Controlled and automatic mindreading in children and adults

Ian Apperly

What is “Theory of Mind”?• “Folk psychology”, “Perspective-taking”, “Social cognition”• Essential for everyday social interaction and communication

• False belief tasks as a paradigm case• (e.g., Wimmer & Perner, 1983)

– These tasks ensure that participant must judge from other person’s point of view

What is “Theory of Mind”?• “Folk psychology”, “Perspective-taking”, “Social cognition”• Essential for everyday social interaction and communication

• False belief tasks as a paradigm case• (e.g., Wimmer & Perner, 1983)

– These tasks ensure that participant must judge from other person’s point of view

• Significant developments from infancy to early childhood

• Disproportionately impaired in autism and several other genetic and psychiatric disorders

What is “Theory of Mind”?• “Folk psychology”, “Perspective-taking”, “Social cognition”• Essential for everyday social interaction and communication

• False belief tasks as a paradigm case• (e.g., Wimmer & Perner, 1983)

– These tasks ensure that participant must judge from other person’s point of view

• Significant developments from infancy to early childhood

• Disproportionately impaired in autism and several other genetic and psychiatric disorders

• Identifiable neural network

Temporo-parietal junction / pSTSTemporal poleMedial prefrontal cortex

Lateral view

TPJ

TP

Medial view

mPF

C

What is “Theory of Mind”?

• Adults?

Temporo-parietal junction / pSTSTemporal poleMedial prefrontal cortex

Lateral view

TPJ

TP

Medial view

mPF

C

Overview

• Part 1– Evidence (from adults) that mindreading

• Often requires cognitive control• May recruit specialised neural systems• May sometimes operate efficiently and automatically

• Part 2– How do these characteristics arise?

Evidence that mindreading is a flexible but demanding ability

• In Adults....• Impaired executive processes can lead to severe egocentrism

– (e.g., Samson, Apperly, Kathirgamanathan & Humphreys, 2005)

• Belief reasoning requires cognitive control– (e.g., Bull, Philips & Conway, 2007)

• Belief inferences are not made automatically – (Apperly, Samson, Riggs, Simpson & Chiavarino, 2006; Back & Apperly,

2010)

• Belief inferences are not used automatically– (e.g., Keysar, Lin & Barr, 2003; Apperly et al., 2010)

• Holding false beliefs briefly in mind has a measurable processing cost

– (Apperly, Back et al., 2008)

• Recursion (e.g., beliefs about beliefs) remains challenging– E.g., Mckinnon & Moscovitch (2007)

• And this converges with evidence from children…• .

A deductive Belief-Desire task(Hartwright, Apperly & Hansen, 2012)

A deductive Belief-Desire task(Hartwright, Apperly & Hansen, 2012)

NB only Belief factor involves a perspective difference

A deductive Belief-Desire task(Hartwright, Apperly & Hansen, 2012)

• B- is harder than B+• D- is harder than D+

• (Replicates Apperly et al. 2011, Ch. Dev. Who found same pattern for adults and older children)

Belief (True vs. False) TPJ, ACC, IFGDesire (Like vs. Hate) TPJ, ACC

Overlap

Orthogonal contrasts of varying beliefs and desires(Hartwright, Apperly & Hansen, 2012)

Harder conditions recruit EF, and attention/ToM areas

Belief (True vs. False) TPJ, ACC, IFGDesire (Like vs. Hate) TPJ, ACC

Overlap

Orthogonal contrasts of varying beliefs and desires(Hartwright, Apperly & Hansen, 2012)

Resisting egocentrism

Belief (True vs. False) TPJ, ACC, IFGDesire (Like vs. Hate) TPJ, ACC

Overlap

Orthogonal contrasts of varying beliefs and desires(Hartwright, Apperly & Hansen, 2012)

Notably no mPFC

Evidence that mindreading is a flexible but demanding ability

• In Adults....• Impaired executive processes can lead to severe egocentrism

– (e.g., Samson, Apperly, Kathirgamanathan & Humphreys, 2005)

• Belief reasoning requires cognitive control– (e.g., Bull, Philips & Conway, 2007)

• Belief inferences are not made automatically – (Apperly, Samson, Riggs, Simpson & Chiavarino, 2006; Back & Apperly, 2010)

• Belief inferences are not used automatically– (e.g., Keysar, Lin & Barr, 2003; Apperly et al., 2010)

• Holding false beliefs briefly in mind has a measurable processing cost– (Apperly, Back et al., 2008)

• Recursion (e.g., beliefs about beliefs) remains challenging– E.g., Mckinnon & Moscovitch (2007)

• And this converges with evidence from children…

• Mindreading seems to depend on processes for attention, working memory and executive control

• Recruitment reflects functional components of mindreading• .

