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Contract Farming in Mexico: A Gendered Analysis

By: Sarah Van Houten

Professor Priti Ramamurthy

3/1510

SIS 345

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Agriculture remains to be one of the most important economic sectors in Latin America

as well as the entire developing world. Agriculture is instrumental in transforming the economic

and social framework of the rural economy as it has the potential to expand the level of

opportunity employment, enhance income distribution and reduce the level of poverty (D’Silva

1). However, due to the increase in market liberalization, information and communication

technology, financial capital mobility and other factors concerning the global economy, many of

the food and agricultural systems of rural communities are being forced to modernize (1). One of

the more modern methods of agricultural activities that have been expanded over the years,

especially in the developing world, to counteract the threat of globalization is contract farming.

Contract farming offers many benefits for growers, including access to new markets, technical

assistance, specialized inputs, and financial resources. Contract farming has the potential to

incorporate low-income growers into the modern sector and can be used as an effective

instrument for using agriculture for development (Runsten and Key 35). However, the effects of

contract farming are not universal as they vary between regions and also between sexes. This

paper will discuss the success of contract farming in rural communities of Mexico in terms of

promoting economic development and equalizing income distribution. With women acting as

crucial agents in the agricultural sector of these communities, I will then analyze the impact of

contract farming and other modernization methods on women and their own progress towards

income equality and social development. I will conclude this paper with a gendered analysis of

development and a discussion of the effectiveness of various development policies and

ideologies in improving the lives of women.

Contract Farming: Theory

Contract farming is the negotiation between producers of an agricultural product and the

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buyers, or processors of that product. The goal of contract farming is to connect the rural farmer

with the large agribusiness corporations to both improve the efficiency of production as well as

integrate the grower into the national and world markets. There are three categories of contracts:

market specification, resource providing, and production management. The first, market-

specification contract are “pre-harvest agreements that bind the firm and the grower to a specific

set of conditions that govern the crop.” Resource-providing contracts “oblige the processor to

supply crop inputs, extension, or credit, in exchange for a marketing agreement.” Production

management contracts bind the farmer to follow a particular production method in exchange for

a marketing agreement or resource provision (Runsten and Key 2). Contract farming, when

successful, has the potential to replace the state as private firms compete through contracts to

provide the credit, inputs and services farmers need to cultivate market lucrative non traditional

crops (2). It is also argued that by incorporating farmers into the global economy, contract

farming can decrease the income stratification between farmers. As result of a higher rate of

income distribution, “contract farming may create positive multiplier effects for employment,

infrastructure, and market development in the local economy” (3). The success of the contract

farming approach will depend on who participates and what benefits are being received from

participation. Therefore, firms and growers will choose to contract with one another based upon

both the gains they expect to obtain from the contract as well as the transactions costs and

information costs in the market environment in which production takes place (Warning and Soo

Hoo 3). The selection process, the differential benefits accumulated and the market environment

are crucial factors in determining the success of contract farming in rural communities.

The firm’s goal in the selection process is to produce a given amount of output while

minimizing transaction costs. In this sense a firm has two choices, it can choose to contract with

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a larger and more financially stable grower or it can choose to work with a smaller and often

poorer farmer. In determining which farm to contract with, the level of transaction costs

including risk premiums and shadow values of credit are all taken under consideration

(Warning and Soo Hoo 5). Smaller farms are usually more risky for firms as contract farming

systems usually involve riskier crops than traditional crops and a small grower will tend to have

less capacity for self-insurance than a large grower (5). Also, contract farming schemes are often

“credit providing” due to the high cost in production of nontraditional crops and poorer farmers

tend to be more credit constrained compared to their larger competitors with a better asset

position (6). However, while most firms would favor contracting with lager growers, there have

been several examples of these firms contracting simultaneously with both large and small

growers as well as exclusively with smaller growers.

Contract Farming: Critics

It is the selection process that favors large growers that has led many critics to reject

contract farming as a universal method for spurring development and equalizing income

distribution. Due to the importance of fixed transaction costs, many agro industrial firms choose

to contract with larger growers, ensuring more stable transactions and higher production yields.

In this sense, if firms choose to contract primarily with large growers, the benefits of contract

farming will fail to reach the poorer members of the rural population thereby reinforcing income

stratification rather than have an equalizing effect (Warning and Soo Hoo 3). The relative

exclusion of many small-scale farmers from the contract system is especially deleterious because

the smallholders are the most vulnerable to market shock and crop failure. In addition to being

more risk-averse, a smaller grower usually has a lower shadow price of labor because most of the

labor is household labor. Household labor usually has low monitoring costs and certain forms of

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household labor (such as the labor of children and women) “are not marketable for legal, social

or cultural reasons, and thus have low labor-market opportunity costs” (Warning and Soo Hoo

6). In this way, small farmers have lower internal labor costs and therefore find the financial

stability of a contract very desirable.

