control + 1 – block headings - ddi11 -...

Domestic Space generic DDI 11 1

Table of Contents

Table of Contents.....................................................................................................................................................1****NASA/DoD CP................................................................................................................................................5NASA Normal Means – Exploration/R&D.............................................................................................................6NASA Normal Means – Military Missions.............................................................................................................7DoD Normal Means – Air Force.............................................................................................................................8DoD Normal Means – Intelligence/All Military Activities.....................................................................................9Competition Yes....................................................................................................................................................10Competition No.....................................................................................................................................................11NASA Stubborn.....................................................................................................................................................12Cooperation Yes....................................................................................................................................................15Cooperation Yes – Agreements.............................................................................................................................16Cooperation Yes – Individual Branches................................................................................................................17Cooperation Yes - Interagency..............................................................................................................................18Cooperation Yes – NASA-DoE.............................................................................................................................19Cooperation Yes – AT: Civil v. Military Items.....................................................................................................20Cooperation Plans Now.........................................................................................................................................21Cooperation No......................................................................................................................................................23Cooperation No – Budget......................................................................................................................................24Cooperation No – Communication........................................................................................................................25Cooperation No – Space Shuttle............................................................................................................................26Cooperation No - Secrecy......................................................................................................................................27Cooperation No – Privitization..............................................................................................................................28Cooperation Good..................................................................................................................................................29Cooperation Good – Success/Efficiancy...............................................................................................................31Cooperation Good – Power Projection/Soft Power...............................................................................................32Cooperation Bad – Military Items Link.................................................................................................................34Cooperation Bad – Dual-Use Technology.............................................................................................................35Cooperation Bad – Consolidation Good................................................................................................................36Changing Agencies Bad........................................................................................................................................38Changing Agencies Bad – Magnifier for Good Agencies.....................................................................................40NASA Shields – Must Read..................................................................................................................................41NASA Shields – Insulated.....................................................................................................................................42NASA Shields – Most Politics DAs/Horsetrading................................................................................................43NASA Shields – Lobby Links...............................................................................................................................44NASA Shields – Obama........................................................................................................................................45NASA Doesn’t Shield – Congress Angry Now.....................................................................................................46DoD Shields – Comparative..................................................................................................................................47DoD Shields – Funding.........................................................................................................................................48DoD Shields – Budget Increases Non-Unique......................................................................................................49DoD Shields - Congress.........................................................................................................................................50DoD Bad – Laundry List.......................................................................................................................................51DoD Bad – Militarization......................................................................................................................................52DoD Bad – Collapses Peaceful Space...................................................................................................................55DoD Bad – Spending.............................................................................................................................................56

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 1


DoD Bad – Staffing...............................................................................................................................................57AT: Theory – Agency Choice Significant.............................................................................................................58CMR – Generic 1NC.............................................................................................................................................59***CMR – Links***.............................................................................................................................................64CMR – Militarization Links..................................................................................................................................65CMR – SBSP Links...............................................................................................................................................66CMR – Human Mission Links...............................................................................................................................67***CMR – Impacts***..........................................................................................................................................68CMR – Smart Power Module................................................................................................................................69CMR – Terrorism Module.....................................................................................................................................71CMR – Warfare Module........................................................................................................................................73***CMR – Aff Answers***..................................................................................................................................74Uniqueness.............................................................................................................................................................75Link Turn...............................................................................................................................................................76No Impact..............................................................................................................................................................77No Spillover...........................................................................................................................................................79****NASA Credibility DA...................................................................................................................................801NC Shell...............................................................................................................................................................81*Uniqueness*.........................................................................................................................................................86Credibility Low......................................................................................................................................................87Public Support Low...............................................................................................................................................88Budget Uncertain...................................................................................................................................................89Funding Low..........................................................................................................................................................90*Links*..................................................................................................................................................................91Generic...................................................................................................................................................................92International Cooperation......................................................................................................................................93Defense..................................................................................................................................................................94Shuttle....................................................................................................................................................................95*Impact Scenarios*................................................................................................................................................96Mars Colonization.................................................................................................................................................97X-37’s/ATVs.......................................................................................................................................................100Nuclear Weapons.................................................................................................................................................101*Internal Links*...................................................................................................................................................102Leverage..............................................................................................................................................................103Funding................................................................................................................................................................106**Aff Answers**.................................................................................................................................................112*Nasa Cred*.........................................................................................................................................................113Rising now...........................................................................................................................................................114Resilient...............................................................................................................................................................115*Congress Opposes*............................................................................................................................................116Generic.................................................................................................................................................................117Controversial........................................................................................................................................................119AT: X-37..............................................................................................................................................................120AT: Weaponization..............................................................................................................................................121Hypersonic Weapons Turn..................................................................................................................................123****SPR/NSSS Recommendation......................................................................................................................125

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 2


NSSS Good..........................................................................................................................................................126NSSS good- future...............................................................................................................................................128NSSS Clarification needed..................................................................................................................................131NSSS modification possible................................................................................................................................132NSSS spillsover...................................................................................................................................................133***Obama Space Policy......................................................................................................................................134US assets vulnerable............................................................................................................................................135US Vulnerable- Shuttle........................................................................................................................................136Obama goal = security.........................................................................................................................................138Space policy needs to change..............................................................................................................................140Obama Space Policy v. Bush...............................................................................................................................141Obama goal = resiliency of tech..........................................................................................................................143Obama current strategy fails- China....................................................................................................................145***Aff..................................................................................................................................................................1462AC Frontline......................................................................................................................................................147NSSS bad- protection..........................................................................................................................................151NSSS bad- leadership..........................................................................................................................................152NSSS can’t be modified.......................................................................................................................................153International Law DA’s.......................................................................................................................................159***OST DA***...................................................................................................................................................160OST DA 1NC......................................................................................................................................................1612NC Uniqueness-US Following Now.................................................................................................................1642NC Uniqueness-Other Countries Following Now.............................................................................................1662NC Uniqueness- OST Working Now................................................................................................................168Link-Weaponization/Military..............................................................................................................................169Link-SPS..............................................................................................................................................................172Link-Mining.........................................................................................................................................................174Link-Space BMD.................................................................................................................................................177Internal Link-US key...........................................................................................................................................178Internal Link-OST is Binding..............................................................................................................................179Impact-International Law....................................................................................................................................180Impact-All Space Treaties...................................................................................................................................181Impact-Politico-Legal Crisis................................................................................................................................182Impact-Space Weaponization..............................................................................................................................184***Moon Treaty DA***......................................................................................................................................185Moon Treaty DA 1NC.........................................................................................................................................1862NC Uniqueness..................................................................................................................................................1882NC AT: Moon Bombing Violated Treaty..........................................................................................................189Link-Property.......................................................................................................................................................190Link-Property.......................................................................................................................................................192Link-Space Station Treaty...................................................................................................................................193Impact- International Law...................................................................................................................................194Terminal Impact-International Law.....................................................................................................................197US key to International Law................................................................................................................................198***SPS Specific Mini Disads***........................................................................................................................201Registry DA.........................................................................................................................................................201

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 3


Liability DA.........................................................................................................................................................202***AFF AT: OST DA***...................................................................................................................................204US violating now/OST fails.................................................................................................................................204China Already Violated OST...............................................................................................................................205OST No Link-SBL’s............................................................................................................................................206***AFF AT: Moon Treaty DA***......................................................................................................................207Moon Treaty Fails................................................................................................................................................207Large Countries Won’t Ratify/Abide..................................................................................................................208US Already Violated Moon Treaty......................................................................................................................210Moon Treaty not key to International Law..........................................................................................................212Moon Treaty Bad-Colonization...........................................................................................................................213

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 4


****NASA/DoD CP

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 5


NASA Normal Means – Exploration/R&D

NASA regularly used for aeronautics R&D for application in military objectivesMahler 2011 (Julianne Mahler, Department of Public and International Affairs George Mason University, “ Agency Autonomy and Contracting: NASA and the Aerospace Industry, June 2011 http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/uploadedFiles/conferences/pmrc/Files/Mahler_Agency%20Autonomy%20and%20Contracting%20NASA%20and%20the%20Aerospace%20Industry.pdf)

NASA’s was created amid much fanfare in 1958 by the National Aeronautics and Space Act at the height of concern over the space race. The agency was re-purposed from the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics, and its mission changed from generic research and aeronautical advice to industry to national aerospace research and development. Thus, while it was not created anew under a new mission, its mission was changed from advice to development, that is, concerned with the creation of new projects and programs rather than regulation or government infrastructure maintenance. It provides a service and products, albeit some that are unrecognized by the public. The value of crewed space exploration, now on hold, for national prestige and, earlier, for military objectives has attracted more public attention and offers a more obvious service to the state than its researches into astrobiology or exoplanets. Its role in climate research is also well known, though more controversial. Its mission is also expandable, that is, not a simply concluded task with an obvious termination, though at present the definition of that mission is under debate. Thus perhaps the issue is not so much whether the mission is expandable as whether it is well defined in the public and political mind.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 6

http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/uploadedFiles/conferences/pmrc/Files/Mahler_Agency%20Autonomy%20and%20Contracting%20NASA%20and%20the%20Aerospace%20Industry.pdf

http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/uploadedFiles/conferences/pmrc/Files/Mahler_Agency%20Autonomy%20and%20Contracting%20NASA%20and%20the%20Aerospace%20Industry.pdf


NASA Normal Means – Military MissionsNormal means is NASA developing tech with military applicationsKingwell 1990 (Jeff Kingwell, Head of Science and Applications at the CSIRO Office of Space Science and Applications (COSSA), “The militarization of space: A policy out of step with world events?” May 1990)

The immediate past head of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO), General James Abrahamson, was formerly, likc Rear Admiral Truly, in charge of NASA's Space Shuttle programme. Military interest in the "Space Transportation System' (STS) - the Shuttle was both a prerequisite for its funding and a continuing rationale for regular military involvement in NASA-led programmes. Although in principle NASA operates the STS, in practice a significant proportion of post-Challenger STS flights are military in nature, with all-military crews and a noticeable departure from NASA's former openness about mission objectives and achievements.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 7


DoD Normal Means – Air ForceAir Force is agency that controls space in the DoDCol Charles Corley, Commander, Detachment -2, AFOTEC, 5-17-05, [“Air Force Space Doctrine: Is It Ready for Weapons in Space?,” Joint Military Operations Department Naval War College, http://dodreports.com/pdf/ada463405.pdf] E. Liu

In addition to enhancing our own forces, we could now target the enemy’s land, naval, and air forces as never before. Can we make the doctrinal leap from space support to offensive space potential without rewriting every doctrinal publication and changing the current command structure? We can if we consider the effects we are trying to achieve without anchoring ourselves to the medium that supports their achievement. This paper does not argue for or against the weaponization of space, but makes the case that if we do put offensive weapons capabilities in space, our current air and space doctrine fully supports this increased warfighting capability. The Air Force, as the Department of Defense’s lead agency for space operations, has already made great strides for offensive space operations in doctrine and command relationships.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 8


DoD Normal Means – Intelligence/All Military ActivitiesNormal means DoD conducts military and surveillance operations in spaceFigliola 2006 (Patricia Moloney Figliola Specialist in Telecommunications and Internet Policy Resources, Science, and Industry Division of the Congressional Research Service, “U.S. Military Space Programs: An Overview of Appropriations and Current Issues,” August 7, 2006, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/space/RL33601.pdf)

The 1958 National Aeronautics and Space Act specified that military space activities be conducted by the Department of Defense (DOD). The Undersecretary of the Air Force is DOD’s executive agent for space. The intelligence community makes significant use of space-based intelligence collection capabilities. The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), an agency within DOD, builds and operates intelligence-collection satellites and collects and processes the resulting data, which are provided to users such as the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) and the National Security Agency (NSA). NRO, NGA, and NSA are all under the oversight of the new Director of National Intelligence (DNI).1 DOD and the intelligence community manage a broad array of space activities, including launch vehicle development, communications satellites, navigation satellites (the Global Positioning System — GPS),2 early warning satellites to alert the United States to foreign missile launches, weather satellites, reconnaissance satellites, and developing capabilities to protect U.S. satellite systems and to deny the use of space to adversaries (called “space control” or “counterspace systems”). The 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War is dubbed by some as the first “space war” because support from space displayed great improvement over what was available during the previous major conflict, Vietnam. These systems continue to play significant roles in U.S. military operations.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 9


Competition YesNASA and DOD compete over rocket defelopmentGAO, 3/98, “Promise of Closer NASA/DOD Cooperation Remains Largely Unfulfilled”, U.S. General Accounting Office, http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=BRANAAAAIAAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&dq=Nasa+DOD+competition&ots=tn62K8SyMn&sig=DXDIMSkhnVF9KkYQHxUOei9Usnk#v=onepage&q=Nasa%20DOD%20competition&f=false

Despite the formation of the rocket propulsion alliance, NASA's and DOD's relationship over this type of testing has been recently marked by competition. Partly to improve its competitive position, NASA has consolidated rocket propulsion test management in one center, but is struggling to define the center's authority for this role. Testing engines in the next phase of the EELV program was the focus of Nasa and Air Force competition. In July 1997, an EELV engine contractor provisionally selected NASA’s Stennis Space Center to test engines in the next phase of the program. Consequently, the future role of the Air Force's tat center for this program is uncertain.

History of DOD-NASA relations is riddled with rivalry and resentment Fred Boone, Admiral, USN, 12/70, “NASA OFFICE OF DEFENSE AFFAIRS THE FIRST FIVE YEARS”, NASA, http://history.nasa.gov/HHR-32/HHR-32.htm

During the final years of the NACA, the Military Services had initiated R&D programs in the new field of space. When NASA was created, the Services had been required to transfer some of this activity to the new Agency, including certain supporting facilities and teams of R&D personnel. Quite naturally, this had left some feeling within DOD that the Services had been deprived of something which was theirs by right of initiation and, in some cases, ultimate user status. This, in turn, had caused some reluctance to enter into a fully cooperative partnership of mutual support in aerospace activities, as obviously intended by the Space Act.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 10


Competition NoNASA doesn’t compete with DOD for fundsTerry Dawson, Engineering advisor to U.S. House of Represantatives Committee on Science, Space and technology, 1992, Progress in Astronautics and Aeronautics, http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=NZzIQ99oLtsC&oi=fnd&pg=PA403&dq=nasa+competes+for+funding&ots=_4k8pq1klH&sig=dR5NGujksK3ErjZ8L7zKvZxGxCw#v=onepage&q=nasa%20competes%20for%20funding&f=false

Additional constraints are imposed by such factors as: l) the presence of overarching guidelines and restrictions (such as the Gramm-Rudman Act or the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990); 2) the organization of specific key congressional committees (e.g.. the current organization of the Appropriations Subcommittee that funds the NASA budget forces NASA to directly compete for funding with such activities as veterans affairs and housing programs rather than defense spending or total federal spending for research); and 3) the particular districts and states that are represented by key leaders in Congress.

Debt-ceiling negotiations will leave DOD unscathed, no chance of backlash over budget cuts Merrill Goozner, Professor of Journalism, NYU, Writer for NYT and Washington Post, 7/5/11, “Cowardly Congress Can’t Cut Bloated Defense Budget”, The Fiscal Times, http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2011/07/05/Cowardly-Congress-Cant-Cut-Bloated-Defense-Budget.aspx

The White House and Republican leaders may be locked in a bruising battle over how to slash the long-term deficit, but defense cuts seem to be off the table. This week, House lawmakers are moving rapidly toward approving a $649 billion defense appropriation bill that would boost baseline Pentagon spending by 3.4 percent in 2012. Republicans and Democrats alike talk a good game when it comes to defense spending. But when push comes to shove, they have a hard time cutting the Department of Defense’s budget out of fear of appearing soft on national security. Outgoing Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who last week won the presidential medal freedom, has used his bully pulpit to warn against sharp defense cuts, as has former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 11


NASA Stubborn NASA is firm on certain issues and willing to backlash – Launch systems proveThe Hill 11 [The Hill, Rep Ralph M. Hall, Texas, 3/14/11, “The future value of NASA depends on priorities”, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/technology/149233-the-future-value-of-nasa-depends-on-priorities]

As the nation’s only civilian space and aeronautics research and development agency, NASA has a unique and important role in fostering innovation and keeping America competitive. Through NASA’s leadership, the U.S. has set the standard for the world in human space flight, exploration, and aeronautics. The investments we have made in NASA research and development have spawned scientific discoveries that have vastly increased our understanding of the Earth, Sun, our solar system and the universe. Last year, Congress approved a plan to ensure a balanced portfolio of science and exploration at NASA. This plan created a roadmap that would give U.S. astronauts access to the International Space Station while developing capabilities to travel beyond low Earth orbit. Unfortunately, this administration seems to be ignoring clear Congressional intent. Last year, Congress passed and the President signed the NASA Authorization Act of 2010. The bill directed NASA to give priority to the development of a Space Launch System (SLS) and Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) to replace the retiring Shuttle. The bill also authorized NASA to “help determine the most effective and efficient means of advancing the development of commercial crew services.” NASA’s FY12 request flips the relative priority, seeking a 70 percent increase for commercial crew ($850 million versus $500 million authorization); and a 31 percent decrease for the SLS and MPCV ($2.8 billion versus $4 billion authorization). NASA Administrator Charles Bolden said at a recent hearing that NASA would not need exploration capabilities until after 2020, although Congress clearly directed NASA to develop the heavy lift system with an initial capability to return to the International Space Station by 2016. Failure to do so will result in continued reliance on the Russians’ Soyuz to transport astronauts to the International Space Station. This is unacceptable. NASA should give highest priority to developing the SLS and MPCV programs that build on the tremendous investments that have already been made in the Constellation systems. We cannot, as the NASA Administrator suggests, wait until 2020. Meanwhile, the commercial space companies will have the opportunity to continue to develop the capability to ferry cargo to the ISS, as provided in the authorization bill enacted into law last year. Ultimately, perhaps they will demonstrate their capability also to safely transport astronauts. Space exploration, however, is too important to be placed at risk for failure, so we must continue to support a robust program at NASA, which has a record of success.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 12


NASA Stubborn

Bolden’s decisiveness guarantees a bold NASAMatthews and Block, 10 [Mark K. Matthews and Robert Block, Orlando Sentinel, 10/18/10, “Critics question Charlie Bolden’s focus on NASA’s new ‘vision’”, http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2010-10-18/news/os-absentee-nasa-administrator-20101018_1_charlie-bolden-nasa-vision-lori-garver]

Since taking charge of NASA in July 2009, the 64-year-old Bolden has visited 14 countries and has been missing at critical moments. Last year, he skipped one of the first shuttle flights under his watch to visit Japan and most recently was on a trip to Europe and the Middle East when the U.S. House nearly defeated the NASA vision endorsed by the Obama administration. "How about saving the manned space program — in America?" said U.S. Rep. John Culberson of Texas, one of several Republicans who have loudly opposed Bolden's most recent trip. "Charlie Bolden should stay focused on America's manned space program." His absence, coupled with several gaffes, has fueled speculation that Bolden may not command the bridge for much longer. Bolden was not available for comment but a NASA official downplayed the whispers. "There's always speculation about people's tenure in Washington," said Lori Garver, deputy NASA chief. "We have gotten to used it, and we don't even consider it a distraction at NASA because we are so excited about our future." Fueling the talk is the rocky relationship between Bolden and the White House, which has been strained since President Barack Obama introduced his new plan for space exploration in February In the week leading up to the unveiling of that plan, Bolden was in Germany and Israel on a trip that included a commemoration for Israeli astronaut Ilan Ramon, killed in the 2003 Columbia accident. Even after the Obama plan became public, Bolden never seemed to get on the same page as the administration, once telling staff to work on an alternative to Obama's plan of using commercial rockets to re-supply the International Space Station with crew and cargo. And in April, Bolden appeared to contradict the White House when he supported further test flights of a rocket being developed by the agency's Constellation program -- despite Obama's aim to scuttle the project's Ares rockets. Ultimately, Congress and the White House settled on a blueprint, which became law Oct. 11. It tasks NASA with building a new spacecraft for exploration beyond lower Earth orbit while giving commercial rockets a greater role in supply missions to the International Space Station. During a media conference call on the day of the signing, Bolden read a statement, thanked reporters and turned the call over to Garver — a practice that has become routine. Two sources said Bolden continued to listen to the questions addressed to Garver but was barred from speaking. In fact, an Administration source said the White House originally planned to hold a public signing ceremony but canceled it when Bolden expressed interest in changing his travel plans and attending. Although the White House denies it, Administration sources said Bolden has been told to keep a low profile. He has all but disappeared from public view since the White House publicly reprimanded him last month. That reprimand came after NASA's inspector general found he acted "inappropriately" when he consulted with Marathon Oil Corp. about a proposed NASA biofuels program. Bolden is a former director of Marathon – which has its own biofuels program – and still holds shares worth up to $1 million. Adding to the administration's issues is that Bolden stays in the news even when he travels overseas. He riled conservatives this summer when he told the Middle East network al Jazeera that one of his top priorities was outreach to the Muslim world. And against the advice of top NASA officials, he returned to the region recently to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the first Arab astronaut's shuttle flight -- a

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 13


NASA Stubborn

trip that came as Congress was fiercely debating the bill providing a blueprint for future human space exploration. The China trip has stirred controversy as well. A powerful Republican lawmaker told Bolden in a letter that he was "ardently opposed to any cooperation with the Chinese" on human spaceflight. "It should go without saying that NASA has no business cooperating with the Chinese regime of human spaceflight," wrote U.S. Rep. Frank Wolf, a Virginia Republican who sits on the subcommittee with oversight of NASA's budget. "China is taking an increasingly aggressive posture globally, and their interests rarely intersect with ours." Bolden wrote back that the trip had been in the works since November 2009 when Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao agreed to a dialogue on space. "While in China, I have also been invited to conduct site visits to Chinese human space flight facilities that were not previously offered to my predecessors," Bolden wrote. What happens when he returns is anyone's guess. "Bolden has also become an easy excuse for administration critics who don't want to acknowledge any merit in the White House proposals [on space]." said Dale Ketcham, director of the University of Central Florida's Space Research and Technology Institute. "They can simply point at Charlie and his seemingly inexplicable behavior to justify their opposition to badly needed change at the agency."

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 14


Cooperation YesDoD and NASA have a longstanding, trusting relationship – Communication and coordination highErickson 5 (Mark Erickson, Lieutenant Colonel USAF, 09/2005 “Into the Unknown Together. The DOD, NASA, and Early Spaceflight” http://www.scribd.com/doc/46133557/Into-the-Unknown-Together-the-DOD-NASA-And-Early-Spaceflight pg. 531)

Levine is the only analyst who has previously examined in detail the NASA-DOD relationship. He correctly explained that the DOD was “the one Federal agency with which NASA had to come to terms in order to carry out its mission at all. The essence of their relationship had far more to do with mutual need than with philosophical arguments concerning the existence or the desirability of one space program or two.” 7 It is difficult to dispute this interpretation of the essentially pragmatic nature of the NASA-DOD relationship. NASA needed certain items (e.g., launch vehicles) and services (e.g., managerial expertise) from the DOD. The DOD honored NASA’s re-quests, and NASA carried out its general mission of civilian space exploration and its particular tasking of landing an American on the moon before the end of the 1960s. Levine elaborated that within this relatively straightforward supportive relationship—which in turn gave rise to intricate coordination mechanisms so as to minimize duplication between the two multibillion-dollar programs—“Where the two agencies could not agree was in the sphere where program philosophy and program management overlapped, particularly in the cases of Gemini and Manned Orbiting Laboratory.

NASA normally collaborates with military researchers and contractorsHoey 2006 (Matthew Hoey, former senior research associate at the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, where he researched and forecasted missile defense and space weaponization technologies, Monday, February 27, 2006, “Military space systems: the roadAhead,” http://www.space-library.com/060227MilitarySpaceSystems_MatthewHoey1.pdf)

These companies are working in two main areas. The first is affordable launch services. Increased competition in the launch service industry was a driving factor behind the decision by Lockheed and Boeing to form a joint venture, United Launch Alliance, to reduce the cost of their launch services. Additional technologies are space asset protection systems, asset maintenance systems, and anti-satellite (ASAT) systems using small satellites. I will highlight the relationships among those applications. Government development of military space systems is being accelerated specifically regarding programs in the early stages of development, thanks in part to partnerships that blur the line between military research and commercial applications. This blurring is a result of dual-use systems—many military space systems have legitimate commercial applications. As various government agencies become more reliant on space, they are increasingly collaborating on space systems with each other, with support from industry- and university-based research teams. Collaborators on a single project might include military research laboratories, NASA, defense contractors, and university researchers.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 15

http://www.space-library.com/060227MilitarySpaceSystems_MatthewHoey1.pdf

http://www.idds.org/

http://www.idds.org/

http://www.scribd.com/doc/46133557/Into-the-Unknown-Together-the-DOD-NASA-And-Early-Spaceflight



Cooperation Yes – Agreements2007 MOA established positive, cooperative relationship between DOD and NASANASA, 11/5/07, SEWP NASA, http://www.sewp.nasa.gov/dod/info.shtml

In November 2007, The Department of Defense (DoD) signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with NASA regarding the use of the SEWP Contract. The memorandum recognizes the mutual agreement of the involved parties to work together as Federal partners and to demonstrate their commitment to achieve compliance with acquisition. In addition, the MOA establishes a framework for the relationship to support the mission of both agencies and to improve efficiencies and leverage resources and capabilities. In particular, the MOA establishes procedures for the use of the SEWP contract by DoD.

Current space policy has fostered positive NASA-DOD relationsNASA, 2/26/07, “NASA and Department Of Defense Partner For Aeronautical Testing”, NASA, http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2007/feb/HQ_07052_DoD_MoU_aero.html

WASHINGTON - NASA and the Department of Defense recently signed an agreement to develop an integrated national strategy for managing their respective aeronautical test facilities. NASA Administrator Michael Griffin and Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Kenneth Krieg signed the National Partnership for Aeronautical Testing (NPAT) agreement. The agreement expands the dialogue beyond the test and evaluation communities to include industry, academia and the science and technology interests from both agencies. Aeronautical test facilities are used for testing vehicles (e.g., aircraft, missiles or space vehicles) or for related scientific and engineering studies. They include wind tunnels, propulsion test facilities, simulation facilities and open-air ranges. The agreement also established an NPAT council responsible for the development of projects that streamline and economize the management of aeronautical test facilities. It is co-chaired by Lisa Porter, associate administrator of NASA's Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate, and John Foulkes, director of the Department of Defense's Test Resource Management Center. The partnership is one element of both agencies' response to the National Aeronautics Research and Development Policy President Bush signed in December 2006.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 16


Cooperation Yes – Individual Branches

Cooperation is high – Individual branches of the DoD collaborate tooNeufield 5 (Michael J. Neufeld is a curator in the Space History Division of the National Air and Space Museum, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C., 2005 “The End of the Army Space Program” Journal of Military History pg 737-757 http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_military_history/v069/69.3neufeld.html)

Of course, it is often too easy to equate units of a military service with the whole service, and thus overlook interservice collaboration: Strategic Air Command had a much better relationship with ABMA when tasked with deploying the Jupiter missile. But the end of the first Army space program certainly is a window onto the excesses of interservice rivalry in the late 1950s. It also provides insight into the origins of that rivalry in competing missions, different systems of industrial contracting, and incompatible military organizational structures, which, Medaris asserted, would have made it a logistical nightmare for two services of the United States armed forces to share the same military base. Such was the extent to which the services had become separate fiefdoms while claiming to fight a common enemy.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 17

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_military_history/v069/69.3neufeld.html


Cooperation Yes - InteragencyGrowing dependence on space causes interagency cooperation – DoD, NASA, DoC and Dot proveWaldrop 2004 (Major Elizabeth S. Waldrop USAF, B.S.E. Duke University, J.D. with honors, University of Texas, Masters in Air and Space Law, McGill University, Quebec, “Integration of military and civilian space assets: legal and national security implications,” Air Force Law Review Vol. 55, http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/airfor55&type=Image&id=163 2004)

An indication of ever-closer cooperation between NASA and the U.S. Air Force (the DOD's executive agent for space) can be seen in recent discussions to assess the feasibility of developing a single launch vehicle to meet civilian, commercial, and military launch requirements.'9 Furthermore, the current NASA Administrator, Sean O'Keefe, is a former Secretary of the Navy.20 The NRO has also been restructured to improve its support for direct military uses -- its Director is now the Under Secretary of the Air Force for Space and its acquisition program is aligned under an Air Force office.21 Growing nationwide civilian reliance on space systems has also expanded the involvement of other civilian governmental agencies in the past few years. For example, the Department of Commerce (DOC) now has management and regulatory responsibility over meteorological earth observation satellite systems in a joint project with DOD and NASA, over commercial remote sensing, and has a large role in trade and export policy.22 The DOT, through the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), has a growing role in regulating commercial launch activities, many of which are currently performed at governmental launch facilities In addition to the more obvious increasing organizational and programmatic alignment, military and civilian governmental space programs are "married" in other ways.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 18

http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/airfor55&type=Image&id=163

http://heinonlinebackup.com/hol-cgi-bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/airfor55&section=8



Cooperation Yes – NASA-DoENASA and the DOE are cooperating nowTimmer 10 (John Timmer, writer for ars technica, which has “original news and reviews, analysis of technology trends, and expert advice on topics ranging from the most fundamental aspects of technology to the many ways technology is helping us enjoy our world”, 2010 “NASA reboots, focuses on cheaper, sustainable exploration” http://arstechnica.com/science/news/2010/02/nasa-reboots-focuses-on-cheaper-sustainable-exploration.ars)

Although the manned program has been in turmoil, NASA's unmanned programs have been very successful, so it's no surprise that there were no surprises there. NASA will work with the DOE to restart plutonium production for use in power long-distance unmanned vehicles. Money is in place to to launch the Mars Science Laboratory rover in the fall of 2011, and they have the funds to give the James Webb Space Telescope a 70 percent chance of launching in 2014. The Juno probe, which will orbit Jupiter, is also on track. The big news for near-Earth missions is that NASA will try again with the Orbiting Carbon Observatory, which will provide fine-grained monitoring of carbon fluxes from space, allowing us to monitor sources and sinks of greenhouse gasses. The first OCO failed to reach orbit, and nothing else of the same caliber is planned by any other space agency, so the decision to build a second and "refly" it, in NASA parlance, is very good news for geoscience.

NASA-DOE relations key to space exploration and nuclear powerKatherine Martin, NASA Media Relations Office, 8/4/09, “NASA/DOE Team Moving Forward on Fission Surface Power Technology”, http://www.nasa.gov/centers/glenn/news/pressrel/2009/09-036_fission.html

Cleveland - NASA and the Department of Energy have completed tests on several fission surface power components within the last few weeks. The agencies are researching technologies that could enable possible use of nuclear power on the surface of the moon and Mars. Nuclear power is part of the range of options that are being examined for potential human missions on the moon and Mars. A fission surface power system could use a small nuclear reactor, about the size of an office trash can, and Stirling power generators to produce 40 kilowatts of energy, enough electricity to power a future lunar or Mars outpost. The electricity produced could be used for life support, performing experiments, recharging rovers and mining resources.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 19

http://arstechnica.com/science/news/2010/02/nasa-reboots-focuses-on-cheaper-sustainable-exploration.ars

http://arstechnica.com/science/news/2010/02/nasa-reboots-focuses-on-cheaper-sustainable-exploration.ars


Cooperation Yes – AT: Civil v. Military ItemsSpace assets are shared among agencies regardless of intentMarcia S. Smith is the founder and editor of SpacePolicyOnline.com and President of Space and Technology Policy Group, LLC. Previously she was Director of the Space Studies Board and of the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board at the U.S. National Research Council (2006-2009). Before that she was a specialist in aerospace and telecommunications policy at the Congressional Research Service (1975-2006), part of the U.S. Library of Congress, which provides objective, non-partisan research and analysis exclusively for the Members and committees of the U.S. Congress. She also was Executive Director of the U.S. National Commission on Space (1985-1986), 1-1-06, [“U.S. Space Programs: Civilian, Military, and Commercial,” Congressional Research Service, fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/19957.pdf]

Although U.S. military and civilian space programs are separated organizationally, the functions performed by satellites and the vehicles that launch them are not easily divided. Both sectors use communications, navigation, weather, and remote sensing/reconnaissance satellites, which may operate at different frequencies or have different capabilities, but have similar technology. The same launch vehicles can be used to launch any type of military, civilian, or commercial satellite. DOD uses some civilian satellites and vice versa. After the Cold War, interest in space weapons to attack satellites (antisatellite, or ASAT, weapons) or ballistic missiles declined initially, but was rekindled beginning with the 104th Congress. Using satellites to attack ballistic missiles has been controversial since President Reagan’s 1983 announcement of a Strategic Defense Initiative to study the viability of building a ballistic missile defense system to protect the United States and its allies. TheIB92011 02-24-06 CRS-9 Clinton Administration changed the name of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization to reflect a new focus on theater missile defense in the wake of the Persian Gulf War, rather than national missile defense. The George W. Bush Administration changed the name to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to reflect its interest in broad missile defense goals (see CRS Report RL31111, Missile Defense: The Current Debate, coordinated by Steven A. Hildreth).

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 20


Cooperation Plans NowPossibilities for more NASA-DOD cooperation on the horizonSUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS, 3/18/04, “NASA–DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COOPERATION IN SPACE TRANSPORTATION HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES”, http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/science/hsy92514.000/hsy92514_0.HTM

The President's new space exploration initiative will require NASA to use more expendable launch vehicles after 2010, which may provide new opportunities for greater coordination with DOD. The vision for NASA that the President announced on January 14th calls for NASA to retire the Shuttle after assembling the International Space Station, now targeted for completion by 2010. After that, NASA must decide whether it will develop a new heavy-lift expendable rocket, convert the Shuttle (which is a heavy-lift vehicle) into a configuration designed to carry only cargo, or use or modify existing expendable launch vehicles, which are not capable of launching the heaviest loads. The vision also calls for NASA to develop a new Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) to carry humans back to the Moon as early as 2015. Such a vehicle would most likely be lifted into orbit on an expendable launch vehicle. Any existing rocket probably would have to be modified to be rated as safe for humans.

Obama is considering NASA – DoD cooperation to balance ChinaMclean 09, [Demian McLean, Bloomberg News, 1/2/09, “Obama Moves to Counter China with Pentagon-NASA Link (Update 1)”,http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aOvrNO0OJ41g&refer=home]

Jan. 2 (Bloomberg) -- President-elect Barack Obama will probably tear down long-standing barriers between the U.S.’s civilian and military space programs to speed up a mission to the moon amid the prospect of a new space race with China. Obama’s transition team is considering a collaboration between the Defense Department and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration because military rockets may be cheaper and ready sooner than the space agency’s planned launch vehicle, which isn’t slated to fly until 2015, according to people who’ve discussed the idea with the Obama team. The potential change comes as Pentagon concerns are rising over China’s space ambitions because of what is perceived as an eventual threat to U.S. defense satellites, the lofty battlefield eyes of the military. “The Obama administration will have all those issues on the table,” said Neal Lane, who served as President Bill Clinton’s science adviser and wrote recently that Obama must make early decisions critical to retaining U.S. space dominance. “The foreign affairs and national security implications have to be considered.” China, which destroyed one of its aging satellites in a surprise missile test in 2007, is making strides in its spaceflight program. The military-run effort carried out a first spacewalk in September and aims to land a robotic rover on the moon in 2012, with a human mission several years later. A Level of Proficiency “If China puts a man on the moon, that in itself isn’t necessarily a threat to the U.S.,” said Dean Cheng, a senior Asia analyst with CNA Corp., an Alexandria, Virginia-based national-security research firm. “But it would suggest that China had reached a level of proficiency in space comparable to that of the United States.” Obama has said the Pentagon’s space program -- which spent about $22 billion in fiscal year 2008, almost a third more than NASA’s budget -- could be tapped to speed the civilian agency toward its goals as the recession pressures federal spending. NASA faces a five-year gap between the retirement of the space shuttle in 2010 and the first launch of Orion, the six- person craft that will carry astronauts to the International Space Station and eventually the moon. Obama has said he would like to narrow that gap, during which the U.S. will pay Russia to ferry astronauts to the station. NASA Resistance The Obama team has asked NASA officials about the costs and savings of scrapping the agency’s new Ares I rocket,

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 21


Cooperation Plans Now

which is being developed by Chicago-based Boeing Co. and Minneapolis- based Alliant Techsystems Inc. NASA chief Michael Griffin opposes the idea and told Obama’s transition team leader, Lori Garver, that her colleagues lack the engineering background to evaluate rocket options, agency spokesman Chris Shank said. “The NASA review team is just asking questions; no decisions have been made,” said Nick Shapiro, a transition spokesman for Obama. The team will pass its finding on to presidential appointees, said Shapiro. At the Pentagon, there may be support for combining launch vehicles. While NASA hasn’t recently approached the Pentagon about using its Delta IV and Atlas V rockets, building them for manned missions could allow for cost sharing, said Steven Huybrechts, the director of space programs and policy in the office of Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who is staying on into the new administration. The Delta IV and Atlas V are built by United Launch Alliance, a joint venture of Boeing and Bethesda, Maryland-based Lockheed Martin Corp., and typically are used to carry satellites. Already Developed “No one really has a firm idea what NASA’s cost savings might be, but the military’s launch vehicles are basically developed,” said John Logsdon, a policy expert at Washington’s National Air and Space Museum who has conferred with Obama’s transition advisers. “You don’t have to build them from scratch.” Meanwhile, Chinese state-owned companies already are assembling heavy-lift rockets that could reach the moon, with a first launch scheduled for 2013. All that would be left to build for a manned mission is an Apollo-style lunar lander, said Griffin, who visited the Chinese space program in 2006. Moon Landing Griffin said in July that he believes China will be able to put people on the moon before the U.S. goes back in 2020. The last Apollo mission left the lunar surface in 1972. “The moon landing is an extremely challenging and sophisticated task, and it is also a strategically important technological field,” Wang Zhaoyao, a spokesman for China’s space program, said in September, according to the state-run Xinhua news agency. China plans to dock two spacecraft in orbit in 2010, a skill required for a lunar mission. “An automated rendezvous does all sorts of things for your missile accuracy and anti-satellite programs,” said John Sheldon, a visiting professor of advanced air and space studies at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama. “The manned effort is about prestige, but it’s also a good way of testing technologies that have defense applications.” China’s investments in anti-satellite warfare and in “cyberwarfare,” ballistic missiles and other weaponry “could threaten the United States’ primary means to project its power and help its allies in the Pacific: bases, air and sea assets, and the networks that support them,” Gates wrote in the current issue of Foreign Affairs magazine. Anti-Satellite Warfare China is designing satellites that, once launched, could catch up with and destroy U.S. spy and communication satellites, said a Nov. 20 report to Congress from the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. China’s State Council Information Office declined to comment on the nation’s anti- satellite or manned programs. To boost cooperation between NASA and the Pentagon, Obama has promised to revive the National Aeronautics and Space Council, which oversaw the entire space arena for four presidents, most actively from 1958 to 1973. The move would build ties between agencies with different cultures and agendas. “Whether such cooperation would succeed remains to be seen,” said Scott Pace, a former NASA official who heads the Washington-based Space Policy Institute. “But the questions are exactly the ones the Obama team needs to ask.”

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 22


Cooperation NoNASA and Air Force will fight over minor issues Erickson 5 (Mark Erickson, Lieutenant Colonel USAF, 09/2005 “Into the Unknown Together. The DOD, NASA, and Early Spaceflight” http://www.scribd.com/doc/46133557/Into-the-Unknown-Together-the-DOD-NASA-And-Early-Spaceflight pg. 127)

This is not to say there was not rivalry between NASA and the Air Force. Perhaps this was inevitable. One political scien-tist explains that any new and rapidly expanding bureaucracy will “soon engender hostility and antagonism from functionally competitive bureaus. Its attempt to grow by taking over their functions is a direct threat to their autonomy. Hence the total amount of bureaucratic opposition to the expansion of any one bureau rises the more it tries to take over the functions of ex-isting bureaus.” 159 For instance, Hall maintains that the loss of many space-related projects to NASA particularly galled the Air Force, “which still nursed a deep resentment over a civil-ian space agency’s preempting a field it called its own.” 160 Air Force frustration could flare over seemingly minor issues. NASA did not permit Air Force officers on duty at NASA to wear their uniforms, causing retired chairman of the JCS Nathan Twining to lament, “Yet these regular career men have to go around in semi-masquerade as civilians. In this regard I feel that as a nation we went overboard in our efforts to show peaceful intent.

[The Air Force controls space capabilities under the DoD]

DoD doesn’t like the civilian/military split – Causes a collapse of true cooperationLaunius 10 (Roger D. Launius, writing in the Space and Defense Journal, Volume 4 Number 2, 2010, “Astronaut Envy?” http://web.mac.com/rharrison5/Eisenhower_Center_for_Space_and_Defense_Studies/Journal_Vol_4_No_2_files/Space_and_Defense_4_2.pdf)

Notwithstanding these speculations, it is obvious the decision made initially by Eisenhower to split the civil and military space programs and to assign the human mission to the civil side remains difficult for some in the DOD to accept. It represents one instance, among many, in which a continuum between cooperation and competition has taken place in the interrelationships between the civil, military, and national reconnaissance space programs.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 23




Cooperation No – BudgetMultiple levels of interagency budget conflicts existNeal Lane, served as provost of Rice University and served as Science Advisor to the President of the United States. He has written extensively on theoretical physics and technology policy for the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, 8/11-08, [“US science and technology: An uncoordinated system that seems to work,” Technology in Society, Volume 30, Issues 3-4, August-November 2008, Pages 248-263, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0160791X08000298, ScienceDirect] E. Liu

The term ‘‘budget authority’’ (defined by the Congressional appropriations) is what the federal government is allowed to spend. Some of these funds might actually be expended over several years. It also should be noted that the numbers for a particular fiscal year tend to change from time to time, as errors are caught or funding definitions are changed—even years into the future. These figures are from the ‘‘AAAS Report XXXII R&D FY2008’’ Table I-5. 17 The word ‘‘authorize’’ means different things in Congress. There are ‘‘Authorizing Committees’’ (e.g., the House Science Committee) that propose legislation (e.g., ‘‘to authorize funding for the NSF for the next five years’’). If passed by both houses and signed by the president, these bills becomelaw. However, on funding matters, while they provide guidance to appropriations committees and subcommittees, they are not binding on the latter. The appropriations process also uses the language to ‘‘authorize’’ spending, but their actions (if signed into law) are binding on the agencies. For example, the House Science Committee tends to be a ‘‘friend’’ of science and often ‘‘authorizes’’ generous spending. The appropriations committees and subcommittees, on the other hand, have to deal with a bottom line. They may be ‘‘friendly,’’ but they are constrained in what they can do. 18 The language in the budget uses three different terms that mean different things: (1) ‘‘budget authority’’ is the legal basis for the government ‘‘obligating’’ and ‘‘outlaying’’ (spending) funds in the future; (2) ‘‘obligations’’ are amounts for contracts made, orders placed, etc., which imply a payment or ‘‘outlay’’ in the future; (3) ‘‘outlays’’ are amounts actually paid by cash or check in a particular fiscal year. 19 For example, the NSF budget request is sent by the House Appropriations Committee to the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, and Related Agencies, which has jurisdiction over the Departments of Commerce (including NOAA and NIST) and Justice, NSF and NASA. Since each subcommittee is given a budget target by the full Appropriations Committee, the tradeoffs must be made at this level. Hence, NSF competes with the NASA science and human space program, and the FBI (in Justice), among others, for its funding. The process is similar in the Senate. N. Lane / Technology in Society 30 (2008) 248–263 254ARTICLE IN PRESS e.g., climate change or nanotechnology; and (3) testify before Congress on behalf of those aspects of the President’s budget request that have to do with S&T. 20

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 24


Cooperation No – CommunicationInteragency collaboration inherently causes conflicts and communicational tensionCatherine H. Tinsley is an Associate Professor at the McDonough School of Business at Georgetown University, and is the Executive Director of the Georgetown University Women’s Leadership Initiative. Professor Tinsley is currently serving on the National Academy of Sciences Committee to Improve Intelligence Analysis for National Security and is a CPMR fellow for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. She is also a Zaeslin fellow at the college of Law and Economics, University of Basel, 11, [“Social categorization and intergroup dynamics,” National Academy of Science, from “Intelligence Analysis: Behavioral and Social Scientific Foundations,” edited by Baurch Fishoff and Cherie Chauvin, Google Books] E. Liu

As this scenario illustrates, current threats to U.S. security can be global, can come from varied nonstate actors (including isolated individu¬als), and can require extensive coordination across intelligence community (IC) agencies. Indeed, the IC has recognized a need to integrate informa¬tion and analysis, as captured in various agencies' strategic plans. The Director of National Intelligence writes that "information sharing is a top priority" and that we must move from a mentality of "need to know" to a mentality of "responsibility to provide" (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2008). The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Strategic Plan lists "supporting] unification of effort across the IC to promote horizontal integration fostering access to data and sharing information" as one of its five major strategic actions (Defense Intelligence Agency, 2007). This coor-dination goes beyond simply the need to share information with each other. Instead, it requires analysts to understand and appreciate the experience and knowledge that each different agency brings to the table. This deeper understanding will help attenuate communication problems (Fischhoff, this volume, Chapter 10), such as agents talking past each other or dismissing each other's analysis. Unfortunately, cross-agency collaboration can be thwarted by the famil¬iar pathologies found in all intergroup endeavors. These include misaligned organizational incentives, ossified bureaucratic policies, and conflicting political pressures. For example, agencies within the IC are "mission spe¬cific" {Sims, 2005), meaning they serve different customers who may be asking different analytic questions about the same target or event. Each agency in the IC naturally has "its own terminology, routines, and expec¬tations about what people can ask for" (Simon, 2005, p. 150). Moreover, interagency "turf wars," which appear to arise from historical inertia and budgetary conflicts (Sims and Gerber, 2005), provide inherent challenges to interagency collaboration.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 25


Cooperation No – Space ShuttleDOD-NASA cooperation on projects dooms them to failure—Space Shuttle provesSUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS, 3/18/04, “NASA–DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COOPERATION IN SPACE TRANSPORTATION HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES”, http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/science/hsy92514.000/hsy92514_0.HTM

NASA and the DOD have had mixed success when collaborating on launching payloads into orbit and on developing new technologies. Some NASA and DOD collaborations have produced spectacular successes. For example, in 1947 the Bell X–1 experimental vehicle (flown by Chuck Yeager) was operated by the Air Force and designed by NASA's predecessor agency, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. On the other hand, the Space Shuttle itself is an example of a collaboration that did not work out as originally intended. Meeting both NASA and DOD requirements made it more difficult and more costly to design, build and operate the Shuttle. Moreover, eventually the Shuttle proved to be too risky for DOD to use. In 1986, when the entire Shuttle fleet was grounded for 32 months in the wake of the Challenger accident, DOD was unable to launch critical national security satellites. Partly as a result, DOD stopped using the Shuttle to launch its national security payloads and turned solely to expendable rockets.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 26


Cooperation No - SecrecyAgency secrecy in synchronization prevents cooperationScott C Armstrong, Director of Enterprise & Systems Integration Center, 4-14-10, [“BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM TRANSITION AND TRANSFER PROCESS FROM MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY TO THE ARMY–INNOVATIVE OR DYSFUNCTIONAL?,” Senior Service College Fellowship, www.stormingmedia.us/35/3534/A353445.html] E. Liu

Finally, in an effort to tightly synchronize and manage the entire nation’s missile defense system development efforts and maintain the necessarily strict system engineering architecture, MDA developed a generally close hold, information restrictive, culture. This lack of transparency by MDA made it difficult for the Army to obtain timely data, detailed program planning information or status, or to influence MDA’s decisions.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 27


Cooperation No – PrivitizationNASA and DOD fail to agree on private contractors they need to get to space—will clog projectsSUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS, 3/18/04, “NASA–DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COOPERATION IN SPACE TRANSPORTATION HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES”, http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/science/hsy92514.000/hsy92514_0.HTM

New entrants in the domestic launch industry have the potential to lower costs, and increase reliability. Some relatively new companies are beginning to produce new launch vehicles for the commercial sector and for government. One such company, SpaceX, has said that its goal is to reduce the cost and increase the reliability of launching payloads into space by a factor of ten. DOD awarded SpaceX a contract to launch a research satellite this May on its new Falcon I rocket. NASA has been unwilling to consider making an award to SpaceX, saying that NASA will only launch on types of rockets that have already had at least one successful launch. However, NASA has recently announced its intent to award a contract to Kistler Aerospace Corporation to demonstrate the company's reusable launch vehicle that someday could carry cargo to the International Space Station. (The contract is contingent on Kistler emerging from bankruptcy.)

