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The Orthopsychic Subject: Film Theory and the Reception of LacanAuthor(s): Joan CopjecSource: October, Vol. 49 (Summer, 1989), pp. 53-71Published by: The MIT PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/778733 .

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The Orthopsychic ubject:FilmTheory and theReceptionof Lacan

JOAN COPJEC

Through hisappearance in Television, acan parodiestheimageof himself-of his teaching that we have, to a large extent,received and accepted.Standing lone behindhisdesk,handsnowsupporting imas he leansassertivelyforward, owthrown pward nsomeemphaticgesture,Lacan staresdirectly utat us, as he speaks in a voice thatnone would call smooth of "quelque chose,n'est-cepas?" This "quelque chose" is, of course, never made specific,neverrevealed, nd so it comes tostandfor factor a system ffacts hat sknown,butnot by us. This image recalls the one presentedto Tabard by the principal nVigo's Zero orConduct. t is theproductof thechildish, aranoidnotion that llourprivate houghts nd actions re spiedon byand visiblewithin publicworldrepresented yparentalfigures.n appearingto us,then,bymeansof the "massmedia,"' Lacan seems to confirmwhat we maycall our "televisual" fear-thatwe are perfectly, ompletelyvisibleto a gaze that observes us from afar (telemeaningboth "distant"and [from elos] complete").2That thisprofferedmageis parodic,however, s almostsurely o be missed, o strong re our mispercep-tionsof Lacan. And, so, the significance f the wordswithwhich he opens hisaddress and by which he immediately alls attentionto his self-parody--"Ialways peak thetruth.Not thewholetruth, ecause there'sno wayto say tall.Sayingthewhole truth s materially mpossible:words fail. Yet it's through hisvery mpossibilityhatthe truthholds onto thereal."' - thesignificancef thesewordsmayalso be missed, s theyhave been generally n our theoriesofrepre-sentation, he mostsophisticated xample ofwhich s filmtheory.Let me first,na kind ofestablishinghot, ummarizewhat take to be the1. In The Four FundamentalConcepts f Psycho-AnalysisLondon, The Hogarth Press, 1977,p. 274), Lacan speaksof the"phantasies"of the"massmedia," as he very uickly uggests critiqueof the familiarnotionof "the societyof the spectacle." This notion is replaced in Lacan bywhatmightbe called "the societyof (formedfrom) henonspecularizable."2. Liddell and Scott'sGreek-Englishexicon, 906; all translationsfancientGreek terms re fromthis ource.3. Jacques Lacan, Television, rans. Denis Hollier, Rosalind Krauss, and AnnetteMichelson,October, o. 40 (Spring 1987), p. 7.

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centralmisconception f filmtheory:believing tself o be followingLacan, itconceivesthe screen as mirror;4ndoingso, however, toperates nignoranceof,and at the expense of, Lacan's more radical insight,wherebythe mirror sconceivedas screen.

The Screen as MirrorThis misconception s at the base of filmtheory'sformulation f twoconcepts- the apparatusand thegaze- and of their nterrelation. ne of theclearestand most succinctdescriptions f this nterrelationand I muststateherethat t s because f tsclarity, ecause of theway tresponsiblynd explicitly

articulates ssumptions ndemicto filmtheory, hat cite thisdescription, ot toimpugn tor itsauthorsparticularly is providedbythe editorsofRe-vision,collection fessaysbyfeministsn film.Although tsfocus sthespecialsituationof thefemale pectator, hedescription utlinesthegeneralrelations mongtheterms aze,apparatus, nd subject s they re statedbyfilmtheory.After uotinga passagefromFoucault'sDiscipline nd Punish n whichBentham's rchitecturalplanfor hepanopticon s laidout,theRe-visionditorsmakethefollowing laim:the dissociationof the see/being seen dyad [whichthe panopticar-rangementof the central tower and annular arrangement nsures]and the sense of permanentvisibilityeem perfectly o describe thecondition not only of the inmate in Bentham's prison but of thewoman as well. For defined n termsof her visibility,he carries herownPanopticonwithher wherever hegoes,herself-image functionof herbeingfor nother. . . The subjectivityssignedtofemininitywithin atriarchal ystemss inevitably ound up with he structure fthe look and the localizationof the eye as authority.5The panopticgaze defines erfectlyhesituation fthewomanunderpatri-archy:that s, it is the very mage of the structurewhichobliges the womantomonitor herselfwith a patriarchal ye. This structuretherebyguaranteesthat

even her innermostdesire will always be not a transgression, ut ratheranimplantation f the law,thateven the "processoftheorizingherown untenablesituation" can onlyreflect ack to her "as in a mirror,"her subjugationto thegaze.

4. MaryAnn Doane pointsout thatit is our veryfascinationwith the model of the screen asmirror hathas made itresistant o the kinds of theoretical bjectionswhich he herselfmakes.SeeMaryAnn Doane, "Misrecognition nd Identity,"Cine-Tracts, o. 11 (Fall 1980), p. 28.5. MaryAnn Doane, PatriciaMellencamp,and Linda Williams,eds., Re-vision, os Angeles,American FilmInstitute, 984, p. 14. The introduction o thisveryusefulcollection of essays lsoattemptsto detail some of the historical hifts n feminist heories of representation; am onlyattemptingoargue theneed forone moreshift, his imeawayfrom hepanopticmodelofcinema.



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The Orthopsychicubject 55

The panoptic gaze defines, hen,theperfect,.e., the total,visibilityf thewomanunderpatriarchy,fanysubjectunderanysocial order,which s to say,of any subject at all. For the verycondition and substance of the subject'ssubjectivitys his or hersubjectivization ythe aw ofthesocietywhichproducesthatsubject.One onlybecomesvisible- notonlyto others,but also to oneself-through (by seeing through)the categoriesconstructed ya specific,histori-callydefinedsociety.These categoriesof visibilityre categoriesof knowledge.The perfection f vision and knowledgecan onlybe procuredat the ex-pense of invisibilitynd nonknowledge.Accordingto the logic of thepanopticapparatus,these ast do notand (in an important ense) cannot exist.One mightsummarize this ogic therebyrevealing t to be more questionable than it isnormally aken to be by stating t thus: since all knowledge or visibility)sproducedby society that s,all that t spossibleto knowcomes not fromreality,but fromsociallyconstructedcategoriesof implementable hought), ince allknowledge s produced,onlyknowledge or visibility)s produced, or all that sproduced is knowledge (visible). This is too glaringa nonsequitor- the thenclauses are too obviouslynotnecessary onsequencesofthe f lause- for t everto be statable s such. And yetthis ack of logicalconsequence is preciselywhatmustbe at work and what mustgo unobserved n thefoundingof the seeing/beingseen dyadwhichfigures hecomprehension f thesubjectbythe aws thatrule over its construction.Here-one can already imaginethe defensiveprotestations: have over-statedmyargument there is a measureof indetermination vailable even tothepanopticargument.This indeterminationsprovidedforbythe fact hatthesubject is constructednot by one monolithicdiscoursebut by a multitudeofdifferent iscourses.What cannot be determined nadvance are thearticulationsthat may result from the chance encounter- sometimeson the site of thesubject of thesevariousdiscourses.A subjectof a legaldiscoursemayfind tselfin conflictwith tself s a subjectofa religiousdiscourse. The negotiation f thisconflictmayproduce a solutionthatwas anticipatedbyneither fthe contribut-ingdiscourses.Some film heorists ave underlinedthispartof Foucault's workin an attemptto locate possible sources of resistanceto institutional ormsofpower, to clear a space for a feminist inema, for example." I would argue,however, hatthis imple tomization nd multiplicationfsubjectpositions ndthispartes xtra artesdescription fconflict oes not ead to a radical undermin-ing of knowledgeor power. Not only is it the case that at each stage what isproducedsconceived nFoucauldian theory o be a determinatething rposition,but, in addition,knowledge nd powerare conceived of as the over-all ffect fthe relationsmong he variousconflicting ositions nd discourses.Differencesdo not threatenpanopticpower; theyfeed it.

