Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-3970           October 29, 1952

GURBAX SINGH PABLA & CO., GURBAX SINGH PABLA, BELA SINGH PABLA, OJAGAR SINGH, DHARAM SINGH, TALOK SINGH and CIPRIANO TAN ENG KIAT, petitioners-appellees, vs.HERMOGENES REYES and TEODORA TANTOCO, respondents-appellants.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.Jose N. Buendia for appellants.Eliseo Caunca for appellees.

LABRADOR, J.:

This is an appeal prosecuted by the respondents-appellants against an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated November 29, 1949, compelling them to surrender owner's duplicates of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 8071 and 8072, so that the contract of lease entered into between petitioners-appellees and the owner of the land covered by said certificates of title be annotated thereon. John Tan Chin Eng is the owner of the land covered by the above-mentioned certificates of title, and on July 23, 1948, he entered into a contract (Exhibit A) with the petitioner-appellees, under the terms of which petitioners-appellees were to construct thereon a three-story building of concrete and of strong materials valued at from P80,000 to P90,000. The contract also provided that the building shall become the exclusive property of the owner of the land, but that the petitioner-appellees were to occupy, hold, or possess it as lessees for a period of three years and six months from its completion, without paying any rentals therefor, the sum spent in the construction being considered as the rentals; that after the above period of three years and six months petitioners-appellees were to continue occupying the said building for another two years at a monthly rental of P2,000. This contract of lease was filed and registered in the office of the Register of Deeds of Manila on August 10, 1948, under Primary Entry No. 3352, Volume 15. At the time that the contract was entered into there was an existing mortgage over the land in favor of Jose Calvo and Carlos Calvo for the sum of P110,000. This mortgage in favor of the Calvos was cancelled, and a new mortgage was executed by the owner in favor of respondents-appellants herein, Honorable Hermogenes Reyes and his spouse Teodora Tantoco, dated March 8, 1949, which was registered on the same date in the office of the Register of Deeds of Manila under Primary Entry No. 5014. On May 14, 1949, the original contract of lease, Exhibit A, was amended by Exh. C, by virtue of which the period under which the lessees were to hold any occupy the property without rentals was extended to seven years and four months, and the rental for the additional two years thereafter reduced to P1,148. This amended contract of lease, Exhibit C, was also registered in the office of the Register of Deeds of Manila under Primary Entry No. 5014, Volume 16, on May 20, 1949.

On May 25, 1949, counsel for petitioners-appellees wrote respondents-appellants requesting them to allow him to take the certificates of title to the office of the Register of Deeds of Manila for the annotation of the contracts of lease entered into by the owner with them (Exhibit D), and on May 27, 1949, the son of respondents-appellants acknowledged receipt of the said letter but informed counsel for the petitioner-appellees that the request could not be granted without the written consent of the owner of the certificates of title (Exhibit E). On June 16, 1949, respondents-appellants' son

wrote the owner of the land (Exhibit M) demanding the payment of the overdue interest on the mortgage with the following statement:

. . . For this reason, I wish to request that you come over to my office before 12:00 noon to pay the said interest before we can deliver your Transfer Certificate of Title to Atty. Manuel P. Calanog who will take charge of registering the lease contract between Mr. Singh Pabla and your goodself.

On June 3, 1949, the petitioners-appellees filed a motion in the Court of First Instance of Manila praying that an order issue to the owner for the delivery of the owner's duplicates of transfer certificates of title Nos. 8071 and 8072 to the petitioners in order that the Register of Deeds of Manila may be able to make the annotation thereon of the contract of lease, Exhibit A, and its amendment, Exhibit C. Against this petition Hermogenes Reyes and Teodora Tantoco filed an opposition, alleging that they had no knowledge whatsoever of the contract of lease, Exhibit A, or of its amendments, Exhibit C, and that the execution of the amendment, Exhibit C, violated the express provision of the mortgage, to the effect that the owner could not sell, assign, or encumber the mortgaged premises without the written consent of the mortgages. It is to be noted that with respect to the original contract of lease, Exhibit A, no allegation is made in the opposition of the respondents-appellants that they were not aware of the existence of the contract, Exhibit A, their only allegation being that the only annotation on the certificates of title at the time they entered into the contract of mortgage was the mortgage in favor of Jose Calvo and Carlos Calvo. It is also to be noted that respondents-appellants do not deny an express allegation of paragraph 13 of the amended petition to the effect that notice was given to the public by a big sign board placed on the premises while the building was under construction that petitioners-appellees are the owners of the building. The amended petition further states, without denial on the part of the respondents-appellants, that as early as October 9, 1948, the Register of Deeds of Manila had demanded in writing from the owner of the land the submission of his duplicate certificates of title Nos. 8071 and 8072 in order that the lease executed by him in favor of the petitioners-appellees may be given due course. At the hearing of the motion no oral evidence was submitted; only documentary evidence was presented.