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 28


Cooperation GoodNASA – DoD Relations vary but define US space activitiesPeter Hays, Associate Director of Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies, USAF Academy, 2006, “NASA AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE: ENDURING THEMES IN THREE KEYAREAS”, http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA091420

As with any large government bureaucracies with imprecisely delineated areas of responsibility and potentially overlapping missions, the quality and pro- ductivity of the relationship between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Department of Defense (DOD) have waxed and waned over the years. The NASA-DOD relationship has been shaped by a series of fundamental issues and questions that accompanied the opening of the Space Age, as well as by subsequent organizational structures, domestic and international politics, technology, and the personalities of key leaders. It is also helpful to consider these relations in terms of the three government space sectors and the bureaucratic roots and culture of the organizations created or empowered to perform these missions: the civil space sector for science and exploration missions performed by NASA, the intelligence space sector for intelligence collection from space by systems procured and operated by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO),and the defense space sector for military missions enhanced or enabled by space systems procured and operated primarily by the Air Force.’ Although relations between these predominant space organizations have usually been quite harmonious and served the United States well, this analysis focuses more attention on periods of uncertainty or tension among these organizations in order to highlight enduring themes that were, and sometimes remain, at stake. Three key issue areas and time periods are examined: organizing to implement America’s vision for space in the 1950s, wrestling with the rationale for human spaceflightin the late 1950sand early 1960s,and finding the logical next steps in space transportation and missions in the 1980s. The state of relations between the three predominant space organizations is also an important factor in shaping current issues such as how best to organize and manage national security space activities or implement the President’s Vision for Space Exploration.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 29


Cooperation Good

Strong DOD – NASA relationship shape space presence Erickson 5 (Mark Erickson, Lieutenant Colonel USAF, 09/2005 “Into the Unknown Together. The DOD, NASA, and Early Spaceflight” http://www.scribd.com/doc/46133557/Into-the-Unknown-Together-the-DOD-NASA-And-Early-Spaceflight pg. 537-538)

Such a repeat of the requisite external circumstances has not yet transpired, and it appears extremely unlikely that it will in the foreseeable future. Until another president calcu-lates, as did Kennedy and to some degree Johnson, that pre-eminence in space is an important element of US power, NASA’s program of civilian space exploration will likely remain focused on earth-orbital activities. The unmanned robotic ex-ploration of Mars could certainly accelerate speculation con-cerning the possibility of microscopic life there, but a human expedition to Earth’s nearest planetary neighbor would seem to be, at a minimum, several decades away. One scholar noted, as the Cold War was ending, “Space exploration has been intimately tied to the Cold War that followed the hostili-ties of the World War. As the Cold War ends, so, I assert, does much of the energy and momentum that propelled us to do some wonderful things in space exploration. Without that drive, and with increasing competition for public funds, it is apt to ask whether space exploration can survive the end of the Cold War.” 32 Now, more than a decade after the end of the Cold War and well into a new century and millennium, there seems little evidence of a renewal of the requisite “energy and momentum” for increased space exploration. However, one conclusion is firm: the multifaceted relationship between NASA and the DOD involving support, coordination, and rivalry formed an important component of America’s first decade in space and its Cold War strategy. The NASA-DOD relationship does and will continue to play a vital role in determining the nature, pace, and international posture of America’s presence in space.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 30




Cooperation Good – Success/EfficiancyDOD-NASA cooperation key to successful space missionsSUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS, 3/18/04, “NASA–DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COOPERATION IN SPACE TRANSPORTATION HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES”, http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/science/hsy92514.000/hsy92514_0.HTM

When our missions are common, when our technology requirements are similar, and when we can make the best use of our nation's limited space infrastructure, both NASA and the DOD benefit from cooperative efforts in S&T development. Whether maneuvering in space, experimenting in space or communicating in space, there is shared workspace that leads to the best possible equipment, processes and procedures to ensure success, whether the mission is military or civil in nature. In developing basic technologies for launch systems, materials for use in space activities, or developing infrastructure to command and communicate with our space assets, DOD and NASA cooperation is key to making the most of our space dollars.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 31


Cooperation Good – Power Projection/Soft PowerInteragency cooperation is essential to successful use of hard and soft powerQuy H. Nguyen, financial manager and Chief, Financial Management, Automated Message Handling System, Intelligence and Information Warfare Systems Program Office, Electronic Systems Center, Hanscom AFB, Mass. 2. January 1999 - August 1999, executive officer to the Comptroller, Electronic Systems Center, Hanscom AFB, Mass. 3. September 1999 - March 2001, weapons system cost officer, Branch Chief and Functional Manager, Space-based Infrared System, High Component, Program Office, Los Angeles AFB, Calif. 4. March 2001 - January 2003, Chief, Earned Value Management, Space-based Infrared System, High Component, Program Office, Los Angeles AFB, Calif. 5. February 2003 - May 2004, Chief, Financial Services, 51st Fighter Wing, South Korea 6. June 2004 - December 2004, Chief, Financial Operations, Directorate of Financial Management and Comptroller, Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, Hickam AFB, Hawaii 7. January 2004 - July 2005, executive officer, Directorate of Financial Management and Comptroller, Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, Hickam AFB, Hawaii 8. July 2005 - May 2007, Chief, Base Support and Budget Integration, Directorate of Financial Management and Comptroller, Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, Hickam AFB, Hawaii 9. June 2007 - June 2008, Commander, 8th Comptroller Squadron, Kunsan Air Base, South Korea 10. June 2008 - July 2009, student, Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. 11. July 2009 - present, Commander, 56th Comptroller Squadron, Luke AFB, Ariz, 6-12-09, [“ACHIEVING UNITY OF EFFORT: LEVERAGING INTERAGENCY COOPERATION BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) AND THE UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (USAID),” US Army Command and General Staff College, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA502419] E. Liu

It is widely accepted that the U.S. military‘s current ability to conduct conventional warfare is unmatched by any other nation in the world. An article from the Journal of Strategic Studies professes ―Operation Iraqi Freedom was planned as a military campaign to defeat enemy forces . . . [and] was one of the most impressive victories ever seen. The invasion campaign not only displayed a known technological superiority of the American military, but also an operational flexibility and effectiveness that took the world by surprise.‖ 26 Regrettably, victory cannot be achieved by conventional means alone, or by means involving only kinetic effects. The lack of planning for stability operations turned what appeared to be a quick victory in May 2003 into a long war, more than six years later, with tragic losses of tens of thousands Iraqi 18 civilian lives 27 and 4294 U.S. service members as of 16 May 09. 28 Certainly, planning for stability operations does not guarantee instant victory nor does it eliminate the loss of human lives, but without adequate planning for stability operations the U.S. has paid a dear price in terms of its credibility both at home and abroad. As a result, the strategic consequences for the lack of planning for stability operations cannot be understated. This and other lessons learned must be applied vigorously throughout the various governmental agencies. Presently, the DOD continues to expend great efforts in planning for and conducting exercises with kinetic (hard power) effects. However, the DOD appears to lack plans for, or lack sufficient exercises involving, scenarios with non-kinetic (soft power) effects, as required when conducting full spectrum operations involving other U.S. government (USG) agencies. While the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) does provide some degree of unity of effort for interagency planning at the operational level, it appears its efforts may be insufficient and have room for improvement, particularly in terms of rehearsing those plans with all the relevant interagency partners, and in particular, USAID. Improved interagency cooperation to combine these effects is needed to achieve unity of effort during stability operations as called for in 2005 by DOD Directive 3000.05, ―Military plans shall address stability operations requirements throughout all phases of an operation or plan as

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 32


Cooperation Good – Power Projection/Soft Power

appropriate. Stability operations dimensions of military plans shall be . . . exercised, gamed, and, when appropriate, red-teamed (i.e., tested by use of exercise opposition role playing) with other U.S. Departments and Agencies. 29 In July 2008, USAID published its Civilian- Military Cooperation Policy providing the foundation for cooperation with the DOD in 19 the areas of joint planning, assessment and evaluation, training, implementation, and strategic communication. 30 Despite these publications, cooperation appears to be ad hoc and have room for improvement. In October 2008, a published study by the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), a bipartisan, private-public partnership, also supports the case for improved cooperation by stating there is ―a need for improved collaboration on security matters among branches of the U.S. government; executive departments and agencies . . . which are currently hamstrung by interagency competition and stovepiped structures.‖ 31 Given continued cooperation shortfalls, the agencies must actively pursue additional measures to better coordinate efforts. Both the DOD and its complementary interagency partner, USAID, should take the next concerted and deliberate ―leap in interagency cooperation‖ by building new institutional structures and maintaining practices that support and reward cooperation if it plans to achieve unity of effort at the strategic, operational and tactical levels in the future. To this end, this research study explores what may have worked in the past and what currently prevents further improvement in cooperation between USAID and DOD. Assumptions The U.S. will continue to engage in combat operations and stability missions for the foreseeable future. The need for improved interagency cooperation and use of soft power will continue to be at the forefront of the USG‘s use of its instruments of power. Adequate U.S. government resources can be made available to support interagency cooperation and programs. 20 Historical studies and their lessons are relevant and can be used to improve interagency cooperation.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 33


Cooperation Bad – Military Items LinkCooperation on military projects go against tradition – Causes delays and increases costSUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS, 3/18/04, “NASA–DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COOPERATION IN SPACE TRANSPORTATION HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES”, http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/science/hsy92514.000/hsy92514_0.HTM

However, cooperation is inappropriate when it crosses the line from civil towards military activities. Tradition and policy dictate that civil and military space endeavors should remain, and do remain, separate. On a different level, true joint programs, the field operational systems that involve funding from multiple agencies and require design tradeoffs to achieve a common configuration, have proven both difficult to bring to completion and inordinately expensive. Given these bounds on when DOD and NASA might work together, there are many fruitful areas of ongoing and future collaboration.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 34


Cooperation Bad – Dual-Use TechnologyInteragency collaboration results in dual-use technology that jeopardizes national securityWaldrop 2004 (Major Elizabeth S. Waldrop USAF, B.S.E. Duke University, J.D. with honors, University of Texas, Masters in Air and Space Law, McGill University, Quebec, “Integration of military and civilian space assets: legal and national security implications,” Air Force Law Review Vol. 55, http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/airfor55&type=Image&id=163 2004)

"Dual use" technology is traditionally defined as technology that is commercial or civilian in nature, but that can be used either directly or indirectly to produce sophisticated weaponry (e.g., computer hardware and software, encryption software, and ceramics).9° However, the current interdependence of military and non-military space services has implications beyond this traditional definition, since the identical space services, not just the underlying technology, are used by both civilians and military simultaneously. This gives rise to very delicate policy considerations. On the one hand, cooperation with foreign nations promotes political and economic ties with those nations, enhances mutual and collective defense capabilities through technological interoperability, and gives a State access to foreign technology (lowering costs, increasing business for domestic companies, and thereby strengthening overall domestic economy). On the other hand, since so much space technology is potentially or actually "dually used," the providing of such technology and services must not be done in such a way as to jeopardize national security. Therefore, the requirements of arms control, nonproliferation, export control, and foreign policy must be considered before sharing such technologies and services internationally.91 In fact, the very concept that any technology may be called "dual use" based on its inherent characteristics has been criticized - experts state that the dual use nature of any technology depends on its actual use, acknowledging that this judgment is made based on prevailing policy. 92 Under this reasoning, proliferation control regulations should focus on the use rather than on the nature of the technology itself. Furthermore, not only must States be concerned about the risk of giving militarily useful technology to the direct recipient, but they should also be concerned about the proliferation of that same technology from the recipient nation to others. Another important consideration for a space-dependent State is the fact that the more it relies on space services, especially for military and national security purposes, the more it needs guaranteed access to those services and to space itself.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 35

http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/airfor55&type=Image&id=163




Cooperation Bad – Consolidation GoodCentralized science and technology information prevents agency chaos, competition and redundancyDavid Gold, venture partner at Access Venture Partners. Previously, David was founder and CEO of ProSavvy, an eProcurement and online marketplace company which grew to profitability and a merger. David has also served in the executive office of the President of the United States where he was responsible for oversight of the U.S. Weather Satellite Program and the National Institute of Standards and Technology. He also was an engineer for NASA and spent time as a manufacturing consultant. David earned a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering with Special Honors from the University of Colorado and was a National Science Foundation Fellow while earning master's degrees in both Aerospace Engineering and Technology Policy from M.I.T, 93, [“Improving the Impact of Federal Scientific and Technical Information: A Call for Action, Government Information Quarterly, Volume 10, Number 2, pages 221-234, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0740624X93900522, ScienceDirect] E. Liu

Federal ST1 offices operate under a plethora of statutes, regulations, and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) circulars as well as other policy instruments. At least 25 policy instruments governing Federal ST1 exist creating a snarl of confusing and often conflicting policies.” Presently, there is no place in the Federal government where the multitude of policies affecting ST1 are discussed and efforts made to streamline them. The absence of a cohesive and effective ST1 policy system, and the confusion it breeds, has been noted in many studies over the past 40 years.” For instance, McClure noted: The lack of specific guidance on how to choose, implement, manage and evaluate various dissemination mechanisms, or how to measure costs and benefits, decide on appropriate pricing techniques, etc. leads to agency confusion and inertia.13 The result of this policy chaos has been ad-hoc formulation over the years of Federal ST1 organizations leading to an uncoordinated system with offices operating under a variety policy guidelines. This is especially true with respect to pricing where inconsistent pricing policy has created undesired inefficiency in the ST1 system, including undesired competition among agencies and unnecessary duplication of efforts.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 36


Cooperation Bad – Consolidation GoodConsolidation to one agency is more efficient and cheaperWilliam E. Hawbrecker, Department of Defense Civilian, 3-30-10, [“Reforming Federal-Level Resource Planning and Management,” US Army War College, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA519855] E. Liu

A second resource-savings policy alternative is to identify further opportunities for combining like federal-level missions for performance at one US government agency vice performance at many US government agencies. In today’s environment, many US government agencies execute like administrative or support missions to allow for execution of their main missions. The OMB is currently leading a large and complex effort to identify Financial Management Lines of Business21 , whereby US government “agencies are to consider the use of certain shared service providers for meeting common support services, such as information technology (IT) hosting and application management, rather than investing in costly and redundant agency-specific solutions.” 22 For similar business functional areas, work within US government agencies to determine common operating procedures to develop standard business concepts of operations is key to allow for use of like providers and thus produce resource savings. 9 “Due to varied business processes in use across agencies to address common and agency-specific needs...officials acknowledge that developing standard business processes that can be used across all federal agencies is a significant challenge.” 23 For instance, all federal employees are paid from the US Treasury. Many individual US government agencies historically processed their respective time and attendance records through disparate payroll systems and submitted output to the US Treasury to effect payment due employees. The OMB, through direction within the 2002 Presidential Management Agenda, began work on the electronic government initiative of consolidating payroll within the US government. 24 “The goal of the e-Payroll initiative is to substantially improve federal payroll operations by standardizing them across all agencies, integrating them with other human resource functions, and making them easy to use and cost-effective.” 25 To effect this, the plan included consolidating federal payroll activities by simplifying and standardizing federal payroll policies and procedures. 26 Additionally, the effort is projected to allow for better integration of payroll, human resources, and finance functions across federal agencies. 27 By developing standards to apply to all federal civilian employee timekeeping, in October 2009 the US government “completed a lengthy consolidation of its payroll systems, a move that should save agencies more than $1 billion during the next 10 years, according to the Office of Personnel Management.” 28

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 37


Changing Agencies BadA shift of agents takes a long time and results in inefficiency and distrustScott C Armstrong, Director of Enterprise & Systems Integration Center, 4-14-10, [“BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM TRANSITION AND TRANSFER PROCESS FROM MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY TO THE ARMY–INNOVATIVE OR DYSFUNCTIONAL?,” Senior Service College Fellowship, www.stormingmedia.us/35/3534/A353445.html] E. Liu

MDA and the Army learned over several years that transferring such complex and expensive systems at a single Point in Time from MDA to the Army was a prohibitively difficult and ineffective approach for various reasons. First, there remained a general 11 distrust and parochial attitudes between MDA and the Army, a legacy of activities that occurred during DoD’s establishment of MDA. Two ballistic missile defense development programs, previously managed entirely by the Air Defense Branch of the Army (PATRIOT PAC-3 and THAAD), transferred in total to MDA for continued development, including the associated funding, with the establishment of MDA. This significantly impacted the Army’s Air Defense Branch, which had begun a deliberate migration of its core capability from an air defense role to missile defense. With its two largest missile defense development programs transferred to MDA, the Army’s influence on planning and developmental decisions was severely impacted, with the future of the branch subject to MDA decisions. Second, the same streamlined authorities the Secretary of Defense vested in MDA to expedite missile defense system development activities caused the Army to feel that it had insufficient influence during the early phases of development for Elements that would eventually transfer to the Army. Since DoD authorized MDA to operate outside the traditional JCIDS-requirements-based process and empowered the Director of MDA as the Milestone Decision Authority up to a production decision, the Army felt that MDA had an insular view of development. The Army perceived that MDA focused primarily on technical performance and rapid capability fielding, at the expense of other planning requirements such as warfighting doctrine development, manning, and procurement, operations and support (O&S) programming and budgeting. As a result, the Army felt that MDA was not adequately addressing many of the requirements of the traditional JCIDS and DoD 5000 series governed acquisition processes through its MDSG-based process.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 38


Changing Agencies Bad

Substantial delay in organizational transfers – Dod took two years just to draftScott C Armstrong, Director of Enterprise & Systems Integration Center, 4-14-10, [“BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM TRANSITION AND TRANSFER PROCESS FROM MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY TO THE ARMY–INNOVATIVE OR DYSFUNCTIONAL?,” Senior Service College Fellowship, www.stormingmedia.us/35/3534/A353445.html] E. Liu

As with any large, complex, bureaucratic organization, significant changes within DoD take time to fully implement. Although the Deputy Secretary of Defense established the Executive Board in March 2007, and the BMDS LCMP in September 2008, the drafting of detailed guidance, staffing, dissemination, and implementation across DoD, MDA, and the Services took time. In fact, DoD just updated Directive 5134.09, which governs the MDA, to incorporate the Executive Board and LCMP guidance in September 2009. Given less than two years of experience with implementation of the Executive Board and LCMP processes, it may be too early to assess whether it reflects progress toward the Deputy Secretary of Defense’s goals of achieving a fundamental improvement in the collaboration of the Services with MDA on missile defense development activities and their preparedness to ultimately receive, operate and sustain capabilities fielded by MDA. However, there are some initial indicators, anecdotal evidence, and preliminary feedback regarding the sufficiency and effectiveness of these changes. 18

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 39


Changing Agencies Bad – Magnifier for Good AgenciesAdvantages to our agent are offensive – An efficient agent makes transfer dysfunctionalScott C Armstrong, Director of Enterprise & Systems Integration Center, 4-14-10, [“BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM TRANSITION AND TRANSFER PROCESS FROM MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY TO THE ARMY–INNOVATIVE OR DYSFUNCTIONAL?,” Senior Service College Fellowship, www.stormingmedia.us/35/3534/A353445.html] E. Liu

In the seven years since President George W. Bush made defense against ballistic missile threats his highest priority and directed the development and deployment of ballistic missile defenses ―at the earliest possible date,‖ 14 the MDA has made incredible technological advances and successfully fielded an initial limited missile defense capability, including Aegis BMD, GMD, and AN/TPY-2. THAAD continued 24 development and is currently being fielded to the Army. However, MDA’s wide-ranging authority, liberal exemptions from many existing DoD acquisition-related processes, and the streamlined, non-traditional development process limited the involvement of the Army in developmental resource planning, decision making, and preparation for receipt of the systems from MDA and assumption of Title 10 responsibilities after transfer. As a result, the innovative MDA development process had made the transition and transfer process dysfunctional, resulting in little to no progress in related agreements or activities. Recent policy initiatives, specifically the establishment of the Executive Board, the implementation of the LCMP and Transition and Transfer Business Rules, and the drafting of the Overarching MOA and Subsystem annexes appear to have improved collaboration between MDA and the Army. The emerging initiatives to establish of MDA/Army Joint Hybrid Project Offices and a milestone review process throughout the missile defense development lifecycle also hold promise in fostering a collaborative MDA/Army lifecycle partnership, ultimately improving the Army’s ability to operate and sustain the system after transfer from MDA. However, DoD, MDA, and the Army must aggressively pursue full implementation of the recent initiatives and consider implementation of the recommendations: Executive Board conducts annual LCMP review Establish a Joint BMDS Management Cell Establish Army and MDA Deputy Project Manager for Transition and Transfer Positions Initiate an Independent Study to Assess Possible Incorporation of JCIDS Aspects into the Life Cycle Management Process Army establishes a Special Assistant for BMDS to the ASA (AL&T)

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 40


NASA Shields – Must ReadNASA is an independent agencyUSA.gov, the government, 7-21-11, [“Independent Agencies and Government Corporations,” http://www.usa.gov/Agencies/Federal/Independent.shtml] E. Liu

Independent Agencies and Government Corporations Independent establishments are created by Congress to address concerns that go beyond the scope of ordinary legislation. These agencies are responsible for keeping the government and economy running smoothly. A Administrative Conference of the United States Advisory Council on Historic Preservation African Development Foundation AMTRAK (National Railroad Passenger Corporation) C Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Commission on Civil Rights Commodity Futures Trading Commission Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) Corporation for National and Community Service Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency for the District of Columbia D Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Director of National Intelligence E Election Assistance Commission Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Export-Import Bank of the United States F Farm Credit Administration Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) Federal Election Commission (FEC) Federal Housing Finance Board Federal Labor Relations Authority Federal Maritime Commission Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission Federal Reserve System Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board Federal Trade Commission (FTC) G General Services Administration (GSA) I Institute of Museum and Library Services Inter-American Foundation International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB) M Merit Systems Protection Board Millennium Challenge Corporation N National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) National Capital Planning Commission National Council on Disability National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) National Endowment for the Arts National Endowment for the Humanities National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) National Mediation Board National Railroad Passenger Corporation (AMTRAK) National Science Foundation (NSF) National Transportation Safety Board Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) O Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission Office of Compliance Office of Government Ethics Office of Personnel Management Office of Special Counsel Office of the Director of National Intelligence Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive Overseas Private Investment Corporation P Panama Canal Commission Peace Corps Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation Postal Regulatory Commission R Railroad Retirement Board S Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Selective Service System Small Business Administration (SBA) Social Security Administration (SSA) T Tennessee Valley Authority U U.S. Trade and Development Agency United States Agency for International Development United States International Trade Commission United States Postal Service (USPS)

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 41


NASA Shields – InsulatedIndependent agents are insulated and concerned with long term motivationsRachel E. Barkow, Professor of Law and Faculty Director, Center on the Administration of Criminal Law, NYU School of Law, 12-1-10, [“Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design ,” NELLCO Legal Scholarship RepositoryNew York University Public Law and Legal, lhttp://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1241&context=nyu_plltwp] E. Liu

The obsessive focus on removal as the touchstone of independence is curious because insulation from the President is often not the dominant reason why policy makers seek to create independent agencies in the first place. Rather, the goal of insulation is frequently to allow an agency to protect the diffuse interest of the general public or a vulnerable segment of the public that, because of collective action problems or resource limitations, is often outgunned in the political process by well-financed and politically influential special interests. The insulated agency, its designers hope, will better resist short-term partisan pressures and instead place more emphasis on empirical facts that will serve the public interest in the long term. Put another way, the creation of an independent agency is often motivated by a concern with agency capture. 5

Independent agencies are isolated from the short term pressures of politicsRachel E. Barkow, Professor of Law and Faculty Director, Center on the Administration of Criminal Law, NYU School of Law, 12-1-10, [“Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design ,” NELLCO Legal Scholarship RepositoryNew York University Public Law and Legal, lhttp://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1241&context=nyu_plltwp] E. Liu

“From the perspective of institutional design,” as Jacob Gersen recently noted, “the optimal bureaucratic structure depends on the ends to be achieved.” 10 This is a critical point to keep in mind in thinking about independent agencies and their design, as one cannot begin to think about what makes an agency independent without thinking about what the agency is supposed to be independent of. The main aim in creating an independent agency is to immunize it, to some extent, from political pressure. 11 But that, in turn, raises the question of why political pressure would be bad. After all, one person’s political pressure is another person’s democratic accountability. What policy makers who seek insulation want to avoid are particular pitfalls of politicization, such as pressures that prioritize narrow short-term interests at the expense of long- term public welfare. This Part explores the different goals of insulation and the particular political shortcomings it seeks to avoid.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 42


NASA Shields – Most Politics DAs/HorsetradingIndependent agencies resolve forced political tradeoffsRachel E. Barkow, Professor of Law and Faculty Director, Center on the Administration of Criminal Law, NYU School of Law, 12-1-10, [“Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design ,” NELLCO Legal Scholarship RepositoryNew York University Public Law and Legal, lhttp://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1241&context=nyu_plltwp] E. Liu

The classic explanation for agency independence is the need for expert decision making. 12 Landis succinctly put it as follows: “With the rise of regulation, the need for expertness became dominant.” 13 The idea is that an agency could be created that would be insulated from short-term political pressures so that it could adopt public policies based on expertise that would yield better public policy over the long term. 14 Thus, the New Dealers hoped to create apolitical agencies that would be guided by information and not politics. Of course, it is impossible to remove politics and political judgments from agencies, particularly given the discretionary authority afforded to them. But it is possible to make politics relatively less pronounced and expertise relatively more of a basis for decision making. 15 Related to the goal of expertise is a desire to insulate agency decisions from the sort of political horse-trading that is anathema to impartial decision making. 16

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 43


NASA Shields – Lobby LinksIndependent agencies are insulated from private groups – This assumes all the reasons why lobbies are effectiveRachel E. Barkow, Professor of Law and Faculty Director, Center on the Administration of Criminal Law, NYU School of Law, 12-1-10, [“Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design ,” NELLCO Legal Scholarship RepositoryNew York University Public Law and Legal, lhttp://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1241&context=nyu_plltwp] E. Liu

To achieve either expert or nonpartisan decision making, one must avoid undue industry influence, or “capture.” 23 Unfortunately, as Richard Stewart has observed, “[i]t has become widely accepted, not only by public interest lawyers, but by academic critics, legislators, judges, and even by some agency members, that the comparative overrepresentation of regulated or client interests in the process of agency decision results in a persistent policy bias in favor of these interests.” 24 This bias operates for a few central reasons. First, regulated industries are well-financed and well-organized, especially when compared to the general public and public interest groups. 25 Industry groups are thus better positioned to monitor agencies closely and to challenge any and all agency decisions that will negatively affect them. 26 All else being equal, agencies would prefer not to become mired in legal challenges, so they may seek to work with, rather than against, these organized interests. Although there are some important and influential groups that seek to represent the public interest, these interest groups do not have the funding or resources of industries. Thus, they often cannot monitor and challenge all the potentially negative rules and orders from an agency or marshal the same resources as industry representatives when they do bring a challenge. 27 Second, agency capture is further exacerbated by the fact that industry groups are also well positioned to contribute to political campaigns and to lobby, which in turn gives them influence with the agency’s legislative overseers on the relevant oversight committees. 28 For example, Arthur Levitt, the chair of the SEC from 1993–2001, describes the SEC during his tenure as being constantly threatened with budget cuts by the SEC’s congressional overseers if it pursued aggressive regulations. 29 Third, capture operates because of the revolving-door phenomenon: the heads of agencies often anticipate entering or returning to employment with the regulated industry once their government service terminates. 30 As a result, they do not want to make enemies within the industry by regulating with what the industry will view as a heavy hand. A fourth factor that helps give regulated entities disproportionate influence over agencies is their information advantage. For an agency to regulate an industry effectively, it needs to know how the industry works and what it is capable of doing. But that information is often in the exclusive control of the regulated entity. 31 These dynamics can be seen operating across a range of agencies. 32 Even if an agency has a promising beginning of “vigorous and independent regulation,” it “often becomes closely identified with and dependent upon the industry it is charged with regulating.” 33 To be sure, it is sometimes hard to identify when an agency decision is the product of undue interest group pressure as opposed to an exercise of the agency’s independent judgment. 34 But the difficulty in assessing ex post whether a decision is the result of capture is all the more reason why policy makers often hope ex ante to create structural checks on capture by designing the agency to better protect it from one-sided political pressure. Politics cannot be removed from agency decision making, so of course one can never hope to avoid all hints of capture. But as with expertise, the question is whether one can achieve some insulation from interest group pressure. 35 The goal of many independent agency designers has been to create this extra buffer against interest group pressures that might harm relatively weaker political interests, including the collective public interest of the general electorate or a vulnerable subgroup. 36

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 44


NASA Shields – ObamaAgencies are designed to give Congress more power – Obama won’t be blamedRachel E. Barkow, Professor of Law and Faculty Director, Center on the Administration of Criminal Law, NYU School of Law, 12-1-10, [“Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design ,” NELLCO Legal Scholarship RepositoryNew York University Public Law and Legal, lhttp://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1241&context=nyu_plltwp] E. Liu

The creation of the first independent agencies appears not to have been motivated by a desire to decrease executive control or to buttress legislative power, 43 but subsequent agencies have been established with these interests in mind. 44 David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran examined the agencies created between 1947 and 1990 and found that Congress used independent agencies more often during periods of divided government than unified government, 45 a result consistent with the idea that Congress uses independent agencies at least in part to keep power away from a President of the opposite party. 46 Although historically this has not always been the driving force in agency creation, much of the criticism of “independent agencies” has focused on the question of what these agencies mean to the presidential/congressional relationship. Scholars concerned with maintaining the power of the unitary executive have made much of the fact that independent agencies shift power from the President to Congress. 47 Justices who endorse a formal view of the separation of powers have similarly honed in on this aspect of independent agencies. A recent opinion by Justice Scalia captures this concern. He noted 607–08 (supporting the assertion that financial agencies are among the most prominent independent agencies by highlighting numerous examples).

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 45


NASA Doesn’t Shield – Congress Angry NowNASA’s already under flame by Congress –Changes are ampliphiedOrlando Sentinal, 2-14-11, [“NASA budget picks fight with Congress,” Mark K. Matthews, http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2011-02-14/news/os-nasa-budget-released-20110214_1_nasa-administrator-charlie-bolden-nasa-budget-spacex] E. Liu

WASHINGTON -- President Barack Obama on Monday released a $18.7-billion budget proposal for NASA that immediately reignited a heated battle with Congress over the role that commercial rocket companies should play in blasting astronauts into space. Obama's plan would spend $850 million in 2012 to help aerospace companies -- such as SpaceX of California -- meet an administration goal of using non-government spacecraft to ferry astronauts to the International Space Station by 2016. That's $350 million more than what Congress provided in a heavily-debated NASA policy plan signed into law in October. Obama also would cut $850 million from the new heavy-lift rocket that Congress ordered NASA to build by the end of 2016. The deviations did not go unnoticed. Florida Democratic U.S. Sen. Bill Nelson, who championed last year's legislation, released a terse statement that said the Obama budget "does not follow the bipartisan NASA law Congress passed late last year" and promised that "Congress will assert its priorities in the next six months." With another round of fighting all but certain, NASA Administrator Charlie Bolden tried to explain why the administration decided to buck the policy approved by Congress. He said commercial space companies had the best chance to quickly build a rocket and capsule that could reach the station. As an example, he pointed to SpaceX, which in December became the first non-government rocket manufacturer to launch a spacecraft into Earth orbit and safely return it and is slated to begin hauling cargo to the space station in 2012. "Our intent -- as soon as we can -- is to have a viable domestic U.S. … vehicle that can take cargo and crew to low-Earth orbit," Bolden said. "Trust me, I wouldn't be doing this if I didn't think it would work," he added. Bolden did not mention a January report in which NASA said it could not build the rocket that Congress wants on the budget and timeline that it was given. Nelson and others have warned the agency that it's disregarding a congressional mandate. Once NASA retires the space shuttle later this year, the U.S. must rely on Russia to ferry astronauts to the station. Some lawmakers, like Nelson, want a government-run rocket to serve as a back-up in case commercial companies are unable to do the job. Obama has argued, however, that commercial companies should have that responsibility so that NASA engineers can concentrate instead on developing futuristic spacecraft. His 2012 budget proposal includes about $1 billion to help develop new technologies that could enable future missions to the moon or beyond. Last year, the White House and Congress feuded for months about how NASA should replace the space shuttle before compromising on a plan that would spend limited money on commercial spacecraft while pushing NASA to build the new rocket and Apollo-like crew capsule. Congress prodded NASA to use the main engines and solid-rocket boosters developed for the shuttle 30 years ago. Monday's budget proposal, essentially, picks that fight all over again. It allocates $1.8 billion for the heavy-lift rocket and about $1 billion for the capsule -- a combined decrease of about $1.2 billion from the compromise plan – to free up money for new-technology research. That's also certain to provoke Congress. "He [Obama] may offer a budget of things he wishes to do, but he's bound to follow the law," said U.S. Rep. John Culberson, R-Texas, who sits on the House Appropriations Committee that has jurisdiction over NASA spending. "It's very disappointing to see the White House return to a policy that has been overwhelmingly rejected by the public and Congress" he said. Another program that took a hit was the five-year, $1.9 billion plan to modernize Kennedy Space Center. NASA officials said they plan to spend $293 million on KSC modernization in 2012 -- a decrease from Obama's previous aim to spend $500 million on it in 2012. Obama's overall NASA budget basically continues current spending levels, which are based on a budget passed by Congress for the 2009-10 fiscal year. His proposed 2010-11 budget, which would have increased agency spending, never passed Congress and is considered dead.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 46


DoD Shields – ComparativeCongress is suspicious of NASA and scrutinizes it – DoD action avoids thisJohnson-Freese 2004 (Joan Johnson-Freese, Chair, Department of National Security Decision Making, Naval War College. Former Chair, Department of Transnational Studies, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, “Congress and Space Policy,” Space Regulations Library Series, 2004, Volume 2, Part Two, 79-103, http://www.springerlink.com/content/k3g1u768352p2511/)

The point is that all civil space programs usually run this political gauntlet regardless of their merits. Congress has shown willingness over time, as the space program has matured, to change its mind repeatedly as other issues are placed on the public policy agenda. The result is a space program driven by high anxiety about congressional reactions leading to concealment as a strategy for NASA to avoid congressional interference in policy formulation and implementation. Unfortunately, when the concealment is exposed, the situation becomes worse because no one in Congress then believes the affected agency and the tendency for congressional oversight and micromanagement is strengthened.5

The overall lack of interest in civil space matters is countered by congressional reluctance to interfere with the defense budget. As long as certain key members of Congress are satisfied, the defense space area has been relatively immune to congressional involvement. Rather, the President normally makes the defining decisions; congressional critics have an uphill battle and often require dissidence within the Department of Defense (DOD) to be successful.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 47

http://www.springerlink.com/content/k3g1u768352p2511/

http://www.springerlink.com/content/k111n1/

http://www.springerlink.com/content/?Author=Joan+Johnson-Freese


DoD Shields – FundingDOD spending not perceived – Vague budget figures misleadSmith 2003 (Marcia S. Smith, Resources, Science, and Industry Division of the Congressional Research Service, “U.S. Space Programs: Civilian, Military, and Commercial,” April 22, 2003, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/19957.pdf)

The Department of Defense (DOD) has a less visible but equally substantial space program. Tracking the DOD space budget is extremely difficult since space is not identified as a separate line item in the budget. DOD sometimes releases only partial information (omitting funding for classified programs) or will suddenly release without explanation new figures for prior years that are quite different from what was previously reported. The most recent figures from DOD show a total (classified and unclassified) space budget of $15.7 billion for FY2002, $18.4 billion for FY2003, and a FY2004 request of $20.4 billion. DOD space issues include management of programs to develop new early warning and missile tracking satellites, and management of military and intelligence space activities generally.

DoD shields funding – Makes up inflation figures for extra budgetWinslow T. Wheeler, Director, Straus Military Reform Project, 5-11, [“Navigating the Pentagon’s Inflation Labyrinth: DOD’s Budget Bible Hides Growth and Provokes Excess Spending,” Center for Defense Information, http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/GreenbookInflationMay11.pdf] E. Liu

The Pentagon uses a specially tailored measure of inflation that masks past budget growth and induces Congress to appropriate excess funding for inflation that the most commonly accepted inflation index says will not occur. The Pentagon budget analysts’ bible, the so-called Green Book, records several DOD- tailored measures of inflation, along with the widely accepted GDP inflation index. While flawed, the GDP measure is used throughout government and the private sector and – for the purposes of this paper – is analytically conservative. A comparative analysis of the data in the Green Book reveals that: • From 2000 to 2012 the Pentagon received an additional $164 billion in “real” growth that the GDP deflator does not justify. • Historically, the Pentagon has reaped substantially more “real” budget increases than most public DOD budget analysts would recognize. For example, the official Pentagon budget numbers assert that for fiscal year 2012 DOD will spend $124 billion more than we spent on average during the Cold War. The GDP index reveals that we will actually spend from $224 billion to $342 billion more in 2012 than during the average Cold War year. After such huge amounts of additional annual spending, we now have a military force structure that is smaller and older than during any point during the Cold War – even smaller and older than after the build-down after the Cold War. • The Pentagon’s self-serving inflation index does not just distort budget history, it induces Congress to appropriate money to the Pentagon for inflation that will not occur, according to the widely accepted GDP index. In the years 2013 to 2016, DOD seeks a minimum of $23 billion more than the GDP measure can justify. • The over-estimation of inflation grows much larger when considering long term deficit reduction. Over the next 12 years, President Obama proposes to “save” $400 billion in “security” spending, including DOD. An extrapolation of data available from DOD and OMB shows that $167 billion of the “savings,” or 62 percent of DOD’s share of the $400 billion, is for phantom inflation.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 48


DoD Shields – Budget Increases Non-UniqueDramatic increases for DoD space have already been planned

Marcia S. Smith is the founder and editor of SpacePolicyOnline.com and President of Space and Technology Policy Group, LLC. Previously she was Director of the Space Studies Board and of the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board at the U.S. National Research Council (2006-2009). Before that she was a specialist in aerospace and telecommunications policy at the Congressional Research Service (1975-2006), part of the U.S. Library of Congress, which provides objective, non-partisan research and analysis exclusively for the Members and committees of the U.S. Congress. She also was Executive Director of the U.S. National Commission on Space (1985-1986), 1-1-06, [“U.S. Space Programs: Civilian, Military, and Commercial,” Congressional Research Service, fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/19957.pdf]

Meanwhile, figures from the DOD Comptroller’s Office over several years showed that the Bush Administration planned to increase DOD’s space budget significantly — from $15.7 billion in FY2002, to $20 billion in FY2004, to a request of $21.7 billion for FY2005, and continued increases to a projected $28.7 billion in FY2008. However, in its 2004 report on the FY2005 DOD appropriations bill (S. 2559, S.Rept. 108-284), the Senate Appropriations Committee cautioned that funding for DOD’s space activities may not be sustainable. Figures provided to CRS by the DOD Comptroller’s Office in March 2005 showed that DOD received $19.8 billion for FY2005 (compared to the $21.7 billion requested). The FY2006 request was $22.5 billion. Projected future year funding was not provided. DOD has not yet released its estimate of how much was appropriated for space programs in the FY2006 DOD appropriations act (P.L. 109-148).

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 49


DoD Shields - CongressThe DoD is becoming less responsible to Congress and more secretiveGeoffrey Corn, Assistant Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law. B.A., Hartwick College; J.D., with highest honors, George Washington University; LL.M., distinguished graduate, Judge Advocate Generalís School. Prior to joining the faculty at South Texas, Mr. Corn served as Special Assistant to the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General for Law of War Matters, and Chief of the Law of War Branch, U.S. Army Office of the Judge Advocate General International and Operational Law Division. Mr. Corn also served as a member of the U.S. Army Judge Advocate Generalí Corps from 1992ñ2004. Previously, he was a supervisory defense counsel for the Western United States; Chief of International Law for U.S. Army Europe; and a Professor of International and National Security Law at the U.S. Army Judge Advocate Generalís School and Eric Talbot Jensen, Lieutenant Colonel, Chief, International Law Branch, Office of The Judge Advocate General, U.S. Army. B.A., Brigham Young University; J.D., University of Notre Dame; LL.M., The Judge Advocate Generalís Legal Center and School; LL.M. Yale Law School. Operational Law Attorney, Task Force Eagle, Bosnia, 1996. Command Judge Advocate, Task Force Able Sentry, Macedonia, 1997. Chief Military Law, Task Force Eagle, Bosnia, 1998. Professor, International and Operational Law Department, The Judge Advocate Generalís Legal Center and School, 2001ñ2004. Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, 1st Cavalry Division, Baghdad, Iraq, 2004ñ2005. Member of the Bars of Indiana and the United States Supreme Court, 5-18- 07, [“THE POLITICAL BALANCE OF POWER OVER THE MILITARY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES, THE PRESIDENT, AND CONGRESS,” Houston Law Review, papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=986609] E. Liu

This shared authority paradigm imposes upon military leaders both a right and duty to provide candid and complete information to the executive and legislative branches on matters within their spheres of constitutional competence. Furthermore, both branches of government have a right and responsibility to require such information. If the President or Congress fails to ensure they are fully informed within their spheres of responsibility, they are abrogating the constitutional design which has provided sound military policy to the United States for over two hundred years. Similarly, members of the military who fail to provide this information to the Executive or the Legislature, especially if acting out of allegiance or loyalty to the other branch of government, have violated their oath of fidelity to the Constitution. This Article asserts that current trends in the civil military relationship paradigm are increasing both the perception and reality that the military is an executive agency without concomitant responsibilities to Congress. As a result, the Department of Defense is increasingly operating under a paradigm of plenary executive-branch dominance which threatens to create an imbalance in the ability of the political branches to qualitatively execute their shared responsibilities related to the use of the military as an element of national power. 14

Congressional support for DOD actionJohnson-Freese 2004 (Joan Johnson-Freese, Chair, Department of National Security Decision Making, Naval War College. Former Chair, Department of Transnational Studies, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, “Congress and Space Policy,” Space Regulations Library Series, 2004, Volume 2, Part Two, 79-103, http://www.springerlink.com/content/k3g1u768352p2511/)

Part of the past pattern of congressional deference to the DOD has occurred because a significant portion of the DOD space effort occurs in the “black.” That means that probably ninety percent of what Congress accepts are the committee decisions. In effect, these decisions are based on their faith in committee leadership. Essentially, this situation means that a mutually reinforcing power configuration arises, which minimizes radical or drastic policy change. Continuity and, to a large extent, inertia characterize the military space area. Occasionally, the general congressional population takes offense at its smaller-number, committee-member allowances. This can be seen in the congressional surprise and outrage when the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) was found to have sequestered sufficient funds to build a $300 million new headquarters without full congressional authorization. Furthermore, the NRO had accumulated in excess of $2 billion in carry-forward accounts. The Clinton Administration changed NRO’s fiscal oversight and fired its leadership in response to congressional concern over the carry-forward accounts.7

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 50

http://www.springerlink.com/content/k3g1u768352p2511/

http://www.springerlink.com/content/k111n1/

http://www.springerlink.com/content/?Author=Joan+Johnson-Freese


DoD Bad – Laundry ListDoD space programs suffer from budget, delay, and high risk Lais 2010 (Sami Lais, Staff Writer for Washington Technology, 3/19/2010 “DOD space program dogged by delays, cost overruns,” http://washingtontechnology.com/articles/2010/03/19/dod-space-program.aspx)

Poised at the beginning of a new era in satellite acquisition, the Defense Department continues to see its space programs dogged by significant and persistent cost overruns and sometimes declining capabilities, according to a new Government Accountability Office report. And until the additional issues of a lack of clear-cut leadership and shortfalls in critical space technical and program expertise are resolved, “commitment to reforms may not be sustainable,” GAO warned. The report, “DOD Poised to Enhance Space Capabilities, but Persistent Challenges Remain in Developing Space Systems,” is based on testimony March 10 by Cristina Chaplain, GAO’s Acquisition and Sourcing Management director, before the Senate Armed Services Committee’s subcommittee on strategic forces, chaired by Sen. Ben Nelson (D-Neb.). Most of DOD’s large space acquisitions “have experienced problems during the past two decades that have driven up costs by billions of dollars, stretched schedules by years and increased technical risks,” the report said.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 51


DoD Bad – Militarization

DoD and air force space doctrine are intrinsically based on space weaponizationSamuel McNiel, Space and Missile Officer stationed at the State Department, Washington DC. He is the Deputy Staff Director of the U.S. Nuclear Risk Reduction Center. Prior to graduating from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces as a Distinguished Graduate (MS, National Resource Strategy) he served as Commander of the 21st Space Operations Squadron at Onizuka AFS, CA. He is a graduate of Baylor University (BA Journalism), The George Washington University (MA Administrative Sciences), and Air Command and Staff College (Master of Military Art and Operational Science—Distinguished Graduate). He is also a graduate of the Air Force Intern program. He has served in space policy staff positions and was an operator in space surveillance and satellite command and control positions. Additionally, he performed numerous Intercontinental Ballistic Missile crew and staff duties,4-03, [“Proposed Tenents of Spacepower: Six Enduring Truths,” Air Command and Staff College, www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/acsc/03-1388.pdf]

This ability to deliver significant effects against targets from space and the need for space control is clearly in the high ground doctrine of space. The recommendations of the report have been accepted by the Department of Defense; therefore, military policy is clearly in line with the high ground school of thought. The Honorable Peter Teets, Undersecretary of the Air Force, is also clearly a member of the high ground school of thought. He recently said, “I intend to exert every effort in my duties to fulfill the Air Force’s responsibility as the Department of Defense’s executive agent for space— to do whatever it takes to ensure that our nation’s space capabilities can perform every conceivable mission needed to conduct effective war fighting.” 16 Air Force Space Command is now applying financial resources to implement parts of a high ground doctrine. On March 1, 2003, they launched an $8 million Analysis of Alternatives for Operationally Responsive Spacelift. The requirements for that program are based on a Joint Requirements Oversight Council validated Mission Needs Statement. The program is projected for initial operational capability in 2014. Projected payloads include the common aero vehicle, a munition that can be delivered from or through space, along with counterspace payloads. 17 Additionally, the Space and Missile System Center is working on programs through the Space-Based Laser Project Management Office. Although the details of the program are beyond the scope of this paper, the Space-Based Laser-Integrated Flight Experiment program began in 131999 and anticipates launch of their first satellite in 2012 and demonstration of an ability to shoot down a ballistic missile in 2013. 18 It was forecast a missile defense system using Brilliant Pebbles, the most mature of the Strategic Defense Initiative program technologies, and space-based laser could be operational before the Theater High Altitude Area Defense and the National Missile Defense system, would cost less than those two systems and be more effective. 19 Although not currently active, it is possible the Brilliant Pebbles program could see new life again someday. An Air Force Weapons School graduate responding as part of the research for this project said there are written requirements from a sister service to have a capability to deliver small ground units into denied territory using sub-orbital space vehicles and then extract them with the same vehicle. While this may sound futuristic, it again shows U.S. spacepower is clearly in the high ground school in spite of some assertions to the contrary. As shown by the unified combatant command’s long range plan, Department of Defense leadership, and Air Force belief that space should be exploited for space control, missile defense, and to create significant effects in conflicts; also considering Air Force Space Command is funding programs that would implement a high ground doctrine, the Air Force is responsible for a high ground school type spacepower—even if its current doctrine does not yet reflect that.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 52


DoD Bad – Militarization

Air force and DoD insist on military and dual use space programsLaunius 10 (Roger D. Launius, writing in the Space and Defense Journal, Volume 4 Number 2, 2010, “Astronaut Envy?” http://web.mac.com/rharrison5/Eisenhower_Center_for_Space_and_Defense_Studies/Journal_Vol_4_No_2_files/Space_and_Defense_4_2.pdf pg 66-67)

The DOD, while certainly an important supporting organization in Mercury, remained committed to achieving an independent human spaceflight capability. “If we concede that man can go into space for peaceful missions,” stated a USAF white paper in 1961, “we must admit that man can go into this same environment for military purposes . It is the Air Force view that many will be required to go into space to perform tasks that will be important to our national security.”20 From this position flowed a series of decisions aimed at creating what the DOD called the Manned Military Space Program (MMSP). Several immediate programs resulted and the Air Force noted: “Fully coordinated, cooperative and where appropriate, joint effort between the Air Force and the NASA is required in order that the content and objectives of the MMSP are properly defined within the framework of the total national space program.”21

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 53


DoD Bad – Militarization The DOD/Air Force will militarize space if given the opportunityLaunius 10 (Roger D. Launius, writing in the Space and Defense Journal, Volume 4 Number 2, 2010, “AstronautEnvy?”http://web.mac.com/rharrison5/Eisenhower_Center_for_Space_and_Defense_Studies/Journal_Vol_4_No_2_files/Space_and_Defense_4_2.pdf)

Yet, elements of the DOD remain committed to this mission to the present. Throughout the 1990s, a succession of studies argued for the potential of military personnel in space. One 1992 study affirmed: It is absolutely essential for the well being of today’s space forces as well as the future space forces of 2025, that DOD develop manned advanced technology space systems in lieu of or in addition to unmanned systems to effectively utilize military man’s compelling and aggressive warfighting abilities to accomplish the critical wartime mission elements of space control and force application. National space policy, military space doctrine and common sense all dictate they should do so if space superiority during future, inevitable conflict with enemy space forces is the paramount objective. Deploying military man in space will provide that space superiority and he will finally become the “center of gravity” of the U.S. space program.43 Another analysis found 37 reasons why military personnel in space would be required in the future, ranging from problem-solving and decision-making, to manipulation of sensors and other systems. It concluded that “A military space plane could play a key role in helping the United States Air Force transform itself from an air force into an aerospace force.”44 Yet another study found: “Our National Security Strategy must take full advantage of the full political, economic, and military power of this nation to be successful. That means soldiers, sailors, and airmen able to operate in every region of the world critical to national security, whether it is on land, at sea, in the air, or in space. A strategy built on anything less is incomplete and shortsighted.”45 The rationale for a military astronaut rests largely on the human flexibility of offering judgment, experience, and decisionmaking capabilities not present with machines. “There is no way that a price tag can be placed on such characteristics as flexibility or serendipity because the essence of these attributes is the ability to capitalize on the unanticipated or unknown,” concluded one study.46 According to some reports, DOD 44Maj. David M. Tobin, “Man’s Place in Space-Plane Flight Operations: Cockpit, Cargo Bay, or Control Room?” Airpower Journal 13 (Fall 1999): 50-65, quote from p. 62. 45Lt. Col. Joseph A. Carretto Jr., “Military Man in Space: Essential to National Strategy,” Executive Research Project, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, NDU-ICAF-95-S3, April 1995, p. 47. 46Air Force Space Command study, “The Utility of Military Crews in Space,” 1985, quoted in Theodore Wierzbanowski, “Manned vs. Unmanned: The Implications to NASP,” AIAA- 90-5265 paper, presented at AIAA Second International Aerospace Planes Conference, 1990, Orlando, FL, p. 10. developed a space plane named “Blackstar” and began flying missions as early as 1990.47 Notwithstanding these speculations, it is obvious the decision made initially by Eisenhower to split the civil and military space programs and to assign the human mission to the civil side remains difficult for some in the DOD to accept. It represents one instance, among many, in which a continuum between cooperation and competition has taken place in the interrelationships between the civil, military, and national reconnaissance space programs.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 54


DoD Bad – Collapses Peaceful SpaceNomilitary control good – Prevents rivalries, costs less and guarantees safe space passageKathleen H. Hicks, former senior fellow and Christine E. Wormuth a current senior fellow in the CSIS International Security Program, 2-10, [“CHANGE AGENTS: WHO LEADS AND WHY IN THE EXECUTION OF US NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY,” Essay for the fulfillment of a doctorate in Political Science at MIT, http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/59793/671485930.pdf?sequence=1] E. Liu

These views were not informed so much by altruism as by the president's strong desire to ensure US means for early warning. Eisenhower was greatly influenced by his desire to avoid strategic surprises like that presented by the Japanese at Pearl Harbor. By arguing for "open skies" and the peaceful exploration of space, the United States could protect its ability to deploy high altitude reconnaissance assets, such as the U-2, over Soviet territory. A NASA historian argues that, far from being concerned by the Sputnik I launch, President Eisenhower saw it as an opportunity: "Four days after Sputnik I, in fact, Eisenhower and Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Quarles discussed the issue. Quarles observed: '. . . the Russians have . . . done us a good turn, unintentionally, in establishing the concept of freedom of international space.' . . . The President then looked ahead . . . and asked about a reconnaissance [satellite] vehicle."12 8 When civilian satellites subsequently traversed the world's airspace in 1958, neither the Soviets nor any other nation voiced objections, seeming to confirm the wisdom of the president's peaceful "open skies" approach. There were other reasons to disincline Eisenhower from selecting the Department of Defense for the space mission. He distrusted its inter-service rivalries and worried over the potential self-perpetuating nature of the defense industrial complex. 12 9 He also knew that the military's satellite programs were more costly and complex than their civilian counterparts, and thus unlikely to yield near term reconnaissance capability. 130 Finally, the National Academies of Science had argued to him in October 1957 that the Department of Defense faced statutory limits on its ability to oversee some of the key benefits of space exploration-meteorology, navigation, and communications. 131

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 55


DoD Bad – SpendingDoD manages space poorly – Their organizational model underestimates excessive costsMarcia S. Smith is the founder and editor of SpacePolicyOnline.com and President of Space and Technology Policy Group, LLC. Previously she was Director of the Space Studies Board and of the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board at the U.S. National Research Council (2006-2009). Before that she was a specialist in aerospace and telecommunications policy at the Congressional Research Service (1975-2006), part of the U.S. Library of Congress, which provides objective, non-partisan research and analysis exclusively for the Members and committees of the U.S. Congress. She also was Executive Director of the U.S. National Commission on Space (1985-1986), 1-1-06, [“U.S. Space Programs: Civilian, Military, and Commercial,” Congressional Research Service, fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/19957.pdf]

For many years, questions have arisen about whether DOD effectively manages its space activities, and several commissions and task forces have studied the issue. Congress created a commission in the FY2000 DOD authorization bill to make recommendations on the overall management of national security space programs. Chaired by Donald Rumsfeld, the Commission released its report on January 11, 2001, shortly after Mr. Rumsfeld became Secretary of Defense. The “Rumsfeld Space Commission” made sweeping recommendations for management of DOD and intelligence community space programs. According to two GAO reports (GAO-02-772, June 2002; GAO-03-379, April 2003), DOD intended to implement 10 of the 13 organizational recommendations. Several DOD space programs have experienced significant cost overruns and schedule delays, raising concerns about DOD’s acquisition process for space systems. The Defense Science Board (DSB) and Air Force Scientific Advisory Board (AFSAB) commissioned a task force to review DOD space program acquisition because of significant cost increases in several programs. Chaired by retired Lockheed Martin executive Tom Young, its May 2003 report was publicly released in September 2003 [http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ space.pdf]. Four key points are that cost has replaced mission success as the primary driver in managing acquisition processes, creating excessive technical and schedule risk; the space acquisition system is strongly biased to produce unrealistically low cost estimates; government capabilities to lead and manage the acquisition process have seriously eroded; and there are long term concerns about the space industrial base. According to press reports (e.g., Wall Street Journal, August 25, 2004, B7), the task force produced an update in August 2004 that concluded that some of the space programs it criticized were making progress but still required close review, and that better coordination in needed between the military and intelligence agencies in setting requirements.

