continental military thoughts

8/8/2019 Continental Military Thoughts

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COL MSA ALIYU


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INTRODUCTION

An Army....requires a theory of an Army. Whether

stated explicitly or implicitly, there must existsomething in addition to its soldiers, tanks and guns- aconcept, a strategy, a notion of who it is and what itwants to be, of what it is about and what it wants to be

about- a concept which is a source of inspiration and ameans of explaining its actions, if only to itself.


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AIM

The aim of this paper is to examine continentalmilitary thoughts from Napoleonic period to WWI


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SCOPE

y Conceptual clarifications,

y Assumptions underlying military thoughts,y Evolution of strategy

y Some strategists and their works


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CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONSy It is a military activity par excellence in which high-

ranking officers plan the overall conduct of war

y Old concepts and old definitions of strategy havebecome not only obsolete but nonsensical with thedevelopment of nuclear weapons. To aim at winning

war, to take victory as your object, is no more than a

state of lunacy.y Many scholars though theorize that strategy is more

about peace that it is about war


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CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONSy War as science, and war as- art theories

y War is not easily predictable through generalizations

based on the past wars; hence there can be no truescience of war.

y War is no more about science that it is about art, afterall, generalship is a product of 3 characteristics: talent,

science (acquired by study) and art, (acquired byexperience)


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TERMINOLOGIESy Stratagem/Ruse: The word stratagem was derived

from the Greek word stratagem, which initially meant

principles or examples of generalship.It later acquiredthe additional sense of trickery, use of surprise,

deception, and indirect means in war. Ruse is a French word that has acquired the same meaning asstratagem, which has declined in usage. Nowadays,stratagem is a relatively infrequent word, more oftendenoted by ruse, surprise, deception, feint,demonstration or diversion


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TERMINOLOGIES

y War: War derived from were (Anglo Saxon) and

wirr (German); it originally meant confusion of thenormal and peaceful order. Contemporary literatureexplains war as armed hostilities between 2 or morestates carried on by their armed forces and regulated

by international law


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TERMINOLOGIESy Levels ofWar: Like war itself there is no universally

accepted terminology for the various forms of war,

although the following usage is fairly widespread.Total War, General war, Limited War andConventional war. It is assumed that these are toobasic for any further explanation


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TERMINOLOGIESy Policy: Policy is the general overall goals and

acceptable procedures that a nation might follow; the

course of action selected from among alternatives inthe light of given conditions. It would normally referto such broad goals as interests and adjectives; strategyto the alternative courses of actions designed toachieve those goals


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TERMINOLOGIESy Strategy: Strategy is understood as the art and science of

planning for the use of, and managing all availableresources in the waging of war by those in high levels of

national and military authorities. It is of 2 forms; nationalstrategy and military strategy.

y National Strategy: is that strategy in its broadest sense, which so integrates the policies and armaments of thenation that resort to war is either rendered unnecessary or

is undertaken with maximum chance of victoryy Military Strategy: Military strategy is strictly concerned

with the employment of military power during peace andin war.


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TERMINOLOGIESy Operational Art: The Germans refers to the lower

level of strategy as operations. Operations can be

considered a separate conceptual level of combat lyingbetween strategy and tactics.

y Military Doctrine: Military doctrine is thecombination of principles, policies, and concepts into

an integrated system for the purpose of governing allcomponents of a military force in combat and assuringconsistent, coordinated employment of thesecomponents


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ASSUMPTIONS

y Realism: Realism in international politics is about

conservative views. The realist conception of humannature and the international society make them seeman as being inherently destructive, selfish,competitive, aggressive, and the international system

one that is anarchic.


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ASSUMPTIONS

y Pacifism/Moral Neutrality: The pacifists concern

themselves with moralizing and about the way statesought to behave. Their position results from arejection in principle to the use of force as aninstrument of national policy


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ASSUMPTIONS

y Pacifism/Moral Neutrality: The pacifists concern

themselves with moralizing and about the way statesought to behave. Their position results from arejection in principle to the use of force as aninstrument of national policy


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ASSUMPTIONS

y Rationality: This assumption is about rational

decision-making. Rationality is about the process ofmeans ends analysis. In the context of strategicanalysis, rational behavior would refer to a behaviourin which the actor either tries to or actually maximizes

his value position


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ASSUMPTIONS

y Cold War: In much the same way that political

realism forms the philosophic backdrop forcontemporary strategic thoughts, so does the cold warpattern of international policies provide the essentialmodel for much strategic speculation


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ASSUMPTIONS

y Peace and Security: Preferences for values are

behind most strategic analysis. Almost withoutexception, strategists share the view that peace andsecurity are desirable goals and they direct theirthoughts towards promoting them


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EVOLUTION OF STRATEGY

y Strategy is the art of theemployment of battles asa means to gain theobjectives of war