6. See, especially,Teresa de Lauretis,TechnologiesfGender,Bloomington, ndiana UniversityPress, 1987.



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The Lacanian argument is quite different. t states that that which isproduced bya signifyingystem an neverbe determinate.Conflict n thiscasedoes notresultfrom he clash between two differentositions, ut from hefactthatno positiondefines resolute dentity.Nonknowledgeor invisibilitys notregistered s thewavering nd negotiations etweentwocertainties,wo mean-ings or positions, but as the underminingof every certainty, he incom-pletenessof everymeaningand position.7 ncapable of articulating hismoreradical understanding f nonknowledge,the panoptic argumentis ultimatelyresistantoresistance,nable to conceive of a discourse that would refuseratherthanrefuelpower.Mypurposehere is notsimply opointout the crucialdifferences etweenFoucault's theoryand Lacan's, but also to attemptto explain how the twotheorieshave failedto be perceivedas different. ow a psychoanalyticallyn-formedfilm heory ame to see itself s expressible nFoucauldianterms, espitethe fact that these very termsaimed at dispensingwithpsychoanalysis s amethodofexplanation. n Foucault'sworkthetechniquesofdisciplinary ower(of the construction f the subject) are conceived as capable of "materiallypenetrat[ing] hebody ndepthwithout ependingeven on themediationof thesubject'sownrepresentations.fpowertakesholdon thebody,this sn'tthroughitshavingfirst o be interiorizedn people's consciousness."' For Foucault,theconscious and the unconscious re categoriesconstructed ypsychoanalysisndotherdiscourses philosophy,iterature, aw,etc.): like othersocially onstructedcategories, theyprovide a means of renderingthe subject visible,governable,trackable. They are categories throughwhich the modern subject is appre-hendedand apprehends tself, ather han as psychoanalysismaintains) rocessesof apprehension;they re not processeswhichengage or are engaged bysocialdiscourses film exts,forexample). What the Re-visionditors force us to con-front s the fact thatin film heorythese radical differences ave largelygoneunnoticedor have been nearly nnulled.Thus, thoughthegaze isconceived as ametapsychological oncept central to the descriptionof the subject's psychicengagementwith he cinematic pparatus,theconcept,as we shallsee, is formu-lated in a waythat makesanypsychic ngagementredundant.My argument s thatfilmtheory erformed kindof "Foucauldization" ofLacanian theory; n earlymisreading f Lacan turned himintoa "spendthrift"Foucault one whowasted a bit too muchtheoreticalenergyon suchnotions s7. In "What Is a Question," F.S. Cohen makesthis mportant istinctionlearly: Indetermina-tionordoubtisnot, s isoftenmaintained, wavering etweendifferentertainties, ut thegraspingof an incompleteform" TheMonist,no. 38 [1929], p. 354, fn.4).8. Michel Foucault, n Colin Gordon, ed., Power/Knowledge,ew York,Pantheon,p. 186. TheinterviewwithLucette Finas in whichthisstatement ccurs was also published n Meaghan Morrisand Paul Patton, ds.,MichelFoucault:Power,Truth, trategy,ydney,Feral Publications, 979. Thestatement s quoted and emphasized in Mark Cousins and AtharHussain's excellentbook,MichelFoucault,New York,St. Martin'sPress, 1984, p. 244.



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TheOrthopsychicubject 57

theantitheticalmeaningof words or therepression nstituted yparental nter-diction. t is theperceivedfrugalityfFoucault whereby verydisavowal s seento be essentially n avowal of what is being denied), everybit as much as therecentand widelyproclaimed nterest nhistory,hat has guaranteedFoucault'sascendancyover Lacan in the academy.

It was throughthe concept of the apparatus--the economic, technical,ideological institution- of cinema that the break between contemporary ilmtheory nd itspastwas effected.9 his breakmeant thatcinematic epresentationwas consideredto be not a clear or distortedreflection f a priorand externalreality, ut one amongmany ocial discourses hathelpedto construct eality ndthe spectatorial ubject.As is well-known,he conceptof theapparatuswas notoriginal o film heory, ut was importedfrom pistemological tudiesofscience.The actual termdispositif"apparatus") used in film heory s borrowed fromGastonBachelard,who employed t to counter thereigningphilosophy fphe-nomenology.Bachelardproposed instead thestudy f "phenomeno-technology,"believing hatphenomenaare notgivento us directly yan independentreality,but are, rather,constructed cf. the Greek techne, produced by a regularmethodof making,rather thanfound in nature") by a range of practices ndtechniquesthat definethe field of historical ruth.The objects of science arematerializable oncepts,not naturalphenomena.Even though tborrowshis term nd theconcept tnames,film heory oesnot ocate itsbeginningsntheworkofBachelard,but rather nthatof one of hisstudents, ouis Althusser.'oThis historysbynowrelatively amiliar, ut since anumberofsignificant ointshave been overlooked or misinterpreted,t sneces-saryto retrace some of thedetails.)Althusserwas udged to have advanced andcorrectedthe theoryof Bachelard in a way that foregroundedthe subjectofscience. Now, althoughhe had argued that the scientificubjectwas formed n9. Althoughsome mightclaim that it was the introduction f the linguisticmodel into filmstudies hat nitiated hebreak, t can be moreaccurately rgued thatthe breakwasprecipitated yashiftn the linguisticmodel itself- from n exclusiveemphasison therelationbetweensignifiersoan emphasison therelationbetweensignifiersnd thesubject,their ignifyingffect. hat is, t wasnot untilthe rhetoricalspectof languagewasmade visible by meansofthe onceptfthe pparatus- that he field ffilm tudieswasdefinitivelyeformed. am arguing,however, hat, nce this hiftwasmade, some of the lessons ntroducedbysemiologywere,unfortunately,orgotten.To define breakrather han a continuity) etweenwhat softenreferred o as "two stages,"or the first nd second semiology,s analogous to defining break between Freud's firstnd secondconcepts of transference. t was only withthe second, the privileging f the analyst/analysandrelationship,hatpsychoanalysisproperly peaking)wasbegun. Biography ather hantheory s thesource of thedemand forthe continuity f theseconcepts.10. The best discussionof the relationshipbetweenBachelard and Althussercan be found inEtienneBalibar,"From Bachelard to Althusser:The Conceptof 'EpistemologicalBreak,"' Economyand Society,ol. 5, no. 4 (November 1976), pp. 385-411.



