CONTINENTAL SOLDIER

Was the Continental Army a reflection ofAmerican Patriot society?

Viewpoint: Yes. The American Revolution was a people's war, and the Conti-nental Army represented a cross section of society where social rank did notdetermine military service. The typical Continental served for a long period oftime and fought for republican ideals.

Viewpoint: No. Continental recruits were the dregs of society, who joined thearmy for economic self-interest. Recruits were frequently insubordinate anddeserted in large numbers.

There are two popular images of the American colonists' response to theRevolutionary War (1775-1783). One is of men from all walks of life rushingto bear arms to defend their rights and property against British tyranny; theother is of half-starved and frozen men deserting George Washington's armyduring the bitter winter of 1777-1778. Both pictures of the Continental soldier,the "regulars" of the army, have elements of truth to them. Many men volun-teered for soldiering out of a sense of duty and patriotism. Others, particularlythe impoverished, volunteered for more self-serving reasons: as a meansto secure cash and land or as a way to escape from debt, servitude, andjail. Still, many Continental troops found military life intolerable. Like mosteighteenth-century soldiers, the men in Washington's army suffered from alack of food, clothing, shelter, and regular pay and amply experienced bore-dom and disease—which led to frequent desertions and even a few mutinies.Indeed, one of the greatest problems the commander in chief confronted afterthe rage militaire subsided was sustaining troop numbers. At times, Washing-ton had fewer than five thousand soldiers fit for duty.

Washington's incessant problems maintaining adequate troop levelsraise some important issues regarding the character of the Continental sol-dier and, concomitantly, that of American society. One trait that Patriot lead-ers constantly exhorted people to exhibit was public virtue, which they viewedas essential if America were to achieve independence from Great Britain. Thevirtuous citizen-soldier was considered perhaps the most important ingredientin the recipe for victory. Yet, Washington had few opportunities to launch amajor offensive against the British because he lacked adequate troops; onlywith foreign aid was the United States finally able to defeat Great Britain.Given this fact, were Americans of the revolutionary generation motivated bypublic virtue or self-interest? Did those men who joined the fight do so forrepublican principles or for selfish reasons?

85

Viewpoint:Yes. The American Revolution was apeople's war, and the ContinentalArmy represented a cross section ofsociety where social rank did notdetermine military service. Thetypical Continental served for a longperiod of time and fought forrepublican ideals.

The character, service, and motives of theContinental soldier have been debated since thetime of the Revolutionary War (1775-1783). Gen-erally celebrated throughout the nineteenth cen-tury as a patriotic model of virtue and self-sacrificefor the common good, the reputation of the"embattled farmer" has come under fire in thetwentieth century. Early-twentieth-century Pro-gressive historians argued that the revolutionarieswere driven by self-interest and that class conflictwas a central feature of the Revolution. FollowingWorld War II (1939-1945) the majority of histori-ans rejected the Progressives' materialist thesis.Historians of the Cold War era, such as LouisHartz, found in America's revolutionaries stalwartdefenders of the liberal traditions of democracyand freedom. In the 1960s, following the lead ofBernard Bailyn, a flood of research confirmed thatrevolutionary-era Americans were indeed informedby republican ideologies and were motivated tofight for independence by their fears of British tyr-anny. By the 1970s, however, amid the cynicism ofthe Vietnam War era (ended 1975), historiansincluding John Shy, Edward Papenfuse, and Greg-ory Stiverson produced a series of influential stud-ies that once again deromanticized the image ofthe embattled farmer. A revisionist thesis emergedthat claimed that America's revolutionary soldierswere drawn largely from the "dregs of society"—the young, the poor, and the socially marginal.The implication of this conclusion was that colo-nial troops were driven by self-interest rather thanprinciple and that the American soldier differed lit-tle from his European counterpart.