Thereafter the Court of First Instance of Manila issued the order already mentioned above, directing respondents to surrender the certificates of title to the Register of Deeds of Manila in order that petitioners-appellees' contract of lease may be noted thereon. It expressly found that respondents-appellants had knowledge of the lease contract, Exhibit A, but that respondents' deed of mortgage of March 8, 1949, has priority over petitioner's amended contract of lease, Exhibit C. As regards the (supposed) prohibition contained in the contract of mortgage, the court held that the prohibition gives a right of foreclosure; in other words, that in spite of the prohibition the amended contract of lease, Exhibit C, may not be considered as null and void.

In this court on appeal claim is made on behalf of the respondents-appellants that the court a quo erred in holding that respondents-appellants had knowledge of the contract of lease, Exhibit A; that it erred in holding that Tirso T. Reyes is the attorney-in-fact of the respondents-appellants; that it erred in ordering the registration of the contract of lease, Exhibit A; and that it erred in not holding that the registration of the contracts, Exhibits A and C, will prejudice the rights and interest of respondents-appellants.

It should be noted that all that the petitioners demand or pray for is the surrender of the titles to the Register of Deeds so that their contracts of lease, Exhibits A and C, may be noted thereon. The only issue, therefore, is whether petitioners have a right to have said deeds registered. It is not denied that the contracts have been executed by the registered owner of the land, or that they have been lawfully executed, or that they have all the qualities of registerable documents. Indeed, the owner is

agreeable to the registration. The objections interposed by respondents, who are mortgagees merely, that they had no knowledge of the contract of lease, or that their mortgage has priority, or that they will be prejudiced, are beside the issue.

The purpose of registering an instrument is to give notice thereof to all persons (section 51, Act No. 496); it is not intended by the proceedings for registration to seek to destroy or otherwise affect already registered rights over the land, subsisting or existing at the time of the registration. The rights of these parties, who have registered their rights, are not put in issue when an instrument is subsequently presented for registration; nor are its effects on other instruments previously registered put in issue by the procedure of registration. Thus, the objections raised by respondents-appellants that they had no knowledge of the contract of lease, Exhibit A, before the property was mortgaged to them, or that the same violates their contract of mortgage with the owner of the land — these are not passed upon by the order for the registration of petitioners-appellees' contract of lease. The objections, as well as the relative rights of all parties who have registered their deeds, shall be decided in the proper suit or proceeding when the opportune occasion arises; but they are not now in issue, nor may they be adjudicated upon, simply because petitioners-appellees have applied for the registration of their contract of lease.

The impropriety and inconvenience of proceeding to determine completely and in advance all the possible consequences of a document, upon all parties affected thereby, in the proceeding for its registration becomes apparent when, as in this case, important and complicated questions of fact and of law were presented by the respondents-appellants about their alleged lack of knowledge of the contracts of lease and the invalidity thereof. The court a quo passed upon vital issues of fact upon the motion and the opposition thereto, and upon the documents, letters, and receipts presented, without any other evidence than the above. Yet the question of knowledge is mainly a question of fact and requires inquiry into many and complicated circumstances, which can not be satisfactorily shown except by testimony.

