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ECPR Conference Reykjavik 25-27 august 2011

Panel Multi-level party politics

Contamination or Containment?

Sub-state nationalism in Belgian political parties’

electoral manifestoes (1965-2010)

Dave Sinardet & Niels Morsink

Very first draft, all comments more than welcome!

Dave Sinardet, Free University of Brussels & University of Antwerp,

dave.sinardet@vub.ac.be; dave.sinardet@ua.ac.be

Niels Morsink, University of Antwerp,

niels.morsink@ua.ac.be

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Introduction

The debate on the role of federalism in so-called (culturally) ‘divided’ societies is plagued by an

unresolved paradox (see e.g.: Kymlicka, 1998; Simeon & Conway, 2001; Erk & Lawrence, 2009). On

the one hand, by granting autonomy to sub state collectivities, federalism can be considered as a

technique to regulate and manage conflicts and to temper demands of sub-state nationalist

movements and parties aimed at further disintegration of the state. On the other hand, by granting

such self-rule, federalism can also institutionalize, essentialise and legitimize sub state identities and

thus provide tools to reinforce sub-state nationalist parties and movements’ demands. Obviously,

this question on the ‘effects’ of federalism is difficult to answer as such. Federal systems and the

national contexts in which they are implemented can strongly differ amongst each other and

therefore the presence or absence of other factors can play a crucial role.

While the subject of much theoretical debate, this ‘federal paradox’ has not been the subject of very

much empirical research yet. While there is an extensive strand of literature on sub-state nationalist

parties and while institutional arrangements have been used as an independent variable to explain

the success of these parties (Brancati, 2007), the precise relation between sub-state nationalism and

federalism hasn’t often been explicitly focused on. We want to focus more in detail on the relation

and precise dynamics between federalization and sub-state nationalism which we see as an

important indicator to be able to speak of pacification or aggravation of ethno-regional conflict. If

there is an increase of sub state nationalism, this would indicate that federalism has not lead to

pacification. Such an increase should not only be measured through the rise and electoral success of

sub state nationalist parties, but probably more importantly also through the spread of issue

salience, positions and ideas of sub state nationalist parties, in the first place among other parties.

We will focus in detail on the Belgian case, by analyzing the evolution of sub-state nationalism among

Belgian political parties during the past five decades, during which the Belgian state went from a

unitary to a federal institutional architecture, with a separatist party winning the most recent 2010

federal elections in the northern part of the country. More precisely, we will analyse electoral

manifestoes of all parliamentary represented political parties in Belgium between 1965 and 2010.

This will be done on three dimensions. The first is the salience of community issues(regionalisation,

cultural identity, federal reform, etc). The second is the positions on these issues. The third and most

important dimension is the arguments used by political parties to advocate these positions, so that

we can assess whether besides maybe sharing the same position parties also share the same

rationale behind this position. We will pay particular attention to the evolution of mainstream

parties on these dimensions during the federalisation process. Were sub state nationalist parties able

to make their concerns, positions and visions mainstream? In that case the federalisation process

would not have reduced disintegrative tendencies and we would rather be able to speak of

contamination than containment. Or could it be that (some) sub-state nationalist parties have

become less radical and were co-opted by the others? Can we distinguish key moments and events

that had an influence on this relationship?

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The federal paradox, sub-state nationalism and manifesto research

The literature on the federal paradox in divided societies does not come to a clear conclusion (Maiz,

2003 : 204). Many authors (e.g. Kymlicka, 1998; Gagnon & Karmis, 2001 : 137, 151; Simeon &

Conway, 2001 : 364; Brancati, 2006; Sorens, 2004 : 740) argue that federalism, while it provides

national minorities with a workable alternative to secession, also helps to make secession a more

realistic alternative by reinforcing the belief that the group is able and entitled to exercise full

sovereignty. ) Federalism would not be likely to remove the issue of secession from the political

agenda, but rather to enhance the likeliness of secession, because by institutionalizing ethnic

divisions, it legitimizes the ethnic claim and reinforces the believe of groups that they are ‘separate

peoples with inherent rights of self-government, whose participation in the larger country is

conditional and revocable’ (Kymlicka, 1998 : 140). Other authors have argued however that

federalism can harmonize relations between several ethno-cultural groups in a multinational state,

reducing the desire for separation (O’Leary, 2001; Anderson, 2004) and removing multi-ethnic

tensions from the politics of the centre (Swenden, 2006 : 288).

Of course, the debate on the federal paradox cannot be settled in a general way. Whether federalism

leads to radicalization or moderation of conflicts in divided societies, also depends on other factors,

such as characteristics of the federal system (centripetal vs centrifugal federalism, symmetrical vs

asymmetrical federalism, consociational vs majoritarian, the number of federated entities, etc), the

electoral system, the party system, socio-economical differences, the number of official languages,

etc. (Horowitz, 1985; Reilly, 2004; Brancati, 2007; Keating, 1997; Swenden, 2006; Hechter, 1975).

Before turning to our own contribution to this debate, based on the case for Belgium, we want to put

into question some of the premises in the dominant literature on the federal paradox.

First, it mostly links concepts and theories on federalism with those on ethnic conflict and secession

(Erk & Anderson, 2009). This is often reductionist and less relevant for Western federal systems,

where the question rather poses itself in terms of the development and success of sub-state

nationalism, demands for greater autonomy and outbreak of political crises than of outright

secession. Therefore, connecting the literatures on federalism and (sub-state) nationalism can prove

very fruitful.

The current literature also tends to see federal systems as static, while they – and the context in

which they are situated – can evolve and consequences of federalization can thus also vary in time.

Therefore, analyzing federal systems over a longer time period can introduce more variation and

thus help to better understand which factors play which role. For instance, in Belgium, the recent

introduction of separate regional and federal election dates and the consequent formation of

incongruent coalitions caused at least a temporary strain on the federal system (Sinardet, 2010).

This brings us to another element, which recently received some attention in the general literature

on federalism but has not really been connected to the paradox question: the role of party politics. In

research on federal reform, regions or other sub state collectivities often tend to be looked at as

homogeneous, ‘single actors’, disregarding possible instrumentalisation of sub-state identities by

parties and differences between them (for recent exceptions, see e.g. Sorens, 2009 and Sinardet

2011).

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Also, we think refining the main interrogation of the federal paradox yields more nuanced results: we

should not just look at the direction (moderation or radicalization) but also at the character and

precise evolution of sub-state nationalism. This is why we chose to analyse the federal paradox for

Belgium by focusing on the evolution of sub-state nationalism among political parties during the

federalization process of the past five decades. We thereby pay particular attention to whether sub-

state nationalist and other parties influenced each other. Considered as sub-state nationalist parties

in Belgium are Volksunie/Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (VU/N-VA), Rassemblement Wallon (RW),

Fédéralistes démocratiques Francophones (FDF), Spirit, Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang1.

Salience, positions and arguments in electoral manifestoes

Our study is based on analysis of electoral manifestoes. We are however aware that these do not

reflect the entire character of a political party, not even at election time. During an electoral

campaign a party needs to react to current events, which might result in another distribution of

salience in an electoral campaign than in the electoral manifesto. In addition, it wouldn’t come as a

surprise to see parties or candidates take more extreme positions in electoral propaganda or

televised debates than those written in their electoral manifesto, as these are compromises of

different factions within a party. Nevertheless we believe that electoral manifestoes are the most

comprehensive available expressions of salience, policy preference and reasoning of a political party

(Budge, 1987; Volkens, 2002).

Salience of the decentralisation issue has been the subject of research in the past. When sub-state

nationalist parties win elections, mainstream parties adapt their attributed salience as well as

positions, whereas ‘peripheral’ parties have a more stable degree of attention (Mazzoleni, 2009).

Dandoy (2010), by looking at the influence of electoral performance of sub-state nationalist parties

on attention to territorial reforms, confirms this ‘contamination’ hypothesis. Although Mazzoleni

(2009 : 212) states that, as suggested by salience theory (Budge et al, 1987), ‘high degree of

emphasis on decentralization is related to a positive discourse on decentralizing reforms’, we do not

believe such a correlation between high salience and positive discourse can always be taken for

granted. Moreover, even if we did it wouldn’t give us exact information about the nature of these

party positions. Therefore we believe research on attention to territorial reform is not sufficient to

grasp the full scale of sub-state nationalist positions. In Belgium this also includes references to

institutional reform, negative presentation of the other community, positive presentation of the own

community, references to conflict between communities or interpretation of conflict in community

terms. Changes in party positions have been far less studied than changes in salience. Some authors

have argued that institutional reform will also increase demands for autonomy (Rocher et al, 2001)

and that over time we observe a convergence in support among mainstream parties for political

decentralization in France, Britain, Italy and Spain (Mazzoleni, 2009).

