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Controlling the Crisis: The Role of the International Community in Protecting Climate Migrants By: Grace Mu April 15, 2020

After an unusually hot summer decimated the crop industry in Honduras, indigenous farmer

Gilberto Ysais lost his job and only means of supporting his family. When the criminal gang

MS-13 threatened to recruit his 11-year-old son, Ysais was forced to take a leap of faith. He and

his son began a 2,000-mile hike to the Texas border, hoping they would be able to apply

for asylum once they reached the United States. Upon arrival, however, they were detained and

prepared for deportation. As of September of 2019, Ysais and his son were still waiting for news

about their claim for asylum under gang violence. Despite representing the central reason for

their escape, climate-related factors could not be considered in their case for asylum.1

Figure 1: World Bank estimated climate migrant totals by 2050 in highlighted regions 2

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Climate change, which is perhaps the defining issue of our time, has been referred to as a “threat

multiplier,” meaning it has the potential to “exacerbate poverty, conflict, and instability.”3 In

other words, as weather events such as storms and droughts intensify, the poorest and smallest

nations will be disproportionately affected.4 Already, since 2008, an estimated 24 million people

have been forced to migrate every year because of devastating natural disasters.5 According to

the International Organization for Migration, by 2050, between 25 million and 1.5 billion people

will have fled their homes due to similar tragedies.6 Figure 1, which shows the World Bank’s

projection of the number of climate migrants by 2050, focuses on three different climate

situations in the regions of Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Latin America.7 The scenarios

include “pessimistic” to describe a rise in temperature of 4.0 - 6.1°C, “more inclusive

development” to describe similar climate conditions but improved socioeconomic factors, and

“more-climate friendly” to represent a rise in temperature of 1.3 – 1.9 °C.8 Despite these

alarming estimates, as of now, international law does not formally recognize the existence of

“climate change refugees,” and therefore does not require nations to accept them.9 Ultimately,

disconnected mitigation efforts and the lack of a clear legal standing have left an ever-growing

climate migrant population vulnerable in the face of catastrophic environmental destruction.

The Climate Migrant Crisis

As highlighted by Walter Kälin, the Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General on

the Human Rights for Internally Displaced Persons, there are a number of events that can lead to

climate-induced migration. These include “sudden-onset disasters” such as floods and storms,

“slow-onset disasters” such as rising sea levels, the sinking of “small island States,” the

designation of high-risk habitation areas, and unrest due to the depletion of natural resources.10

Figure 2 depicts the percentages of global displacement due to sudden-onset disasters, with

floods and storms seemingly representing the largest dangers. The Pacific island nations of

Tuvalu, Kiribati, and the Marshall Islands, as well as the Maldives in the Indian Ocean are

particularly vulnerable because they are impacted by both sudden-onset and slow-onset

disasters.11 Other regions, however, also face a risk of being significantly affected by climate

change. In Bangladesh, coastal flooding forces hundreds of thousands of people to regularly

relocate to the heavily populated slums of the capital, Dhaka.12 About 70% of the five million

people living in these slums were displaced from their homes due to environmental factors.13 In

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West Africa, the disappearance of Lake Chad due to desertification has driven over four million

people into camps.14

Figure 2: The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre’s estimates of types of environmental

displacement 15

As is evident in both Bangladesh and West Africa, many climate migrants will begin by moving

within their nation’s borders. The World Bank estimates that 143 million people in Sub-Saharan

Africa, South Asia, and Latin America will "move within their own countries to escape the slow-

onset impacts of climate change.”16 However, for many of the small island nations who may see

their homes rendered completely uninhabitable due to rising sea levels, migration will need to be

international.17 This mass migration is expected to have a devastating economic impact. In a

small-scale example, 100 people in a Louisiana community needed to be relocated after their

island, the Isle de Jean Charles, was submerged under rising sea levels.18 The relocation process

to a town 40 miles inland took several years and $50 million.19 It is thus reasonable to conclude

that the relocation of entire nations will be exponentially more costly and time-consuming, yet

formal legislation regulating how these people will be relocated and under which protections is

nonexistent.

