closer to the truth.

One might respond that even if Darwinian forces have influenced thecontent of our moral beliefs, there have been a variety of other influenceson their content, including cultural influences, and these other influencesmight have tended to push our moral beliefs in the direction of the truth(see Sinnott-Armstrong 2006, 40–45). For example, even if natural selectioncaused men to have a tendency to think unreflectively that there is nothingwrong with rape, their cultures might have led many of them to thinkotherwise. Empathy for the victim might also have led them to thinkotherwise. The trouble with this response is that, on the adaptive link account,the nature of our moral emotions has also been affected by natural selection,and our cultures also have been affected by Darwinian forces. So if we rejectthe tracking thesis, it is not clear what reason we have to think that our

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emotions or our cultures will tend to push our moral beliefs in the directionof the truth.

The most important objection to Street’s argument is that realists whoaccept the Darwinian hypothesis do not need to accept the tracking thesis inorder to avoid being committed to Street’s or Joyce’s skeptical result. Realistsdo not need to hold that Darwinian forces tended to cause our moral beliefsto track the truth. It would be enough if the following complex relation wereto obtain: the indirect effect of Darwinian forces on the content of our moralbeliefs has been such that, given the cumulative effect of all influences ontheir content, our beliefs tend to do well enough in tracking the moral truththat rational refection can in principle correct sufficiently for any distortinginfluence so as to undermine the skeptical worry. That is, it would be enoughif Darwinian forces so influenced the content of our moral beliefs that,given all influences on their content, they track the truth to an ‘epistemicallysufficient degree’.11 For brevity, I will speak of “quasi-tracking” when I havein mind tracking to an epistemically sufficient degree.

The quasi-tracking thesis is the thesis, basically, that Darwinian forces soaffected our psychology that our moral beliefs tend to quasi-track the moralfacts. I have argued that realists who accept the Darwinian hypothesis donot need to accept the tracking thesis to avoid a skeptical result. It shouldbe clear, however, that these realists must accept the quasi-tracking thesisto avoid a skeptical result. We can therefore reformulate the dilemma sothat it presents realists with a choice between accepting and denying thequasi-tracking thesis. I am willing to concede that realists who accept theDarwinian hypothesis must accept the quasi-tracking thesis.

5. The Tracking Horn of the Dilemma

On the tracking horn of the dilemma, as I originally formulated theargument, realists accept the tracking thesis. Street argues that realists whoaccept the tracking thesis must explain why this thesis holds. To explain this,she argues, realists must accept the tracking account, which is the hypothesisthat our moral beliefs tend to track the truth because the capacity to detectmoral truths promoted reproductive success among our ancestors (2006,125–126). “There is no other way to go,” she says, if realism is to avoidthe non-tracking horn of the dilemma (135). She contends, however, thatthe tracking account is “unacceptable” because it is not compatible with theempirically more plausible adaptive link account (128–135).

There is a problem here. The tracking thesis is the thesis that, basically,Darwinian forces caused our moral beliefs to track the moral facts. Thetracking account is the hypothesis that, in effect, Darwinian forces causedour moral beliefs to track the moral facts because the capacity to detectmoral truths promoted reproductive success. It appears that one can reject


this explanation without denying the tracking thesis. Instead, it seems, realistsshould be able to invoke the adaptive link account to explain why we cameto have the tendency to form moral beliefs that track the facts. Street herselfthinks that constructivism can employ the adaptive link account to explainwhy we came to have this tendency.

We have, however, reformulated the dilemma. On the tracking horn ofthe reformulated dilemma, realists accept the quasi-tracking thesis. Again, theimportant point is that the quasi-tracking thesis is the thesis that Darwinianforces caused our moral beliefs to quasi-track the moral facts. The quasi-tracking account is the hypothesis that Darwinian forces caused our moralbeliefs to quasi-track the moral facts because the capacity to detect moraltruths promoted reproductive success among our ancestors. It appears thatrealists can reject this explanation without denying the quasi-tracking thesis.As I will argue, they can invoke the adaptive link account to explain why thequasi-tracking thesis holds.