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and bythe fieldof science,Bachelard had also maintainedthatthe subjectwasnever ully ormed nthisway.One of the reasons forthismerely artial uccess,he theorized,was an obstacle that impeded the subject's development; thisobstacle he called the imaginary.But the problem with this imaginary, sAlthusseraterpointedout,was that twas tselfargely ntheorized nd wasthus(that s,almostbydefault) ccepted byBachelard as a given, s external nd priorto rather hanas an effectf historical eterminations. he scientificubjectwassplit, hen,between twomodes of thought:one governed by historically eter-mined scientific orms, he otherbyforms hatwere eternal,spontaneous, ndalmostpurely mythical."Althusser ethought hecategoryofthe imaginary,making ta partoftheprocessof the historical onstructionfthesubject.The imaginaryame to namea processnecessary or rather hanan impediment o the deologicalfound-ingof thesubject:the maginary rovidedtheform fthesubject's ived relationto society.Through thisrelation, hesubjectwasbrought oacceptas itsown,torecognizeitself n, the representations f the social order.This last statement f Althusser'spositionis important or our concernshere because it is also a statement f the basic positionof film heory s it wasdeveloped inthe 70s, inFrance and inEngland, byJean-LouisBaudry,ChristianMetz,Jean-LouisComolli, and by the ournal Screen. n sum: the screen is amirror.The representations roduced by the institution inema, the imagespresentedon the screen, are accepted by the subject as its own.12 There is,admittedly,n ambiguitynthe notionof thesubject's"own image"; it can refereither to an image ofthe subject or an image belonging o the subject. Bothreferences re intendedby filmtheory.Whetherthat which is represented sspecularizedas an image of the subject'sown bodyor as the subject's mage ofsomeone or something lse,what remains rucial s the attribution o the imageof what Lacan (not filmtheory,whichhas never, it seems to me, adequatelyaccounted forthe ambiguity) alls "that belong to me aspect so reminiscent fproperty."'" t is thisaspect thatallows the subjectto see in anyrepresentation11. This notionof thescientist iscontinuouswithhim- rherself an be given precise mage,thealchemical image of the Melusines: creaturescomposed partially f inferior, ossil-like orms hatreach back ntothe distantpast the maginary)nd partially fsuperior, nergetic scientific)ctivity.In ThePoetics f pace Boston,Beacon, 1969, p. 109), Bachelard,whosenotionoftheunconscious smoreJungianthanFreudian,refers o this mage fromJung's Psychologynd Alchemy.12. The one reservationMetzhas tothe otherwise perative nalogybetweenmirror nd screen sthat at the cinema, "the spectator s absent fromthe screen: contrary o the child in themirror"(ChristianMetz, The Imaginary ignifier, loomington, ndiana UniversityPress, 1982, p. 48).JacquelineRose clarified he error mplied nthisreservation ypointing ut that the phenomenonoftransitivismemonstrates hatthesubject'smirror dentificationan be with notherchild," thatone always ocatesone'sownimagen anothernd thus heimaginarydentificationoes notdependona literalmirror "The Imaginary," n Sexualityn theField ofVision, ondon, Verso, 1986, p. 196).What s mostoftenforgotten, owever, sthecorollary fthisfact: ne always ocates the thern one'sown mage.The effect f this acton theconstitution f the subject s Lacan's fundamental oncern.13. Lacan, TheFourFundamentalConcepts, . 81.



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notonlya reflection f itself, ut a reflection f itself s masterof all itsurveys.The imaginary elationproducesthesubjectas master f the mage.This insightled tofilm heory's econception f film's haracteristicimpression freality."'4No longerconceivedas dependentupon a relationofverisimilitude etween theimage and the real referent, his impressionwas henceforth ttributedto arelationofadequation between theimageand thespectator. n otherwords,theimpression freality esults rom he fact hat hesubjecttakesthe mageas a fulland sufficientepresentation f itself nd itsworld;thesubject s satisfied hat thas been adequatelyreflected n thescreen. The "reality ffect" nd the "sub-ject effect"both name the same constructed mpression: hat the image makesthe subject fully isible to itself.The imaginary elation sdefined s literally relationofrecognition. hesubjectreconceptualized s its own concepts alreadyconstructed ythe Other.Sometimes he reconstructionfrepresentations thought o takeplace second-arilyrather than directly, fter there has been a primaryrecognitionof thesubjectas a "pure act ofperception."This is Metz's scenario."5The subjectfirstrecognizes tself y identifying ith hegaze and thenrecognizesthe imagesonthescreen.Now,what xactly sthegaze, in thiscontext?Whydoes itemerge nthiswayfrom the theoryof the apparatus?What does it add- or subtract-fromBachelard'stheory,where tdoes notfigure s a term? All thesequestionswillhave to be confrontedmorefullyndue course;fornow we mustbeginwiththeobservation hatthis deal pointcan be nothingbut the ignified fthe mage,the point fromwhich the image makes ense to the subject. In taking up itspositionat thispoint,the subject sees itself s supplyinghe image withsense.Regardlessof whether ne or twostagesare posited,thegaze is alwaysthepointfromwhich dentificationsconceivedbyfilm heory o takeplace. And becausethe gaze is always conceptualized as an analogue of thatgeometralpoint ofRenaissanceperspective t which hepicturebecomesfully, ndistortedlyisible,thegaze alwaysretainswithin ilm heory hesense ofbeingthatpointat whichsense and being coincide. The subjectcomes intobeing by identifying iththeimage'ssignified. ensefounds hesubject that is theultimatepointof thefilmtheoretical onceptof the gaze.14. It wasJean-LouisBaudrywho first ormulated hisdefinition fthe impression freality. eehis second apparatus essay, "The Apparatus," in Camera Obscura,no. 1 (Fall 1976), especiallypp. 118-119.15. Metz's two-stage cenario s critiqued byGeoffreyNowell-Smithn "A Note on History/Dis-course," in Edinburgh76, pp. 26-32; and by MaryAnn Doane in "Misrecognition nd Identity."16. I haveelsewherereferred o thegaze as "metempsychotic":lthough t s a conceptabhorrentto feminist eason, the targetof constanttheoretical allies,the gaze continues to reemerge,to bereincorporated, s an assumption f one film nalysis fter nother.The argument am making sthat t s because we have notproperly eterminedwhatthegaze is,whence t hasemerged,thatwehave been unable to eliminate t. It is generally rgued thatthegaze is dependenton psychoanalyticstructuresfvoyeurismnd fetishism,resumed o be male. I am claiming nstead hat hegaze arisesout of linguisticssumptionsnd thattheseassumptions,nturn, hape (and appear to be naturalizedby) thepsychoanalytic oncepts.