Currently, climate change is not seen as a valid reason for asylum in any country, since the

people do not fit into the traditional definition of refugees.20 As stated in the United Nations’

“1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,” a “refugee” is any person who has

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crossed an international border “for a well-founded fear of being persecuted because of his or her

race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.”21 Given

that this definition does not specify any climate-related factors, a more-widely accepted term for

a person displaced as a result of climate change is “climate migrant.” The International

Organization for Migration states that climate migrants are “persons or groups of persons who,

for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect

their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their homes or choose to do so, either

temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad."22

Yet, while the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) annually grants more than 20

million people escaping from political violence refugee status, no protection is given to the same

number of people annually fleeing from sudden weather hazards.23 Countries are not required to

accept climate migrants, and in nations such as the U.S. and Europe, aid following natural

disasters is temporary and does not facilitate full residency.24

Initiatives have begun to take shape, but a lack of widespread support means the world remains

severely underprepared for the predicted influx of migrants. More than 150 countries have

acknowledged the issue of climate migration, and in 2015, the Paris Agreement required the

creation of a task force to “address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate

change.”25 This, however, has done little to legally change the status of climate migrants or

guarantee them protections.26 While nations such as New Zealand and Australia have agreed to

accept displaced people, with New Zealand going as far as to suggest a new visa category for

migrants from the Pacific nations highlighted in Figure 3, nations such as India have expressed

concerns about needing to accommodate increasing numbers of people from Bangladesh.27 The

United States, widely considered a global leader, abstained from voting on the 2018 Global

Compact of Migration and plans to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. Ironically, this comes

after 2017 Hurricane María left about 2,300 Puerto Rican families without permanent housing.28

The Trump administration’s anti-environmental and anti-immigration policies have greatly

hindered the United States, normally the world’s number one migrant destination, from leading

the development of legally mandated climate migrant procedures.29

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Figure 3: Graphic by Independent depicting migration paths of Pacific Islands 30

The Role of the United Nations

Better protecting the rights of climate migrants will require the involvement of the international

community. While individual nations are responsible for managing climate migration that occurs

within their borders, only intergovernmental agencies will be able to regulate an issue as

prominent and widespread as cross-border climate migration.31 Currently, the United Nations,

which is tasked with developing and enforcing solutions to global problems related to basic

human rights, is the only “truly global institution” that has the capabilities of doing so.32

As a result, the first step in the solution is for the UN secretary to designate one unit for response

to climate displacement.33 A reasonable choice is the United Nations Framework Convention of

Climate Change (UNFCCC) secretariat. The secretariat is currently tasked with the handling of

intergovernmental negotiations, analyzing and reviewing climate change information, and

overseeing the policies of the Convention.34 Given that climate migration is considered an

adaptation to climate change, and as defined in the Cancun Agreement, the UNFCCC is expected

to address adaptation issues, it seems reasonable for the secretariat to assume management of this

issue.35

As the chief organization, the UNFCCC secretariat would then be responsible for the

coordination of the cooperation of other UN branch organizations.36 Environmental migration

raises a plethora of problems related to human rights and socioeconomic development, so to

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ensure full consideration of all aspects of migration, the secretariat should seek to build

relationships with other UN organizations.37 These include the International Organization for

Migration, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the UN Development Program, the UN

Environmental Program, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the World Food

Program, and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.38

In addition to its secretariat leading environmental migration policies, the UNFCCC should

formally recognize the existence of climate migrants. Recognition would allow for

implementation in international law, a budget, and identification of who to protect and the

subsequent measures that need to be taken.39 It would thus guarantee that environmental

migrants are given the same legal protections as refugees, including a guarantee to civil,

political, economic, social, and cultural freedoms.40 As of May 2012, 194 countries and the

European Union officially endorsed the UNFCCC, so the legal recognition of climate migrants

would be nearly universally accepted.41 The UNFCCC’s negotiation and implementation

procedures are widely agreed upon amongst members, so mechanisms to protect climate

migrants would be approved with less delay and dissent than if an unrelated organization were

developed to oversee the management of these migrants.42 For funding, existing pledges,

bilateral agreements, and impositions on taxes on carbon trading from the original UNFCCC

could be applied to climate migration mitigation efforts. Adoption by the UNFCCC would also