Specialised neural systems for Mindreading?(Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003......)

False belief (FB) sample storyJohn told Emily that he had a Porsche.Actually, his car is a Ford. Emilydoesn’t know anything about carsthough, so she believed John.—When Emily sees John’s car shethinks it is aporsche ford

False photograph (FP) sample storyA photograph was taken of an apple hangingon a tree branch. The film took half an hour todevelop. In the meantime, a strongwind blew the apple to the ground.—The developed photograph shows the apple on theground branch

Specialised neural systems for Mindreading?(Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003......)

False belief (FB) sample storyJohn told Emily that he had a Porsche.Actually, his car is a Ford. Emilydoesn’t know anything about carsthough, so she believed John.—When Emily sees John’s car shethinks it is aporsche ford

False photograph (FP) sample storyA photograph was taken of an apple hangingon a tree branch. The film took half an hour todevelop. In the meantime, a strongwind blew the apple to the ground.—The developed photograph shows the apple on theground branch

R-TPJ shows greatest specificity for reasoning about mental states. Contrast with mPFC, which also shows activity for thinking about body states, internal sensations and personal characteristics.

Evidence that mindreading is a flexible but demanding ability

• In Adults....• Impaired executive processes can lead to severe egocentrism

– (e.g., Samson, Apperly, Kathirgamanathan & Humphreys, 2005)

• Belief reasoning requires cognitive control– (e.g., Bull, Philips & Conway, 2007)

• Belief inferences are not made automatically – (Apperly, Samson, Riggs, Simpson & Chiavarino, 2006; Back & Apperly, 2010)

• Belief inferences are not used automatically– (e.g., Keysar, Lin & Barr, 2003; Apperly et al., 2010)

• Holding false beliefs briefly in mind has a measurable processing cost– (Apperly, Back et al., 2008)

• Recursion (e.g., beliefs about beliefs) remains challenging– E.g., Mckinnon & Moscovitch (2007)

• And this converges with evidence from children…

• Mindreading seems to depend on processes for attention, working memory and executive control

• Recruitment reflects functional components of mindreading• Quite strong evidence for some neural specialisation• .

Evidence that mindreading is an efficient but inflexible processes?

• Can all mindreading really be so demanding?• Two systems for mindreading? (e.g., Apperly &

Butterfill, 2009, Psych. Rev.)

Evidence that mindreading is an efficient but inflexible processes?

• Can all mindreading really be so demanding?• Two systems for mindreading? (e.g., Apperly &

Butterfill, 2009, Psych. Rev.)

• Evidence of involuntary inference of:• Simple visual perspective (Samson et al., 2010)• Agent’s spatial frame of reference (Zwickell, 2011)• Agent’s “false belief” (Kovacs et al., 2010)

• Sometimes without explicit awareness• Schneider et al. (2011)

• Without need for “executive control”• Qureshi et al. (2010)

• This pattern converges with evidence of mindreading in infants….

Automatic perspective-taking?(Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite et al., 2010, JEP:HPP)

Only ever judge “self” – how many dots you can see

500

550

600

650

700

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800

Self - avatar distractor Self - rectangle distractor

Experiment 3R

eact

ion

tim

e (m

s)

Consistent

Inconsistent* ns

Automatic perspective-taking?(Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite et al., 2010, JEP:HPP)

Only ever judge “self” – how many dots you can see

500

550

600

650

700

750

800

Self - avatar distractor Self - rectangle distractor

Experiment 3R

eact

ion

tim

e (m

s)

Consistent

Inconsistent* ns

Automatic perspective-taking?(Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite et al., 2010, JEP:HPP)

Only ever judge “self” – how many dots you can see

Such effects are exaggerated under cognitive load (Qureshi et al., 2010)

Overview

• Part 1– Evidence that mindreading

• Often requires cognitive control• May sometimes operate efficiently and automatically• May recruit specialised neural systems

• Part 2– How do these characteristics arise?– We must look at developmental change

Effortful & Flexible

Efficient & limited

Temporo-parietal junction / pSTSTemporal poleMedial prefrontal cortex

Lateral view

TPJ

TP

Medial view

mPF

C

Effortful & Flexible

Efficient & limited

Temporo-parietal junction / pSTSTemporal poleMedial prefrontal cortex

Lateral view

TPJ

TP

Medial view

mPF

C

?