It appears, moreover, that the tracking account, or at least a close relativeof the tracking account, is actually compatible with the adaptive link account.Realists therefore can combine these accounts in order to explain why thequasi-tracking thesis holds. An analogy might help. We presumably evolvedto be able to track facts about predators. This can be explained on the basisthat the capacity to detect predators was part of a system that enabled us toavoid predators, where of course the ability to avoid predators was adaptive(Street 2006, 135–136). Realists can take an analogous position regardingthe capacity to detect moral truths. They can say that our moral beliefstend to quasi-track the moral facts because the capacity to detect moraltruths was part of a system of evaluative responses that was adaptive amongour ancestors. This is the close relative of the quasi-tracking account that Imentioned. Realists can then use the adaptive link account to explain that thesystem of evaluative responses in question was adaptive because it motivatedbehavior that enhanced reproductive success.

The basic idea, then, is that the capacity to quasi-track the moral truthwas part of a system of evaluative responses that was adaptive becauseit motivated behavior that enhanced reproductive success, as explained bythe adaptive link account. As I understand it, the adaptive link accountpostulates a four-stage process whereby Darwinian forces affected the contentof our moral beliefs. At one stage in this process, our ancestors came to bedisposed to make moral judgments and to have moral beliefs with a contentthat tended to motivate them to respond to their circumstances in ways thatwere reproductively advantageous. This story is compatible with the realistclaim that there are moral facts. And it is compatible with the claim that thefour-stage process led to our having a tendency to have moral beliefs thatquasi-track the truth. Realists therefore can add these claims to the story.They can argue that the disposition to have evaluative responses that tendedto lead our ancestors to respond to their circumstances in ways that were

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adaptive led, in turn, through the four-stage process, to a tendency in ourmore recent ancestors to have moral beliefs that approximated to the truth.And they can argue that this tendency was part of a system of responses thatwas adaptive.

If all of this is correct, realists can combine the adaptive link accountwith a near relative of the quasi-tracking account to explain why the quasi-tracking thesis holds. This means that, for all Street has shown, realists cansafely grasp the tracking horn of the Darwinian Dilemma.

6. The Remaining Challenge

Even if realists can use the adaptive link account in the way I havesuggested to explain why the quasi-tracking thesis holds, there remains thequestion whether the explanation is plausible. Indeed, there appears to bea gap in the explanation, for it is unclear what it is about the moral truthsuch that, if the adaptive link account is correct, the capacity to quasi-trackthe moral truth would be part of a system of evaluative responses that wasadaptive. The key question remains, then, whether realists who accept theDarwinian hypothesis can underwrite the plausibility of the quasi-trackingthesis. If they cannot, then, as Street would argue, if we assume the truth ofthe Darwinian hypothesis, realism faces the skeptical worry that threatenedon the non-tracking horn of the dilemma.

This should be easy to see, given how I defined quasi-tracking. Thequasi-tracking thesis is basically the thesis that the effect of all influenceson the content of our moral beliefs, including Darwinian influences, hasbeen such that rational refection can in principle correct sufficiently for anydistorting influences so as to undermine the skeptical worry. If realists areunable to support this thesis, they are unable to support the claim that moralrealism can avoid the skeptical worry.

The skeptical worry in question is the worry that Street raised in herdiscussion of the non-tracking horn of the dilemma. It might be usefulto review this discussion. Recall that I am assuming in this context thatthe Darwinian hypothesis and the adaptive link account are at least roughlytrue. On these assumptions, the content of our moral beliefs has been stronglyinfluenced, first by the fact that a certain complex set of moral attitudes anddispositions was adaptive in the ancestral environment, and second by thefact that certain kinds of normative systems, once they achieved currency ina society, were more likely than others to be successfully transmitted fromone generation to the next. If we assume that some form of moral realismis correct, influences of these kinds will surely appear to be “independent”of the moral facts (Sober 1993, 107). Hence, it seems, the realist faces askeptical conclusion. To be sure, it is not clear how best to formulate thisconclusion. Street suggests that realists may be forced to conclude that it is


unlikely that our moral beliefs are true (2006, 121–122). Joyce suggests morecautiously that realists may be forced to conclude that their moral beliefsare unjustified or to significantly reduce their degree of confidence in thosebeliefs (2006, 179–182). The challenge to the realist is to avoid or to defangany such conclusion.

In response, realists could argue that Darwinian influences are not rele-vantly independent of the moral facts. Call this “the aggressive strategy.” Onthis approach, one would aim to provide a showing that, in effect, Darwinianforces do tend to track the moral facts. Or realists could reject the argumentfrom the independence claim to any interesting skeptical conclusion. Call this“the defensive strategy.” On this less ambitious approach, one would aim toshow that the skeptical argument is unsound or unpersuasive. Given howI defined quasi-tracking, both strategies can be described conveniently asaiming to support the quasi-tracking thesis. A fully adequate account wouldperhaps combine both strategies, but I will focus on the aggressive strategysince it seems to me to be potentially the more satisfying of the two.