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The imaginary elation snot, however,merely relationofknowledge, fsense and recognition;t s also a relationof love guaranteed byknowledge.Theimage seems not only perfectly o represent he subject, t seems also to be animage of the subject's perfection.An unexceptionaldefinitionof narcissismappearsto support hisrelation: hesubjectfalls n love with tsownimageas theimageof its deal self.Except orthefactthatnarcissism ecomes in this ccountthestructurehatfacilitates heharmoniouselationbetween elf nd socialorder(since the subject is made to snuggle happily nto the space carved out for t),whereas, n the psychoanalyticccount,the subject'snarcissistic elation to theself s seen to conflict ith nd disrupt ther social relations. am attempting opinpointhere no minorpointof disagreementbetweenpsychoanalysisnd thepanoptic argument:the oppositionbetween the unbindingforce of narcissismand thebindingforce of social relations s one ofthe defining enetsofpsycho-analysis."7 t is nevertheless rue that Freud himselfoften ran into difficultytrying o maintain he distinction nd thatmany,fromJungon, have found teasier tomergethetwoforces ntoa libidinalmonism.Buteasier is notbetter; odisregardthe distinctions notonlyto destroypsychoanalysis ut also to courtdeterminism.Why s therepresentation fthe relationof thesubjectto the socialneces-sarilyan imaginaryone? This question, posed by Paul Hirst,'8 should havelaunched a seriouscritiqueoffilm heory.That it did not sattributable,npart,to the fact hatthequestionwasperceivedto be fundamentally questionaboutthe content of the concept of the imaginary.With only a slightlydifferentemphasis, hequestioncan be seen toaskhow the maginaryame tobear,almostexclusively, heburden of the construction f thesubject despitethe fact hatwe always speak of the "symbolic" construction f the subject. One way ofanswering his s to note that nmuchcontemporary heory hesymbolic s itselfstructuredike the maginary,ikeAlthusser's ersion fthe maginary.And thusHirst'scriticismsre aimed at our conceptionofthesymbolic onstructionf thesubject, ngeneral.That this s so ismade explicitonce again bythefrugalityfFoucault,whoexposes to us notonlythecontent, utalso theemptiness f someof our concepts. For he successfully emonstrates hat the conceptionof thesymbolic n whichhe (and, implicitly,thers)relies makes theimaginary nnec-essary. n a move similar o theone thatrefigureddeology s a positiveforceoftheproductionrather hanfalsificationfreality, oucaultrethinksymbolicawas a purely ositive orceof theproductionratherthanrepression f the subjectand its desires. Offeringhis argument-that the law constructs esire- as a17. MikkelBorsch-Jacobsen'sxtremely nteresting ook, TheFreudianSubject Stanford, tan-fordUniversity ress,1988), grappleswith hisnecessaryistinctionn its final ection- withresultsverydifferent romLacan's.18. Paul Hirst,"Althusser'sTheory of Ideology," Economynd Society,ol. 5, no. 4 (November1976), pp. 385-411.



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critique f psychoanalysis, oucault refusesto acknowledgethatpsychoanalysishas itselfneverargued any differently.What is thedifference, hen,betweenFoucault's and psychoanalysis's er-sionof the aw/desirerelation? imply his:Foucault conceivesdesire notonly san effect,utalso as a realization f thelaw,whilepsychoanalysiseaches s that hisconflationfeffectnd realizations an error.To saythat the law is onlypositive,that it does not forbiddesire, but rather incites it, causes it to flourishbyrequiringus to contemplate t,confess t,watch for ts variousmanifestations,sto end up saying imply hatthelaw causes us to havea desire for ncest, et ussay.Whilerejectinghismoralism, hispositionrecreates heerrorofthepsychia-tristnone ofMel Brooks's routines. n a fit frevulsion, hispsychiatristhrowsa patient utofhis office ecause shereportedhaving dreamin which he "waskissingherfather!"The feeling fdisgust s the humorous resultofthepsychia-trist'sfailureto differentiatehe enunciativepositionof the dreaming patientfrom the stated position of the dreamed one. The elision of the differencebetween these positions enunciation and statement- causes desire to bethought s realization n two ways.First,desire is conceived as an actual stateresultingfrom possibility llowed by law. Second, ifdesire is something nesimply nd positivelyhas, nothingcan prevent ts realizationexcept a purelyexternalforce.The destiny fdesire srealization, nless t sprohibited ysomeexternalforce.Psychoanalysis enies thepreposterousproposition hatsociety s foundedon desire the desirefor ncest, et us sayonce again. Surely, targues, t s therepressionf thisdesirewhich scrucial. The lawdoes notconstruct subjectwhosimply nd unequivocablyhas a desire,but one who rejectstsdesire,one whowantsnot to desire t. The subject s thussplitfrom tsdesire,and desire tself sconceived as something- precisely unrealized;itdoes not actualize what thelawmakespossible.Nor is desire committed o realization,barring nyexternalhinderance. For the internaldialectic which makes the being of the subjectdependenton the negationof itsdesire turnsthe construction f desire intoaself-hindering rocess.Foucault's definition f the law as positive nd nonrepressive mpliesthatthe aw s both 1) unconditional that tmust e obeyed,sinceonlythatwhich tallows can come into existence; beingis, by definition,obedienceand (2)unconditioned sincenothing,.e.,no desire,precedesthe aw;there sno causeof the law and we must not therefore eek behind the law for tsreasons. Lawdoes not exist n order to repressdesire.Now, not onlyhave these claimsfor the law been made before,theyhavealso been previously ontested.'9For these are preciselythe claims of moral

19. Mikkel Borsch-Jacobsen, n "The Law of Psychoanalysis" Diacritics [Summer 1985],pp. 26 - 36), discussesFreud's argumentwithKant in Totem nd Taboo. This articlerelies, tappears,on Lacan's work nL'ithiquede la psychanalyse,Paris,Seuil, 1986) and theunpublished eminaron