1 We realize that the literature tends to designate Vlaams Belang mostly as an extreme right party, but the

party itself clearly defines itself as (sub state) nationalist. Sub state nationalism was also the main reason the

Vlaams Blok was created, as a radical desertion from the Volksunie, after the latter had compromised with

francophone parties on community issues in the Egmont pact.

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We are not only interested in what position parties take concerningcommunity issues, we are also

interested in the reasoning behind these positions. What type of arguments do parties put forward

to defend institutional reform? Can these be considered as typical sub state nationalist arguments or

do they rather advocate reform from other perspectives? Do we see an influence from sub-state

nationalist parties on other parties or the other way around? And do these arguments change as the

federalization process moves further? Similar to the problems encountered by Mudde (2000) in his

work on electoral manifestoes of the extreme right, we can’t be sure that the party positions

advanced by parties are what they ‘really’ think or whether this use is strategic. However, this is also

true for issue salience and positions. Moreover, even if parties would use (or not use) a number of

arguments for strategic reasons, can in itself be very revealing of evolutions of a party and larger of a

political and societal climate. We divided the arguments into identity-based and functional

arguments, whereby a spread of the proportion of the former can be considered as an indication of

increasing sub-state nationalism. Identity-related arguments include arguments whereby

homogenous, undifferentiated groups with specific collective interests, opinions and identities are at

the origin of the argument to transfer the sovereignty of a competence to this group. This type of

arguments can be considered as typically nationalist in the sense that they ‘primarily emphasise

national uniqueness and intra-national uniformity but largely ignore intra-national differences’

(Wodak et al, 2009 : 4; see also Martin, 1995). Functional arguments, are those who do not entail

such elements, but rather base demands for decentralisation on other types of analysis of

governance and society.

Belgian federalism

Belgium is of particular relevance to the study of federalism and nationalism in general and of the

federal paradox in particular, as since the 1960s the unitary Belgian state has been subject to a

process of devolution that eventually led it to officially become a federal state in 1993. Since 2007, it

has been trying to negotiate a sixth reform, which has so far only resulted in Belgium breaking the

world record of the longest government formation and being in a state of permanent political crisis,

at least since 2010, when the Flemish-nationalist and separatist N-VA became the largest party in the

north of the country.

The institutional landscape that resulted from federal reform is very complex. Two types of

federated entities were created: three territorially based regions (the Flemish, Walloon and Brussels

region) and three language based communities (the Flemish, French-speaking and German-speaking

community). The Flemish and French-speaking community overlap in the Brussels region, that is part

of both communities. The borders of regions and communities have been based on those of the four

language areas, through which language use is officially regulated: only the official language(s) can

be used in administration, education, justice. Since 1963 the borders of these language areas have

been fixed, through a linguistic border line. The system is thus based on territorial unilingualism

(except in the Brussels region). However, some exceptions exist: 16 communes (of which 6 bordering

the Brussels region) with significant linguistic minorities enjoy ‘language facilities’ which grant

inhabitants the right to communicate with the authorities or have primary school organised in

another than the official language (Sinardet 2008b).

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The institutions of federal Belgium are both a product and a pace maker of (political) identity

construction: ‘they created permanent boundaries that gave additional subjective meaning to

cultural markers and / or territory in addition to favouring identity politics’ (Lecours 2001: 63).

Notwithstanding the existence of three regions, three communities and four language areas, the

federal dynamic in Belgium is largely bipolar, based on the two large communities of Dutch-speakers

(approx. 6 million) and French-speakers (approx. 4 million). On the level of federal parliament and

government, a number of consociational devices, obliging power-sharing, were introduced in 1970:

all MPs have to belong to either the Dutch or French language group, a number of ‘special majority

laws’ can only be passed by a majority in both language groups (and an overall majority of two

thirds), an ‘alarm bell procedure’ protects one language group from being dominated by the other,

linguistic parity is guaranteed in the council of ministers (this is the federal government with the

exception of secretaries of state) which also decides in consensus (Deschouwer, 2006; Sinardet,

2010). On the level of the party system, Belgium is also a unique federation, as no national parties of

importance exist, the three traditional parties having split on language basis between 1968 and 1978

and new parties created afterwards (greens, extreme right, …) limiting their action radius to one

language community (Deschouwer, 2009). On the level of the electoral system, for the Senate and

the European Parliament two electoral colleges were created and for the Chamber most electoral

districts do not cross the borders of the regions. This all leads to federal elections being in fact

‘community elections’: ‘community’ parties compete with parties of the same community for

‘community’ voters through ‘community’ campaigns. After election day, however, two ‘community’

election results are put together to form one federal government (Sinardet, 2008).

Although the Belgian system and practice of consociationalism and federalism was supposed to lead,

amongst other objectives, to political pacification between the communities (Deschouwer 2002), the

bipolar institutional characteristics are rather incentives that foster political conflict. Due to the way

the party and electoral system is organized, parties only compete for votes within their own language

community and are therefore not incited to take into account or be accountable to voters of the

other language group. This stimulates taking polarized positions on community issues and also leads

to other issues being framed in a community dimension (cf. De Winter, 1993; Sinardet 2010).

Institutional explanations can therefore largely account for community conflicts being much more

salient among political elites than among the Belgian population (Hooghe 2004). Indeed, public

opinion research shows that community issues generally score among the lowest as vote-

determining issues among Dutch-speaking as well as French-speaking voters (Deschouwer &

Sinardet, 2010). Also the number of separatists remains limited to 9,4 % in the Flemish region and

3,84 % in the Walloon region (Swyngedouw and Rink, 2008; Frognier et al, 2008). Research on ethno-

territorial identity feelings shows a majority of citizens still identifies with Belgium and does not at all

consider Flemish or Walloon / Francophone identity on the one hand, and Belgian identity on the

other to be mutually exclusive (Deschouwer & Sinardet, 2010).

Data and Methods

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As mentioned, our corpus consists of the electoral manifestoes of all parties that got representatives

elected in parliament during national / federal elections from 1965 to 20102. When regional electoral

manifestoes were mixed with or attached to the federal electoral manifesto, these were also coded3.

This totals 150 electoral manifestoes of 16 parties. In the changing ecology we tried to construct a

coherent evolution of political parties. Which parties were considered a successor to each other as

well as the abbreviations used in this paper can be found in annex 1.

Measuring salience, positions and arguments

Electoral manifestoes have been studied before, but mostly quantitatively such as in the

Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge et al., 1987), while we want to combine a more quantitative

aspect (salience of community issues issues) with a qualitative focus such as party positions and

argumentation. The combination of quantitative and qualitative methods allows to discover non-

obvious relations and gives more room for interpretation of the data. Although through a

quantitative method such as corpus linguistics the researcher can establish more ‘objective’ (Baker et

al., 2008) results, it can also lead to misinterpretation. An illustrative example is the case of Freake et

al (2011) who measured discursive construction in Québec and noticed that the computer program

‘wordsmith’ misinterpreted references to ‘our nation’ from a first-nation inhabitant as references to

Québec.

Also, even for our analysis of salience, the data gathered by the comparative manifesto project,

although highly valuable, are less useful, because the only codes concerning community issues are

‘decentralization positive’ and ‘decentralization negative’, which is far too limited for our purposes.

In the ‘Comparative Manifesto Data’ decentralization was defined as ‘support for federalism or

devolution; more regional autonomy for policy or economy; support for keeping up local and

regional customs and symbols; favourable mentions of special consideration for local areas;

deference to local expertise’ (Volkens & Würst, 2003 : 26). Dandoy (2010) expanded this concept to

include inter-level relations, state reform, specific status of Brussels and linguistic issues. However,

because we find this definition doesn’t contain the full extent of community issues in Belgium, we

created the concept of ‘community issues’ and established a clear delimitation of what we would

code under this (see table 1). Also, we think salience should not only be measured through the

proportion of the program that is dedicated to community issues, as parties can also express the

importance of an issue through the prominence they attribute to it in an electoral manifesto (an

issue discussed on the first page, will be perceived as more salient than those discussed last). We

have therefore also added this dimension in our salience index.