However, both characterizations are too sim-plistic. Neither the icons of virtue portrayed in the1950s nor the social outcasts described in the1970s satisfactorily depict the complexity of char-acteristics and motivations of America's revolu-tionary soldiers. First, logic insists that a practicaldefinition of the "Continental soldier" include allcombatants who fought the British. Many Ameri-can soldiers were in battle well prior to the organi-zation of a Continental Army, and they oftenserved independently of the national army. Forexample, the battle of Bunker Hill (17 June 1775)was fought more than a year before the Continen-tal Army was established. Second, the Continental

Army was only one part of a three-pronged mili-tary establishment. Brigadier General HenryKnox, later secretary of war in the Washingtonadministration, delineated three types of Revolu-tionary units: Continental troops paid directly byCongress, state soldiers attached to the nationalarmy, and local militiamen. These types had spe-cialized roles, but the three tiers of service, thoughinstitutionally distinct, were in fact mutuallydependent, fully interactive, and most often coop-erative. Whenever any of these units served oncampaigns under orders of the Continental Con-gress, the soldiers referred to such service as "Con-tinental." Militiamen and state recruits performedContinental service prominently at the defense ofCharles Town (28 June 1776) and during the bat-tles of Bennington (16 August 1777), Freeman'sFarm (19 September 1777), Bemis Heights (7October 1777), King's Mountain (7 October1780), Cowpens (17 January 1781), and EutawSprings (8 September 1781).

State regiments were sometimes attached toContinental service, and at other times they oper-ated independently. Examples of independentactions include the state troops who conductedthe Canadian campaign in the fall of 1775 andthose who attempted the amphibious assault onthe British stronghold on the Penobscot Rivernear present-day Castine, Maine, in 1779. Statelines, with rotating personnel, were also attachedpermanently to Continental armies. Militias, too,were integral to the ultimate success of thenational army. Militiamen controlled the coun-tryside, put down Loyalist uprisings, defendedthe frontiers, harassed British foraging parties,provided intelligence, and fought coastal raiders.Institutionally, militia formations provided intro-ductory training for a manpower pool to sustainthe state lines and Continental troops. Theymoved supplies, held posts, and performed guardduties. Multiple enlistments further blur institu-tional affiliations as many individuals enlistedrepeatedly and accumulated long service, some-times in different units. It is not unusual to dis-cover an individual who served a year in the stateline, then responded to brief call-ups of the localmilitia, only to sign on later directly with thenational army.

The distinction between regular and militiaservice was therefore blurred. Evidence from everytheater of operations shows clearly that thoughtheir roles varied, the militia, state lines, and Conti-nental Army were equally critical in supplying sol-diers and indeed were thoroughly intertwined.Therefore, to assess the characteristics of the Conti-nental soldier requires that one cast a wide net thatembraces all of America's revolutionary soldiers.

The American Revolution was a differentkind of war than those conducted between Euro-pean dynastic states. American soldiers fought ini-

86 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

tially to defend their rights as Englishmen, andlater their human rights, which they believed couldonly be achieved through political independence.General George Washington frequently remindedhis soldiers that they were free citizens fighting todefend their country and not like members ofEuropean professional armies who fought to fur-ther royal ambitions. American soldiers were notforced conscripts; they understood the issues atstake and willingly joined the military. Few Ameri-cans aspired to become professional soldiers.Instead, Americans insisted on their individualityand intended to return to civilian life as soon as theUnited States achieved its independence. WhenWashington assigned German-born inspector gen-eral and drillmaster Baron Frederich von Steubenthe task of training American soldiers, Steuben dis-covered the independent attitudes particular toAmerican soldiers. In a letter to an old Europeancomrade, Steuben observed:

In the first place, the genius of this nation is notthe least to be compared to that of the Prus-sians, Austrians or French. You say to your sol-dier, "Do this, and he doeth it,"; but I amobliged to say, "This is the reason why youought to do that, and then he does it."

Another distinguishing characteristic of Amer-ican soldiers was derived from colonial militia tradi-tions of voluntary and universal service amongproperty holders. The colonial militiaman was atemporary citizen-soldier who usually served lim-ited terms on specific campaigns. Because of thosetraditions the Continental Congress was loath toask for more than a single-year enlistment untilfinally persuaded by Washington in 1777 of thenecessity for three-year enlistments. In comparison,the standard European military enlistment was tenyears or longer, and these soldiers were a profes-sional class set apart from the civilian community.