“ensure a fairer cost burden.” Without recognition of the environmentally displaced, the

vulnerable, developing countries would bear most of the responsibility for the migrants because

of many migrants’ inability to travel extensively. An official legal recognition would force

developed nations to assume some of this responsibility and encourage contributions toward the

logistics and costs of relocation.43

There are, however, several disadvantages that must be fully addressed before claiming

UNFCCC recognition is the ideal solution. In its conception, the UNFCCC was intended to

reduce the causes of climate change, not to focus on issues of widespread mobility. Despite this,

the Convention has seen limited success with ineffective policies such as the Kyoto Protocol. Its

newer adaptation strategies in the Copenhagen Accord and Cancun Agreement have proven

much more promising and illustrate the precedent for actively amending the Convention as need

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arises. Additionally, the UNFCCC does not possess the ability to regulate its policies with

sanctions, and therefore relies on “international peer pressure and the good intentions of

signatories.”44 This concern is easily assuaged with the UNFCCC secretariat enlisting the aid of

other UN branches. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the Environmental Program

have justice mechanisms in place that could impose the necessary sanctions to compel

cooperation.45 Adaptation funding being funneled toward local projects rather than global

initiatives has also been considered a possible obstacle.46 Once again, however, the

interconnection of UN organizations could allow for the enlistment of donor governments and

multilateral development banks to invest in aiding climate-sensitive nations.47

Prevention of Further Climate Displacement

Prevention of further climate displacement is the second important component of the solution.

Five to ten-year investments by member nations of the UN could fund projects in vulnerable

countries to increase their resilience to climate change. In West Africa, for example, investments

in irrigation infrastructure and food supplies as well as encouragement of regional water security

could alleviate some of the climate-related factors pushing people to migrate. Given its particular

status as a global leader, the United States has a large responsibility to contribute to foreign aid

efforts. One way in which the nation could accomplish this is through the creation of a single

fund dedicated toward environmental migration.48

Currently, the majority of the United States’ foreign aid operations are managed by the U.S.

Agency for International Development (USAID). USAID is responsible for overseeing four

different types of aid: long-term development (46%), military and security (33%), humanitarian

(14%), and political (11%).49 However, it is notable that there is not a specific type of aid

dedicated toward climate migration. Migration is implicitly accounted for in the long-term

development aid that funds the World Bank and the UN Development Program, as well as in the

humanitarian aid used to alleviate short term crises caused by natural or man-made disasters.50 If

a specialized fund were created within long-term development that could draw from the

Operations and Maintenance, Research and Development, and the Refugee Assistance funds, the

United States could centralize its aid efforts and restore its reputation on the international level.51

The new fund could partner with the United Kingdom’s Department for International

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Development (DFID), Germany’s Society for International Cooperation (GIZ), and Japan’s

International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to further the theme of international coordination.52

While there are not specific numbers available for how much the United States should contribute

to climate migration mitigation efforts in particular, increasing how much the nation spends on

foreign aid in general should ensure that a larger proportion of aid is being allocated toward

migration. In 2016, the United States spent $49 billion in foreign aid, which comprised about 1.2

percent of the federal budget.53 In terms of percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), this

number amounted to about 0.18 percent of GDP. In contrast, other developed nations such as

Sweden, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom spent 0.7

percent or more of GDP on foreign aid. In order to truly establish itself as a leader in the climate

migration crisis, the United States should thus increase its foreign aid spending to at least 0.7

percent of its GDP, a percentage that would allow it to meet the target set by the United Nations

for developed countries.54

The United States should also deploy its internal resources when necessary, which is already

illustrated in the U.S. Navy serving as an emergency hotline for international natural disasters.55

The Navy served as a line of first response for Haiti following the 2010 earthquake, for the