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ANCIENTPERIODy War in the ancient time was characterized by thrown

weapons such as javelin and spears amongst others

y

The Age of Renaissance followed, during whichMercantilism developed. Mercantilism was abouttrade and discovery of sources of wealth for the kingsand Emperors. This led to policy formulation on

protection of merchant shipping, slave trade andcolonization


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NAPALEONIC AGE (1769-1821)y From this period we entered

the Napoleonic age when

people were moved by nationalistic zeal followingthe French and the AmericanRevolutions

y

Napoleon showed mastery inorganization, planning andinstitutionalized the conceptof levee en masse


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AMERICANCIVIL WAR (1861-65)y In contrast to Napoleonic era, the American Civil War

was characterized by significant technological

innovation but poor generalship.I

t was an era duringwhich strategy was accentuated by the introduction oflong-range infantry weapons and the growing strategicimportance of material and manpower resources, asexemplified by the victory of the more populous andindustrialized North over the agrarian South.


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WORLD WARIy During World War I (WWI), strategy became topical

because the means and ends were at variance

y

The significant changes in warfare included use oftanks, smokeless gunpowder and emergence of airpower, improved artillery systems, gas warfare,mechanized warfare and the blitzkrieg

y

The Germans sued for peace as they were the first to beexhausted


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SUNTZUy Sun Tzu was a Chinese

general, a pioneer

strategist whose work, theArt of War, remainsevergreen, impacting onthe military and thebusiness world thusinfluencing the course ofhistory


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SUNTZUy Sun Tzus Art of war covers 13 chapters including LayingPlans/Strategic Assessment; Waging War/Doing Battle;Attack by Stratagem/Planning a Siege; Tactical

Dispositions/Formation; Energy/Force; and WeakPoints/Emptiness and fullness and Strong/Armed Struggle

y Others are Manoeuvering/Adaptation; Variation inTactics/Manouevering Army; the Army on theMarch/Terrain; the Nine Situations/Nine Grounds; the

Attack by Fire /On Fire Attack and the Use of Spies/Espionage. Sun Tzus greatest legacy was hisphilosophy that winning without fighting is the acme ofskills


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CLAUSEWITZy Clausewitz started his military career at the age of 12

y His treatise on strategy On War, contained in 8 books

cover 28 chaptersy Clausewitzs work on strategy centres on 12 areas,

which include War and Politics, where he asserts thatWar is nothing but the continuation of politics by

other meansy War being violent act and political act

y People, the Army and the Government as thedeterminants of the outcome of any war


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CLAUSEWITZy On morale elements, he opined that the skill and

experience of the commander, the courage of the

troops, their patriotic spirit and upkeep will engendertheir morale. The eleventh point deals with themilitary virtues, where he emphasizes that cohesion ofthe army, under the most unforeseen situation, is asignificant military virtue that can facilitate success.The last point concerns the roles of Principles whichhe decried as being unnecessary


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SUNTZU ANDCLAUSEWITZy There is no doubt that the works of Sun Tzu and

Clausewitz do have differences yet similarities exist.

y The main point on which they differ concern the value ofintelligence, the utility of deception, feasibility of surpriseattack and the possibility of reliably forecasting andcontrolling events in the battle field

y Sun Tzu prefers to rely chiefly on the master of wars skill inmaking calculated rational choices, while Clausewitzemphasizes the artistic intuition of the military genius


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ALFREDMAHAN (1840 - 1914)y Alfred T Mahan was a

strong American

protagonist of sea powerfor the projection ofcommerce and colonialinfluence

y Wars are won by economic strangulation ofthe enemy from the sea.


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ALFREDMAHAN (1840 - 1914)y Scholars believe that Mahans views were generally

biased, obtuse and apocryphal, yet he left a legacy of

maritime strategy that is remembered today for itsideas of national interest, the moral implications ofmilitary force, the cardinal fulcra of world power, theUS foreign policy and expansion overseas

y The latter is the basis of theDoctrine of global reach ofthe US Navy


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GIULIODOUHET (1869-1930)y Victory smiles upon

those who anticipate the

changes in the characterof war, not upon those who wait to adaptthemselves after thechanges occur


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GIULIODOUHET (1869-1930)y This statement shows that this strategist is an exponent of

air power

y Douhet argued that command of an enemy air space and

subsequent bombing of industrialized centres would be sodisruptive and destructive that the pressure for peacewould be overwhelming

y To us who have until now been inexorably bound to thesurface of the earth, it must seem that the sky, too, is to

become another battlefield no less important than thebattlefields on land and at sea. For if there are nations thatexist that are untouched by the sea, there are none thatexist without the breath of air


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GIULIODOUHET (1869-1930)y Central to his theory was the premise that air

supremacy alone could win a war regardless of those

armies on land or at seay The air arm should be independent of all other

services and receive the lions share of militaryexpenditure

y Douhet did not visualize the advancement intechnology bordering on effective air defence to

counter fighters and bombers


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THEEND

continental military thoughts

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