DoD rushes into programs – That causes expensive and misleading resultsLais 2010 (Sami Lais, Staff Writer for Washington Technology, 3/19/2010 “DOD space program dogged by delays, cost overruns,” http://washingtontechnology.com/articles/2010/03/19/dod-space-program.aspx)

Causes of the cost escalations and related problems vary, “but several consistently stand out,” the GAO report said. DOD starts more weapon systems than it can afford, creating a competition for funding that encourages low cost estimates, overly optimistic schedules, a reluctance to convey bad news “and, for space programs, forsaking the opportunity to identify and assess potentially more executable alternatives.” DOD launches space programs before ensuring their goals can be met within given time and resource constraints. “This tendency is caused largely by the funding process, since acquisition programs attract more dollars than efforts concentrating solely on proving technologies.” DOD tries to make programs all-encompassing, satisfying “all requirements in a single step, regardless of the design challenge or the maturity of the technologies necessary to achieve the full capability.”

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 56


DoD Bad – StaffingDoD is poor for space missions – Insufficient staffingJohn A. Tirpak, the executive editor of ‘Air Force’ the monthly magazine of the United States Air Force Association. This article first appeared in the September 2006 issue of the magazine and this slightly updated version is republished courtesy of ‘Air Force’ and the Association, 3-01, [“The Space Commission Reports,” Airforce Magazine, http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2001/March%202001/0301space.aspx] E. Liu

The commissioners don't think this is happening. "The Department of Defense is not yet on course to develop the space cadre the nation needs," said the panel's report. "The department must create a stronger military space culture, through focused career development, education, and training, within which the space leaders for the future can be developed. This has an impact on each of the services but is most critical within the Air Force." The nation's vital interests depend on creating such a cadre of space professionals, the commissioners said. The pace of technological change is so great, they asserted, that there must be a core group able to make "a concentrated effort to deter and defend" against attacks on US space and information infrastructure. "Such efforts are not being pursued with the vision and attention needed," the panelists said.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 57


AT: Theory – Agency Choice SignificantAgency choice is important – Signaling provesKathleen H. Hicks, former senior fellow and Christine E. Wormuth a current senior fellow in the CSIS International Security Program, 2-10, [“CHANGE AGENTS: WHO LEADS AND WHY IN THE EXECUTION OF US NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY,” Essay for the fulfillment of a doctorate in Political Science at MIT, http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/59793/671485930.pdf?sequence=1] E. Liu

125Geopolitical considerations do not always weigh in favor of military mission assignment. A strong geopolitical sense was also behind the decision to civilianize the new US space agency. Foremost in President Eisenhower's mind in establishing NASA was the need to signal the peaceful nature of the US space program. He needed a means to pursue an "open skies" policy, which military mission assignment would have undermined.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 58


CMR – Generic 1NC

1. CMR is on the brink – at its lowest point since VietnamDesch 10 (Michael Desch, professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame, 10/18/10 “Why have the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan been so corrosive of civil-military relations?” http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/10/17/why_have_the_wars_in_iraq_and_afghanistan_been_so_corrosive_of-civil_military_relations)

If civil-military relations aren't that bad, then why even mention them? The answer is clear: The Iraq and Afghan wars have seriously frayed the fabric civil-military in the United States, perhaps not yet at the level of the Vietnam War, but certainly heading in that direction. Beginning with the pre-Iraq war debate between Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz over the appropriate force levels for the Phase IV operation in Iraq, continuing through the so-called "revolt of the generals" over Iraq strategy as the situation there deteriorated, and culminating in the contentious fall 2009 Afghan strategy review, these wars have divided civilian leaders and important segments of the military in a way not seen since the rancorous civil-military debates about the conduct of the Vietnam War of the late 1960s.

2. The DOD/Air Force want militarization control – civil programs doing it angers themLaunius 10 (Roger D. Launius, writing in the Space and Defense Journal, Volume 4 Number 2, 2010, “Astronaut Envy?” http://web.mac.com/rharrison5/Eisenhower_Center_for_Space_and_Defense_Studies/Journal_Vol_4_No_2_files/Space_and_Defense_4_2.pdf)

Yet, elements of the DOD remain committed to this mission to the present. Throughout the 1990s, a succession of studies argued for the potential of military personnel in space. One 1992 study affirmed: It is absolutely essential for the well being of today’s space forces as well as the future space forces of 2025, that DOD develop manned advanced technology space systems in lieu of or in addition to unmanned systems to effectively utilize military man’s compelling and aggressive warfighting abilities to accomplish the critical wartime mission elements of space control and force application. National space policy, military space doctrine and common sense all dictate they should do so if space superiority during future, inevitable conflict with enemy space forces is the paramount objective. Deploying military man in space will provide that space superiority and he will finally become the “center of gravity” of the U.S. space program.43 Another analysis found 37 reasons why military personnel in space would be required in the future, ranging from problem-solving and decision-making, to manipulation of sensors and other systems. It concluded that “A military space plane could play a key role in helping the United States Air Force transform itself from an air force into an aerospace force.”44 Yet another study found: “Our National Security Strategy must take full advantage of the full political, economic, and military power of this nation to be successful. That means soldiers, sailors, and airmen able to operate in every region of the world critical to national security, whether it is on land, at sea, in the air, or in space. A strategy built on anything less is incomplete and shortsighted.”45 The rationale for a military astronaut rests largely on the human flexibility of offering judgment, experience, and decisionmaking capabilities not present with machines. “There is no way that a price tag can be placed on such characteristics as flexibility or serendipity because the essence of these attributes is the ability to capitalize on the unanticipated or unknown,” concluded one study.46 According to some reports, DOD 44Maj. David M. Tobin, “Man’s Place in Space-Plane Flight

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 59

http://web.mac.com/rharrison5/Eisenhower_Center_for_Space_and_Defense_Studies/Journal_Vol_4_No_2_files/Space_and_Defense_4_2.pdf



CMR – Generic 1NC

Operations: Cockpit, Cargo Bay, or Control Room?” Airpower Journal 13 (Fall 1999): 50-65, quote from p. 62. 45Lt. Col. Joseph A. Carretto Jr., “Military Man in Space: Essential to National Strategy,” Executive Research Project, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, NDU-ICAF-95-S3, April 1995, p. 47. 46Air Force Space Command study, “The Utility of Military Crews in Space,” 1985, quoted in Theodore Wierzbanowski, “Manned vs. Unmanned: The Implications to NASP,” AIAA- 90-5265 paper, presented at AIAA Second International Aerospace Planes Conference, 1990, Orlando, FL, p. 10. developed a space plane named “Blackstar” and began flying missions as early as 1990.47 Notwithstanding these speculations, it is obvious the decision made initially by Eisenhower to split the civil and military space programs and to assign the human mission to the civil side remains difficult for some in the DOD to accept. It represents one instance, among many, in which a continuum between cooperation and competition has taken place in the interrelationships between the civil, military, and national reconnaissance space programs.

3. That kills CMR – we completely lose control of the military Foster 97 (Gregory D. Foster, George C. Marshall Professor and former J. Carlton Ward Distinguished Professor and director of research at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., “Confronting the crisis in civil‐military relations” Published in the Washington Quarterly, 1997, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01636609709550275)

Our response to the Bosnia situation, then, like Somalia and Haiti before it, says much about the distorted relationship that now exists between civilian authorities and the military. But unless something truly catastrophic involving U.S. troops yet occurs in Bosnia, any claim to the effect that there is a crisis in civil-military relations will likely fall on deaf ears. That will certainly be so if, in the end, we incur negligible casualties—in which case, another political bullet having been dodged, we will be sustained in the complacent belief that all is well. The extent of civilian subjugation to the military is further exem- plified by the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and its accompanying recommendations on armaments and forces. The QDR was charged with "a comprehensive examination of the defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan and other elements of the defense program and policies with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a revised defense program through the year 2005."10 What a mouthful—and what a sweeping mandate! But like the other exercises in bureaucratic and political legerdemain that preceded it (the Roles and Missions Commission and the so-called Bottom-Up Review) the QDR produced only superficial and modestly incremental recommendations for change. By no stretch of the imagination were there calls for the sort of fundamental transformation that would give substance to the military's claims that it is in the midst of a "revolution in military affairs." On the contrary, the QDR recommendations call only for maintaining the existing combat force of 10 activeduty Army divisions, 20 Air Force fighter wings, 12 aircraft carrier battle groups, and 3 Marine expeditionary forces, with a few minor emendations at the margins, all for the continuing purpose of ostensibly being able to fight and win two major regional conflicts (or "major theater wars") nearly simultaneously.11 Once again, the military worldview has prevailed unblemished. As the QDR report is the product of the secretary of defense himself, and as the president reportedly has called it "brilliant," it is only logical to conclude that our civilian national command authorities have essentially bought into the conception of war and military affairs embedded in the review lock, stock, and barrel. Similarly, the independent National Defense Panel established by

CMR – Generic 1NC

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 60

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01636609709550275


Congress to evaluate the QDR proposals and to propose alternatives has thus far given little sign that it will offer anything that strays too far from established orthodoxy. Even if the National Defense Panel were to propose something truly heterodox that strikes at the core of established military thinking, its purely advisory status robs it of authoritative voice and leverage. It thus will fall to Congress to make final judgments about future military direction, and Congress has repeatedly shown how totally it is immersed in the minutiae of budgetary bean-counting and captive of prevailing military thought. Although both Democrats and Republicans on Capitol Hill have criticized the QDR report as "largely a status quo product" and a "cautious document" that "makes only minor changes to the current force," the views repeatedly expressed by Rep. Floyd Spence (R-S.C), chairman of the House National Security Committee, are more representative than not: Budget considerations are driving the decisionmaking on issues of both strategy and force structure, instead of strategy driving decisions on forces and budgets. . . . The preparedness of U.S. armed forces to fight high-intensity major conflicts in defense of vital national interests is eroding inexorably. . . . The diminished readiness of our military forces is most directly influenced today by two competing pressures: the post-Gold War cutbacks in defense budgets and downsizing of military forces and the expanding demands of manpower-intensive peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. . . . The cumulative effects of readiness, quality-of-life and modernization problems are putting at risk the nation's ability to rapidly employ and sustain substantial forces in combat—capabilities that lie at the very heart of our national military strategy and that are essential for a superpower with global interests.12 These are words with which the military is perfectly happy—ecstatic even—and they demonstrate how wedded members of Congress are to traditional conceptions of war and military purpose that, in a largely subliminal and unrecognized way, undermine their ability to exercise truly discerning control over the military. Such skepticism as these individuals bring to the table, in other words, is skepticism of change rather than of stasis.

4. Effective CMR is key to Pakistan stabilityFrederick Barton and Noam Unger, ‘9. Barton is Codirector, Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project and Senior Adviser, International Security Program at the CSIS. Unger is fellow and policy director of the Foreign Assistance Reform project at Brookings. 2009 “civil-military relations, fostering development, and expanding civilian capacity ,” http://csis.org/publication/civil-military-relations-fostering-development-and-expanding-civilian-capacity

The security rationale for stability and development in poor and fragile states is based on the understanding that strengthening the economy of states and ensuring social equity are in the short and long term interests of the United States. Stable states pose the United States with far fewer security challenges than their weak and fragile counterparts. Indeed, stable states with healthy economies offer the United States opportunities for trade and represent potential partners in the fields of security and development. In contrast, weak and failing states pose serious challenges to the security of United States, including terrorism, drug production, money laundering and people smuggling. In addition, state weakness has frequently proven to have the propensity to spread to neighboring states, which in time can destabilize entire regions. While the group acknowledged that the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan are particular in scope and complexity (and may not be repeated in the near future by the U.S.), participants broadly concurred that the lessons of these challenges are that the United States must improve and expand its stabilization and development capabilities. In particular, cases such as Pakistan and Nigeria, huge countries with strategic importance, make clear that a military response to many internal conflicts will be severely limited. As such, increased emphasis on civilian capacity within the U.S. government and civil-military relations in general, will greatly improve the United States’ ability to respond to such crises in the future.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 61

http://csis.org/publication/civil-military-relations-fostering-development-and-expanding-civilian-capacity



CMR – Generic 1NC

5. Pakistan collapse causes global nuclear conflict – draws in China, India and RussiaPitt 9 (William Pitt, a New York Times and internationally bestselling author of two books: "War on Iraq: What Team Bush Doesn't Want You to Know" and "The Greatest Sedition Is Silence, 5/8/09, “Unstable Pakistan Threatens the World,” http://www.arabamericannews.com/news/index.php?mod=article&cat=commentary&article=2183)

But a suicide bomber in Pakistan rammed a car packed with explosives into a jeep filled with troops today, killing five and wounding as many as 21, including several children who were waiting for a ride to school. Residents of the region where the attack took place are fleeing in terror as gunfire rings out around them, and government forces have been unable to quell the violence. Two regional government officials were beheaded by militants in retaliation for the killing of other militants by government forces. As familiar as this sounds, it did not take place where we have come to expect such terrible events. This, unfortunately, is a whole new ballgame. It is part of another conflict that is brewing, one which puts what is happening in Iraq and Afghanistan in deep shade, and which represents a grave and growing threat to us all. Pakistan is now trembling on the edge of violent chaos , and is doing so with nuclear weapons in its hip pocket, right in the middle of one of the most dangerous neighborhoods in the world. The situation in brief: Pakistan for years has been a nation in turmoil, run by a shaky government supported by a corrupted system, dominated by a blatantly criminal security service, and threatened by a large fundamentalist Islamic population with deep ties to the Taliban in Afghanistan. All this is piled atop an ongoing standoff with neighboring India that has been the center of political gravity in the region for more than half a century. The fact that Pakistan, and India, and Russia, and China all possess nuclear weapons and share the same space means any ongoing or escalating violence over there has the real potential to crack open the very gates of Hell itself.Recently, the Taliban made a military push into the northwest Pakistani region around the Swat Valley. According to a recent Reuters report: The (Pakistani) army deployed troops in Swat in October 2007 and used artillery and gunship helicopters to reassert control. But insecurity mounted after a civilian government came to power last year and tried to reach a negotiated settlement. A peace accord fell apart in May 2008. After that, hundreds — including soldiers, militants and civilians — died in battles. Militants unleashed a reign of terror, killing and beheading politicians, singers, soldiers and opponents. They banned female education and destroyed nearly 200 girls' schools. About 1,200 people were killed since late 2007 and 250,000 to 500,000 fled, leaving the militants in virtual control. Pakistan offered on February 16 to introduce Islamic law in the Swat valley and neighboring areas in a bid to take the steam out of the insurgency. The militants announced an indefinite cease-fire after the army said it was halting operations in the region. President Asif Ali Zardari signed a regulation imposing sharia in the area last month. But the Taliban refused to give up their guns and pushed into Buner and another district adjacent to Swat, intent on spreading their rule. T he United States, already embroiled in a war against Taliban forces in Afghanistan, must now face the possibility that Pakistan could collapse under the mounting threat of Taliban forces there. Military and diplomatic advisers to President Obama, uncertain how best to proceed, now face one of the great nightmare scenarios of our time. "Recent militant gains in Pakistan," reported The New York Times on Monday, "have so alarmed the White House that the national security adviser, Gen. James L. Jones, described the situation as 'one of the very most serious problems we face.'" "Security was deteriorating rapidly," reported The Washington Post on Monday, "particularly in the mountains along the Afghan border that harbor al-Qaeda and the

CMR – Generic 1NC

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 62


Taliban, intelligence chiefs reported, and there were signs that those groups were working with indigenous extremists in Pakistan's populous Punjabi heartland. The Pakistani government was mired in political bickering. The army, still fixated on its historical adversary India, remained ill-equipped and unwilling to throw its full weight into the counterinsurgency fight. But despite the threat the intelligence conveyed, Obama has only limited options for dealing with it. Anti-American feeling in Pakistan is high, and a U.S. combat presence is prohibited. The United States is fighting Pakistan-based extremists by proxy, through an army over which it has little control, in alliance with a government in which it has little confidence." It is believed Pakistan is currently in possession of between 60 and 100 nuclear weapons. Because Pakistan's stability is threatened by the wide swath of its population that shares ethnic, cultural and religious connections to the fundamentalist Islamic populace of Afghanistan, fears over what could happen to those nuclear weapons if the Pakistani government collapses are very real. "As the insurgency of the Taliban and Al Qaeda spreads in Pakistan," reported the Times last week, "senior American officials say they are increasingly concerned about new vulnerabilities for Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, including the potential for militants to snatch a weapon in transport or to insert sympathizers into laboratories or fuel-production facilities. In public, the administration has only hinted at those concerns, repeating the formulation that the Bush administration used: that it has faith in the Pakistani Army. But that cooperation, according to officials who would not speak for attribution because of the sensitivity surrounding the exchanges between Washington and Islamabad, has been sharply limited when the subject has turned to the vulnerabilities in the Pakistani nuclear infrastructure." "The prospect of turmoil in Pakistan sends shivers up the spines of those U.S. officials charged with keeping tabs on foreign nuclear weapons," reported Time Magazine last month. "Pakistan is thought to possess about 100 — the U.S. isn't sure of the total, and may not know where all of them are. Still, if Pakistan collapses, the U.S. military is primed to enter the country and secure as many of those weapons as it can, according to U.S. officials. Pakistani officials insist their personnel safeguards are stringent, but a sleeper cell could cause big trouble, U.S. officials say." In other words, a shaky Pakistan spells trouble for everyone, especially if America loses the footrace to secure those weapons in the event of the worst-case scenario. If Pakistani militants ever succeed in toppling the government, several very dangerous events could happen at once. Nuclear-armed India could be galvanized into military action of some kind, as could nuclear-armed China or nuclear-armed Russia . If the Pakistani government does fall, and all those Pakistani nukes are not immediately accounted for and secured, the specter (or reality) of loose nukes falling into the hands of terrorist organizations could place the entire world on a collision course with unimaginable disaster. We have all been paying a great deal of attention to Iraq and Afghanistan, and rightly so. The developing situation in Pakistan, however, needs to be placed immediately on the front burner. The Obama administration appears to be gravely serious about addressing the situation. So should we all.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 63


***CMR – Links***

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 64


CMR – Militarization Links

The DOD/Air Force want militarization control – civil programs doing it angers themLaunius 10 (Roger D. Launius, writing in the Space and Defense Journal, Volume 4 Number 2, 2010, “Astronaut Envy?” http://web.mac.com/rharrison5/Eisenhower_Center_for_Space_and_Defense_Studies/Journal_Vol_4_No_2_files/Space_and_Defense_4_2.pdf)

Yet, elements of the DOD remain committed to this mission to the present. Throughout the 1990s, a succession of studies argued for the potential of military personnel in space. One 1992 study affirmed: It is absolutely essential for the well being of today’s space forces as well as the future space forces of 2025, that DOD develop manned advanced technology space systems in lieu of or in addition to unmanned systems to effectively utilize military man’s compelling and aggressive warfighting abilities to accomplish the critical wartime mission elements of space control and force application. National space policy, military space doctrine and common sense all dictate they should do so if space superiority during future, inevitable conflict with enemy space forces is the paramount objective. Deploying military man in space will provide that space superiority and he will finally become the “center of gravity” of the U.S. space program.43 Another analysis found 37 reasons why military personnel in space would be required in the future, ranging from problem-solving and decision-making, to manipulation of sensors and other systems. It concluded that “A military space plane could play a key role in helping the United States Air Force transform itself from an air force into an aerospace force.”44 Yet another study found: “Our National Security Strategy must take full advantage of the full political, economic, and military power of this nation to be successful. That means soldiers, sailors, and airmen able to operate in every region of the world critical to national security, whether it is on land, at sea, in the air, or in space. A strategy built on anything less is incomplete and shortsighted.”45 The rationale for a military astronaut rests largely on the human flexibility of offering judgment, experience, and decisionmaking capabilities not present with machines. “There is no way that a price tag can be placed on such characteristics as flexibility or serendipity because the essence of these attributes is the ability to capitalize on the unanticipated or unknown,” concluded one study.46 According to some reports, DOD 44Maj. David M. Tobin, “Man’s Place in Space-Plane Flight Operations: Cockpit, Cargo Bay, or Control Room?” Airpower Journal 13 (Fall 1999): 50-65, quote from p. 62. 45Lt. Col. Joseph A. Carretto Jr., “Military Man in Space: Essential to National Strategy,” Executive Research Project, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, NDU-ICAF-95-S3, April 1995, p. 47. 46Air Force Space Command study, “The Utility of Military Crews in Space,” 1985, quoted in Theodore Wierzbanowski, “Manned vs. Unmanned: The Implications to NASP,” AIAA- 90-5265 paper, presented at AIAA Second International Aerospace Planes Conference, 1990, Orlando, FL, p. 10. developed a space plane named “Blackstar” and began flying missions as early as 1990.47 Notwithstanding these speculations, it is obvious the decision made initially by Eisenhower to split the civil and military space programs and to assign the human mission to the civil side remains difficult for some in the DOD to accept. It represents one instance, among many, in which a continuum between cooperation and competition has taken place in the interrelationships between the civil, military, and national reconnaissance space programs.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 65




CMR – SBSP Links

DOD wants to buy SBSP from utilities – government ownership angers themNSSO 7 (National Security Space Office, 2007 “Space-Based Solar Power As an Opportunity for Strategic Security” http://www.nss.org/settlement/ssp/library/nsso.htm)

Several major challenges will need to be overcome to make SBSP a reality, including the creation of low-cost space access and a supporting infrastructure system on Earth and in space. Solving these space access and operations challenges for SBSP will in turn also open space for a host of other activities that include space tourism, manufacturing, lunar or asteroid resource utilization, and eventually settlement to extend the human race. Because DoD would not want to own SBSP satellites, but rather just purchase the delivered energy as it currently does via traditional terrestrial utilities, a repeated review finding is that the commercial sector will need Government to accomplish three major tasks to catalyze SBSP development. The first is to retire a major portion of the early technical risks. This can be accomplished via an incremental research and development program that culminates with a space-borne proof-of-concept demonstration in the next decade. A spiral development proposal to field a 10 MW continuous pilot plant en route to gigawatts-class systems is included in Appendix B. The second challenge is to facilitate the policy, regulatory, legal, and organizational instruments that will be necessary to create the partnerships and relationships (commercial-commercial, government-commercial, and government-government) needed for this concept to succeed. The final Government contribution is to become a direct early adopter and to incentivize other early adopters much as is accomplished on a regular basis with other renewable energy systems coming on-line today.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 66

http://www.nss.org/settlement/ssp/library/nsso.htm


CMR – Human Mission Links

The Air Force and DOD want independent manned flight ability – plan angers themLaunius 10 (Roger D. Launius, writing in the Space and Defense Journal, Volume 4 Number 2, 2010, “Astronaut Envy?” http://web.mac.com/rharrison5/Eisenhower_Center_for_Space_and_Defense_Studies/Journal_Vol_4_No_2_files/Space_and_Defense_4_2.pdf pg 66-67)

The DOD, while certainly an important supporting organization in Mercury, remained committed to achieving an independent human spaceflight capability. “If we concede that man can go into space for peaceful missions,” stated a USAF white paper in 1961, “we must admit that man can go into this same environment for military purposes . It is the Air Force view that many will be required to go into space to perform tasks that will be important to our national security.”20 From this position flowed a series of decisions aimed at creating what the DOD called the Manned Military Space Program (MMSP). Several immediate programs resulted and the Air Force noted: “Fully coordinated, cooperative and where appropriate, joint effort between the Air Force and the NASA is required in order that the content and objectives of the MMSP are properly defined within the framework of the total national space program.”21

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 67


***CMR – Impacts***

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 68


CMR – Smart Power ModuleBalanced CMR is key to Smart PowerFrederick Barton and Noam Unger, ‘9. Barton is Codirector, Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project and Senior Adviser, International Security Program at the CSIS. Unger is fellow and policy director of the Foreign Assistance Reform project at Brookings. 2009 “civil-military relations, fostering development, and expanding civilian capacity ,” http://csis.org/publication/civil-military-relations-fostering-development-and-expanding-civilian-capacity

Most current proponents of a NSGD seek a strategy that employs a broad definition of development as it applies to foreign assistance -- inclusive of humanitarian aid, post-conflict reconstruction and good governance as well as poverty alleviation and economic growth. Within this vision, an NSGD would also address other relevant development policy areas such as trade and migration. The underlying understanding is that efforts in all of these areas shape the longterm progress of developing countries, including the prevention of conflict. The workshop discussions also reminded participants that “development assistance” can be interpreted more narrowly as long term aid programs to various less-developed countries. This definitional problem continues to be important as the government explores the scope of potential new strategies, but the feeling of the organizers is that the complementarities of crisis response and longer term development should be emphasized. There is a general consensus on the need to strengthen the capacity of the United States government’s civilian international affairs agencies as part of a “smart power” approach to global engagement. Clearly, it is a national security imperative to ensure that the United States government can effectively harmonize stabilization efforts with broader development approaches and institutions. At a strategic level, policymakers must identify steps that can set the nation on a course of greater reliance on, and sufficient investment in, civilian development expertise.

The smart power doctrine is key to stop global economic collapse, disease, terror, and climate changeNye 9 (Joseph S. Nye, former US Assistant Secretary of Defense, professor of International Relations at Harvard University, 9/10/9, “American Power in the Twenty-First Century”, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/nye74/English)

CAMBRIDGE – The United States government ’s National Intelligence Council projects that American dominance will be “much diminished” by 2025, and that the one key area of continued American superiority – military power – will be less significant in the increasingly competitive world of the future. Russian President Dmitri Medvedev has called the 2008 financial crisis a sign that America’s global leadership is coming to an end. The leader of Canada’s opposition Liberal Party, Michael Ignatieff, suggests that US power has passed its mid-day. How can we know if these predictions are correct? One should beware of misleading metaphors of organic decline. Countries are not like humans with predictable life spans. For example, after Britain lost its American colonies at the end of the eighteenth century, Horace Walpole lamented Britain’s reduction to “as insignificant a country as Denmark or Sardinia.” He failed to foresee that the industrial revolution would give Britain a second century of even greater ascendency. Rome remained dominant for more than three centuries after the apogee of Roman power. Even then, Rome did not succumb to another state, but suffered a death of a thousand cuts inflicted by various barbarian tribes. Indeed, for all the fashionable predictions of China, India, or Brazil surpassing the US in the coming decades, the classical transition of power among great states may be less of a problem than the rise of modern barbarians – non-state actors. In an information-based world of cyber-insecurity, power diffusion may be a greater threat

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 69

http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/nye74/English




CMR – Smart Power Module

than power transition. So, what will it mean to wield power in the global information age of the twenty-first century? What resources will produce power? In the sixteenth century, control of colonies and gold bullion gave Spain the edge; seventeenth-century Holland profited from trade and finance; eighteenth-century France gained from its larger population and armies; and nineteenth-century British power rested on its industrial primacy and its navy. Conventional wisdom has always held that the state with the largest military prevails, but in an information age it may be the state (or non-state) with the best story that wins. Today, it is far from clear how the balance of power is measured, much less how to develop successful survival strategies. In his inaugural address in 2009, President Barack Obama stated that “our power grows through its prudent use; our security emanates from the justness of our cause, the force of our example, the tempering qualities of humility and restraint.” Shortly thereafter, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, “America cannot solve the most pressing problems on our own, and the world cannot solve them without America. We must use what has been called ‘smart power,’ the full range of tools at our disposal.” Smart power means the combination of the hard power of command and the soft power of attraction. Power always depends on context . The child who dominates on the playground may become a laggard when the context changes to a disciplined classroom. In the middle of the twentieth century, Josef Stalin scornfully asked how many divisions the Pope had, but four decades later, the Papacy was still intact while Stalin’s empire had collapsed. In today’s world, the distribution of power varies with the context. It is distributed in a pattern that resembles a three-dimensional chess game . On the top chessboard, military power is largely unipolar , and the US is likely to remain the only superpower for some time. But on the middle chessboard, economic power has already been multi-polar for more than a decade, with the US, Europe, Japan, and China as the major players, and others gaining in importance. The bottom chessboard is the realm of cross-border transactions that occur outside of government control. It includes diverse non-state actors, such as bankers electronically transferring sums larger than most national budgets, and, at the other extreme, terrorists transferring weapons or hackers threatening cyber-security. It also includes new challenges like pandemics and climate change. On this bottom board, power is widely dispersed, and it makes no sense to speak of unipolarity, multipolarity, hegemony, or any other cliché. Even in the aftermath of the financial crisis, the giddy pace of technological change is likely to continue to drive globalization and transnational challenges. The problem for American power in the twenty-first century is that there are more and more things outside the control of even the most powerful state. Although the US does well on military measures, there is much going on that those measures fail to capture. Under the influence of the information revolution and globalization, world politics is changing in a way that prevents America from achieving all its international goals acting alone. For example, international financial stability is vital to Americans’ prosperity, but the US needs the cooperation of others to ensure it. Global climate change , too, will affect Americans’ quality of life, but the US cannot manage the problem alone. In a world where borders are more porous than ever to everything from drugs to infectious diseases to terrorism, America must help build international coalitions and institutions to address shared threats and challenges. In this sense, power becomes a positive sum game. It is not enough to think in terms of power over others. One must also think in terms of power to accomplish goals. On many transnational issues, empowering others can help to accomplish one’s own goals. In this world, networks and connectedness become an important source of relevant power. The problem of American power in the twenty-first century is not one of decline, but of recognizing that even the most powerful country cannot achieve its aims without the help of others.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 70


CMR – Terrorism Module

CMR key to homeland security and fighting the War on TerrorismGuttieri 3- Member of the Global Public Policy Academic Group at the Naval Postgraduate School and faculty share with the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute at the US Army War College (August 2003, Karen,“Homeland security and U.S civil-Military Relations,” http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2003/aug03/homeland.html

The American strategic policy community—for example, the US Commission on National Security in the 21st Century—was concerned with homeland defense prior to 9/11. After that fateful day, the Bush administration began using a new, more proactive sounding term: homeland security. The Pentagon, however, treated this new term not as a replacement for, but as separate from, homeland defense. A seemingly simple matter of semantics reveals a great deal about US civil-military relations. America's post-9/11 obsession with securing the "homeland" shifted the domestic political landscape, including American civil-military relations. The American model of civil-military relations has been characterized by a contract according to which the military defends the nation's borders while domestic police keep order at home. "On September 11," in the words of DoD Transformation "czar" Arthur K. Cebrowski, "America's contract with the Department of Defense was torn up and a new contract is being written."[1] This Strategic Insight describes some of the forces compelling military changes in the historical context of US civil-military relations. Although the military itself may resist change, institution-building (outside and within that organization) and attitudinal changes in response to massive terrorist attacks at home cannot but alter American civil-military relations. Much of the shift in American politics since 9/11 has to do with the nature and requirements of homeland security: it is both public and private, interagency (involving a number of government elements) and civil-military. Implementing the new national security strategy will require cooperation across sectors of activity and jurisdictions of authority.[2] Government-private sector coordination is vital to critical infrastructure protection. Agency-to-agency coordination is the foundation of any national response to security threats involving multiple levels of government in a nation consisting of more than 87,000 government jurisdictions.[3] Civil-military coordination is indispensable for ensuring adequate military support to civilian agencies responsible for homeland security. The quality of America's civil-military relations will be a factor in the effectiveness of America's "war on terror," while by the same token, the conduct of the war will irrevocably shape those relations. Given the US military's lead in homeland defense, civilian control of the military should be a topic of particular interest to anyone concerned with the function of democracy in wartime.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 71

http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2003/aug03/homeland.html


CMR – Terrorism Module

Terrorism risks extinctionAlexander 03. (Yonah, Prof and Director of Inter-University for Terrorism Studies, Washington Times, August 28, lexis)

Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber] with its serious implications concerning national, regional and global security concerns. Two myths in particular must be debunked immediately if an effective counterterrorism "best practices" strategy can be developed [e.g., strengthening international cooperation]. The first illusion is that terrorism can be greatly reduced, if not eliminated completely, provided the root causes of conflicts - political, social and economic - are addressed. The conventional illusion is that terrorism must be justified by oppressed people seeking to achieve their goals and consequently the argument advanced by "freedom fighters" anywhere, "give me liberty and I will give you death," should be tolerated if not glorified. This traditional rationalization of "sacred" violence often conceals that the real purpose of terrorist groups is to gain political power through the barrel of the gun, in violation of fundamental human rights of the noncombatant segment of societies. For instance, Palestinians religious movements [e.g., Hamas, Islamic Jihad] and secular entities [such as Fatah's Tanzim and Aqsa Martyr Brigades]] wish not only to resolve national grievances [such as Jewish settlements, right of return, Jerusalem] but primarily to destroy the Jewish state. Similarly, Osama bin Laden's international network not only opposes the presence of American military in the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq, but its stated objective is to "unite all Muslims and establish a government that follows the rule of the Caliphs." The second myth is that strong action against terrorist infrastructure [leaders, recruitment, funding, propaganda, training, weapons, operational command and control] will only increase terrorism. The argument here is that law-enforcement efforts and military retaliation inevitably will fuel more brutal acts of violent revenge. Clearly, if this perception continues to prevail, particularly in democratic societies, there is the danger it will paralyze governments and thereby encourage further terrorist attacks. In sum, past experience provides useful lessons for a realistic future strategy. The prudent application of force has been demonstrated to be an effective tool for short- and long-term deterrence of terrorism. For example, Israel's targeted killing of Mohammed Sider, the Hebron commander of the Islamic Jihad, defused a "ticking bomb." The assassination of Ismail Abu Shanab - a top Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip who was directly responsible for several suicide bombings including the latest bus attack in Jerusalem - disrupted potential terrorist operations. Similarly, the U.S. military operation in Iraq eliminated Saddam

Hussein's regime as a state sponsor of terror. Thus, it behooves those countries victimized by terrorism to understand a cardinal message communicated by Winston Churchill to the House of Commons on May 13, 1940: "Victory at all costs, victory in spite of terror, victory however long and hard the road may be: For without victory, there is no survival."

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 72


CMR – Warfare ModuleCMR now has global consequences – any divide leads to warCohen 97 (Elliot, Spring, professor of strategic studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, “Civil-military relations - Are U.S. Forces Overstretched?”, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0365/is_n2_v41/ai_19416332/pg_9/?tag=content;col1)

Left uncorrected, the trends in American civil-military relations could breed certain pathologies. The most serious possibility is that of a dramatic civil-military split during a crisis involving the use of force. In the recent past, such tensions did not result in open division; for example, Franklin Roosevelt insisted that the United States invade North Africa in 1942, though the chiefs of both the army and the navy vigorously opposed such a course, favoring instead a buildup in England and an invasion of the continent in 1943. Back then it was inconceivable that a senior military officer would leak word of such a split to the media, where it would have reverberated loudly and destructively. To be sure, from time to time individual officers broke the vow of professional silence to protest a course of action, but in these isolated cases the officers paid the accepted price of termination of their careers. In the modern environment, such cases might no longer be isolated. Thus, presidents might try to shape U.S. strategy so that it complies with military opinion, and rarely in the annals of statecraft has military opinion alone been an adequate guide to sound foreign policy choices. Had Lincoln followed the advice of his senior military advisors there is a good chance that the Union would have fallen. Had Roosevelt deferred to General George C. Marshall and Admiral Ernest J. King there might well have been a gory debacle on the shores of France in 1943. Had Harry S Truman heeded the advice of his theater commander in the Far East (and it should be remembered that the Joint Chiefs generally counseled support of the man on the spot) there might have been a third world war. Throughout much of its history, the U.S. military was remarkably politicized by contemporary standards. One commander of the army, Winfield Scott, even ran for president while in uniform, and others (Leonard Wood, for example) have made no secret of their political views and aspirations. But until 1940, and with the exception of periods of outright warfare, the military was a negligible force in American life, and America was not a central force in international politics. That has changed. Despite the near halving of the defense budget from its high in the 1980s, it remains a significant portion of the federal budget, and the military continues to employ millions of Americans. More important, civil-military relations in the United States now no longer affect merely the closet-room politics of Washington, but the relations of countries around the world. American choices about the use of force, the shrewdness of American strategy, the soundness of American tactics, and the will of American leaders have global consequences. What might have been petty squabbles in bygone years are now magnified into quarrels of a far larger scale, and conceivably with far more grievous consequences. To ignore the problem would neglect one of the cardinal purposes of the federal government: "to provide for the common defense" in a world in which security cannot be taken for granted.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 73


***CMR – Aff Answers***

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 74


UniquenessInevitably expanding non-combat missions collapses CMR Yoo 9 – John Yoo, Fletcher Jones Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law; Professor of Law, School of Law, University of California, Berkeley; Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, May 2009, “THIRTY-NINTH ANNUAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ISSUE: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNDER THE GEORGE W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION: LOOKING BACK AND LOOKING FORWARD: ARTICLE: ADMINISTRATION OF WAR,” Duke Law Journal, 58 Duke L.J. 2277, p. lexis

This appears to explain developments in civil-military relations since the end of the Cold War. It does not appear that civilian monitoring or sanctions have fallen; in fact, they may well have risen. The tension in civilian-military relations nevertheless has sharpened because the difference between civilian and military policy preferences has grown at an even faster rate. This should come as no surprise. The disappearance of the Soviet threat, which had been the overwhelming focus of American military planning for a half-century, left both sets of leaders searching for a redefinition of national security means and ends. Increasing reliance on the military for operations that do not involve combat, such as drug interdiction, nation building, and disaster relief, may draw the military more deeply into civilian debates, increase the scope for disagreements over the role of the military, and place strains on the military's resources and warfighting abilities . An all-volunteer force may have exacerbated tensions as the military becomes more separate and distinct from civilian society.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 75


Link Turn

Space policy keeps NASA and DOD operations separated to civil and militarySUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS, 3/18/04, “NASA–DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COOPERATION IN SPACE TRANSPORTATION HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES”, http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/science/hsy92514.000/hsy92514_0.HTM

Current U.S. National Space Transportation policy establishes NASA as ''lead agency for technology development and demonstration for next generation reusable space transportation systems.'' DOD's role in the current Policy is focused on expendable launch systems. The practical effect of this language has been to limit unnecessarily DOD's involvement in decisions pertaining to next generation reusable systems. To meet emerging national security requirements for space control and force projection, DOD should be able to fully explore next generation reusable system solutions. Conversely, this delineation has precluded NASA innovation in exploiting the DOD investment in expendable launch vehicles. As mentioned earlier, the current and foreseeable launch rates do not support the development of fully reusable launch systems.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 76


No Impact

No impact to CMR – there is already too much civilian control in the militaryFeaver and Kohn 5 [Peter Feaver, professor of Political Science and Public Policy and the director of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies at Duke University, and Richard H. Kohn, Professor of History at the University of North Carolina, 2005, “The Gap: Soldiers, Civilians, and Their Mutual Misunderstanding,” in American Defense Policy, 2005 edition, ed. Paul J. Bolt, Damon V. Coletta, Collins G. Shackelford, p. 339]

CONCERNS about a troublesome divide between the armed forces and the society they serve are hardly new and in fact go back to the beginning of the Republic. Writing in the 1950s, Samuel Huntington argued that the divide could best be bridged by civilian society tolerating, if not embracing, the conservative values that animate military culture. Huntington also suggested that politicians allow the armed forces a substantial degree of cultural autonomy Countering this argument, the sociologist Morris Janowitz argued that in a democracy military culture necessarily adapts to changes in civilian society, adjusting to the needs and dictates of its civilian masters.z The end of the Cold War and the extraordinary changes in American foreign and defense policy that resulted have revived the debate. The contemporary heirs of Janowitz see the all-volunteer military as drifting too far away from the norms of American society, thereby posing problems for civilian control. They make four principal assertions. First, the military has grown out of step ideologically with the public, showing itself to be inordinately right-wing politically, and much more religious (and fundamentalist) than America as a whole, having a strong and almost exclusive identification with the Republican Party. Second, the military has become increasingly alienated from, disgusted with and sometimes even explicitly hostile to civilian culture. Third, the armed forces have resisted change, particularly the integration of women and homosexuals into their ranks, and have generally proved reluctant to carry out constabulary missions. Fourth, civilian control and military effectiveness will both suffer as the military-seeking ways to operate without effective civilian oversight and alienated from the society around it-loses the respect and support of that society. By contrast, the heirs of Huntington argue that a degenerate civilian culture has strayed so far from traditional values that it intends to eradicate healthy and functional civil-military differences, particularly in the areas of gender, sexual orientation and discipline. This camp, too, makes four key claims. First, its members assert that the military is divorced in values from a political and cultural elite that is itself alienated from the general public. Second, it believes this civilian elite to be ignorant of, and even hostile to, the armed forces-eager to employ the military as a laboratory for social change, even at the cost of crippling its warfighting capacity. Third, it discounts the specter of eroding civilian control because it sees a military so thoroughly inculcated with an ethos of subordination that there is now too much civilian control, the effect of which has been to stifle the military's ability to function effectively. Fourth, because support for the military among the general public remains sturdy, any gap in values is inconsequential. The problem, if anything, is with the civilian elite. The debate has been lively (and inside the Beltway sometimes quite vicious), but it has rested on very thin evidence-competing anecdotes, claims and counterclaims about the nature of civilian and military attitudes. Absent has been a body of systematic data exploring opinions, values, perspectives and attitudes inside the military compared with those held by civilian elites and the general public. Our project provides some answers.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 77


No Impact

CMR doesn’t make sense as a policy any more – irregular warfare has blended the lines of civil and militaryCronin 8 (Patrick Cronin, Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, 10/1/08 “Irregular warfare: new challenges for civil-military relations” http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0QZY/is_234/ai_n31461852/pg_12/?tag=mantle_skin;content)

Persistent irregular conflict poses difficult new challenges for command and leadership and civil-military relations in general. Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq amply demonstrate these challenges. The Iraq engagement began with a short, conventional war that aimed massive military power to defeat a hostile state and depose its leader. The Commander in Chief, with the approval of civilian leaders in Congress, authorized the action, and military commanders carried it out successfully. But after the initial goals were achieved, the engagement in Iraq rapidly devolved into a counterinsurgency. Similarly, as conflict in Afghanistan shows, in an irregular war against an asymmetric, nonstate threat, the traditional lanes of authority no longer clearly separate the activities of the political leaders responsible for managing the engagement, the military commanders responsible for executing it, and the civilian officials responsible for diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, and reconstruction.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 78

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0QZY/is_234/ai_n31461852/pg_12/?tag=mantle_skin;content


No Spillover

Policy disagreements don’t undermine overall CMR and don’t spill over Hansen 9 – Victor Hansen, Associate Professor of Law, New England Law School, Summer 2009, “SYMPOSIUM: LAW, ETHICS, AND THE WAR ON TERROR: ARTICLE: UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF MILITARY LAWYERS IN THE WAR ON TERROR: A RESPONSE TO THE PERCEIVED CRISIS IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS,” South Texas Law Review, 50 S. Tex. L. Rev. 617, p. lexis

According to Sulmasy and Yoo, these conflicts between the military and the Bush Administration are the latest examples of a [*624] crisis in civilian-military relations. n32 The authors suggest the principle of civilian control of the military must be measured and is potentially violated whenever the military is able to impose its preferred policy outcomes against the wishes of the civilian leaders. n33 They further assert that it is the attitude of at least some members of the military that civilian leaders are temporary office holders to be outlasted and outmaneuvered. n34If the examples cited by the authors do in fact suggest efforts by members of the military to undermine civilian control over the military, then civilian-military relations may have indeed reached a crisis. Before such a conclusion can be reached, however, a more careful analysis is warranted. We cannot accept at face value the authors' broad assertions that any time a member of the military, whether on active duty or retired, disagrees with the views of a civilian member of the Department of Defense or other member of the executive branch, including the President, that such disagreement or difference of opinion equates to either a tension or a crisis in civil-military relations. Sulmasy and Yoo claim there is heightened tension or perhaps even a crisis in civil-military relations, yet they fail to define what is meant by the principle of civilian control over the military. Instead, the authors make general and rather vague statements suggesting any policy disagreements between members of the military and officials in the executive branch must equate to a challenge by the military against civilian control. n35 However, until we have a clear understanding of the principle of civilian control of the military, we cannot accurately determine whether a crisis in civil-military relations exists. It is to this question that we now turn.