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conscience which Freud examines in Totem nd Taboo. There Freud reducestheseclaims to what he takes to be theirabsurd consequences: "If we were toadmit the claims thus assertedby our conscience [thatdesire conforms o oralwaysfallswithin he law], it would follow,on the one hand, thatprohibitionwould be superfluous nd, on the other,the factof consciencewould remainunexplained.''20 On the one hand, prohibitionwould be superfluous.Foucaultagrees: once the aw isconceived as primarily ositive, s producingthephenom-ena it scrutinizes, heconceptof a negative,repressive aw can be viewed as anexcess-of psychoanalysis.On the other hand, the factof conscience wouldremain unexplained. That is, there is no longerany reason forconscience toexist; tshould, ikeprohibition, e superfluous.What becomessuddenly nexpli-cable is the veryexperiencef conscience which is not only the subjectiveexperience of the compulsionto obey, but also the experience of guilt,of theremorsethat followstransgressiononce we have accepted the claimsof con-science that the law cannotfailto impose itself nd cannotbe caused. Foucaultagreesonce again: theexperienceofconscience nd the nteriorization fthe awthroughrepresentationss made superfluousbyhis theory f law.Again: the claimsof conscienceare used to refutethe experienceof con-science. This paradox located by Freud will,of course, not appear as such tothose who do not ascribe the claims to conscience. And yet somethingof theparadox ismanifestnFoucault'sdescription fpanopticpowerand film heory'sdescription fthe relationbetween theapparatusand thegaze. In bothcases themodel of self-surveillancemplicitly ecalls the psychoanalyticmodel of moralconscience even as the resemblance is being disavowed. The image of self-surveillance, elf-correction,s bothrequiredto construct hesubjectand maderedundantby the fact thatthe subject thus constructed s, bydefinition,bso-lutely upright,completelycorrect. The inevitabilitynd completenessof itssuccess renderstheorthopedicgestureofsurveillanceunnecessary.The subjectis and can onlybe inculpable.The relation betweenapparatusand gaze createsonlythemirageofpsychoanalysis. here is,in fact,no psychoanalyticubject nsight.

anxiety; ee especially he sessionofDecember 12, 1962,where Lacan defines bsession s thatwhichcovers ver hedesire n theOtherwith heOther's emand.This remarkrelatesobsessionalneurosis o acertain Kantian) conceptof moral consciousness.20. SigmundFreud, The Standard EditionoftheComplete sychologicalWorks fSigmundFreud,trans.Jamesand Alix Strachey,London, The Hogarth Press and the Institute f Psycho-Analysis,1953-1974, vol. 13, pp. 69-70.



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Orthopsychism21How, then,to derive a properlypsychoanalyticthat is, a split-subjectfrom hepremisethatthesubject s theeffect ather han the cause ofthe socialorder?Beforeturning, inally,o Lacan's solution, twillbe necessary opause toreviewone extraordinaryhapterfromBachelard-chapter IV of Le rational-isme pplique,titled"La surveillance ntellectuelle e soi"- wherewe willfindsome arguments hathave been overlookedin more recent theorizations f theapparatus.22AlthoughBachelardpioneered thetheory f the institutionalonstructionof the fieldof science,he also (as we have alreadysaid) persistentlyrgued that

the protocolsof science never fully aturatednor providedthe contentof thisfield.The obstacle of the imaginary s onlyone of the reasons given for this.Besides thispurelynegativeresistanceto the scientific,here is also a positiveconditionofthe scientifictselfthat preventedsuch a reductionfromtakingplace. Both these reasons togetherguarantee thatthe conceptsof science arenevermererealizations fpossibilities istoricallyllowed,and scientifichoughtisneversimply abit, heregulatedretracing fpossiblepathsalready aid out inadvance.To saythatthescientificubject s constructed ythe nstitutionfscience,Bachelardwouldreason, s to saythat t salwaysthereby bligedto survey tself,its own thinking,not subjectively,not througha process of introspection owhich the subjecthas privileged ccess, but objectively,romthe positionof thescientificnstitution.o farthisorthopsychicelationmayseemno differentromthe panoptic relation we have been so intenton dislodging. But there is adifference:heorthopsychic elation unlikethepanopticone) assumesthat t isjust thisobjectivesurvey hatallowsthought o become (notwhollyvisible,but)secret;tallowsthought o remainhidden, ven underthe most ntense crutiny.Let us make clear thatBachelard is not attempting o argue that there is anoriginal,private elf hathappenstofind nobjectivity means amongothers)ofconcealing tself.He isarguing,rather, hattheverypossibilityfconcealment sonlyraised by the subject's objectiverelationto itself.For it is the veryact of21. In order to dissociatehis concept of science from that of idealism,conventionalism,ndformalism, achelard formulated he concept of "applied rationalism": a scientific oncept mustintegratewithin tselfthe conditions of its realization. It is on the basis of this injunctionthatHeisenbergcould dismiss s illegitimatenytalkof an electron's ocation thatcould not also proposean experimentalmethodoflocating t.)And inorder todissociatehisconceptofsciencefrom hat fthepositivists,mpiricists,nd realists, achelard formulated heconceptof"technicalmaterialism":the instruments nd the protocolsof scientificxperimentsmust be theoretically ormulated.Thesystem f checks and balancesaccordingto which these two imperatives perate is whatBachelardnormallymeans by orthopsychism.e extends the notion in Le rationalismeppliqui, however,toincludethe formation f the scientificubject.22. Gaston Bachelard, Le rationalism ppliqui, Paris, Presses Universitairesde France, 1949,pp. 65-81.



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surveillance whichmakes clear the fact that the subject is external to itself,exists in a relationof "extimacy" (Lacan's word) with tself- that causes thesubjectto appear to itself s culpable,as guilty fhidingsomething.The objec-tive relation to the self,Bachelard informsus, necessarily aises the insidiousquestionthatNietzsche formulated hus: "To everythingwhich manallows tobecome visible, ne is able to demand: what does he wish to hide?" It does notmatterthat this "man" is oneself. The ineradicablesuspicionof dissimulationraisedbytheobjectiverelationguarantees hat houghtwillnever becometotallycoincidentwith the formsof the institution. hought will be split,rather,be-tweenbelief n whatthe nstitutionmakesmanifest,nd suspicion bout what t skeepingsecret.All objectiverepresentations,tsveryownthought,willbe takenbythesubjectnotas truerepresentationsf tself r theworld,but as fictions: o"impressionof reality"will adhere to them. The subjectwill appear, even toitself, o be no more thanan hypothesisfbeing.Belief nthereality frepresenta-tionswillbe suspended,projected beyondthe representationshemselves.Andthe "impression freality"willhenceforth onsist n the "mass of objectionstoconstituted eason," Bachelard sayshere; and elsewhere: n the conviction hat"what is real but hidden has more contentthan what s givenand obvious.'"23The suspicion f dissimulation ffers hesubjecta kindofreprievefrom hedictatesof law, the social superego. These dictates re perceivedas hypothesesthat must be tested rather than imperatives hat must be automatically ndunconditionallybeyed.The subject snotonly udged byand subjectedtosociallaws; it also udges themby subjecting hem to intellectual crutiny. elf-surveil-lance, then,conduces to self-correction;ne thoughtor representation lwaysadvances another as the former'sudge.The chapterends up celebrating kindof euphoria of freethought.As aresultof itsorthopsychic elation to itself, .e., before an imagewhich tdoubts,the scientific ubject is ubilant. Not because its image, its world, its thoughtreflectstsownperfection, ut because thesubject sthus llowedto imaginethatthey re all perfectable.t is this ense of theperfectibilityfthings hat iberatesthoughtfrom hetotally etermining onstraints f thesocial order.Thought isconceivedto police, and notmerely o be policed bythesocial/scientificrder,and the paranoia of the "Cassandra complex" (Bachelard's designationforthechildishbelief hateverythingsalreadyknown nadvance,byone's parents, ay)is therebydispelled.Curiously, hechargeofguiltthat s lodged,we weretold,bythestructureof surveillance,has been dropped somewhere long theway. It is now claimed,on thecontrary,hatsurveillance nables thought o be "morally incere." As itturnsout, then, t is thevery xperiencefmoralconscience,theveryfeelingofguilt,thatabsolvesthought f the charge fguilt.How has this bsolutionbeen23. GastonBachelard,TheNewScientificpirit,Boston,Beacon Press, 1984, p. 32.