However, due to the vulnerability of small growers, agro industrial firms that do contract

with small growers often create unfair contracts that reinforce an unequal and exploitative power

relationship (Runsten and Key 5). The firm often takes advantage of the limited opportunities of

the poorer grower in order to increase their profits. Proponents of contract farming would argue

that these contracts are entered into voluntarily meaning that the contract, however unfair, is a

better alternative to no contract. In this way, the motives of the firm are inconsequential to an

improvement in the distribution of income (Warning and Soo Hoo 8). However, it is found that

over time, firms may impede the development of small growers by investing fixed resources into

production or altering crop patterns which results in an over-dependence of these poor farmers

on contracts with large firms (Runsten and Key 6). When this is the case, growers face limited

exit options and reduced bargaining power, which may force them to accept even more

disadvantageous and exploitative contract terms. Also, many of these small, poor farmers depend

on their own cultivation of subsistence crops for survival and an over reliance on cash crops can

make a household more vulnerable to food shortages and price fluctuations (Runsten 6). In this

way, rather than serving as a mode of liberation for small farmers, contract farming systems have

become a more modern form of feudalistic tenant farming.

Another critique of contract farming as a mechanism for development is the prevalence

of contract default. With a lack of institutional enforcement and the presence of regional

monopolies, it is not uncommon for a company to break a contract with a farmer for example by

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failing to deliver inputs and services at the correct time or refusing to receive the product by

arbitrarily raising quality standards (Coulter 2). However, the development of competitive output

markets has transferred the risk to agri- businesses, which has bolstered the incentive for these

firms to maintain good relations with smallholders (Coulter 2). The problem remains then, the

tendency of farmers to default on their contracts with firms. Farmers break contracts due to

production failures or because they have already sold their produce to a competing buyer or have

failed to pay back loans. The problem of deliberate default has been exacerbated by failed

development programs and the continued “absence of effective legal systems, the lack of

collateral held by smallholders, and weak insurance sectors, create considerable risk for

companies entering into contracts” (Coulter 3). The combined problems of exploitative contract

terms and lack of contract enforcement has led to the failure of many contract farming schemes

in the developing world.

The issues of smallholder selection, exploitative contracts and contract default are

particularly important in Latin America where a “heterogeneous rural population characterized

by an unequal distribution of income, productive assets, and human capital presents a diverse

collection of potential growers from which firms can choose their clients” (Runsten and Key 9).

In this next section, I will demonstrate how the theories and critiques of contract farming apply

to the frozen vegetable processing industry in Mexico. I will then compare the success of

contract farming in terms of the prevalence of working with smallholders and equalizing income

distribution.

Contracting in Mexico: Frozen Vegetable Industry

In Mexico, contract farming dominates agricultural farming production. Originally, the

large international firms that contracted with Mexican farmers worked with both large and small

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growers (ejidos), but when economic conditions became less favorable in the 1980’s these firms

shifted their production increasingly to large growers (Runsten and Key 20). U.S. firms such as

Pillsbury—Green Giant and Campbells chose to work exclusively with large growers during this

time due to the high level of transaction costs associated with smallholders. Like most crops

associated with contract farming, the frozen vegetable crop grown in the Bajio region in Mexico

are very risky in that they are more expensive to cultivate and they have greater yield variation

due to frost, hail, pests, and disease (21). In case of crop failure, firms would only be responsible

for a small fraction of the total investment in the crop, which would leave the grower to bear a

considerable portion of the yield risk. As discussed above, larger growers due to their ability to

access credit and insurance systems are generally better able to endure the risk of crop loss. Due

to the lack of credible legal institutions in Mexico, the cost of legal action to enforce contracts in

which the producer has experienced crop loss is very high. In addition, legal action taken by

firms is seen negatively by community members (21). Without legal recourse to ensure against

the issues of contract default and non-payment, firms are forced to write off any lost income.

Without the ability to enforce contracts, many international firms choose to contract with the

grower that has access to credit and insurance or in other words, the grower less likely to default.

In this way, larger growers are more appealing to these firms because they involve the least

amount of risk and can maximize output.

It is very hard to balance the additional costs associated with smallholders. In general,

smaller producers require more inputs and capital from the firm, per unit of product than larger

growers; they tend to borrow/rent more machinery, require more extension services and borrow

more capital pr unit of output (Runsten and Key 29). A greater number of producers means more

trips by extension agents, more monitoring for pesticide violations, more deliveries of inputs, and

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smallholders also make more product deliveries of smaller volume” (30). By choosing a larger

grower instead, firms can minimize total costs by minimizing the number of growers with whom

they contract there by maximizing the scale of farmers contracted (29).

“Not only did their [the smaller growers] numbers increase administrative costs, but they needed more services from the firm. For example: they needed more extension assistance; communication was costly as they often has no phones; they had to borrow or rent more specialized machinery (such as roto-tillers or high-pressure sprayers); they wanted to borrow operating capital in addition to receiving crop inputs; they made more numerous deliveries of smaller volume; they tried to get the firms to loan them money for tractors and other machinery; and they required more monitoring for pesticide violations. The director said they did not want to be an investment bank, did not want to be the patron” (Runsten and Key 29)

In addition, communication between firm and farmer can be very difficult because smallholders

tended to be more geographically disperse and did not own phones or were not organized in a

way that can easily facilitate communication and cooperation. In theory, firms could circumvent

the additional cost of contracting with smallholders by inflating the price they charge for services

or differentiate the rates for services to large and small growers. However, the former often

discourages large growers to participate and the latter is very difficult to implement (30). For

example, the corporations Birdseye and Green Giant utilized two contracts: one with few

services and one with no services. However, this still attracted mostly large growers, as most

smallholders could not produce without additional inputs (31). Another example of how

smallholders are excluded from the market is Campbell’s offering of seven different contracts.