2 With the exception of the Communist party, of which programs were not available. The communist party

should have been included in 1965, 1968, 1971, 1974, 1977, 1978 and 1981, 3 This was the case in 1971, when the liberal party, had a separate Flemish and Walloon section, similar the PSC

and the CVP had the same program in 1971, except for a regional part. In 1974, again the CVP and PSC have the same program, except for a regional chapter. the PSC has a regional (Walloon) section. In 1974, the PSC and CVP have the same program, except for a regional section. In 1977, the BSP has a second part of its program called ‘regional policies’, divided in a part on Wallonia, Flanders and Brussels. In 1985, the PSC has a separate program for Brussels. In 1995, the PS has specific programs for Wallonia, Brussels and the German community, the PSC has a separate program titled ‘regional elections 1995 ’. ln 1999, the PRL-FDF-MCC formation has chapter on Wallonia-Brussels between a chapter on ‘Justice’ and a chapter on ‘Europe’, the Flemish Green party indicated with (VL) or (B) or (EUR) which propositions belong to which level of government.

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Table 1 : definition of community issues

community issues not community issues

references advocating institutional

reform.

arguing in favour or against federalism

tables, cartoons, numbers showing

discrimination by the central state, if

dominated by one community.

negative references to the other

community

positive references to the own

community as a distinct culture and/or

identity

References to conflict between

communities or interpretation of conflict

in community terms : language quota’s,

Brussels, periphery around Brussels,

removal of French-speaking University of

Leuven, and Voeren.

decentralization to provinces or

municipalities

institutional reform concerning

institutions such as parliament,

government, senate and the

administration

institutional reform within Dutch-

speaking community or French-speaking

community such as cooperation

between Brussels and Walloon region.

The left column of table 1 contains what we conceive to belong to community issuesin Belgium,

while in the right column are institutional reforms that aren’t necessarily associated with community

issues in Belgium. A definition of community issues would be all text that includes all normative

references to differences, all references to tensions between different regions and communities and

normative expressions concerning the own or another region/community or devolvement of

competences to regions/communities.

Subsequently we created an index of the salience of community issues in electoral manifestoes,

which took into account the percentage of the total manifesto devoted to community issues, similar

to what was done in other research, as well as the prominence attributed to community issues in the

manifesto.

To calculate this salience index, we coded every page of every electoral manifesto, by giving it a value

from 0.1 to 1 depending on how much of the page was devoted to community issues. We admit that

this is rather rough, but this allowed us to deal with quite a large corpus, while treating small as well

as large electoral manifestoes in a consistent manner. This consistency is not to be taken for granted,

as for example in the Manifesto Project sometimes a paragraph was used as a coding unit instead of

the habitual quasi-sentence (Klingemann, 1987 : 301). We then calculated the percentage of the

electoral manifesto which is devoted to community issues. Then we multiplied the proportion of the

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electoral manifesto dedicated to community issues by the prominence index. This prominence index

was calculated by dividing the number of the first page on which community issues appeared by the

total amount of pages. Subsequently we subtracted the outcome from 1. This way, the higher the

amount of the manifesto that is devoted to community issues and the closer to the first page, the

higher the salience index will be. An increasing salience index points to a rise of sub-state

nationalism, while a decreasing salience index points to a decrease in sub-state nationalism.

To analyse party positions, we also couldn’t rely on the CMP. Indeed, as mentioned by other authors

(Janda et al, 1995 : 177), the data are not very useful to determine parties’ actual positions on issues.

We used 320 codes to code positions on community issues in consecutive elections. These codes

thus present party positions such as ‘expansion of Brussels outside 19 municipalities’ or ‘devolution

of national lottery’, we coded them as ‘1’ if a political party mentioned favoured the position and as

‘-1’ if they opposed the position, we left a blank when parties didn’t mention the position. After an

initial reading of party positions advocated in the electoral manifestos, a list of all party positions

related to community issues was drawn up. This list was tested and adapted after a second reading.

In a third phase, a definitive list was created, after which each electoral program was coded. In the

last phase, a final reading of all electoral programs was done to track possible positions that were

missed, resulting in a complete coding of all positions on community issues of all parties represented

in the Belgian parliament between 1965 and 2010.

Concerning the analysis of arguments, we used an inductive, ‘grounded’ approach (Glaser & Strauss,

1971; Strauss & Corbin, 1990) in the sense that we didn’t deduct arguments used to devolve

competences from theory or approach the data with a ‘start list’ in order to avoid forcing codes onto

the data. The unit of analysis is an argument, this is one or several sentences in which a position is

defended. One sentence can contain several arguments and thus be categorized under different

arguments. We started by clearly limiting our research focus to arguments on devolution of

competences to regions and communities. After an initial reading we drew up a list of arguments

used in the electoral manifestoes. In the process, some categories were merged and others were

split. Subsequently a second reading followed, after which the same splitting and merging process

took place and led to a definitive list. In the third phase, all electoral manifestoes were coded with

this list. In the last phase, the electoral manifestoes were coded again to make sure we coded all

arguments.

This list of arguments found consists of 18 different categories, which are summarized in table 2.

First, we discuss the identity-based arguments. The first is ‘a people needs to rule itself’. Although

political parties only rarely use this argument to argue in favour of total independence, the logic that

there is a distinct group of people, which needs to rule itself at least on a number of important

domains is also part of this category. The second is ‘Belgium is ruled by the other language group’,

which is defined as ‘the other language group is in control of the Belgian government, or Belgium is

ruled in function of the other language group, discriminating against our language group’. The idea of

internal colonialism and an expansion and dominance of the centre of the periphery (Deutsch, 1966;

Hechter, 1975) was seen as an explanation for the rise of sub-state nationalist parties, although it has

been discredited in by more recent studies (Swenden, 2006). The third is ‘x is limited by

Belgium/other language group’, defined as ‘Belgium or language group B hinders/restrains/limits

language group A’. The other is not perceived as a actively discriminating subject, but rather a

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passive, hindering object. The fourth is ‘our own money in our own hands’, referring to quotes

stating that ‘a community should be able to keep its money, it should be able to dispose freely of its

own resources’. The fifth is ‘the region is a better manager’, meaning that devolution will lead to

better policy, because the community/region is better in administering this competence’. This

argument is based on identity, because it supposes a region or even group which would inherently be

better at managing a certain competence. The sixth is ‘structural differences’ and includes that

regions/communities should be in control of a competence because they have structurally different

characteristics, needs, problems which warrant a specific policy on the regional level’. The seventh is

‘cultural differences’, which are all the arguments stating that the other region has a different

‘culture, attitude, policy opinions’ therefore a competence needs to devolved.

Next, we discuss the functional arguments. The first is national pacification, which means that a

devolution of competences is needed in order to pacify community conflicts. The second is ‘better

cooperation between regions/communities’, which argues that a devolution of competences will

result in better cooperation between regions/communities. The third is ‘more prosperity’, which

includes all arguments that argue that a devolution of competences will result in more prosperity for

the whole or for the region. Often this is expressed by arguing that more autonomy will result in

economic growth. The fourth is ‘more efficiency’, meaning arguments that argue that devolution will

result in more efficiency, it will be done quicker or cheaper, because supposedly less civil servants

would be necessary. The fifth is ‘more responsabilisation’, which states that devolution will lead to

regional governments being more responsible for the financial repercussions of their policies. This is

supposed to lead to a more cautious and efficient usage of budgetary means. The sixth is more

coherence, which means that devolution is necessary to obtain more coherent and/or more

homogeneous policy packages. The seventh is more modernisation. This code consists of the

arguments that devolution of competences will lead to a modernization of the government. The

eight is ‘more democratic’, which argues that devolution of competences makes the government

more democratic, brings the government closer to the people or raises democratic legitimacy. The

ninth is ‘simplification’, arguing that a devolution of competences will lead to a simplification of the

institutions and/or more transparency. The tenth is ‘external legitimation’. This code contains all

arguments that legitimize a devolution of competences because it is advocated by ‘external actors’

such as labour unions or ‘experts’ or because it works well in other countries or is in line with the

evolution of the European Union or if it’s the will of the people. Last, we included a category

‘unfinished’, which we didn’t include in the list functional arguments. Arguments in this code state

that the institutional reform is natural evolution, unfinished, impossible to avoid.

Table 2 : identity-based and functional arguments

Identity-based Functional Other

People rule itself National pacification Unfinished

Ruled by other More cooperation

Different culture More efficiency

Own money in own hands More responsabilisation

Hindered by other More coherent competences

Structural differences Modernization

Better policy Democratization

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Simplification

External legitimation

To estimate the proportion of identity-based arguments and functional arguments, we divided the

sum of identity-based arguments with the sum of functional arguments. We have called this the

identity index. When this identity index rises, this means that there is a rise in sub-state nationalism

and vice versa4. Our data only extends to 1965, which allows to observe evolutions in these

arguments, but it is not totally excluded that arguments that we designate as having originated from

sub-state nationalist parties have in fact previously been used by other parties. However, due to time

constraints we were obliged to cut off our data at some point.