The defensive strategy is of course familiar. Realists need to respond toa variety of skeptical challenges because our moral beliefs are subject to avariety of potentially distorting influences, including self-interest, ideology,superstition, and culture (Sturgeon 1992). One might think that the influenceof Darwinian forces is simply an additional potentially distorting factor andthat nothing in the Darwinian challenge warrants taking up the aggressivestrategy.

This thought misses the fact that, on the Darwinian hypothesis and theadaptive link account, Darwinian forces have had a strong and pervasiveeffect on the phenomena of moral psychology as a whole. Included amongthese phenomena are not only our moral emotions and reactive dispositions,but also the content of our moral beliefs and the nature of the psychologicalcapacities and processes, including reasoning processes, that are involved inthe formation and evaluation of moral beliefs. If we assume the truth ofthis picture, as I am doing, then, it seems to me, realists need to show thatDarwinian influences can enter into an explanation of our ability to discernthe moral truth. The aggressive strategy aims to show this.

In carrying out the aggressive strategy, it is not enough to argue thatthe basic moral beliefs that natural selection primed us to have, according tothe adaptive link account, seem intuitively to be at least approximately true.This claim is completely uninteresting if the adaptive link account is correct.For if the account is correct, the moral propositions it predicts we will tendto believe must of course be propositions we tend to find plausible.

In order to carry out the aggressive strategy, realists need to explainwhy, if the adaptive link account is correct, the ability to quasi-track thetruth would have been part of a system of responses that was adaptive.Moreover, the explanation needs to be counter-factually robust. That is, itshould support the idea that, even if natural selection had led our moral

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psychology to be somewhat different from what it is, and even we had hadsomewhat different moral beliefs as a result, it is likely that our moral beliefsstill would have tended to approximate to the truth.12 Otherwise there wouldbe a sense in which it would simply be a fortunate accident that there is atendency for our moral beliefs to approximate to the truth.

The basic challenge, however, is to explain what it is about the moraltruth such that, if the adaptive link account is correct, it is likely that ourmoral beliefs tend to approximate the truth. To meet this challenge in afully satisfying way, I think a realist would need to propose a theory of thetruth conditions of moral judgments. The realist could then use this theoryto explain why beliefs influenced by Darwinian forces in accord with theadaptive link account would tend to quasi-track facts that, by the lights ofthe theory, are moral facts. Some realist theories may be in a position tomeet the challenge, as I will now attempt to show.

7. Society-Centered Moral Theory

To pursue the aggressive strategy, realists who accept the Darwinianhypothesis need to do three things. First, they need to accept the quasi-tracking thesis. Second, I assume, they need to accept the adaptive linkaccount. Third, they need to explain why, if our moral psychology wasformed in accord with the adaptive link account, it is likely that our moralbeliefs tend to quasi-track the truth. They need to explain why a tendencyto form moral beliefs that is explained on the basis of the adaptive linkaccount would be a tendency to form moral beliefs that are by and largeapproximately true.

I now want to sketch a version of naturalistic moral realism that I havedefended elsewhere, and to argue that it can meet the Darwinian challenge.I call it the society-centered theory.13 It is beyond the scope of this paper toconsider whether other forms of moral realism can successfully pursue theaggressive strategy.14

The society-centered theory is a kind of moral functionalism. We livein societies and we need to live in societies, but because we have differenttalents and somewhat conflicting interests, our societies need to motivate usto live together peacefully, cooperatively and productively. To be successfulin doing this, a society needs to be governed by shared norms or standards,which we can think of as constituting a social moral code. In this sense,‘morality’ has the function of enabling a society to meet its needs. It doesthis by providing rules governing our lives that, when internalized widelyenough in a society, would motivate the needed cooperation and peacefuland productive behavior among its members. Different moral codes woulddiffer in how well their currency in society would serve this function. Giventhis, as I will now explain, the theory says that a basic moral proposition,


such as the proposition that torture is wrong, would be true only if the moralcode that would best serve the function of enabling society to meet its needsincluded or entailed a relevantly corresponding norm, such as a prohibitionon torture.

