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document.doc DDI 20101

T—In........................................................................................................................................................................2T—Military Presence...............................................................................................................................................3***Advantage Frontlines***...................................................................................................................................4Six Party Talks Frontline.........................................................................................................................................5Chinese Modernization Frontline............................................................................................................................9China Miscalculation Frontline.............................................................................................................................11Solvency Frontline.................................................................................................................................................12***Counterplans***..............................................................................................................................................13Yokota Airbase PIC...............................................................................................................................................14Advantage CP: Taiwan Arms Sales.......................................................................................................................15Advantage: North Korea/6 party talks...................................................................................................................16Advantage: China Heg...........................................................................................................................................17Advantage: China Econ/Foreign policy.................................................................................................................18China wants good US relations..............................................................................................................................19***Disadvantages***............................................................................................................................................20Asian Prolif Bad DA..............................................................................................................................................21Link--Redeployment DA.......................................................................................................................................23Link—Midterms....................................................................................................................................................24***2AC Answers***.............................................................................................................................................25AT: Arms sales don’t hurt relations.......................................................................................................................26AT: Multiple Causes for Talks not happening......................................................................................................27

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T—In

1. Interpretation: In Means Within the Place or Thing Words and Phrases Vol. 28 2008 [204-215]

—Forman v. May, 202 So.2d 685, application denied 204 So.2d 576, 251 La. 397.—Wills 466. La.App. 3 Cir. 1967. Two words “of” and “in” are frequently used interchangeably to convey same meaning, one of which is that of location or inclusion within place or thing.

2. Violation: The military exercises are being held in international watersBBC 7/14 BBC News, 7/14/2010. “US plans military exercises with South Korea”

Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell said Mrs Clinton and Mr Gates would "discuss and likely approve" combined naval and air exercises in the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea. China earlier warned against any joint military exercises near its waters, saying it could add to tensions with North Korea, its ally. But Mr Morrell insisted the manoeuvres were "a matter of our ability to exercise in the open seas, in international waters. Those determinations are made by us, and us alone".

3. Standards

A. Limits: The aff unlimits the topic by allowing allowing plans that fall outside of the resolution countries. By unlimiting the topic, it destroys research ability because the plan only has to take place near the resolution countries, and so the neg can never know how many different places they need to research. It defeats all clash, which is the main focus of all debates.

4. T is a voter for fairness and education

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T—Military Presence

1. Military forces means bases with combat forces

Layne, Professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service, 10(Christopher, “Definition of Military presence” May 12th, http://abnormalmeans.com/2010/05/definition-of-military-presence/)

My interpretation would be that “military presence” means bases with combat forces (or bases that normally are maintained by skeleton units but are maintained to receive combat forces crisis/surge type circumstances). I do not think in the normal meaning of the term that the US has military bases in N. Korea.

2. The affirmative reduces troops used for scare tactics, and not for combat

3. Prefer our interpretation:

A. Limits: The U.S. military is an enormous entity which can be used for varying activities. Preparing for affs that can deal with any possible military operation skews focus on topical literature and discourages in depth clash. Focusing on combat forces excludes the excessive number of affirmatives that could deal with various missions involving the military.

B. Predictability: The primary purpose of the military is to wage war. Affirmatives interacting with combat aspects of the military are the most predictable

C. Intent to define: Our source clearly defines military presence.

D. Qualified Source: our definition is from a professor of intelligence and national security. Expert definitions are best because they are based on relevant topic literature.

4. T is a voting issue for fairness and education

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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Bush_School_of_Government_and_Public_Service

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Bush_School_of_Government_and_Public_Service


***Advantage Frontlines***

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Six Party Talks Frontline

1 US-Japan relations key to checking China—it will help welcome China to the global community Blair and Hills 07 Dennis C. Blair, Former United States Director of National Intelligence, retired United States Navy Admiral. Carla A. Hills, former US Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, former US Trade Representative, Co-Chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations, Chair of the National Commiittee on United States-China relations, primary negotiator of NAFTA, 2007. [Council on Foreign Relations, U.S. China Relations: An Affirmative Agenda, A Responsible Approach p. 87]

The U.S.-Japan alliance remains the cornerstone of the United States’ Pacific system of alliances, and the United States depends on the alliance The United States should continue to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance to cope with the full range of challenges of the post-Cold War world. In order for a strategy of integrating China into the community of nations to succeed, the United States must work in concert with its Japanese ally. So long as Sino-Japanese relations are marred by deep mistrust, Japan’s ability to assist in China’s integration will remain limited and efforts by Japan to play a more active role in global security affairs— efforts championed by the United States—will tend to cause alarm in Beijing. It is therefore in the interest of the United States for Japan and China to build more cooperative relations. The core differences between Tokyo and Beijing involve questions of honor, history, national self- esteem, and fear, as well as a competition for power and influence. These are all issues that the two parties themselves will ultimately need to resolve bilaterally—or at least come to some accommodation. But the United States has a role to play. The United States should: • Encourage dialogue between Tokyo and Beijing aimed at resolving differences and achieving genuine reconciliation in a spirit of mutual respect. • Urge both countries to identify areas of common interest—trade and investment, nuclear energy, the environment, counterterrorism—and build on those, rather than focus on differences. • Embrace Japan’s ambition to become a more effective, engaged, global citizen, and quietly express Washington’s view that in order for Japan to assume this broader international role it will be necessary for Tokyo to improve its relations with Beijing and Seoul. • While staying out of territorial disputes, offer ‘‘good offices’’ to facilitate Sino-Japanese dialogue on areas of mutual interest, such as maritime security, energy security, counterterrorism, and nonproliferation.

2 Six Party Talks will fail—already led to North Korean proliferationSeong-whun 09 Cheon Seong-whun, senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, 6/13/2009. [International Institute for Strategic Studies, The six-party talks are dead in the water]

Despite all the compliments of the talks, North Korea quadrupled nuclear capacities during the talks, conducted two nuclear tests, and secretly provided Syria with an upgraded version of the 5MWe reactor at Yongbyon - a plutonium producing machine. Compared to the mid-1990s, the amount of plutonium the DPRK acquired has increased from 7-12.5kg to 28.5-49kg at the end of 2007. The possible number of nuclear warheads also has increased from 1-5 to 5-20, depending on various criteria and level of technologies. This is the end result of the six-party talks. Unfortunately, Bush administration could not give up groundless hope of negotiating away North Korean nukes. During his summit meeting with Lee in April 2008, former U.S. President George W. Bush repeated his usual "wait and see" attitudes. When asked whether North Korea might not make full disclosure of nuclear programs, Bush said that "you just have to wait and see whether they're sincere or not." The six-party talks also have major flaws in the agreed documents as well as its negotiating strategy. Original intention of the talks was to build a five-party coalition, exert pressure, and push North Korea to dismantle its nuclear programs. China was given a role of moderator and host of the talks. With hindsight, the six-party talks were no more than a setoff of the U.S.-DPRK bilateral talks. Major breakthroughs could be made only when Pyongyang and Washington made compromises. China scored high diplomatic marks as it convened the talks with little substantial avail. In the end, Beijing only displayed that it had limited ability to handle the Kim regime. North Korea tried to drive a wedge between the five parties, and created every opportunity to have direct talks with the United States, marginalizing the six-party framework. Five parties were supposed to lead North Korea, but in fact, were led by the North. An important impetus on unraveling the six-party framework was Bush's political desire to build a legacy. At its final days, the Bush administration was trapped into passion for legacy. During his second term, Bush made a series of about-faces from its initial positions, and this trend was precipitated after the first nuclear test in October 2006. Bogged down in the Iraq War and isolated in the world stage, Bush began to regard the North Korean nuclear crisis as an opportunity to make his foreign policy legacy. And he gave up key principles such as the CVID in negotiating with Pyongyang. A highlight was a decision to rescind the designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism in return for its unfulfilled promise of accepting rigid verification. As a founding document of the six-party process, the Sept. 19 Joint Declaration has inherent flaws as well. First, it was wrong to define