The practice of electing officers was yetanother peculiarly colonial tradition that shapedthe American army. The rank and file in militiacompanies traditionally elected their officers. Thispractice continued into the Revolution, leading thehistorian Alfred Young to characterize the Ameri-cans as a democratic soldiery. European officerranks, in contrast, were generally reserved to thearistocracy. To fill the rank and file, Europeanstates tapped the bottom strata of society for thearmy rather than divert manpower from economicproduction. European armies, according to DaveRichard Palmer in The Way of the Fox: American

HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 87

Strategy in the War for America, 1775-1783 (1975),represented only the "steeple and the mudsill" ofsociety. In America there was neither hereditaryaristocracy at the top nor widespread poverty at thebottom. In New England, which provided thelargest number of recruits to the war, small-property-owning farmers dominated the popu-lace. As a result, unlike in the British Army, therewas often little social distance between the rankand file and their officers in the American armies.Knox provides a case in point. A humble booksellerprior to the Revolution, he rose to a general's rankby virtue of his self-taught knowledge of artillery.The roughly egalitarian society of colonial Americacontributed to the formation of a popular army.

To what extent were American soldiers repre-sentative of their communities in social and eco-nomic terms? On the one hand, Merrill Jensen inThe New Nation: A History of the United States dur-ing the Confederation, 1781-1789 (1950) concludedthat "most of the common soldiers were freeAmericans: farmers and their sons and the inde-pendent mechanics and artisans of the towns." Onthe other end of the spectrum is the argument thatrespectable citizens avoided long-term service, andthe common soldiers who filled the ranks werepoor, young, indentured servants or otherwiseindividuals from the bottom tier of society.

Several recent studies shed some light on thiscontroversy. William Arthur Bailer's socioeco-nomic study of revolutionary soldiers in Marble-head, Massachusetts, indicates that they represented across section of the community. A study of revolu-tionary Peterborough, New Hampshire, by JohnResch reveals broad-based participation in wartimeservice in that community. Nearly two-thirds ofPeterborough's adult men, representing the entiresocial spectrum, went into active service at sometime. Resch concludes that most of these soldierswere the sons of established farmers and home-steaders who were vested in the community's poli-tics and economic structure. Walter L. Sargent'sstudy of Plymouth soldiers offers similar findings.More than one-half of the 693 soldiers he analyzedhad a stake in the community and belonged to afamily on an economic par with state averages forpropertied persons. Records of military serviceindicate that Plymouth consistently sent recruitsinto the American armies, with service levels peak-ing during the critical years from 1777 through1779. Direct enrollments into the ContinentalArmy accounted for about one-third of Plymouthenlistments. Not surprisingly, the data reveals apattern of surges of militia and state enlistmentswhenever British forces posed an immediate threatto the region. In all three of these empirical studiesthe results indicate that military service was borneby a reasonably representative cross section of thecommunities. The overwhelming majority of sol-diers from New England communities came pre-dominantly from among the 90 percent of

American families who farmed, practiced a trade,or fished for a living.

Did the typical soldier enlist for personalgain or for republican ideals? Certainly every indi-vidual weighed the importance of wages andbounties alongside personal ideals. Military ser-vice offered prospects for material gain throughenlistment bounties of cash or land grants. Thepromise of adventure and glory attracted somemen. Others viewed military service as an oppor-tunity to gain social prestige by achieving anofficer's rank. Then, too, many soldiers' journalsnote resentment of British encroachments onlocal self-rule through taxes and regulations. Oncehostilities began, many men felt bound to defendtheir families, farms, and communities. Personalchoices were also affected by family and commu-nity concerns. Brothers enlisted together; fathersserved with sons. Communities drew lots to meetquotas. The strategies for providing soldiers wereas varied as the circumstances.

While one can never know precisely why menserved, Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski in Forthe Common Defense: A Military History of theUnited States of America (1994) argue that therewere so many ways to avoid service that few whoserved were actually coerced. Bounties alone hadlimited effect in America because it was not diffi-cult to make money or acquire land. In fact, boun-ties did not convince most men to enlist; rather,incentives probably reinforced ideological commit-ments to liberty. One sees proof in the fact thatmany men continued to serve under the most diffi-cult circumstances. A Hessian captain wondered:

With what soldiers in the world could one dowhat was done by these men, who go aboutnearly naked and in the greatest privation?Deny the best disciplined soldiers of Europewhat is due them and they will run away indroves, and the general will soon be alone. Butfrom this one can perceive what an enthusi-asm—which these poor fellows call 'Liberty'—can do!