No risk of a spillover---many checks exist even after explicitly overruling the military Hooker 4 - Colonel Richard D. Hooker, Jr., Ph.D. from the University of Virginia in international relations and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, served in the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Winter 2004, “Soldiers of the State: Reconsidering American Civil-Military Relations,” Parameters, p. 4-18

Clearly there have been individual instances where military leaders crossed the line and behaved both unprofessionally and illegitimately with respect to proper subordination to civilian authority; the Revolt of the Admirals and the MacArthur-Truman controversy already have been cited. The increasingly common tactic whereby anonymous senior military officials criticize their civilian counterparts and superiors, even to the point of revealing privileged and even classified information, cannot be justified.Yet civilian control remains very much alive and well. The many direct and indirect instruments of objective and subjective civilian control of the military suggest that the true issue is not control—defined as the government’s ability to enforce its authority over the military—but rather political freedom of action. In virtually every sphere, civilian control over the military apparatus is decisive. All senior military officers serve at the pleasure of the President and can be removed, and indeed retired, without cause. Congress must approve all officer promotions and guards this prerogative jealously; even lateral appointments at the three- and four-star levels must be approved by the President and confirmed by Congress, and no officer at that level may retire in grade without separate approval by both branches of government. Operating budgets, the structure of military organizations, benefits, pay and allowances, and even the minutia of official travel and office furniture are determined by civilians. The reality of civilian control is confirmed not only by the many instances cited earlier where military recommendations were over-ruled. Not infrequently, military chiefs have been removed or replaced by the direct and indirect exercise of civilian authority.37

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 79


****NASA Credibility DA

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 80


1NC ShellNASA cred low now- Bolden seeking alternativesWall Street Journal 11, [Any Pasztor, Reporter for Wall Street Journal, 7/22/11, “NASA’s Post-Shuttle Space-Exploration Plans Generate Little Excitement”, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903554904576460203278610600.html?mod=googlenews_wsj]

Despite the fanfare surrounding Thursday's final shuttle landing, plans for future U.S. manned space exploration have failed to spark broad public excitement or congressional backing. Starting in the late 1980s, three presidents prior to Barack Obama proposed plans for rockets and spacecraft intended to replace the shuttle fleet operated by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, only to discover the projects were either unaffordable or lacked political support. So far, the Obama administration doesn't appear to be faring much better. The administration wants to rely on commercial space-taxis for the next decade or two to reach the orbiting International Space Station. But the planned commercial projects are years late, and critics worry there may be fewer of them than initially envisioned, which could hurt the program's reliability. .Plans for vehicles built and operated by NASA to take astronauts deeper into space also face major delays. The agency is having trouble coming up with cost effective new propulsion systems, and is facing bipartisan pressure in Congress to use variants of shuttle technology to reduce layoffs in states and districts where it is manufactured. Lawmakers in both parties complain that arguments over such matters have damaged NASA's credibility on Capitol Hill . As a result, nearly two years after President Obama pledged to revitalize NASA, the agency still hasn't laid out detailed missions to blast astronauts deeper into the solar system. The shortage of specifics is a big reason for today's apparent lack of national consensus over the agency's direction, according to lawmakers, industry officials and other NASA critics. "Not having a clear-curt mission is a very big deal," said Mark Albrecht, a former White House space official and U.S. space-industry executive. "We've been talking about what to do at the end of the shuttle era for 20 years," Mr. Albrecht said in a recent interview, "but the hard truth is we still don't have a concrete plan" for new technologies or destinations. With the safe landing of the shuttle Atlantis, an era in U.S. space exploration comes to a close. Take a look at highlights of America's space program. WSJ's Araby Williams reports. .NASA chief Charles Bolden, a former astronaut, has said U.S. leadership in space exploration would "persist for the foreseeable future . . . I'm very confident in that." Mr. Bolden tries to play down his disputes with lawmakers and some NASA contractors, saying that by 2025, U.S.-built hardware and American astronauts will be exploring distant parts of the solar system. "A lot of the controversy," he has said, stems from "people who are nervous about doing new things." In an interview earlier this week, Mr. Bolden said the Obama administration's vision of putting humans "in the vicinity of an asteroid" by 2025 and having astronauts orbit Mars "with the intent of landing" sometime after 2035 are comparable to the pivotal U.S. decision to put a man on the moon. Countering critics who say NASA isn't focused enough on a precise destinations, the NASA chief said "those are pretty specific goals," challenging enough to elicit widespread public support. The legislative tug-of-war over NASA's direction—and how much its current $18.7 billion budget will shrink—is bound to continue well past the shuttle's return. The House Appropriations Committee wants to lop off around $2 billion for next year. Mr. Bolden seeks to ramp up spending on commercial alternatives , but his foes on Capitol Hill want to shift more dollars to offshoots of traditional NASA-run programs—sometimes without opening the contracts to competitive bidding. If lawmakers succeed in mandating certain technologies, some champions of private space ventures say that would amount to the largest

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 81


1NC Shell

congressional earmark in history. The Endeavour and its crew of six glided into Runway 15 at Kennedy Space Center on Jan. 20, 1996, after spending nine days in space on the STS-72 mission. .More photos and interactive graphics .Still, NASA's contentious dealings with Congress are unlike previous policy disputes. Two separate committees have threatened to subpoena documents lawmakers requested months ago related to a new rocket design, some of which NASA still hasn't handed over. Rep. Pete Olson, a Texas Republican whose district includes Houston's Johnson Space Center, summed up the unprecedented friction and distrust at a hearing last year, telling Mr. Bolden that his "ill-conceived decisions" and failure to keep lawmakers apprised of NASA's plans managed to "surprise, frustrate and anger those of us who have been your greatest advocates." NASA also faces engineering and management hurdles. Closely-held Space Exploration Technologies Corp., the best known pioneer in private space ventures, years ago was expected to conduct as many as 17 cargo missions to the station, partly to verify safety systems, before it would attempt to launch its first astronaut, according to government and industry officials. But now, with the kickoff of cargo trips taking longer than initially projected, NASA and the company are looking at beginning manned missions around the middle of this decade, following fewer in-flight safety checks. On Thursday, a spokeswoman for SpaceX, said the Hawthorne, Calif., company "has a number of advantages" over its rivals. SpaceX is the only commercial entity ever to successfully launch and recover a capsule from orbit. With its first cargo flight to the International Space Station scheduled to take place by the end of the year, and nine more slated to follow over the next three years, "we will have extensive testing before the first manned mission," she said. She added that "no decisions were made to change the number of cargo missions in order to speed up development" leading to the first manned flight. NASA also has abruptly shifted course in other areas. Agency officials have angered lawmakers by repeatedly changing their minds about using a Lockheed Martin Corp. space capsule, dubbed Orion. In early 2010, NASA proposed canceling Orion as too big and expensive. Facing congressional pressure, the agency resurrected the program about a year later, but only as a stripped-down emergency escape vehicle for the space station. Last month, Mr. Bolden amended his position once more by designating Orion as NASA's premier manned-exploration capsule for the foreseeable future. The European Space Agency and other partners in the $100 billion space station have publicly challenged NASA's recent policy reversals, suggesting that station planning had become "chaotic" as a result. But officials at the Russian space agency Roscosmos said they weren't worried. "Rosocomos has no doubts about the reliability of the U.S. as a partner in the ISS program," said Vitaly Davydov, deputy head of Roscosmos in Moscow, in a statement. WSJ reporter Arian Campo-Flores details projects on the horizon for NASA following the end of the 30-year Space Shuttle program. The 4-person Shuttle Atlantis crew returned safely early Thursday morning. Photo: REUTERS/Don Emmert/Pool .Many prominent U.S. aerospace industry leaders are less sanguine. Jim Albaugh, who ran Boeing Co.'s space and defense businesses before taking over the company's commercial airplanes unit, issued an unusually blunt challenge earlier this month to NASA's priorities and decision making. Addressing an industry group in Crystal City, Va., Mr. Albaugh said that watching the final shuttle launch "was one of the most devastating days of my professional career." The Boeing executive, whose early engineering jobs included designing rocket engines, said the U.S. has now become "just another country hitchhiking a ride to low-earth orbit" using Russian boosters and spacecraft. "For the first time in years," he added, the U.S. has "no mission, no dream, no leadership and no remorse."

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 82


1NC Shell

Nasa will push for lazers Lisa Grossman, Reporter, 03-15-11, “NASA Considers Shooting Space Junk With Lasers”, http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2011/03/lasering-space-junk/ [RR]The growing cloud of space junk surrounding the Earth is a hazard to spaceflight, and will only get worse as large pieces of debris collide and fragment. NASA space scientists have hit on a new way to manage the mess: Use mid-powered lasers to nudge space junk off collision courses. The U.S. military currently tracks about 20,000 pieces of junk in low-Earth orbit, most of which are discarded bits of spacecraft or debris from collisions in orbit. The atmosphere naturally drags a portion of this refuse down to Earth every year. But in 1978, NASA astronomer Don Kessler predicted a doomsday scenario: As collisions drive up the debris, we’ll hit a point where the amount of trash is growing faster than it can fall out of the sky. The Earth will end up with a permanent junk belt that could make space too dangerous to fly in, a situation now called “Kessler syndrome.” Low-Earth orbit has already seen some scary smashes and near-misses, including the collision of two communications satellites in 2009. Fragments from that collision nearly hit the International Space Station a few months later. Some models found that the runaway Kessler syndrome is probably already underway at certain orbit elevations. “There’s not a lot of argument that this is going to screw us if we don’t do something,” said NASA engineer Creon Levit. “Right now it’s at the tipping point … and it just keeps getting worse.” In a paper submitted to Advances in Space Research and posted to the preprint server arXiv.org, a team led by NASA space scientist James Mason suggests a novel way to cope: Instead of dragging space junk down to Earth, just make sure the collisions stop. “If you stop that cascade, the beauty of that is that natural atmospheric drag can take its natural course and start taking things down,” said William Marshall, a space scientist at NASA and coauthor of the new study. “It gives the environment an opportunity to clean itself up.” Simply keeping new fragments from forming can make a big difference for orbital safety, Levit said. Because objects with more surface area feel more drag, the atmosphere pulls down the lightest, flattest fragments of space junk first. When big pieces of debris break up into smaller ones, the pieces become harder and harder to remove. Worse, the pieces left behind are often the most dangerous: small, dense things like bolts. “If one collides with a satellite or another piece of debris at the not-unreasonable relative velocity of, say 5 miles per second, it will blow it to smithereens,” Levit said. In the new study, the researchers suggest focusing a mid-powered laser through a telescope to shine on pieces of orbital debris that look like they’re on a collision course. Each photon of laser light carries a tiny amount of momentum. Together, all the photons in the beam can nudge an object in space and slow it down by about .04 inches per second. Shining the laser on bits of space litter for an hour or two a day should be enough to move the whole object by about 650 feet per day, the researchers show. That might not be enough to pull the object out of orbit altogether, but preliminary simulations suggest it could be enough to avoid more than half of all debris collisions. NASA scientists have suggested shooting space junk with lasers before. But earlier plans relied on military-class lasers that would either destroy an object altogether, or vaporize part of its surface and create little plasma plumes that would rocket the piece of litter away. Those lasers would be prohibitively expensive, the team says, not to mention make other space-faring nations nervous about what exactly that military-grade laser is pointing at.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 83


1NC Shell

Dual use of tech inevitably increase military development and dominanceDuvall and Havercroft, 06, [Raymond Duvall, University of Minnesota, and Jonathan Havercroft, University of British Columbia, October 2006, “Taking Sovereignty Out of This World: Space Weapons and Empire of the Future”, http://www.ligi.ubc.ca/sites/liu/files/Publications/Havercroft_paper.pdf]

The placing of weapons in orbital space has an intimate relationship to space exploration, in that the history of the former is embedded in the latter, while the impetus for space exploration, in turn, is embedded in histories of military development. Since the launch of Sputnik, states that have ability to access—and hence to explore—orbital space have sought ways in which that access could improve their military capabilities. Consequently, militaries in general and the U.S. military in particular have had a strong interest in the military uses of 6 space for the last half century. Early on, the military interest in space had two direct expressions: enhancing surveillance; and developing rocketry technologies that could be put to use for earth-based weapons, such as missiles. Militaries also have a vested interest in the “dual-use” technologies that are often developed in space exploration missions. While NASA goes to great lengths in its public relations to stress the benefits to science and the (American) public of its space explorations, it is noteworthy that many of the technologies developed for those missions also have potential military use. The multiple interests that tie together space exploration and space weaponization have been vigorously pursued and now are beginning to be substantially realized by a very small number of militaries, most notably that of the United States. For example, since the 1990 Persian Gulf War, the U.S. military has increasingly relied on assets in space to increase its C4ISR (Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) functions. Most of these functions are now routed through satellites in orbit. In addition, new precision weapons, such as JDAM bombs, and unmanned drones, such as the Predator, rely on Global Positioning System satellites to help direct them to their targets, and often these weapons communicate with headquarters through satellite uplinks.29 For another instance, NASA’s recently completed Deep Impact mission, which entailed smashing part of a probe into a comet to gather information about the content of comet nuclei, directly served the U.S. military in developing the technology and the logistical capabilities to intercept small objects moving at very fast speeds (approximately 23,000 miles per hour).30 As such, the technologies can be adapted for programs such as missile defense, where a similar problem of intercepting an object moving at a very high speed is confronted. So, in a certain sense, the military colonization of orbital space has already begun to a significant extent—it is no longer a distant future vision, nor an unrealizable fiction. We are not in a position to detail all of the technological or strategic manifestations of this important development. Pretending to be able to do so would distract from the purposes of this paper. Our concern, instead, is with the broad forms of space weaponization that are now being actively pursued—again, especially by the U.S.—and/or that are very much alive on the drawing board and in the U.S. military imagination. On the near horizon, three new military uses of orbital space are becoming increasingly possible, and all three seem particularly likely to be carried out by the U.S. The first, which has been an active pursuit since at least the 1980s, is the possibility of using weapons based in space to intercept missile attacks from foreign enemies before these weapons reach their destinations—a space-based missile-defense shield. Second, there is serious discussion in the U.S. military of developing “space

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 84


1NC Shell

control,” which the U.S. Department of Defense defines as “the exploitation of space and the denial of the use of space to adversaries”.31 A third front on which space weaponization is being pursued by the U.S. is through the practice of force application from space. In this instance, weapons of varying types (discussed briefly below) would be placed in orbit, with the ability to attack objects either flying in the Earth’s atmosphere or on or near the Earth’s surface (including even under ground or under water).

(Space wep bad)

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 85


*Uniqueness*

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 86


Credibility LowBolden’s cred low- lack of space focusMark Whittington, has written numerous articles, some for the Washington Post, USA Today the LA Times, 07-05-2010, “Are Charles Bolden's Days as NASA Administrator Numbered?” http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/5556126/are_charles_boldens_days_as_nasa_administrator.html?cat=9 [RR]

Will NASA administrator Charles Bolden be forced to step down in the near future? There is a growing sense of unease about the former astronaut and Marine General reflected in discontent over how the space agency has been run. First, Congressional anger over the somewhat tortured explanations by Bolden about the Obama space plan seems only to be rising. This is coupled by the outrage over the creative use of the Anti Deficiency Act to shut down parts of the Constellation space exploration program, potentially throwing thousands of aerospace contractors out of work even before Congress has voted on the Obama proposal to cancel the Constellation program. Second, questions of a conflict of interest have arisen over Administrator Bolden's attempt to shut down a NASA project involving an experimental biofuel project involving algae. Bolden had come to this decision while consulting with one of his previous employers, Marathon Oil, a company in which he still owns stock and which has its own rival biofuel project. Finally, Charles Bolden opined on the Arabic television network Al Jazeera that the primary mission of NASA was to help Muslim nations "-feel good about their historic contribution to science, math, and engineering." This has caused some Internet wags to suggest that all that space exploration stuff that NASA used to be able to do is now replaced by promoting self esteem. Almost as controversial was Bolden's statement that America, which went to the Moon from a standing start in eight years during the 1960s, can now do almost nothing without international assistance.

NASA cred low now- skeptical congressHillhouse 10, [Jim Hillhouse, Reporter, 12/13/10, “Bolden Releases outline of NASA Strategic Plan”, http://www.americaspace.org/?p=6233]

Today, the NASA Administrator let the NASA family know that the Agency will submit, along with the President’s budget request for NASA, its new Strategic Plan, which will guide the work NASA will perform. How this will contrast with NASA’s appropriations and Authorization Act is yet unanswered. Today’s Space News article, “Continuing Resolution Boosts NASA Budget by $186M“, notes that H.R. 3082, the Continuing Resolution funding, among other entities, NASA that was just voted out of the House, doesn’t necessarily agree with the 2010 NASA Authorization Act that was passed late last September. And while NASA works on charting a path that merges both appropriations and authorization legislation, it needs to be careful to not run afoul of a Congress that is very skeptical, based on December 1st hearing one could say mistrustful, of NASA leadership’s willingness to adhere to the plan Congress, not the President, has handed down to NASA. Several statements by NASA officials as recent as a couple of months ago, whether of launch vehicle designs or of human exploration destinations that NASA saw as its goals, seemed to fly in the face of the just-signed 2010 NASA Authorization Act.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 87


Public Support LowPublic support low Chris Bergin, Reporter, 03-12-2007, “Constellation concerned by the gap in public support for NASA” http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2007/03/constellation-concerned-by-the-gap-in-public-support-for-nasa/ [RR]

NASA’s problem with communicating to the public has been the subject of a number of media reports, some of which – wrongly or rightly – point towards a level of apathy within today’s often described as ’American Idol’ driven youth. OSAC is one group that has been tasked with tackling the problem, and will meet with Constellation to find out where NASA PAO/Communications departments throughout the agency are apparently failing the public. ‘The Integration Deputy Manager and a representative from the Office of Strategic Analysis and Communications (OSAC) are planning to meet with the Constellation Program Strategic Communications Manager Jennifer Radigan at the Johnson Space Center,’ noted Steve Cook’s notes for March, available on L2. ‘This follows a meeting they attended at Marshall with Bob Hopkins, the NASA Assistant Administrator for Communications Planning, who rolled out the Agencyâ€™s strategic communications framework, including key messages built on marketing research and focus group participation. ‘It is clear that there is a gap in support for NASA in the 18-24 age group, and that a sustainable space program depends on long-term advocacy from these future taxpayers and voters. Future planning will address these and other influential audiences based on sound marketing research and messages that are geared toward sharing the value proposition for space.’ Also noted in Steve Cook’s notes was something those 18 to 24 year olds might find ‘cool’ – the development of a Jumbo Drop Test Vehicle (JDTV), a 50,000 pound vehicle that will be used to test the parachute recovery systems of the large five segment first stage booster of the Ares I.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 88


Budget Uncertain

NASA budget in question- Bolden conflict with congressMcGlaun 11 [Shane McGlaun, Reporter, 3/3/11, “NASA’s Charlie Bolden Defends Fiscal 2012 Budget”, http://www.dailytech.com/NASAs+Charlie+Bolden+Defends+Fiscal+2012+Budget/article21047.htm]

The current budget for NASA that will be used in fiscal 2012 is under some intense debate by those close to the agency. NASA chief Charlie Bolden went to Capitol Hill recently to defend the budget that NASA wants for 2012 against those in Congress that think the budget doesn't adhere closely enough to the outlines that were approved last year. The debate around the budget has to do with how much funds will be offered to encourage the development of commercial spacecraft, and how much of the money will be put towards building a new heavy lift rocket that could be used to send astronauts into orbit and to the ISS. The heavy lift rocket was being viewed as a potential backup to the commercial spacecraft and private craft like the SpaceX capsule that became the first private spacecraft to hit orbit. The NASA Authorization bill that was signed into law last year by Obama and set aside money from NASA to fund privately-developed spacecraft that would potentially take over after the final space shuttle mission. The problem some have with the budget that is being outlined for NASA is that it puts less money into the development of the next-generation spacecraft for NASA and more money into funding private development. The total budget for NASA for fiscal 2012 has the backing of Obama and will lock NASA at 2010 levels amounting to $18.7 billion. "While last year's Authorization Act was by no means a perfect bill, it did clearly articulate Congress' intention: that NASA pursue a means of transportation that builds on all the work that’s been done over the past five years," said the committee's ranking Democratic member, Eddie Bernice Johnson (D-Texas). "I do not see it reflected in the proposed NASA budget request." Committee chairman Ralph Hall (R-Texas) said, "The new budget proposal disregards — yes, ignores — our authorization law." "I get your message loud and clear and so does the president," Bolden said. "I think the budget does, in fact reflect following your guidance." Bolden does admit the funds were redistributed in the budget. He continued saying, "Because these are tough fiscal times we also had to make some difficult choices. Reductions are necessary in some areas so we can invest in our future."

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 89


Funding LowNo hope of NASA funding nowCowing 11, [Keith Cowing, Florida Today News, 6/5/11, “Telescope debacle devours NASA Funds”, http://nasawatch.com/archives/2011/06/webb-stifles-fu.html]

"Alan Boss, an astronomer at the Carnegie Institution for Science in Washington who chairs NASA's independent advisory committee on astronomy research, worries the project could eat up a growing share of the nation's funding for astronomy and space science. He's gone so far as to call the telescope's woes "NASA's Hurricane Katrina." NASA has since removed the project from its astrophysics budget, making it a higher priority and less of a drain there. But it's still part of the overall science portfolio, drawing from a limited pot of money. Cash spent on Webb can't be spent on other science, Boss said. NASA concedes Webb will be a priority. Until the issues with Webb are resolved, Boss said, "everything is on hold with regard to funding for any major new projects."

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 90


*Links*

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 91


GenericPlan boosts supportAndrew Lawler, senior writer with Science Magazine, 7-17-09 [“Can Bolden banish NASA’S blues?”, Science Magazine, http://www.sciencemag.org/content/325/5938/261.full.pdf]

Next week marks 40 years since NASA first put men on the moon. But trepidation about the space agency’s future is dampening celebr a t ion of tha t mi l e s tone a chi ev em en t . “NASA is not what it was,” declared the chair of the Senate Commerce, Science, and T r a n s p o r t a t i o n c o m m i t t e e d u r i n g l a s t week’s confirmation hearing for Charles B o l d e n J r . , P r e s i d e n t B a r a c k O b a m a ’ s choice to lead the agency. Rather than inspiring the nation with wondrous feats of science and exploration, said Senator Jay Rockefeller (D–WV), NASA is adrift. The agency’s biggest fan on Capitol Hill agrees. “That magic is gone,” bemoaned Senator Bill Nelson (D–FL), who once flew o n t h e s o o n - t o - b e - r e t i r e d s h u t t l e . E v e n Bolden, a 62-year-old retired Marine general and astronaut, joined the chorus of gloom during a hearing in which legislators lauded his fitness for the job. But some remedies to this midlife crisis are emerging. The day before Bolden testif i e d , t h e Na t i o n a l A c a d em i e s ’ N a t i o n a l Research Council (NRC) released a report urging the space agency to link its efforts to broader national goals. Both the report and Bolden suggest that NASA support more basic research, as it once did, and take the lead in monitoring the environment. Both thrusts will require greater cooperation with other nations, they add. The biggest question facing NASA is w h e t h e r t h e 2 0 0 4 v i s i o n o f P r e s i d e n t G eo rg e W. Bu sh to r e tu r n humans to the moon by 2020 and then on to Mars is still alive. During the presidential campaign, Obama promised to build a large new rocket that can put humans back on the lunar surface, and Bolden told senators that is still in the cards. “We will go on to the moon,” he said. But he avoided mention of any timeline and left up in the air the second phase of B u s h ’ s v i s i o n . “ I w a n t t o g o t o M a r s , ” Bo ld en d e c l a r ed, be for e not ing tha t thi s would be at least a 20-year venture

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 92


International Cooperation

NASA cooperation internationally boosts credibilityNASA 10, [NASA, 2/26/10, “PM Challenge in International Forum”, Volume 3 Issue 2, http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/511758main_AtA_Vol_3_Anthology_v1.0.pdf]

PM Challenge’s first-ever international forum featured representatives from over a half dozen space agencies as well as industry, academia, and nonprofit organizations. With international cooperation and collaboration poised to play an increasing role in NASA’s future, the international forum at PM Challenge 2010 provided an opportunity for NASA to bring together partners from around the world to share perspectives, challenges, and opportunities. Greg Balestrero, President and CEO of the Project Management Institute (PMI), kicked off the forum with an overview of the context for global projects. Challenges such as space exploration require an enabling environment, he said. “The enabling environment is here, and we have to talk about in terms of a global solution.” Michael O’Brien, NASA Assistant Administrator for External Affairs, set the stage by describing the extent of NASA’s international partnerships. Historically, the agency has had over 3,000 international agreements with over 100 countries. It currently has 458 active international agreements with 118 countries, with just 10 partners accounting for half of those agreements. He emphasized that the successful implementation of existing agreements is critical for NASA’s credibility . “Do what you say you’re going to do,” he said. Representatives from three partner agencies provided their perspectives on working with NASA. Andreas Diekmann of the European Space Agency (ESA) suggested that a new trend might be toward more integrated cooperation , with missions that are jointly planned and developed . He contrasted this with past and current international missions that have emphasized discrete contributions from partners. Yoshinori Yoshimura of the Japanese Space Agency (JAXA) noted that changes at NASA can have a dramatic impact on JAXA, and he said that when difficulties arise, partners should try to indicate a common path and build consensus. “The best agreements are difficult to negotiate but don’t have to be referred to later,” said Benoit Marcotte of the Canadian Space Agency (CSA). “They have to be fair for both or all parties.”

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 93


DefenseNASA credibility is based off of their adherence to Congress’s goals—specifically defenseBroniatowski and Weigel 2006 (D. A. Broniatowski and A. L. Weigel, Graduate Research Assistant, Aeronautics and Astronautics/Technology and Policy Program at MIT and Assistant Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics and Engineering Systems at MIT, “Political Sustainability in Space Exploration Architectures,” 2006)

Whereas a program’s costs are driven largely by technical and organizational parameters, Congressional budgeting behavior is driven largely by salience and political compromise. In the absence of a salient interest, NASA can expect to receive an incremental funding baseline – approximately equal between years but for minor stochastic perturbations. On the other hand, periods of non-incremental behavior arise when outside factors conspire to divert funding to or from NASA’s budget. This upset in the status quo can occur for many, often unpredictable reasons. Congressional testimony links salience of NASA’s agenda to national security in the specific context of returning astronauts to LEO after the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia. In addition to the motivations of national pride and prestige associated with having an American presence in LEO, many members of Congress derive distributive benefits from NASA’s human spaceflight programs. The threat inherent in the prospect of the loss of these values and associated distributive benefits is sufficient to gain Congressional attention and, if the testimony of certain American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 7 members of Congress serves as any indication, additional funding. Nevertheless, the conditions of Congressional salience cannot be expected to last forever. If history is any indication, NASA’s budget can be expected to return to an incremental steady-state following the fulfillment of Congress’ desire to return humans to LEO. If NASA is to fulfill the President’s directive to affordably and sustainably explore beyond LEO, funding must be present to enable a successful CEV upgrade. Given this environmental context, design for ease of upgradeability becomes a salient concern for NASA. Political sustainability within this context suggests that NASA should build a CEV that may be easily upgraded later in the future. In the specific example provided by the TPS, NASA should begin development of the Block 2 TPS now while there is funding available. For example, if it is at all possible to minimize future funding by including a lunar-capable TPS in a Block 1 CEV, it should be done. Delaying lunar expenditures until after LEO deployment is not politically sustainable from a lifecycle perspective. Indeed, if the costs of upgrade from Block 1 to Block 2 are too high, the deployment of a lunar-capable CEV will be delayed, and possibly cancelled, in the face of more pressing national priorities. Thus, acceleration of the CEV should be undertaken with utmost care to ensure that the means by which this acceleration is implemented do not undermine the Vision for Space Exploration. This dynamic illustrates the differing preferences of Congress and the President. To the extent that Presidential and Congressional goals are in alignment, one may expect definite action accompanied by the funding required to carry it out. It is therefore unlikely that the Block 1 CEV will be cancelled or significantly delayed. Nevertheless, if the Presidential goal of lunar exploration is to be carried out, NASA must take advantage of the current political environment to design a CEV that does not inspire Congressional ambivalence by exceeding future funding expectations. This will more easily enable a sustainable lunar exploration by helping to keep future development costs for the CEV under the incremental level enforced by Congress-NASA power dynamics. Political sustainability on the part of NASA requires a constant attention to the details of technical design and political choice. Although it might also seem to require a prescience that extends over several years, general principles can apply to how systems are developed in a politically sustainable fashion. In particular, the presence of events that raise an agency’s national salience allows that agency an opportunity to briefly increase expenditures for the purposes of reducing future costs. So as to maintain credibility, these expenditures must be associated with the goals of Congress. Nevertheless, NASA’s ability to control design implementation allows for the selection of a design that can simultaneously satisfy Congressional directives while enabling ease of future execution of the President’s VSE.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 94


Shuttle

Plan boosts NASA credLeonard David, senior writer,7-12-2005 [“The Discovery Mission: NASA’s countdown to credibility”,Space.com, http://www.space.com/1303-discovery-mission-nasas-countdown-credibility.html]

"Clearly a safe return to flight is critical in terms of restoring public and congressional confidence," said Peter Diamandis, Founder and Chairman of the X Prize Foundation in Santa Monica, California. He is a leading advocate for personal spaceflight. Beyond the shuttle's return to flight, Diamandis said, the future of NASA is dependent upon it getting beyond low Earth orbit with a clear vision and strong public support. "NASA needs to re-engage the public, and the way to do that can be summarized into two approaches: Allow the public to personally participate; and do something exciting and wondrous which excites the public's imagination," Diamandis said. Still, other space experts see a range of issues that need early resolution.

Successful space missions boosts public supportLeonard David, senior writer, 7-12-05, “The Discovery Mission: NASA’s countdown to credibility”, Space.com, http://www.space.com/1303-discovery-mission-nasas-countdown-credibility.html [RR]

The impeding liftoff of Discovery is not just a return to flight of the American human spaceflight program. For NASA a victorious shuttle mission will be received by the public as a signal that the agency, shattered by the calamitous Columbia accident, is fixed. Successfully returning the shuttle to active duty also means that the International Space Station can still be assembled in place...not abandoned in place. Also, getting a shuttle off terra firma and safely back down again lends credibility to a visionary space quest: That NASA has the wherewithal to propel humans elsewhere, not only back to the Moon, but onward and outward toward the distant dunes of Mars. But even with all the care that Discovery has received, the shuttle system remains a delicate beast of burden. One super-babied flight does not safeguard the human-rated space transportation system from problems down the road. Just how important, then, is this shuttle liftoff to NASA's long-term future? Public confidence The results of a new CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll released July 11 found that most Americans say they have at least a "fair amount" of confidence in NASA to prevent another disaster akin to the Columbia disaster in February 2003. Nearly three in four Americans favor a continuation of the space shuttle program. And a majority believes that NASA is moving at an appropriate pace in restarting the shuttle effort. A majority also evaluates NASA positively for the job it is doing overall. The poll, carried out June 24-26, found that 74 percent of Americans say the United States should continue the space shuttle program, while 21 percent disagree. "Historically, Americans have supported the program, even in the immediate aftermath of the Challenger and Columbia shuttle disasters," reported Jeffrey Jones of the Gallup Poll group.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 95

http://www.space.com/1303-discovery-mission-nasas-countdown-credibility.html


*Impact Scenarios*

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 96


Mars ColonizationSpecifically, NASA would use political capital to revive the mars programEnke 09, [Brian Enke, Denver Space Industry Examiner, 8/4/09, “Political capital running low for NASA’s Mars science program?”, Examiner, http://www.examiner.com/space-industry-in-denver/political-capital-running-low-for-nasa-s-mars-science-program]

The keynote speaker on the third day of the twelfth annual Mars Society conference, veteran NASA-Ames planetary scientist and astrobiologist Dr. Chris McKay, revealed yet another challenge facing NASA. The once high-flying Mars science program within the Science Mission Directorate (SMD) suffers from a major identity crisis. Already reeling from a massive cost overrun to the 2011 Curiosity rover, the Mars science program has also lost much of its uniqueness within the astrobiology community. Follow the water – follow the life… Astrobiology has formed the heart and soul of the Mars science program for over a decade. The search for life on Mars dictated the goals for a string of missions since the Mars Global Surveyor orbiter in the mid-1990’s. Each robotic mission added to our understanding of the physical conditions on the Red Planet and its potential for harboring sub-surface life forms. While our knowledge of Mars has grown in leaps and bounds, our knowledge of the rest of the solar system has grown too. According to McKay, Mars is no longer unique in its potential as a habitat for non-terrestrial life forms. Europa, Titan, and Enceladus have now surpassed Mars as the most likely and accessible places in the solar system to continue the great search for life elsewhere in the universe. The upcoming decadal survey could demote the Mars science program to a shadow of its former glory. Due to its heavy price tag and lengthy development interval, the next flagship mission in the robotic Mars science program, a Mars Sample Return (MSR) mission planned for around 2020, must receive strong support from the science community if it ever hopes to leave the Earth. The Mars three-step… McKay believes all is not gloom and doom for NASA’s Mars science program. The program might soon receive a major jolt from an unexpected source: NASA’s human spaceflight program within the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD). The ESMD’s Mars program has long endured its own identity crisis, lagging far behind the Lunar exploration program in funding and schedule. NASA still seems determined to attach prerequisite missions to their ESMD Mars program, so McKay suggests the following three precursor activities: a) Returning geological samples from the surface of Mars (a Mars Sample Return mission); b) Traveling to a Near Earth Asteroid to test the in-space components of the Mars exploration hardware; c) Establishing a base on the Moon capable of continuous research operations for 50+ years. The Mars Sample Return mission could potentially bring the SMD and ESMD Mars programs together, giving each the support it needs to thrive over the next decade. The ESMD program provides a new justification for high SMD Mars budgets, while the Mars Sample Return mission reduces the risk of the ultimate ESMD goal, a piloted mission to Mars. The Near Earth Asteroid mission suggested by McKay would not require any new hardware beyond the equipment needed to send human explorers to Mars. Therefore, he hopes the mission won’t be used as an excuse to delay the overall Mars program. The list of potential asteroid destinations contains several with round trip flight times on the order of 150 days. If a small asteroid is chosen, landing maneuvers would closely resemble orbital docking procedures. “To Boldly Stay…” McKay’s goal of selling precursor missions to the Mars-focused crowd at the conference hit a speed bump when he discussed building a research base on the Moon capable of continuous operation for over 50 years. He used the American base at the South Pole as a role model for his lunar base; the privately operated South Pole base has temporarily housed scientists for the past 50 years. He believes a lunar base should be “a goal in and of itself,” with the base striving to become a major exporter of PhD students. His mantra of “to boldly stay” (an improvement upon the Star Trek motto of “to boldly go”) will resonate with the portion of the Mars community dedicated to space settlement – even though McKay’s ideal base would not become a permanent lunar settlement. Unfortunately, “staying” on the

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 97


Mars Colonization

Moon requires significantly more and different hardware than living on Mars, which means significant expense. Unless the current budget climate changes, critics like Mars Society president Dr. Robert Zubrin suggest that NASA can’t build a lunar base unless they delay the more important Mars program by decades. Undaunted by the dilemmas his approach may generate, McKay stated boldly, “I reject the view that we can’t do both.” He believes the Moon’s proximity to Earth makes up for its major environmental disadvantages compared to Mars – despite the inconvenient fact that proximity to Earth is yet another major difference between the two destinations. He believes NASA should develop the long-term lunar base… then step aside, turn the base over to private industry, and continue onward to Mars. The plenary discussion got a bit passionate when Dr. Zubrin questioned the need for a temporary lunar base. Yet the ensuing dialogue revealed that McKay and Zubrin share an underlying goal: NASA needs to change. McKay would prefer the changes come from inside the agency while Zubrin hopes the Augustine Committee will include options in their final report that will lead to changes externally.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 98


Mars ColonizationBolden spends cred on joint Mars expedition.Jonathan Amos, Science correspondent, BBC News, 6-30-2011[“ Mars missions in summer slow lane”, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-13982527

The missions were a key topic for discussion this week at a meeting of the European agency's Industrial Policy Committee (IPC) - its "cheque writing" body. It was expected that the IPC would be presented with a letter from Nasa Administrator Charles Bolden explicitly affirming his country's commitment to take part in the rover mission in 2018. The ExoMars project was initiated by European space ministers six years ago A letter from Washington did arrive, but not until after the start of the two-day gathering. And in the letter, Mr Bolden said Nasa was not yet in a position to promise to provide a rocket, an interplanetary cruise stage to take the 2018 rover to Mars, and a landing system to put it on the surface. These were all elements the Americans said they would like to contribute when the idea of joint missions was first established. In the eyes of Esa, the 2016 orbiter and the 2018 rover are one programme, and without a firm undertaking from the Americans on the latter part of the venture, the Europeans are reluctant to press ahead on the former part. "Before we embark on spending a lot of taxpayers' money, we want to be sure we have the commitment of Nasa," Mr Morel de Westgaver told BBC News. Mr Bolden did say in his letter that he would be working within the US government to get that commitment, and that he hoped to be able to deliver it to the IPC before it meets again in September.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 99

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-13982527


X-37’s/ATVsNASA will develop X-37s and ATVsFAS 11, [FAS, 7/21/11, “X-37, Future X, Advanced Technology Vehicle (ATV)”, http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/man/uswpns/air/xplanes/x37.html]

NASA is considering asking for funding for an X-37 flight test vehicle. This will provide the agency has a sustainable research and technology program in space transportation. There will be a need for a research vehicle after X-33. And one of the facts of the hypersonic or the very high speed vehicle business is that the place to validate systems and components is in-flight. So the team at Marshall and other centers, is working to put together a sustainable research and technology program with flight demonstration, where appropriate, in the investment strategy, that is called X-37 by some. The intended objective of the program is to demonstrate the next generation of technologies. The technologies in X-33 are frozen at 1994. Assuming success at this level of technology, the future requirements of NASA and the commercial industry are going to require a next generation of technologies, and NASA would be ready to develop those and to validate them in the X-37 experimental flight program. While the X-33 is a demonstrator for Earth-to-orbit technologies, Future X demonstrators will flight test technologies for multiple applications including orbital and commercial transport, military spaceplane, human exploration, multi-stage and hypersonics research. In December 1998 NASA selected the Boeing Company, Downey, Calif., for negotiations leading to possible award of a four-year cooperative agreement to develop the first in a continuous series of advanced technology flight demonstrators called Future-X. The total value of the cooperative agreement, including NASA and Boeing contributions, is estimated at $150 million, with an approximate 50/50 sharing agreement. Work conducted under this initiative may include: •Development of core technologies for low-cost space transportation. •Pathfinder vehicle flight tests to prove focused technologies that require a flight environment validation. •Trailblazer vehicles integrated flight demonstrations that validate a vareity of technologies and operations, along with performance and economic feasibility. Possible concepts include all-rocket and air-breathing systems, single and two-stage systems. Work under this cooperative agreement will begin immediately after successful negotiations. In addition, three companies and three NASA Centers were selected for seven Future-X flight experiments with an estimated value of $24 million. The Future-X effort is managed by the Space Transportation Programs Office at NASA's Marshall Space Fight Center, Huntsville, Ala. Future-X vehicles and flight experiments will demonstrate technologies that improve performance and reduce development, production and operating costs of future Earth-to-orbit and in-space transportation systems. Under the cooperative agreement Boeing and NASA will advance 29 separate space transportation technologies through development and flight demonstrations of a modular orbital flight testbed called the Advanced Technology Vehicle (ATV). The ATV is first-ever experimental vehicle that will be flown in both orbital and reentry environments

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 100


Nuclear WeaponsNASA wants nuclear weapons to shoot down NEOsGraham and Schweickart, 08 [Thomas Graham Jr. and Russell L. Schweickart, 2/18/08, “NASA’s Flimsy Argument for Nuclear Weapons”, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=nasas-flimsy-argument-for-nuclear-weapons]

On January 4, 2007, the Wall Street Journal published an op-ed entitled “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” written by an impressive array of statesmen: former secretary of state George Shultz , former secretary of defense William Perry, former secretary of state Henry Kissinger and former senator Sam Nunn of Georgia. In the article the authors worried that the likelihood of international terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons is increasing. They asserted that “unless urgent new actions are taken, the U.S. soon will be compelled to enter a new nuclear era that will be more precarious, psychologically disorienting and economically even more costly than was Cold War deterrence.” Invoking President Ronald Reagan’s call in the 1980s for the abolition of all nuclear weapons, they endorsed “setting the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and working energetically on the actions required to reach that goal.” Recently, however, a counterargument has been advanced—by NASA. In 2005 Congress ordered the space agency to analyze the alternatives that it could employ to divert a near-Earth object (NEO)—an asteroid or comet—if one was found to be on a collision course with our planet. Last March, NASA submitted a report entitled “Near-Earth Object Survey and Deflection Analysis of Alternatives,” having first coordinated its response with the White House, the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy. In its report NASA chose to analyze only the highly improbable threat posed by large NEOs, which very rarely strike Earth, in lieu of the more realistic danger of a collision with one of the cohort of smaller NEOs, which are far more numerous. What is more, the report emphasized the effectiveness of nuclear explosions in providing the force to deflect an NEO from a collision course, but it completely neglected the need for precision in such a procedure.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 101


*Internal Links*

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 102


LeverageCred gives NASA leverage against congressPasztor 10, [Wall Street Journal, 3/4/10, “Chief Bolden Seeks ‘Plan B’ for the Space Agency”, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704541304575100000820591666.html]

NASA chief Charles Bolden has asked senior managers to draw up an alternate plan for the space agency after members of Congress indicated they wanted to reject a White House proposal to hire private companies to ferry U.S. astronauts into orbit and beyond. In an internal National Aeronautics and Space Administration memo viewed by The Wall Street Journal, Mr. Bolden ordered officials to map out "what a potential compromise might look like" to satisfy critics on Capitol Hill. By calling for an alternative plan, Mr. Bolden threatened to undercut White House efforts to get its proposed NASA budget through Congress. The White House is seeking to cancel major existing programs intended to build a new generation of government spacecraft and rockets to carry astronauts into space. .Instead the administration wants to outsource some early missions to smaller companies, such as Orbital Sciences Corp. and Space Exploration Technologies Corp. Under the White House plan, large and small companies would also compete for NASA funds to devise longer-term "game-changing" leaps in space propulsion and other capabilities. Congress has reacted coolly to the White House proposal, which could lead to thousands of job losses in places like Florida, Texas and elsewhere. Many of the targeted programs involve large contractors such as Lockheed Martin Corp. and Alliant Techsystems Inc. The move to draft a compromise highlights behind-the-scenes maneuvering by NASA officials to save big chunks of existing programs now in jeopardy. A space-agency spokesman said that while the administrator "is open to hearing ideas from any member of the NASA team," Mr. Bolden and the ageny "are fully committed to the President's budget" because it "sets the agency on a reinvigorated path of space exploration." The NASA memo, dated March 2, came just a few days after Mr. Bolden faced a tough round of questioning in Congress over the White House plan. The memo suggests the NASA chief and his team were more inclined to try to pacify lawmakers than wage a tough battle to end multibillion-dollar contracts signed under the previous administration. It was written by Michael Coats, director of the Johnson Space Center. In an email, Mr. Coats told senior managers at other centers and program offices that Mr. Bolden "agreed to let us set up a 'Plan B' team" to come up with alternate budget and program priorities. NASA's latest budget has been buffeted by stiff bipartisan opposition from House and Senate members, including Rep. Bart Gordon, the Tennessee Democrat who chairs the House Science and Technology Committee. The memo says Mr. Bolden is meeting with Rep. Gordon "in a couple of days and asked for a one pager with talking points before his meeting." The memo doesn't mention any coordination with senior White House budget aides, or senior policy makers in the President's Office of Science and Technology Policy, who played major roles in devising the administration's position. The memo says the team will work further to "flesh out" alternative approaches consistent with White House budget caps and report through Douglas Cook, the NASA official overseeing the Constellation program to return to the moon, which the White House wants to kill. NASA managers recognize the fiscal challenges they face to retain big-ticket items. "Living within the budget is a huge issue," the memo said, "since it's doubtful we'll get more funding" than the White House requested. On Capitol Hill and in interviews, Mr. Bolden has stressed that he envisions retaining only small portions of the hardware being developed under the Constellation program. But in the memo, which went to NASA offices that have major roles in supervising parts of Constellation, Mr. Coats suggests any alternate plan to please Congress most likely will entail keeping large chunks of Constellation and its planned Orion capsule, designed to transport astronauts to the international space station and beyond. The memo lists "a human spacecraft development effort," heavy-lift rocket development and "a launch vehicle test program" as important elements of any alternate NASA plan. All three are core Constellation objectives. Mr. Coats wrote about quickly assembling a study team and told colleagues: "You can name it anything you want—I don't recommend Constellation or Orion." On Wednesday, NASA spokesman Bob Jacobs said that "after a long period of underinvestment in new technology and unrealistic budgeting," the President's proposals chart a space exploration path "that is bold, ambitious, and, most importantly, achievable."