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"denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" as its goal. Since South Korea already has been denuclearized, the goal should have been "denuclearization of North Korea." Based on this misplaced goal, the North has argued for a mutual nuclear disarmament talk with the United States. Second, declaration should not have mentioned the joint declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which was signed between the two Koreas in 1991. It was persistently violated by the North from the beginning. It also is a symbol of South Korea's humiliation toward North Korea, exacerbated by the wishy-washy sunshine policy. To refer to a document which already was nullified by one party is no more than infringing on South Korea's sovereignty and national esteem. Third, the declaration should not have brought up two incompatible ideas of offering 200 million kilowatts of electricity and hinting the provision of a light-water reactor at the same time. South Korea intended to supply electricity only if North Korea was to forgo the LWR option. Finally, declaration had better not extend scope by introducing very sensitive issues such as peace settlement or regional security dialogues. Extending the negotiation agenda runs the risk of obscuring the primary objective of the six-party talks, which is North Korean denuclearization. It also has a danger of malicious linkage, where the North takes advantage of other issues as a pretext to stall or delay nuclear dismantlement.

3 North Korea will not use its nukes in a conflict with the US—their own Japan Today evidence says that the North threatened the US with a nuclear attack if it continued with the military exercises, and four months later, no military action has been made. The north makes threats all the time, but never follows through with attacks on other countries.

4 North Korea has conditions before it will resume talks—don’t include anything about the military exercisesAFP News 2/25 AFP News, Bangkok Post, 2/25/2010. “N. Korea blasts war games amid bid to revive nuclear talks”

On the diplomatic front, a US envoy trying to restart six-nation nuclear disarmament talks said they could resume very soon if North Korea called off its boycott. "We are prepared to resume six-party talks in the very near future," Stephen Bosworth told reporters on arrival in South Korea, his second stop in a three-country mission. But the envoy, who earlier held talks in China which hosts the six-party forum, said he did not know whether the North would rejoin the talks. China said it was closely consulting other parties to try to reopen talks soon. "At present the six-party talks is certainly facing an important opportunity to work out of the current dilemma and move forward," said foreign ministry spokesman Qin Gang. The talks grouping the two Koreas, Japan, China, Russia and the United States were last held in December 2008 before getting bogged down in disputes over verifying disarmament. In April last year the North declared the forum "dead". It staged its second atomic weapons test and ballistic missile launches before indicating readiness in principle to return to dialogue. Estimates vary but the North is thought to have enough plutonium to make around eight atomic weapons. It is not known whether it could deliver them by missile. Bosworth, the US special envoy on North Korea, met his Chinese counterpart Wu Dawei in Beijing Wednesday to assess prospects of resuming negotiations. South Korea's chief nuclear negotiator Wi Sung-Lac also met Wu during a two-day visit to Beijing that began Tuesday. Wi, quoted by South Korea's Yonhap news agency, said Wednesday the future was unclear. "We will have to wait and see because it is still not clear how the consultations (on the resumption of the talks) will go," he added. The North has two conditions for returning to dialogue: the lifting of UN sanctions and a US commitment to discuss a formal peace treaty on the Korean peninsula. "We could not see any significant changes (to North Korea's demands)," a South Korean official told Yonhap after the Wi-Wu meeting.

Scenario 1: China

5 Uniqueness overwhelms the link- the uniqueness evidence postdates the link evidence and their Lin evidence says that the military exercises kill six party talks, but their Kirk evidence says that North Korea is ready for talks-North Korea no longer cites the military exercises as a reason to not continue the peace talks.

6 China wants to continue peace talks—has major influence over North KoreaSaiget, 2/23 Robert Saiget, Asia One News Staff Writer, 2/23/2010. “China Encourages US-North Korea to meet”

China on Tuesday urged the United States and North Korea to step up efforts to restart stalled nuclear disarmament talks, as

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diplomats crisscrossed the region to try to get Pyongyang back to the table. The US and South Korean envoys to the six-party talks, which began in 2003 and have been on hold since the North stormed out 10 months ago, were both due in Beijing this week for meetings with their Chinese counterparts. China, the host of the talks and the communist North's sole major diplomatic and economic ally, said efforts by Washington and Pyongyang would be the key to success. "We encourage multilateral and bilateral meetings and dialogue... on this issue, China adopts a supportive and positive attitude," foreign ministry spokesman Qin Gang told reporters. Such contact between the United States and North Korea "will be conducive to the early resumption of the six-party talks and ensure the peace and stability of northeast Asia and the Korean peninsula." he said. Qin said US special envoy Stephen Bosworth would hold talks with Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei in Beijing on Wednesday to discuss the North Korean disarmament issue. South Korea's chief negotiator Wi Sung-Lac was also expected in Beijing Tuesday and would hold talks with Wu. Meanwhile, a senior North Korean Communist Party official, Kim Yong-Il, met Tuesday with his Chinese counterpart Wang Jiarui and was scheduled to meet President Hu Jintao later in the day, the state Xinhua news agency said. South Korea's Yonhap news agency said the North Korean official could deliver a letter from leader Kim Jong-Il to Hu. On Monday, the US State Department said that Bosworth had no plans to stop in North Korea during a three-nation Asia tour, and there was no sign Pyongyang was ready to return to the six-nation disarmament forum. "We are looking for a signal from North Korea, and we're still waiting for that signal," spokesman Philip Crowley said. Bosworth was travelling with the US chief nuclear negotiator Sung Kim. Media reports have said the North is sticking to its preconditions for returning to dialogue: the lifting of United Nations sanctions and a US commitment to discuss a formal peace treaty on the Korean peninsula. The United States, South Korea and Japan say the North must first return to dialogue and show it is serious about denuclearisation before other issues are dealt with. "The (Seoul) government maintains that discussions on a peace treaty will be possible only after we make progress in denuclearisation," Wi told reporters. Yun Duk-Min, professor at Seoul's Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, said China was trying to narrow the gap between North Korea and the other countries, notably the United States. "It remains to be seen how things will end up, as North Korea wants to extort as many gains as possible from others before returning to six-party talks while China plays good cop and the United States bad cop," he told AFP. But Yun said he believes Pyongyang would come back to the talks eventually. Under deals in 2005 and 2007 the North agreed to scrap its nuclear weapons in return for aid and major diplomatic and security benefits, including a formal peace pact. But the talks became bogged down by disputes over ways to verify disarmament and in April last year the North quit them altogether. Pyongyang, which tested atomic weapons in October 2006 and May 2009, says it developed nuclear weaponry because of a US threat of aggression, and it must have a peace pact before it considers giving them up. The 1950-1953 Korean War ended only in an armistice. Seoul officials suspect talk of a peace treaty is an excuse to delay action on the nuclear programme. –AFP

7 China key to US agenda in North KoreaSeib 09 Gerald F. Seib, Staff Writer for the Wall Street Journal, 4/7/2009. “U.S.-China Relations Get Trickier”