The theory has two parts. One is an account of the truth conditionsof normative propositions that I call the “standard-based” account. Theother is the society-centered account of the ‘truth grounding’ status of moral‘standards’.

The standard-based account rests on a distinction between moral propo-sitions, such as the proposition that torture is wrong, and moral standards,such as the standard prohibiting torture that could be expressed by theimperative, “Do not torture anyone!” The account proposes a schema thatcan be used to explicate the truth conditions of moral propositions in terms ofthe status of relevantly corresponding standards. The schema says that a (pureand basic) moral proposition is true if and only if a corresponding moralstandard has the relevant truth-grounding status.15 For example, it is truethat torture is wrong if and only if a corresponding standard—presumablythe standard that prohibits torture—has the relevant truth-grounding status.

The idea is that if there are any moral truths, there is some status that astandard can have such that if a standard enjoys that status, a corresponding(pure and basic) moral proposition is true. There must be some property thatdistinguishes the standard that prohibits torture from standards that have nomoral standing, such as the standard that prohibits men from wearing hatsindoors. We may call the truth-grounding status of moral standards the statusof being morally “authoritative.” The standard-based account then says thatif torture is wrong, it is prohibited by a morally authoritative standard.

Now consider the intuition that a society needs a ‘social moral code’;that is, a society needs it to be the case that there is, among its members, asystem of moral standards that is generally subscribed to and that is sociallyenforced and culturally transmitted and that calls for prosocial behaviors ofvarious kinds. Other things being equal, a society with such a moral codewould experience less conflict among its members, and less harmful conflict,than it would if it lacked such a code. Other things being equal, there wouldbe more cooperation among its members than would be the case if it lackedsuch a code, and its members would be more successful at meeting their ownneeds and pursuing their values. A society with such a code does better, otherthings being equal, than it otherwise would, at meeting its need for there tobe cooperation among its members, and its need to avoid harmful internalconflict.

Obviously some social moral codes would better enable a society tomeet its basic needs than others. According to society-centered theory,the code that would best serve the basic needs of a society, if it were toserve as the societal moral code in that society, is the code that is morallyauthoritative with respect to that society. It has the relevant truth-grounding

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status. Standards that are included in or implied by the code underwritethe truth of corresponding basic moral propositions. Accordingly, the theorysays, a basic moral proposition is true only if a corresponding moral standardis included in or implied by the moral code the currency of which in therelevant society would enable the society better to serve its basic needs thanwould the currency of other sets of norms and better than would be the caseif no set of norms had currency in the society.16 Wrongness thus turns outto be relational. The theory in effect says that the term “wrong” expressesa relation, wrongness in relation to society S, where, roughly, this is theproperty of being prohibited by the moral code the currency of which in Swould be ‘best’ for society S, and where the identity of society S is fixed bythe context.

This basic account needs to be amended in various ways.17 For example,it needs to be amended to allow for ties between distinct moral codes, thecurrency of which in a society would serve the society’s needs equally well. Iignore this and other complications in what follows.

What are the basic needs of a society? This is an important and difficultquestion, but certain things seem obvious. A society needs to ensure that itspopulation continues to exist. It needs to ensure that there is and continuesto be a system of cooperation among its members. It needs to ensureinternal social harmony. It needs peaceful and cooperative relationshipswith neighboring societies. The question of how to promote these needsis empirical, and the moral implications of the theory are contingent andsomewhat speculative. However I think it is likely that the theory yieldsa deontological moral code of a familiar kind (Copp 1995, 201–209). Sincesocieties have the same basic needs, moral codes that are authoritative relativeto different societies will tend to be similar in content. Yet societies can be indifferent circumstances, so the ‘best’ moral codes for different societies areunlikely to be exactly the same.

This account raises a number of questions. What are societies? Which isthe ‘relevant’ society? Can the theory be defended against familiar objectionsto moral relativism? Does the theory provide a plausible account of thenormativity of moral propositions? I cannot address these issues here (seeCopp 1995, Copp 2007a).

The important question for present purposes is whether the theory canillustrate a strategy that would allow moral realists to escape the Darwinianchallenge. As we saw, the key to escaping the challenge is to explain why,granting the Darwinian hypothesis, and assuming the adaptive link account,our moral beliefs might tend to quasi-track the moral truth. The question iswhether the society-centered theory can explain this.