Even though this system attracted smallholders, there was still an issue of balancing additional

costs. The director of agriculture at Campbells admits he was “pressured by the other plants to

maintain prices at a common level and not to price discriminate and even with the seven

contracts” and claimed that “he was unable to pay the no-service large growers a high enough

price, nor the full-service small producers a low enough price, to account for all costs” (31).

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There are examples of firms contracting with both large and small-scale growers, but this

coalition is not long-term. The examples of Green Giant Green Giant in Irapuato, Campbells in

the Valle de Santiago, and Birdseye in Aguascalientes suggest that when there is weak local

development of the markets for the product and labor the firms needed, firms would contract

with smallholders (Warning and Soo Hoo 12). These case studies lead to the conclusion that

firms are willing to contract with smaller growers only when other alternatives are not available

and the economy permits. However, when the economy declined in the late 1980’s, many of

these firms shifted back to working exclusively with large growers and smallholders were shut

out of contracting. While most firms in Mexico have been unable to work with smallholders in

the long-term, an exception lies with the case of the firm La Huerta, which has successfully

contracted with smallholders for over a decade.

In contrast to these large international firms, the Mexican family-owned frozen vegetable

firm “Frigorizados La Huerta has successfully contracted with smallholders even during

economic downturns. While La Huerta produces much of the vegetables it processes, it also

contracts with 10 large producers and 70 ejidatarios, or smallholders (Warning and Soo Hoo 14).

This case illustrates the potential of contract farming systems to create a contractual arrangement

that “takes advantage of the relative efficiencies of smallholders while minimizing transaction

costs” (Runsten and Key 33). The key to La Huerta’s success is the ability to create contracts that

benefit both the smallholder and the buyer. Working with smallholders can prove to be very

valuable, as they possess several advantages in the land and labor markets. For example, due to

the fact that ejidatarios have access to unremunerated family labor for which markets are

missing, La Huerta estimated that the ejidatarios had per unit costs of producing broccoli that

were only half of the firm’s own costs (33). Another reason costs were low is because ejidatarios

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have lower effective labor. They faced these lower transactions costs such as the cost of

recruiting, supervising and transporting labor, because they did not pay any government benefits

such as social security and are in close proximity to many potential laborers. (Warning and Soo

Hoo 16). Ejidatarios also had lower pest control costs because they managed smaller plots of

land and were therefore able to catch pest and disease problems sooner, thereby limiting the use

of chemicals. In addition to lowering costs, ejidatarios actually had higher average yields then

the firm’s own ranches due to the fact that they are residual claimants of their labor and they

therefore demonstrate more “conscientious” work (34).

In order to take advantage of the relative efficiency of the smallholders without incurring

overbearing transaction costs, La Huerta offered resource-providing contracts that delivered

credit, specialized inputs, and extension assistance. For the ejidatarios who had little access to

formal credit, the availability to access credit without collateral is very important (Runsten and

Key 35). As a result of these in-kind credit contracts, La Huerta was able to balance its expenses

and the overall costs for vegetable crops ended up in the same range as the costs for traditional

crops such as maize (35). Unlike other foreign-owned companies, La Huerta was able to make a

profit from contracting with smallholders by establishing a management strategy with low

transaction costs. This management strategy includes the restriction and the number and location

of the ejidatarios with whom it contracted, choosing only those farms that lie along the main

highway. This prevents any problems associated with communication and makes it possible for

the firm’s agronomist to visit the farms once a week to protect against crop failure and contract

default. (Warning and Soo Hoo 15). In addition, the growers themselves are required to both

pick up the seedlings and fertilizer from the firm, and deliver their harvest to the firm, which

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further minimizes transaction costs (15). The success of La Huerta can be used as a model of

how large firms can make a profit without exploiting smallholders.

Conclusions: Contracting with Smallholders

The key to securing all the potential benefits associated from contract farming lies in the

ability of firms to contract with smallholders. If this is implemented, contract farming has the

potential to both raise incomes of the poor and promote rural development. However, if firms are

unable to manage contracting with smallholders, the opposite will hold true and contract farming

may serve to exacerbate income and asset inequalities (Runsten and Key 35). La Huerta in

Mexico can act as an example of how firms can contract with smallholders and still make a

profit.

“By acting as intermediaries, firms can profit from the willingness of smallholders to pay more for credit and insurance than would larger landholders. Hence, even if small-scale producers are not competitive in the open marketplace, they may be the most profitable type of grower with whom the firms could contract” (Runsten and Key 36). Simple changes in the institutional structure of contract farming such as differentiated contracts

or working with grower groups or cooperatives can significantly lower transaction costs and

create smallholders more desirable business partners.

The problem remains then, how to ensure that these smallholders in the ejido system are

not being exploited or subject to manipulation by companies. In order to encourage the

development of contract farming as a free labor system, growers must engage in a collective

action to organize themselves or to organize with the help of government agencies, non-profit

organizations or even the agroprocessors themselves (Runsten and Key 40). Also, stronger

institutional development, while disadvantaging smallholders in the short-term, may benefit them

in the long term. Many of the transaction costs that impede from contracting with smallholders

result from weak institutions. For example, if markets for information were better developed,

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growers might directly access important production information rather than relying on the firm

for the high fixed costs of extension services (Warning and Soo 22).

Women’s participation in agriculture has become vital to the success of contract farming

and other systems of export-oriented production. In this next section, I will discuss the

importance of women’s role in agriculture in Mexico and Latin America and their experiences as

agricultural producers. I will then analyze how women’s increased participation in agricultural

production has affected their status and development within in society with reference to both the

WID and GAD approaches. I will conclude with a commentary, which address some solutions to

improve the effectiveness of development policies in advocating female empowerment.