On the other hand, the supposed invalidity of the contracts of lease is no valid objection to their registration, because invalidity is no proof of their non-existence or a valid excuse for denying their registration. The law on registration does not require that only valid instruments shall be registered. How can parties affected thereby be supposed to know their invalidity before they become aware, actually or constructively, of their existence or of their provisions? If the purpose of registration is merely to give notice, then questions regarding the effect or invalidity of instruments are expected to be decided after, not before, registration. It must follow as a necessary consequence that registration must first be allowed, and validity or effect litigated afterwards.

The foregoing, however, must not be understood as an absolute and invariable rule of procedure, for parties may, by mutual consent, submit issues for determination at the time of the proceeding to register a document. But the court should only proceed therewith (determination of the issues) upon giving all the parties concerned sufficient opportunity to present their respective sides and the evidence in support thereof, and that if this can not be done, the determination of the issues should be reserved in a subsequent proceeding and the registration of the document ordered.

In accordance with the above opinion, we find that the issues raised by respondents-appellants, namely, that the contracts of lease, Exhibits A and C, are invalid because they violate the contracts of mortgage executed in favor of the owner of the land, that Tirso T. Reyes is not the attorney-in-fact of the respondents-appellants, and that the respondents-appellants had no knowledge of the execution of the contract of lease, Exhibits A and C — these issues were not properly investigated because respondents-appellants did not have the opportunity to present evidence thereon and did not even present copy of their mortgage at the hearing, and the trial court decided the questions

without full and complete investigation. The ruling of the trial court on the above issues should, therefore, be set aside and their determination reserved in a proper proceeding.

Wherefore, the opposition to the motion for the surrender of the certificates of title to the Register of Deeds of Manila is overruled, and the order appealed from, in so far as it orders the surrender of the certificates of title for the registration of the contracts of lease, is hereby affirmed, but the other rulings are reversed, and the other issues raised by respondents-appellants reserved for determination in a proper proceeding. With costs against the respondents-appellants.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor and Jugo, JJ., concur.

   

    

SECOND DIVISION 

 YOLANDA O. ALFONSO,

Petitioner,

- versus -

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT andPHIL-VILLE DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING CORPORATION,

Respondents.

G.R. No. 150091

Present:

QUISUMBING, J.,Chairperson,CARPIO,CARPIO MORALES,TINGA, andVELASCO, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:

April 2, 2007

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x  

D E C I S I O NCARPIO MORALES, J.:

  The present controversy traces its roots to the purportedly irregular issuance of several transfer certificates of title (TCTs), which has resulted in two sets of derivative titles, one set bearing the date of registration of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 as May 3, 1917; the other, as April 19, 1917. OCT No. 994 is one of five OCTs covering the vast Maysilo estate. 

In the midst of this land-titling irregularity, petitioner Yolanda O. Alfonso (petitioner), then the register of deeds of Caloocan City, was found administratively liable for allegedly acquiescing to the change of the date of the registration of OCT No. 994 from May 3, 1917 to April 19, 1917, and for making it appear that there were two OCT Nos. 994. Consequently, she was dismissed from government service for grave misconduct and dishonesty.

 Petitioner has come to this Court to seek a reversal of the Court of Appeals

(CA) Decision[1] of July 27, 2001 and its Resolution[2] of September 21, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 61082, affirming the dismissal ordered by herein public respondent Office of the President (OP).

 From the labyrinthine twists and turns that the facts have taken, the

following are relevant to the disposition of this administrative case: OCT No. 994 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal in the name of

Maria de la Concepcion Vidal pursuant to the December 3, 1912 Decision of then Judge Norberto Romualdez in C.L.R. Case No. 4429. In accordance with this decision, the Court of Land Registration issued on April 19, 1917 Decree No. 36455, which was received for transcription by the Registry of Deeds of Rizal on May 3, 1917. OCT No. 994 covered 34 lots located in Caloocan City with an aggregate area of 13,312,618.89 square meters.[3]

 In an Order of May 25, 1962, the then Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal,

in Civil Case No. 4557, In Re: Petition for Substitution of Names, directed the Register of Deeds of Rizal to cancel the name of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal in OCT No. 994 and to substitute the names of her alleged grandchildren/heirs: Bartolome Rivera, Eleuteria Rivera (Rivera), Josefa R. Aquino, Gregorio R.