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 103


LeverageBolden cred would allow NASA leverage against congress SLS demandsSpace Politics 11, [Space Politics, 3/11/11, “As budget debate continues, Bolden says space technology spending safe”, http://www.spacepolitics.com/2011/03/11/as-budget-debate-continues-bolden-says-space-technology-spending-safe/]

Earlier this week the Senate rejected dueling FY11 spending bills, including both HR 1, which the House passed last month, as well as an alternative from Senate appropriators. Now it appears that the next step will be another short-term continuing resolution (CR), as the current CR expires next Friday. This CR would run for three weeks and include $6 billion in spending cuts, at least as proposed by House Republicans, who will release more details about their plans today. One ongoing concern regarding the budget deliberations has been the lack of funding for the agency’s revamped space technology program. The FY11 budget proposal included over $570 million for space technology, but neither the recent House or Senate bills included any explicit funding for the program. The statement from Senate appropriators when they rolled out their budget plan last week noted, almost apologetically, that “NASA will not be provided any funds for requested but new long-range space technology research activities.” However, NASA administrator Charles Bolden said yesterday that claims about the demise of the space technology program are unfounded. “Our understanding is that we have the flexibility to conduct, for the most part, the space technology initiatives we want to do as long as we can go in and communicate with our stakeholders in the Congress and help them understand why we’re putting a priority on this,” he said in response to a question after a speech about innovation at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington. That is based, he explained, on the fact that the language in the proposed full-year CRs gives NASA the flexibility to allocate funding within its various accounts, so long as it communicates those plans with Congress. “So the space technology was not zeroed out in the continuing resolution. They didn’t plus it up and they didn’t take anything off,” Bolden said. “As long as we satisfied their concerns that we not waste the money, I have the flexibility to move the money around.” Separately, Bolden said he was trying to convince Congress that it’s not feasible for NASA to move ahead directly to a 130-metric-ton launch vehicle for the Space Launch System authorized by Congress. “We’re not going to build a 130-metric-ton heavy-lift vehicle. We can’t,” he said. “We continue to negotiate and discuss with the Congress why that is not necessary.” The 2010 authorization act requires the initial development of a vehicle capable of carrying 70 to 100 tons into LEO, with later enhancement to 130 tons. The Senate full-year CR, though, suggested that the heavy-lift vehicle “shall have a lift capability not less than 130 tons”. Bolden also strongly endorsed plans for commercial crew development, stating that by doing so, “we not only create multiple means for accessing low Earth orbit, we also spark an engine for long-term job growth.” He cited in particular two companies with first-round CCDev awards, Blue Origin and Sierra Nevada, as examples of the types of innovation he’s seeking. “We have to embrace the innovators who may be able to do things more cheaply and effectively than we can,” he said, referring to NASA. “New capabilities in commercial space for crew and cargo must, must succeed, and I have every confidence they will.”

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 104


LeverageBolden cred would give him leeway against the bipart opposition from congress he’s currently facingKlamper 10, [Amy Klamper, Space News Reporter, 3/4/10, “Johnson Space Center Prepares ‘Plan B’ with Bolden’s Permission”, http://www.spacenews.com/civil/100304-bolden-ask-johnson-space-center-for-plan.html]

WASHINGTON – NASA Administrator Charles Bolden is expected to discuss changes to U.S. President Barack Obama’s plan to scrap the agency’s Constellation program with at least one top lawmaker this week, according to an internal agency e-mail shared with Space News. In the March 2 document, Michael Coats, director of NASA’s Johnson Space Center in Houston, wrote to the manned spaceflight center’s chief engineer, Stephen Altemus, instructing him to establish a “'Plan B' team” to draw up "a potential compromise," including a series of talking points for Bolden regarding development of a crewed spacecraft, heavy-lift launch vehicle and launch vehicle test program. The e-mail indicates Bolden is to discuss the compromise with House Science and Technology Chairman Bart Gordon (D-Tenn.) “in a couple days.” Bolden, however, said March 4 that he did not request NASA human spaceflight officials to come up with an alternative to Obama's plan. "The President’s Budget for NASA is my budget. I strongly support the priorities and the direction for NASA that he has put forward," Bolden said in a written statement. "I’m open to hearing ideas from any member of the NASA team, but I did not ask anybody for an alternative to the President's plan and budget. We have to be forward thinking and aggressive in our pursuit of new technologies to take us beyond low-Earth orbit, and the President's plan does this. After years of underinvestment in new technology and unrealistic budgeting, we finally have an ambitious plan for NASA that sets the agency on a reinvigorated path of space exploration." Obama’s plan to terminate Constellation, including the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle and Ares family of rockets encountered bipartisan resistance from House and Senate lawmakers during budget hearings held in February. Coats, in his e-mail, said Bolden agreed to the creation of a team to examine changes to the president's plan, adding that Bolden requested "talking points" in advance of his meeting with Gordon, and instructs Altemus to “flesh this out, then report to Charlie through Doug Cooke,” the head of NASA’s Exploration Systems Mission Directorate. Cooke was not a recipient of the e-mail, though Coats sent copies to his deputy, Ellen Ochoa, Robert Lightfoot, director of NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Ala., Bob Cabana, director of NASA’s Kennedy Space Center in Florida, Constellation Program Manager Jeff Hanley, Orion Program Manager Mark Geyer and Edward Mango, launch director for Constellation’s Ares 1-X flight test program. Johnson, Kennedy and Marshall all play central roles in Constellation’s development. “Steve[,] Robert and I talked to Charlie and he agreed to let us set up a ‘Plan B’ team (my term, since Chairman Gordon asked Charlie about his ‘plan B’ at the hearing) to look at what a potential compromise might look like,” Coats wrote, referring to a Feb. 25 hearing before the House Science and Technology Committee in which Gordon urged Bolden to be open to compromise in order to achieve consensus in Congress. In the e-mail, Coats told Altemus to contact Mango, Geyer and Gary Lyles, NASA’s associate director for technical management at Marshall, “to develop that one pager quickly, and set up a team (you can name it anything you want—I don’t recommend Constellation or Orion).” In addition, while Obama’s budget proposal calls for a $6 billion increase to NASA’s top-line spending over the next five years, Coats urged Altemus to keep the alternate proposal’s cost estimates in mind. “Living within the budget is a huge issue, since it’s doubtful we’ll get more funding,” he wrote. Here's the text of the entire e-mail: From: Coats, Michael (JSC-Center-Director)(JSC-AA111) To: Altemus, Stephen J. (JSC-EA111) Cc: Lightfoot, Robert M. (MSFC-DA01); Cabana, Robert D. (KSC-Center-Director)(KSC-AA000); Mango, Edward J. (KSC-FA000); Geyer, Mark S. (JSC-ZV111); Hanley, Jeffrey M. (JSC-ZA111); Ochoa, Ellen (JSC-AB111) Sent: Tue Mar 02 12:34:12 2010 Subject: Plan B team Steve Robert and I talked to Charlie and he agreed to let us set up a “Plan B” team (my term, since Chairman Gordon asked Charlie about his “plan B” at the hearing) to look at what a potential compromise might look like. Charlie is meeting with Chairman Gordon in a couple days and asked for a one pager with talking points before his meeting. Please contact Gary Lyles, Ed Mango, and Mark Geyer to develop that one pager quickly, and set up a team (you can name it anything you want—I don’t recommend Constellation or Orion). Robert and I mentioned the importance of three areas: a human spacecraft development effort; a heavy lift launch vehicle development effort; a launch vehicle test program. Your white paper is a good basis, but please work with Gary, Ed and Mark. Our desire is to establish a team to flesh this out, then report to Charlie through Doug Cooke. Living within the budget is a huge issue, since it’s doubtful we’ll get more funding.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 105


Funding

Increased public support leads to government fundingDuke University, No date given [“Political and Controversial Issues”,,http://www.chem.duke.edu/~jds/cruise_chem/Exobiology/politics.html]

Since its inception, NASA has done its best to manipulate its own image, so that the public will give it support. NASA has gone through three different eras since it was created. In each of these eras, it used a different tactic to win over the public. When NASA was first created, it tried to use nationalism to gain support. From the 1950s to the early 1960s, NASA did this by telling the public that in order for the United States to be successful as a nation, it needed to develop a space program which was second to none. At this time, the United States was in fierce competition with the Soviet Union. In order to gain funds for its research and different programs, NASA convinced the government that it could not afford to fall behind the Soviet Union, or else the United States would suffer severe consequences later. By being superior in space, the United States would be able to demonstrate its superiority , which is important for the nation in international politics. In the mid-1960s, NASA entered a new era in space, and needed to gain public support in a new way. NASA achieved this through romanticism. During this era, Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin had walked on the moon, and the United States public was fascinated with the idea of space exploration. Astronauts were treated as heroes who has returned from a great quest when they came back from space. NASA used this sense of awe about space to bolster support for its programs. Because of the immense backing by the public, the government was happy to support NASA's exploration programs. When NASA achieved a milestone in space, it reflected well on both NASA, and the United States government which financed the mission. Finally, in the early 1970s, NASA once again changed the way the public felt about it in order to gain financial aid. The public was waning with its sentimental feelings about space. NASA needed to show the people of America its importance to the individual, and used pragmatism to do this. This meant showing the public and the government what it could do for them personally. Thus, NASA demonstrated the security and economic gains which are achieved through space exploration and utilization. Some of these include the use of satellites for communication and television, and the deployment of defense systems allowing for the detection of attacks from other countries. In showing how its programs were important to the individual, NASA has been able to keep its support from the public.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 106

http://www.chem.duke.edu/~jds/cruise_chem/Exobiology/politics.html


FundingNASA increased cred and funding would lead to militarization and military control- moon-mars programCook 07, [Richard C. Cook, NASA Analyst, Consultant, Global Research, 1/22/07, “Militarization and the Moon-Mars Program: Another Wrong Turn in Space?”, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=4554]

The way NASA has started its new moon-to-Mars exploration program, the October 2006 White House announcement of a new national space policy, and subsequent statements by the State Department raise grave concerns about whether a new push to militarize space has begun. Events are pointing to an aggressive extension of U.S. supremacy beyond the stratosphere reminiscent of Reagan administration actions in the 1980s. Then it was the militarization of the space shuttle and the start-up of the Strategic Defense Initiative—"Star Wars"—which were gaining momentum until space weapons technology testing halted with the space shuttle Challenger disaster. To date, the principal beneficiary of the moon-Mars program is Lockheed Martin, to which NASA awarded a prime contract with a potential value stated at $8.15 billion. Already the world’s largest defense contractor, Lockheed Martin’s stock yielded an instant bonanza, rising more than seven percent in the five weeks following NASA’s August 2006 announcement. NASA is not paying the giant of the military-industrial complex $8.15 billion to have people hop around and hit golf balls on the moon. The aim of the moon-Mars program is U.S. dominance, as suggested by NASA Administrator Michael Griffin’s statements that "my language"—i.e., English—and not those of "another, bolder or more persistent culture" will be "passed down over the generations to future lunar colonies." The first step will be a colony at the moon’s south pole, described by NASA in a December 2006 announcement. According to Bruce Gagnon of the Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space, "In the end, NASA’s plan to establish permanent bases on the moon will help the military control and dominate access on and off our planet Earth and determine who will extract valuable resources from the moon in the years ahead." NASA’s plans appear to be a step backward to the Cold War perspective which the International Space Station (ISS) was supposed to transcend and is contrary to its original mission. NASA’s 1958 authorization stated that, "The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of the United States that activities in space should be devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of mankind." Fostering a 21st century race to the outposts of the solar system, which Griffin has likened to the armed scramble by European nations for colonies, would not appear to further the visionary goals for which NASA was created. These goals were compromised by the words and actions of the Reagan administration in the 1980s and are being repeated today, as shown by the new national space policy outlined by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. At the landing of the fourth space shuttle mission by Columbia on July 4, 1982, nine months before his March 1983 speech inaugurating SDI, President Ronald Reagan told an audience at Edwards Air Force Base in California that a primary goal of the space program was to "strengthen the security of the United States." A fact sheet issued that day said that the use of space "for peaceful purposes…allows activities in pursuit of national security goals." The language of the October 2006 White House announcement is similar, defining "peaceful purposes" in the use of space as including all "U.S. defense and intelligence-related activities in pursuit of national interests." The announcement was amplified in a December 2006 speech by Undersecretary of State Robert G. Joseph, where he stated that "We reserve the right to defend ourselves against hostile attacks and interference with our space assets. We will, therefore, oppose others who wish to use their military capabilities to impede or deny our access to and use of

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 107


Funding

space. We will seek the best capabilities to protect our space assets by active or passive means." Joseph spoke at the George C. Marshall Institute, which had published a policy statement two months earlier entitled, "The War in Space Has Already Begun." The mixing of civilian and military priorities by NASA led to the Challenger disaster of January 31, 1986, an incident which showed how muddled motives and lack of candor in public programs can result in tragedy. On February 9, 1986, almost two weeks after Challenger was lost, the New York Times published a series of explosive documents, including a memo I had written the previous July—and which I shared with Times science writer Phil Boffey— warning of a possible catastrophe from a flawed O-ring joint. Thus began a cascade of disclosures that included the account of how contractor engineers protested against launching in the cold weather and NASA’s past knowledge of the deficient booster rocket seals. But it was not until after the presidential commission which investigated the disaster completed its work that I learned why NASA kept flying shuttle missions after the worst damage to date had occurred on the seals during a January 1985 cold-weather flight, a full year before Challenger blew up. It was because a launch commit criterion for joint temperature could interfere with the military flights NASA planned to launch for the Air Force out of Vandenberg Air Force base in California, where the weather tended to be cooler than in Florida. Many of these flights were to carry "Star Wars" experiments in preparation for possible future deployment of "third-generation" nuclear weapons, such as the x-ray laser. Flying with the O-ring problem was but one of the design compromises made on the shuttle to accommodate the military. These began at the shuttle’s inception, when NASA abandoned a straight-wing design and agreed to a huge 65,000-pound capacity payload bay to launch military satellites. The shuttle orbiter also had to be as lightweight as possible, which accounted in part for the heat-shield tiles that have been so troublesome. This compromise contributed to the loss of Columbia in 2003 from a reentry fuselage burn-through that began with tile damage at liftoff. The shuttle will stop flying after 2010. But the nationalistic tone of Griffin's language about the moon-Mars program, combined with the gargantuan contract awarded to Lockheed Martin, the Bush administration's 2006 space policy declaration, and the Air Force’s "Strategic Master Plan for FY 2006 and Beyond," which designates space as "the ultimate high ground of U.S. military operations," sets the stage for another attempt to militarize NASA’s manned space activities. These issues point to a flawed direction in U.S. space policy that calls for national debate. The U.S. could gain credibility by reversing its opposition to ongoing efforts at the U.N. to ban weapons in space. NASA has said, almost as an afterthought, that they are talking to other nations, including Russia, China, and India, about involvement in the moon-Mars program, but wouldn’t an honest intention to forego using future manned space activities for military purposes start with the kind of overt international agreements observed with the ISS? Funding is also an issue. In ten years, $100 billion has been spent by the U.S. on the ISS, a half-finished six-person workshop in low-Earth orbit, a cost which does not count the expense of shuttle flights to build and service it. Critics might say the money was "squandered," since, according to Gregg Easterbrook writing in Slate, little of the promised private sector investment ever materialized. Meanwhile, NASA’s space science and aeronautics budgets have been drastically cut just to keep the shuttle and ISS aloft. Has Congress really determined what the moon-Mars program will eventually cost the U.S. government and what its impact will be on a budget whose deficits have again skyrocketed as they did in the Reagan era? Perhaps it's not NASA's question to answer, but it should also be asked how we as a nation can be planning to spend hundreds of billions more to extend our imperial reach throughout the solar system when we cannot provide for our own people at home—when over forty-five million citizens have no health insurance, thirty-five million lack what USDA

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 108


Funding

calls "food security," the income of our middle class is in long-term decline, the city of New Orleans remains largely in ruins, the value of the dollar is plummeting, recession looms from deflating asset bubbles, and we must sell Treasury bonds to China to keep the doors of federal government offices open from one day to the next because, as stated in a July/August 2006 analysis published by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, "the U.S. government is, indeed, bankrupt."

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 109


FundingNASA popularity would increase their fundingSpace Politics 11, [Space Politics, 3/4/11, “More Questions about NASA priorities”, http://www.spacepolitics.com/2011/03/04/more-questions-about-nasa-priorities/]

For the second day in a row, NASA administrator Charles Bolden made the trip to Capitol Hill to discuss the agency’s FY2012 budget request, this time to members of the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee. During the lengthy hearing (nearly three and a half hours, without breaks) members again quizzed Bolden on the agency’s priorities in an era when the agency’s fiscal resources may be mismatched to its plans. “Last year at this time we were in the early stages of what turned out to be a very lengthy, contentious debate about the future direction of NASA’s human spaceflight program,” subcommittee chairman Rep. Frank Wolf (R-VA) said in his opening statement. The passage of the NASA authorization act last year was supposed to end that debate, but now, he said, the question is whether NASA can implement the act. “No amount of authorizing language can hold NASA to a particular goal or commitment if that language isn’t backed up by the budget.” He added that the funding levels in the FY12 budget for the Space Launch System (SLS) and Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) “virtually guarantee that NASA won’t have core launch and crew capabilities in place by 2016,” the deadline in the authorization act. Bolden repeated previous statements that NASA was funding all the programs included in the authorization act, but that the agency had to make “some difficult choices” because of the current fiscal environment. “Reductions were necessary in some areas so that we can invest in the future while living within our means.” He reiterated this during questioning by Wolf, saying that when the agency’s FY11 budget proposal was submitted just 13 months ago “the world was different, and our fiscal situation was really different.” Bolden said NASA put its highest priority on spending on safely flying out the shuttle, followed by providing safe access to the ISS over the next decade through commercial cargo and crew programs. “If we lose the International Space Station, we’re dead in the water” in therms of future human space exploration plans, he said later in the hearing. Nonetheless, committee members sought to find ways to adjust those choices in spending priorities. Several asked about potential duplication of Earth sciences work between NASA other agencies, such as NOAA and USGS; Bolden said that there was no evidence of such duplication, citing a October 2009 GAO report that found no evidence of duplication of NASA programs with those of other agencies. Later, asked about any excess or underutilized properties that NASA could sell to raise money, Bolden said that a facilities master plan is being updated to identify such properties. Committee members did promise some relief in one area, though: the 2010 appropriations language that prevents NASA from terminating any element of Constellation, even those not aligned with the new direction given in the authorization act. “One thing I hope we can do is to, in one of the short-term CRs we’re dealing with, is get you some immediate clarification on that,” Rep. John Culberson (R-TX) said. Bolden tried to walk a fine line in regards to current spending tied to Constellation programs, as members of Congress cited a report from NASA’s Inspector General (IG) earlier this year warning of wasted spending. “I disagree that we are wasting money,” he said, saying that they have tried to focus spending on those programs on efforts that could be applicable to future efforts, but made it clear he wants the language removed. “I do agree with the IG that [with] the soon-as-possible relief from the restriction of terminating the Constellation programs, the better off we’d be.” Wolf also said he would work to preserve a provision in the HR 1 spending bill for FY11 the House passed last month that would prevent NASA and OSTP from spending any money on cooperation with China. Later in the

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 110


Funding

hearing Wolf spoke for several minutes about Chinese human rights abuses, and went so far as to predict that the Chinese government would fall in a democratic uprising like those taking place in the Middle East. “I will fight to the death for this language,” he said. Late in the hearing, Culberson asked about the planetary sciences Decadal Survey, scheduled for release late Monday, and whether NASA had funding to support top missions identified in the survey. He was making a push in particular for a Europa Orbiter mission, a mission identified in the last survey and, he believes, will be a top priority in the new survey. Bolden said they agency will look at the missions identified in the survey and see how they match up with projected funding. (A Space News article published after the hearing, though, suggests funding for a Europa mission will be hard to come by given current budget projections.) One minor bit of news that Bolden made at the hearing regarded the disposition of the shuttle orbiters once the fleet is retired. Asked about this by Rep. Norm Dicks (D-WA), the ranking member of the full committee, Bolden said NASA was planning to make an announcement on April 12, the 30th anniversary of the launch of STS-1. (Dicks also used his question to play up the bid by Seattle’s Museum of Flight; another subcommittee member, Rep. Steve Austria (R-OH), made a pitch for the Museum of the Air Force in Dayton.)

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 111


**Aff Answers**

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 112


*Nasa Cred*

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 113


Rising nowNasa cred rising- working with other companiesDean Sigler, Reporter, 07-17-10, “CAFE News: Become a Part of Aviation History – Help Fund the Green Flight Challenge” http://blog.cafefoundation.org/?p=1330 [RR]

CAFE Foundation has also documented the performance and flying characteristics of over 25 popular light aircraft, providing scientifically accurate verification or rejection of the sometimes extravagant claims of builders and manufacturers. They have created scientific instruments and techniques that have enhanced the collection of accurate data. Hard work and honesty has provided a touchstone for the evaluation of modern light aircraft and earned the Foundation a reputation for reliability and credibility. CAFE’s reputation has led to its being chosen to be an Allied Organization with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to manage the Green Flight Challenge. The GFC is part of NASA’s Centennial Challenges, “a program of incentive prizes to generate novel solutions to problems of interest to NASA and the nation.” The GFC is a major event in itself, one of several such challenges being presented by NASA. As NASA explains, “Allied Organizations are those NASA partners that conduct the Centennial Challenges competitions. NASA provides the prize purse for the competitions, but no funding for the conduct of the competition itself. Allied Organizations may provide additional funding from other sources subject to NASA’s approval. Allied Organizations are selected through a competitive process and agreements are negotiated directly between the Allied Organization and NASA. Allied Organizations cannot compete in the Challenges for which they have responsibility. “Because no NASA funds are provided to fund the conduct of the Challenges, Allied Organizations must administer the Challenges with their own funding or they must raise the funding needed to administer the Challenges through partnerships with Sponsoring Organizations or through other means. Allied Organizations are also permitted to supplement the prize purse with funding from outside organizations, such as a Sponsoring Organization.” Taking an active part through sponsoring the CAFE Foundation’s involvement in the GFC helps fulfill NASA’s goals in funding the Challenges. These goals include: Driving progress in aerospace technology of value to NASA’s missions.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 114


ResilientSupport for nasa is resilientLA Times 08-31-03, “Public support for NASA still high”, http://articles.latimes.com/2003/aug/31/nation/na-shuttlepoll31 [RR]

Sixty percent of Americans are willing to spend what it takes to build a new type of manned spaceship to replace the aging shuttle, according to a new poll. Despite the Columbia disaster and a highly critical report released last week by the accident's investigators, public support for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration remains high. The survey by the Orlando Sentinel found that 81% of Americans consider space exploration very important or somewhat important to the country's future.

Nasa cred high- public still supportingJeff Foust, Reporter, 07-02-07, “NASA’s new outreach plan”, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/899/1 [RR]

While the overall plan was released just last week, one key element of it, the market research commissioned by NASA to determine how the public currently perceives the space agency, was discussed during a presentation by Robert Hopkins, chief of strategic communications at NASA, during a panel session of the International Space Development Conference (ISDC) in Dallas in late May. That research provided a mix of good and bad news for NASA. The good news was that a vast majority of the general public had a favorable impression of the agency: 76 percent, comparable to the Centers for Disease Control and better than other agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency and the Internal Revenue Service (which, despite its poor reputation, still had a favorable impression in the minds of 49 percent of the public). That market research also found that 71 percent thought that it was very or somewhat important that NASA continue with space exploration.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 115


*Congress Opposes*

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 116


GenericCongress reluctant to increase NASA fundingBrian Berger, Reporter, 05-15-11, “Congress Approves $18.45 Billion for NASA” http://www.foxnews.com/scitech/2011/04/15/congress-approves-1845-billion-nasa/ [RR]

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Congress included $18.45 billion for NASA in hard-fought spending compromise lawmakers passed April 14 to fund the federal government for the last five months of the 2011 budget year. Formal passage of the budget compromise Congress and the White House reached April 8 to avert a government shutdown brings an end to the uncertainty that has frustrated decision making at NASA and other federal agencies since the new fiscal year began last October. But it also leaves NASA with a budget some $240 million below last year's level. President Barack Obama is expected to sign the spending legislation, H.R. 1473, despite his party's objections to many of the $38 billion in cuts it contains. Most of the NASA savings were achieved by funding Space Operations — an account that includes the international space station and soon-to-be-retired space shuttle — at about $600 million below the 2010 level and denying increases the White House sought for Aeronautics and Education. There's also no funding specified for Space Technology, a roughly $300 million account NASA hopes to boost to $1 billion next year.

Nasa not worth funding- WEBB provesHank Campbell, Reporter, 07-08-11, “Webb Space Telescope - Why Congress May Be Right To Kill It, http://www.science20.com/science_20/webb_space_telescope_why_congress_may_be_right_kill_it-80701 [RR]

The Webb telescope has likewise been a black hole for funding. In James Webb Space Telescope delivers more bad news last year I noted that the budget was up to $6.5 billion and now an earliest completion date of 2015, though its original claim was it would be done by now. Budgets are finite. Everyone knows this except partisans in science. The $1.5 billion that JWST now claims it needs in order to not waste the billions already spent could fund 5,000 basic science research projects in space science (see While Webb Bleeds, Space Science Hemorrhages) and $1.5 billion is just the latest cost overrun, not the total budget that may come up as more engineering concerns arise - so rather than circle the wagons around this project because it is science and people want to avoid a slippery slope, scientists can do a world of good holding each other accountable and making it less necessary for politicians to do so. The idea behind the Webb Telescope is a great one - continuing the work started by Hubble and Webb will be able to see light from about 250-400 million years after the Big Bang whereas the Hubble Space Telescope sees back to only 800 million years. It sounds esoteric to the public but there are fascinating things we can learn. However, science has to have a cost attached to a value, basic research or not. This is what killed the SSC. Those who compare the Webb Telescope to losing the SSC should take note - canceling the SSC made the much more reasonable, both in cost and engineering, Large Hadron Collider (LHC) a reality. Did it give Europe some ethereal, unquantifiable 'leadership' in physics? No, lots of projects are still done in the US and Japan but the task of finding the Higgs boson, which may not even exist, and its press has fallen to Europe. America still contributes and its knowledge will benefit all scientists, just like the Tevatron in the US has helped all scientists worldwide.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 117


Generic

Congress cutting now- NASA lost $240 millionBrian Berger, Reporter, 04-14-11, “Congress Approves $18.45 Billion for NASA”, http://www.spacenews.com/civil/110414-congress-approves-1845-billion-for-nasa.html [RR]

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Congress included $18.45 billion for NASA in the hard-fought spending compromise lawmakers passed April 14 to fund the federal government for the last five months of the 2011 budget year. Enactment of the budget compromise — which Congress and the White House reached April 8 to avert a government shutdown — brings an end to the uncertainty that has frustrated decision-making at NASA and other federal agencies since the new fiscal year began last October. But it also leaves NASA with a budget some $240 million below last year’s level.

Congress will cut funding- seen as ambitiousWashington Post, 09-29-10,”Congress's budget battle leaves NASA without a clear mission”, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/28/AR2010092805201.html [RR]

This flawed bill only proves that the biggest challenges now facing NASA are on the ground. Members of Congress, hoping to protect jobs in their districts, have fought against the shutdown of the Constellation manned spaceflight program, which a blue-ribbon commission on the future of human spaceflight found to be doomed by excessive ambition and insufficient funds. Without further funding, the commission warned, such a program was not feasible. More funding, in the current economic climate, will not be forthcoming. And simply continuing to provide funding at a level already determined to be inadequate is wasteful. In these straitened economic times, there is little logic to support an ambitious -- and ambitiously underfunded -- plan for NASA that continues its heavy-lift rocket programs, allocates a limited amount of funding for commercial spaceflight and keeps NASA's eyes lifted to the dream of manned flight beyond low-Earth orbit.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 118


Controversial

Nasa funding controversialClara Moskowitz, Reporter, 01-07-11, “NASA stuck in limbo as new Congress takes over”, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40967788/ns/technology_and_science-space/t/nasa-stuck-limbo-new-congress-takes-over/ [RR]

Lawmakers in October passed — and President Obama signed — a NASA authorization bill that gave America's space agency the go-ahead to abandon its previous moon-oriented human spaceflight program and take aim at new targets: visiting an asteroid and Mars. That bill called for NASA to receive $19 billion in 2011 — a boost from the 2010 NASA budget of $18.3 billion. But that promised funding was not appropriated, since the outgoing lawmakers, along with the president, could not agree on a federal budget. Instead they enacted a continuing resolution — a kind of placeholder law until a full budget can be agreed upon — that froze the federal government, including NASA, at 2010 spending levels through March 4. "Clearly the big issue with NASA in this Congress is money," said Henry Hertzfeld, a professor of space policy and international affairs at George Washington University in Washington, D.C. "The details of the budget really hadn't been fully resolved with the old Congress, which left us with a continuing resolution and nothing more. The question is what happens when they begin to start debating NASA." Based on claims by new House Speaker John Boehner (R–Ohio), who said his party will aim to cut non-military discretionary spending back to 2008 levels, the space agency could be in for some serious budget cutbacks.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 119


AT: X-37

NASA weaponization has already started- handed over X-37 to DARPALasker 10, [John Lasker, Reporter, 5/27/10, “US Space Weapon now Circling the Globe”, http://towardfreedom.com/home/content/view/1980/1/]

The US space weapon X-37 is now circling the globe in relative secrecy. It is an unmanned space plane that looks like a smaller version of the Space Shuttle and was launched from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station on April 22, 2010. This new weapon poses threats to global peace and risks sparking an arms race in space. "At one time, [the X-37] was going to replace the Space Shuttle," said Bruce Gagnon, director of the Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space. The replacement plan was scrapped, however. In 2004 NASA handed over the X-37 to DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) and the Phantom Works at Boeing, the major aerospace player racing to develop space weapons and missile defense systems with millions of taxpayer dollars. The X-37 officially is a US Military Space Place or MSP, and like most US space weapons, spreading anxiety across the globe. The Pentagon also has an unknown number of "dual purpose" space planes in the works; the Pentagon has publicly stated in their budgets these prototypes have been tested in wind tunnels. They might be space bombers, but no one is completely sure. They're so secret, no one can say what they'll be used for or how far developed they are. A space vehicle that can repair, deploy and even attack satellites, or insert reconnaissance drones back into the atmosphere - all within hours of orders - is also desired. As one NASA official put it, the space plane will "be the key to opening and conquering the space frontier."

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 120


AT: WeaponizationNASA missions will fall under Pentagon control- weaponization comingWorthingon 11, [Amy Worthington, Global Research, Researcher in Environmental Science, 4/21/11, “Aerosol and Electromagnetic Weapons in the Age of Nuclear War”, http://www.rense.com/general59/aerosolandelectromag.htm]

North America is now suffering its seventh year of conspicuous and dangerous aerosol and electromagnetic operations conducted by the U.S. government under the guise of national security. Concerned citizens watch in fear as military tankers discolor the skies with toxic chemicals that morph into synthetic clouds. We continually witness bizarre meteorological occurrences as powerful electromagnetic devices manipulate both the jet stream and individual storm fronts to create artificial weather and climatic conditions. Black operations projects embedded within these aerosol missions are documented to sicken and disorient select populations with biological test agents and psychotronic mind/mood control technologies. Part of what is happening in the atmosphere above us involves the Pentagon's secret space weapons program, designed for strategic, operational and tactical levels of war. NASA missions will soon be transferred to Pentagon control.1 The Air Force Space Command declares that, in order to monitor and shape world events, it must fight intense, decisive wars with great precision from space.2 Air Force Secretary James G. Roche has stated: "Space capabilities are integrated with, and affect every link in the kill chain."3 A glimpse into new death technologies under construction is in legislation introduced by Ohio Congressman Dennis Kucinch. His unsuccessful Space Preservation Act of 2001 was intended to ban space deployment of:4 * electronic, psychotronic and information weaponry * high altitude ultra low frequency weapons * plasma, electromagnetic, sonic and ultrasonic weapons * laser weapons * strategic, theater, tactical or extraterrestrial weapons * chemical biological, environmental climate or tectonic weapons * chemtrails (this item was stricken from a later version, suggesting duress) In their quest to remain top dog in the kill chain, the purveyors of perpetual war have deliberately dimmed earth's life-giving sunlight,5 and reduced atmospheric visibility with lung-clogging particulates and polymers.6 This ecological terrorism has severely compromised public health, according to thousands of testimonials. Years of mass appeals to legislators, media and military officials for information, and for cessation of catastrophic atmospheric degradation, have fallen on deaf bureaucratic ears. Public awareness of what befalls us remains as murky as our skies because those "in the know" are muzzled by national secrecy laws and Americans have no authority to challenge matters of national security. Left to gather clues, we know this much so far: 1. At least part of the aerosol project has been dubbed Operation Cloverleaf,7 probably due to its multi-faceted operations, which include: weather modification, military communications, space weapons development, ozone and global warming research plus biological weaponry and detection testing. 2. Dumping tons of particulate matter from aircraft has geo-engineered our planetary atmosphere into a highly charged, electrically-conductive plasma useful for military projects.8 The air we breathe is laden with asbestos-sized synthetic fibers and toxic metals, including barium salts, aluminum, and reportedly, radioactive thorium.9 These materials act as electrolytes to enhance conductivity of military radar and radio waves.10 Poisonous on par with arsenic and a proven suppressant of the human immune system,11 atmospheric barium weakens human muscles, including those of the heart.12 Inhaled aluminum goes directly to the brain and medical specialists confirm that it causes oxidative stress within brain tissue, leading to formation of Alzheimer's like neurofibrillary tangles.13 Radioactive thorium is known to cause leukemia and other cancers.14 3. Only a small percentage of the military's atmospheric modification projects are visibly obvious. What we can't see is equally dangerous. The ionosphere, the earth and its inhabitants are

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 121


AT: Weaponization

continually bombarded with high frequency microwaves used to manipulate the charged atmosphere for weather modification, information gathering and for tectonic (earthquake-producing) weaponry.15 Independent chemtrail researcher Clifford Carnicom confirms that we are also continuously subjected to extremely low electromagnetic frequencies (ELF) pulsing at 4 hertz multiples, frequencies known to profoundly affect human biological and mental functioning.16 4. There is a well-documented biological component to continuously ongoing atmospheric studies in which nations and regions are furtively inoculated via specially designed delivery systems with combinations of viruses, bacteria, fungi, mycoplasma, desiccated blood cells and exotic biological markers so that testmasters can assess human, animal and plant response.17 5. The multi-organizational megalith perpetrating these bio-chem projects against humanity includes the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and its research arm DARPA, plus the Department of Energy (DOE) with its huge network of national labs and universities. Private defense contractors and pharmaceutical companies are heavily involved.18 Cooperating governments of other nations and probably some United Nations agencies are complicit, since the aerosol projects are global in scope.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 122


Hypersonic Weapons Turn

NASA will develop Hypersonic Weapons with AirforceSpace 10, [Jeremy Hsu, Space News, 6/17/10, “Air Force Sees Hypersonic Weapons and Spaceships in Future” http://www.space.com/8617-air-force-sees-hypersonic-weapons-spaceships-future.html]

A recent United States Air Force scramjet test has hinted at a future where hypersonic vehicles streak through the sky at many times the speed of sound around the world, and perhaps even open up access to space. The experimental X-51A Waverider used a rocket booster and an air-breathing scramjet to reach a speed of Mach 5 and achieve the longest hypersonic flight ever powered by such an engine on May 26. That technology might not only deliver cargo quickly to different parts of the globe, but could also transform the space industry and spawn true space planes that take off and land from the same runway. The wealth of possibilities offered by aerospace vehicles that can ride their own shockwaves likely explains why the project has drawn support from the Pentagon's Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA), NASA, and the U.S. Navy. "We could have in the future such things as hypersonic weapons that fly 600 nautical miles in 10 minutes," said Charlie Brink, X-51A program manager with the Air Force Research Laboratory at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio, during a June 1 teleconference. [Most destructive space weapon concepts.] Scramjet engines can also eliminate the need for much of the huge oxidizer tanks carried by rockets, because the engines capture oxygen from the air to mix with the fuel while moving at hypersonic speeds. That would permit future space-lift systems or space planes to carry greater payloads and operate more efficiently, Brink said. That concept naturally excites NASA, as the American space agency has continued to consult with the Air Force on the X-51A project, as well as the HIFiRE Flight 2 scramjet experiment. "NASA would ultimately like to enable large vehicles for access to space using air-breathing propulsion," said James Pittman, principal investigator for NASA's hypersonics project at the NASA Langley Research Center in Virginia. But first, military and civilian researchers will have to refine the scramjet engines that marks a significant break from past jet engine technologies.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 123


Hypersonic Weapons Turn

Hypersonic Weapons good- cost low, targeting abilities Grossman 07, [Elaine M. Grossman, Inside Defense, “Army Eyes Advanced Hypersonic Weapon”, http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,121633,00.html]

AHW -- weighing less than 40,000 pounds and measuring less than 35 feet -- is envisioned as a boost-glide weapon capable of attacking targets up to 6,000 kilometers away in less than 35 minutes, according to defense officials. "The Advanced Hypersonic Weapon is inserted into the upper atmosphere with a two-stage rocket, where it separates and hypersonically glides to a designated target," according to an information paper circulated on Capitol Hill and obtained by ITP. "Due to technical advancements in guidance, space-based infrastructure, thermal protection materials and kinetic-energy warheads/fuzes, it is now possible to develop a highly flexible, long-range, low-cost, strategic strike weapon." The initial boost would get AHW to an altitude of about 300,000 feet, after which the system would glide en route to its target at approximately 150,000 feet, according to other sources. Upon nearing its target, the weapon would be capable of maneuver -- an important factor to avoid overflight of third-party nations -- and would home in on its endpoint using a precision guidance system, officials say. AHW could be fitted with a 900-pound penetrator warhead or 900 pounds of rods to impact at Mach 4 speed, sources say. The greatest technical challenge for the nascent Army weapon appears to be a "thermal protection system" that would allow the weapon to endure high temperatures as it flies at hypersonic speeds through the upper atmosphere, ITP has learned. It is unclear, in particular, if newly developed "TPS" materials can withstand flight at the wing's leading edge, according to officials. The first sounding tests would be focused on TPS material survivability in hypersonic flight and recovery, using an experimental payload, officials explain. If that first hurdle is crossed, flight tests could be conducted using a prototyped hypersonic-glide re-entry body. These flight tests would begin to incorporate AHW operational controls with the new TPS materials on excursions of increasingly longer ranges and in more stressful environments, as the weapon nears its 6,000-kilometer capability, according to defense officials.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 124


****SPR/NSSS Recommendation

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 125


NSSS Good

NSSS good- solves crowding and competitivenessPellerin 11 [Cheryl Pellerin, American Forces Press Service, 2/4/11, “National Security Space Strategy Targets Safety and Stability”, National Guard News, http://www.nationalguard.com/news/2011/feb/04/national-security-space-strategy-targets-safety-and-stability]

The National Security Space Strategy released today responds to the realities of a space environment that is increasingly crowded, challenging and competitive, said senior Defense Department officials. "The National Security Space Strategy represents a significant departure from past practice," Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said in a DoD news release issued today. "It is a pragmatic approach to maintain the advantages we derive from space while confronting the new challenges we face." Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte, the deputy secretary of defense for space policy, told the Pentagon Channel and American Forces Press Service that this is the first national security space strategy co-signed by the secretary of defense and the director of national intelligence. "Space has changed in fundamental ways, and that requires us to change our strategy," Schulte said. Gates and Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper "have signed a document that shows the new directions we need to go," he added. The 10-year strategy concludes the congressionally mandated Space Posture Review by providing strategic objectives and approaches for national security space. The Defense Department and the intelligence community submitted an interim report to Congress in March that delayed a review of national security space policy and objectives until after the release of the U.S. National Space Policy in June. Perhaps the strategy's most important message, Schulte said, "is that we have to think differently about how we operate in space." For example, he said, "we have to think about how to encourage other countries to act responsibly in space and how the United States can provide leadership in that regard. "Secondly," he added, "we have to think about how we can better leverage the growing amount of foreign commercial capabilities that are now in space. And third, we need to think differently about how to deter others from attacking our space assets." As in the past, he said, the Defense Department must protect space capabilities to protect the warfighter, whether it's communications, surveillance or global positioning. "It's space that allows our Soldiers to see over the next hill," Schulte said. "It's space that allows us to communicate quickly. It's space that allows us to see whether hostile missiles are launched, so we need to preserve that capability. "Our goal is to make the peaceful use of space available to all countries," he added, noting that the peaceful use of space includes support for critical defense capabilities. "Space becomes critical to everything we do, and that's why we're worried that the environment is increasingly challenging," Schulte said. "You have more debris in space, and you have countries that are developing counterspace capabilities that can be used against us. That's why this strategy emphasizes the need to protect our capabilities, protect our industrial base and protect the space domain itself." U.S. Strategic Command officials at Offutt Air Force Base, NE, are working with other countries and commercial firms to increase situational awareness in space. "Stratcom was once in charge of delivering nuclear weapons," Schulte said. "Stratcom is now also delivering warnings of potential collisions in space to any variety of countries because we have an interest in preventing more collisions and more debris." The military also must begin to consider operating in coalitions in space, he said. "In just about every other domain—at sea, in the air, on the ground—we operate with allies and partners. There are good reasons to do it," Schulte said. Potential partners include members of NATO, whose new 10-year strategic concept issued last year "acknowledged for the first time that access to space is something you can't take for granted," he said. The Joint Space Operations Center at Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA, is a focal point for the operational use of worldwide U.S. space forces, Schulte said, and it allows the commander of

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 126


NSSS Good

Stratcom's joint functional component command for space to integrate space power into global military operations. "We would like to make that into a [combined center]," Schulte said, "where we bring in our closest allies and eventually others, so that like in other domains, we can conduct combined operations." The 10-year National Security Space Strategy will require at least that long to implement, he said. "You will see some early indications of it in the president's budget for 2012, and you will see more in his budget for 2013, but ultimately what we're trying to do is affect programs of the services, particularly the Air Force, over the longer term," Schulte said. "We're trying to affect how we train, we're trying to affect how we plan, and we're trying to affect the diplomacy we conduct with the Department of State. So I think you'll see [the strategy] roll out in many different ways. In fact, you're already seeing elements of it." On Jan. 6, Gates announced that he would use some of the efficiency savings Air Force officials identified to invest in the U.S. launch capability to help in protecting the industrial base, Schulte said. Defense Department officials are working Australia on sharing of space situational awareness and are talking to the commercial sector about how DoD can host payloads on their satellites, he said. "And we're looking for a whole range of activities to implement the new strategy in a budget-constrained environment," he added Schulte said to get DoD organized for space, Deputy Defense Secretary William J. Lynn III created the Space Defense Council, to be chaired by Air Force Secretary Michael B. Donley. "The secretary and the deputy have entrusted to Secretary Donley the role of moving forward with our strategy," he said, "and the Defense Space Council provides a forum to do that."

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 127


NSSS good- futureNSSS is good – guides future space policiesSchculte 2011 (Gregory L. Shculte, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense of Space Policy, "National Space Security Strategy Outlines Rules of the Road," 2/13/2011 pg online @ www.oc180news.com/article/US_Department_of_Defense/US_Department_of_Defense/National_Space_Security_Strategy_Outlines_Rules_Of_The_Road/19830//gh-arjun)

WASHINGTON, Feb. 11, 2011 - Department of Defense's strategic approach to space must change. This is the message of the National Security Space Strategy recently approved by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Director of National Intelligence James Clapper. During the Cold War, space was the private reserve of the United States and Soviet Union. It was the "high frontier," from which we could support national defense and power projection with near impunity. Space capabilities were essential to such strategic tasks as monitoring compliance with arms control treaties and providing early warning of nuclear attack. Today, space capabilities support a much broader range of domestic and global needs. Space systems benefit the global economy, enhance our national security, strengthen international relationships, advance scientific discovery, and improve our way of life. Many nations have recognized the benefits derived from space, and the United States increasingly shares the domain with more and more space-faring countries -- both close allies, like France and Japan, and potential adversaries. And space is increasingly congested, competitive, and contested - challenges that we refer to as "the three C's." U.S. policy must first adapt to increased congestion in space. There are over 1,100 active systems in orbit and an additional 21,000 pieces of debris littering the skies and posing a threat to our satellites. Radio frequency interference is also a concern, with more than 9,000 transponders relaying communications between spacecraft and the ground expected in orbit by 2015. Either radio interference or collision with a piece of debris could render a satellite useless, depriving military forces and national decision-makers of the information it collects and transmits. Space is also the object of increased competition between nations. When the space age began, only the United States and the Soviet Union had the technology and industrial capacity to develop space capabilities. In recent years, however, growing international interest in space capabilities has spurred space industries in many more nations. The U.S. share of worldwide satellite exports has dropped from nearly two-thirds in 1997 to one-third in 2008. Eleven countries are operating 22 launch sites. More than 60 nations and government consortia currently operate satellites. In sum, the U.S. competitive advantage in space has decreased as market-entry barriers have lowered, and the U.S. technological lead is eroding in several areas as expertise among other nations increases. America's assets in space are also increasingly contested by its rivals and adversaries. China demonstrated a direct-ascent anti-satellite capability in 2007 and is developing other capabilities to disrupt and disable satellites. Iran and others have demonstrated the ability to jam satellite signals. Our reliance on space tempts potential adversaries to see it as a vulnerability to be exploited. To confront these challenges, the new National Security Space Strategy begins the process of outlining the rules of the road when it comes to space. The current body of international space law resides in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) and its associated conventions. While the OST is a good departure point, a clearer definition of responsible behavior can help minimize the chances for mishaps, misperception, and mistrust in space. Rules can help the United States minimize the chance of collisions in space, reduce unintentional radio frequency interference, maximize the use of crowded orbits, and discourage destabilizing behavior such as intentional interference with space systems in times of crisis. Rules encourage good conduct but also provide a way to hold accountable those who would engage in malign acts. As a first step in

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 128


NSSS good- future

developing rules, we are working closely with the State Department to evaluate the European Union's proposed code of conduct for the use of space and are encouraging other space-faring countries, including Russia, China, and India, to do the same. We are considering what further measures of transparency, verification, and confidence-building can enhance the stability of space. And we are working with the State Department to establish and conduct bilateral and multilateral space security dialogues with existing and emerging space-faring nations to encourage increased transparency and confidence building measures. Rules of the road need to be accompanied by practical measures to support implementation and monitor compliance. U.S. Strategic Command, the military combatant command with responsibility for space, is already doing important work to help other countries avoid collisions by providing Space Situational Awareness services. Just as the Air Force through USSTRATCOM is the world's premier provider of global positioning data, USSTRATCOM is becoming the world's premier provider of collision warning. Fostering broader sharing of space situational awareness information to avoid collisions is a first step toward shared responsibility for the safety, stability, and security of the space domain.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 129


NSSS good- future

NSSS key to successful space futureAerospace Industries Association 2011(Aerospace Industries Association, the Aerospace Industries Association is the most authoritative and influential trade association representing the nation's leading manufacturers and suppliers of civil, military and business aircraft, helicopters, unmanned aircraft systems, space systems, aircraft engines, homeland and cybersecurity systems, materiel and related components, equipment services and information technology, 2/8/2011 pg online @ www.lexisnexis.com//gh-arjun)

ARLINGTON, Va., Feb. 8, 2011 /PRNewswire-USNewswire/ -- AIA is very encouraged that the newly released National Security Space Strategy emphasizes the need for a healthy space industrial base. "We've long supported a more cohesive, strategic approach to managing our nation's space enterprise," said AIA President and CEO Marion C. Blakey. "The strategy's commitment to maintaining a healthy industrial base, including focused science, research and development efforts and promoting STEM education and professional development is crucial to success in the space arena." AIA believes it is absolutely critical to establish an open and ongoing dialogue and partnership with the Defense Department and the Intelligence Community to develop and execute the implementation plans needed to move forward. In addition, securing the budgets and funding needed to realize this strategy and to deliver vital space capabilities to our nation is of utmost importance. "Defense Secretary Gates and Director of National Intelligence Clapper are to be congratulated for the first ever jointly signed National Security Space strategy," Blakey said. "In today's contested, congested and competitive space environment having a clearly enunciated plan in which government and industry work together is more important than ever."

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 130


NSSS Clarification needed

Lack of clarity in NSSS means US will remain vulnerableBuxbaum 11(Peter A Buxbaum, ISN Insights, 6/28/11, “Taming the Heavens: The New Space Diplomacy”, http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Taming_the_Heavens_The_New_Space_Diplomacy_999.html//gh-ag)

Laura Grego, a scientist in the Union of Concerned Scientists' Global Security Program told ISN Insights that the "Code does not mention space weapons of any kind, nor would it meaningfully limit their development." The senators' attempt at "inhibiting these initial efforts to establish norms is shortsighted and counterproductive," she said."Norms are a modest step in the right direction," Grego added, "but leave many of the serious problems of space security unaddressed. Without robust constraints on anti-satellite weapons, threats to satellites will continue to proliferate and mature, requiring the United States to expend more effort securing satellites and leading to less predictability and stability in crises."