I will argue that if a population begins by having moral beliefs with acontent predicted more or less by the adaptive link account, its initial beliefsapproximate sufficiently to the moral truth, by the lights of the society-centered theory, that, given appropriate deliberation and reflection, other


things being equal, its beliefs are likely to get closer to the truth. That is, I willargue that the moral propositions that the society-centered theory claims tobe true “turn out to be [near enough] the same judgements that forge adaptivelinks between circumstances and response” (Street 2006, 132). Given this, thesociety-centered theory can avoid Street’s skeptical conclusion.

8. The Society-Centered Theory and the Darwinian Challenge

In order to make the case, I need to connect the adaptive link account’sexplanation of the development of our moral psychology with the society-centered theory’s account of moral truth.

According to the adaptive link account, Darwinian forces affected thecontent of our moral beliefs through a four-stage process of the kindI outlined before. In an initial stage, our remote ancestors developed atendency to have altruistic and cooperation inducing dispositions becausesuch dispositions were adaptive in the ancestral environment. A capacityfor normative governance also would have been adaptive. In a subsequentstage of the process, ancestors with this capacity would have come toshare a system of norms that would reinforce prosocial dispositions. Ina later stage, as a result of a process of cultural evolution, certain kindsof norms would have become more widely accepted, including especiallynorms designed to promote social stability, peacefulness, and cooperation(Kitcher 2006, 173). Finally, as a result of all of this, humans developeda tendency to form moral beliefs that favor importantly prosocial kinds ofbehavior, including behaviors that promote social stability, peacefulness, andcooperation.

The account does not depend on the truth of the moral judgments thatit predicts Darwinian forces would have led human beings to be disposed toaccept. Yet it is compatible with their truth or approximate truth. And, as Iwill explain, the society-centered theory implies that these judgments wouldlikely be approximately true.

The important point is that, on this picture of the four-stage process, theprocess of cultural evolution likely would have led to the currency of moralcodes favoring behavior that would enhance the ability of societies to meettheir needs. Societies need there to be social stability, cooperation among theirmembers, and peaceful relations with their neighbors. The currency of normsthat promote social stability, peacefulness, and cooperation would promotebehavior that tends to meet these needs. Moreover, on our picture of the four-stage process, cultural evolution would tend to lead to the currency of moralcodes that include norms of this kind, norms that call for kinds of behaviorthat promote social stability, peacefulness, and cooperation. A person whosubscribed to such a code would tend to form ‘corresponding’ beliefs.18 Forexample, if the code calls for her to be cooperative, she would tend to form

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the belief that such behavior is right or good. And she would tend to actaccordingly, given that she has a capacity for normative governance. Herbehavior would then tend to enhance the ability of the society to meet theneeds I sketched earlier. On the adaptive link account and the account ofthe four-stage process, then, cultural evolution plausibly would favor moralcodes the currency of which in a society would enhance the society’s abilityto meet its needs (see Copp 2007a, 85).

According to the society-centered theory, given the adaptive link ac-count, as the process of social evolution proceeds, other things being equal,people’s moral beliefs would tend more and more to approximate to the moraltruth. That is, beliefs that correspond to the social moral code that emergedin this way from a process of cultural evolution would increasingly tendto approximate to the truth. For the theory implies that moral beliefs thatcorrespond to a moral code, the currency of which in a society would tend topromote the society’s ability to meet its needs, are by and large approximatelytrue. And it is reasonable to think that appropriate deliberation and reflectionmight bring these beliefs closer to the truth.

Accordingly, I claim that the society-centered theory can explain why,other things being equal, given the adaptive link account and the account ofthe four-stage process, it is likely that our moral beliefs tend to quasi-trackthe moral truth. The theory can explain why a tendency to form moral beliefswith a content that has been influenced by the four-stage process would be atendency to form beliefs that would be sufficiently close to the moral truththat, given appropriate deliberation and reflection, our moral beliefs wouldtend to get closer to the truth.