Women and Agriculture: The Feminization of Agriculture

For most of history, women have played a very large, yet unrecognized role in

agriculture. However, in the past decades, women’s work in agriculture has become much more

visible due in part to the improvement of research and data collection that has more accurately

measured women’s participation (Lastarria 1). Over the past decades, women have broadened

their involvement in agricultural production in order to ensure household survival and take

advantage of the opportunities in commercial agriculture (1). This trend is called the

feminization of agriculture. The feminization of agriculture can be described broadly as the

general increase in the proportion of women working in the agricultural sector either as self-

employed or as agricultural wage laborers. This term also refers to the increase in the percentage

of women in the agricultural labor force relative to men either because more women or fewer

men are working in agriculture (Lastarria 2). While this increase is not consistent throughout all

of Latin America, it is known that in general, larger percentages of women are working in

agriculture in both wage work and unremunerated family labor (Katz 36). While women do play

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a significant role in processing plants and factory work, I will focus my analysis on smallholder,

cash-crop production.

In order to understand this growth of women’s work in agriculture, it is important to

consider the larger agricultural context. In Latin America, smallholder agriculture is committed

to producing mostly traditional food crops and animal products either for personal consumption

or for local and national markets. However, increasing relative rural poverty and the economic

crises of the 1970s, 80s, and 90s encouraged family members to seek wage labor and migrate to more

non-traditional agricultural exports (Lastarria 2). Due to the economic liberalization policies, non-

traditional agricultural exports grew from 10%-23% of total exports from 1970 to 1990 respectively,

which created an increasing demand for a wage labor force (4). Due to the increasing demand for

cheap labor, many smallholder agro-export farms are becoming dependent upon female labor.

However, women’s entrance into the export agricultural sector has been complicated by the fact that

women are faced with additional constraints to production. As I examine these constraints and

women’s work in agriculture, gender relations and specifically their influence on the distribution and

allocation of work, income, wealth, and assets become increasingly relevant.

Smallholder Agriculture: The Gender Dimension

In Latin America, due to land concentration and scarcity, many men are forced to diversify

their livelihoods and migrate for extended periods of time or engage in off-farm employment

(Lastarria 8). As a result, many women are increasing their participation in smallholder agriculture

as principle farmers, wage laborers or unremunerated family workers (5).

The increasing presence of women taking charge of farms as principal farmers has resulted in

the increased visibility of women in agriculture. The migration of family members to seek non-farm

work has left women to bear most of the burden of agricultural fieldwork and tasks (Lastarria 9).

Many have assumed the position of independent producers, working long hours on the farm and

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making most of the decisions (9). However, women are faced with additional constraints to their

production. With the feminization of agriculture, the division of labor has shifted from the traditional

domestic roles of women. When men migrate, women are responsible for the strength-intensive work

traditionally done by the males such as clearing the land for planting in addition to their previous

responsibilities. Also, women who want their children to go to school take on the work children

traditionally did such as caring for small and large livestock (9). In addition to these added duties, a

woman’s role as the provider of food for the household continues to be the social standard. However,

with the increase in women’s participation and responsibilities in agriculture, a new challenge has

arisen in simultaneously providing enough food for the household and making a profit (9). In this

way, some women do not participate in contract farming, as they are unwilling to switch production

on their own plots from food to cash crops. Due to the fact that women are more vulnerable to the

volatility of non-traditional crops, many have taken over production for home consumption rather

than for the market (9). However, there are a number of women that continue to engage in

commercial farming, such as contract farming.

In addition to women working as principle farmers, women have also found work as laborers

in smallholder production of agro-exports. As fruit and vegetable firms have expanded production,

many have shifted to a largely female labor force (Collins 221). In fact, in Mexico’s Bajio Valley,

“75 percent of the workers employed directly by the company were women” and in Sinaloa Mexico,

women compose 50-60 percent of the harvest labor force in vegetable production (222). As stated

earlier these small farms can be very desirable for commercial firms and agribusiness due to the

availability of cheap labor. However, women working as wage laborers are often confronted with

exploitative working conditions with low wages and little job security. Women are seen by firms as

the ideal labor force as they “nimble”, “dexterous” and “docile” allowing them to better meet the

demanding grade and quality standards of non-traditional crops (222). Also many firms consider

women’s work to be temporary, as their primary responsibilities are home and family, which caters

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to the firms labor supply production cycles allowing them to hire workers on a casual or intermittent

basis without long-term contracts (222). Additionally, firms prefer women because of their minimal

risk in that women are observed to be less likely to engage in strikes, join unions or take up activist

leadership roles (223). The fact that women represent quality, flexibility and political stability

combined with the increased migration of males has created smallholder farms producing cash crops

to be increasingly dependent on women’s labor (Lastarria 10).

Land Rights in Oaxaca, Mexico: Case Study

One of the biggest disadvantages women face in the agricultural sector is the lack of land

rights. In Oaxaca Mexico in 1992 the Mexican Government made substantial changes to the

communal agrarian structure that has governed fully half of the country’s agricultural land (103

million hectares) since the land reform that followed the 1910 Mexican Revolution (Brown 1).