Aquino, Rosauro Aquino, Pelagia R. Angeles, Modesta R. Angeles, Venancio R. Angeles, Felipe R. Angeles and Fidela R. Angeles.[4]

 An action for partition and accounting was subsequently filed by the alleged

heirs sometime in 1965 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Caloocan City, against Isabel Gil de Sola, et al. Then RTC Branch 120 Judge Fernando A. Cruz granted the action for partition in a Decision of December 29, 1965, which became final and executory per the courts certification of June 7, 1966.[5]

 Three commissioners were appointed by the Caloocan RTC to submit their recommendations on the partition prayed for. It appeared, though, that the commissioners failed to comply with their duties, prompting the registered owners to file a motion to cite them in contempt of court, on which no action was shown to have been taken.[6]

 In the meantime, the different lots of OCT No. 994 were acquired by several

persons and/or entities, which led to the issuance of several TCTs. Three of these titles, TCT Nos. 270921,[7] 270922[8] and 270923[9] covering Lots 1-G-1, 1-G-2 and 1-G-3, were issued to private respondent Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corporation (Phil-Ville) on September 15, 1993. On Phil-Villes TCTs, it was stated that OCT No. 994 was registered on May 3, 1917, and that the same was a transfer from TCT No. C-14603/T-73.[10]

 On May 22, 1996, Rivera, one of the substituted owners of OCT No. 994, filed with the Caloocan RTC, Branch 120, in Civil Case No. C-424, a motion for partition and segregation of lots 23-A, 24, 25-A, 26, 28, 29 and 31 (covering an area of 1,572,324.45 square meters), praying that the lots be awarded in her favor and titled in her name.[11]

 By Order of September 9, 1996, Judge Jaime D. Discaya approved the

recommendation[12] made by the court-appointed commissioners that Lots 23, 28-A-1 and 28-A-2 be segregated from OCT No. 994, and ordered the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City to issue new certificates of title in the name of Eleuteria Rivera x x x.[13] In the courts Order of September 17, 1996, the surrender of the owners duplicate certificate of title of OCT No. 994 if the same is no longer available, lost or otherwise was dispensed with.[14]

 It appears that another order of November 28, 1996[15] was issued by Judge

Discaya directing petitioner to implement the September 9, 1996 Order for the issuance of the three new certificates of title in the name of Rivera.

 Petitioner thus issued TCT Nos. C-314535[16] for Lot No. 28-A-1, C-

314536[17] for Lot No. 28-A-2, and C-314537[18] for Lot No. 23, based on the technical descriptions mentioned in the September 9, 1996 Order, and all in the name of Rivera. It was uniformly stated in these TCTs that Riveras titles were derived from OCT No. 994, which was registered on the 19th day of April in the year 1917. Upon learning of this development, Phil-Ville requested then Land Registration Authority (LRA) Administrator Reynaldo Y. Maulit to investigate the discrepancies in the date of registration of OCT No. 994, as reflected in its TCTs and those of Rivera.[19] Phil-Ville invited attention to petitioners letter of September 20, 1996 informing it that there was only one OCT No. 994, which was transcribed or registered on May 3, 1917, as well as to the LRA Administrators certification of October 31, 1996 confirming that OCT No. 994 was issued on May 3, 1917. Phil-Ville maintained that the issuance of the three TCTs in favor of Rivera was highly irregular as they cover[ed] lots already owned by Phil-Ville, LCM Theatrical Enterprises and Bonifacio Shopping Center, Inc. 

Phil-Villes letter-complaint led to the conduct of an inquiry by the Senate Committees on Justice and Human Rights, and on Urban Planning, Housing and Resettlement. On May 25, 1998, the joint committees submitted Senate Committee Report No. 1031[20] which found, among other things, that (1) there is only one Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 and this was issued or registered on May 3, 1917, (2) OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917 is non-existent for being a fabrication perpetrated by Mr. Norberto Vasquez, Jr. [(Vasquez, Jr.)], former Deputy Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan City, and (3) petitioner acted maliciously, fraudulently and in bad faith, when she signed the TCTs issued in the name of Rivera which bear a wrong date of registration x x x. The Senate committees recommended that administrative cases be filed against petitioner, Vasquez, Jr. and all those involved in illegal and irregular land titling.