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 131


NSSS modification possibleNSSS can be modified ACQ 4 [Space Human Capital Resources, 2/4, “Space Human Capital Resources Strategy”, http://www.acq.osd.mil/nsso/SpaceCadre/hcrwg/NSS%20HCR%20Strategy%20_Final%20FEB%202004_.pdf]

Annual Battle Rhythm Following the initial implementation there will be an ongoing process based on the calendar year in order to properly manage the space cadre. Deliver an annual “Space Cadre Update Report” to SecDef and DCI Update the National Security Space Strategy and National Security Space Plan, to reflect the tasks and activities associated with space cadre management Call for and implement demonstration projects Implement best practices

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 132


NSSS spillsoverNew policies follow NSSS exampleDefense 11 [National Security Space Strategy Fact Sheet, 1/19/2011http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0111_nsss/docs/2011_01_19_NSSS_Fact_Sheet_FINAL.pdf]

Strategic Approaches: The NSSS draws on all elements of national power and requires active U.S. leadership in space. The United States will pursue a set of interrelated strategic approaches to meet our national security space objectives: FACT SHEET: National Security Space Strategy • Promote responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space; • Provide improved U.S. space capabilities; • Partner with responsible nations, international organizations, and commercial firms; • Prevent and deter aggression against space infrastructure that supports U.S. national security; and • Prepare to defeat attacks and to operate in a degraded environment. Addressing the Challenges: Congestion – Our words and deeds should reassure our allies and the world at large of our intent to act peacefully and responsibly in space; we will encourage others to do the same. To strengthen safety, stability, and security in space, we will: • Establish norms and transparency and confidence-building measures; • Enhance space situational awareness; and • Foster greater transparency and sharing of space-derived information. Contested environment – We will use a multilayered deterrence approach to prevent and deter aggression. We will: • Support efforts to promote norms of responsible behavior in space; • Pursue partnerships that encourage restraint; • Improve our ability to attribute attacks, strengthen our resilience, and retain the right to respond, should deterrence fail. Competition – A resilient, healthy, and flexible space industrial base must underpin all of our activities in space. To energize the industrial base that supports U.S. national security, we will: • Enhance our space capabilities; • Improve our acquisition processes; • Foster a healthy U.S. industrial base; and • Strengthen our collaboration and cooperation. Next steps: The National Security Space Strategy will inform future planning, programming, acquisition, operations, and analysis guidance. The Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community will work with other U.S. Government agencies and partners, as well as with foreign governments and commercial partners, to update, balance, and integrate all of the tools of U.S. power. We will evolve policies, strategies, and doctrine pertaining to national security space.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 133


***Obama Space Policy

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 134


US assets vulnerable

Space vehicles and launch processes still vulnerable- lack competitivenessConaton and Barnes, 2011, [Erin C. Conaton, Undersecretary of the Air Force, oversees Air Force annual budget, previously staff director of the US House Committee on Armed Services, minority staff director, and Rudy Barnes, Special Assistance, UnderSecretary of the AirForce, senior civilian advior, senior manager for Sandia National Laboratories, previously staff member for House Armed Services Committee and Lead Staff for Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Feb 2011, “Air Force Implementation of the National Space Policy: Space Situational Awareness and Launch”, http://www.afspc.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-110224-052.pdf]

In addition, for many critically important payloads there is no backup system, and the leading cause of delayed capability in space continues to be late delivery of space vehicles. So while our focus on mission assurance is producing the desired results, there are elements of fragility behind our launch successes that require additional work. At the same time, our current acquisition strategy for launch services is not adequately containing costs, and is straining the industrial base with small buys and short-term demand forecasts. Air Force senior leaders understand that purchasing launch hardware one launch at a time will not sustain the capability over the long term—and perhaps not even over the short term. Consequently, we are examining options that could provide a steady baseline transportation capability, such as utilizing block-buys with quantities tied to expected demand for launch services. The government would of course assume some risk with a block buy approach, but working in partnership with NASA and NRO, such risk should be mitigated over time to a manageable level. And these changes in our approach to the acquisition of launch capability and services must be made in concert with a more economical launch business case. The mandate to sustain our focus on mission assurance, then, is matched by our determination to do better. The new NSP makes clear that Air Force contributions to national security via our space programs are enormous—not least in the area of space launch and assured access. But to be good stewards of the space mission in the emerging budget environment, we have to make our programs more competitive. Consequently, the Air Force is working to ensure the reliability of EELV is matched by a contract structure that enables more efficient production and that provides more affordable launch vehicles for our space enterprise. As part of this effort, and in tandem with our industry partners, the Air Force is pressing to make our space acquisition contracts more transparent, to provide greater visibility into the way our resources are applied. Without such visibility, we are unable to demonstrate with the value of our investment with the granularity required by the DoD and Congress. The new NSP’s emphasis on assured access and the dependence of all other space activities on launch underscore the urgency of our efforts.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 135


US Vulnerable- Shuttle

Termination of shuttle program leaves US space assets vulnerableSpudis 11, [Paul D. Spudis, Synthesis Group, Clementine Mission Science Team, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory senior staff scientist, Lunar and Planetary Institute Senior Staff Scientist, formerly worked for US Geological Survey, NASA Office of Space Science, Solar System Exploration Division, PhD in geology, 6/25/11, “ISS and the soon-to-be discarded Shuttle; Last tango in Earth orbit- NASA Shifts into Neutral”, http://blogs.airspacemag.com/moon/]

By moving forward on their mission to convert the U.S. fleet of Space Shuttles into museum pieces, the administration has shifted NASA into neutral. America’s multi-billion dollar investment in the International Space Station (ISS) and our access to space is in jeopardy. As a result of the termination of the Shuttle program, we have no means to assure ISS health and safety or the continuation of manned-space for the coming decade. True, the “retirement” of the Shuttle is an event long-planned — announced in 2004 as part of the Vision for Space Exploration (VSE). But contrary to common belief, the VSE plan to retire Shuttle was not because it is “too dangerous to fly” or “outdated technology.” Rather, its retirement was intended to free up that portion of the NASA budget it consumes, with that money going to the development of new space vehicles for human missions beyond low Earth orbit—the limit of Shuttle’s reach. In 2004, it was understood that the old and new systems would not seamlessly overlap in time, but in the past eight years, the “gap” of time between the last flight of the Shuttle and the first flight of whatever system succeeds it has increased alarmingly from months to years and now finally, to infinity. The spaceflight “gap,” once seen as risky, now looms before us a black hole of uncertainty. Our country is set to eliminate the one proven system remaining under our control that can access both space and the ISS. The only thing clear about the administration’s current plan is the confusion surrounding it. Initially, the proposal was to replace a government-built and operated space transportation system with a contractor-controlled one. Coined “New Space,” these contractors were to provide access to orbit for both cargo and people. The New Space path was already being pursued under VSE – not as an immediate replacement for a government system but as an interim adjunct to it. The belief and hope of the agency under VSE was that a transition period would allow commercial companies to design, build and perfect their systems into operational status, while working through anticipated difficulties in technology, budget and program set-backs. As NASA began transitioning away from ISS re-supply, workforce continuity would remain as we began building systems for missions beyond low Earth orbit. New Space advocates claim that as “commercial” entities, they can provide the needed capabilities to service ISS faster and at a fraction of the cost of either Shuttle or a new government system. If this promise sounds familiar, it is because thirty years ago, as part of the marketing for Shuttle, we heard similar arguments. What we learned then was that spaceflight is difficult, unforgiving and expensive. While one could argue that Shuttle is an inherently flawed transportation system, it still is a working system and it works because we expended the time, experience and money needed to make it work. Any of the new systems (“commercial” or government) will not have the unique capabilities of Shuttle. Unlike the current “capsule” configuration of the new planned spacecraft, Shuttle carries crew (7 people) and cargo, the latter in enormous quantity – over 24,000 kg per flight. The Russian Soyuz crew (3 people) or Progress cargo vehicles (2350 kg) deliver but a fraction of this so-called “up mass” (the amount of material delivered to the ISS) per launch. The large payload capacity of Shuttle was necessary to build the ISS. Now that Station is complete, one might argue that smaller amounts of cargo delivery are

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 136


adequate to maintain it. This might be true for normal operations but what happens if a catastrophic failure occurs? The largest part that can be sent to Station will be less than ¼ the mass that Shuttle can deliver. An example of a possible critical need would be a de-orbit motor. If the ISS became uninhabitable or suffered a failure, its orbit would begin to decay. In order to keep over one million pounds of debris from re-entering Earth’s atmosphere, breaking up and falling onto that part of the globe where 98% of humanity resides, a rocket engine must be delivered and attached to send the ISS on a controlled descent into uninhabited areas over the oceans. Beyond the safety issue surrounding the loss of Shuttle’s capability to deliver to LEO, Shuttle is also an operational service platform when on-orbit. It has an airlock, permitting crew to conduct EVA to repair and maintain ISS and other spacecraft on a routine basis. The only way crew can EVA from the

US Vulnerable- Shuttle

<card continues>

Shuttle’s successor will be to depressurize the entire vehicle, a complex and dangerous maneuver that will likely be conducted only in the event of an emergency. The large stable base of the Shuttle (100 tons on-orbit) permits it to have a robotic operating arm to use both in conjunction with space-walking astronauts and independently. Balky space satellites and parts are firmly held in its cargo bay while repairs are safely completed. Astronauts attempting to service small-mass, free flying satellites find that they drift away, rotating at the slightest touch. The Shuttle serves as a “hangar” in space in which repairs and maintenance can be safely and efficiently accomplished. Ignoring these considerations is troubling, but might be less so if there were any evidence that serious thought had been given to them. Under our previous direction, it was fully understood that a Shuttle replacement system would be in the pipeline and by now (a bit late and after the usual developmental problems) would have been cutting metal. In contrast, we now have nothing but policy chaos. Summary cancellation of the Constellation rocket system may have been justified on grounds of cost, but the wishful thinking represented by its imaginary replacement is simply unconscionable. Despite the loud and persistent claims of many in the space media, “commercial” providers are not going to produce anywhere near the same capability that Shuttle gives us, even if, through some miracle, they are successful in both budget and schedule. Yet, in the coming decade, essentially the same amount of spending is proposed. New Space, for all its marketing and eager supporters, has entered a realm where their success on the time frame and budget envisioned – that will greatly affect us all—is uncertain. For a country in troubled times, it is foolhardy, short-sighted and financially ignorant to destroy the one working space access system we have. For New Space cheerleaders to herald the new path as a wonderful anomaly in a sea of otherwise benighted government meddling is to be blind to the reality of the current climate and of the importance of the job they have been handed. The “New Space” companies that NASA currently funds will have the same problems of money, time and architecture that space projects traditionally have had. How long will our rapidly growing government (with its rapidly shrinking discretionary budget) patiently support “commercial” New Space efforts? In the past, we were assured of government’s ability to project power and protect national interests in space. After the last Shuttle flies, NASA will idle in neutral for the indefinite future. Our space program is adrift—a barometer of our national condition. Sometimes events dictate a course correction. Now is not the time to stop flying Shuttle.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 137


Obama goal = security

Obama policies will be aimed at preserving US safety and securityKueter 10, [Jeff Kueter, President at George C. Marshall Institute, Policy Outlook, July 2010, “Evaluating the Obama National Space Policy: Continuity and New Priorities”, http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/900.pdf]

International Leadership and Space Arms Control In both the statement of principles and elsewhere, the Obama policy places great emphasis on “space leadership.” Early commentators see the policy as a dramatic revision of past policies with its emphasis on international cooperation and commitment to “bilateral and multilateral transparency and confidence building measures.” The “guidelines” section offers details on how the policy would strengthen U.S. space leadership and there is a separate section discussing transparency and confidence-building measures. The Bush policy lacks these details, but it is wrong to interpret it as eschewing U.S. leadership in space. The Bush policy set a specific goal of strengthening the nation’s space leadership, directed the State Department and related agencies to work internationally to build support for the principles and activities outlined in the policy, and routinely referenced working through international fora in the context of specific topics. For example, the Bush policy called for the U.S. to assume a leadership role in international discussions and organizations to encourage the adoption of “policies and practices aimed at debris minimization” and to encourage cooperation “in the exchange of information on debris research and the identification of improved debris mitigation practices.” A careful examination of the actions of the Bush Administration also reveals great use of pertinent international bodies for purposes related to the transparency and confidence-building activities suggested in the Obama policy. 10 In pursuit of transparency, the Bush policy directed the Secretary of State and others, as they are in the Obama policy, to “carry out public diplomacy efforts, as appropriate, to build an understanding of and support for U.S. national space policies and programs …” The Obama policy discusses these issues in greater detail, but whether the added detail reflects a dramatic shift in U.S. actions remains to be seen. The two policies address the prospect of space arms control differently. The Bush Administration’s statements on the utility of space arms control were widely pilloried in the national and international media, and by numerous arms control and space policy experts. Overlooked initially in the rush to condemn the language was the similarities shared with the 1996 policy and ones before it. Famously, the Bush policy opposed “the development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit U.S. access to or use of space,” which meant that arms control agreements that would have impaired or restricted U.S. rights to act in its national interests in space were to be rejected on face. Critics savaged the Bush policy for this language. But the statement reaffirmed the bedrock principles guaranteeing freedom of access to space and the right to protect, defend, and deter attacks on U.S. assets and interests in space by rejecting limits on those basic principles. The explicit nature of the statement left little doubt about where the U.S. stood on the question. Can the same be said for the Obama policy? The Obama policy says that the U.S. “will consider proposals and concepts for arms control measures if they are equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance the security of the United States and its allies.” The statement is open to interpretation. On the one hand, it says that the U.S. will agree to talk space arms control, but we don’t commit to doing anything unless it meets these standards, which are not defined. If the standards are held strictly, then the arms control discussions will inevitably falter because the proposals have not proven to be equitable, verifiable or in the interests in U.S. security.11 On the other hand, if those standards are defined loosely, the statement opens the door for a space arms control agreement that may prove harmful to U.S. security. The Administration’s language may be intentionally vague in hopes of signaling a reversal of attitude regarding the discussion of arms control

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 138


without actually reversing the positions of the U.S. vis-à-vis arms control. Only time will tell. A third new term offered in the new policy is “stability.” The Obama policy sets a goal to “strengthen stability in space” and ranks stability in space among the vital interests of U.S. The term is nowhere to be found in the Bush policy. Like sustainability and responsible behavior, the term is not defined.

Obama goal = security

When first introduced in the principles section, the policy proclaims the “shared interest of all nations to act responsibly in space to help prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and mistrust” following which the policy says that sustainability, stability, and free access are vital national interests. Is the term meant to refer to the relationships between states as it regards space? If so, who determines whether space is stable”? Is there a common view of what a “stable” space security environment looks like? And, is that view in U.S. interests? Is the use of space for terrestrial warfighting purposes an “unstable” use of space? If so, the consequences for the U.S. are profound.12

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 139


Space policy needs to change

Space has changed- old policies no longer relevantLynn 2011, [William J. Lynn III, Deputy Secretary of Defense at the Pentagon, Senior Vice President of Government Operations and Strategy at Raytheon Company, Executive Vice President of DFI International, Feb 2011, “Remarks on Space Policy”http://www.afspc.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-110224-052.pdf]

A decade into the 21st century, space is characterized by what I have called the three C’s: congested, contested, and competitive. Congested because 60 nations now have a presence in space. 9,000 satellite transponders will be active by 2015. And the skies over Earth are so cluttered with debris that further collisions could eventually put some usable orbits in jeopardy. As I said in April, we are approaching a point at which the limitless frontier no longer seems quite so limitless. Space is also becoming contested. In today’s space environment we cannot take the stability or sustainability of space—or access to it—for granted. It used to be that the primary threat to a satellite was launch failure. Now many countries can hold space systems at risk through kinetic and non-kinetic means. Some nations are even jamming satellite signals to censor news, illustrating how counter space capabilities can be used for political, as well as military purposes. The market for space services has also become more competitive. US firms once captured nearly three quarters of global business. They now account for 30 to 40 percent. In short, the space environment has fundamentally changed, and probably irrevocably so.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 140


Obama Space Policy v. Bush

Obama advocates continued defense of space interests but urges all nations to engage in responsible behaviorKueter 10, [Jeff Kueter, President at George C. Marshall Institute, Policy Outlook, July 2010, “Evaluating the Obama National Space Policy: Continuity and New Priorities”, http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/900.pdf]

Both policies include strong language upholding the right of the U.S. to defend its interests. The Obama policy states that the U.S. may: “… consistent with the inherent right of self-defense, deter others from interference and attack, defend our space systems and contribute to the defense of allied space systems, and, if deterrence fails, defeat efforts to attack them.” U.S. efforts to deter, defend against, and defeat attacks in space remain a priority and are discussed again when the policy offers guidance to the Secretary of Defense. But, this language is not as direct as that included in the Bush policy. The 2006 policy said the U.S. may act to: “dissuade or deter others from either impeding those rights or developing capabilities intended to do so; take those actions necessary to protect its space capabilities; respond to interference; and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests.” Gone from the principle statement in the new policy are references to deterring or dissuading the development of capabilities and the right of the U.S. to deny the use of space to those hostile to its interests. These concepts may be subsumed in the intent of the Obama policy’s calls to deter, defend against, and defeat. If they are not, then an explanation for the shift in policy and its rationale is required. The Obama policy introduces new terms. All nations are said to have a shared interest in “responsible” behavior. The policy does not define what “responsible behavior” means. In outlining goals, the policy calls for measures to ensure “responsible operations in space” and also references collision avoidance and debris mitigation efforts in the same statement. If those actions are what define “responsible behavior,” then the new statement reinforces and elevates existing practice. If more is implied, then additional detail and elaboration is required. “Sustainability” of space is another new addition to the principles. The term is used only one other time in the policy in a section calling for the preservation of the space “environment.” Specifically, the policy says “Develop, maintain, and use space situational awareness (SSA) information from commercial, civil, and national security sources to detect, identify, and attribute actions in space that are contrary to responsible use and the long-term sustainability of the space environment.” The expansion of SSA capabilities precedes this Administration, is well underway and serves many purposes. In 2007, for example, the Bush Administration issued a classified memo directing government agencies to focus effort on improving SSA capabilities.8 Improving SSA capabilities offers a number of benefits and some risks. In the context of improving the sustainability of space, these capabilities are expected to reduce the probability of unintentional or intentional collisions of objects in space thereby reducing the generation of space debris. A focus on space debris is hardly new. The Bush policy said: “the United States shall seek to minimize the creation of orbital debris by government and non-government operations in space in order to preserve the space environment for future generations.” Both the Obama and Bush policies ordered the U.S. to lead international efforts to develop and adopt policies to minimize debris and re-committed U.S. adherence to its own guidelines concerning debris mitigation.9 U.S. leadership in this area is well established. The Obama policy adds a welcome additional focus on positive steps to address the orbital debris challenge, directing NASA and the DOD to develop technologies “to mitigate and remove on-orbit debris, reduce hazards, and increase understanding of the current and future debris environment.” How these investments mature will be of great interest.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 141


Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 142


Obama goal = resiliency of tech

Old space policies outdated- resiliency of technology is now keySchulte 2011, [Gregory L. Schulte, Ambassador, Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency and UN Security Council, Senior Visiting Fellow at National Defense University’s Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Feb 2011, “A New National Security Strategy for Space”, http://www.afspc.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-110224-052.pdf]

Resiliency and Mission Assurance Second, we need to increase our emphasis on resiliency and mission assurance in an increasingly congested domain. Past means to protect our space systems were frequently too narrow. Too often they provided system-level protection or no protection at all. They also tended to focus on specific satellites, not the missions they performed. We need a different approach. Specifically, we need to make our space-based architectures more resilient and to assure the missions they support. This may entail a variety of means: • No matter what else, we must improve our capability to “fight through” interference. Our military services are already conducting training and exercises that simulate a degraded space environment, helping and indeed requiring them to develop the necessary tactics, techniques, and procedures for this environment. • Rather than relying on a small number of complex satellites for critical functions, we may want to distribute their functions across multiple satellites or increase the number of simpler, singly purposed spacecraft. Hosting DoD payloads across a larger number of commercial, civilian, or foreign satellites could similarly increase resiliency. • We may want to use international partnerships to increase resiliency through collaborative spacecraft development, shared constellations, hosted payloads, or shared missions. Wideband Global Satellite Communications is a good example. Australia has joined the constellation and other allies are looking at doing the same. A larger, more international constellation adds resilience and also encourages adversary restraint by making “an attack on one an attack on all.” • We may want to have a responsive capability to rapidly augment, replenish, and reconstitute space-based capabilities that have been degraded or lost. The Operationally Responsive Space program is starting us on a trajectory to that end. • We may want to pursue cross-domain solutions with ground-, sea-, or air-based systems backing up spacebased capabilities. Space problems do not always require a space solution. Interdependent, multi-domain capabilities provide an effective way to assure critical warfighting and intelligence functions despite potential degradation or loss. Unmanned aerial vehicles are one option that we are exploring. • In many cases, we may want to pursue multiple means. Take for example the Global Positioning System, a spacebased capability critical to all of our services. To enhance its resiliency and mission assurance, we may want a combination of on-orbit spares, interoperability with Europe’s Galileo satellite system, and land- or air-based backup systems. Resiliency and mission assurance can help protect critical capabilities in crisis and conflict. Moreover, to the extent we develop and demonstrate resilience and mission assurance, potential adversaries may be dissuaded in peacetime from pursuing counterspace capabilities.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 143


Obama goal = resiliency of tech

Strengthening resiliency key – deterrence no longer has guaranteed successSchulte 2011, [Gregory L. Schulte, Ambassador, Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency and UN Security Council, Senior Visiting Fellow at National Defense University’s Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Feb 2011, “A New National Security Strategy for Space”, http://www.afspc.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-110224-052.pdf]

Deterrence We also need to think differently about deterrence. We must not assume that attacks in space can or should be deterred by the threat of retaliation in space. Rather, as Secretary Lynn has argued, a strategy that encompasses a broad range of options will have the greatest chance for success. Many of the actions that I previously described can contribute to deterrence by encouraging adversary restraint: • Creating norms that would need to be broken; • Building international partnerships that would need to be attacked; and • Strengthening resilience and mission assurance that would reduce the benefit of attack. The threat of retaliation—imposing costs—can still play a role, though it need not be confined to space. Indeed, the threat of retaliation elsewhere may be more credible. As Secretary Lynn said, we must make clear that the US “views its space assets as a vital national interest. Consistent with our inherent right of self-defense, we will respond accordingly to attacks on them.” This implies certainty of response but in a manner of our own choosing. Ultimately, like any deterrent strategy, the deterrent strategy for space must be developed in the context of particular countries and particular scenarios. And we must consider the best means to convey our deterrent messages in peacetime and to influence the decision-making of potential adversaries in crisis and war.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 144


Obama current strategy fails- China

Current strategy fails- risk of space conflict or arms race with China Lewis 11, [James A. Lewis, PhD, senior fellow and program director at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, formerly served at the Departments of State and Commerce as a foreign service officer and as a member of the Senior Executive Service, Feb 2011, “Engagement and Sustainability in the 2010 National Space Policy”, http://www.afspc.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-110224-052.pdf]

Finding the balance between manned and unmanned space programs is an issue that goes back decades. There is no black or white answer—the nation needs to do both. But for many years, the shuttle/station programs absorbed the bulk of civil space funding, and Constellation and the effort to return to the moon threatened to do the same. The new NSP is artfully vague on this balance, but earlier Obama actions pointed towards an increased emphasis on unmanned activities that traditionalists found to be both dangerous and wrong, particularly in combination with the new emphasis on entrepreneurial space efforts. Faced by strong opposition, the 2010 NSP commits to crewed missions beyond the moon by 2025 and to send humans to Mars by the mid 2030s and return them. Going to Mars is not really a feasible goal, given the state of our space-faring technologies. It is more interesting to note, however, that the 2010 policy never mentions a return to the moon—the only reference to the moon is the goal of going beyond lunar orbit by 2025. Return to the moon remains a contentious issue. If the Chinese are able, eventually, to land on the moon’s surface, the world will perceive it as further evidence of US decline and China’s rise. The political implications are more important for US international influence than they are for science. The real issue is not whether China can repeat what the US did 40 years ago, but whether it will be able to create a permanent presence on the moon. A bolder US policy would have moved from the ISS to the moon as a place to experiment with long-term human presence in space, but this is both expensive and risky, and would require a sustained effort that would necessarily stretch across administrations. It also implies a new space race, with China instead of the Soviets. This is not question for the current policy, but it will be unavoidable in the next space policy if the US and China cannot develop a more cooperative approach. The issue of cooperation with China is where general guidance on cooperation and engagement is no longer adequate. While the scientific and commercial communities in China may desire cooperation, the military does not. China has military space programs aimed against the US. Bilateral relations in the region show flashes of confrontation, as in the recent Chinese claim that US naval vessels cannot transit waters in its economic zone, even though by international law these are considered open seas. In terms of technology, a cooperative effort would be marked by a flow from the US to China with little in return. These obstacles do not mean that the US should not engage China nor that cooperation may not someday be worthwhile. Although this analogy is imprecise, we are in our security relations with China where we were with the Soviets in the late 1950s, and the US will need to develop a specific strategy of engagement with China to reduce the risk of conflict in space.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 145


***Aff

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 146


2AC Frontline

1. The NSSS is the final step of the Space Posture Review and will not be changed for the next 10 years- no recommendation possible DOD 2011(DOD, The US Government, February 2011, "Fact Sheet: National Security Space Strategy," pg online @ www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0111_nsss/docs/2011_01_19_NSSS_Fact_Sheet_FINAL.pdf//gh-arjun)

The National Security Space Strategy (NSSS) charts a path for the next decade to respond to the current and projected strategic space environment. Leveraging emerging opportunities will strengthen the U.S. national security space posture while maintaining and enhancing the advantages gained from space. The NSSS is jointly signed by the secretary of defense and the director of national intelligence. It builds on the President’s National Security Strategy and National Space Policy, as well as the Department of Defense’s Quadrennial Defense Review and the Intelligence Community’s National Intelligence Strategy. The NSSS culminates the Space Posture Review.

2. NSSS destroys US space leadershipBuxbaum 11 [Peter A Buxbaum, ISN Insights, 6/28/11, “Taming the Heavens: The New Space Diplomacy”, http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Taming_the_Heavens_The_New_Space_Diplomacy_999.html]

US diplomacy and engagement The NSSS does not go far enough, in Grego's opinion. She criticized the document for failing to emphasize arms control agreements "as part of a larger scheme for keeping space secure" and for failing to recommend that the United States take the lead on space diplomacy. Well-crafted arms control proposals could lower the risk of arms races or conflicts in space or on the ground, Grego said, and protect the space environment from the harmful debris caused when countries deliberately destroy satellites. "A more robust diplomatic initiative that includes the major space-faring countries would have the potential to increase cooperation with countries that are not traditional US military allies," she added, "and spur other countries to develop realistic proposals that could ensure a safe and sustainable future in space. Diplomatic engagement could help relieve suspicions among countries, reduce incentives for building anti-satellite systems and other space weapons by establishing negotiated limits, and avert space disputes." The UCS released a report last year which called for the US government to "declare that the United States will not intentionally damage or disable satellites" and "press other space powers to make the same pledge." The report recommended that the US make satellites "more resistant to interference and develop ways to quickly replace them or compensate with other measures if they are disabled." The report also called for the US to assemble an expert negotiating team and to "engage in international discussions on space." "The United States should play an active and leading role in engaging the international community to further develop space laws and norms and to keep space free of weapons," said Grego. "A Code of Conduct provides a useful but preliminary standard for responsible space conduct. It should be a first step, but not the last."

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 147


2AC Frontline

3. NSP fails- not a strategy and leaves US assets vulnerable to debris and other threats- also lacks situational awareness and key infrastructureRendleman and Ryals, 2011 [Col James D. Rendleman, Air Force Space Command, National Recon Office, level-3 space professional and trained director of space forces, study director for the National Academies study of US Aerospace Infrastructure and Aerospace Engineering Disciplines, member of the American Institute of Aeronatuics and Astronautics, teacher at Golden Gate University, and Col Robert E. Ryals, president of Point B Defense, Feb 2011, “The New National Space Policy: More is Needed”, http://www.afspc.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-110224-052.pdf]

On seeing and hearing the familiar messages conveyed about the new policy, one is left with a sneaky suspicion that more needs to be said and done to assure US access to much-needed space capabilities. The new NSP cannot serve as a substitute for a space strategy.13 Fundamentally, a strategy document should result from a process of identify an organization’s objectives, identifying and developing ways and means to achieve these objectives, and allocating resources to implement the plans to achieve the organization’s objectives. A strategy is about the how. In contrast, a policy is a plan of action to guide decisions and actions as they are made in support execution of the strategy. A policy is about the will and won’t do’s. The US is faced with a dilemma. It has a national space policy but no national space strategy. The new policy could and should direct such a strategy or series of focused strategies be developed, but it does not. As of the writing of this article, no National Security Space Strategy has been issued. There is no strategy to link the defense and intelligence communities. As a result, future space programs, plans, and new space concepts will be developed without the overarching strategic guidance a national strategy could provide. New programs such as operationally responsive space will suffer as a result. This is not a new complaint. In April 2003, the General Accounting Office (GAO) recommended and the Department of Defense (DoD) agreed that space activities needed to include a national security space strategy tied to overall department-level space goals, time lines, and performance measures to assess space activities’ progress in achieving national security space goals.14 The National Security Space Office proposed a draft strategy in 2004, but the draft did not survive the interagency coordination process. Various reasons were offered for the failure. The National Security Council requested that the strategy not be issued until the George W. Bush NSP was released in October 2006. However, once that policy was released, changes in leadership in the NRO and within the Air Force delayed effective coordination of the strategy. As could be expected, differences of opinion arose between the defense and intelligence communities over the implementation of the strategy, and cultural differences between the two communities exacerbated the coordination process. No doubt, some within the intelligence community do not want to be constrained by direction on space programs from within the DoD or US Air Force. Similar sentiments have been expressed about the intelligence community by DoD officials. Attempting to divorce themselves from the rancor, some officials mischievously disavowed being part of any coordination process on the draft strategy.15 The GAO notes that it is standard practice to have a strategy that lays out goals and objectives, suggests actions for addressing those objectives, allocates resources, identifies roles and responsibilities, and integrates relevant parties. “Until a national security space strategy is issued, the defense and intelligence communities may continue to make independent decisions and use resources that are not necessarily based on national priorities, which could lead to gaps in some areas of space operations and redundancies in others.”16 Is it possible to successfully develop a usable single “comprehensive” National Security Space Strategy? Perhaps not, and for good

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 148


reason. The space enterprise has grown so large and complex that no single document can cover it all. For the same reason, there is no single national air or maritime strategy. National security space involves the panoply of military, intelligence, industry, civil, and education communities, and their sometime disparate interests and needs. Crafting and implementing such a document would impact too large an audience. Obtaining consensus and traction on it would be difficult to obtain. Targeted strategies and policies appear to be better suited to shape programs and behaviors and produce results. What should be included in a national security space strategy? The challenges associated with possibilities of space conflict and combat are complicated and growing, and the US does not appear fully prepared to address them. Fortunately, space activities today enjoy a peaceful, non-wartime environment. Of course, there are the known exceptions that

2AC Frontline

include satellite communications jamming but they are few and far between. Kinetic antisatellite technologies have been tested, deployed, but not employed in combat. Given the potential threats, preparing for space as a “contested environment” should still be a prudent component of US national strategy and policy. A comprehensive strategy to respond to threats to space systems is overdue. A classic deterrence and protection paradigm may be satisfactory for a military space strategy, but is incomplete. It will not protect satellite systems against threats posed by space debris. Further, the US may be unsuccessful in dealing on its own with non-state actors or near-peer adversaries. For some potential adversaries, there are no mutual understandings or reliable lines of communication. Leveraging and fielding cooperative situational awareness tools, globally agreed end-of-life protocols, and TCBMs measures may be more effective in responding to these threats. A deterrence and protection strategy only leads to strategic instability, as it is too easy to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy US access to space capabilities, and the dangerous and destabilizing technologies that can accomplish these ends are being steadily improved across the globe. Considering the complexity of the threat and hazard environment, a strategy to assure access to space capabilities should have a number of attributes. Space systems must be protected so they can operate for the short-term and long-term. This involves more than just dissuading, deterring, defending against, and defeating potential adversaries seeking to neutralize, disable, or destroy space systems. By far, the greatest risk to US space assets today comes from the space environment, such as space weather and orbital debris, and then irresponsible actions and accidents caused by other space actors. The global space community should be encouraged to operate safely in a manner conducive to operations by all members. Finally, the strategy must empower the US industrial base to be vibrant and robust, and flex its muscles, to ensure it can deliver space capabilities when needed. A space assurance strategy depends on four mutually supportive elements, or pillars: (1) deterrence and defense; (2) global engagement to include bi-lateral and multilateral TCBMs; (3) situational awareness; and (4) responsive infrastructure.17 Employing these four pillars should enable US and friendly space-faring nations to continue to perform their missions for the short-term and long-term. The yin and yang of space deterrence and protection will always be an important pillar of space assurance.18 Global engagement leverages long-standing approaches to secure and protect the space domain through recognized international law, policy, and diplomacy. Situational awareness employs the monitoring of environmental and intelligence factors, and prediction of threats essential to decision making to assure mission success. It enhances global engagement by enhancing transparency. This allows a policy maker or commander to differentiate between purposeful attacks and natural environmental hazards; to anticipate space events and clarify intentions; to reduce the potential for misperception or miscalculation; and to enhance opportunities to

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 149


avoid disruptive or destructive events. A robust infrastructure enables agile responses to changes in the space environment, to threats, and to assure viability of its systems. In the end, a US space strategy rooted in classic deterrence and protection constructs does not offer sufficient ways and means needed to assure access to space. Threats of retaliation cannot be credibly employed as a strategy against long-standing, but feckless, allies and friends who operate systems in the space domain, who also act irresponsibly or recklessly. The US is not going to retaliate against an ally for refusing to de-orbit a defunct satellite. In addition, threats posed by space debris and the space environment must be addressed and minimized.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 150


NSSS bad- protection

NSSS bad- power of example fails to protect US and doesn’t provide for missile defenseBendikova 11 [Michaela Bendikova, Research Assistant, Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at the Heritage Foundation, The Foundary, 2/10/11, “National Security Space Strategy 2011: Time to Act instead of Control”, http://blog.heritage.org/2011/02/10/national-security-space-strategy-2011-time-to-act-instead-of-control/]

The unclassified summary of the National Security Space Strategy (NSSS) of the Obama Administration was released in January 2011. The NSSS is supposed to provide a guiding principle for the next 10 years for all government-related agencies that use the information provided by the U.S. space assets. Unfortunately, President Obama’s preoccupation with arms control won over prudent space policy guidance. The strategy rightly recognizes that space is vital to U.S. national security and describes the three major trends that drive the current strategic environment: congestion, contest, and competitiveness. The strategic objectives are to strengthen safety, stability, and security in space; maintain and enhance the strategic national security advantages afforded to the United States by space; and energize the space industrial base that supports U.S. national security. So what are the strategies to achieve these objectives? Considering that the constitutionally mandated obligation of the federal government is to provide for the common defense (and therefore protect U.S. vital space capabilities), the priorities in the NSSS seem misplaced. Instead, the NSSS brings up the old fallacious assumption that the power of example will prevent adversaries from doing the United States harm. Indeed, then-presidential candidate Obama promised not to “weaponize” space during his campaign, and arms control in space is seen as one more checked box from the list of promises to arms control advocates. As Baker Spring concludes, this policy will force the U.S. in the direction of giving up its dominant position in military and intelligence space capabilities, which provide the U.S. with enormous advantages over the enemy in the conduct and support of military operations. On the positive side, the NSSS emphasizes the importance of the revitalization of the U.S. space industrial base, preventing and deterring aggression against the space infrastructure that supports U.S. national security and preparing to defeat attacks. These positive steps, however, could be jeopardized by the NSSS’s commitment to pursue international partnerships. The strategy suggests additional measures that can be taken to prepare to defeat attacks and operate in a degraded environment. The most important criterion to judge development of new capabilities is resilience. Unfortunately, the strategy does not recognize the utility of space for missile defense systems. Space-based missile defense systems are the most capable and efficient alternative to costly and vulnerable sea- and ground-based systems. A serious NSSS would recognize this fact.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 151


NSSS bad- leadership

NSSS Lacking According to Top Scientists – Doesn’t address US leadership or Space WeaponsSatellite Today Insider 2011(Satellite Today Insider, Your portal to global communications intelligence, "UCS Wary of Obama's New Space Security Strategy," 1/21/2011 pg online @ www.satellitetoday.com/twitter/UCS-Wary-of-Obamas-New-Space-Security-Strategy_35970.html//gh-arjun)

[Satellite TODAY Insider 01-21-11] U.S. President Barack Obama’s National Security Space Strategy, scheduled for public release over the next few weeks, is coming under criticism from the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), which said that the plan is unlikely to address “broader ways to approach space security and sustainability issues,” according to a UCS statement released Jan. 20. The National Security Space Strategy will outline out how the U.S. Department of Defense and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence will carry out the National Space Policy, which was issued last June. In a statement, UCS Senior Global Security Scientist Laura Grego said that while the strategy emphasizes certain steps to strengthen space security and foster international cooperation, it likely will fall short of the Union’s expectations. “For example, the document is unlikely to recommend that the United States take the lead on space diplomacy. Diplomatic engagement could help relieve suspicions among countries, reduce incentives for building anti-satellite systems and other space weapons by establishing negotiated limits, and avert space disputes. The strategy document is likely to encourage bilateral discussions, confidence building and transparency measures, which is a good start. But strong U.S. leadership could reap even greater rewards,” she said. The UCS also said that the National Security Space Strategy, like the National Space Policy, would not discuss arms and import/export control agreements. “Well-crafted arms control proposals could lower the risk of arms races or conflicts in space or on the ground and protect the space environment from the harmful debris caused when countries deliberately destroy satellites,” said Greco. “Agreed-upon limits on weapons in space and interfering with satellites could strengthen stability and security in space and on the ground, and such limits should be part of the U.S. national security strategy. Unfortunately, the National Space Policy had little to say about this issue, and it is unlikely that the new space strategy will urge the United States to take the lead on it.”

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 152


NSSS can’t be modified

Obama’s Space Policy has already been createdNosowitz 2010 (Dan Nosowitz, Dan Nosowitz is based in San Francisco, where he covers Silicon Valley, consumer electronics, green tech and the influence of technology on our daily lives, July 1 2010 pg online @ www.smartplanet.com/blog/thinking-tech/obamas-new-national-space-policy-focuses-on-8230earth/4631//gh-arjun)

President Obama’s new National Space Policy is going to be a tough pill to swallow for anyone wanting NASA to pursue traditional goals of manned space missions. But NASA has always been a contentious destination for public funding, and Obama’s plan uses the department’s expertise to help solve problems right here on our home planet. The policy statement is pretty ambiguous, but at least we can get a sense of the direction in which Obama wants our space policy to go. It lays out NASA’s new role in supporting private firms like SpaceX, and also its new policy to focus on Earth-bound issues like climate change, human environmental impact, and changes to land and water. The policy ropes in other governmental departments for this task, including the Departments of Defense, Commerce, the Interior, and Homeland Security. In addition to a new focus on issues here at home, Obama makes a drastic change from his predecessor in relationships with other countries in the space arena. He actually says that “space belongs to all nations,” which former President Bush may not have agreed with, and asks for all space-bound countries to work together on projects like cleaning space debris.

The NSSS is a 10 year plan – no new plansEdmonton Journal 2011(Edmonton Journal, AFP, "China's space capabilities," 2/5/2011 pg online @ lexisnexis//gh-arjun)

China is developing "counterspace" weapons that could shoot down satellites or jam signals, a Pentagon official said Friday as the United States unveiled a 10-year strategy for security in space."The investment China is putting into counterspace capabilities is a matter of concern to us," deputy secretary of defence for space policy Gregory Schulte told reporters as the defence and intelligence communities released their 10-year National Security Space Strategy (NSSS).The NSSS marks a huge shift from past practice, charting a 10-year path in space to make the United States "more resilient" and able to defend its assets in a dramatically more crowded, competitive, challenging and sometimes hostile environment, Schulte said.

Space Posture Review and NSSS already submitted – Nothing new for 10 years Air Force News Agency 2011(Air Force News Agency, Defence Talk: Global Defense and Military Portal, "National Security Space Strategy targets safety, stability," 2/7/2011 pg online @ portal.eqentia.com/ad/permalink/62533245-National-Security-Space-Strategy-targets-safety-stability?refresh=true//gh-arjun)

The 10-year strategy concludes the congressionally mandated Space Posture Review by providing strategic objectives and approaches for national security space. Officials from the Defense Department and the intelligence community submitted an interim report to Congress in March 2010 that delayed a review of national security space policy and objectives until after the release of the U.S. National

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 153


Space Policy in June 2010.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 154



National Security Space Strategy is a plan for the next 10 years Space Watch 2011(Space Watch, Providing a Vital link on global space issues, "DOD releases National Security Space Strategy," 2011 pg online @ newsletters.spacefoundation.org/spacewatch/articles/id/770//gh-ag)

On Feb. 4 the Department of Defense (DoD) released its long-awaited 10-year National Security Space Strategy (NSSS), which, according to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, "represents a significant departure from past practice" with a pragmatic approach to maintain advantages derived from space while confronting the new challenges of an increasingly "congested, contested and competitive" space environment. NSSS places increased emphasis on proper norms of behavior by space actors, enhanced space situational awareness and partnership with international and commercial space users. Signed jointly by Gates and Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, NSSS is derived from the National Security Strategy and the National Space Policy and outlines changes to enhance national security through DoD and intelligence community activities in space. It is the culmination of a lengthy Space Posture Review conducted in consultation with other agencies and allies. According to the DoD, the fiscal 2012 budget will contain initial steps toward NSSS implementation to lay the foundation for changes in fiscal 2013 and beyond. The new Defense Space Council, chaired by Secretary of the Air Force and Department of Defense Executive Agent for Space Michael Donley, will help oversee implementation.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 155



Space posture review plans for next decade- no changes after releaseIsria News, 11 [Isria News, Feb 2011, “National Security Space Strategy Targets Stability and Safety”, http://www.isria.com/free/7_February_2011_x4.php]

The National Security Space Strategy released today responds to the realities of a space environment that is increasingly crowded, challenging and competitive, said senior Defense Department officials. “The National Security Space Strategy represents a significant departure from past practice,” Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said in a DOD news release issued today. “It is a pragmatic approach to maintain the advantages we derive from space while confronting the new challenges we face.” Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte, the deputy secretary of defense for space policy, told the Pentagon Channel and American Forces Press Service that this is the first national security space strategy co-signed by the secretary of defense and the director of national intelligence. “Space has changed in fundamental ways, and that requires us to change our strategy,” Schulte said. Gates and Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper “have signed a document that shows the new directions we need to go,” he added. The 10-year strategy concludes the congressionally mandated Space Posture Review by providing strategic objectives and approaches for national security space. The Defense Department and the intelligence community submitted an interim report to Congress in March that delayed a review of national security space policy and objectives until after the release of the U.S. National Space Policy in June. Perhaps the strategy’s most important message, Schulte said, “is that we have to think differently about how we operate in space.” For example, he said, “we have to think about how to encourage other countries to act responsibly in space and how the United States can provide leadership in that regard. “Secondly,” he added, “we have to think about how we can better leverage the growing amount of foreign commercial capabilities that are now in space. And third, we need to think differently about how to deter others from attacking our space assets.” As in the past, he said, the Defense Department must protect space capabilities to protect the warfighter, whether it’s communications, surveillance or global positioning. “It’s space that allows our soldiers to see over the next hill,” Schulte said. “It’s space that allows us to communicate quickly. It’s space that allows us to see whether hostile missiles are launched, so we need to preserve that capability. “Our goal is to make the peaceful use of space available to all countries,” he added, noting that the peaceful use of space includes support for critical defense capabilities. “Space becomes critical to everything we do, and that’s why we’re worried that the environment is increasingly challenging,” Schulte said. “You have more debris in space and you have countries that are developing counterspace capabilities that can be used against us. That’s why this strategy emphasizes the need to protect our capabilities, protect our industrial base and protect the space domain itself.” U.S. Strategic Command officials at Offutt Air Force Base, Neb., are working with other countries and commercial firms to increase situational awareness in space. “Stratcom was once in charge of delivering nuclear weapons,” Schulte said. “Stratcom is now also delivering warnings of potential collisions in space to any variety of countries because we have an interest in preventing more collisions and more debris.” The military also must begin to consider operating in coalitions in space, he said. “In just about every other domain -- at sea, in the air, on the ground -- we operate with allies and partners. There are good reasons to do it,” Schulte said. Potential partners include members of NATO, whose new 10-year strategic concept issued last year “acknowledged for the first time that access to space is something you can’t take for granted,” he said. The Joint Space Operations Center at Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif., is a focal point for the operational use of worldwide U.S. space forces, Schulte said, and it allows the commander of Stratcom’s joint functional component command for space to integrate space power into global military operations. “We would like to make that into a [combined center],” Schulte said, “where we bring in our closest allies and eventually others, so that like in other domains, we can conduct combined operations.” The 10-year National Security Space Strategy will require at least that long to implement, he said. “You will see some early indications of it in the president’s budget for 2012, and you will see more in his budget for 2013, but ultimately what we’re trying to do is affect programs of the services, particularly the Air Force, over the longer term,” Schulte said. “We’re trying to affect how we train, we’re trying to affect how we plan, and we’re trying to affect the diplomacy we conduct with the Department of State. So I think you’ll see [the strategy] roll out in many different ways. In fact, you’re already seeing elements of it.” On Jan. 6, Gates announced that he would use some of the efficiency savings Air Force officials identified to invest in the U.S. launch capability to help in protecting the industrial base, Schulte said. Defense Department officials are working Australia on

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 156


sharing of space situational awareness and are talking to the commercial sector about how DOD can host payloads on their satellites, he said. “And we’re looking for a whole range of activities to implement the new strategy in a budget-constrained environment,” he added Schulte said to get DOD organized for space, Deputy Defense Secretary William J. Lynn III created the Space Defense Council, to be chaired by Air Force Secretary Michael B. Donley. “The secretary and the deputy have entrusted to Secretary Donley the role of moving forward with our strategy,” he said, “and the Defense Space Council provides a forum to do that.”

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 157



Space posture review released and concluded by NSSSMessieron 11, [Doug Messieron, Reporter, 2/10/11, “National Security Space Strategy Focuses on Stability, Safety, DOD Press Release,http://www.parabolicarc.com/2011/02/10/national-security-space-strategy-focuses-stability-safety/]

The National Security Space Strategy released today responds to the realities of a space environment that is increasingly crowded, challenging and competitive, said senior Defense Department officials. â€œThe National Security Space Strategy represents a significant departure from past practice,â€ � Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said in a DOD news release issued today. â€œIt is a pragmatic approach to maintain the advantages we derive from space while confronting the new challenges we face.â€ Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte, the deputy secretary of defense for space policy, told the� Pentagon Channel and American Forces Press Service that this is the first national security space strategy co-signed by the secretary of defense and the director of national intelligence. â€œSpace has changed in fundamental ways, and that requires us to change our strategy,â€ Schulte said. Gates and� Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper â€œhave signed a document that shows the new directions we need to go,â€ he added. � The 10-year strategy concludes the congressionally mandated Space Posture Review by providing strategic objectives and approaches for national security space. The Defense Department and the intelligence community submitted an interim report to Congress in March that delayed a review of national security space policy and objectives until after the release of the U.S. National Space Policy in June.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 158


International Law DA’s

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 159


***OST DA***

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 160


OST DA 1NCOST strong now - All members abide by itUNIDIR '06(United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, a conference report, 3/31/06, http://www.unidir.org/pdf/ouvrages/pdf-1-92-9045-185-8-en.pdf// GH-aspomer)

The specific question that this paper was invited to address is “What progress could be made at a possible OST RevCon and how should a possible RevCon unfold?”1 The answer to the question as framed is, with serious trepidation and extreme caution. However, the question contains the assumption that a revision conference for the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty)2 ought to occur. The response to that assumption is, at this point in time, to leave the Outer Space Treaty alone. Regardless of how compelling or meritorious the reason for revising the Outer Space Treaty may appear to be, the fact is there is much more to lose than there is to gain. This paper begins with an overview of the Outer Space Treaty, a brief discussion of its provisions and its likely status during a revision conference. It then raises the hard questions that must be addressed in a discussion about potentially revising the treaty. A conclusion follows. The Outer Space Treaty is, beyond any question, one of the most successful multilateral, international treaties ever promulgated.3 It has been accepted by a large majority of the world’s nation-states, including all of the world’s space-capable states.4 Nearly 40 years after it entered into force in 1967, the Outer Space Treaty still continues to garner signatories. As newly active and recently advancing space nations continue to emerge, they are also choosing to become treaty signatories.5 “It is also generally agreed by legal scholars and governments that the earlier Declaration of Legal Principles (which were incorporated into the Outer Space Treaty) expresses general customary law, binding on all states.”6 Moreover, treaties that “provide for neutralisation or demilitarisation of a territory or area, such as politically motivated revision process will guarantee no guarantees. All treaty provisions will be susceptible to change or elimination.