Results

Salience of sub-state nationalism

When we take a first general look at the total of election manifestoes, we can clearly see that the

community issue remains present over time. Out of 150 analysed manifestoes, only 4 have absolutely

no attention for sub-state nationalism. This observation might however partly be explained by the

size of the Belgian electoral manifestoes, which tend to cover a wide range of issues.

Figure 1 : Average salience index for Dutch-speaking mainstream parties (window) and Dutch-

speaking sub-state nationalist parties (square)

4 It happened that parties didn’t use an identity-based argument, this would mean that in the calculation of the

identity index we would have zero in the numerator. Or, similarly it happened that an electoral manifesto didn’t use any functional arguments, thus we would have zero in the denominator. To avoid this situation we added ‘1’ to all sums of arguments.

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1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1978 1981 1985 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2010

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Figure 2 : Average salience index for French-speaking mainstream parties (window) and French-

speaking sub-state nationalist parties (square)

For the Belgian case, which consists of two separate party systems (Billiet et al., 2006; Sinardet, 2008;

Brack & Pilet, 2009), it is useful to look distinctly at the Dutch-speaking and French-speaking party

system in order to analyse the dynamic between sub state nationalist and other parties. Therefore,

in figure 1 we have separated the Dutch-speaking mainstream parties from the Dutch-speaking sub-

state nationalist parties, while in figure 2 we did the same for French-speaking parties.

As can be expected, sub state nationalist parties attribute consistently higher salience to community

issues than other parties. However, when we take into account the entire analysed period, we see a

diminishing salience over time for Dutch-speaking sub state nationalist parties. Surprisingly, in the

2010 election, which was strongly dominated by community issues, the index for N-VA and Vlaams

Belang is at an all time low, for VB with the exception of 1995. Here, we do however notice a

difference between the prominence and proportion index, as prominence decreases for sub-state

nationalist parties since 1999, but proportion increases from the all-time low in 1995. On the long

term, it is also not possible to speak of an increase for other parties, even if in 2010 the index is

suddenly at its highest point since 1987. For the French-speaking parties, the image is less clear,

which is also due to the fact that independent sub state nationalist parties only existed until 1991.

There is however a clear increase in salience from 1978 to 1985, with a remarkable peak in 1981,

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35,00

40,00

1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1978 1981 1985 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2010

13

after which figures remain very stable, be it at a slightly higher level than for the Dutch-speaking

parties. After 1981, the prominence index rises to a peak in 1985, however the proportion index is

much lower. Actually, over the entire period, salience of community issues is structurally higher

among French-speaking than among Dutch-speaking mainstream parties, which is quite surprising,

given the fact that sub state nationalism is generally mostly attributed to Flemish parties. It seems

that salience of community issues is past its peak for French-speaking parties since 1981 and for

Dutch-speaking parties since 1987, although for Dutch-speaking parties it has risen in 2010, but is still

lower than for the French-speaking parties.

To summarize, on the basis of these figures, it is difficult to speak of a clear, long term increase in

salience of community issues.

Nevertheless, if we look in more detail at evolutions per election on figure 1, we do observe that a

peak in salience by Dutch-speaking sub-state nationalist parties is often followed in the subsequent

election by a peak in salience by Dutch-speaking mainstream parties, for example in 1965-1968,

1977-1978, 1985-1987.In addition, the proportion that Dutch sub-state nationalist parties attribute

to community issues peaks in 1977 and 1985, after a low level in 1981. After 1985, the proportion

index drops until a low in 1995. While the prominence index is higher than average in 1977 and 1985,

it only decreases a little and even peaks in 1995, when the proportion is low. For French-speaking

parties, on figure 2, the peak in salience of the French-speaking mainstream parties, coincides with a

peak in salience of the sub-state nationalist parties in the same election in 1968 and 1981.

Concerning the French-speaking mainstream parties it is remarkable that after the disappearance of

the last independent sub state nationalist party, the FDF, the salience index remains very stable,

although not at the lowest level. Both observations point to an adaptation of parties to the presence

of sub-state nationalist parties, concerning salience.

To be able to look at the dynamics between the different parties more in detail, we have included

the salience indexes for every individual party per individual election year in figure 3.

As can be observed from the table in figure 3, the higher index for French-speaking mainstream

parties between 1971 and 1991 can largely be attributed to the rise in score of the French-speaking

socialists, which is consistently higher in that period than that of the other francophone parties. The

1981 peak can almost entirely be explained by the fact that the PS suddenly devotes almost half of its

manifesto to community issues, the highest score for any party. In that 1981 manifesto, the PS wants

to regionalize the five so-called national economic sectors, as it feels that on the federal level Dutch-

speaking parties and particularly the CVP refuse to aid these ailing economic sectors (PS, 1981 : 21).

The drop in the salience of French-speaking mainstream parties after 1991 is again most attributable

to the PS. Possibly, this is the result of the disappearance of the FDF as an independent party after

1991. When the RW disappeared after 1981, a drop in salience for French-speaking mainstream

parties could also be observed. One could also look at the possible causality in this relation the other

way around, as wen the salience index of the French-speaking socialist party starkly peaks in 1981,

the Walloon sub-state nationalist party contests its last election and when that the French-speaking

liberal party peaks in 1991, the Brussels sub-state nationalist party contests its last election.

14

Figure 3 : salience index per political party, per electoral year.

Within the Dutch-speaking party system, differences between parties are less striking. The relatively

small peak for Dutch-mainstream parties in 1987 can however be attributed to the liberal party,

which also contributes to to the 1968 peak, together with the SP. These two cases however do not

seem to refer to a more structural pattern such as with the PS. Among Dutch-speaking parties, the

CVP has the most consistent – and low – salience index, with all figures contained between 0,2 and

2,5.

We will now refine these findings based on saliency and see if they concur with those on the policy

positions.

1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1978 1981 1985 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2010

VU/NVA 20,8 18,7714,4316,8835,14 27,5 13,1441,1838,2814,2218,31 8,85 11,1123,28 2,73

FDF 33,8320,5511,6228,6527,55 27,5 18,1326,3118,08

RW 14,29 3,64 23,6126,47 30,1

VB 22,2210,9422,9713,4721,25 5,96 22,5620,9516,6116,58

Spirit 4,92 0,28

SP 0,44 15,2 4,88 0,28 0,4 0,28 0,1 1,35 0,83 0,37 0,15 0,01 0 0 0,07

PS 0,44 15,2 4,88 0,28 0,4 13,59 49,6 11,81 8,42 6,46 1,1 2,06 1,41 1,18 0,19

VLD 0,66 12,58 1,78 2,34 0,35 2,26 0 0,83 8,5 1,2 0,86 0,64 0,61 1,07 6,36

MR 0,66 12,58 0 7,27 1,51 5,86 1,97 3,63 3,23 7,35 0,86 0,45 2,65 0,17 3,03

CVP 0,74 1,78 0,74 1,3 0,59 2,5 0,62 0,41 0,63 2,89 0,2 1,23 0,46 0,29 1,82

cdH 0,74 8,89 1,21 0,69 0,62 5,13 6,95 5,65 2,77 3,38 0,73 1,09 0,07 0,41 0,96

FN 0,58 0,38

Groen 0 0,25 0,14 0,03 0,32 1,02 0,37 0,25 0,67

Ecolo 1,54 0,26 1,22 0,34 0,08 0,47 0,52 0,34 2,45

LDD 2,21 2,22

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

VU/NVA

FDF

RW

VB

Spirit

SP

PS

VLD

MR

CVP

cdH

FN

Groen

Ecolo

LDD

15

Policy positions

When we look at the positions taken in the total of electoral manifestoes, a first surprising

observation is that in 112 out of 150 of these, more autonomy for the regions/communities is

advocated. Even parties which are considered as being rather moderate on community issues often

argue for devolution of at least some competences. For the Dutch-speaking socialist party this is the

case in 11 out of 15 manifestoes, while for the Dutch-speaking Greens this is four out of nine. In what

follows we will more specifically look at the evolution of federal reform positions concerning state

structure, social policy, foreign policy and financial/fiscal autonomy and describe an evolution

common to these policy domains.