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secured?Bytheseparationof theact ofthinking rom hethoughts hat t thinks.So thatthoughthethoughtsmaybe guilty, he act ofthinking emains nnocent.And thesubjectremainswhole, ts ntentions lear. This is theonly waywe canunderstandthe apparent contradictions f thischapter.Throughout his workBachelardmaintains hat"duplicity s maladroit n itsaddress"-i.e., thattheyerr whoassumethey annot be duped, thatno one issparedfrom eception.As aresult,no thoughtcan ever be perfectly enetrable. Yet, in this chapter hesimultaneouslymaintains hat thesubjectcan and mustpenetrate tsown act ofthinking.This scenarioofsurveillanceof the"joy ofsurveillance" is consciouslydelineated in relation to Freud's notion of moral conscience. But Bachelardopposes his notion to the "pessimism"of thatof Freud, who, of course, seesmoral conscienceas crueland punishing. n Bachelard, surveillance,n seemingto offer hesubjecta pardon, sconstrued s primarily positive r benignforce.Bachelard,then, too, likeFoucaultand filmtheory, ecalls and yetdisavowsthepsychoanalyticmodel of moral conscience however differently. achelard'sorthopsychism,which is informed n the end by a psychologistic rgument,cannot reallybe accepted by filmtheoryas an alternative o panopticonism.AlthoughBachelard argues thata certaininvisibilityhelters he subjectfromwhat we mightcall "the gaze" of the institutional pparatus, the subject isnevertheless haracterized yan exact legibilityn another evel.The Bachelard-ian subjectmaynot locate in its mage full nd uprightbeing that t ubilantly(but wrongly)takes itselfto be, but this subject does locate, in theprocessofscrutinizinghis mage,the oyous prospectof rightingtself.Filmtheory's or-rectsubjectis here replaced bya self-correctingne.Yet this detour through orthopsychism as not led only to a dead end.Whatwe have forcibly een led to consider s thequestionofdeception,of thesuspicionofdeceptionthatmustnecessarilye raisedifwe are to understand hecinematicapparatus as a signifyingpparatus, whichplaces the subject in anexternalrelationship o itself.Once the permanentpossibility f deception isadmitted ratherthandisregarded, s it is by the theoryof the panoptic appa-ratus),the conceptof the gaze undergoes a radical change. For, where in thepanoptic apparatus the gaze marksthe subject's visibility,n Lacan's theory tmarks the subject's culpability.The gaze stands watch over the inculpation- thefaulting nd splitting-of the subjectby the apparatus.

The Mirror as ScreenFilmtheoryntroduced hesubject nto ts tudy, nd therebyncorporatedLacanian psychoanalysis, rimarily ymeans of "The Mirror tage as Formative

of the Functionofthe I.'" It is to this ssaythattheoristsmade reference s theyformulated heirarguments bout the subject'snarcissistic elation to the film



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and about thatrelationship's ependence on "the gaze." While t s true thatthemirrorphase essay does describe the child's narcissistic elation to its mirrorimage, it is not n thisessaybut in SeminarXI that Lacan himself ormulates isconcept of the gaze. Here, particularly n those sessions collected under theheading "Of the Gaze as ObjectPetita," Lacan reformulatesis earlier mirrorphase essay and paintsa pictureverydifferent romthe one painted by filmtheory.Lacan tellshis taleofthe relationofthesubjectto itsworld nthe form fahumorously econditestory bout a sardinecan. The story s told as a kindofmockHegelian epic,a send-upof thebroadly xpansiveHegelian epic formbyadeliberately little tory"thattakesplace in a "small boat" in a "smallport" andincludesa singlenamed character,Petit-Jean. he entire overtplot consists nthesighting f a "small can." A truly hort tory f theobject smalla; theproofand sole guaranteeof thatalterity f the Other whichHegel's sweepingtale,inoverlooking,denies.The story etsHegelian themes drift nd awashina sea of bathos.A young(Hegelian) intellectual,dentifying imselfwith the slavingclass, embarks on ajourneythathe expectswillpithim nstruggle gainstthe raw forces fa pitilessnature.But, alas, thedayturns ut to be undramatically unny nd fine, nd theanticipated vent,themeeting nd matchwith heMaster,never comesabout. Itis narratively eplaced bywhatwe can accuratelydescribe as a "nonevent,"thespotting f the shiny,mirrorlikeardinecan--and an attack of anxiety. n theend, however, bathos gives way to tragedy,as we realize that in this littleslice-of-liferama there s no sublationofconsumption, o transcendence, nlythe slow dying away, throughconsumption, f the individual membersof theslaving lass. The mocking s notmerely entle,but carries nitswakethis bruptstatement fconsequence; something uite serious s at stake here. Ifwe are torewrite the tragic ending of this political tale, somethingwill have to beretheorized.What is it? Plainly,ultimately,t is "I"--the I that takes shape in thisrevisedversionofthe mirror tage.As ifto underline he fact hat t s the , andthe narcissistic elationthroughwhich t is constructed, hat s thepointof thediscussion,Lacan tells personalstory. t ishe, infact,who is thefirst-personfthenarrative; hisportrait f theanalyst s a youngman is hisown. The cameorole in Seminar XI preparesus, then,forthe starring ole Lacan playsas thenarcissistic televanalyst" n Television. What is at stakein bothcases," Lacansays in Television bout his performanceboth there and in his seminars, ngeneral,"is a gaze: a gaze to which, n neither ase, do I addressmyself, ut inthenameofwhich speak."24What ishe sayinghere about therelationbetweenthe I and the gaze?24. Lacan, Television, . 7.