 On the basis of Senate Committee Report No. 1031 and Phil-Villes

complaint, the LRA initiated Administrative Case No. 98-07 for grave misconduct and dishonesty against petitioner and Vasquez, Jr. who, as directed, filed separate explanations/comments to the charges against them.

 During the pre-trial conferences, the parties presented documentary evidence

and marked their exhibits, and a pre-trial Order was issued on September 3, 1998.[21]

 At the scheduled start of the formal hearing on September 6, 1998, the

parties agreed to dispense with the presentation of oral evidence, in lieu of which they filed their respective memoranda. The case was then considered submitted for resolution.

 On February 4, 1999, the LRA, through then Administrator Alfredo R.

Enriquez, issued a Decision adopting in toto the findings and recommendation of LRA Hearing Officer Atty. Rhandolfo Amansec, as follows:

 Consequent to the foregoing findings, the inescapable conclusion is that

the issuance by respondent Norberto Vasquez, Jr. of the Dimson titles which bear a wrong date of registration of OCT 994 constitute Grave Misconduct, and his subsequent insistence that April 19, 1917 is the correct date of registration of OCT 994 constitute[s] Dishonesty in the service. On the other hand, respondent Atty. Yolanda Alfonsos acquiescence in the alteration of the date of registration of OCT No. 994 in the titles of Eleuteria Rivera as well as her act of deliberately ignoring the safeguards enunciated under the law, specially her failure to require the presentation of a subdivision plan duly approved by the Land Registration Authority or by the Land [M]anagement Bureau, for the titles of Eleuteria, are sufficient basis to find her guilty of Grave Misconduct.

 Considering the pervasive adverse consequences of respondents acts,

which impaired the very integrity of the Torrens System which they are duty bound to protect, the extreme penalty of dismissal is hereby recommended for both respondents Atty. Yolanda O. Alfonso   and Mr. Norberto Vasquez, Jr.[22] (Underscoring supplied)  

Subsequently, the records of Administrative Case No. 98-07 were elevated to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for review. On June 14, 1999, then Justice Secretary Serafin R. Cuevas recommended to the OP that petitioner, a presidential appointee, be found guilty of Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty and be dismissed from the service.[23] Pertinent portions of the letter-recommendation read:

 Respondent Alfonso maintains that the said alteration of the date of

registration of OCT 994 was the sole responsibility of respondent Norberto Vasquez, Jr. who ordered the alteration pursuant to the Supreme Court decision in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs. The Court of Appeals, et al., GR No. 103556, 17 November 1992. She claims that the preparation of transfer certificates of titles is essentially a mechanical endeavor with the typist automatically adopting the entries in the titles to be canceled. To examine the entry according to her is no different from proof reading which can be best left to subordinates citing the case of Arias v. Sandiganbayan [180 SCRA 309]. To further support her claim of innocence in the alteration, respondent Alfonso said that upon discovery thereof, she issued several memoranda requiring her subordinates who have participated in the Rivera titles to explain why the alteration was made.It should be noted however that the memoranda were issued after she signed the Rivera titles.

 It is true that respondent Alfonso could not be faulted for carrying over to

TCT No. 312804 an erroneous date of registration of OCT 994 inasmuch as the title from which it was derived from likewise bear the said erroneous date of registration. However, the mere fact that she consented to the acquisition of the property by and signed and issued on 12 August 1996 TCT 312804 in the name of her children adopting   19 April 1917 as the date of registration of OCT 994   knowing the same to be erroneous   as shown by her 20 March 1996 referral of Ms. Roqueta Dimsons application for issuance of certificate of title citing therein the LRA Verification Committee report is a clear case of   dishonesty , malice and bad faith. This is also a clear violation of the Code of Conduct for Public Officials and Employees   prohibiting government officials and employees from having any interest in a transaction requiring their approval.

 x x x x Moreover, respondent Alfonso also violated the provisions of Sections

50, 58 and 92 of P.D. 1529   for failure to require the presentation of (1) the subdivision plan duly approved by the Land Registration Authority or by the Land Management Bureau; and (2) proof of payment of estate of inheritance tax.