It's pretty obvious that North Korea's firing of a long-range missile will test President Barack Obama's ability to strong-arm the regime of Kim Jong Il, who has elevated erratic behavior to an art form. Less obvious, but perhaps even more important: North Korea's weekend shot tests the new president's ability to work with China, the country that has far and away the most leverage on North Korea yet seems less willing to use it than it was just a couple of years ago. North Korea's missile test will be, as much as anything else, a test of President Obama's ability to work with China, the country that has far and away the most leverage on North Korea, Capital Journal columnist Gerald Seib says. It's no exaggeration to say China today represents North Korea's lifeline. It is the North's leading trading partner, primary source of energy and principal facilitator in the outside world. In fact, new trade figures show the North only growing more dependent on China. So when Mr. Obama called for the international community to act promptly to punish North Korea after its missile test, he was essentially asking China to go along with the idea of slapping down Pyongyang and its "dear leader." On the surface, at least, the initial results can't be too encouraging to the president. The United Nations Security Council was summoned for an emergency Sunday meeting to decide how to respond to a missile firing that appeared to be not only an attempt to perfect a nuclear-weapons-delivery vehicle, but also a violation of a 2006 U.N. resolution. But the Security Council broke up without so much as issuing a statement, much less passing any new resolutions or sanctions. That's largely because China balked. What was striking wasn't merely that reluctance to act, but also the stark difference in tone between the U.S. and China. Within hours of the firing, Mr. Obama declared: "This action demands a response from the international community, including from the United Nations Security Council, to demonstrate that its resolution cannot be defied with impunity." China replied by saying, essentially, "Now, now, let's not get too excited." Its ambassador to the U.N., Zhang Yesui, declared: "Our position is that all countries concerned should show restraint and refrain from taking actions that might lead to increased tensions." It's still early in the diplomatic game, of course, and China may merely be saying that it

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would rather deal with the problem not at the U.N. but in the so-called six-party talks, in which the U.S., China, South Korea, Russia and Japan have been sitting across from North Korea for the past five years, trying to find a path away from the nuclear abyss. Whatever the forum, though, the first predicate for meaningful action will be some level of agreement between the U.S. and China. John Bolton, who was the American ambassador to the U.N. under President George W. Bush, says flatly that the Chinese "are the only ones who can stop the North Korean nuclear program.... I think they are the only country that has any real leverage over North Korea." Indeed, it was only China's anger over a North Korean nuclear test in 2006, and its agreement to punish Pyongyang, that produced U.N. Security Council Resolution 1718, the most meaningful international sanctions yet imposed. But Mr. Bolton also sees a China still engaged in wishful thinking about the nuclear danger. "Their view is they just keep hoping that the U.S. and North Korea will come to a deal and it will just go away," he says. The underlying problem is that the longstanding American goal on the Korean peninsula -- reunification of the North and South -- is precisely what the Chinese fear. Beijing doesn't oppose reunification so much as frets over the unpredictable turmoil that might ripple out from a toppling of the Kim regime: internal unrest, conflict between North and South, and Korean refugees by the hundreds of thousands fleeing into China. Yet China's leverage over the North is, if anything, greater than it was in 2006, and mounting. The Institute for Far Eastern Studies, a South Korean think tank, reports that North Korean imports from China soared 46% in 2008 over the previous year, according to Chinese government figures. More than half of those imports came in the form of "mineral resources" -- mostly, that is, energy. Without China, even fewer lights would go on in the North Korean night. The institute says the North's increased international isolation has made its trade with China even more important. The giant trade deficit it runs with Beijing is exacerbated by "isolation from the rest of the international community, leaving it little choice but to continue trading at prices set by the Chinese."

Scenario 2: Kaesong Complex

8Their Richardson evidence cites a conflict between the South Korean and Japanese Prime Ministers who were in power five years ago. Neither of them are in power, and their parties are not in the majority any more, so a South Korean economic decline won’t lead to Asian instability.

9 Status quo solves the Kaesong Complex scenario--The complex productions have already been restartedPrzystup 09 James J. Przystup, ICAS Fellos, Senior Fellow and Research Professor, Institute of National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, November 2009. [Institute for National Strategic Studies, North Korea: Challenges, Interests, and Policy, p. 1]

A month later, Pyongyang unexpectedly shifted gears. Kim Jong-il received former President Bill Clinton and agreed to the release of two American journalists sentenced by North Korea to 12 years of hard labor for illegal entry in March 2009. Shortly afterward, Kim met with Hyun Jeong-eun, the chairwoman of the Hyundai Group. The Kim-Hyun meeting resulted in an agreement to resume tourism to Mount Kumgang, which Seioul had suspended sine the 2008 shooting of a South Korean tourist; to restart operations at the Kaesong Industrial Complex, a collaborative North-South economic development; and to resume reunions of separated families. On August 22, a North Korean delegation attended the state funeral of former South Korean President Kim Dae-jung.

10 Their Park evidence says that the Kaesong complex will only help the South Korean economy if the Government can bring in business. The Six Party talks don’t bring in business, so building the complex doesn’t actually help the economy.

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Chinese Modernization Frontline

1 China will never have the same military capabilities as the USBlair and Hills 07 Dennis C. Blair, Former United States Director of National Intelligence, retired United States Navy Admiral. Carla A. Hills, former US Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, former US Trade Representative, Co-Chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations, Chair of the National Commiittee on United States-China relations, primary negotiator of NAFTA, 2007. [Council on Foreign Relations, U.S. China Relations: An Affirmative Agenda, A Responsible Approach]

The principal area in which the mission sets of the United States and China currently come into potential conflict is Taiwan. China can damage Taiwan with missiles, but it can only take and hold Taiwan if it can win and sustain control of the space, air, and waters around Taiwan—a difficult task without U.S. intervention, and nearly impossible should the United States intervene in a China-Taiwan war. The Task Force finds that as a consequence of its military modernization, China is making progress toward being able to fight and win a war with Taiwan (absent U.S. intervention), and it is also beginning to build capabilities to safeguard its growing global interests. The mere existence of these capabilities—including anti-satellite systems—poses challenges for the United States. China does not need to surpass the United States, or even catch up with the United States, in order to complicate U.S. defense planning or influence U.S. decision-making in the event of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait or elsewhere. Looking ahead as far as 2030, however, the Task Force finds no evidence to support the notion that China will become a peer military competitor of the United States. By virtue of its heritage and experience, its equipment and level of technology, its personnel, and the resources it spends, the United States enjoys space, air, and naval superiority over China. The military balance today and for the foreseeable future strongly favors the United States and its allies.

2 US will make sure China can’t modernize its militaryBlair and Hills 07 Dennis C. Blair, Former United States Director of National Intelligence, retired United States Navy Admiral. Carla A. Hills, former US Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, former US Trade Representative, Co-Chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations, Chair of the National Commiittee on United States-China relations, primary negotiator of NAFTA, 2007. [Council on Foreign Relations, U.S. China Relations: An Affirmative Agenda, A Responsible Approach]