State structure

State structure refers to the type of state the parties would like to see Belgium become and entails

‘unitary’ (1), ‘decentralized unitary’ (2), ‘federal’ (3), ‘confederal’ (4) and ‘abolished’ (5). Rather than

determining parties’ positions on state structure on the basis of our own definition of these

categories, we coded based on the preferences parties themselves explicitly mentioned in their

electoral manifesto. This is because there is at times a sensible difference between the definition

parties seem to give to types of state structure and definitions on which there is a broad

international academic consensus5. Even if labels are not used ‘correctly’, the fact that they are used

is not without importance as it does signal a fundamental positioning in the debate.

In figures 4 and 5 we see an overall evolution towards a less unified state structure in the period

from 1965 onwards. While in 1965, all mainstream parties still favoured a unitary state structure,

with only the still unitary socialist party arguing for decentralisation within this framework), in 1974 a

general acceptance of some form of decentralization to communities or regions had already

occurred, which turned into a general demand for federalism in 1991 all parties favoured federalism

(which would be inscribed in the constitution two years later), when the Dutch-speaking socialists

and the Francophone liberals were the last to join the consensus. In 2010, two non-sub state

nationalist parties favour confederalism.

In this evolution, other parties clearly followed sub-state nationalist parties’ position on state

structure, first in a consensus towards decentralization, then federalism and for Dutch-speaking

Christian-Democrats and liberals further to confederalism. Sub state nationalist parties were always

the first to advocate a new type of state structure (with the exception of decentralisation within a

unitary framework). Thus not only mainstream parties radicalize, but sub-state nationalist parties as

well, with most recently the confederalist VU re-emerging as the separatist N-VA.

5 For instance, from 2003 onwards, some Flemish parties plead for a confederal state structure, while their

concrete positions would rather be associated with a federal system, be it with substantially more regional

autonomy than before.

16

Figure 4 : state structure position Dutch-speaking parties

Figure 5 : State structure position French-speaking parties

This evolution towards a more decentralised state structure is at first the same among Dutch-

speaking as well as French-speaking parties, but among Francophone parties this stops in the 1990s,

as they stick with a federal organization of the Belgian state, arguing that ‘institutional reforms have

brought our country to a finished federalism. We now have to let these institutions function at the

heart of the Belgian federation in respect for federal loyalty’ (PS, 1995 : 89) and that an institutional

equilibrium (Ecolo, 1999 : 1; PSC, 1999 : 1; PRL-FDF, 1999 : 9 ) has been reached. Simultaneously,

further radicalisation concerning state structure occurs on the centre-right of the Dutch-speaking

political spectrum, with the Dutch-speaking Christian-democrats and later also the Dutch-speaking

liberals advocating confederalism (even if their further positions on state reform would not be

1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1978 1981 1985 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2010

SP

VLD

CVP

Agalev

VU

VB

1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1978 1981 1985 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2010

PS

MR

cdH

Ecolo

FDF

RW

17

considered as ‘confederal’, based on usual definitions) . During a 2001 party conference, the Dutch-

speaking Christian-Democrats chose to change their preferred institutional organization to

confederalism, while the Dutch-speaking liberals followed this choice in their 2010 electoral

manifesto.

Thus on the Dutch-speaking side the parties ideologically closest to the sub-state nationalist party

seem to follow the sub-state nationalist party the furthest, as Flemish nationalism has always been

more of a (centre-)right political movement. This observation can however also be made for

francophone parties. Particularly illustrating in this respect is the behaviour of the French-speaking

liberal party. Among mainstream francophone parties, it is the first which moves in 1974 to

federalism, while in 1976 two of the leading figures of the Walloon sub-state nationalist party join its

ranks, after which the RW goes back to a more left-wing course (Deschouwer, 2009). After the left

turn of the RW, the French-speaking liberals change their preference to decentralization in 1978, and

the PS change their party position from decentralization to federalism. This suggests an influence of

sub-state nationalist parties on those ideologically close to them for the French-speaking party

system also.

We discuss state structure, because of its importance, but also because it shows a similar evolution

as is the case for the competences of foreign policy, social policy, financial/fiscal autonomy. Broadly,

in the Dutch-speaking party landscape the sub-state nationalist VU proposes devolution of a certain

competence, it is followed by the BSP, later on by CD&V, then VLD. When the BSP splits the Dutch-

speaking socialists take less sub-state nationalist positions, than the French-speaking socialist party

does. The Dutch-speaking left-wing parties don’t adopt a sub-state nationalist position often, but

seem to do so more often since the nineties. In the French-speaking party landscape we observe that

a position by FDF or RW, taken up by PS, then cdH and last and hesitantly MR. A radical shift occurs

for all French-speaking parties in after 1991 when they start opposing all further devolution.

Social policy, fiscal autonomy and foreign policy

We consistently observe a similar evolution in other policy domains such as social policy,

fiscal/financial autonomy and foreign policy, where the Dutch-speaking Christian-Democrats and the

French-speaking socialist party (and before the split of the socialist party this is true for the Belgian

socialist party also) are the parties that are the first and go the furthest in adopting sub-state

nationalist party positions.

Concerning foreign policy, the VU is the first to advocate more autonomy in cultural international

relations in 1971, and is followed by the CVP in 1977. That same year, the BSP is however the first

party to demand direct representation in the EC, which is also advocated by the VU in 1985 and by

VLD in 1995. As of 1985, the VU also demands autonomy in international relations for the regional

and community competences, as well as the possibility to close international treaties. In 1991, the

Dutch-speaking socialists follow by demanding the possibility to have international relations, but

don’t follow on the demand to close treaties. That demand is however followed by the Dutch-

speaking Christian-Democrats as of 1991In 2007, the CD&V stresses again the need for an ‘own’

foreign policy for Flanders and direct representation in Europe.

In the French-speaking party landscape we observe that the FDF as well as the PSB demand more

autonomy concerning foreign policy and direct representation on the European level in 1977. The

18

only other party to still follow is Ecolo, only in its 1985 manifesto. The PS continues to follow sub-

state nationalist demands of the FDF on foreign policy. When the FDF demands the right for the

regions and communities to conclude treaties in 1987, the PS duly follows in 1991. However, from

1995 onwards, devolution of any aspect of foreign policy is entirely absent from the francophone

parties’ manifestoes. The only exception is the demand of the PS to split development cooperation in

2003 and 2007 (which they had already done between 1985 and 1991). However, the three other

francophone parties clearly state they are opposed to such defederalisation6.

The story concerning social policy reads quite similarly. The VU is the first to plead for devolutions in

social policy, with family policy and public health in 1968, while in 1971, it demands a split in social

security as a whole. In 1977, it is followed by the BSP, which demands a split of family policy and

public health. On the split of health care, the VU is again first and followed by the CVP in 1991, who

continue to demand this in every electoral manifesto onwards. The VLD only follows splitting health

care in 2003, although they already advocate splitting parts of social security that don’t concern

replacement income in 1991. The sp.a and Groen! remain strongly opposed to the defederalization

of social security and specifically of income-replacing allowances. However, in 1991, the sp.a does

state that ‘the distortions between the communities on the level of health care, which are a.o.

related to abuses and oversupply are *…+ unacceptable’ and ‘if these imbalances remain unresolved,

the federalisation of additional allocations will undoubtedly appear on the agenda’. This suggests the

party does not demand a split in health care allowances, but feels a strong pressure on this issue, to

which it cannot entirely resist. The Greens also start talking about defederalising family policy in

1999.d 1978, while also mentioning social policy from 1971 to 1987. In 1977, the PSB follows on

defederalizing public health and family policy, while PRL and PSC also want to defederalize parts of

social policy. But while the PRL nuances its position in 1978 and the PSC never reiterates it again, the

PS keeps stressing its position on public health and child benefits. In addition, they add in 1985 parts

of social policy and in 1991, the devolution of responsibility for the Public Centre for Societal Welfare

(OCMW/CPAS). Again, as of 1995, demands on the domain of social policy disappear from all

francophone manifestoes.