These land reforms permitted the once inalienable land parcels of the ejido, or smallholder

communities, to be transferred, leased, used as collateral and privatized. This was good news to

most farmers, as the advantages of these reforms mainly included the ability to privatize their

holdings and potentially increase access to formal credit (1). However, the new ability to use

land to get formal loans has not spurred any further investment in agriculture, as many banks do

not accept ejidal plots as collateral. (1). Despite this setback, many farmers are positive about the

certification program as the reforms allow more control over land and facilitate the ability for

farmers to enter into partnerships with private companies. Unfortunately, these reforms have not

benefited all ejodos equally. Due to the fact that many women are not heads of their households

and do not have access to land rights, the Agrarian Law has undermined women’s rights on

ejidos (1). Women have no administration or disposal of the land they work on and cannot take

advantage of the new Agrarian Law, creating it difficult to compete with their male counterparts.

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In order to understand the disadvantages many women are faced with, it is important to

understand the legal framework behind this law. Only members of ejidos can access the benefits

from the reforms. In general, membership is granted by being born into the community or by

fulfilling the legal residency requirement of 1 year. This membership is recognized by the ejidal

assembly or by the inheritance of land rights (12). However, not everyone who works or lives

inside an ejido is considered a member. Only those who have land rights and have the right to

vote, generally the head of the household are permitted membership (12). Originally, ejido

membership secured family rights, in which all members of the family were entitled to rights over the

land. However, the reforms have converted the rights of ownership solely to individuals, or the heads

of the households (males). In this way, women do not hold land rights and are not considered

voting members of ejidos unless they are widowed or divorced and head their own household

(12). With no voting right or legal rights, most women in ejido society are powerless to stop their

husbands from leasing or selling land.

The marginalization of women in development is a concern that has come to the forefront

of development policies in the last 30 years. There are multiple theories about how to incorporate

women into development, but I will focus on two: Women in Development (WID) and Gender

and Development Approach or Social Relations of Gender approach (GAD). It is within these

two theoretical frameworks that I will analyze the participation of women in agricultural

development.

Women in Development: WID v GAD

WID: the dominant ideology

While not completely absent, sexual rights and women in general have been marginalized

in development thought and policy. One theory, WID, that has arisen in the 1970’s from this

issue is the notion that modernization is a universal solution to the absence of women in

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development. However, the incorporation of modernization policies alone is not sufficient as women

benefit from modernization differently from men. Boserup, a prominent leader of the WID approach

argues that fundamental changes need to be made in the way women are treated in development

theory and practice. She argues that women have an important, productive role in development

and they cannot be treated as unaffected or “welfare” recipients in development policy (Kabeer

47). Basically, through women-targeted programs, the techniques of modernization can be

implemented to change distortions in sex-role socialization in under-developed countries.

Women are then “free laborers” in that they are liberated from the constraints of patriarchy and

can move in society. In this way, the notions of modernization and development are interchangeable

as women everywhere are considered rational individuals and when given the opportunity to enter

markets as productive agents, women will maximize their productivity and feel empowered in

society.

This theory maintains that the marginalization of women in development is due to the male

dominated institutions such as patrilineal land inheritance laws and family norms, which create

unequal access to resources and opportunities. In the Oaxaca, Mexico case study, failure of

development programs to benefit women is demonstrated. The new Agrarian Law, like most

development programs, is completely gender neutral in its language and does not take into

account women’s disenfranchisement in ejido communities. The liberalization of land policies,

while a positive step, cannot be held as the final goal. Development reforms must consider the

role of women in agriculture and integrate policies that do not further marginalize women in

society. According the 2008 World Development Report, “if agriculture is to be an effective

sector for development, women need to be able to fully participate. That step requires action

across a broad swathe of the policy and institutional domains. Governments will need not only to

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advocate but also to legislate and demonstrate gender mainstreaming in national and local

governance” (WDR 5).

One of WID’s main arguments is that the gender gap in land ownership is the single most

critical contributor of women’s marginalization in development. Women’s land ownership is

critical as land is a valuable asset that enhances security, improves social status and promotes

empowerment (Zoomers 3). With the increased migration of men, the possibility of abandonment or

death has increased and the ability of a women to hold land in her own name (or at least jointly with

her husband) which would provide security in the chance she is deserted or widowed by her husband

and thereby reduces the risk of rural poverty (Brown 18). Similarly, rights to land would facilitate

access to benefits under government programs so that women can more easily manage the greater

responsibilities over the land due to the loss of a husband (19). Also, land is an important and

valuable asset. Land rights for women would mean enhanced access to formal credit and if women

have more access to financial loans, they will be able to engage more in commercial agriculture,

including contract farming. Additionally granting women land ownership provides benefits to the

whole community as “numerous studies have found that children directly benefit from

improvements to their mother’s income to a much greater extent than they do from

improvements to their father’s income (19) Finally, land ownership encourages empowerment as

it places women in a stronger position to demand respect and increases bargaining power within

the family (Jackson 460).

From much of the evidence provided about women’s role in agriculture, it would seem that

what is impeding women from acting as active, equal agents in agricultural production is their

exclusion from markets, both in land and labor. It would seem that an increase in resources such as

women’s access to credit, education, fertility control, technology, agricultural training, through

gender-specific programs would help to elevate women in a patriarchal society and allow them

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access to a more equal playing field. However, this approach to development has its shortcomings.

While women-targeted modernization policies may be beneficial, they are not a universal solution to

the constraints of women in development.