China’s economic and military modernization efforts rely heavily on technologies acquired from abroad, although as discussed above, that dependence is gradually shrinking as China builds up its own technological base. Until the Tiananmen tragedy, the United States actively encouraged and facilitated China’s acquisition of many advanced technologies, even those with direct military applications, to bolster China as a counterweight to Soviet power. Although technology exports to China were regulated under the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls regime (COCOM), China generally received much more favorable treatment than did the Soviet Union. Until 1989, China acquired U.S. military hardware through foreign military sales, and also aggressively sought out advanced dual-use technologies such as machine tools, computers, and aerospace systems. It was not until after Tiananmen and the collapse of the Soviet Union that U.S. attitudes about technology transfer to China changed, and abruptly. Technology transfer became a point of leverage over China, and new laws attempted to use that leverage to modify Chinese foreign and domestic policies. Congress and the George H.W. Bush administration banned the sale of military hardware to China after Tiananmen, requiring improvements in China’s human rights policies before sales could resume. Congress restricted nuclear cooperation, strictly linking it to cooperation on U.S. nonproliferation goals. Congress similarly imposed sanctions on space cooperation—including the launch of U.S. satellites on Chinese rockets—in response to China’s proliferation of missile technology.49 The Department of Commerce is currently considering restrictions on forty-seven new categories of dual-use technologies. Business associations find the new regulations confusing and point out that for most, if not all, of the technologies on the proposed list, there is a producer in the European Union, Japan, or China itself. This means that to be effective, any export controls would have to be multilateral. This will not be easy to accomplish. In 2005, the United States had to work hard to convince the EU to sustain its prohibition on arms sales to China (a restriction in place since Tiananmen). This transatlantic dialogue succeeded in sensitizing many EU policymakers to U.S. security interests in Asia as well as the rapid pace and scope of PLA modernization. With the possible exception of France, there currently do not appear to be any strong forces within the EU advocating abolishment of the arms embargo. For the most part, however, the members of the EU want to expand, not restrict, technology exports to China, hoping to gain an ever-larger share of the growing Chinese technology market. U.S. consultations with Japan suggest a similar dynamic is under way in Tokyo, particularly given Prime Minister Abe’s desire to continue the recent thaw in Sino-Japanese relations. One result of the EU and U.S. arms embargo has been to encourage China to develop a robust arms supply relationship with Russia, involving

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purchases, coproduction, training, and joint maneuvers.

3 China modernization bad—technology can get into the hands of terrorists, and they may use this as leverage against the US Blair and Hills 07 Dennis C. Blair, Former United States Director of National Intelligence, retired United States Navy Admiral. Carla A. Hills, former US Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, former US Trade Representative, Co-Chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations, Chair of the National Commiittee on United States-China relations, primary negotiator of NAFTA, 2007. [Council on Foreign Relations, U.S. China Relations: An Affirmative Agenda, A Responsible Approach p. 70]

The Department of Commerce also recently proposed, and then withdrew, new restrictions on ‘‘deemed exports.’’ These new regulations would have made it more difficult for American companies and universities to hire Chinese (and other foreign students) to work in laboratories. After a massive outcry from business associations and universities—which argued that if the United States was worried about competitiveness and its ability to train and attract the best and the brightest it ought not to treat these students as second-class citizens— the proposal was withdrawn. But new proposals are being considered. 49 This stands in marked contrast with the Reagan era, when the United States chose to launch satellites on Chinese rockets after the space shuttle Challenger disaster even though China was actively selling arms to Iran at the time. China has complained that U.S. restrictions on high-technology exports contribute significantly to the U.S.-China trade deficit. The Task Force finds this argument unconvincing and empirically false. There are legitimate national security and economic security reasons for the United States to restrict some sensitive technologies to China, including the risk that such technologies–even if not employed by China against U.S. interests—might fall into the hands of those who mean to do harm to the United States. Export licensing stopped only about 1.5 percent of the value of exports to China in 2005. Out of $39 billion in U.S. exports, only about $3 billion worth even required export licenses from the Commerce Department, and almost all of those exports were eventually approved, according to Commerce Department data. Today, the United States continues to use export controls and sanctions on technology transfer to protect transfers of sensitive goods, punish China for actions contrary to U.S. interests (such as proliferation), or to create incentives for China to change its foreign or domestic policies. The Bush administration has sanctioned dozens of Chinese firms for violating U.S. export controls regulations, often for selling dual-use technologies to Iran, Libya, or North Korea.

4 China collapse doesn’t lead to Russian conflict—There can’t be an interstate conflict if the Chinese central government collapses because there will be nobody to attack. There can’t be a war if one of the governments doesn’t exist anymore.

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China Miscalculation Frontline

1 China Relations are high nowThaindian News, 11/17/09 “ US, China not rivals, but partners in cooperation: Hu, Obama” http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/world-news/us-china-not-rivals-but-partners-in-cooperation-hu-obama_100275814.html

China is ready to work together with the United States to push forward the continuous, healthy and stable development of Sino-U.S. relations to better serve the interests of the two peoples and the people around the world, the Chinese leader added. Hu said that the two sides have reaffirmed the “cardinal principle” of “mutually respecting national sovereignty and territorial integrity” and voiced opposition to any attempt by any force that violates this principle. He said that China appreciates President Obama’s support for the one-China policy and the three Sino-U.S. joint communiqués, and his respect for China’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity on the Taiwan issue and other matters. “We have both agreed to conduct dialogues and exchanges on issues including human rights and religion, in the spirit of equality, mutual respect and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, so as to boost understanding, mitigate differences and broaden consensus,” Hu said. Jintao said that his talks with Obama were candid, constructive and fruitful. He said both made a deep exchange of views on the China-U.S. relationship and major international and regional issues of common concern and reached consensus on many important issues. Hu said both Obama and he believed that international cooperation needs to be strengthened at a time when the international situation continues profound and complex changes, global challenges keep increasing and interdependence between nations intensifies. Under the new circumstances, China and the United States have more comprehensive shared interests, and a more extensive prospect for cooperation on a series of major issues involving the peace and development of the humankind, Hu said. Hu said he and Obama gave positive remarks on the development of the China-U.S. relationship since the inauguration of the new U.S. administration, and they agreed to strengthen dialogue, communication and cooperation from a strategic and far-sighted perspective, and to make joint efforts to build a positive, cooperative and comprehensive China-U.S. relationship, so as to promote world peace, stability and prosperity. (ANI)

2 Countries do not immediately go to war because of misunderstandings—issues between states arise all the time, yet there has never been a nuclear war, especially between countries that have strong relationships like the US and China

3 Their Samuelson evidence does not give any warrants for miscalculation. It claims that China has differing views from the US, but it doesn’t say anything about the two countries not understanding each other.

4 Even if there is an misunderstanding, there is an illogical jump between differences and extinction, it’s a slippery slope. They have no evidence about our presence leading to US Sino War; just that offshore balancing is good

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http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/world-news/us-china-not-rivals-but-partners-in-cooperation-hu-obama_100275814.html


Solvency Frontline

1 There are fundamental differences between China and US—negotiation must occur before withdrawalJiang 4/19 Wenran Jiang, Research Chair of the China Institute at the University of Alberta, Senior Fellow of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, 4/19/2010. [Bloomberg BusinessWeek, U.S. China Relations: Vision Needed]

The key here is not the lack of communication channels. Both countries have interacted with each other for more than three decades. There are no language problems, little cultural barriers, and plenty of conferences, track-two mechanisms, and personal correspondence. We have seen elegant op-ed articles written on both sides articulating how one side is right and the other side wrong. The end result? They talk past each other rather than with each other. The fundamental issue in today's U.S.-China relationship is how Washington and Beijing manage their relations with a long-term strategic vision that rewards both sides. The Americans tend to think what's good for America must be good for the world. Beijing, and for that matter much of the world, may not think so. Chinese leaders tend to think nothing matters that much unless it is good for China. The starting point is to acknowledge that both countries have their own domestic and foreign policy priorities. Some of them may be shared, some may not, and others may be in conflict. To accommodate and bridge different interests, the U.S. and China need to engage in more than just frank discussions. Tangible strategic concessions from both sides must be made in order to promote cooperation and avoid confrontation.