Again, the same dynamic appears concerning financial and fiscal autonomy. The VU is the first to

argue in favour of autonomy in spending for the regions in 1968. They are followed by the PSB in

1971, which argues that ‘each level of government will be financially responsible for the

competences attributed to it’. In 1974 the VU argues that the regions should ‘take their own

responsibility to fund economic expansion’, while the CVP argues that territory-based taxes should

be transferred to the regions and the PVV only asks for ‘enough financial means’. In 1977 the PVV

however also switches to ‘a well-described autonomy concerning *…+ finances’. From 1985, the VU

argues that the regions should be completely fiscally independent and that the federal level should

depend on the region. That same year PVV only argues for the competence to grant subsidies and

lower taxes, but in 1995, they argue that the two big communities need to cover their expenses by

their own taxation, whereas the CVP emphasizes that regional taxes are collected by and controlled

by regional authorities. The SP only takes its first position in 1999 and argues for a split-rate income

tax, which the regions could fluctuate within margins. The CVP however meanwhile argues for the

transfer of the whole income tax and to make it possible to fluctuate the tax on companies. In 2003,

6 The fact that this issue comes to the forefront in 2003 and 2007, is because a partial defederalisation of

development cooperation was decided in the 2001 state reform, but had not been executed.

19

they expand to the tax on companies being wholly levied by the regions. The VLD is more timid than

CD&V and N-VA in 2007, arguing in favour of fluctuation within income tax and company tax in order

to allow the regions to lower taxes. In 2010, VLD however argues that the regions should be 100%

self-reliant and extend the possibility to fluctuate taxes to the social security contribution (RSZ).

Concerning French-speaking parties, as mentioned the PSB is in 1971 already in favour of financial

autonomy concerning the attributed competences. In 1974, the FDF argues that 25% as well as the

income tax should go directly to the communities, while other parties agree on a yearly dotation. In

1981, the FDF emphasizes that regions should levy and collect at least 50% of the taxes. Exceptionally

Ecolo in 1985 argues in favour of a basis tax rate set by the federal level to which all lower levels can

add, which is quite a radical proposition. PS argues in 1987 that territory-based taxes should be put

directly at the disposition of regions and communities, while the Christian-Democrats argue in favour

of exclusive tax competences for the regions. From 1995 onwards, fiscal policy devolution is not

mentioned by any of the French-speaking parties anymore.

Brussels and its periphery

The exception to the above described dynamic is clearly Brussels and its periphery. The party

positions taken by French-speaking parties concerning this issue do not change in 1995, but in

contrast come closer to the position taken by the FDF. This might be because the FDF didn’t

completely disappear after 1981, as the RW, but remained a small partner in cartel with the French-

speaking liberal party or because demands of French-speaking parties on this issue weren’t met.

Another difference with other issues is the quickness with which French-speaking parties adapt their

position to the position of the FDF after the split of their respective unified parties. For example, the

demand of the FDF to enlarge Brussels and free it from its ‘straightjacket’, is adopted by the PSC in

1968, the French-speaking liberals in 1971 and the PS in 1978. Similarly all French-speaking parties

subscribe at some point to the demand of the FDF to lessen demands for the knowledge of Dutch by

civil servants in Brussels. The French-speaking Christian-Democrats underwrite this position in 1968,

the French-speaking liberals in 1971 and the French-speaking socialists in 1978, although the French-

speaking greens only emphasize this point in 2010. The party positions of Dutch-speaking parties on

Brussels are similarly homogeneous. The VU is the first to demand parity in Brussels institutions in

1965 and is followed by the CVP in 1968, by the BSP in 1974, PVV in 1985. A similar homogenous set

of opinions is found concerning the split of the electoral district Brussels and later Brussels-Hallve-

Vilvoorde. The VLD is the first to argue in favour of this split in 1971. They are followed in 1974 by VU

and CVP and in 1977 by sp.a. Mirroring French-speaking parties, their Dutch-speaking counterparts

agree that Brussels cannot be extended beyond its 19 municipalities. VU and CVP argue this in 1968

and keep repeating this in several electoral manifestos. In 1974 the PVV expresses its opposition to

the expansion of Brussels and repeats this in 1985 and 1987, while the Dutch-speaking socialist party

does this in 1981 and 1985. Thus we observe an almost complete polarization between Dutch-

speaking and French-speaking parties concerning Brussels.

Arguments

20

In this section, we turn to the reasoning behind party positions on devolution of competences to

regions or communities. What type of arguments, identity-based or functional, are used by political

parties to advocate the devolution of competences to regions or communities? Do sub-state

nationalist parties adopt arguments from other parties or is it the other way around? Do other

parties adopt identity-based arguments or do sub-state nationalist adopt functional arguments? Is

there a decrease in the usage of identity-based arguments and could we consequently speak of a

decrease of sub-state nationalism or is the other way around?

Figure 6 contains the general identity index of all parties together. Somewhat surprisingly, this shows

that the identity index starts of quite high in 1968 …, we observe that the identity index has fallen

with two-thirds over 45 years. This points to a decrease in sub-state nationalism.

Figure 6 : identity index

It seems that there is an influence of institutional reform on the arguments index, however in four

out of five institutional reforms the index rises. After 1970 it falls, after 1980 it rises and peaks, after

1988 it rises, after 1993 it rises and after 2001 we see a slight rise as well.

We observe three peaks: in 1968, 1981 and 1995. The peak in 1995 seems very interesting, because

in the same year the salience index is at its lowest and these are the first elections without the FDF,

thus we would expect to see a lower identity index. However, from figure 7 we clearly observe this is

due to the high identity index of VB.

0,00

0,50

1,00

1,50

2,00

2,50

68 71 74 77 78 81 85 87 91 95 99 3 7 10

21

Figure 7 : identity index per party per year

From figure 7, we observe that sub-state nationalist parties clearly inflate the identity index, in a

similar way as they do with the salience index, as they use identity-based arguments the most.

Dutch-speaking sub-state nationalist parties have the highest identity-index, with the exception of

the PS in 1981 (similar to salience and party positions). Thus we might argue that Dutch-speaking

sub-state nationalist parties are more sub-state nationalist than French-speaking sub-state

nationalist parties.

In addition, we find modest evidence for the assertion in the former section that parties closer to

sub-state nationalist parties would be more sub-state nationalist. On average CVP and PS (the latter

between 1977 and 1991) have the highest identity index, although the identity index of the PS is only

slightly higher than the identity index of cdH. The identity index of the CVP however is clearly higher

than that of the other Dutch-speaking parties. The identity index of VLD is however clearly lower

than that of CVP/CD&V, while the VLD is ideologically closer to the VU/N-VA. This is in contradiction

1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1978 1981 1985 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2010

NVA 2,00 0,86 1,67 2,00 1,67 3,00 1,00 1,50 1,20 0,75 1,40 0,75 2,50 1,17 0,70

FDF 1,67 1,25 0,57 0,71 1,00 1,50 1,00 0,86 1,00

RW 2 1,00 1,20 1,00 0,86 1,17

VB 5 1,5 1,5 3 6 0,86 0,86 1 1,25

SP 1,50 0,17 0,20 0,25 0,50 0,20 0,17 0,33 1,00 0,33 0,25

PS 1,50 0,17 0,40 0,83 1,25 1,67 1,00 1,50 0,33

VLD 0,25 0,33 1,00 0,33 0,50 0,33 0,25 0,43

MR 0,67 0,8 0,5 0,5 1 0,2 0,5 0,5

CVP 0,5 1 1 0,6 0,4 1 1 1 1 0,33 0,67 0,67 0,71 0,33

cdH 1,00 0,67 1,50 0,43 0,50 0,25 3,00 0,17

Groen 0,5 0,25 0,25 0,2 0,25

Ecolo 0,5 0,5

0,00

1,00

2,00

3,00

4,00

5,00

6,00

7,00

Ast

ite

l

22

with the salience index, where the VLD attributes on average more salience to community issues

than the CVP.

When we look at the evolution of argument use between the different parties, we can see that,

except for the argument on ‘cultural differences’, all identity-related arguments are first used by sub-

state nationalist parties and subsequently spread to a number of other parties. This confirms the

‘lead’ taken by sub state nationalist parties and the follower’s role of other parties, which already

became apparent concerning the positions, and suggests a rise in sub-state nationalism. Only the

‘cultural differences’-argument is first used by the BSP/PSB, which was also the first mainstream

party to advocate decentralization of competences to the regions, even though this was not so

strongly reflected in the salience index, except in 1968.