(+ Language, Executive function, Knowledge) Autom

atisation

Effortful & Flexible

Efficient & limited

How do we end up with automatic processes?

Infant system grows up

a.

(+ Language, Executive function, Knowledge) Autom

atisation

(+ Language, Executive function, Knowledge)

Infant system grows up

Infant system remains intact

Effortful & Flexible

Efficient & limited

Effortful & Flexible

Efficient & limited

a.

b.

How do we end up with automatic processes?

(+ Language, Executive function, Knowledge) Autom

atisation

(+ Language, Executive function, Knowledge)

Infant system grows up

Infant system remains intact

Effortful & Flexible

Efficient & limited

Effortful & Flexible

Efficient & limited

a.

b.

How do we end up with automatic processes?

Both exist in development

What is the origin of automatic perspective-taking?

Main effect of consistencySignificant interaction

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900

Self Other Self Other Self Other

Discs vary Figure varies Blocked

Consistent

InconsistentRT (m

s)

Altercentric interference = indication of automatic perspective calculation

Evidence for automatisation?Surtees & Apperly (2012) Child Development

“You see 2”Or“He sees 2”

120 children aged 6-10 and adults

Automatisation: Predict younger children to suffer less interference for self judgements.

Original automaticity:Predict equivalent interference at all ages.

Evidence for automatisation? Surtees & Apperly (2012) Child Development

Consistent

Inconsistent

Consistency

0

500

1000

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2000

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sp

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se

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ms

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OTHER SELF

Consistent

Inconsistent

Consistency

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Err

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Fig. 2. Mean Response Times and Error Proportions of children and adults in experiments 1A and 1B (Bars indicate standard errors).

6 8 10 Adult* 8

Age 6 8 10 Adult* 8

1A 1BExperiment

6 8 10 Adult* 8

1A 1B

Age 6 8 10 Adult* 8

1A 1BExperiment

1A 1B

Consistent

Inconsistent

Consistency

0

500

1000

1500

2000

Re

sp

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se

Tim

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ms

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OTHER SELF

Consistent

InconsistentInconsistent

Consistency

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0.15

0.20

Err

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Fig. 2. Mean Response Times and Error Proportions of children and adults in experiments 1A and 1B (Bars indicate standard errors).

6 8 10 Adult* 8

Age 6 8 10 Adult* 8

1A 1B1A 1BExperiment

6 8 10 Adult* 8

1A 1B

6 8 10 Adult* 8

1A 1B1A 1B

Age 6 8 10 Adult* 8

1A 1B1A 1BExperiment

1A 1B1A 1B

“You see 2”Or“He sees 2”

120 children aged 6-10 and adults

Automatic perspective-taking?

– In adults, Level-1 visual perspectives may be calculated even when unnecessary and unhelpful

– Automatic?

– What is the developmental origin of automaticity?

– Original automaticity?

– Automatisation?No evidence of automatization

Neural specialisation through development

• E.g., Reading development

• correlation with children’s reading skill– Yellow = +ve

– Blue = -ve

• Neural specialisation emerges

• Unlikely to be determined by an evolved programme

Turkeltaub et al. 2003

Developmental specialisation of a rTPJ(Gweon et al. 2012, Ch. Dev.)

• 5-11Y children, and adults• 3 story conditions in fMRI

– Physical– Social– Mental (+Social)

• Battery of mindreading tasks outside of scanner

Developmental specialisation of a rTPJ(Gweon et al. 2012, Ch. Dev.)

Developmental specialisation of a rTPJ(Gweon et al. 2012, Ch. Dev.)

Developmental specialisation of a rTPJ(Gweon et al. 2012, Ch. Dev.)

Differentiation of social and mental in rTPJ was correlated with mindreading success outside of the scanner

Summary

• Part 1– Evidence that mindreading

• Often requires cognitive control• May sometimes operate efficiently and

automatically• May recruit specialised neural systems

• Part 2– Development must be explained– Development constrains theories of the

mature system

Temporo-parietal junction / pSTSTemporal poleMedial prefrontal cortex

Lateral view

TPJ

TP

Medial view

mPF

C

Social abduction(Hartwright, Apperly & Hansen, in prep)

Social abduction(Hartwright, Apperly & Hansen, subm.)

Selective for D?

TB vs. FB

Green = D? vs. D-&D+

Green = D? vs. D-&D+&FB&TB