<Insert specific link>

Violating the OST collapses itHickman and Dolman ‘02 (John Hickman, professor in the Department of Government and International Studies at Berry College, Everett Dolman, Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the US Air Force’s School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 2002, “Resurrecting the Space Age: A State–Centered Commentary on the Outer Space Regime,” Page 20, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/014959302317350855// GH-aspomer)

Thus a state party need merely announce its intention to withdraw and then wait one year. Withdrawal of a single state party to the treaty, however, would not necessarily terminate the treaty between the other state parties. Yet, the decision of an important state not to be bound by a regime–creating treaty obviously endangers the entire treaty. The decision of the United States or China to withdraw from the OST would have far greater implications for the survival of the international space regime than the same decision by Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, or Papua New Guinea—the equality of states under international law remains nothing more than a useful fiction. For the OST to remain good international law, it must be accepted as such by the major space faring states of the 21st Century: the United States, Russia, the European Union, Japan, and China. One defection from the regime by a member of this group would no doubt lead to its effective collapse, as the remaining space faring states are unlikely to use the kind of coercion necessary to

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 161


enforce the regime. A more likely response to such a defection is a scramble to make similar claims to sovereignty, based on historical precedent and effective occupation. Similar rushes to stake claims for territory sovereignty in other celestial bodies might follow.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 162


OST DA 1NCThe outer space treaty prevents space weaponizationRusek No Date Cited [Benjamin Rusek, Member of the Committee on International Security and Arms Control at The U.S. National Academies, “The Outer Space Treaty at a Glance”, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/outerspace PHK]

Treaty TermsThe treaty forbids countries from deploying "nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction" in outer space. The term "weapons of mass destruction" is not defined, but it is commonly understood to include nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. The treaty, however, does not prohibit the launching of ballistic missiles, which could be armed with WMD warheads, through space. The treaty repeatedly emphasizes that space is to be used for peaceful purposes, leading some analysts to conclude that the treaty could broadly be interpreted as prohibiting all types of weapons systems, not just WMD, in outer space.The treaty's key arms control provisions are in Article IV. States-parties commit not to:Place in orbit around the Earth or other celestial bodies any nuclear weapons or objects carrying WMD. Install WMD on celestial bodies or station WMD in outer space in any other manner. Establish military bases or installations, test "any type of weapons," or conduct military exercises on the moon and other celestial bodies.

<Insert Space Weapons Bad Impact>

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 163

http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/outerspace


2NC Uniqueness-US Following NowObama’s Complying with the OST now, continued US adherence is key to the treatyAbramson and Pacer 10 [Jeff Abramson, former Deputy Director of the Arms Control Association and Valerie Pacer, intern at the Arms Control Association, “New U.S. Space Policy Open to Arms Control”, September 2010, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_09/SpacePolicy PHK]

The Obama administration this summer announced a new space policy that marks a break with the previous administration by being more receptive to arms control efforts.According to the document, released June 28, that spells out the policy, Washington will “consider proposals and concepts for arms control measures if they are equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance the national security of the United States and its allies.” The new policy also calls on governmental agencies to “pursue bilateral and multilateral transparency and confidence-building measures.”In a July 13 speech to the stalled Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Defense Policy and Verification Operations Frank A. Rose noted that greater willingness to pursue arms control measures was a “departure from the 2006 policy.” That policy stated that “the United States will oppose the development of new legal regimes or restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit U.S. access to or use of space.” Christina Rocca, the U.S. ambassador to the CD, said in 2007 that the universalizing of existing space agreements was a “much more practical and effective step towards guaranteeing the peaceful use of outer space.”It remains unclear what new measures the United States will pursue. Rose highlighted the desire to mitigate orbital debris; share information about observations and activities in space, in part to help avoid collisions; and pursue transparency and confidence-building measures. One possibility for Washington to consider supporting is the EU space code of conduct, according to senior administration officials at a June 28 briefing. The draft code, issued in December 2008, includes a voluntary commitment to refrain from intentionally harming space objects, measures to control and mitigate space debris, and mechanisms for cooperation and consultation. (See ACT , January/February 2009 .) A revised draft of the code is expected soon. Rose reiterated U.S. support for discussions at the CD on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, even though the CD has failed to reach agreement on an agenda this year.

US Follows the OSTCDI, 2008 (Center for Defense Information, Eugene Marder, CDI Research Assistant, 2008 pg online @ www.cdi.org/pdfs/ChineseASATtest.pdf//gh-arjun)

In addition to these general affirmations, history has seen some affirmative uses of Article IX. When the Soviet satellite Cosmos 954 was plummeting out of the sky with a nuclear payload, the United States sent a communiqué to the Soviet Union asking for information on the 30 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 102 (1987). 31 In 1981, for example, the U.S.S.R. proposed two draft treaties prohibiting the placement of ASAT weapons in space to the UNGA. Hays, supra note 13, at 108. 32 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature January 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15. © Center for Defense Information, 2008. satellite and invoking the Outer Space Treaty. 33 The Russians replied, answering the questions—albeit obliquely—and provided the U.S. and Canadian authorities with critical intelligence. 34 More recently, the United States was candid about the potential environmental impact of its shoot-down of USA 193, a deorbiting satellite. 35 While the United States has since been criticized for failing to disclose any military purpose in conducting the test, 36 the minimum international consultations that

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 164

http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_01-02/eu_issues_space_code_conduct

http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_01-02/eu_issues_space_code_conduct

http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_09/SpacePolicy


the government engaged is a much closer reflection of Article IX requirements than China’s absolute lack of forewarning. Thus, the community of OST parties has shown a respect for Article IX’s general ideas and its specific mandate

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 165


2NC Uniqueness-Other Countries Following NowChina is committed to the OSTXinhau '11(4/8/11, "China commits itself to abide by all principles of outer space treaty: Chinese envoy", http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/7343739.html// GH-aspomer)

China committed itself to stick to all basic principles provided in outer space treaties, conduct all explorations and use of outer space for the benefits of the whole mankind, said a Chinese envoy to the United Nations on Thursday. Li Baodong, the Chinese permanent representative to the UN made the remarks at a plenary meeting of the General Assembly 65th session, in which a resolution was adopted to designate April 12 as the International Day of Human Space Flight. On April 12, 1961, astronaut Yuri Gagarin from the former Soviet Union made the first space flight on Vostok 1 opening the new chapter in human's exploration of the outer space. Li told the meeting that over the past 50 years, with the efforts of the space scientists of all countries, great progress has been made in manned space cause. "So far nearly 40 countries sent astronauts into the outer space. We are very happy to see that China is making its contribution to the development," he said. Since the year of 1999, the Chinese manned space project has successfully completed seven flights, sent six astronauts at three times into the outer space and executed spacewalk, Li said, adding that this year China would conduct the first rendezvous and docking flight and has begun building the space station. "With utmost confidence and courage, China would explore the unknown and further promote manned space program so as to make contributions to human space flight cause," Li said. China reiterated that it will always stick to all basic principles provided by conventions on outer space, conduct all explorations and use of outer space for the benefit of the mankind, and enhance international cooperation in exploring and making use of outer space making the progress of space science and technology benefit all countries, particularly the developing countries. "We hope that the international community would make joint efforts to build a harmonious outer space conducive to peace, development, cooperation and rule of law," Li said. .

The United States will follow the OST no matter what AFP 2006(AFP, "US Defends Its Opposition To Ban On Weapons In Space, " December 13 2006, pg online @ www.spacewar.com/reports/US_Defends_Its_Opposition_To_Ban_On_Weapons_In_Space_999.html//gh-arjun)

The United States defended Wednesday its opposition to a new ban on weapons in space, saying it needed to keep its options open amid threats from nations seeking ways to attack US space systems. Robert Joseph, under secretary of state for arms control and security, said he was unaware of plans to deploy weapons in space but that the new National Space Policy does not preclude that option in the future. Joseph also said terrorism had emerged as a new potential threat to US space operations on the ground. "Ensuring the freedom of space and protecting our interests in this medium are priorities for US national security and for the US economy," Joseph said in a speech here on the new US space policy made public in October. "But not all countries can be relied upon to pursue exclusively peaceful goals in space," he said. "A number of countries are exploring and acquiring capabilities to counter, attack, and defeat US space systems," he said, without naming the nations. The growing threats require the United States to boost its ability to protect its space assets, he said. "To achieve this end, the United States needs to remain at the forefront in space, technologically and operationally, as we have in the air, on land, and at sea," he said. "Specifically, the United States must have the means to employ space assets as an integral part of its ability to manage crises, deter conflicts and, if deterrence fails, prevail in conflict," Joseph added. While the United States sees "no value" in setting new agreements to ban

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 166

http://www.spacewar.com/reports/US_Defends_Its_Opposition_To_Ban_On_Weapons_In_Space_999.html//gh-arjun

http://www.spacewar.com/reports/US_Defends_Its_Opposition_To_Ban_On_Weapons_In_Space_999.html//gh-arjun


weapons in space, it will continue abiding "scrupulously" to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which forbids placing nuclear weapons in space, he said.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 167


2NC Uniqueness- OST Working Now

The OST is serving its purposeGabrynowicz '06 (Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, Director, National Center for Remote Sensing, Air and Space Law and Research Professor of Law, ch. 11 "The Outer Space Treaty and Enhancing Space Security", 2006, http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2562.pdf// GH-aspomer)

The Outer Space Treaty is, beyond any question, one of the most successful multilateral, international treaties ever promulgated.3 It has been accepted by a large majority of the world’s nation-states, including all of the world’s space-capable states.4 Nearly 40 years after it entered into force in 1967, the Outer Space Treaty still continues to garner signatories. As newly active and recently advancing space nations continue to emerge, they are also choosing to become treaty signatories.5 “It is also generally agreed by legal scholars and governments that the earlier Declaration of Legal Principles (which were incorporated into the Outer Space Treaty) expresses general customary law, binding on all states.”6 Moreover, treaties that “provide for neutralisation or demilitarisation of a territory or area, such as … outer space” “have been held to create a status or regime valid erga omnes (for all the world)”.7

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 168


Link-Weaponization/MilitaryWeaponization violates the OST – independently causes space arms raceThe Globe and Mail '85(A Canadian newspaper, Paul Taylor - staff writer, 7/25/85, "Star Wars participation could violate treaties, lawyers say", Lexis, http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic// GH-aspomer)

The Strategic Defence Initiative, commonly known as Star Wars, represents a violation of the Anti- Ballistic Missile Treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States, he said. "Canada's role in aiding and abetting the United States to violate the ABM Treaty is itself, arguably, a violation of international law," Mr. Wright told the parliamentary committee which is holding a series of cross-country hearings into Canada's role in Star Wars and into freer trade with the United States. External Affairs Minister Joe Clark has pledged that the Government will not make a decision on the two issues until after the committee reports to Parliament Aug. 23. Mr. Wright said his organization, which has 435 members across Canada, has just completed a legal study of Star Wars and found that the proposed weapon system could violate many other international agreements. These include the Outer Space Treaty, Non-Proliferation Treaty and Partial Test Ban Treaty as well as the United Nations Charter and UN Declarations that Canada has signed. After addressing the committee, which has just completed three days of hearings in Toronto, Mr. Wright told reporters that many international agreements have "no enforcing mechanisms." It is up to individual nations to "adhere to the spirit of the treaties." But he added that "the security of the entire world depends upon the rule of law." If all nations act as if the treaties do not apply to them, Star Wars will have a destabilizing influence on the arms race, Mr. Wright said.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 169


Link-Weaponization/MilitarizationMilitary nature of the DoD makes its space actions necessarily violate the OSTDr. Xiaoming Zhang, associate professor in the Department of Leadership and Strategy at the Air War College. He holds a PhD in history from the University of Iowa and has authored a number of articles on Chinese military involvement in the Korean and Vietnam Wars and Sino-Soviet relations during these conlicts, as well as Red Wings over the Yalu: China, the Soviet Union and the Air War in Korea (Texas A&M University Press, 2002). Col Sean D. McClung is director, National Space Studies Center at Air University. His recent involve ment with Chinese space studies includes cosponsoring China, Space and Strategy workshops with the Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies, participating in CSIS’s 2008 Global Space Development Summit in Beijing, and presenting at the 2008 Chinese Aerospace Power Conference at the Naval War College. He holds the Master Space Operations Badge. His civilian education includes a BS degree from the University of Florida and an MA in international relations from International University, London, Spring 10, [“The Art of Military Discovery Chinese Air and Space Power Implications for the USAF,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2010/spring/zhangmcclung.pdf] E. Liu

Offensive space operations are critical to ensuring freedom of maneuver in space. These operations can be in reaction to hostilities or in a preemptive maneuver as a spoiling attack or simple patrolling. Conducting offensive space operations carries with it some legal trip wires. First is the ability to maneuver forces. According to the Outer Space Treaty, Article IV, “… the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies shall be forbidden.” (Outer Space Treaty, 1967) The question is how does the world community define maneuver? Most would think this is a straight forward concept, but it isn’t. For example if a country uses a strict definition to define maneuver as the movement of military personnel and equipment within an area of operations, then we conduct maneuvers in space all the time. Many of our Apollo astronauts were military and what if we put a Department of Defense satellite in orbit around the moon and continually move it? Is that conducting military maneuvers? If so, we have violated the treaty. Another interpretation of military maneuvers could be conducting a military exercise. This is sometimes called conducting maneuvers. The problem with this is we did conduct military exercises on the moon. During our visit to the moon, we had military men conducting Reconnaissance. Although they were working in a “civilian capacity,” for scientific investigation, Reconnaissance is a form of combat patrol. This was a thin line we walked and the Soviets were planning to walk the same thin line. Could this have been a violation? Our definition of maneuver is “the employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission.” (FM 3-0 Operations, 2008) If we use our definition, we have not violated it. The problem is most treaties have a section that defines what words will mean in the treaty. The Outer Space treaty does not have this, and I believe that was intentional. Some would say that this part of the Outer Space Treaty was referring to the marshalling of military troops on the moon in preparation for an attack on earth. Based on the political environment of the day, this is the most likely intent of the “no military maneuver” part of the treaty. The biggest misconception about the Outer Space Treaty is that it forbids placing weapons in space. This is definitely not true. Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty (1967) says, “States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any manner.” Some people would look at this portion of the Outer Space Treaty and conclude they were concerned about a space nuclear war. The real concern is of placing nuclear launch platforms in space to be used on enemy states on earth. This type of action could render the Mutually Assured Destruction doctrine

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 170


useless. This would allow virtually undetected nuclear missile launches from space. The only problem with this article is that Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles are “objects carrying nuclear weapons” Outer Space Treaty (1967) and they transition through space.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 171


Link-SPSEven if the plan isn’t for military purpose, the high energy output of SPS ensures that it’s perceived as dual useFan et al. 6/2 [William Fan, distinction MBA holder having strong background in telecommunication, Harold Martin, James Wu, and Brian Mok, “Space Based Solar Power: Industry and Technology Assessment”,

6/2/2011, http://www.pickar.caltech.edu/e103/Final%20Exams/Space%20Based%20Solar%20Power.pdf PHK]

Due to the high energy transmitter that it will utilize, space based solar power could potentially be in violation of international space treaties. In 1967, the Outer Space Treaty was signed by the United States and other world powers. One of the key issues addressed by this treaty is space based weapons. The Outer Space Treaty bans the placement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in space or on any celestial body. This could become a serious issue for space based solar power because of the potential for the transmitter to become a dual use weapon. Additionally, the newly proposed Space Preservation Treaty could severely hinder the implementation of space based solar power, as it would ban the any kind of weapon from being placed in space. In addition to political issues, there may be social disapproval of having a potential weapons system in space

Attempting to put weapons on SPS satellites violates the OSTBetancourt 2010 [Kiatan Betancourt, Law Student at University of Maryland who specializes in International and Environmental Law, “Legal Challenges Facing Solar Power Satellites”, Winter 2010, http://spacejournal.ohio.edu/issue16/betancourt.html PHK]

For the purposes of SBSP, the Outer Space Treaty contains several other key provisions. Article V of the Outer Space Treaty specifically prohibits the placement of any objects in space carrying nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction. Further, testing of any military weapons is strictly forbidden. An example might be an attempt to transform a solar power satellite into a death ray using microwaves or laser beams.[44] Such an action would be in strict violation of the Outer Space Treaty. Article XII of the Outer Space Treaty requires that any station, installation or equipment on the moon, asteroid or other celestial body must be open to inspection on a basis of reciprocity. This provision, though limited to objects on celestial bodies, allows countries to ensure that others are within the terms of the treaty. The Outer Space treaty answers questions concerning the right of private ownership and the role of private companies in outer space. The following two treaties answer questions relating to liability and registration of objects in space.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 172

http://spacejournal.ohio.edu/issue16/betancourt.html

http://www.pickar.caltech.edu/e103/Final%20Exams/Space%20Based%20Solar%20Power.pdf

http://www.pickar.caltech.edu/e103/Final%20Exams/Space%20Based%20Solar%20Power.pdf


Link-SPSAttempts to keep SPS at geosynchronous orbit violates the Outer Space TreatyWallach 10 [Mark Wallach, attorney at Calfee, Halter & Griswold, “Legal Issues for Space Based Solar Power”, Winter 2010, http://spacejournal.ohio.edu/issue16/wallach.html PHK]

Another major, yet still largely undeveloped, legal question is who owns the right to the "slot" located at the geosynchronous orbit above a particular rectenna. The highly prized equitorial orbit at approximately 36,000 kilometers above mean sea level has the unique characteristic of appearing to maintain the same position relative to the earth's surface, since the object in that orbit has an orbital period matching the earth's rotation period. Ideally, SBSP satellites collecting energy and converting it into a microwave beam for transmission to the surface will be positioned in a suitable location over the equator from which they can reach their targeted receiving rectennas by way of movable "spot beams."Who owns - or who controls - the "air rights" to the space far above the atmosphere at GEO? If there is, for example, a communications satellite already located there, does it have primacy by reason of prior arrival? If a company receives approval to locate its SBSP collecting satellite at a particular spot, is it entitled to that location in perpetuity, or for the life of the satellite? In general, since most of the orbital slots in GEO have already been assigned to interested nations, and not to individuals or companies, it will fall to the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the regulatory agencies of nations to adjudicate such questions.The ITU, an agency of the United Nations, holds responsibility for assigning both orbital and electromagnetic spectrum positions. The ITU is governed by a constitution and the International Telecommunications Convention. The rights and obligations therein are binding on all member states. Currently, the ITU appears to apply a "first-in-time, first-in-right" system to orbital allocation. However, the ITU's primary considerations are supposed to be equitable access and efficient use of a limited resource. Many argue that these considerations obligate the ITU to reserve spaces for developing nations.The matter of crowding is already a contentious issue for present and future operators of satellites at GEO. Telecommunications satellites need to be positioned far enough away from one another to ensure that their signals do not interfere with each other. The ITU Radio Communication Sector interprets, administers, and enforces the policies and agreements of the ITU, and also oversees coordination of the use of the spectrum and assists in solving conflicts with orbital position in the "Master Register."The Space Treaty, a legally binding international agreement that provides the legal framework for the access and use of outer space and celestial bodies, does not allow for the allocation of orbital slots "either as a property right or through appropriation by national sovereignty." Article II of the Space Treaty provides that outer space "is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means." The Space Treaty also appears to prevent private companies from selling slots in the geostationary orbit: "Under the current treaty regime, the geostationary orbit is a scarce resource that no nation or individual can claim a legal right to beyond that of a squatter, which does not work to allocate the orbital space either efficiently or equitably."While the ITU presumably will govern the allocation of GEO slots to SBSP satellites, it is by no means clear how conflicts between communications satellites and their vastly larger SBSP cousins will be decided, or what criteria will be used to make those decisions.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 173

http://spacejournal.ohio.edu/issue16/wallach.html


Link-MiningMining on the moon violates the OSTWall '11 (Mike Wall, Space.com senior writer, 1/13/11, "Moon Mining Idea Digs Up Lunar Legal Issues", http://www.space.com/10621-moon-mining-legal-issues.html// GH-aspomer)

The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 seems to permit extractive activities on the moon and other celestial bodies, according to space-law experts. But it's not entirely clear that mining companies would own the stuff that they extract. That fuzziness could be a problem for outfits contemplating a moon mining endeavor, which could have initial costs running into the tens of billions of dollars. As far as title goes, it's a gray area," international lawyer and space-law expert Timothy Nelson, who works for the firm Skadden in New York City, told SPACE.com. "And from a risk perspective, lack of clarity means it doesn't exist." [Q & A: One Company's Moon Mining Plan] Water on the moon: An abundant resource The moon has a lot of water ice, as recent discoveries have made clear. Frigid craters at both lunar poles have likely been trapping and accumulating water for billions of years — water that is relatively pure and easy to get at. Scientists and entrepreneurs alike have begun talking seriously about mining this ice, and not just to keep future moon dwellers hydrated. Water ice can also be separated into its constituent hydrogen and oxygen — the chief components of rocket fuel. Propellant could be produced from moon water and sold at refueling stations in low-Earth orbit, allowing spaceships and satellites to top off their tanks in space. This arrangement could help spur a wave of trade, travel and exploration throughout the solar system, researchers and businessmen have argued. It would make more economic sense to supply the filling stations from the moon, they've added. The moon's gravity is just one-sixth that of Earth’s, so launching from there is far cheaper. Robotic Lunar Bulldozers Small commercial robots the size of riding mowers could prepare a safe landing site for NASA's lunar outpost by surrounding it with an eight-foot high semi-circle berm to block grit kicked out by spacecraft landings from hitting nearby habitats. CREDIT: Mark Maxwell, Astrobotic Technology View full size image Some companies are already drawing up plans to mine moon water for this very purpose. Shackleton Energy Co. (SEC), for example, hopes to be selling rocket fuel in orbit by 2020, according to its founder Bill Stone. The good news: It's legal The good news for outfits such as SEC is that moon-mining operations appear to be legal, experts say. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 — which forms the basis of international space law and has been signed by the United States and other major spacefaring nations — prohibits countries from exercising territorial sovereignty over the moon or other celestial bodies. But it doesn't prohibit resource extraction. "Experienced space lawyers interpret the treaty to allow mining," space-law expert Wayne White, who works in the aerospace industry, told SPACE.com. "I have never seen anybody argue that you couldn't use mineral resources." White and Nelson both referenced the Moon Treaty of 1979, which sought to set up a regime governing how the moon's resources would be used. The Moon Treaty remains more or less irrelevant today; it has been ratified by just a handful of nations, none of them big players in spaceflight and space exploration. "If the Moon Treaty wants to regulate how we use natural resources in outer space, then that presumes that it's legal to do so under the Outer Space Treaty," White said. Nelson compared the legal status of moon mining to that of fishing in the high seas, beyond national borders and claims. "The idea that you can't claim sovereignty is not necessarily incompatible with the right to go conduct mining operations," Nelson said. "The high seas are not subject to any sovereignty, but people can go and fish there." The bad news: Title may be ambiguous While the Outer Space Treaty likely allows mining, it does not set up a system granting explicit title to the extracted resources, according to Nelson. That ambiguity may not cause problems during mining operations, but it could be an issue when companies try to sell the resources.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 174


Link-MiningMining and claiming property on the moon violates the OST and the Moon treatySvoboda '08 (Elizabeth Svoboda, editor for Popular Science magazine, 1/19/08, Lexis, "Who owns the moon?", http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic// GH-aspomer)

Until a couple of years ago, no one paid much attention to Hope and other space-plot peddlers like Lunar International and the Lunar Registry; they were widely regarded as a few planets short of a solar system. Besides, the idea of claiming land in outer space or exploiting its resources remained chiefly theoretical. These days, with Virgin et al. charging full speed ahead, private citizens could feasibly start taking regular jaunts to the moon by 2020 or so. But the real money is not in the pleasure rides. With crude oil nearing $100 a barrel, entrepreneurs focused on petroleum alternatives are looking at the green cheese in a whole new light -- and that has lunar real estate agents envisioning asteroid showers of money raining down on them. Lunar soil is rife with platinum group metals, which are exceedingly rare on Earth and are key to helping hydrogen fuel cells operate efficiently. Then there's the real golden ticket: helium-3, deposited on the moon's surface by radioactive solar winds. When combined with deuterium, an isotope of hydrogen, helium-3 can initiate fusion reactions so potent that scientists estimate a single space-shuttle load of the stuff could power all the homes and businesses in the United States for a year. "The moon contains 10 times more energy in the form of helium-3 than all the fossil fuels on the Earth," former Indian President Abdul Kalam told attendees at 2004's International Conference on Exploration and Utilization of the Moon. Gerald Kulcinski, director of the University of Wisconsin's Fusion Technology Institute, thinks helium-3 could potentially power future long-distance space travel, though it could take decades before a commercial helium-3 reactor becomes available. Since the moon's resources could fetch billions of dollars in the Earth marketplace, Hope says, it should be a no-brainer for shrewd real-estate buyers to set aside some petty cash and snag a piece of the action. Best of all, the entire scheme is perfectly aboveboard from a legal standpoint -- if you take Hope's word. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the most recent piece of widely ratified United Nations legislation on moon property ownership, states that territories beyond the Earth cannot be owned by national governments, but it does not specifically prevent private citizens from making land claims. The 1979 Moon Treaty attempted to close this loophole by forbidding ownership of any extraterrestrial property by any organization or person, but the treaty quickly died on the vine; only 13 U.N. member nations ever ratified it. After the Moon Treaty tanked, Hope sent letters to the the U.N., the United States government and the Russian government, declaring his ownership of the moon. He has taken their lack of response as carte blanche to go ahead with his grandiose appropriation scheme. His plans include establishing the first helium-3 mining operations on the moon by 2011 (NASA, by contrast, won't mount its next manned lunar landing until 2019) and forming a "democratic republic sovereign nation," the Galactic Government, in which his property-owning customers will enjoy voting rights. If other nations infringe on the territory he has claimed, he will view their incursions as acts of war. "The U.N. has had plenty of time to acknowledge our claims of ownership," Hope says. "Who are they to tell us we can't do this?" He cites first-claimant-takes-all precedents set during the homesteading era as justification for his planned land grab. "Look at the United States when it first became a country. Land acquisition was frequently done on a remote basis. We're just going by the precepts of our forefathers." Unsurprisingly, most space law experts reject Hope's claims. Ram Jakhu, a space lawyer at McGill University, thinks Hope made a mistake in assuming the Moon Treaty's demise made his venture legitimate. In fact, the Outer Space Treaty, ratified by the United States and 97 other nations, already covers all the necessary bases because its prohibition against government space property ownership applies to individual citizens as well. "The Outer Space Treaty is public law, and as such, private citizens are subject to it," Jakhu says. "It doesn't matter if you go and put your own

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 175


flag up there. The treaty is very clear and broad and denies the claims of any property owners." Virgiliu Pop, a member of the International Institute of Space Law and author of "Unreal Estate: The Men Who Sold the Moon," agrees. "People like Dennis Hope have no legitimate basis whatsoever for what they are doing. If states cannot appropriate extraterrestrial realms, neither can their nationals." Hope fires back by dismissing their dismissals. "That has no credence. That's just their opinion. We don't need the recognition of the world." While many legal experts have written Hope off as a loon, Rosanna Sattler, chair of the space law group at Boston firm Posternak Blankstein & Lund, counters that regardless of whether his dubious venture passes international muster, it exposes some glaring omissions in existing space-property legislation. When the Outer Space Treaty was drafted more than 40 years ago, it's unlikely the possibility of lunar commerce ever crossed legislators' minds; all space exploration then took place under governmental auspices, and private space travel was as foreign a concept as portable personal computers. "I don't think we want anyone up there unless there's some more concrete framework in place," Sattler says. "The $64,000

Link-Mining

question is: Is the Outer Space Treaty flexible enough to allow commercial development, or are there gaps and holes, things that have to be done to amend it?" The issue at the core of the debate is whether owning extraterrestrial land is a necessary prerequisite to culling its resources, and the aging Outer Space Treaty does little to clarify the matter. "If I'm an entrepreneur who goes to Wall Street and says, 'Will you invest in my lunar mining company?' Wall Street will say, 'Wait a minute, the law is not clear here. You can't appropriate that space,'" Sattler says. "It's like if you drafted all this legislation about the tail of the elephant, and then you find out about the elephant itself and go, 'Oh my God.'" The international community's failure to acknowledge the newly burgeoning commercial realm in space stems from a long-standing schism in the U.N. between established space powers and up-and-coming nations outside the extraterrestrial fray. While countries uninvolved in space exploration tend to favor laws, like the failed Moon Treaty, that explicitly forbid any ownership or private use of outer-space territory, space heavyweights like the United States, Russia and China, with an eye toward future commercial gain, have shied away from such blanket declarations. As a result of this stalemate, the moon retains many of the trappings of the wild frontier: It's unspoiled, partially ungoverned, and flush with resources --- the ultimate prize for opportunists like Dennis Hope. To dispel some of the confusion, Jakhu says individual space-faring nations need to seize the initiative and place concrete limits on how businesses and private citizens can conduct themselves on lunar soil. "Anyone who wants to transmit video over the airwaves needs a license. People who want to conduct mining operations [on the moon] should have to get a license as well," he says. "It's in the best interest of the United States to direct the use of the moon in an organized manner." Sattler points to existing laws regarding use of the oceans as a blueprint for national governments to follow as they draft lunar legislation. The U.N.'s Convention on the Law of the Sea, for instance, established an International Seabed Authority that grants licenses to businesses that wish to conduct mining operations in deep-sea areas that do not belong to any country. A specialized tribunal handles any resource-allocation disputes that arise. "We need to say, 'People can take moon resources, but you have to go through this procedure first.' This shouldn't be like the Gold Rush, where people just got on a horse and made a claim," Sattler says.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 176


Link-Space BMDSpace BMD kills OST credibility, leads to international abandonment and a space arms raceThe Globe and Mail '85(A Canadian newspaper, Paul Taylor - staff writer, 7/25/85, "Star Wars participation could violate treaties, lawyers say", Lexis, http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic// GH-aspomer)

External Affairs Minister Joe Clark has pledged that the Government will not make a decision on the two issues until after the committee reports to Parliament Aug. 23. Mr. Wright said his organization, which has 435 members across Canada, has just completed a legal study of Star Wars and found that the proposed weapon system could violate many other international agreements. These include the Outer Space Treaty, Non-Proliferation Treaty and Partial Test Ban Treaty as well as the United Nations Charter and UN Declarations that Canada has signed. After addressing the committee, which has just completed three days of hearings in Toronto, Mr. Wright told reporters that many international agreements have "no enforcing mechanisms." It is up to individual nations to "adhere to the spirit of the treaties." But he added that "the security of the entire world depends upon the rule of law." If all nations act as if the treaties do not apply to them, Star Wars will have a destabilizing influence on the arms race, Mr. Wright said.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 177


Internal Link-US keyIt is the job of the major space powers to uphold the OST and International Law Wolter 2005(Detlev Wolter, Dr. Detlev Wolter, Head of European Policy and Law Division, State Chancellery, Brandenburg, was Political Counsellor at the German Mission to the United Nations in New York (2003-2005), and served as Vice-Chairman of the First Committee of the 60 th UN General Assembly. He was also Chairman of the Group of Interested States in Practical Disarmament Measures and Co-Chairman of the Group of Like-Minded States on Conflict Prevention. He has a Master of International Affairs, Columbia University, New York and a PhD in international law and arms control from Humboldt University, Berlin. "Chapter 7: Legal Foundations and Essential Treaty Elements For a System of Comon Security in Outer Space," March 2005, Published in Safeguarding Space Security: Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space—Conference Report,21–22 March 2005, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 2006, www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2458.pdf//gh-arjun)

Use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes and in the common interest of all states and mankind as a whole Outer space is a common territory beyond national jurisdiction, the global commons par excellence. In addition, the OST provides for cooperation and consultation principles. Hence, security cannot be pursued in the interest of one state or a group of states. Instead, it must be common or cooperative security. The legal order for outer space that exists today was developed in close cooperation with the international community’s efforts to prevent the space powers from entering into an arms race in space. From the beginning of the space age, the international community raised the claim that the exploration and use of outer space shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes in the interest, and for the benefit, of mankind as a whole. The United States and the Soviet Union introduced the principle of peaceful use in proposals aimed toward developing a legal order that would limit the military use of outer space. In its first memorandum devoted to arms control in outer space to the General Assembly in 1957, the United States proposed that the United Nations should establish a multilateral control system with “international inspection and participation” as “the first step toward the objective of assuring that future developments in outer space would be devoted exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes”. The obligation to prevent the weaponization of space The deployment of space weapons would clearly not be in the “interest of all states” and would thus violate Article I of the OST. While the international community has accepted passive military uses of outer space,59 such as reconnaissance and communication satellites, it clearly opposes the transgression of the threshold toward active uses of outer space of a destructive nature. Since 1981, the annual resolutions of the General Assembly regarding outer space and the prevention of an arms race in outer space have repeatedly requested that the nuclear powers actively participate in the prevention of an arms race in outer space “with a view to reaching agreement” as well as to restart or speed up parallel bilateral arms control negotiations concerning outer space and refrain from any contrary activities. At the 59th First Committee meeting of the United Nations in 2004, Sri Lanka declared the PAROS resolution, in substance, to be customary international law. In addition, the General Assembly in several PAROS resolutions stated explicitly that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) disarmament obligation also applies to outer space. As the International Court of Justice has stated in its Advisory Opinion in 1996, there is an obligation to conclude and not only to negotiate a disarmament agreement

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 178


Internal Link-OST is BindingThe OST is binding-violations ensure cred collapseCDI, 2008 (Center for Defense Information, Eugene Marder, CDI Research Assistant, 2008 pg online @ www.cdi.org/pdfs/ChineseASATtest.pdf//gh-arjun)

As news of a Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon test spread throughout the world during the second and third weeks of January 2007, most spacefaring nations condemned the action as irresponsible and troubling. 1 Some complaining states cited China’s potential spurring of an arms race in space, and all noted the staggering amount of hazardous orbital debris generated by the test without any prior warning by the Chinese. While these statements were uniformly unequivocal in their disapproval, they seldom implied that China had somehow breached the terms of international law—China’s actions were deemed reproachable, but not illegal. But the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 (OST), by its Article IX provisions, calls for a state to engage in international consultations when predicting that its space activities will harm the interests of others. 2 China failed to do so, and thereby violated the terms of the OST. Yet few states noted this illicit behavior. Rather than skirting the issue of China’s flagrant flouting of international law, states should directly confront the manifest illegality of China’s behavior. Such a discussion amon members of the OST would strengthen Article IX and create customary law (as a supplement to the text of the agreement), engendering future compliance with the consultation provision. As an international agreement, the OST is binding law; although nations have often refrained from pursuing Article IX consultations in the past, this behavior has been contextualized and has not yet effected a customary “amendment” to the OST. To avoid rescission of Article IX in the future, parties to the OST can strictly abide by its principles to the letter; China’s ASAT test provides a perfect opportunity to do so. The deleterious consequences of continued wanton ASAT testing in space are many, and Article IX offers a solution. States should capitalize on the chance to strengthen the article’s legal muscle by denouncing the lack of notification surrounding the Chinese ASAT test.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 179


Impact-International LawThe OST is part of international lawThe Space Review '05 (Michael J. Listner, staff writer, 5/31/05 "It’s time to rethink international space law", http://www.thespacereview.com/article/381/1// GH-aspomer)

Since the inception of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, international law regarding the use of outer space by nations and individuals has been dominated by the res communis doctrine, the concept that space belongs to mankind and not to one individual or country. While the doctrine is a noble one and is likely the offspring of the political and economic environment of the time, strides in technology as well as the evolution of the socio-political and economic environment makes the treaty more of a hindrance than a safeguard. The fact is that although some of the principles espoused by the treaty have merit and have resulted in some child treaties that are certainly beneficial to the progress of space exploration, the underlying premise of res communis effectively limits expansion and innovation in the realm of outer space. Two areas in particular are national security and property rights and commercialization.

The OST is the most important space treaty in IlawDziuba '11 (Andy Dziuba, studied International Law at James Madison, "Space Law and the Future of Space Exploration", http://www.brighthub.com/science/space/articles/73480.aspx// GH-aspomer)

Between 1967 and 1979 the COPUOS drafted 5 international treaties. Some of them were widely signed by the international community and some were not. Here are some of the important aspects of the effects of these treaties: The United Nations has acted as the main arbiter for space law. No nukes in space. The Outer Space Treaty, signed in 1967, is the backbone of international laws governing space. The Cold War was in its prime, and both sides were wary of bringing the conflict into space. This treaty states that it is illegal to place nuclear weapons or another weapon of mass destruction into space, meaning in orbit, on the Moon, or on any other celestial body. It is also illegal to place any military installation in space.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 180


Impact-All Space TreatiesThe OST is key to all other space treatiesDanilenko no date(Genaddy M. Danilenko, Head of the Center for International Law, http://www.law.berkeley.edu/journals/btlj/articles/vol4/Danilenko/HTML/text.html//GH-aspomer)

The first multilateral space convention, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, 2 establishes a basic framework for the international legal regime in outer space. The treaty declares that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries and "shall be the province of mankind." 3 It provides that outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, should be free for exploration and use by all states. 4 Outer space is not subject to national appropriation. 5 The treaty prohibits the placement of nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction in outer space, and declares that the moon and other celestial bodies shall be used "exclusively for peaceful purposes." 6 The treaty contains provisions on the rescue and return of astronauts. 7 States bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space, 8 as well as international liability for damage. 9 According to the treaty, states conducting activities in outer space should inform the United Nations and the international scientific community, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable, of the nature, conduct, locations and results of such activities. 10 The treaty has been ratified by 91 countries. 11 The Outer Space Treaty provides the basis for all subsequent treaties and other legal instruments relating to space activities. The 1968 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts 12 expands the relevant general provisions of the Outer Space Treaty. The 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects 13 provides a detailed regime for the liability of states for damage caused by space objects on the surface of the earth, to aircraft in flight and in outer space. The 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space 14 specifies the requirements for the registration of space objects. The 1979 Moon Treaty, 15 while reaffirming a number of principles contained in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, also declares the moon the "common heritage of mankind" 16 and calls for the creation of an international regime to govern the exploitation of the natural resources of the moon. 17 Along with these multilateral treaties dealing specifically with space and space activities, the international community has promulgated a number of other conventions bearing on space activities. Of major importance are the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 18 which bans nuclear explosions in outer space, the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, 19 which bans the use of certain environmental modification techniques aimed at changing the dynamics, composition, or structure of outer space, and the International Telecommunications Convention, 20 which contains provisions relating to space communications.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 181


Impact-Politico-Legal CrisisBreaking of the OST will lead to a politico-legal crisisDinerman 2007(Taylor Dinerman, has written on space and defense issues for the Wall Street Journal, National Review, and Ad Astra the magazine of the National Space Society, Space News, and elsewhere. He is now a Senior Editor at the Hudson Institute’s New York office. He was an author of the textbook Space Science for Students and has been a part time consultant for the US Defense Department, "Beyond the Outer Space Treaty," October 1 2007 pg online @ www.thespacereview.com/article/965/1//gh-arjun)

Russia’s recent Arctic seabed claims have raised serious questions about the long-term viability of the Law of the Sea Treaty (LoST), which the Bush administration is trying to convince the US Senate to ratify. Why, after all, should the US join a treaty and an organization that ignores or minimizes the most brazen violations of the spirit, if not the letter, of the agreement? There is a tendency inside the leadership of major transnational institutions to ignore most violations of their agreements, except with these are supposedly carried out by the “usual suspects”. While the US State Department says that there is no connection between the LoST and the Outer Space Treaty (OST), which was signed and ratified a long time ago, the same entropic process seems to be undermining both agreements and it is time to begin examining alternative arrangements. The OST was designed in an age when two superpowers were competing for control of the heavens and there was little prospect for private enterprise in space, aside from what was then a tightly-regulated, monopoly-controlled telecommunications market. Today things have changed considerably. Not only are there lots of nations with thriving space programs, but more and more players are entering the whole “NewSpace” market and some of the big old-style companies, such as Northrop Grumman, are getting in on the act by buying control of Burt Rutan’s Scaled Composites. Space tourism, and the eventual low-cost access to orbit that it implies, is the thin end of the wedge for a whole new area of commercial space activities including space solar power, space mining, and space manufacturing. The preamble of the OST states, “Believing that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried out for the benefit of all peoples irrespective of the degree of their economic and scientific development.” Like the “common heritage of mankind” language in the LoST, this opens the way for an attempt at control and taxation of the commercial space activities by international bodies. No major organization has yet tried to implement such control, but the day may soon come when someone will try and push the limits. The OST states in Article 6 that, “The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty.” For the moment this has worked out pretty well, but when one state or group of states considers that the authorization and supervision of private activities in space by another state is inadequate or is harmful to their interests, this will lead to a legal or moral challenge to the responsible state. Such a challenge could easily lead to the first major politico-legal space crisis. The proposals that have so far been made to replace the principle of private property guaranteed by a responsible nation state, with either a long-term lease granted by the UN or some other sort of collective body or by license to operate, are at best stopgap measures. At worst they will be excuses for international bureaucrats to impede and probably endanger any truly productive work. The corruption for which the UN has become all too well known should be allowed to replicate itself in outer space. That is not to say that nation states cannot themselves be corrupt or incompetent, but at least with democracies there are built-in corrective mechanisms that are lacking in international institutions such as the UN and EU. As humanity moves out into the solar system, it will carry with it all its flaws and its many sins, but let us try and not make them our main payload. Fortunately the UN is a weak and increasingly discredited organization. Its future ability to influence the regulation of space commerce will be, for all practical purposes, non-existent. Yet some international agreement will have to be made delineating who controls or owns what objects and who has controls of what space lines of communications. What will probably end up

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 182


happening after the first big crisis is a “Space Yalta”. As humanity moves out into the solar system, it will carry with it all its flaws and its many sins, but let us try and not make them our main payload. The original 1945 Yalta agreements did not, in and of itself, carve up Europe into spheres of influence. Instead they recognized the unpleasant (for the West) truth, that Stalin’s Soviet Union would keep control of the nations of Eastern Europe, from which they had just ejected Nazi Germany. A future Yalta, might, for example, agree that the US and China would keep control of those parts of the Moon on which they had established their respective bases and the surrounding areas

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 183


Impact-Space WeaponizationLiability Convention and OST solve Space WeaponizationCaldicott and Eisendrath 2007 (Helen Caldicott and Craig Eisendrath, Helen Mary Caldicott (born 7 August 1938) is an Australian physician, author, and anti-nuclear advocate who has founded several associations dedicated to opposing the use of depleted uranium munitions, nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons proliferation, war and military action in general. She hosts a weekly radio program, If You Love This Planet. Craig Eisendrath is currently chairman of the Project for Nuclear Awareness, an organization dedicated to furthering nuclear disarmament. “War in Heaven,” 2007 Book, pg 114 and 115, Typed, gh-arjun)

Treaties already exist today that could be used to prevent of inhibit the weaponization of space. At the “Full Spectrum Dominance” Conference in May 2005, Ambassador Jonathan Dean made clear that if the United States “perseveres in moving toward weaponization of space, the legal regime could be used to block or delay these moves.” At present, he pointed out, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty permits the transit of outer space by nuclear missiles, and the orbiting of non-nuclear weapons to attack other satellites or bombard the earth. However, the Liability Convention of 1972 establishes procedures for determining the liability of a country that damages or destroys the space objects of another country and the Registration Conventions of 1976 requires that registration of objects launched into space. In addition, the Outer Space Treaty itself makes signatories to the treaty who launch objects into space liable for damage they do to the space assets of another power. It also provides consultations with other governments if a party to the treaty believes that an activity planned by another treaty party could cause potentially harmful interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space. Consultations under these treaty provisions would constitute an early warning that complications could follow practices that violate these provisions. Beyond this, Ambassador Dean maintained, the UN General Assembly, disposed to limit the military uses of space, could ask for an advisory opinion from the International Criminal Court in the Hague to determine whether the United States moves towards weaponization are in compliance with the Outer Space Treaty. If the United States refused to comply, nations could request an injunction from the Court.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 184


***Moon Treaty DA***

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 185


Moon Treaty DA 1NCUS stance on Moon treaty currently uncertain but it is applicable to all nationsSpace Future 2K (David M Livingston, staff writer, "Lunar Ethics and Space Commercialization", 2000 http://www.spacefuture.com/archive/lunar_ethics_and_space_commercialization.shtml// GH-aspomer)

The United Nations treaty known specifically as the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, has not been widely accepted by UN members, but this particular twenty-one article treaty has been ratified or acceded to by nine states: Australia, Austria, Chile, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines, and Uruguay. In addition, the agreement has been signed, but not ratified, by five states: France, Guatemala, India, Peru, and Romania. The treaty carries with it a controversial school of legal thought that is potentially applicable to all nations, even those that are not signatories to this treaty. It provides specifics relating to the Moon and to celestial bodies that are not part of the Outer Space Treaty, and sets the basis for the future regulation, exploitation, and exploration of these bodies. The provisions requiring benefit sharing for the "common heritage of mankind" add to the controversy surrounding this treaty. While the treaty is legally effective, it is unknown if the United States is bound by any of its terms. The treaty contains sensitive language indicating that a country has to have signed it to be bound by it, but, also, when a country follows some of the treaty's provisions there is the potential of construing acceptance to the treaty. Since the United States and other spacefaring nations are part of the United Nations itself, some believe that the provisions of the treaty apply to all member countries of the UN, whether or not those countries have formally signed the specific treaty.

<Insert Specific Link>

Violation of the Moon treaty violates international lawFree Republic ’09 (Free Republic, "NASA Will Use 2 Ton Kinetic Weapon to Bomb Moon on Oct. 9Breaks UN Treaty", 7/4/09, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/2285605/posts// GH-aspomer)

NASA’s lunar bombing violates Space Law and must be stopped NASA’s use of a 2-ton empty Centaur rocket as a kinetic weapon violates space law in multiple ways and must be stopped, in flight or in lunar orbit, which the LCROSS lunar orbiter reaches on Tuesday June 23, 2009. The bombing of the moon with a kinetic weapon to create a 5 mile crater is a per se violation of the U.N. Outer Space Treaty, which the U.S. has ratified, irrespective of its being designed as part of an experiment related to lunar colonization. The U.N. Outer Space Treaty (Article III) provides that “States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations.” The Moon Treaty (Agreement Governing The Activities Of States On The Moon And Other Celestial Bodies (1979)) addresses and bans the specific activity bombing of the moon carried out unilaterally by the U.S. The Moon Treaty prohibits disruption of the environment of the Moon. The LCROSS bombing constitutes a disruption of the delicate balance of the lunar ecology. Article 7 of the Moon Treaty states: Article 7 of the Moon Treaty “1. In exploring and using the moon, States Parties shall take measures to prevent the disruption of the existing balance of its environment whether by introducing adverse changes in that environment, by its harmful contamination through the introduction of extra-environmental matter or otherwise. States Parties shall also take measures to avoid harmfully affecting the environment of the earth through the introduction of extraterrestrial matter or otherwise. “2. States Parties shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the measures being adopted by them in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article and shall also, to the maximum extent feasible, notify him in advance of all placements by them of radio-active materials on the moon and of the purposes of such placements. “3. States Parties shall report to other States Parties and to the Secretary-General concerning areas of the moon having special scientific interest in order that, without prejudice to the rights of other States Parties, consideration may be given to the designation of such areas as international scientific preserves for

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 186


which special protective arrangements are to be agreed upon in consultation with the competent bodies of the United Nations.” Although the U.S. has not ratified the Moon Treaty, 13 nations have, and it can be construed as a relevant international standard of what constitutes “international law” under the U.N. Outer Space Treaty.