The American tradition of volunteerismmeant that every call for reenlistment or newrecruits amounted to a referendum of popular sup-port for the war. That the American people sus-tained resistance for more than eight years, despiteshort-term service in earlier colonial wars and localautonomy, suggests the depth and breadth of pop-ular support. As late as 1781 Washington's armyboasted as much manpower as it had ever fielded.In all, approximately 231,771 soldiers served inthe Continental Army throughout the war (incomparison to an estimated 145,000 in the variousstate militias). The precision of those statistics maybe challenged, but the magnitude is quite certain:approximately one out of every two adult whitemen served at one time or another. The aggregatemilitary efforts of Americans led historian

88 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

Edmund S. Morgan in The Birth of the Republic.,1763-89 (1977) to declare that the Revolution ulti-mately was "a people's war."

In conclusion, American soldiers in the Con-tinental Line were a varied lot. Some came frommilitias or state lines to serve only briefly inanswer to emergency calls, such as at Saratoga orKing's Mountain, while others served for theduration of the struggle. However, the socio-economic structure and political autonomy ofcolonial society, combined with its militia tradi-tion, meant that the American revolutionarysoldier was not like his European counterpart.The American military system was multifaceted,and the variety of service venues afforded a flex-ibility that successfully accommodated tradi-tions of volunteerism. Furthermore, recentregional studies suggest that soldiers of NewEngland, a major contributor of revolutionarytroops, were largely representative of their soci-ety. Finally, evidence also suggests that individ-ual self-interest was not the sole determinativeof the willingness to serve—many American sol-diers fought for their communities and theirliberties, answering the call to arms throughouta long, hard conflict.

-WALTER L. SARGENT,UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

Viewpoint:No. Continental recruits were thedregs of society, who joined thearmy for economic self-interest.Recruits were frequentlyinsubordinate and desertedin large numbers.

Contrary to popular belief, the ContinentalArmy was not filled with republican-minded yeo-man farmers and artisans. Many middle- andupper-class men skirted their enlistments by payingsubstitutes to fight in their place during the Revo-lutionary War (1775-1783). The majority of therank and file in the Continental Line were youngand poor; they joined primarily for economic rea-sons, not out of any sense of patriotism.

Admittedly, men of all social classes joinedthe military during the initial rush of enthusiasmand patriotic fervor in 1775. After their enlist-ments expired, however, most returned home.For some of these early enlistees, the novelty ofwar had worn off. Moreover, they believed thatthey had contributed their fair share of service tothe war effort and that it was time for others todo the same. Harsh discipline meted out byofficers and the threat of contracting diseases

rampant in the camps discouraged others fromreenlisting. Men with families had prioritiesawaiting them at home. In short, soldiering wasno longer their main concern.

As for yeoman farmers and urban craftsmen,there are several specific reasons why they shunnedarmy service. Many were reluctant to leave lucrativeprofessions to serve for the low pay and high risksof the military. Others joined state militias, wherethey often received higher bounties than thoseoffered by the Continental Congress. Some ofthese men served as privateers with the hope ofmaking a fortune in prize money.

For these reasons, recruiting officials had toaccept almost anyone willing to join, even the"dregs of society." A study of the Virginia Conti-nental Line revealed that 90 percent of the sol-diers were under the age of twenty-five, with themedian age of recruits being twenty; about 3 per-cent were in their early teens. Most of these indi-viduals had no property, marketable skills, oreducation. Regimental officers frequently signedup indentured servants, debtors, vagrants, thementally ill, and midgets, although Congressbanned these types of recruits. Some Hessiandeserters were given promises of land at the endof the war in exchange for enlisting in the Conti-nental Army. Local officials also gave convicts andprisoners of war the option of incarceration andexecution or joining the army; not surprisingly,many volunteered for service.