2 Even if China is against the exercises, China’s reaction to them will not lead to Asian instabilityBumiller and Wong 7/20 Elisabeth Bumiller and Edward Wong, NYT Staff Writers, 7/20/2010. “China Warily Eyes U.S.-Korea Drills”

China, which has growing naval ambitions and is North Korea’s most important ally and biggest trading partner, has made clear that it objects to any foreign operations on the Yellow Sea. Most pointedly, on Tuesday, the state-run English-language newspaper China Daily announced China’s own just-completed exercises there. The report said the purpose of the Chinese exercise, Warfare 2010, had been to improve defense capabilities against long-distance attacks. Four helicopters and four rescue vessels took part in the exercise on Saturday. The next day, tanks were loaded onto vessels at a port in Shandong Province. Trains were also used to transport tanks and other military equipment to ships. In a sign that China was moderating its response, the report cited military analysts saying that the drill had been a routine logistics mission and that it had little to do with the imminent exercises by the United States and South Korea, though one analyst was quoted as saying the timing was not an “entire coincidence.” The United States appeared to shrug off the Chinese drill. “I don’t think it’s a cause for any concern,” Geoff Morrell, the Pentagon press secretary, who is traveling with Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, said Tuesday in Seoul. “We operate in international waters, and we wouldn’t preclude them from doing the same thing.”

3 US is not just using the navy in its military exercisesTing 7/19 Zhao Ting, Staff Writer for Global Times, 7/19/2010. “F-22 Raptor likely to join US-South Korea military exercises”

The US and South Korea are set to launch joint military exercises off the east coast of South Korea later this month. And a South Korean government official said that the US is considering sending the F-22 Raptor air dominant fighter to the naval exercises. Washington has said the drill follows the recent sinking of the Cheonan and is aimed at sending a message to North Korea. The US government will also send its Seventh Fleet as well as US troops currently based in Japan. The US announced in May that it would deploy 12 air force fighters F-22 at the Kadena air base of the US Forces Japan in Okinawa for four months. The F-22 is the most advanced fighter, with a high stealth performance and mobility, and is equipped with Active Phased Array Radar and advanced weapons. It costs about $140 million per unit. According to South Korean media, Washington and Seoul will hold 10 joint military exercises off the coast of South Korea this year.

4 The plan does not solve because not all of the military exercises will end—the airforce is also conducting exercises but the plan only pulls out the navy.

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http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/g/robert_m_gates/index.html?inline=nyt-per

http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/g/robert_m_gates/index.html?inline=nyt-per

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-07/20/content_11021401.htm


***Counterplans***

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Yokota Airbase PIC

Counterplan: The United States federal government should withdraw all of its military and police presence from South Korea and Japan, except for the Yokota Air Base.

1 The Yokota Air base is key for Japanese security against North Korean nukesThe Tokyo Foundation, October 8, 2008, “New Security Strategy of Japan: Multilayered and Cooperative Security Strategy,” pg 19, tokyofoundation.org

Japan-U.S. cooperation is indispensable for dealing with ballistic missiles, currently the most serious direct security threat to Japan. The key to success is how Japan and the U.S. can combine their military assets, including U.S. early warning satellites, U.S. X-band radars, ground-based radars such as FPS-5 uniquely developed by Japan, phased array radars on the Aegis ships, and early warning and control aircraft (AWACS), and integrate the operations of the respective armed forces of the SDF and the U.S. forces in Japan. It is essential for these major platforms of missile defense to be highly integrated, while their interoperability should be reinforced at the Bilateral Joint Operation Coordination Center at the Yokota Air Base. It is also important to ensure that additional U.S. assets can be forward-deployed in contingencies.

2 Yokota is key for Japanese defense; US cooperation is necessaryLarry D James, Major General, United States Air Force, June 1 2008, “Senior Leader Perspectives,” 5th Air Force: Ready for the Future, Air and Space Power Journal, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj08/sum08/james.html

The heart of our bilateral air and missile defense operations—the Bilateral Air Operations Coordination System—features operational-level coordination between the USAF and JASDF in carrying out the roles and missions of the joint force air component commander, area air defense commander, and airspace control authority. The system deconflicts and integrates processes and products associated with the air and space operations center (AOC) weapon system for safe and effective operations. The JASDF and Thirteenth Air Force staffs are colocated at Yokota in a bilateral air component coordination element (BACCE) to execute the close and detailed bilateral coordination necessary when operating under unilateral and parallel lines of command and control. In 2010 the JASDF Air Defense Command will construct a new headquarters building at Yokota that will include a dedicated bilateral contingency facility for the BACCE, allowing constant, side-by-side operations and greatly improving coordination and training. Additionally, the JASDF is considering the acquisition of a theater battle-management system that will significantly enhance bilateral planning and coordination.

3 The tiny amount of troops that will remain in Japan is so small that it all nations will perceive it to be a total withdrawal. Their only purpose is to help Japanese troops

4 Yokota is also the least threatening of bases; it is farthest from China and is the center for Japanese defense capabilities rather than rapid deployment, so it is not run by the US, just assisted.

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http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj08/sum08/james.html


Advantage CP: Taiwan Arms SalesCP text: The United States Federal Government should end all arms sale to Taiwan.

Alternate Text: The United States Federal Government should end all arms sales to Taiwan with the condition that China pushes North Korea in the 6-Party Talks.

1. China wants the US to end arms sale to Taiwan; this is the key barrier to relationsAssociated Press, Jan. 10, 2010, “China urges U.S. to end arms sales to Taiwan,” http://www.deseretnews.com/article/705357419/China-urges-US-to-end-arms-sales-to-Taiwan.html

China has reiterated its opposition to American arms sales to Taiwan, calling them an interference in Beijing's internal affairs that could undermine relations with the United States.Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei's comments — the sixth official announcement in a week against the arms sales, according to the state-run news agency — underscore Beijing's sensitivity to the idea Washington may be conferring legitimacy on the island's government while boosting its defenses.Communist-ruled China split with Taiwan amid civil war in 1949 and continues to regard the self-governing democracy as part of its territory, triggering frequent diplomatic spats with the United States, which pledged to provide Taiwan with the means to defend itself in 1979.In the most recent announcement Saturday, He said China expressed its strong dissatisfaction to recent moves by the U.S. government to award contracts for Taiwan-bound weapons to Raytheon Company and Lockheed Martin Corp., according to the Xinhua News Agency.

2. Arms sales are a major barrier to Sino-US relationsThomas Lum, Specialist in Asian Affairs, Congressional Research Service, March 12, 2010, “U.S.-China Relations: Policy Issues,” pg 16. http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~db=all~content=a915184713

U.S. arms sales to Taiwan continue to pose a major obstacle to better U.S.-China relations. The three joint communiqués (1972, 1979, and 1982) and the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979 guide U.S.-China relations and U.S. policy toward Taiwan. While the third communiqué provides that the United States “intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan,” the TRA, which the PRC does not recognize, commits the United States to supplying weapons to Taiwan “in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” On October 3, 2008, the George W. Bush Administration notified Congress of its intent to sell defense articles and services to Taiwan. In January 2010, President Obama notified Congress of further arms sales. On January 30, Vice-Foreign Minister He Yafei announced that China would postpone some military exchanges, suspend meetings on international security, and punish U.S. companies involved in the arms sales.