 The non-presentation of the owners duplicate of OCT 994 has been

satisfactorily explained by respondent Alfonso as the said presentation was dispensed with by an order of the court.

 

For her failure to require the presentation of a subdivision plan for the three titles of Eleuteria Rivera, respondent Alfonso claims that inasmuch as the issuance of the titles is pursuant to a court order, Sections 50 and 58 of P.D. 1529 do not apply. Said contention of respondent Alfonso is without merit as said sections apply as long as the title to be issued covers only a portion of a bigger tract of land. The presentation of a duly approved subdivision plan is necessary in order to delineate the particular portion of the lot being covered by the new title. Had respondent Alfonso required the presentation of an approved subdivision plan, she could have discovered the defects in the titling of the Rivera property and could have manifested the same in court.

 As to the question regarding the presentation of proof of payment of

inheritance tax, respondent Alfonso claims that no inheritance tax is due on the estate simply because there is no inheritance involved as the titles were issued pursuant to a court order in a judicial partition and the adjudicatee Eleuteria Rivera is very much alive at the time of issuance. Again, this deserves scant consideration. It does not matter whether Eleuteria Rivera is alive or not because the subject matter of inheritance tax is not the estate of Eleuteria Rivera but the transfer of property covered by the subject titles by way of inheritance from the predecessor and alleged parent Maria Concepcion Vidal to the heir who is Eleuteria Rivera.

 x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

 On November 29, 1999, the OP issued Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 99,

[24] ordering the dismissal of petitioner. It found that petitioner had undermined the integrity of the Torrens system by disregarding certain provisions of the law and had virtually compelled certain individuals holding separate titles to litigate to protect their rights. In addition, it was noted that petitioner prima facie appears to have exacted a substantial sum from one Danilo Bonifacio to expedite the release [of] a certificate of title.[25]

 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration before the OP but the same was

denied by Resolution of September 8, 2000.[26]

 In due time, petitioner appealed the decision of the OP, as embodied in A.O.

No. 99, to the CA. She contended that the order of dismissal had no factual and legal bases and that she was not afforded due process especially because issues and matters, which were not agreed upon in the pre-trial conferences and subsequently embodied in the pre-trial order, were admitted and considered.

 

On July 27, 2001, the CA issued the assailed Decision discrediting petitioners claim that she was denied due process, it noting that during the hearing of her administrative case before the LRA, she was given the chance to explain her side, and to submit voluminous documents in her defense, which documentary evidence the DOJ and the OP considered in arriving at their decisions.

 Its own examination of the records, the CA added, did not justify a departure

from the rule that factual findings of lower courts and quasi-judicial bodies command great respect on appeal. Thus, with a lone dissent, that of CA Justice Oswaldo D. Agcaoili, it affirmed A.O. No. 99. [27]

 Hence, this present Petition for review on certiorari.[28]

 Having brought this petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner must be aware that only questions of law may be considered for resolution.[29] It is a well-settled principle that this Court is not a trier of facts, and that respect is generally accorded to the determinations made by administrative bodies,[30] especially where, as in this case, the findings and conclusions of the administrative and executive offices concerned (the LRA, the DOJ and the OP) and those of the CA are similar. 

However, to lay the matter to rest and in the interest of justice, this Court shall set aside the procedural barrier to a re-examination of the facts to resolve the legal issues, which pertain to (1) the alleged violation of petitioners right to due process and (2) the propriety of the order of her dismissal.

 In deciding this administrative case, this Court deems it fit, though, to steer

clear from discussing or passing judgment on the validity of the derivative titles of OCT No. 994, which have spawned a number of cases.[31] Reference to OCT No. 994 is made only to determine the circumstances surrounding the dismissal of petitioner.

 In the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations,[32] this

Court laid down the cardinal primary requirements of due process in administrative proceedings. Foremost of these requisites is the right to a hearing, including the right to present ones case and submit evidence in support thereof.[33] The essence of

due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain ones side or to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[34]

 As aptly observed by the CA, petitioner was given every opportunity to

explain her side and to present evidence in her defense during the administrative investigation conducted by the LRA. Records sufficiently show that in compliance with the show-cause letter of the LRA Administrator, she submitted her written explanation, and that during the pre-trial conferences, she presented documentary evidence.