GAD: An alternative approach

Despite the fact that WID is the dominant ideology in development, women’s increasing role

as economic producers does not universally benefit women. This ideology is known as the Social

Relations of Gender Approach (GAD) and critiques the universality of the WID approach to

development. Unlike the WID approach, GAD takes into account the influences of regional

patriarchies, sexuality, intersectionality and the possibility of agency.

A woman’s experience within or exclusion from the agricultural sector is largely dependent upon

regional patriarchies. Patriarchal societies are societies in which social institutions influence

practices and behaviors that are unequal and based upon gender hegemonies, or gender

ideologies that reinforce the subordination of women (Kabeer 48). These social institutions

(sates, markets, civil society, family/kinship) translate into practices and social norms by

providing a predictability and structure to everyday life (48). Institutions govern almost all

aspects of a women’s life including their social role/meaning in society, their ability to

participate in the economy and the division of labor. The degree of inequality of patriarchal

societies differs across regions and over time. In addition the GAD approach takes into account

intersectionality which demonstrates that gender is not solely based upon sexed difference but

intersects with other inequalities such as those relating to class and race (“Intersectionality” 1).

In this way, one cannot group the entirety of the female population into one homogeneous

category (Mohanty 63). The social norms that are translated into society from social institutions

vary considerably and consequently and each woman should be considered in development

policy depending on the specific social/historical context at a specific time.

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Land Rights

While the WID approach would argue that land rights are good for equity, welfare and

empowerment, I would argue that while land rights are very important, they are not a universal

answer to women’s improvement in economic well being, social status and empowerment (Jackson

453). As I stated earlier, men and women differ in their response to modernization and what is good

for men is not necessarily completely good for women. While it is possible that land ownership can

make a notable difference to women’s bargaining power within the home and community, it is not

necessarily inevitable. In fact, land rights may not be in the best interest for some women. While

many women may not get their full due of access to resources, they are not necessarily advantaged

by a marriage to a wealthy man or have no interest in their husband’s level of wealth/land ownership.

In fact, many women stand to gain from their husband’s role as a provider and do not wish for this

standard to be challenged. In this way, the interests of women and men within a marriage are both

joint and separate creating gender struggles very complex (473). Changing household arrangements

and gender cultures is a long-term process that is not immediately resolved through government

policies and projects.

With this new perspective, the case study in Oaxaca Mexico can be re-analyzed to

understand that the increased access of women to land ownership is not a sole solution to the

gender inequalities of ejidos. Despite women’s increased participation in the fields, women in

ejidos remain excluded in management decisions and are increasingly alienated from their labor

and community as producers. Jennifer Brown from the Rural Development Institute describes

her experience in two of the mountainous communities in Oaxaca that prohibit women from

attending assembly meetings.

“During our visit to one comunidade the male comunidade members were very upset that five or six women attended an assembly meeting in place of their husbands. They tried to force the women to leave but the Agrarian Visitor eventually convinced them to allow the women to stay” (Brown 14)

Van Houten 21

In this way, the inclusion of women in the Agrarian Law will not substantially elevate their

status within society, as there is a crucial difference between formal equity of men and women

before the law and a real equity between them. Collins argues

“'collective land rights do not necessarily guarantee all members of a community secure access to or control of land. Rather, how collective land is distributed, the rules through which it is allocated to families and to the men and women within them, and who participates in determining these rules, are governed by traditional customs and practices, which often discriminates against the women” (Zoomers 2) In this way, bargaining positions and material outcomes are not determined solely by asset

acquisition. Resources such as norms, ideas, values, and words are resources that can imbue

power just as much if not more so than means of production or land ownership (Jackson 475). It

is the extent to which a woman can secure a cultural interpretation of her ownership as legitimate

and appropriate that will determine her potential for strengthening her position within the

household and community (475). As a result, the increased inclusion of women in agriculture is not

enough to alter the inferior status of women in ejido society in Oaxaca. Even when women are

granted access to land markets they are still constrained by the disadvantages imposed from regional

patriarchies.

In addition to land rights, work conditions in high-value agricultural exports are strongly

influenced by gender relations and the potential for female empowerment and improved status is

limited by the gender segregation of wage employment. In many cases in Latin America there is

a “gendering” of workers, which demonstrates that even though women are working in a field,

they are still constrained to the social constructions of femininity. There is a strong gender

segregation of tasks in the fields, processing plants, and packing plants. Women usually are assigned

to do the labor-intensive tasks while men do those tasks that entail strength or involve machinery

(Lastarria 1). In addition, women’s wages are generally lower than men’s due to the fact that many

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employers view a woman’s work as secondary or temporary. Also, men predominate in the limited

number of permanent positions and in supervision and management (1). In this way, social

institutions such as agribusiness firms are able to use gender ideologies to reinforce existing

forms of gender subordination.