The spread of identity-based arguments is however not distributed equally over all mainstream

parties. Again it is clearly CVP and PS which follow sub state nationalist parties most closely. Out of

the seven arguments that make up the identity index, six are taken over by CVP and PS (the one they

do not take over is however not the same for both parties, but ‘a people needs to rule itself’ for

CD&V and ‘money in our own hands’ for PS). Then follow MR (3 arguments, of which 2 only in the

1970s), CdH (3 arguments) and VLD (2 arguments), while the other parties do not use any identity

based arguments. Moreover, in all cases but one, these arguments are used more times and thus

more structurally by CD&V and PS. The overall most used identity-based argument is that structural

differences between the regions/communities make devolution necessary, which is used two times

by MR, three times by VLD, four times by cdH, six times by PS and nine times by CVP. There is also a

difference as to the periods when PS and CD&V use identity-based arguments. For the PS this is

entirely limited to the period between 1977 and 1991 (and most dominantly between 1978 and

1987), with the exception of two arguments used in 1968. For the CD&V the use of identity based

arguments is much more spread over time, with however the electoral manifesto of 2007 coming

forward as the one containing most identity based arguments, the election in which CD&V

presented itself in cartel with N-VA to the elections.

More surprising is that sub state nationalist parties were not only the first to use identity based

arguments but also the first to use functional arguments. This somewhat weakens the link between

sub-state nationalist parties and identity-based arguments, but reinforces the image of sub state

nationalist parties leading other parties on the state reform issue, as they seem to provide them with

the arguments with which to advocate policy positions that they have also inspired. There is however

a difference concerning the spread of those functional arguments. While identity-based arguments

mostly spread to CD&V and PS, functional arguments spread to many more of the other parties.

Almost all arguments spread to at least some of the other parties, while ‘more efficiency’, ‘more

responsabilisation’, ‘more coherence’, ‘more democratic’, ‘simplification’ and ‘external legitimation’

spread to all of the six traditional mainstream parties. The green parties form an exception. The

Flemish green party also takes over a number of functional arguments, but much later than other

parties, which is also due to the fact that it only consistently starts to advocate state reform since

1999. ECOLO only uses one argument, ‘external legitimation’, and only in 1981 and 1985, the two

only years it advocated devolution of competences.

We do however also observe trends in time for certain arguments, such as ‘simplification’ which is

used by a lot of parties in 1977-1978, and again in 1985-1987, which suggests that external

contextual variables can have an influence as well on the usage of arguments.

23

Table 1: a people needs to rule itself

65 68 71 74 77 78 81 85 87 91 95 99 03 07 10

NVA 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1

1 1 FDF 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 RW 1 1 1 1 1 1

Spir

SP

PS

VLD

1

MR 1 1

1

1 CD&V 1

1

1 1

cdH 1

VB

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

FN Groe

Ecol LDD

Finally, we focus more in detail on one of the identity-based arguments, ‘a people needs to rule

itself’, as this is clearly the most nationalist argument because it reflects the essence of the

nationalist idea: ‘the political and national unit must be congruent’ (Gellner, 1991 : 1). Particularly

present in this argument is the ‘house metaphor’ (De Cilia et al, 1999), where a people/region is

portrayed as a house, through which a sense of autonomy and homogenization is created. This is

particularly used in expressions as ‘we have to be boss / master in our own home’ (‘baas in eigen

huis’ / maître chez soi’). Personification is also often used in the trope ‘x needs to take its future into

its own hands’, which constructs a region/people as a person with a distinct future, that is currently

being decided by someone else.

As mentioned above and as can be seen in table 1, this argument is not taken over by the PS. This is

somewhat surprising as we have seen earlier that the PS takes over a lot of the party positions of the

RW in the 1970s and 1980s as well as all other of the identity based arguments. The PS mostly

focuses on the fact that the Belgian level is dominated by Dutch-speakers, particularly the CVP and

that this hinders the development of Wallonia. This seems to point to the fact that the following

attitude of the PS is not so much animated by a fundamentally nationalist position, than by strategic

concerns. Also surprising is that the French-speaking liberal party, on the other hand, uses the

‘people needs to rule itself’ argument four times. Remarkable is that ‘the people’ are interpreted in

three different ways: in 1974 and 1977 this refers to the Walloon, in 1987 to the ‘Bruxellois’, and in

24

2010 to the ‘Francophone fatherland’. This can probably be explained by the fact that the mid-1970s

were the period in which the French-speaking liberals were closer to the RW, while afterwards they

have allied themselves to the Brussels and Francophone FDF (even though they did not form one

party in 1987 yet).

Discussion and conclusion

When attempting to discuss our research results in light of the federal paradox debate, we are

confronted with differences among the different indicators we used to establish an increase or

decrease of sub state nationalism. While the salience index points at a decrease of sub state

nationalism over the past decades in Belgium and does not show a clear long term influence of sub

state nationalist parties on other parties, analysis of party positions and of arguments used to

advocate them point in the opposite direction, albeit with some nuances.

During the federalisation process, positions on state reform have clearly radicalised, always

progressing in the direction of regional autonomy, although since 1995 this is not true anymore for

the francophone parties where transfers of competences are concerned (but still true for other

community issues, mostly linked to Brussels and its periphery). The analysis of arguments used to

advocate devolution does not show an overall rise in the use of identity-based arguments, but does

very clearly show that arguments – whether they are identity-based or functional – are nearly all

introduced by sub state nationalist parties, to be later taken over by other parties, which points to an

evolution of other parties in the direction of sub state nationalist parties, in line with their evolution

on positions. While it is relevant that identity-based arguments are only taken over by the Flemish

Christian-democrats and the French-speaking socialists, it is just as relevant that other types of

justifications for state reform that are more largely and commonly used also originate from sub state

nationalist parties.

How can these fundamentally different findings on the level of salience on the one hand and of

positions and arguments on the other hand be explained? We do not see many explanations, besides

a methodological one, certainly given the fact that the results for position / arguments are much

closer to the academic consensus on federalism and nationalism in Belgium, which is that sub state

nationalism has certainly not decreased in importance over the past years in Belgium and that at

least a number of Flemish parties have tended to radicalise along the years. Indeed, when you see

that over five decades a number of mainstream parties have evolved from advocating a unitary state

structure to a confederal structure, it is difficult to speak of a decrease in sub state nationalism. This

paper therefore shows that to measure the evolution of sub state nationalism and to assess whether

we should speak of moderation or exacerbation of the ethno-regional conflict in Belgium, taking into

account salience of community issues is not sufficient and maybe not even a very relevant indicator.

It should at least be complemented by analysis of positions and discourse of the parties, which have

shown to be more relevant indicators. Indeed, if a political party devotes less of its electoral

manifesto to community issues, but takes fundamentally more radical positions and advocates them

with identity based arguments, we think the latter two findings are probably more relevant

indicators to position Belgium in the federal paradox debate. However, to get an even more detailed

view, it would be good to expand analysis of sub state nationalist discourse in electoral manifestoes

25

beyond the use of arguments, to also include other, often more implicit, forms of identity

construction and so-called ‘banal nationalism’ (cf. Billig, 1995).

The combination of the three indicators also permits us to get a more complete and detailed view on

the precise dynamics between the different political parties and to nuance and further explain

individual party positions. We for instance find important differences among individual parties

concerning their evolution towards sub state nationalism. It is the Flemish Christian-democrats and

the French-speaking socialists, between 1977 and 1991, which on the level of salience (although this

is only true for the socialists), positions and arguments most evidently follow sub state nationalist

parties.

This can be explained by two types of strategic behaviour parties can develop when determining

their attitude towards federal reform. Most discussed in the literature – and already mentioned

above – is the fact that other parties have often been known to adapt their positions on

decentralization as a strategy to react to electoral threats of sub state nationalist parties. This is more

often the case for typical governing parties who more generally tend to adapt their positions to

electoral evolutions and also for parties who have electorally most to fear from the success of sub

state nationalist parties and are ideologically closer to them (particularly on the left-right axis). For

instance, the success of the right wing Lega Nord in 1990’s Italy mostly lead centre right parties to

become more strongly in favor of decentralization, while the success of the Scottish National Party in

the UK had a similar effect on the positions of the Labour Party, at first mostly in Scotland but

increasingly also on the national level (Mazzoleni, 2009: 212-213; Mitchell, 1998).

There is however another, lesser analysed strategic reasoning that can determine parties’ positions

on federal reform. As argued by O’Neill (2003), for parties whose electoral support at sub-state levels

appears more secure than their prospects in national elections, decentralization can represent a

desirable strategy, which maximizes electoral possibilities. This is mostly the case for parties with

strong support in specific regions, low expectations to control power at the center and stable support

over time. O’Neill (2003) showed the importance of such partisan political calculations as explanation

for decentralization for Latin American democracies, but similar dynamics can be obeserved in

Western European federations. At different times and in different contexts, national left wing

opposition parties have favored decentralization so as to create new political institutions in which

they would have more chance to be in power. This was for instance the case in Italy of the 1960s,

France of the 1970s and to a lesser extent also in Spain. In 1990s’ Italy however, with the Lega Nord

being very strong in the north, left wing parties opposed decentralisation (Mazzoleni, 2009; Sorens,

2009). The nationalist turn of Labour in Scotland during the Thatcher years can also be explained by

the fact that Labour’s electoral situation in England – and thus in the UK – was very unpromising

while they kept on being the strongest party in Scotland (Mitchell, 1998).