 Moreover, petitioner moved without fail for the reconsideration of the LRA

Decision, the DOJs recommendation on review, the OPs order of dismissal, and the CA Decision affirming her dismissal from government service. At no instance, therefore, was she deprived of the chance to question the assailed recommendations, order or decision.

 Respecting petitioners contention that the LRA, the DOJ and the OP had

digressed from the issues and matters agreed upon during the pre-trial conferences and thereafter embodied in the pre-trial order, suffice it to point out that technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied in administrative proceedings.[35] At any event, these matters and issues were seasonably addressed by petitioners motions for reconsideration. Hence, the possibility of surprise and maneuvering, which the rule on pre-trial is designed to prevent,[36] has altogether been obviated. Now, the quantum of proof required in an administrative proceeding is only substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[37] The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that the person indicted was responsible for the alleged wrongdoing or misconduct.[38]

 It bears stressing that petitioner stood charged not for changing the date of

registration of OCT No. 994 in TCT Nos. 314535 to 314537, which was established to have been made upon the instructions of then Deputy Register of Deeds Vasquez, Jr. Rather, she was indicted for acquiescing to the change by (1) issuing conflicting certifications on the date of issuance of OCT No. 994; and (2)

for making it appear that there were two OCT Nos. 994. Thus, her protestations that she had no hand in the alteration are unavailing.

 Petitioner herself admits that she had signed TCT Nos. 314535 to 314537,

which were issued in the name of Rivera, with the following statement on the lower portion thereof:

 IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that said land was originally registered on

the 19 th  day of April, in the year nineteen hundred and seventeen in the Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Volume A-9, page 224, as Original Certificate of Title No. 994, pursuant to Decree No. 36455 issued in L.R.C. ________ Record No. 4429, in the name of __________.

 This certificate is a transfer from ORIGINAL Certificate of Title No. 994,

which is cancelled by virtue hereof in so far as the above-described land is concerned.

 x x x x

  

However, she argued that the so-called certifications were mere entries forming part of the titles. Whether it was a certification or a mere statement that she had issued is unnecessary as it does not alter the fact that she signed several TCTs, some reflecting the date of registration of OCT No. 994 as May 3, 1917 and the others as April 19, 1917. 

The facts on record, moreover, show that petitioner had knowledge of circumstances that suggested the existence of an irregularity.

 First. On March 20, 1996, petitioner had, by letter, referred to the LRA

Legal Department the application of Ms. Roqueta Dimson for the issuance of the certificate of title on Lot 23-A of the Maysilo estate, in which Dimson had contended that all previously-issued titles which were derived from OCT No. 994 dated May 3, 1917 were void ab initio.

 In a subsequent letter to the LRA Administrator dated May 2, 1996,[39] she

raised serious doubts over Dimsons request for annotation of a Notice of Lis

Pendens on the certificates of titles of Mt. Carmel Farms, Inc., which were also derived from OCT No. 994. She pointedly stated in her letter, as follows:

 If we allow the registration of the Notice of Lis Pendens of Dimson, what

will prevent her to question all titles derived from OCT No. 994 issued on May 3, 1917.

 To prevent the proliferation of similar request and nuisance suits, may we

request this Authority for its official stand on OCT No. 994 and the Dimson titles. To date, the Dimson titles and their derivative titles [are] still existing and on file at the Registries of Deeds of Kalookan and Malabon despite the Verification Committees findings that they were issued void ab initio.[40]

  

Second. Petitioner wrote Phil-Ville a letter dated September 20, 1996[41] in which she categorically stated that OCT No. 994 was issued pursuant to Decree No. 36455 dated April 19, 1917, and the date of transcription of said decree at the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal was May 3, 1917.

 Third. As CA Justice Agcaoili had correctly observed in his dissent,

petitioner had previously issued certificates of title in the names of other individuals reflecting the true date of issue of OCT No. 994, the mother title, i.e., May 3, 1917.[42]

 In light of these facts, it was indeed surprising that petitioner consented to

the acquisition by her children in July 1996 of a property titled in the name of Norma Dimson Tirado. As a consequence of this acquisition, she issued on August 12, 1996 TCT No. 312804, to which April 19, 1917 was carried over as the date of registration of OCT No. 994.