Another shortcoming of the WID approach is the failure to incorporate the notion of

sexuality and reproductive work into the analysis of women in development. Under WID, all

women are treated as producers or productive agents equally as effective as men. However, in

addition to their role as producers, women must also manage reproductive work. In addition to

the biological reproduction of labor and gendered persons in the family, women must also

manage social reproduction or “the reproduction of the relations between labor and capital that

allow for the extended accumulation of capital” (Ramamurthy 400). In this way, while women

have increased their work time in agricultural production, there has been little change in the gender

division of labor within the household with regard to reproductive work: men are not assuming

reproductive and domestic tasks, even as women are increasing their participation in on-farm and off-

farm productive activities (Lastarria 12). As a result, women’s increased contribution to cash income

in smallholder households does not necessarily alter the gender division of labor. In many cases in

Latin America, women’s work on cash crops increases their overall work burden since they are still

responsible for domestic chores and reproductive work (12). It is important to acknowledge in

development policy that reproductive/domestic work is unpaid and women’s labor time is not

infinitely elastic. In this way agrarian institutions, with their embedded gender norms, demonstrate

how female labor may be allocated between sectors in a skewed and inefficient manner because the

various constraints arising from the gender division of labor (Razavi 6). Policy makers must realize

that biology is socially significant as the prejudices and preconceptions about women and their

labor persist in society in spite of the forces of modernization (Kabeer Reversed Realities 19).

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One example of the impact of gender relations and sexuality is the non-participation of

female principle farmers from commercial production. As stated earlier, many women in Mexico

and Latin America are forced to convert production on their farms to consumption due to the

social norm dictating the woman as the provider of food. This added responsibility severely

limits a woman’s ability to compete in the labor market and cannot be solved solely by

modernization programs such as training and technology. Conversely, as more smallholder land

is being dedicated to cash crops, such as vegetables in Mexico, many women are losing the land

allocated to them by their husbands where they traditionally grew food crops for subsistence

consumption or sale (Lastarria 14). It is important to note that “gender equality is not simply a

matter of equal numbers of men and women in employment but rather the degree to which their work

contributes to women’s well-being and empowerment” (12). In this way, development must move

beyond the WID focus of formal equality with men as the blind incorporation of women in

development policy does not have universally positive effects (Kabeer Reversed Realities 224)

Agency

In addition, the GAD approach to development recognizes that women’s role in

agriculture is not static and inflexible but can change over time and space. In this way, the

“modernization” of developing societies can have both positive and negative effects depending

upon specific regional/individual constraints such as regional patriarchies and intersectionality.

Despite many negative consequences, participation in the agro-export labor force has not

unambiguously disadvantaged women. The inclusion of women into the labor market can foster

the possibility a positive redefinition of gender identity and what it means to be a woman and a

worker based upon alternative versions of gender roles and expectations (Kabeer Reversed

Realities 67). Within the contradictions proposed by capitalism and patriarchy, women can be

seen as “active agents in the interaction between capital accumulation and the traditional forms

Van Houten 24

of gender identities” (Pearson 180). Even the idea of women as agricultural producers has begun

to recompose the traditional forms of gender subordination by changing the notion of femininity

or what is considered “acceptable” woman’s work. In many ways, women have improved their

status in society and reduced existing forms of gender subordination. For example, in relation to

land rights, patterns of change have emerged in which women have used the contradictory nature

of patriarchy to their advantage. It is observed that women can and do displace patriarchal

control of property when opportunities and subjectivities coincide and often “the benefits of wage

employment for women include economic independence, mobility, and increased ability to make

their own decisions” (Lastarria 12). In addition, women working in the non- traditional agricultural

export industry often earn more than women in other rural occupations (12) In this way, there is a

sense of power that comes with the ability to make money for yourself or your family and obtain

an increased voice within the home.

However, the newfound involvement of women in smallholder agriculture presents

contradictory possibilities in that while women are empowered to assert independence by

entering the labor force, they are still in many ways marginalized and confined to the restrictions

of patriarchy. While in some cases increased participation in commercial agriculture may increase a

woman’s self-esteem, self-confidence, and decision-making power in the household, it does not in all

cases. For example, a study in Guatemala indicated that a woman’s increased economic

independence and mobility often contributes to increased conflict and domestic violence in the home

(Lastarria 12). Also, women must deal with the reality of male-controlled income in that even though

they may be the primary income provider, the man still in many cases has control over the allocation

of resources. In this way, women continue to be subordinated despite increased access to markets.

In other words, they are not equal producers as they are only “free” to enter the labor market as

long as they continue to uphold their standard roles in society. Contract farming schemes and

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other forms of commercial agriculture are exploitative of smallholder farmers but especially of

women in that they are constrained by the market in addition to patriarchy. Contract farming

then, results in “unfree” labor, as many women are vulnerable to the manipulation of large firms

and patriarchal institutions. Markets alone do not guarantee equality, justice, or empowerment

for those who are marginalized and subordinated; it is the social forces that shape these markets

that must be examined in order to enact long-term change (Razavi 15)

WID and Discursive Colonization

In general, increasing the trend of commercial firms contracting with smallholders is a positive

improvement however, the blind inclusion of women in commercial agriculture such as contract

farming may have negative effects. Many of the dominant neo-liberal development institutions

do not acknowledge the influence of regional patriarchies and that the subjugation of women

varies due to different social institutions/cultural norms. This Western feminist literature assumes

“women” are the same everywhere in the third world and as such form a coherent homogeneous

group (Mohanty 70). This in turn provides “proof” that women in the third world are connected

universally and cross-culturally by shared oppression despite differences of race, class, or

ethnicity. In this way, universal images of “women” as an ideological “other” are created based

on stereotyping discourses regardless of material reality (74). This framework is called

discursive colonization in that the West’s colonial legacy has influenced the production of

knowledge and seeped into the ideological realm of development thought (75).

In western feminism, the colonial discourse demonstrates that the difference between first

and third world women is constructed upon binary terms creating a hierarchy and a notion of the

western woman as privileged and modern and the average third world woman as underdeveloped

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and victimized. For example, the first sentences of the WDR in 2008 depicted this universal

image of the “third world woman.”