The account implies that our moral beliefs can be expected other thingsbeing equal to be sufficiently close to the truth that deliberation and reflectionwould tend to get us closer to the truth, but there is no guarantee that thisis so.19 Many contingencies might have interfered, including superstitionand ideology. Moreover, if our ‘initial’ moral beliefs were too far off track,moral deliberation might simply have led us further into error. Richard Boydpointed out similarly that the reliability of scientific methodology depends onthe extent to which “currently accepted theories are relevantly approximatelytrue.”20 It seems likely, however, that the moral beliefs we would tend to have(given the influence of the four-stage process) would tend to be close enoughto the truth (according to the society-centered theory) that there is a realisticchance that human beings who began with such beliefs, and who reflectedon them in an effort to achieve a reflective equilibrium, would tend over timeto get closer to the truth, other things being equal—given that human beingshave the kind of moral psychology that the adaptive link account suggeststhat they have. I believe the argument has shown at least that, if our moralbeliefs are true or approximately true, this is not a matter of chance. Onthe society-centered theory, it is due to the nature of morality and the truthconditions of moral propositions.


9. Objection: A Second-Order Darwinian Dilemma

The society-centered theory is a realist theory according to which themoral facts are identical to certain ordinary natural facts having to do withthe needs of societies. Street holds that any genuinely realist version of moralnaturalism runs afoul of a second-order Darwinian dilemma (2006, 139-141).This is because, she thinks, a naturalist must rely largely on moral intuitionsin devising a theory as to which natural facts are identical to the moral facts,and, on the Darwinian hypothesis, the content of these intuitions has beenheavily influenced by natural selection. The naturalist then faces the choicebetween holding or denying, roughly, that natural selection caused our moralintuitions to quasi-track the moral facts.21

For the reasons I have given, the naturalist clearly should take thetracking option. As I argued, the naturalist can combine the claim thatDarwinian forces caused our intuitions to quasi-track the moral facts withthe adaptive link account. The second-order dilemma can be avoided in thesame way that the first-order dilemma can be avoided.

My argument for the society-centered theory rests largely, moreover,on second-order philosophical intuitions, including the idea that moralityhas the function of making society possible, and on the standard-basedaccount of the semantics of normative judgment. To be sure, we would notfind the society-centered view to be plausible if its implications conflicteddramatically with our moral views, especially if we thought there would stillbe conflict after appropriate deliberation. Yet my argument does not rest onour moral intuitions. Indeed, I think we can imagine a Martian philosopher,with different substantive moral intuitions than we have, nevertheless comingto accept the society-centered theory for the very reasons that led me to thesociety-centered view.22 It therefore appears that my argument for the society-centered view is not vulnerable to a Darwinian challenge of the kind thatStreet has in mind.

Perhaps, however, it is vulnerable in a different way.23 Perhaps the second-order intuitions that I rely on have been influenced by evolutionary forces ina way that makes my argument open to a new Darwinian dilemma. PerhapsI face a choice between a skeptical result, if I deny that Darwinian forcescaused the second-order intuitions to track the facts, such as facts about thefunction of morality, and an implausible Darwinian hypothesis, if I claimthat Darwinian forces did cause the second-order intuitions to track thesefacts.

It is implausible, however, that the content of the second-order intuitionsthat I invoked has been strongly influenced by evolutionary forces. It isplausible that the phenomena of moral psychology have been influencedby evolutionary pressures because our moral psychology prompts behaviorthat can be either adaptive or maladaptive. But second-order views aboutmorality and about the truth conditions of normative judgments do not

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have the direct connection to behavior that first-order moral beliefs have.They are philosophical views rather than normative moral views that speakto how to behave. Hence, although we did evolve to be capable of havingphilosophical thoughts, it is implausible that the content of these thoughtshas been shaped by evolutionary forces. There is therefore no plausibility tothe idea that a person who thinks that there are facts about philosophicalmatters faces a Darwinian dilemma.

10. Conclusion

On the Darwinian hypothesis, the phenomena of moral psychology,including the content of our moral beliefs, have been strongly affected byDarwinian forces. Street argues that, on this account, moral realists face adilemma. On the tracking horn, they are committed to denying the adaptivelink account, the most plausible account of the working of Darwinian forceson our moral psychology. On the non-tracking horn, they must concede thatit is “sheer chance” if our moral beliefs tend to be true. In response, I arguedthat realists can grasp the tracking horn of the dilemma, and they can usethe adaptive link account in explaining why the quasi-tracking thesis holds. Iintroduced the society-centered moral theory, which is a kind of naturalisticmoral realism. I argued that it can explain why our moral beliefs wouldtend to quasi-track the moral truth if their content has been affected byDarwinian forces as suggested by the adaptive link account. On the society-centered theory, other things being equal, a tendency to form moral beliefswith a content that has been influenced in the way suggested by the adaptivelink account would be a tendency to form moral beliefs that approximateto the truth. The society-centered theory shows, then, that the Darwinianchallenge carries no risk for moral realism. The argument against moralrealism must rest on more familiar philosophical objections to the society-centered theory and other forms of realism rather than on the Darwiniandilemma.