Particularly the examples of Italy and the UK show that these two types of party political strategies to

favor decentralization – response to electoral threats and opportunity for political power at new

levels – are often linked. Indeed, parties who are ideologically closest to sub state nationalist parties

will have most to fear on the electoral level, but will often also be the ones profiting from

decentralization to specific regions. This is because sub state nationalist parties generally tend to

26

adopt the dominant ideological position in their region. This can in turn be explained by the fact that

a sub state nationalist party will of course always be able to exert more political power on the

regional than on the national level as its electoral base is generally entirely regional. Also, staying in

tune with the dominant ideological currant in the region, can reinforce their claim to represent the

whole region and permit to attack the legitimacy of the national level, in which this position is

generally less strongly represented. While dominant parties in a specific region thus have a double

electoral interest in favoring decentralization, sub state nationalist parties have a double interest to

be ideologically close to the dominant political current in their region.

It is this double dynamic which we can also see at work in Belgium, where Flemish sub state

nationalism has always been dominantly right wing and associated with Flemish Catholicism while its

Walloon counterpart was always more left wing, close to the Walloon labour movement, as well as

secular. Simultaneously, the catholic party and socialist party were always the leading political forces

in respectively Flanders and Wallonia, which often contributed to their stances being associated with

those of Flanders and Wallonia as a whole. Consequently, in the north of Belgium, the Flemish

catholic party and to a lesser extent also other right wing parties have gone furthest in adopting

positions in favor of federal reform, with the Flemish socialists and greens generally being more

reluctant. The south shows a mirror image, with federal reform mostly being advocated by the

French-speaking socialists – certainly in the 1970s and 1980s – and the French-speaking catholics

being most reluctant. Not only did the Flemish socialists and the French-speaking Christian-

democrats have less to fear from the competition of sub state nationalist parties as they were not

fishing in the same ideological pond, they also had no interest in more decentralization, as they were

not electorally strong enough in their region to reap the benefits.

Regionalism and federalism in Belgium have always been linked to the socio-economical left-right

divide and to a lesser extent also to the philosophical divide between catholics and liberals. As Huyse

(1981: 124) explains, the gain of importance of the community issue from the 1960s onwards, can in

part be explained by how pacification of the other two main divisions in Belgian political life, which

had occurred in the years after the war through consociational pact-making, was not as complete as

it might have seemed. As well in the north as in the south of the country, strong factions within both

majority groups (catholics in Flanders, socialists in Wallonia) opposed the status quo, that had taken

form in pacts and found in regional and cultural ideas ‘new, more compelling instruments for the

diffusion of their clerical/anticlerical or socioeconomic blueprints’, leading Huyse (1981: 124) to

conclude that ‘the federalist idea became more attractive to more people in the 1970s not strictly for

linguistic or cultural or ethnic reasons, but because it bears the promise of the ultimate achievement

of socialism in Wallonia and of a sort of Catholic model of societal harmony in Flanders’.

The difference between the Belgian case and those of the aforementioned federations is that in

Belgium both parties that were strong in their region were not in opposition on the national level.

Quite to the contrary, the Flemish Christian-democrats and French-speaking socialists were very

often also in power on the national level. However, it is probably not a coincidence that they mostly

became strong defenders of regionalization when their hopes to gain an overall majority became

quite irrealistic and they realized power on the national level would always have to be shared with

one another. Also, the consociational mould in which federalization in Belgium was carried through,

strengthened the logic that the regional balance of power would generally also be respected in

27

national coalition-making, turning a coalition of Christian-democrats and socialists into the most

evident coalition for a very long time (cf. Swenden, 2002).

In our opinion, this shows that party politics is a relevant lens to analyse federalisation processes in

general and Belgium in particular, one that is probably not used enough. Indeed, constitutional

reform processes in federal political systems are often analysed through a focus on the different

identities and interests of the constituent entities. Regions, communities, länder, provinces, cantons

or other federated institutions tend to be regarded as unitary actors, much like states in international

relations theory. Certainly in so-called ‘multinational’ federations, the collectivities that these

institutions represent are also considered this way (‘the Flemish’, ‘the Walloons’, ‘the Québécois’,

‘the Catalans’, …). This is mostly the case in domestic political and media discourse, but also in

international academic work. Such one-dimensional analysis runs the risk of obscuring and

underestimating the crucial dynamic at play of party politics: the reasons, motivations and interests

individual parties can have in engaging (or not) in federal reform. Parties may even try to

instrumentalise regional or cultural identities and interests, in the pursuit of other partisan goals, in

which case analyzing federal reform solely or mainly in terms of those interests can play into those

partisan strategies. While the relevance of party politics is true for federations in general, this is

certainly true for the case of Belgium, which has often been characterised as a ‘partitocracy’.

Moreover, Belgium is also a consociational federation, which also implies that the role of political

parties and their elites is very strong. In Belgium, political parties are thus essential actors to

understand political and societal evolutions in the country and therefore also to understand federal

reform.

However, one should not make a similar mistake by only taking into account party politics. Specific

interests of regions can obviously also play a part in political parties’ positioning. For instance, the

fact that the French-speaking socialist party in Belgium has since the state reform of 1993 become

much more hesitant in advocating federal reform and later downright hostile to further large scale

decentralisation, followed in this stance to more or less extent by all French-speaking parties, can be

attributed to the fact that the socio-economical and financial situation of the Walloon region was

such that it was not perceived in its interest to regionalize many more competences.

28

29

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Annex 1

Christelijke Volkspartij (CVP)/ Parti social Chrétien (PSC) : Belgian Christian-Democratic party, split

from 1968 elections

Christelijke Volkspartij (CVP), from 2003 : Christelijk Democratisch & Vlaams (CD&V) : Dutch-speaking

Christian-Democrats :

Parti social Chrétien (PSC), from 2003 Centre Démocrate Humaniste (cdH) : French-speaking

Christian-Democrats :

Belgische Socialistische Partij (BSP)/Parti socialiste belge (PSB) : Belgian socialist party, split from

1978 elections

Socialistische Partij (SP), from 2003 : socialistische partij anders (sp.a) Dutch-speaking socialist party :

Parti socialiste (PS): French-speaking socialist party

Parti-libéral/ Liberale partij : Belgian liberal party, split from 1971 elections

Partij voor vrijheid en vooruitgang (PVV), from 1995 elections Vlaamse liberale democraten : Dutch-

speaking liberal party

Parti pour la liberté et le progress (PLP), from 1974 Parti pour la liberté et le progrès Wallon, from

1977 elections, Parti réformateur liberal Wallon (PRLW),, from 1981 elections Parti réformateur

libéral (PRL), from 1995 elections Parti réformateur libéral – Front démocratique des Francophones

(PRL-FDF), from 1999 elections Parti-réformateur libéral (PRL)- Front Démocratique des

Francophones (FDF) – Mouvement des citoyens pour le changement (MCC), from 2003 elections

Mouvement Réformateur (MR) : French-speaking liberal party :

Volksunie (VU), from 2003 Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA) 7. : Dutch-speaking sub-state nationalist

party :

Front démocratique des Francophones (FDF), in cartel with PRL from 1995 : Brussels sub-state

nationalist party :

Rassemblement Wallon (RW), disappears from parliament after 1981 : Walloon sub-state nationalist

party

Vlaams Blok (VB), from 2004 Vlaams Belang (Erk, 2005b) (VB) : Dutch-speaking extreme right-wing

party

7 , because a referendum among Volksunie members designated that largest part of VU-members had moved

to the N-VA. ‘ (Deschouwer, 2009 : 567)

34

Front national (FN) : French-speaking extreme right-wing party, only coded for 1999 and 2003

Anders Gaan Leven (Agalev), from 2007 Groen! : Dutch-speaking green party

Ecolo : French-speaking Green party

Sociaal Progressief Internationaal Regionalistisch Integraal-democratisch en Toekomstgericht (Spirit)

: Dutch-speaking sub-state nationalist party, only coded for 2003 and 2007

Lijst Dedecker (LDD) : Dutch-speaking libertarian party