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http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~db=all~content=a915184713

http://www.deseretnews.com/article/705357419/China-urges-US-to-end-arms-sales-to-Taiwan.html


Advantage: North Korea/6 party talks

China has leverage over North Korea, but does not use itDingli Shen, professor and Deputy Director of Fudan University's Centre for American Studies, Jul 24, 2009, Cooperative Denuclearization toward North Korea, Pg 3 www.twq.com/09october/docs/09oct_Shen.pdf

If North Korea is currently committed to developing nuclear weapons further, can they be stopped? China is expected to play a significant role in changing North Korea’s nuclear course due to the economic bond between Beijing and Pyongyang, as well as their ‘‘traditional’’ bilateral defense ties. It is widely understood that China is North Korea’s main outside source to access food, energy, medicine, fertilizers, and possibly cash in terms of foreign aid.4 Such assistance has indeed provided China with some leverage, at least in theory. As long as Beijing wishes, it can craft a policy to use some or all of these tools to affect North Korea’s international behavior. For instance, China was believed to employ some tools to affect North Korea’s position toward the Three-Party Talks, the precursor to the Six-Party Talks, in early spring 2003, by cutting off oil supply for three days due to ‘‘technical reasons’’ of the pipeline.But what may have rendered China’s efforts ineffective? China has not used all leverages it has possessed, such as food, energy, money, and many more, mainly for the sake of stability of the peninsula and its border area with North Korea. Indeed, economic sanctions could serve as a double-edged sword, either pressing North Korea to curtail its nuclear development, or potentially triggering a breakdown of North Korea’s already fragile system, leading to an implosion that is unlikely to be contained with low cost.

North Korea will try to exploit the Taiwan problemIt seems obvious that North Korea’s survival could serve China’s national security interests, especially in light of the Taiwan issue and the security dilemma it poses. Despite the improvement in relations between China and the United States since 1979 and the increasing interaction and cooperation across the Pacific, the issue of Taiwan has remained a sour point. While the mainland claims Taiwan as part of China’s territory, the government in Taiwan continues to view itself as an independent state and the sole representative of its citizens. Though Beijing has garnered more international support than Taiwan, continued U.S. support to Taiwan, especially in terms of arms deals, has angered China on more than one occasion. More significantly, China feels that the United States is using Taiwan to indirectly threaten China and force it to take a military stance toward Taiwan at a time when it is trying to peacefully integrate into the world’s economy. As a result, China has played down the Taiwan issue so long as Taiwan does not seek de jure independence, while making great leaps in economic development that can be translated to comprehensive national and military strength, which will be helpful if Taiwan declares independence.

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http://www.twq.com/09october/docs/09oct_Shen.pdf


Advantage: China HegEnding arms sales allows China to be more confident and expandThomas J. Christensen, Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University, 2005, “Will China Become a “Responsible Stakeholder”? The Six Party Talks, Taiwan Arms Sales, and Sino- Japanese Relations,” pgs 6-7, http://www.libertyparkusafd.org/lp/Hale/Special Reports%5CCommunist China%5CWill China Become a Responsible Stakeholder -- 2005.pdf

As discussed in the earliest editions of CLM, one of the most important factors in Chinese security analysts’ view of the region and the world is their assessment of the relationship between Washington and Taipei at any given time. When that relationship is very close, mainland security analysts worry deeply. This is particularly true when Taiwan’s government seems to be pushing toward juridical independence for the island. When U.S.-Taiwan relations seem strained, particularly when Taiwan independence advocates seem unable to pursue their agenda at home, Beijing’s analysts seem more confident and less worried. Applying this standard, one can only code recent trends in Taiwan and U.S.-Taiwan relations as quite positive from Beijing’s perspective. Since the 2004 Legislative Yuan elections, in which the anti-independence pan-Blue parties maintained a majority of the seats, there seems to have been little chance for pro- independence politicians to pursue their goals through the ongoing constitutional reform process. Moreover, the island seems unable to respond effectively to the growing military challenge posed by PLA modernization The pace of that modernization has been quite impressive since 1999 and will provide the mainland added leverage over the island in the future. The inability and refusal of Taiwan’s government to purchase several weapons systems offered to the island in April 2001 by the Bush Administration not only renders the island’s military weaker over the long run, but also damages Taipei’s relations with the United States. All of this means that trends in the cross-Strait balance of power seem to favor the mainland quite heavily. This reduces the likelihood that Taiwan will take actions that would be viewed on the mainland as necessitating the coercive use of force. Mainland observers have viewed with some glee the recent low popularity ratings of President Chen and the lack of public or legislative support for the expensive arms procurement bills he is sponsoring.24

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http://www.libertyparkusafd.org/lp/Hale/Special%20Reports%5CCommunist%20China%5CWill%20China%20Become%20a%20Responsible%20Stakeholder%20--%202005.pdf

http://www.libertyparkusafd.org/lp/Hale/Special%20Reports%5CCommunist%20China%5CWill%20China%20Become%20a%20Responsible%20Stakeholder%20--%202005.pdf


Advantage: China Econ/Foreign policy1. Taiwan is at the top of China’s goals, and relations are good now; integration boosts China’s economyQuanshen Zhao, Professor of international relations, American University, 2006, “Moving Toward a Co-Management Approach: China’s Policy Toward North Korea and Taiwan”, pg 48-49

China’s national interest in Taiwan is present in at least two forms. First, Beijing’s desire for national unification with Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao is at the top of China’s national goals. Since matters relating to Hong Kong and Macao were resolved in 1997 and 1999 respectively, the Taiwan issue has become more salient. Second, ever since China’s reform and opening policy begin in 1978, modernization has been a national priority. Beijing thus considers Taipei not only critical to its national interests in terms of sovereignty and legitimacy, but also important because it can accelerate the mainland’s economic drive. Taiwan, like South Korea, is one of the four East Asian tigers, and is therefore also able to provide China with capital, technology, and markets. Furthermore, because of a shared culture, Taiwan is in a position to provide the mainland with capitalist know-how to help China develop a market economy and integrate itself further into the world economy.In order to achieve its goal of national unification, Beijing has always maintained two different approaches – peaceful means and military force--- to prevent Taiwan from gaining independence (Taidu). Cross-strait relations have been highly uncertain since Taiwan’s presidential elections in March 2000. But instead of political and military pressure to promote integration with Taiwan, as in 1996, Beijing has increasingly relied upon economic means. Whatever the outcome, Beijing’s overall strategy remains clear. A particularly important factor in Taiwan’s politics is the business sector, as profit-driven businesspeople generally have viewed the mainland as a desirable market and location for investment. Indeed, Taiwan’s extensive trade and economic relations with the mainland have been responsible for generating Taiwan’s huge trade surplus. Thus, Taiwan’s business community has pressured its politicians to allow for enhanced ties cross the Taiwan Strait.

2. Taiwan is key to Chinese foreign policyRobert Sutter, Visiting Professor of Asian Studies at the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 2002, “China’s Recent Approach to Asia: Seeking Long Term Gains,” pg 23

There are few developments on the horizon that are likely to prompt significant change in Beijing’s long-term approach toward China’s neighbors. Preoccupation with leadership succession and managing domestic economic development and social and political stability will remain the top concerns for the time being. Foreign policy issues will continue to give pride of place to dealing with the United States and Taiwan. Chinese fourth generation leaders have been actively involved in the recent high level exchanges with China’s neighbors and show no sign of deviating from the recent approach. The expanded U.S. power along China’s western periphery thus far has not elicited a shift in China’s overall approach, and Beijing may judge that the U.S. presence will wane over time. Meanwhile Beijing on balance appears poised to exert ever-greater regional influence.

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China wants good US relationsUS friendship is in China’s best interestsRobert Sutter, Visiting Professor of Asian Studies at the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 2002, “China’s Recent Approach to Asia: Seeking Long Term Gains,” pg 2.