Philippines after the 2013 typhoon, and Nepal in the midst of the 2015 earthquake.56 In 2017,

when Hurricane María left mass chaos and destruction in its wake, U.S. military forces were

deployed to distribute basic necessities and assist in reconstruction efforts.57 With consistent

military responsiveness to large-scale natural disasters, the need for people to completely

abandon their homes will be diminished.58

A Call to Action

Ultimately, the best way to prepare for the predicted influx of climate migrants is to encourage

cooperation in the international community. This begins with the appointment of the UNFCCC

secretariat as the primary agency handling the environmental migration initiatives. The

secretariat should seek to cooperate with other related branches of the UN to ensure multiple

avenues for funding, a mechanism for legal enforcement, and full representation of the diverse

aspects of migration. The UNFCCC should also formally recognize climate migrants in order to

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ensure they are granted the same basic protections as refugees. A legally enforceable recognition

would facilitate the creation of policies to mandate the processing of environmental migrants in a

fair and efficient manner.

On a federal level, the United States should do its part in contributing foreign aid. The nation

should seek to increase its foreign aid spending to about 0.7 percent of its GDP to match the

efforts made by other countries and establish itself as a global leader in the migration crisis.

Through the long-term development sector of USAID, the United States can create a directed

fund toward preventing migration and financing it once it occurs. This fund should then be

connected with similar funds of other developed nations to create a centralized system of aid.

Continued deployment of military resources to support developing nations following

environmental catastrophes should also reduce the number of people who need to cross borders

in search of new homes.

While in an ideal world, each individual nation would have detailed preparation plans for the

acceptance of climate migrants, from a practical standpoint, it is the responsibility of the United

Nations to act. The United Nations has the power to mandate international cooperation and

legally recognize climate migrants, restoring the basic rights and protections they deserve as

human beings.

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Endnotes 1 Izzie Ramirez, “Climate Change Will Create 1.5 Billion Migrants by 2050 and We Have No Idea Where They’ll Go,” Vice (September 2019), available at https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/59n9qa/climate-change-will-create-15-billion-migrants-by-2050-and-we-have-no-idea-where-theyll-go (last accessed April 14 2020). 2 Jocelyn Timperley, “Expect tens of millions of internal climate migrants by 2050, says World Bank,” Carbon Brief (March 2018), available at https://www.carbonbrief.org/expect-tens-of-millions-of-internal-climate-migrants-by-2050-says-world-bank (last accessed April 14 2020). 3 Ramirez, “Climate Change Will Create 1.5 Billion Migrants by 2050 and We Have No Idea Where They’ll Go.” 4 Tim McDonnell, “The Refugees the World Barely Pays Attention To,” NPR (June 2018), available at https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2018/06/20/621782275/the-refugees-that-the-world-barely-pays-attention-to (last accessed April 14 2020); Ramirez, “Climate Change Will Create 1.5 Billion Migrants by 2050 and We Have No Idea Where They’ll Go.” 5 McDonnell, “The Refugees the World Barely Pays Attention To.” 6 Ramirez, “Climate Change Will Create 1.5 Billion Migrants by 2050 and We Have No Idea Where They’ll Go;” Rafael Leal-Arcas, “Climate Migrants: Legal Options” Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences 37 (2012): 86, available at https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1877042812007562. 7 Timperley, “Expect tens of millions of internal climate migrants by 2050, says World Bank.” 8 Ibid. 9 Ramirez, “Climate Change Will Create 1.5 Billion Migrants by 2050 and We Have No Idea Where They’ll Go.” 10 Leal-Arcas, “Climate Migrants: Legal Options,” p. 88. 11 Ibid. 12 McDonnell, “The Refugees the World Barely Pays Attention To.” 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, “Global Displacement by Type of Hazard,” (July 2015), available at https://www.internal-displacement.org/publications/global-estimates-2015-people-displaced-by-disasters (last accessed April 14 2020). 16 Stewart M. Patrick, “How Should the World Respond to the Coming Wave of Climate Migrants?” World Politics Review (2020): 1, available at http://ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=142309523&site=ehost-live&scope=site; McDonnell, “The Refugees the World Barely Pays Attention To;” John Podesta, “The Climate Crisis, Migration, and Refugees,” Brookings (July 2019), available at https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-climate-crisis-migration-and-refugees/ (last accessed April 14 2020). 17 Leal-Arcas, “Climate Migrants: Legal Options,” p. 89. 18 McDonnell, “The Refugees the World Barely Pays Attention To.” 19 Ibid. 20 Ramirez, “Climate Change Will Create 1.5 Billion Migrants by 2050 and We Have No Idea Where They’ll Go.” 21 Ibid.