Moon Treaty DA 1NCUS violations of I-law kill human rights promotion, soft power, and leadershipKoh ‘03(Harold Hongju Koh, Professor of International Law at Yale, “On American Exceptionalism”, a version of this can be found here: http://www.riehlworldview.com/carnivorous_conservative/2009/04/koh-us-no-better-than-iran-nigeria-and-saudi-arabia.html// GH-aspomer)

For now, we should recognize at least four problems with double standards. The first is that, when the United States promotes double standards, it invariably ends up not on the higher rung, but on the lower rung with horrid bedfellows - for example, with such countries as Iran, Nigeria, and Saudi [*1487] Arabia, the only other countries that have not in practice either abolished or declared a moratorium upon the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders. n28 This appearance of hypocrisy undercuts America's ability to pursue an affirmative human rights agenda. Worse yet, by espousing the double standard, the United States often finds itself co-opted into either condoning or defending other countries' human rights abuses, even when it previously criticized them (as has happened, for example, with the United States critique of military tribunals in Peru, Russia's war on Chechen "terrorists," or China's crackdown on Uighur Muslims). n29 Third, the perception that the United States applies one standard to the world and another to itself sharply weakens America's claim to lead globally through moral authority. This diminishes U.S. power to persuade through principle, a critical element of American "soft power." Fourth, and perhaps most important, by opposing the global rules, the United States can end up undermining the legitimacy of the rules themselves, not just modifying them to suit America's purposes. The irony, of course, is that, by doing so, the United States disempowers itself from invoking those rules, at precisely the moment when it needs those rules to serve its own national purposes. n30

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 187

http://www.riehlworldview.com/carnivorous_conservative/2009/04/koh-us-no-better-than-iran-nigeria-and-saudi-arabia.html//

http://www.riehlworldview.com/carnivorous_conservative/2009/04/koh-us-no-better-than-iran-nigeria-and-saudi-arabia.html//


2NC UniquenessThe Moon Treaty is internationally binding but there is concern over US adherenceHurtak '09(J.J. Hurtak, has a Ph.D. and is prez of The Academy for Future Science, 2009, http://www.affs.org/html/existing_space_law_concepts.html// GH-aspomer)

Only nine nations have ratified the Moon Treaty (Australia, Austria, Chile, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines, and Uruguay), while over 90 have signed the Outer Space Treaty. By UN agreement, five signatures are sufficient to validate a treaty as an international instrument, but there is concern at the refusal of the USA and Russia/USSR to sign—the two nations most likely at present to engage significantly in space exploration.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 188


2NC AT: Moon Bombing Violated TreatyMoon bombing didn’t disturb the moon or violate the treatyForeign Policy '09(Jordana Timerman, staff writer, "Was NASA's moon bombing legal?", 10/9/09, http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/09/illegal_testing// GH-aspomer)

Amateur astronomers squinted to see the anti-climactic "explosion" Friday morning, but others were far more concerned about the potential impact (and legality) of NASA's scientific experimentation. The UN Moon Treaty (technically the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies), states that: In exploring and using the Moon, States Parties shall take measures to prevent the disruption of the existing balance of its environment, whether by introducing adverse changes in that environment, by its harmful contamination through the introduction of extra-environmental matter or otherwise." Although the (no joke) United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs makes no mention of the lunar explosion, some bloggers say the treaty seems to have been violated, and that Only people with colonized minds believe these things are positive, or that this type of "progress" can be beneficial to anyone beyond a small circle of exploiter-elites." NASA investigators attempted to allay environmental concerns, albeit without addressing the potential international law issues: The impact has about 1 million times less influence on the moon than a passenger's eyelash falling to the floor of a 747 [jet] during flight," said an investigator. The response won't satisfy the pacifists, but it should reassure the many moon property owners as to the continuing worth of their land.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 189


Link-PropertyLaying claim to property on the moon violates the Moon TreatyWiles ‘98(Gladys E Wiles, International Review of Law, Computers and Technology, October 1998, "The Man on the Moon makes Room for Neighbors," pg online @ EbscoHost//gh-arjun)

The Moon Treaty Background. Opened for signature in 1979, in New York, the Moon Treaty( n143) has only been ratified by eight states.( n144) Although the US, Russia and the UK have not signed the treaty, it still took effect upon the signature of a fifth state.( n145) The Moon Treaty is not binding on the US.( n146) To be binding, the US must have ratified (signed) the Moon Treaty.( n147) The Purpose of the Moon Treaty. The Moon Treaty is an expansion of the Outer Space Treaty regarding `demilitarization'( n148) and `national appropriation'.( n149) Similarly, consistent with the Outer Space Treaty, the Moon Treaty allows states to maintain jurisdiction and control over objects launched onto the surface of the Moon.( n150) The purpose of the Moon Treaty was to address problems left open by the Outer Space Treaty.( n151) Yet, the Moon Treaty maintained similar ideas to those set forth in the Outer Space Treaty.( n152) For instance, the Moon Treaty stresses co-operation among the states in the use and exploration of the Moon, and it prohibits any military activities on the Moon.( n153) 1) to promote on the basis of equality the further cooperation among States in exploring the moon and other celestial bodies', 2) to prevent the moon from becoming an area of international conflict, and 3) to define and develop the provisions of existing legal instruments in relation to the moon and other celestial bodies.( n154) The Articles of the Moon Treaty. Article I lays out the scope of the Moon Treaty. It states that the treaty not only applies to the Moon, but also to other celestial bodies, not including èxtraterrestrial material' that make its way to earth by `natural means'.( n155) Similar to article II of the Outer Space Treaty, article 2 of the Moon Treaty says that the activities that take place on the Moon are to occur ìn accordance with international law, in particular the Charter of the United Nations.'( n156) Article 3 expands the provisions in article IV of the Outer Space Treaty. It says the use of force is prohibited on the Moon because it is for peaceful purposes only.( n157) Furthermore, states may not carry or install any nuclear weapons nor conduct any `military maneuvers on the [M]oon'.( n158) The fourth article of the Moon Treaty expands on article I of the Outer Space Treaty, stating that activities on the Moon `shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries'.( n159) This article encourages co-operation, mutual assistance among states, and says that `[d]ue regard shall be paid to interests of present and future generations'.( n160) Article 5, like article XI of the Outer Space Treaty, requires states to give notice to the Secretary-General of the UN, the public and the scientific community, of any activities conducted on the Moon.( n161) Furthermore, states are required to promptly inform other states, the public and the scientific community of any discoveries that may be a danger to human life, or the existence of organic life.( n162) The sixth and seventh articles deal with the removal of materials from the Moon. Article 6 allows `freedom of scientific investigation on the moon ... without discrimination of any kind, on the basis of equality and in accordance with international law'.( n163) States have the right to remove materials from the Moon, and the states removing these materials will determine if this material is made available to other states.( n164) Article 7, however, says that states must take preventative measures to ensure that the èxisting balance of its [Moon's] environment ...' is not disturbed.( n165) This article also has a notice requirement that forces states to inform the Secretary-General of the UN of any activity states initiate that may disturb the environmental balance, or of any radioactive material that will be placed on the Moon.( n166) A list of activities stating what states may do on the Moon is found in articles 8 and 9.( n167) States may conduct exploration on or below the Moon's surface;( n168) they may èstablish manned and unmanned stations on the moon';( n169) also, they may land and launch space objects on and from the Moon, put equipment, space stations and other facilities on or below the Moon's surface, as long as they do not interfere with another state's activities;( n170) finally, article 9 says that installation of space stations on the Moon cannot interfere with the `free access to all areas of the moon ...'( n171) Like article V of the Outer Space Treaty, article 10 of the Moon Treaty provides astronauts with assistance if needed.( n172) Article 11 was included in the treaty to `close[] the

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 190


loopholes of property and quasi-sovereignty left by the Outer Space Treaty'.( n173) The Moon Treaty says that the `moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of mankind...'(n174) The treaty explicitly says that the Moon cannot become the property of any government or non-governmental entity through use or occupation of the Moon.(n175) The Moon is not subject to national appropriation by any claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means. Neither the surface nor the subsurface of the moon, nor any part ... shall become property of any State, international intergovernmental or non-governmental organization or any natural person.(n176)

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 191


Link-PropertyLaying claim to celestial bodies violates the moon treatyListner 2011 (Michael J. Listner, Policy, Legal Analyst and Consultant at N/AContractor Attorney at Unum, "International Space Law: An Overview of Law and Issues," Spring 2011 pg online @ www.nhbar.org/uploads/pdf/BJ-Spring2011-Vol52-No1-Pg62.pdf//gh-arjun)

tHe “moon treaty” of 1979 The final and most controversial child of the Outer Space Treaty is the Agreement Governing the Activities on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies [the Moon Treaty]. 52 This child of the Outer Space Treaty stands out from the others in that it deals specifically with the Moon and other celestial bodies. It is the only one of the five foun- dational treaties that has not been ratified by the United States, the Rus- sian Federation (USSR) and the People’s Republic of China. 53 These three holdouts notwithstanding, the Moon Treaty has a sufficient number of ratifications to be entered into force. 54 The Moon Treaty takes the concept of non - appropriation by nations from the Outer Space Treaty and closes the loophole for private enti - ties barring them from laying claim to the moon or other celestial bodies and extending that pro - hibition to resources as wel l. 55 While theoretically closing the door for private entities to lay claim to extraterrestrial natural resources, it does not prohibit their extraction. It does envision an international regime to oversee the extraction and distribution of those resources. 56 The Moon Treaty expands the “common heritage” language and suggests that not only is extraterrestrial property and the resources contained within belong to allmankind, but the technology andmeans to obtain those resources must be shared with who could not otherwise obtain it on their own. This suggests that intellectual property rights as well as real property and resource rights are implicated as well. 57 It is concern over these issues and others that have dissuaded the United States, the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China from assenting to the Moon Treaty, and unless they are addressed, the Moon Treaty likely will not be signed by these three. 58

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 192


Link-Space Station TreatyThe Space Station Treaty violates the Moon TreatyManzione no date(Lara L. Manzione, "Multinational Investment in the Space Station: An Outer Space Model for International Cooperation?", http://www.auilr.org/pdf/18/18-2-3.pdf// GH-aspomer)

This provision requires that stations, such as the ISS, remain open for access, albeit on a reciprocal basis. 49 Because the Space Station Treaty requires access on a reciprocal basis, it conforms with the specific language of the Outer Space Treaty." However, the Space Station Treaty may violate the spirit of the Outer Space Treaty, as expressed in Article I: The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind.5' The Space Station Treaty only provides access to the ISS on a reciprocal basis, and thus, automatically excludes lesser-developed States, specifically because of "their degree of economic or scientific development."52 Without specific ameliorative provisions, such as those contained in the Remote Sensing Principles, parity will not be reached. 3

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 193


Impact- International LawMoon Treaty key to international lawWiles ‘98(Gladys E Wiles, International Review of Law, Computers and Technology, October 1998, "The Man on the Moon makes Room for Neighbors," pg online @ EbscoHost//gh-arjun)

Development of Treaty Law The promulgation of the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Treaty find their existence stemming from International Law. International Law is based on Custom and Treaty.( n63) Internatienaonal Law is also shaped by `general principles of law recognized by civilized nations', `judicial decisions' and `teachings of qualified authorities'.( n64) It is anticipated that customary law will grow and change as space access and use develops.( n65) Furthermore, civilized states consider the general principles and customary law to be binding on these states.( n66) These principles are considered binding by these states because they feel they have a legal obligation that stems from the `general and consistent practice[s]' of these states to act.( n67) However, the most powerful states in the world and smaller states directly affected by any particular custom must be among these states, and must have accepted these principles for them to be binding.( n68) Treaties preserve agreements between states, and their existence eliminates ambiguities, reduces confusion, and clarifies future obligations.( n69) However, states that `violate treaty law are subject to penalties that are only enforceable by nations which are willing to take action' against the violator.( n70)

Moon Treaty has been accepted as an important component of international law Weeks 2011(Edythe Weeks, St. Louis Space Policy Examiner, "What's Wrong With the Moon Treaty?" 1/21/2011 pg online @ www.examiner.com/space-policy-in-st-louis/what-s-wrong-with-the-moon-treaty//gh-arjun_

In recent years the low level of signatories to the Moon Agreement has been at the forefront of discussions within the space law community. For example, during the forty-seventh session of the United Nations Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (March 31 to April 11, 2008), a Working Group made up of Parties to the Moon Agreement, including delegations from Austria, Belgium, Chile, Mexico, the Netherlands, Pakistan and the Philippines articulated a Joint Statement outlining key benefits provided in the Moon Agreement. These key actors requested that this Joint Statement(A/AC.105/C.2/L.272, annex) [1] be recognized, as a useful basis for further discussion regarding the Moon Agreement. In a nutshell, they highlighted these features of the Moon Treaty: a) several provisions contained in the Moon Agreement are unique and bring “real added value” above and beyond reiterating the principles contained in the prior space treaties; b) some of these unique provisions foster implementation of projects and space activities; c) the Moon Agreement contains provisions for the establishment of stations, safeguards for life and health of people, and other provisions which don't exist or are not clear in the other space law treaties. See http://www.iafastro.net/iac/browse.lite/IAC-10/E7/2/. The Moon Treaty is often treated as though it is not a part of the body of international space law. There exists a tendency to refer to this agreement as a failed treaty. However, after about nine years of proposals, negotiations and revisions by and between a community of nations, the United Nations General Assembly on December 5, 1979 formally adopted the finalized draft of the Moon Agreement on December 18, 1979. Thereafter, it opened for signature and ratification on December 18, 1979 (Galloway, 1980: 19). The next step, in the series of legal norms, which had been agreed upon by the international community, was for five nations to sign, ratify and deposit it with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Although it took several years, Chile, the Philippines, Uruguay, the Netherlands and Austria were the first five nations to sign and ratify this Agreement. Advertisement Technically, consensus was achieved. The Moon Agreement entered into

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 194


force on July 30th, 1984, which would be the “thirtieth day following the date of deposit of the fifth instrument of ratification”, since July 11, 1984 marked the date of the fifth instrument of ratification which was deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The political mood that existed within the United States in 1979-1984 created opposition to the signing of the Moon Treaty. Without the signature of the U.S., many other nations saw little reason to sign. For further research, the title of the Moon Agreement is as follows:

Impact-International Law

The US would be sent in front of the ICC for breaking the OSTCaldicott and Eisendrath 2007(Helen Caldicott and Craig Eisendrath, Helen Mary Caldicott (born 7 August 1938) is an Australian physician, author, and anti-nuclear advocate who has founded several associations dedicated to opposing the use of depleted uranium munitions, nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons proliferation, war and military action in general. She hosts a weekly radio program, If You Love This Planet. Craig Eisendrath is currently chairman of the Project for Nuclear Awareness, an organization dedicated to furthering nuclear disarmament. “War in Heaven,” 2007 Book, pg 114 and 115, Typed, gh-arjun)

Treaties already exist today that could be used to prevent of inhibit the weaponization of space. At the “Full Spectrum Dominance” Conference in May 2005, Ambassador Jonathan Dean made clear that if the United States “perseveres in moving toward weaponization of space, the legal regime could be used to block or delay these moves.” At present, he pointed out, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty permits the transit of outer space by nuclear missiles, and the orbiting of non-nuclear weapons to attack other satellites or bombard the earth. However, the Liability Convention of 1972 establishes procedures for determining the liability of a country that damages or destroys the space objects of another country and the Registration Conventions of 1976 requires that registration of objects launched into space. In addition, the Outer Space Treaty itself makes signatories to the treaty who launch objects into space liable for damage they do to the space assets of another power. It also provides consultations with other governments if a party to the treaty believes that an activity planned by another treaty party could cause potentially harmful interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space. Consultations under these treaty provisions would constitute an early warning that complications could follow practices that violate these provisions. Beyond this, Ambassador Dean maintained, the UN General Assembly, disposed to limit the military uses of space, could ask for an advisory opinion from the International Criminal Court in the Hague to determine whether the United States moves towards weaponization are in compliance with the Outer Space Treaty. If the United States refused to comply, nations could request an injunction from the Court.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 195


Impact-International LawInternational Consensus that the Moon Treaty is key to broader international lawBini 2010 (Antonella Bini, fense & SpaceCurrent: Associate Expert in Space Policy and Law at United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) Past: Space Law and Policy Analyst at German Aerospace Center (DLR), Political/Legal Analyst at European Space Policy Institute (ESPI), "The Moon Agreement in the 21st Century April 2 2010 pg online @ www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0094576510001219//gh-arjun)

In response to this call for action, some of the State Parties to the Moon Agreement (Austria, Belgium, Chile, Mexico, the Netherlands, Pakistan and the Philippines), at the forty-seventh session of the Legal Subcommittee held in March, 2008, presented the “Joint statement on the benefits of the adherence to the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies by States parties to the Agreement”.21 This joint statement emphasizes a number of aspects and considerations concerning the benefits of Member States from becoming parties to the Agreement, with the purpose of providing “the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space with elements for reflection in the framework of its activities aimed at the development and wider application of outer space law”. It takes into consideration the main issues related to the Moon Agreement, such as the fact that “some States regularly question whether the Agreement is part of international law or should be considered to be on the same level as the other four United Nations treaties on outer space” or the poor participation of States. In answer to the first issue, the statement recalls that the Agreement was registered according to article 102 of the UN Charter, entered into force on 11 July, 1984, and therefore considers the Moon Agreement as part of international law. The statement also comments that it offers a dedicated international legal framework commented by the UN General Assembly and accepted by the international community. The statement provides a commentary on the Agreement, emphasizing that some provisions unique to the Agreement are of “particular interest for the implementation of projects, activities and missions, either because they provide a better understanding of or a complement to principles, procedures or notions enshrined in the other outer space treaties that are applicable to the Moon and other celestial bodies22 or because they facilitate international scientific cooperation”.23

Violations of the Moon Treaty directly violate international lawFree Republic ’09 (Free Republic, "NASA Will Use 2 Ton Kinetic Weapon to Bomb Moon on Oct. 9Breaks UN Treaty", 7/4/09, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/2285605/posts// GH-aspomer)

NASA’s lunar bombing violates Space Law and must be stopped NASA’s use of a 2-ton empty Centaur rocket as a kinetic weapon violates space law in multiple ways and must be stopped, in flight or in lunar orbit, which the LCROSS lunar orbiter reaches on Tuesday June 23, 2009. The bombing of the moon with a kinetic weapon to create a 5 mile crater is a per se violation of the U.N. Outer Space Treaty, which the U.S. has ratified, irrespective of its being designed as part of an experiment related to lunar colonization. The U.N. Outer Space Treaty (Article III) provides that “States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations.” The Moon Treaty (Agreement Governing The Activities Of States On The Moon And Other Celestial Bodies (1979)) addresses and bans the specific activity bombing of the moon carried out unilaterally by the U.S. The Moon Treaty prohibits disruption of the environment of the Moon. The LCROSS bombing constitutes a disruption of the delicate balance of the lunar ecology. Article 7 of the Moon Treaty states: Article 7 of the Moon Treaty “1. In exploring and using the moon, States Parties shall take measures to prevent the disruption of the existing balance of its environment whether by introducing adverse changes in that environment, by its harmful contamination through the introduction of extra-environmental matter or otherwise. States Parties shall also take measures to avoid harmfully affecting the environment of the earth through the introduction of extraterrestrial

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 196


matter or otherwise. “2. States Parties shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the measures being adopted by them in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article and shall also, to the maximum extent feasible, notify him in advance of all placements by them of radio-active materials on the moon and of the purposes of such placements. “3. States Parties shall report to other States Parties and to the Secretary-General concerning areas of the moon having special scientific interest in order that, without prejudice to the rights of other States Parties, consideration may be given to the designation of such areas as international scientific preserves for which special protective arrangements are to be agreed upon in consultation with the competent bodies of the United Nations.” Although the U.S. has not ratified the Moon Treaty, 13 nations have, and it can be construed as a relevant international standard of what constitutes “international law” under the U.N. Outer Space Treaty.

Terminal Impact-International LawI-law solves war, terrorism, environmental destruction, and free tradeFDFA '10(Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2010, "International Law", http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/topics/intla.html// GH-aspomer)

Globalisation has not only increased the importance of international law but also the complexity of international legal issues. Switzerland, which is not a major power politically or militarily, is committed to ensuring that international relations are governed by law and not by force. For this reason, it takes an active part in the development of international law. This is in fact one of the main objectives of Swiss foreign policy: to safeguard the country’s interests. International law encompasses the various fields, including: The prohibition of the use of force: States must resolve their differences by peaceful means. Human rights: Every individual can demand certain fundamental rights (the right to life, freedom from bodily harm, personal freedom, freedom of opinion and conscience, etc.). The protection of individuals during wars and armed conflicts: International humanitarian law defines the rules of war and especially those concerning the protection of civilians, the wounded and prisoners of war. The fight against terrorism and other serious crimes: Efforts to deal with such threats can only be effective if they are founded on international law. Environment: The more universal the rules on protecting climate and preserving natural resources are, the more efficient they are. Trade and development: The Swiss economy earns every second franc abroad. A stable international order is an essential prerequisite for achieving this. Telecommunications: A telephone call abroad would be impossible without a body of international law. Transport: International treaties are essential for ensuring the safety of international air and rail travel. International law is binding on a state inasmuch as it agrees to comply with specific international obligations. This condition is inherent in state sovereignty. In Switzerland, it is the two houses of the federal parliament and, through the institution of the obligatory or optional referendum, the people who decide on whether or not to accept international laws. For example, international treaties which affect national law are, like federal laws, subject to an optional referendum.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 197


US key to International LawUS Adherence to international law is key to global enforcementHead ‘01(John W. Head, professor of international and comparative law at Kansas, 9/27/01, http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/kjpp11&div=10&g_sent=1&collection=journals// GH-aspomer)

Yes. Despite weaknesses in the enforcement of international law-or perhaps because of those weaknesses - it is especially important that the United States abide by its international legal obligations. I would offer two main reasons. First, ours is a society founded on a respect for the rule of law. In countless ways we pledge fealty to law and criticize those persons, whether outside this country or inside it, who seek to replace the rule of law with the arbitrary exercise of raw power. We would demean ourselves and our values if we were to dishonor this pledge merely because we are so powerful and so seriously aggrieved today. Hence, we should take our international legal obligations seriously and honor them to the extent that they apply to the current situation. Second, there is a practical reason for the United States to abide by its international legal obligations: reciprocity. It is in our own national interest to treat international legal obligations as binding on us so that we can continue to expect other states to take their own international legal obligations seriously. If we disregard of dishonor or disavow our treaty commitments-such as the United Nations Charter commitments I shall discuss below not to use armed force against another country except in self-defense – then we cannot easily press other states to honor their own treaty commitments

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 198


US key to International LawUS failure to abide destroys international lawAmon '10(Isaac, paraphrasing Thomas Buergenthal, the American judge on the International Court of Justice, "The future of international law", http://www.studlife.com/forum/2010/04/12/the-future-of-international-law-2// GH-aspomer)

On Thursday, April 8, 2010, Thomas Buergenthal, the American judge on the International Court of Justice (ICJ), gave a lecture entitled “The International Judicial System: Its Growing Influence,” at the Washington University School of Law. As a person interested in the law, the judicial process and international affairs, I attended this Tyrrell Williams Lecture of 2009-10. The Bryan Cave Moot Courtroom was packed to capacity with notable figures including Missouri State Supreme Court Judge Richard B. Teitelman and Federal District Judges Jean C. Hamilton and Catherine D. Perry; interestingly, all three obtained their law degrees from the Wash. U. School of Law. Judge Buergenthal mentioned the respect with which most countries regard the ICJ, but also the growing number of international courts, such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), the European Court of Human Rights and the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. This nine-person tribunal was created in the early 1980s to adjudicate claims between the two sides following the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the storming of the American embassy in Tehran that same year. It is still active and is composed of three Americans, three Iranians and three neutral participants; the point is that, according to Buergenthal, even bitter adversaries can resolve their disputes peacefully without force and bloodshed. I took notes throughout the lecture, and he emphasized the fact that while the United States wants all countries to adhere to international law and norms, it refuses to submit itself to this same standard. Judge Buergenthal referred to this standard as an “exaggerated assertion of sovereignty, which is an empty slogan if the ICJ is not [even able] to resolve disputes.” Will our civil rights suffer as developing countries come to dominate international law? Yes, these countries won't change their little respect for rights No, the world will be able to agree upon reasonable freedoms and restrictions View Results Thoroughly interested, when given the opportunity to address the judge, I asked, “In the coming decades of this century, as Western democratic nations decline in influence, and non-Western countries correspondingly increase theirs, many of whom do not share the West’s appreciation of the rule of law and human rights, what is the future of international law?” He disagreed with my premise, and suggested that perhaps the opposite might be true. According to him, countries are becoming increasingly more democratic and committed to the rule of law. Furthermore, events in history once thought impossible have already taken place, e.g. the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of apartheid in South Africa. He ended with, “Try not to be so pessimistic, for you never know what will happen.” My respectful disagreement with Judge Buergenthal’s response stems from the fact that when we look at the world, especially in regard to human rights, the violators of these rights seem to be increasing their influence worldwide. From Iran to Venezuela, from China to Saudi Arabia, the prohibition of free speech and even freedom to practice one’s beliefs are under assault. With the West in general, and the United States in particular, declining in influence (especially with their soft power), where does that leave the institutionalized system of concepts and values that we call international law? Many countries of the world view international law as an imposed creation after World War II in order to reward and support the victorious allies, and rightfully so. Thus, it is inevitable that sooner or later the West’s influence will start to falter. As other countries and cultures become increasingly confident in and proud of their own traditions, values and ideas, international law, based on Western values, will no longer be able to maintain itself and must likewise adapt to new situations and new powers. I sincerely hope that I am wrong, that Judge Buergenthal’s response is correct and that more

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 199


nations will adopt Western values and ideals; thus, I “will try not to be so pessimistic,” for if I am right, the future looks much darker and bleaker than I even dare to imagine.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 200


***SPS Specific Mini Disads***Registry DA

SPS creates a clog on the Registration Convention-Turns solvencyBetancourt 2010 [Kiatan Betancourt, Law Student at University of Maryland who specializes in International and Environmental Law, “Legal Challenges Facing Solar Power Satellites”, Winter 2010, http://spacejournal.ohio.edu/issue16/betancourt.html PHK]

Though the U.N. maintains a general registry, as more satellites are sent into space a simple registry may not be sufficient. The international regime will likely need to develop a mechanism for space traffic control with the ability to track satellites in orbit and the authority to assign orbital slots equitably, while establishing transit corridors for new satellites to safely reach orbit. Without such, space travel could become more dangerous. An increase in the frequency of collisions could also add to the costs and threaten the security of solar power satellites.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 201



Liability DASPS violates the Liability Convention-risk of debris collisionBetancourt 2010 [Kiatan Betancourt, Law Student at University of Maryland who specializes in International and Environmental Law, “Legal Challenges Facing Solar Power Satellites”, Winter 2010, http://spacejournal.ohio.edu/issue16/betancourt.html PHK]

The Liability Convention could be improved by further clarifying when a party would be liable to another for damages. For example, the Liability Convention fails to define the term “fault” in the context of liability for damage caused in outer space. Because fault is not well defined it is difficult for countries or companies to determine when another party is at fault for damage to their property in space. A narrow definition of fault could see a country escape liability for damage caused in space, when liability could have been found under a broader definition. This could be especially troubling for a company that invests billions of dollars into SBSP only to have its satellite destroyed by space debris left behind by an old satellite. The U.N. and member states should work to clarify more precisely the meaning of “fault” so that countries and companies will be able to more easily predict their potential liability. Thus, the international regime should continue to develop the framework used to determine liability for damages to protect the property and investments of countries and companies around the world. This could include requiring countries to cleanup after broken satellites and retrieve satellites that have been decommissioned, or face strict liability for the damages they caused. Steps could also be taken to improve dispute mechanisms between countries and the assessing of penalties on those refusing to pay proper judgments. Penalties for refusal to pay for damages could help ensure compliance for damage awards, incentivizing countries and companies to promote safe practices, while lowering the risk of catastrophic losses.

Liability Convention and OST solve Space WeaponizationCaldicott and Eisendrath 2007 (Helen Caldicott and Craig Eisendrath, Helen Mary Caldicott (born 7 August 1938) is an Australian physician, author, and anti-nuclear advocate who has founded several associations dedicated to opposing the use of depleted uranium munitions, nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons proliferation, war and military action in general. She hosts a weekly radio program, If You Love This Planet. Craig Eisendrath is currently chairman of the Project for Nuclear Awareness, an organization dedicated to furthering nuclear disarmament. “War in Heaven,” 2007 Book, pg 114 and 115, Typed, gh-arjun)

Treaties already exist today that could be used to prevent of inhibit the weaponization of space. At the “Full Spectrum Dominance” Conference in May 2005, Ambassador Jonathan Dean made clear that if the United States “perseveres in moving toward weaponization of space, the legal regime could be used to block or delay these moves.” At present, he pointed out, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty permits the transit of outer space by nuclear missiles, and the orbiting of non-nuclear weapons to attack other satellites or bombard the earth. However, the Liability Convention of 1972 establishes procedures for determining the liability of a country that damages or destroys the space objects of another country and the Registration Conventions of 1976 requires that registration of objects launched into space. In addition, the Outer Space Treaty itself makes signatories to the treaty who launch objects into space liable for damage they do to the space assets of another power. It also provides consultations with other governments if a party to the treaty believes that an activity planned by another treaty party could cause potentially harmful interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space. Consultations under these treaty provisions would constitute an early warning that complications could follow practices that violate these provisions. Beyond this, Ambassador Dean maintained, the UN General Assembly, disposed to limit the military uses of space, could ask for an advisory opinion from

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 202



the International Criminal Court in the Hague to determine whether the United States moves towards weaponization are in compliance with the Outer Space Treaty. If the United States refused to comply, nations could request an injunction from the Court.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 203


***AFF AT: OST DA***US violating now/OST fails

Space treaty can’t be enforced and US is already in violation of itDavidson '98(Jim Davidson, former president of Houston Space Society, 1998, "Property in Space", http://indomitus.net/space/moon.html// GH-aspomer)

Article IX A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial body. Forget for a moment that some of the personnel within an object launched into outer space might wish to defect. Consider only the issue of how "control over such object, and over any personnel thereof" can be established and maintained. Space is very large. As Douglas Adams has said, it is really, really tremendously large. Much larger than a walk to the corner pharmacy. It takes radio frequency communications many minutes to reach Mars. During the interval while control statements are being sent, objects and people on the surface of Mars are not under the control of any nation on Earth, no matter whether that nation is a State Party to the Treaty or not. Right now, today, there are objects outside our Solar System put there by the United States. It takes radio communications hours to reach the Voyager spacecraft. There are strong indications that NASA won't keep those channels open indefinitely. There are already dozens of spacecraft placed into outer space whose power supplies have failed. The US is already in violation of the Treaty, because it does not control many of the objects placed into space. And it cannot control people and objects lightyears away, or even light minutes away. The idea is ludicrous. It suggests a power beyond reason. There is no hope of enforcing this Treaty obligation, and no penalty for failing to enforce it, so why allow it to exist?

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 204


China Already Violated OSTChina violated the OST in 2008 – ASAT testingHitchens '08(Theresa Hitchens, Director of World Security Institute’s Center for Defense Information and leads CDI's space security project, 2008, http://www.chinasecurity.us/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=186// GH-aspomer)

The deliberate destruction of a satellite in a highly used orbit – creating mass quantities of space debris that will remain a global danger for decades – has deservedly been met with U.S. and international opprobrium. U.S. Air Force satellite tracking data is already showing that debris from the impact has spread from the FY-1C’s original orbit of about 850 kilometers in altitude to as high as 3,500 kilometers and as low as about 200 kilometers1 – an area of space that includes hundreds of satellites owned by numerous nations and commercial companies, particularly Earth-observation and weather satellites important in day-to-day civil life as well as the International Space Station.2 As of Jan. 29, some 517 pieces of debris have been publicly identified by the U.S. Air Force’s Space Surveillance Network (SSN), according to Dr. T.S. Kelso, technical program manager at Analytical Graphics, Inc.’s (AGI) Center for Space Standards and Innovation in Colorado Springs.3 David Wright, a physicist at the Union of Concerned Scientists in Cambridge, Mass., has estimated (based on NASA models) that the impact will create at least 800 pieces of debris larger than 10 centimeters in diameter (the size of a baseball) and some 40,000 other pieces of smaller debris, between 1 centimeter and 10 centimeters). 4 Most of the larger debris will eventually be tracked by the SSN, but the smaller debris will be difficult, if not impossible to track without at the same time damaging or destroying a satellite. So, it likely will be weeks if not months before the debris threat becomes clear. Even if China broke no laws, the destructive ASAT test violated at least the spirit, if not the letter, of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, in which signatory nations (including China) pledge not to interfere with the space operations of others and to consult when national action might lead to such interference. China neither notified others nor has it conceded fully to calls for consultations; behavior that is simply unacceptable, particularly in peacetime. While China has now admitted to conducting the test after an inexplicable two weeks of official silence,5 official dismissals of any “threat” emanating from the test are not credible, and all space-stakeholders have not only the right but also the responsibility to press China for more details and transparency regarding their future intentions. Indeed, the cavalier attitude toward endangering other’s satellites raises serious questions about Beijing's credibility as a responsible space-faring nation – undercutting the good reputation that the Chinese leadership has been steadily building among the international space community. For example, concerns are already emerging about the potential negative impact of the test, and its implications for the future of the commercial space market.6 How that affects, or should effect, other nation's willingness to continue civil and commercial space cooperation with China will be discussed below, but suffice to say it is more than likely there will be repercussions at some level

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 205


OST No Link-SBL’sSpace based lasers don’t violate the outer space treatySchlie 2k [Kimberly Schlie, JD candidate at Depaul University College of Law, “Developing and Deploying Laser Weaponry in Space: Is It Legal?”, Winter 2000, lexis PHK]

The second outer space treaty was entered into force in 1967. The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States In The Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, also known merely as the Outer Space Treaty, again states principals for international cooperation in outer space. n39 This treaty, as well as the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects n40, and the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space n41, all recognize "the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes." n42 Specifically, Article III of the Outer Space Treaty [*24] states that the Parties to the Treaty shall "carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding." n43 Article IV states that Parties to the Treaty are to "undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapon on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner." n44 While the treaty thus clearly prohibits placing weapons of mass destruction in outer space it creates a loophole for weapons such as lasers which are purported to be used for targeting specific and limited sites such as missiles or satellites, thus escaping the definition of a weapon of mass destruction. In doing so, the placement of laser weapons in space does not explicitly violate the Treaty. Also, the recognition of the "common interest of (the) use of outer space for peaceful purposes" n45 again, does not explicitly prohibit the use of laser weapons in space. So while such provisions and principles seem to demonstrate the will of the international community to preserve space as peaceful arena, firing lasers from space or into space does not explicitly violate a specific condition in any international space treaty. For these reasons, many argue that the development, testing, or deployment of such space-based or space-aimed laser weapons thus does not violate international law.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 206


***AFF AT: Moon Treaty DA***Moon Treaty Fails

The Moon treaty is irrelevant – the OST is what countries listen toWall '11(Mike Wall, Space.com senior writer, 1/13/11, "Moon Mining Idea Digs Up Lunar Legal Issues", http://www.space.com/10621-moon-mining-legal-issues.html// GH-aspomer)

White and Nelson both referenced the Moon Treaty of 1979, which sought to set up a regime governing how the moon's resources would be used. The Moon Treaty remains more or less irrelevant today; it has been ratified by just a handful of nations, none of them big players in spaceflight and space exploration. "If the Moon Treaty wants to regulate how we use natural resources in outer space, then that presumes that it's legal to do so under the Outer Space Treaty," White said.

The Moon Treaty is unimportant and won’t be modeledCSM '80(Christian Science Monitor, 5/27/80, "Reaching for a Home in the Stars", Lexis, http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic// GH-aspomer)

The United Nations' Moon Treaty now before Congress defines the Moon and its resources as the "common heritage of mankind." The treaty is partly an effort to prevent the Moon from becoming an arena of international conflict. But the only two countries able to mount major space colonization programs, the US and the USSR, are embroiled in conflict around the world. And discussions between Third World and Western nations seem deadlocked on many fronts. Given this situation on Earth, can we expect a cooperative approach to colonizing space? I tend to think about this historically. The Treaty of Tordesillas was an arrangement drawn up in Europe shortly after Columbus discovered America, and ratified by the Pope and the governments of Spain and Portugal. It divided the New World between Spain and Portugal. I think that's a fairly close analogy to what the present situation is between the United States and the Soviet Union. I don't think that in the long run these two countries will be the only ones going into space. The Spanish and the Portuguese each got a big chunk of the New World. But in the end the English did even better. And when the English came they came with the Mayflower, with what was essentially private enterprise, not big governmental expeditions. That's the model I personally hope to follow in the future. In the 128- year time frame I'm talking about, I doubt that the Moon Treaty, if passed, would last.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 207


Large Countries Won’t Ratify/AbideLarge Countries won’t join-Common Heritage Concept Cherian and Abraham 2007 (Jijo George Cherian and Job Abraham, "Concept of Private Property in Space - An Analysis," Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology, National University of Advanced Legal Studies, 2007 pg online @ https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:YPVg__7lCJwJ:www.jiclt.com/index.php/jiclt/article/viewDownloadInterstitial/34/33+"the+moon+treaty"+OR+"moon+treaty"+%2B+violations&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESjSOU_q58yMLPmCcPpD1r4dSi7DK_VHOBGt2aZGeY7iwWeGJ8ovUMrOgm5PrumQANAQkDTwMBiA0VneK1m6anRnE-TlEae1qikxnbAoyGHqe5_hC87A5dgTCcBhE5HGx3U3wU0m&sig=AHIEtbS6XV9PExPg4VW7lpxAEa_SNno2-w&pli=1//gh-arjun)

The Moon Treaty was signed in 1979 as the expanding US space program led to the possibility of actually using lunar resources (Rosanna S., 2005). The moon treaty however, has not been able to command the same popularity as the Outer Space Treaty, 1967 moreover this Treaty was not accepted far and wide. Besides no major space power has signed it, presumably because it further restricts ownership and prohibits any property rights until an international body is created and the requirement of “equitable sharing” is met consequently. The Moon Treaty does allow “States Parties in the course of scientific investigations to use mineral and other substances of the moon in quantities appropriate for the support of their missions” and it permits individual states to construct space stations on the moon and retain jurisdiction and control over these stations (Art. VI). While the Common Heritage doctrine as developed in the Moon Treaty is arguably beneficial for the developing states, the space powers see it as a hindrance to the development of space due to the restriction it places on property rights and ownership of resources (Reynolds, 1992). The developed nations fear that adoption of the common heritage principle in space exploration would tantamount to transfer of wealth, political power, and technology from the space-faring nations to the Third World countries (Moon Treaty Hearings, 1980). Some scholars consider the Moon Treaty to have little practical value, while others consider it already obsolete (Lynn F., 2003). On further analysis of the treaty, the language prohibiting a claim to property rights of “natural resources in place” ostensibly permits, by negative inference, the removal of natural resources not in place or removed from their natural setting. In addition Article XI’s language which states that “[n]either the surface nor the subsurface of the moon, nor any part thereof or natural resources in place, shall become property.” would run contrary to this view. However, when compared with the specific activities associated with property rights, the Moon Treaty does envision substantive property rights (John L. & Christopher L., 2005). There is a widespread debate as to whether the “common heritage concept” is indeed part of customary international law, with strong views expressed on both sides. However it is felt that, the common heritage concept is not in tune with the development in today’s world. In the age of private and commercial wealth, asserting ownership in outer space seems no longer unimaginable. According to the common heritage of mankind principle, nations manage, rather than own certain designated international zones. No national sovereignty over these spaces exists, and international law (i.e., treaties, international custom) governs. The common heritage of mankind principle deals with international management of resources within a territory, rather than the territory itself (Christopher C. J., 1999). Developed nations interpret the principle as meaning that “anyone can exploit these natural resources so long as no single nation claims exclusive jurisdiction” over the area from which they are recovered. Simply stated, every nation enjoys access and each nation must make the most of that access. The herito ttage lies in the access to the resources, not the technology or funding to exploit them. The Common Heritage concept, formulated during the cold war era, though well intentioned, does not serve any useful purpose in the current scenario – the free market economy. The freedom granted to the states for exploration and use cannot be mired. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that the earlier Environmental Law provisions, starting with the Stockholm declaration, 1972 did not specifically address the development agenda, in the line of commercial use. However later on the international community had to give in to the development concerns and draft the subsequent provisions accordingly as amply illustrated form the Rio Declaration, 1992. Besides as discussed earlier, by virtue of the Outer Space treaty and Moon treaty, the states have the freedom to ‘explore’ and ‘use’ the outer space, which including using them for commercial purpose. It is our view that the space faring nations, with their advanced technology should not be prevented form utilizing the resources of the space. What has to be done in such a case is to ensure that, it does not adversely affect outer space and its resources than to have a blanket ban on such activities. The Common Heritage Concept binds nations and firms to make the most of what their access grants them. Thus, if a nation or firm is unable to properly exploit a resource found in international territories, then that resource should be left to a nation or firm that is able. This view is aligned with the “first in time, first in right” view of ownership. Industrialized nations promote this

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 208


view because, unlike the limited access view of the developing world, unlimited access promotes and rewards private investment. (Jeremy L. Z., 2006). Therefore it is clear that possessionary rights do exist in space, even going by the treaties. Thus as a naturally following corollary, the states may grant property rights, in this regard to the private individuals, in compliance with International Law.

Large Countries Won’t Ratify/AbideThe Moon treaty is worthless – countries don’t abide by itWeeks ‘11(Edythe Weeks, teaches International Law and Politics of Outer Space and Introduction to International Relations for the MA in IR program at Webster University, 1/21/11, "What's Wrong WIth the Moon Treaty?",http://www.examiner.com/space-policy-in-st-louis/what-s-wrong-with-the-moon-treaty// GH-aspomer)

In recent years the low level of signatories to the Moon Agreement has been at the forefront of discussions within the space law community. For example, during the forty-seventh session of the United Nations Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (March 31 to April 11, 2008), a Working Group made up of Parties to the Moon Agreement, including delegations from Austria, Belgium, Chile, Mexico, the Netherlands, Pakistan and the Philippines articulated a Joint Statement outlining key benefits provided in the Moon Agreement. These key actors requested that this Joint Statement(A/AC.105/C.2/L.272, annex) [1] be recognized, as a useful basis for further discussion regarding the Moon Agreement. In a nutshell, they highlighted these features of the Moon Treaty: a) several provisions contained in the Moon Agreement are unique and bring “real added value” above and beyond reiterating the principles contained in the prior space treaties; b) some of these unique provisions foster implementation of projects and space activities; c) the Moon Agreement contains provisions for the establishment of stations, safeguards for life and health of people, and other provisions which don't exist or are not clear in the other space law treaties. See http://www.iafastro.net/iac/browse.lite/IAC-10/E7/2/. The Moon Treaty is often treated as though it is not a part of the body of international space law. There exists a tendency to refer to this agreement as a failed treaty. However, after about nine years of proposals, negotiations and revisions by and between a community of nations, the United Nations General Assembly on December 5, 1979 formally adopted the finalized draft of the Moon Agreement on December 18, 1979. Thereafter, it opened for signature and ratification on December 18, 1979 (Galloway, 1980: 19). The next step, in the series of legal norms, which had been agreed upon by the international community, was for five nations to sign, ratify and deposit it with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Although it took several years, Chile, the Philippines, Uruguay, the Netherlands and Austria were the first five nations to sign and ratify this Agreement.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 209


US Already Violated Moon TreatyBombing of the moon violated the Moon Treaty in 2009Webre '09(Alfred Lambremont Webre, space author, lawyer, and environmental activist, 6/19/09, "NASA moon bombing violates space law & may cause conflict iwht lunare ET/UFO civilizations", http://www.examiner.com/exopolitics-in-seattle/nasa-moon-bombing-violates-space-law-may-cause-conflict-with-lunar-et-ufo-civilizations// GH-aspomer)

NASA’s use of a 2-ton empty Centaur rocket as a kinetic weapon violates space law in multiple ways and must be stopped, in flight or in lunar orbit, which the LCROSS lunar orbiter reaches on Tuesday June 23, 2009. The bombing of the moon with a kinetic weapon to create a 5 mile crater is a per se violation of the U.N. Outer Space Treaty, which the U.S. has ratified, irrespective of its being designed as part of an experiment related to lunar colonization. The U.N. Outer Space Treaty (Article III) provides that “States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations.” The Moon Treaty (Agreement Governing The Activities Of States On The Moon And Other Celestial Bodies (1979)) addresses and bans the specific activity bombing of the moon carried out unilaterally by the U.S. The Moon Treaty prohibits disruption of the environment of the Moon. The LCROSS bombing constitutes a disruption of the delicate balance of the lunar ecology. Article 7 of the Moon Treaty states: Article 7 of the Moon Treaty “1. In exploring and using the moon, States Parties shall take measures to prevent the disruption of the existing balance of its environment whether by introducing adverse changes in that environment, by its harmful contamination through the introduction of extra-environmental matter or otherwise. States Parties shall also take measures to avoid harmfully affecting the environment of the earth through the introduction of extraterrestrial matter or otherwise. “2. States Parties shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the measures being adopted by them in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article and shall also, to the maximum extent feasible, notify him in advance of all placements by them of radio-active materials on the moon and of the purposes of such placements. “3. States Parties shall report to other States Parties and to the Secretary-General concerning areas of the moon having special scientific interest in order that, without prejudice to the rights of other States Parties, consideration may be given to the designation of such areas as international scientific preserves for which special protective arrangements are to be agreed upon in consultation with the competent bodies of the United Nations.” Although the U.S. has not ratified the Moon Treaty, 13 nations have, and it can be construed as a relevant international standard of what constitutes “international law” under the U.N. Outer Space Treaty. Is NASA’s LCROSS bombing of the moon a camouflaged attack or attempt to impose moon sovereignty by the U.S.? There is witnessed evidence, through the testimony of UASF SGT Karl Wolfe and through the statements of U.S. astronauts, NASA employees, former Soviet scientists that the U.S., and its agencies NASA and the NSA has had scientific evidence that the moon has extraterrestrial civilizations and present settlements on it for more than 40 years, since the 1960s. The U.S. has not attempted any public, peaceful diplomacy with the civilizations on the moon. In fact, the U.S. has imposed an embargo on public knowledge that settlements and an extraterrestrial presence exist on the moon. What is touted as a scientific experiment – the bombing of the moon – may in reality be an attempt to impose de facto U.S. sovereignty on the moon. Article II of the U.N. Outer Space Treaty, which the U.S. has signed, states: “Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.” Moreover, the LCROSS bombing of the moon may be an intentional hostile

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 210


act by the U.S. (which has know the moon is inhabited for at least 40 years by other civilizations), a kind of “shot across the bow” to mark turf against other intelligent civilizations on the moon. The U.N. Outer Space Treaty prohibits non-peaceful activities on the moon. Article IV states, “The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be forbidden.” NASA’s LCROSS bombing of the moon must be stopped, while the lunar orbiter is in orbit, before the bombing occurs on October 9, 2009.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 211


Moon Treaty not key to International LawThe Moon treaty carries no weight in I-lawComar '11(Inder Comar, a lawyer, "Is it legal to mine the moon?", http://www.comarlaw.com/2011/04/is-it-legal-to-mine-the-moon// GH-aspomer)

Article 11 declares that the Moon and its natural resources are “the common heritage of mankind,” and that no part of the surface or subsurface of the moon shall “become the property of any State, international intergovernmental or non-governmental organization, national organization or non-governmental entity or of any natural person.” The treaty requires an international regime for any exploitation of resources. The Moon Treaty, however, has not been ratified by any Moon-faring nation, and likely lacks weight in international law. The thing about any treaty, though, is that it is only as good as the promise to honor it.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 212


Moon Treaty Bad-ColonizationAdherence to the Moon Treaty prevents colonizationHurtak '09(J.J. Hurtak, has a Ph.D. and is prez of The Academy for Future Science, 2009, http://www.affs.org/html/existing_space_law_concepts.html// GH-aspomer)

Obviously, it is the criteria for exploitation of natural resources found on the moon, Mars and other celestial bodies that is of the greatest practical interest. In the foreseeable future, Mars and perhaps its two satellites will be the only sources of usable resources for space researchers or colonists, until we are able to reach the nearest earth-asteroid for mining. By not signing the Moon Treaty, the USA and Russia/USSR tried to set a precedent for the possible future commercialization of space that most likely will occur in the 21st Century. Most scientists also do not want to recognize the Moon Treaty for fear that it would inadvertently prevent our expansion into space if no economic benefits can be derived. The Moon Treaty, however, does not place a moratorium on exploitation of natural resources, but insists upon the establishment of an international regime to monitor and control such exploitation. In fact, mining could be begun on an experimental basis even while clearer rules are established and eventually made law. But what is at question here, if taken literally, is the "common heritage of mankind" clause which indicates that if exploitation does commence, all nations should have a share in the proceeds.

<Insert Space Col Good Impact>

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 213

control + 1 – block headings - ddi11 -...

Documents