Some western assessments emphasize China’s determination to secure its boundaries from suspected U.S. containment and give pride of place to Chinese competition for influence with the United States.2 In fact, the recent record shows keen Chinese awareness of the difficulties involved in China competing directly with the U.S. superpower, and there are in- stances where U.S. power and influence are beneficial to China. For example, Chinese leaders doubtlessly have mixed feelings regarding the recent expanded U.S. influence and military presence along China’s periphery in Central and South Asia, but, as was apparent during the cordial U.S.-China summit in Beijing in February 2002, they see China’s interests best served with a posture generally cooperative with the United States while pursuing improved Chinese relations and influence with the countries in the region. Overall, it appears that Beijing is determined to continue following a long-term strategy to pursue a range of Chinese objectives that in the process will broaden Chinese influence relative to that of the United States in the countries around China’s periphery.

China wants friendship with the US, the majority of the elite and influential people support thisRosemary Foot ,Professor of International Relations, and the John Swire Senior Research Fellow at St Antony's College, Oxford University International Affairs, 24 Jan 2006 Vol 82, Issue 1, pg 83 http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/118726910/abstract?CRETRY=1&SRETRY=0

The Chinese accept, then, that they are functioning in a world dominated by a United States that in a globalized era is especially privileged. Moreover, they believe that US dominance is likely to prevail for many decades to come. Yet, although Chinese recognize that their country is far behind the United States across all dimensions of power, they also see their own country on the rise— and, unlike the former Soviet Union, being steadily integrated into the world economy and able to benefit from economic globalization. Moreover, while China has been increasing its military spending over the past several years, it is not—again unlike the former USSR—about to exhaust itself in an unproductive arms race with the United States.How, then, within this framework of power-related ideas, does China see the present and future of US–China relations? According to the influential scholar Shi Yinhong, those debating this matter in China can be divided into three main groups. The first group—which he describes as the majority of the elite—‘hope for long-term accommodation with the United States, but seriously doubt its probability’, ruling out neither major conflict nor a Cold War-type confrontation. A second group—a minority, but very influential— are more optimistic about the prospects for cooperation over the long term, although they accept that Sino-US accommodation would be subject to a process of ‘agonized mutual adaptation’. And a third group—a small minority with little influence on officials, according to Shi Yinhong—predict conflict because the US will ‘never tolerate a China as a world power or even No. 2 great power in Asia and the Pacific’.15 Wang Jisi, also an influential voice, has assessed Chinese perspectives in a fairly similar but more polarized way, stating that some believe US administrations will attempt to constrain China’s rise, prevent it from emerging as a strategic competitor, and make use of its energy dependency to cut it off from supplies vital to its economic development, while others are more optimistic and point to China’s ability to benefit from the promotion of economic and security cooperation in Asia and from cooperative partnerships with other great powers, including the United States.16

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http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/118726910/abstract?CRETRY=1&SRETRY=0

http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/118726910/abstract?CRETRY=1&SRETRY=0


***Disadvantages***

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Asian Prolif Bad DA

1 East Asia not proliferating nowEtel Solingen Chancellor's Professor at the University of California Irvine and Chair of the UCLA Burkle Center's Faculty Advisory Board 2007 “Nuclear logics: contrasting paths in East Asia and the Middle East” pgs 4-5

Both traditional and novel theories of nuclear behavior can be applied to explain these diverging trajectories. Neorealist literature in international relations has often traced nuclearization to international structure, relative power, balance of power, and self-help. It is crucial to distinguish between neorealist theory in international relations scholarship, pivoted in the concepts of structural or relative power, international anarchy, and self-help on the one hand, and the common use of the word "realism" in American politics on the other. The latter is frequently applied to visions or policies that arc "realistic" or "feasible." Yet, a policy that some may consider "realistic" in the more colloquial sense can be diametrically opposed to structural or neorealist understandings of international politics. Throughout this book the term neorealism refers to its use in international relations scholarship as a structural theory of politics (and in particular to offensive neorealism), not as a policy that seems "realistic." While some rely on neorealism as the theory that explains nuclear policy, concerns with existential security are never perfunctory reflections of structural considerations invariably leading to aggression or power maximization, but rather the product of domestic filters that convert such considerations into different policies. The extent to which state—rather than regime security—is invariably the dominant source of nuclear behavior may have been overestimated, precluding alternative—and perhaps more incisive—understandings or what drives the acquisition or renunciation of nuclear weapons.6 One such alternative forces greater attention to domestic political considerations of nuclear aspirants. In particular, systematic differences in nuclear behavior can he observed between states whose leaders or ruling coalitions advocate integration in the global economy, and those whose leaders reject it. The former have incentives to avoid the political, economic, rcputational, and opportunity costs of acquiring nuclear weapons because such costs impair a domestic agenda favoring internationalization. ' Conversely, leaders and ruling coalitions rejecting internationalization incur fewer such costs and have greater incentives to exploit nuclear weapons as tools in nationalist platforms of political competition and for staying in power. This insight may be extended to explain differences between nuclear aspirants in East Asia and the Middle East over nearly four decades. East Asian leaders pivoted their domestic political control on economic performance and integration into the global economy. Middle East leaders relied on inward-looking self-sufficiency and an emphasis on domestic markets and nationalist values for their political survival.8 These respective platforms created different incentives and constraints that influenced leaders' preferences for or against nuclear weapons.

2. US withdrawal leads to Chinese Modernization—that’s their 1AC evidence

3 East Asian countries adapt their militaries based off of China’sBlair and Hills 07 Dennis C. Blair, Former United States Director of National Intelligence, retired United States Navy Admiral. Carla A. Hills, former US Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, former US Trade Representative, Co-Chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations, Chair of the National Commiittee on United States-China relations, primary negotiator of NAFTA, 2007. [Council on Foreign Relations, U.S. China Relations: An Affirmative Agenda, A Responsible Approach]

For its part, the United States is upgrading forward deployed naval and air forces in the Pacific theater (especially on Guam), and will for the first time base a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in Japan. The United States is improving interoperability with its major Asian allies, staging more realistic and complex multilateral training exercises. The United States is also expanding military cooperation with India, Mongo- lia, and Indonesia. American air and maritime forces are one to three generations ahead of China’s, while U.S. defense spending is about eight times that of China. U.S. forces have significant recent large-scale combat experience and have mastered joint, integrated operations. The United States continues to dominate the region’s sealanes, through which flow much of the oil and other commodities on which China’s economy depend. Finally, China’s defense planning is complicated by the U.S. troop presence in Central Asia, to say nothing of China’s long borders with Russia and India, both of which maintain large, modern armed forces. The Task Force finds that many of China’s neighbors and potential adversaries are closely marking China’s military modernization and making adjustments to their own defense plans and expenditures that help to balance China’s growing military capabilities. But Taiwan has failed to keep pace with China’s defense modernization, shifting more of the burden to deter potential Chinese military action onto the United States.