Patriot leaders also offered slaves the choiceof joining the army and receiving their freedomafter the war. In all, about five thousand blacksenlisted in American forces. All states, exceptSouth Carolina and Georgia, both of which hadlarge slave populations, allowed free blacks to jointhe Continental Army. Officials quickly saw theadvantages of recruiting African Americans, whogenerally enlisted for the duration of the war, and,because they were former slaves, were not as likelyto desert and return home. Yet, these wartimeopportunities for black men were the result of thedesperate need for soldiers and did not reflect anykind of commitment on the part of whites toracial equality. Many black troops served as substi-tutes for wealthier whites who were unwilling torisk their lives to defend their country. Indeed, sla-very ended in some Northern states during theRevolution because so many slaves there wereemancipated to help fill enlistment quotas. Themass of poor and uneducated white recruits werelured into the Continental Army by the promiseof land and cash bounties. In 1776 Congressoffered $20, one hundred acres of land, and a $20yearly clothing allowance as bounties for enlist-ment. Still, these incentives were not enough toentice men to perform their civic duty and fightfor their country. In 1779 Congress, desperate forrecruits, raised the cash bounty to $200. States

HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 89

also provided bounties for Continental enlisteesand militiamen, with amounts often surpassingCongress's offer. Sensing that they could make agreat deal of money, some opportunists enlistedin one regiment, collected the hefty bounty, andthen at the first possible chance deserted, where-upon they enlisted in another unit and claimedthe bounty. They would then repeat the processmany times over. A few of these "bounty jumpers"also had a fondness for stealing from the army andplundering private homes, thereafter selling thestolen goods.

Motivated by such self-serving reasons, it isno surprise that many of the recruits whoremained in the army caused problems for mili-tary officials. Too many lacked any sense of disci-pline, took orders only when they felt like it, andcame and went from camp at their leisure. Many

also had little understanding of camp sanitationand did little to keep themselves and their sur-roundings clean. Some also neglected to bringtheir own equipment (musket, cartridge box, can-teen, haversack, blanket, and so forth) when theyjoined the ranks, which worsened an alreadysevere supply problem for the Army.

Even more troublesome was the high deser-tion rate among the rank and file. At least 15 per-cent of troops in the Continental Army desertedfor a variety of reasons: lack of regular pay, inade-quate shelter and food, fear of contracting disease,and the need to return home for planting and har-vesting. They often deserted when leaders neededthem most-on the eve of a battle-and this ram-pant problem forced General George Washingtonto alter his military strategy frequently. Rarely didhe have more than ten thousand troops at his dis-

90 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

Men's Names

Abraham DefreestBenjamin GoodalesHendrick CarmanNathaniel ReedJacob CrolrinJames WhiteJoseph BattinaJohn WyattJacob ReyningPatrick KannelyJohn RussellPatrick McCueJames J. AtksonWilliam BurkeWilliam MillerEphraim H. BiancherdFrancis AcklinWilliam OrrThomas WelchPeter GasperMartinis ReesHenck AbieDaniel SpinniePatrick KellyRichard James BarkerJohn Patrick CronkiteWilliam Dougherty

Source: Gary Nash and others, The American People: Creating a Nation and a Society (New York'HarperCollins, 1994), p. 193.

Age

222024322925393825362919212342184029312419242123121117

Occupation

Yeomando [ditto]

doCarpenter

doWeaverCoppersmithCarpenterYeomanBarberPenmanTannerWeaverChandlerYeomanYeomanCardwainerCardwainerLabourerLabourerLabourer

dodo

Labourerdo

Place of BirthN. YorkNobletownRynbeckNorwalkGermanyIrelandIrelandMarylandAmsterdamIrelandIrelandIreland

doIrelandScotlandIrelandIrelandIrelandN. YorkN, JerseyFishkillAlbanyPortsmouthIrelandAmerica

Donyal, Ireland

Place of AbodeClaverack

doEast CampWestchesterBeaver DamRynbeckFlorida

AlbanyN. YorkN. YorkSchoharyStillwaterN. YorkCiaverackWhite CreekClaverackAlbanyNorman's KillGreenbushFlattsFlatts

ClaverackRynbeckClaverackSchenectady

SOLDIERS FOR AMERICABelowis a muster roll of Captain John H. Wendell's Company of the First New York Regiment for 1776-1777. tt presents atyptcal pre&fe of the men who composed the rank and file of the Continental Army:

posal. If just one out of twelve men of fighting agehad joined the army and stayed in, Washingtoncould have had a force of thirty thousand soldiers,more than enough to conduct offensive opera-tions. The Virginian wanted to fight a conven-tional war pitting a large American army againstBritish forces; instead, the number of troops avail-able to Washington was so small that he was forcedto implement a defensive strategy of harassment.