Notes

∗ I presented earlier versions of this paper at the University of Utrecht in February2007, at the Humboldt University in June 2007, and at the Fourth Workshop inMetaethics, at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, in September 2007. I wouldlike to thank the audiences on these occasions for very useful discussion. I amespecially grateful to several people for insightful and helpful specific comments,including Richmond Campbell, William FitzPatrick, Martin Gunderson, RichardKraut, Mark Schroeder, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Sharon Street, NicholasSturgeon, and Jon Tresan. An early draft is forthcoming, in Italian translation,in La Contingenza dei Fatti e l’Oggettivita dei Valori, ed. Giancarlo Marchetti(Roma: Editrice Armando Armando s.r.l., 2008).


1. See for example Blackburn 2000, Gibbard 1982 and 1990, Joyce 2006, Kitcher1993 and 2006, Ruse 1986, Sober and Wilson 1998, Street 2006.

2. Street’s target is evaluative realism, but I focus on moral realism. This changedoes not affect the force of her argument.

3. Street 2006, 109 and throughout. For the quoted remarks, see p. 109.4. Gibbard also thinks evolutionary considerations support noncognitivism (1982,

43). For discussion, see Sturgeon 1992.5. For useful discussion, see Sober 1994, 95–99. See also Joyce 2006, 33–40, 140,

180–181.6. See Ruse 1986, 253–254. For criticisms, see Campbell 1996.7. Joyce argues that no reduction of moral facts to natural facts can be successful

because morality has an “inescapable practical authority” that no version ofmoral naturalism can explain (2006, 199–209). I have replied to this argumentelsewhere (Copp 2007b).

8. See Street 2006, note 37; also Street, 2008.9. Street says realists must choose between supposing there is no relation between

the evaluative facts and natural selection and supposing there is such a relation(2006, 125). This is not what she ought to say. She argues that if, on the firsthorn of the dilemma, there is no relation between the evaluative facts and naturalselection, then “natural selection must be viewed as a purely distorting influence”on our evaluative beliefs (121). But if natural selection had a distorting influenceon our beliefs, it stands to the moral facts in the relation of causing our evaluativebeliefs to misrepresent them. Hence, if natural selection stands in no relation tothe evaluative facts, then it did not distort our evaluative beliefs. Fortunately,this problem is superficial. The central issue is whether natural selection stood inan epistemically significant “tracking relation” to the moral facts (2006, 125). Itherefore reformulate the dilemma as offering realists a choice between assertingand denying the tracking thesis.

10. Street offers a different argument (2006, 153–154).11. For a similar point, see Boyd 1988, 190, 208–209.12. I thank Mark Schroeder and Jon Tresan for help formulating this idea.13. Copp 1995 and 2007a. I have presented somewhat different versions of the theory

in different places. For more about this, see the introduction to Copp 2007a.14. For suggestive remarks, see Boyd 1988, 208–209.15. A ‘pure’ moral proposition has no non-moral entailments or presuppositions

(other than those given by the standard-based theory itself). A ‘basic’ moralproposition ascribes a moral property to something.

16. See Copp 1996, 252–53.17. Copp 1995, 198–200; Copp 1996, 257–58. See also the introduction to Copp

2007a.18. A belief that p “corresponds” to a moral code C just when (1) C includes or

implies a moral standard s and (2), according to the society-centered theory, pis true just in case s is included in or implied by the ‘best’ moral code for therelevant society.

19. For helpful discussion, see Sober 1994, 95–99.20. Boyd 1988, 190. The passage is italicized in the original.21. Presumably a constructivist would also face this second-order dilemma. But see

Street 2006, note 57.

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22. See Street 1996, note 57.23. Jon Tresan pressed me on this point.

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21–31.Copp, David. 1995. Morality, Normativity, and Society. New York: Oxford University Press.——. 1996. “Moral Knowledge in Society-Centered Moral Theory.” In Moral Knowledge? New

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——. 2007a. Morality in a Natural World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.——. 2007b. “Moral Naturalism and Three Grades of Normativity”, in Copp 2007a.Gibbard, Allan. 1982. “Human Evolution and the Sense of Justice.” Midwest Studies in

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