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The gaze is thatwhich "determines"the I in thevisible; t is "the instru-ment through which . . . [the] I [is] photo-graphed.'"25 his might be taken toconfirm he coincidence of the Foucauldian and Lacanian positions, o indicatethat, nboth,thegaze determines hecompletevisibilityf the I, themappingoftheI on a perceptualgrid.Hence thedisciplinarymonitoring f thesubject.Butthis coincidencecan onlybe produced bya precipitous, snapshot" readingofLacan, one thatfailsto notice the hyphenthatsplitsthe termphoto-graphntophoto "light" and graph among otherthings, fragment f the Lacanianphrase "graph ofdesire"--as it splitsthe subjectthat t describes.Photo.One thing s certain: ightdoes not enterthese seminars na straightline, throughthe laws of optics.Because, as he says,the geometric aws of thepropagationof lightmap space only, nd notvision,Lacan does not theorizethevisualfield nterms f these aws.Thus, the egitimate onstructionannotfigureforhim-as itdoes forfilm heory- the relationofthespectator o the screen.And these seminars annotbe used, as they re used byfilm heory, o supportthe argumentthat the cinematic pparatus, in directline with the camera ob-scura,by recreating hespace and ideologyof Renaissanceperspective, roducesa centeredand transcendent ubject.26This argument scritiqued nthe seminars n thegaze as Lacan makes clearwhythespeaking ubjectcannot verbe totally rapped n the imaginary. acanclaims, rather,that "I am not simplythat punctiformbeing located at thegeometralpointfromwhichtheperspective s grasped."27Now, filmtheory, fcourse,has alwaysclaimed that thecinematic pparatusfunctionsdeologicallyoproducea subjectthatmisrecognizestself s source and centerof therepresentedworld.But althoughthis claimmight eem to imply greementwithLacan, tosuggest, oo, that the subject is notthepunctiform eing that Renaissanceper-spectivewould have us believe it is,film heory'snotion ofmisrecognitionurnsout to be different romLacan's inimportantways.Despitethe fact hat he termmisrecognitionmplies n error on the subject'spart,a failureproperly o recog-nize its true relation to the visibleworld, the process by whichthe subject isinstalled n itspositionof misrecognition perates withoutthe hintof failure.25. Lacan, TheFour FundamentalConcepts, . 106.26. See, especially, ean-LouisBaudry,"Ideological Effects f the Basic CinematographicAppa-ratus" (firstpublished in Cinithique,nos. 7-8 [1970] and, in English, n Film Quarterly, o. 28[Winter1974- 75]), andJean-LouisComolli,"Technique and Ideology:Camera,Perspective, epthof Field" (firstpublished in Cahiersdu cinema,nos. 229, 230, 231, and 233 [1970-71] and, inEnglish,bytheBritishFilmInstitute).This historical ontinuity as been takenforgrantedbyfilmtheorygenerally.For a history f thenoncontinuityetween Renaissancetechniquesofobservationand our own,seeJonathanCrary, Techniques of theObserver," October, o. 45 (Summer1987). Inthisessay,Crarydifferentiateshe camera obscura from the physiologicalmodels of vision thatsucceeded it. Lacan, inhisseminars n thegaze, refers oboth thesemodelsas they re representedby the science of opticsand the philosophy f phenomenology.He exhibitsthemas two "waysofbeingwrongabout this function f the subject n the domain of the spectacle."27. Lacan, TheFourFundamentalConcepts, . 96.



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The subjectunerringlyssumes the position perspectivebids it to take. Erasedfrom heprocessofconstruction,henegativeforce of erroremerges ateras acharge directedat the subject. But fromwhere does it come? Film theoryhasonlydescribed the construction f thispositionof misrecognition. hough itimpliesthat there is another actual, nonpunctiform osition,filmtheoryhasneverbeen able to describethe constructionf thisposition.In Lacan's description,misrecognition etains its negative force in theprocessof construction. s a result heprocess s no longerconceived as a purelypositiveone, but ratherone withan internaldialectic. Lacan does not take thesingletriangle hatgeometrical erspective rawsas an accuratedescription f tsown operation. Instead he rediagrams hisoperation bymeans of two nterpene-trating riangles. hus he represents oththewaythe science ofopticsfigures heemissionof lightand theway itsstraight ines become refracted, iffusedthewaythey cquire the "ambiguity fa jewel") once we take into account thewaythe signifiertself nterferesn thisfiguring. he second trianglecuts throughthe first,marking he elisionor negationthat s partof theprocessofconstruc-tion. The second trianglediagramsthe subject'smistakenbelief thatthere issomethingbehind the space set out by the first. t is thismistakenbelief thismisrecognition) hat causes the subject to disbelieve ven those representationsshaped according to the scientific aws of optics. The Lacanian subject,whodoubtstheaccuracyof even its most"scientific" epresentations,s submitted oa superegoicaw that s radicallydifferent rom heoptical aws to whichthefilmtheoretical ubjectis submitted.

Thegaze image Thesubject f representationscreen

Graph.Semiotics,notoptics, s the science thatclarifies or us the structureof the visual domain. Because it alone is capable of lendingthings ense, thesignifier lone makes visionpossible. There is and can be no brute vision,novisiontotallydevoid of sense. Painting,drawing,all formsof picture-making,then, re fundamentally raphic rts. And because signifiersre material, hat s,because theyare opaque rather than translucent, ecause theyrefer to othersignifiersather handirectly oa signified,hefield fvision s neither lear noreasilytraversable. t is insteadambiguousand treacherous, ulloftraps.Lacan'sSeminarXI refers onstantly, utambiguously, o thesetraps.When Lacan saysthat the subject is trapped in the imaginary,he means that the subject can



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imaginenothingoutside it; the imaginary annot itselfprovide the means thatwouldallow thesubjectto transcend t. When he says,on the otherhand,thatpainting, r anyotherrepresentation,sa "trapforthegaze," he meansthattherepresentation ttracts he gaze, induces us to imagine a gaze outside--andobserving-the field of representation. t is this second sense of trapping,wherebyrepresentation ppears to generate its own beyond (to generate,wemight say,recallingLacan's diagram,the secondtriangle,whichthe science ofoptics neglects o consider)thatprevents hesubjectfrom verbeing trapped ntheimaginary.Where thefilm heoretical ositionhas tended to trapthesubjectinrepresentationan idealistfailing), o conceive of anguageas constructingheprisonwalls of thesubject'sbeing,Lacan arguesthatthesubjectsees these wallsas trompe 'oeil and is thus constructedby somethingbeyond them.For, beyond everything hat is displayed to the subject, the question isasked: what is being concealed from me? What in thisgraphic space does notshow,does notstopnotwritingtself?This pointat whichsomething ppears tobe invisible, hispoint t which omething ppearstobe missing rom epresenta-tion,some meaning eftunrevealed, s thepointof the Lacanian gaze. It markstheabsence fa signified;t san unoccupiable oint, hepoint t which hesubjectdisappears. The image, the visual field,thentakes on a terrifyinglterity hatprohibits hesubjectfrom eeing tselfntherepresentation. hat "belong to measpect" is suddenlydrained fromrepresentation, s the mirrorassumes thefunction f a screen.Lacan is certainlynotofferingn agnosticdescription f thewaythe realobject is cut offfromthesubject'sviewby language,of thewaythe real objectescapes capture in the networkof signifiers. is is not the idealistpositionofeitherPlato or Kant, who splitthe object between its real being and its sem-blance. Lacan argues, rather,thatbeyond the signifying etwork,beyond thevisualfield, here s, in fact,nothing t all.28The veil ofrepresentationctuallyconcealsnothing.Yet the fact hatrepresentationeems ohide,toputa screenofaborescent signifiersn frontof somethinghidden beneath, is not treatedbyLacan as a simpleerror which thesubjectcan undo; nor is thisdeceptiveness flanguagetreated s somethingwhichundoesthesubject,deconstructsts dentitybymenacing ts boundaries.Rather, anguage's opacity s taken as thevery auseof thesubject'sbeing, tsdesire. The fact hat t smateriallympossible o saythewholetruth that ruth lwaysbacksawayfrom anguage,thatwords lwaysfallshortof theirgoal founds the subject. Contraryto the idealistpositionthatmakesformhe cause ofbeing,Lacan locates the cause ofbeing nthe nforme:heunformed thatwhich has no signified, o significanthape in the visual field);the inquiry the question posed to representation's resumedreticence).The28. The questionsMoustaphaSafouan poses to Lacan duringSeminarXI (TheFourFundamentalConcepts, . 103) force himto be quite clear on thispoint:"Beyond appearance there s nothing nitself, here s thegaze."