Thus, the Continental Army was not com-posed of the best classes of society who were fight-ing for American liberty. In many respects it was arich man's war but a poor man's fight. MostAmericans simply lacked public virtue—boththose who avoided military service and those whoenlisted for self-serving reasons. According toJames Kirby Martin, during the Revolution pub-lic virtue meant letting "others do the sacrificingfrom which they might hope to derive some bene-fit." With a citizenry and army lacking in publicspirit, it is amazing that the United States eventu-ally managed to defeat Great Britain. Without themilitary and financial support from foreignnations to make up for the lack of patriotismamong the "best" American citizens, victoryagainst Great Britain would have been impossible.

-KENDRA DEBANY,CONCORD, NEW HAMPSHIRE

AND-KEITH KRAWCZYNSKI,

AUBURN UNIVERSITY AT MONTGOMERY

References

William Arthur Bailer, "Military Mobilizationduring the American Revolution in Marble-head and Worcester, Massachusetts," disser-tation, Clark University, 1994.

E. Wayne Carp, To Starve the Army at Pleasure:Continental Army Administration and Ameri-can Political Culture, 1775-1783 (ChapelHill: University of North Carolina Press,1984).

Don Higginbotham, War and Society in Revolu-tionary America: The Wider Dimensions ofConflict (Columbia: University of SouthCarolina Press, 1988).

Merrill Jensen, The New Nation: A History of theUnited States during the Confederation, 1781-1789 (New York: Knopf, 1950).

James Kirby Martin, "A Most Undisciplined,Profligate Crew: Protest and Defiance inthe Continental Ranks, 1776-1783," inArms and Independence: The Military Charac-ter of the American Revolution, edited byRonald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert (Char-

lottesville: University Press of Virginia,1984), pp. 119-140.

Martin, "The Myth of Popular Participation inthe Revolutionary War," in Myth and theAmerican Experience, volume 1, edited byNicholas Cords and Patrick Gerster, thirdedition (New York: HarperCollins, 1991),pp. 53-58.

Martin and Mark Edward Lender, A RespectableArmy: The Military Origins of the Republic,1763-1789 (Arlington Heights, 111.: HarlanDavidson, 1982).

Robert Middlekauf, The Glorious Cause: TheAmerican Revolution, 1763-1789 (New York:Oxford University Press, 1982).

Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For theCommon Defense: A Military History of theUnited States of America, revised edition(New York: Free Press, 1994).

Walter Millis, Arms and Men: A Study in Ameri-can Military History (New York: Putnam,1956).

Edmund S. Morgan, The Birth of the Republic,1763-89, revised edition (Chicago: Univer-sity of Chicago Press, 1977).

Dave Richard Palmer, The Way of the Fox: Ameri-can Strategy in the War for America, 1775-1783 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press,1975).

John Resch, Suffering Soldiers: RevolutionaryWar Veterans, Moral Sentiment, and PoliticalCulture in the Early Republic (Amherst: Uni-versity of Massachusetts Press, 1999).

Charles Royster, A Revolutionary People at War:The Continental Army and American Charac-ter, 1775-1783 (Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1979).

Walter L. Sargent, "Plymouth's Soldiers: Family,Status, and Military Service during theAmerican Revolution," presented at theOmohundro Institute of Early AmericanHistory and Culture, Sixth Annual Confer-ence, Toronto, 9-11 June 2000.

John Shy, A People Numerous and Armed: Reflec-tions on the Military Struggle for AmericanIndependence (New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 1976).

Harry M. Ward, The American Revolution:Nationhood Achieved, 1763-1788 (New York:St. Martin's Press, 1995).

Robert K. Wright Jr., The Continental Army(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center ofMilitary History, 1983).

HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 91