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4 Military modernization in East Asian countries ends kills US heg in AsiaTellis 06 Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, former Senior Advisor to the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi, specialist in international security and Asian Security Issues, 2006. [National Bureau of Asian Research, Military Modernization in the Era of Uncertainty]

When Asian military modernization is judged upon the merits of technology, it is clear that many of the weapons systems meeting Sokolski’s pro- visos will increasingly make appearances in different quadrants of the Asian landmass. All the major Asian powers—China, Russia, Japan, India, South Korea, Australia, and even the more advanced Southeast Asian states—will possess various military systems that are capable of inflicting “high-leverage strategic harm,” are effective against different U.S. defenses, and will enhance their strategic reputation within the region and beyond. Fortunately, many of these states are friends and allies of the United States; thus, their growing technological sophistication is unlikely to raise serious political concerns in Washington. The steadily increasing sophistication of these same militaries suggests, however, that at a purely technological level, the operating environment facing U.S. forces in and around Asia is likely to grow increasingly complex over time. Similarly, as certain geopolitically startling technologies (e.g., nuclear weapons) begin to gradually appear, critical portions of the Asian landmass may even become wholly immune to the successful application of U.S. military power.40 In light of these trends, ongoing transforma- tions in the U.S. armed services, including basing and deployment patterns abroad, may need to be accelerated in order to protect Washington’s ability to implement its current holding-the-ring strategy in Asia.

5 Heg collapse in Southeast Asia causes global nuclear conflict – ensures the US is drawn back inLieber 2005 – PhD from Harvard, Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown, former consultant to the State Department and for National Intelligence Estimates (Robert, “The American Era”, pages 53-54, WEA)

Withdrawal from foreign commitments might seem to be a means of evading hostility toward the United States, but the consequences would almost certainly be harmful both to regional stability and to U.S. national interests. Although Europe would almost certainly not see the return to competitive balancing among regional powers (i.e., competition and even military rivalry between France and Germany) of the kind that some realist scholars of international relations have predicted,21 elsewhere the dangers could increase. In Asia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan would have strong motivation to acquire nuclear weapons – which they have the technological capacity to do quite quickly. Instability and regional competition could also escalate, not only between India and Pakistan, but also in Southeast Asia involving Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and possibly the Philippines. Risks in the Middle East would be likely to increase, with regional competition among the major countries of the Gulf region (Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq) as well as Egypt, Syria, and Israel. Major regional wars, eventually involving the use of weapons of mass destruction plus human suffering on a vast scale, floods of refugees, economic disruption, and risks to oil supplies are all readily conceivable. Based on past experience, the United States would almost certainly be drawn back into these areas, whether to defend friendly states, to cope with a humanitarian catastrophe, or to prevent a hostile power from dominating an entire region. Steven Peter Rosen has thus fittingly observed, “If the logic of American empire is unappealing, it is not at all clear that the alternatives are that much more attractive.”22 Similarly, Niall Ferguson has added that those who dislike American predominance ought to bear in mind that the alternative may not be a world of competing great powers, but one with no hegemon at all. Ferguson’s warning may be hyperbolic, but it hints at the perils that the absence of a dominant power, “apolarity,” could bring “an anarchic new Dark Age of waning empires and religious fanaticism; of endemic plunder and pillage in the world’s forgotten regions; of economic stagnation and civilization’s retreat into a few fortified enclaves.”23

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Link--Redeployment DA

US withdrawal from South Korea leads to redeployment in other regionsKorea Times 7/23 The Korea Times, 7/23/2010. “US Troops in Koera to be redeployed to other conflict regions”

The United States will deploy some of its troops in Korea to other conflict regions in the future to meet growing regional security challenges, Yonhap News reported in Washington, quoting the top U.S. military officer has saiying. "Part of the discussion we are having with the Republic of Korea, with the leadership, and what we will be able to do in the next several years is support for deployments, literally, off of the peninsula," Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told U.S. soldiers at the Camp Red Cloud, north of Seoul, Tuesday, according to a transcript released by the Pentagon. "But we're not there yet. We haven't got to that point in time. But will there be rotational options? And part of this is, quite frankly, a regional issue." Mullen was in Seoul to attend the inaugural two-plus-two meeting of foreign and defense ministers of South Korea and the U.S. Wednesday amid heightening tensions after North Korea's torpedoing of a South Korean warship in March. Forty-six sailors died when the Cheonan sank in the Yellow Sea. The ministers announced plans to conduct joint military exercises in the Yellow Sea and East Sea in the coming month from Sunday in a show of deterrence against North Korea, despite opposition from China as well as North Korea. Mullen was saying the Obama administration is following the strategic flexibility posture drawn up by the Bush administration for rapid deployment of U.S. troops abroad to conflict regions.

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Link—Midterms

US China relations unpopular—Americans believe recession happened because of China Blair and Hills 07 Dennis C. Blair, Former United States Director of National Intelligence, retired United States Navy Admiral. Carla A. Hills, former US Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, former US Trade Representative, Co-Chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations, Chair of the National Commiittee on United States-China relations, primary negotiator of NAFTA, 2007. [Council on Foreign Relations, U.S. China Relations: An Affirmative Agenda, A Responsible Approach p. 62]

A growing number of Americans believe that trade with China harms the U.S. economy and that the U.S. trade deficit with China is mainly the result of unfair Chinese trade practices. Both notions are false. But that does not mean that competition with China is always benign or fair. Certain sectors of the U.S. economy have been hurt by Chinese competition, and according to the U.S. trade representative, some of China’s economic policies constitute an unfair subsidy of exports in violation of China’s WTO obligations.42

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***2AC Answers***

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AT: Arms sales don’t hurt relations

1. Continued arms sales tank US-China relationsAssociated Press, Jan. 10, 2010, “China urges U.S. to end arms sales to Taiwan,” Dereset News, http://www.deseretnews.com/article/705357419/China-urges-US-to-end-arms-sales-to-Taiwan.html

The outgoing Bush Administration made an 11th hour decision to notify the U.S. Congress on October 3—a day before Congress went into recess ahead of the groundbreaking November presidential election in the United States—that a raft of arms and weapons systems, which have been effectively frozen since December 2007, will be released for Taiwan. The passage of the arms package provided a temporary reprieve for Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou, whose approval rating since assuming office in May has plummeted to 23.6 percent in October (Global View, November 2008). The items released by the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, at the value of $6.4 billion, includes: 182 Javelin anti-tank missiles; 30 Apache helicopters; four PAC-3 anti-missile batteries; 32 submarine-launched Harpoon missiles; and four E-2T radar plane upgrades. But more noticeable than the items released is the absence of the first phase of 8 diesel-powered submarines, Black Hawk helicopters, and two additional PAC-3 batteries that had been originally sought (United Daily News [Taiwan], October 5, 2008; Defense News, October 6). Taipei also requested 66 F-16 C/D jet fighters to add to its current inventory, but the Bush Administration has not received the letter of request for the reason that it would only process the above-mentioned package at the current stage. The passage of the arms package was received with a sigh of relief in Taipei, which is concerned about the island's strained relations with the United States, and, had a decision lapsed to the next U.S. president, weary that the package would be approved at all. As expected, Beijing complained bitterly and suspended unspecified military exchange programs with the United States (United Daily News, October 8, 2008), but overall the sale did not upset Sino-U.S. relations, nor did it interrupt the momentum of reconciliatory gestures between the Kuomintang (KMT), the ruling party on Taiwan, and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). However, the scaling-down of the arms package signifies subtle changes in the geopolitical landscape in East Asia, where the shifting center of gravity may affect the long-term interests of the United States and its relations with the nations in the region.

2. China and Taiwan have always been enemies, and China feels the US is siding against them by assisting Taiwan.

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http://www.deseretnews.com/article/705357419/China-urges-US-to-end-arms-sales-to-Taiwan.html


AT: Multiple Causes for Talks not happening

1. They concede that they don’t solve for six-party talks because there are multiple reasons the talks aren’t happening.

2. Even if you agree that the aff solves one of the main reasons the talks aren’t happening, the fact that there are more than one reasons means that the aff won’t restart the talks.

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