“An African woman bent under the sun, weeding sorghum in an arid field with a hoe, a child strapped on her back—a vivid image of rural poverty. For her large family and millions like her, the meager bounty of subsistence farming is the only chance to survive” (WDR 1). The problem with this analytic strategy of development is that it assumes women are already

constituted as sexual-political subjects prior to their entry into the arena of social relations and

does not consider the influences of local historical, material, and cultural contexts (Mohanty 59).

In this way, women are invariably powerless to protest their victimization as this “powerless-

ness is an effect of the analysis” (64). By categorizing women as victims, sexual difference

becomes interchangeable with female subordination and power is automatically defined in binary

terms: oppressed and oppressors (64). This perspective is historically reductive as it serves to

reinforce existing binary divisions between men and women. In addition, the idea that women’s

oppression is universal and cross-cultural denies degree and meaning for women in specific

contexts and therefore denies room for subversion (65). In other words, western feminism does

not take into account the possibility of agency and mobilization that is found when accounting

for differences in women of different social classes and cultures. It is through the contradictions

inherent in women’s location within various structures that women are able to assert “choice”

and the freedom to act (Mohanty 65). In this way, women are not mere victims of the production

process, but rather are capable of resisting and challenging oppression in varying degrees and

levels. Discursive colonization suppresses heterogeneities in women’s lives in the 3rd world and

this western philosophy is overly simplistic, negative, limited in scope, and often racist and is

therefore ineffectual in designing development strategies to combat oppression (73).

Van Houten 27

Rather than adhering to the restrictions of western feminism, one must deconstruct the

effects of discursive colonization and acknowledge the diversity/divergence of development

discourses. Gendered access to assets and resources can have a significant effect on women’s

bargaining position within the household and control over land and income is important in

determining the status of women in society however, women and gender relations are constantly

shifting. Often the division of labor is not clear as men and women negotiate access to and control

over income, assets, labor, and other productive resources (Lastarria 18). The role of women in

development is in constant flux and an alternative development approach should merely

acknowledge the importance of this ambiguity in development policy.

Conclusion

The agriculture sector holds the key in developing methods of generating income and

reducing poverty. However, using agriculture as the basis for economic growth requires a

productivity revolution in smallholder farming (WDR 1). The World Development Report offers

practical, gender inclusive ways to create smallholder farming more productive and sustainable.

It is argued that development policies must improve price incentives for firms to increase the

quantity and quality of contracting with smallholder farmers, stabilize product markets, improve

access to credit and reduce exposure of uninsured risks and promote innovation through science

and technology (WDR 10). Where women constitute the majority of smallholders, it is critical to

release their full potential in agriculture and include them in land reform. In this way,

development policy should reduce inequalities in land distribution, increase efficiency and be

organized in ways that recognize women’s rights (WDR 9).

However, while these policies incorporate the role of women in agriculture, they do not

address regional patriarchies, intersectionality, and other additional constraints to female

productivity. Instead, most dominant development institutions follow comprehensive plans to

Van Houten 28

end global poverty and subscribe to the hubristic mentality that outside economic experts can

transform developing societies and change the world. In their efforts to reform “underdeveloped

societies”, these institutions disregard the complexity of socio-economic systems in poor

countries. Rather than taking into account the cultural, social and political difference between

poor nations, they quantify them all into a set of reforms based upon numerical targets that are

not necessarily compatible with all countries, peoples, and genders. In this way, these aid

agencies function as ineffective bureaucracies in that they are not directly accountable for their

actions. Without a well-working feedback system, aid agency bureaucracies are usually

unsuccessful in creating long-term change in developing countries. (Easterly). A more specific

and targeted approach that would ensure real, measured results starts with a “bottom-up”

approach to development.

Grassroots Empowerment

As women take on greater responsibility for agricultural production, they face different

constraints and obstacles than of men. However, the WID approach of merely increasing

women’s access to productive resources, agricultural support services, health, education and

training is not enough to permanently alter women’s position within the household. These

policies are superficial and often reinforce existing forms of gender subordination. Alternative

approaches to development must be implemented that focus on explicit tasks and demands that

are attuned to specific social/cultural contexts and acknowledge the influence of complex

gendered institutions and social norms unique to each region. These alternative development

strategies have evolved out of grassroots experience and are based on “close, face-to-face

interaction between organizations and their constituencies so that ideas and policies are shaped in

the crucible of everyday practice rather than in the upper echelons of remote and rule-bound

Van Houten 29

bureaucracies” (Kabeer Reversed Realities 223). They formulate policies based upon calculated,

experiential research and analysis and as a result, agencies that incorporate grassroots strategies

are accountable for their successes and failures and have the means to enact real, tangible

change. Rather than women seen as universal victims of oppression, these agencies consider

women to be competent yet socially constrained actors who are capable of making choices,

articulating priorities and taking responsibility (235). These “participatory methodologies”

provide a space for women’s voices to be heard and promote “empowerment from within” (245).

Additionally, female empowerment strategies must stress the notion of the “collective” as a

means to mobilize for change. Solidarity and alliances enable the disempowered to act in their

own practical and strategic interests as a collective group (256). In this way, this bottom-up

approach recognizes that power is institutionalized and works to alter the underlying structures

or the source of inequality not merely the symptoms.

Van Houten 30

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