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subject s the effect f the mpossibilityfseeingwhat s acking n therepresenta-tion,what thesubject,therefore,wantsto see. Desire, in otherwords,the desireof representation,nstitutes he subject in the visible field.It should be clearbynowhow differenthisdescriptions from hatofferedbyfilmtheory. n film heory hesubject dentifies iththegaze as thesignifiedof the mageand comes intoexistence s the realization fa possibility.n Lacan,the subject identifieswith the gaze as the signifier f the lack thatcauses theimage to languish.The subject comes into existence, then, througha desirewhich s still onsideredto be theeffectf the law,butn't itsrealization.Desirecannotbe a realizationbecause it fulfills o possibilitynd has no content; t is,rather, ccasionedby mpossibility,he mpossibilityfthesubject'severcoincid-ingwiththe real being fromwhichrepresentation uts it off.Narcissism, oo, takeson a differentmeaning nLacan, one moreinaccordwith Freud's own. Since something always appears to be missingfromanyrepresentation,narcissism annot consist in finding atisfaction n one's ownvisual image. It must,rather, onsist n the belief thatone's own beingexceedsthe imperfectionsf its mage. Narcissism, hen,seeks the selfbeyondthe self-image,with which the subjectconstantly indsfaultand in which t constantlyfails orecognize tself.What one loves none's imageissomethingmore hantheimage ("in youmore thanyou").29Thus is narcissismhe source of themalevo-lencewithwhich hesubjectregards ts mage,theaggressivitytunleasheson allitsown representations.s0 And thusdoes thesubjectcome intobeingas a trans-gression f,rather han nconformityo,the aw. It is not the aw,butthefault nthelaw--the desire that the law cannotultimatelyonceal--that is assumedbythesubject s itsown.The subject, ntakingup the burden of the aw'sguilt,goesbeyondthe law.Much of thisdefinition f narcissism take to be compacted in Lacan'sotherwise otally nigmatic entences: "The effect f mimicrys camouflage nthe strictlyechnicalsense. It is not a question of harmonizingwiththe back-29. This is the titlegivento the last session of the seminarpublishedas The Four FundamentalConcepts. lthoughthe "you" of the titlerefers o theanalyst, t can referust as easilyto the idealimage in the mirror.30. JacquelineRose's "Paranoia and theFilmSystem" Screen, ol. 17,no. 4 [Winter1976-77]) isa forceful ritique directedspecificallyt RaymondBellour'sanalysesof Hitchcock,but also at arange of filmtheoretical ssumptions)-of hat notion of the cinema that sees it as a successfulresolution fconflict nd a refusalofdifference. ose remindsus thatcinema,as "techniqueoftheimaginary"Metz), necessarily nleashes a conflict,n aggressivity,hat s irresolvable.While I am,forthe mostpart, nagreementwithher mportant rgument, am claimingherethatRose iswrongto make this ggressivity ependenton theshot/counter-shottructure f the filmthereversibilityof thelook),or to defineaggressivitys the result fthe imaginary elation.The gaze is threateningnot because itpresents he reverse the mirror) mage of the subject,but because itdoes not. Thegaze deprivesthesubjectof thepossibilityfever becoming fully bservablebeing. Lacan himselfsaysthat ggressivitys nota matter f transitive etaliation: The phenomenonofaggressivitysn'tto be explained on the level of imaginary dentification"in TheEgo in Freud's Theorynd in theTechnique fPsychoanalysis,ew York and London, Norton, 1978, p. 22).



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ground,but againsta mottledbackground,of becomingmottled--exactlylikethetechniqueofcamouflagepracticed nhumanwarfare." The effect frepre-sentation "mimicry," n an older, idealistvocabulary) s not a subjectwho willharmonizewith, r adapt to, tsenvironmentthesubject'snarcissistic elation othe representation hat constructstdoes not place it in happyaccord withtherealitythat the apparatus constructsfor it). The effectof representation s,instead,the suspicionthat some reality s beingcamouflaged, hat we are beingdeceived as to the exact natureof something-in-itselfhat ies behindrepresenta-tion. In responseto such a representation,gainstsucha backgroundofdecep-tion,the subject's own being breaks up between its unconsciousbeing and itsconscious semblance. At war both with its world and with itself, he subjectbecomesguilty f theverydeceit itsuspects.This can hardly,however,be calledmimicry,n the old sense, sincenothing s being mimed.In sum, the conflictualnature of Lacan's culpable subject sets it worldsapart fromthe stable subject of filmtheory.But neitherdoes the LacaniansubjectresemblethatofBachelard. Forwhile, nBachelard,orthopsychism inproviding n opportunity orthe correction fthought's mperfections allowsthesubjecttowanderfrom tsmoorings, onstantlyo drift rom ne positiontoanother, n Lacan "orthopsychism"--onewishesto retainthe term n order toindicatethesubject'sfundamental ependence on the faults t finds nrepresen-tation nd in tself- groundsthesubject.The desire that tprecipitates ransfixesthe subject, albeit in a conflictualplace, so that all the subject's visions andrevisions, ll itsfantasies,merelycircumnavigate he absence that anchors thesubjectand impedesitsprogress.32 It is this desire that mustbe reconstructedfthe subjectis to be changed.This paper was presented n Paris at a conference n "The TheoryofCinema and theCrisis in Theory"organizedbyMichile Lagny,Marie-Claire Ropars, and Pierre Sorlinand held inJune 1988. A translationofthepaper, along with otherpapers fromtheconference nd responses to them,were published in Hors Cadre, no. 7 (Winter1988-89).

31. Lacan, TheFour FundamentalConcepts, . 99.32. In "Another Lacan" (Lacan StudyNotes,vol. 1, no. 3),Jacques-AlainMiller s concernedtounderlinetheclinicaldimensionof Lacan's work,particularly isconceptof "the pass." The differ-ence between the "deconstructionist"nd the Lacanian notion of fantasys, thus, lso made clear.

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