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22 Patrick, “How Should the World Respond to the Coming Wave of Climate Migrants?” 23 Ibid. 24 Leal-Arcas, “Climate Migrants: Legal Options,” p. 90. 25 Ramirez, “Climate Change Will Create 1.5 Billion Migrants by 2050 and We Have No Idea Where They’ll Go.” 26 Podesta, “The Climate Crisis, Migration, and Refugees.” 27 Ramirez, “Climate Change Will Create 1.5 Billion Migrants by 2050 and We Have No Idea Where They’ll Go;” Leal-Arcas, “Climate Migrants: Legal Options,” p. 89. 28 McDonnell, “The Refugees the World Barely Pays Attention To.” 29 Ramirez, “Climate Change Will Create 1.5 Billion Migrants by 2050 and We Have No Idea Where They’ll Go.” 30 Tom Bawden, “Global warming: Thousands flee Pacific islands on front line of climate change,” Independent (December 2015), available at https://www.independent.co.uk/environment/climate-change/global-warming-thousands-flee-pacific-islands-on-front-line-of-climate-change-a6757796.html (last accessed April 14 2020). 31 Christine Gibb and James Ford, “Should the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change recognize climate migrants?” 7 (4) (2012): 1, available at https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/7/4/045601 32 Gibb and Ford, “Should the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change recognize climate migrants?” p. 2. 33 Patrick, “How Should the World Respond to the Coming Wave of Climate Migrants?” 34 United Nations Climate Change, “About the Secretariat,” UNFCCC, available at https://unfccc.int/about-us/about-the-secretariat (last accessed April 14 2020). 35 Gibb and Ford, “Should the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change recognize climate migrants?” p. 2. 36 Patrick, “How Should the World Respond to the Coming Wave of Climate Migrants?” 37 Ibid. 38 Patrick, “How Should the World Respond to the Coming Wave of Climate Migrants?” 39 Gibb and Ford, “Should the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change recognize climate migrants?” p. 2. 40 40 Patrick, “How Should the World Respond to the Coming Wave of Climate Migrants?” 41 Gibb and Ford, “Should the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change recognize climate migrants?” p. 2. 42 Gibb and Ford, “Should the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change recognize climate migrants?” p. 2-3. 43 Gibb and Ford, “Should the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change recognize climate migrants?” p. 3. 44 Gibb and Ford, “Should the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change recognize climate migrants?” p. 4. 45 United Nations and the Rule of Law, “Refugee Law,” UN, available at https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/thematic-areas/international-law-courts-tribunals/refugee-law/ (last accessed April 14 2020). 46 Gibb and Ford, “Should the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change recognize climate migrants?” p. 4. 47 Patrick, “How Should the World Respond to the Coming Wave of Climate Migrants?” 48 Podesta, “The Climate Crisis, Migration, and Refugees.”

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49 James McBride, “How Does the U.S. Spend Its Foreign Aid?” Council on Foreign Relations (October 2018), available at https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/how-does-us-spend-its-foreign-aid (last accessed April 15 2020). 50 Ibid. 51 Podesta, “The Climate Crisis, Migration, and Refugees.” 52 Ibid. 53 McBride, “How Does the U.S. Spend Its Foreign Aid?” 54 Ibid. 55 Podesta, “The Climate Crisis, Migration, and Refugees.” 56 Ibid. 57 Matthew Bell, “When disaster strikes, it’s the US military that’s often the most capable responder,” PRI (September 2017), available at https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-09-29/when-disaster-strikes-its-us-military-thats-often-most-capable-responder (last accessed April 14 2020). 58 Podesta, “The Climate Crisis, Migration, and Refugees.” Photo Citation: Migrant Children on Mountain: Migrant Clinicians Network https://www.migrantclinician.org/issues/climate-change-and-migration.html