 Considering the proximity of the issuance of TCT No. 312804 to her letters

of March 20, 1996 and May 2, 1996, it is highly inconceivable that petitioner was unaware of the supposedly altered date of registration of OCT No. 994 that was reflected in her childrens TCT.

 Parenthetically, it was because of the issuance of the TCT in her childrens

favor that petitioner was found by the DOJ to have additionally violated the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,[43] which

prohibits government officials and employees from having any interest in a transaction requiring their approval.

 Even her contention that she was without a remedy to correct an erroneous

entry that had been carried over to the derivative TCT was belied by her filing before the RTC, Branch 120, Caloocan City, in Civil Case No. C-424, of a Petition dated January 1997[44] for the correction of the erroneous entries of 19th and April on the blank spaces in the certification portion of Riveras titles. Invoking Section 108[45] of P.D. No. 1529, she manifested that the correct dates were 3 rd and May because these are the dates appearing in the original of OCT No. 994 on file in the registry.

 As for petitioners next contention that the issuance of Riveras titles merely

involved the mechanical procedure of transferring the dates contained in the derivative titles which she, as head of office, had every right to rely on the bona fides of her subordinates, the same deserves scant consideration.

 Unlike in Arias v. Sandiganbayan,[46] upon which petitioner relies for

jurisprudential support, petitioners foreknowledge of facts and circumstances that suggested an irregularity constituted added reason[47] for her to exercise a greater degree of circumspection before signing and issuing the titles.

 Arias and the subsequent case of Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan[48] were held

inapplicable in Escara v. People[49] because the person indicted therein had foreknowledge of the existence of an anomaly that should have put him on guard regarding the transaction.

 It may not be amiss to mention that even Justice Agcaoili, in his dissent to

the assailed CA Decision, observed petitioners failure to take precautionary measures, thus:

 x x x Considering the notoriety of the Maysilo estate as the mother of all

land titling scams, the irregularity attending the issuance of the titles could have been avoided had petitioner exercised a little more due care and circumspection before she affixed her signature [on the Rivera titles]. The fact that the Maysilo estate has spawned conflicting claims of ownership which invariably reached the courts, a fact which petitioner cannot ignore on account of her long exposure and

experience as a register of deeds, should have impelled petitioner to be more prudent even to the extent of deliberately holding action on the papers submitted to her relative to the estate until she shall have fully satisfied herself that everything was above board. x x x

 

x x x xIf petitioner had made further investigation (in the light of her previous

certifications and the notoriety of the Maysilo estate as a potential breeding ground of titling irregularities) and, thus, made a timely discovery of the error in the questioned entry, but still was in doubt on how to proceed, she could have easily referred the matter to the LRA Administrator en consulta as authorized by Section 117 of PD No. 1529 x x x.[50] (Emphasis in the original)

  Petitioners claim that the issuance of Riveras TCTs was her ministerial duty

in accordance with the final and executory order of the trial court, deserves scant consideration too insofar as the carrying over of the technical descriptions contained in Judge Discayas order was concerned.

  The date of registration of OCT No. 994, however, was a different matter.

To note, Riveras owners duplicate certificates of title were not submitted to the register of deeds for cancellation as required in Section 53[51] of P.D. No. 1529 because Judge Discayas Order of September 17, 1996 had excused the submission of the duplicate certificates. Hence, it was left to petitioners office to supply the date of registration of OCT No. 994 upon verification of the copy it had on file.

 For this reason, Deputy Register of Deeds Vasquez, Jr. wrote in pencil the

missing information on the blank spaces, according to clerk Nelda Zacarias.[52] Vasquez, Jr. admitted in his February 21, 1997 reply-memorandum to petitioner that he had instructed one of the employees to change [the date] from May 3, 1917 to April 19, 1917. [53]

 The observations of the LRA and the DOJ on petitioners failure to require

the presentation of the subdivision plan for Riveras three titles are in keeping with the provisions of Sections 50 and 58 of P.D. No. 1529, as follows:

 SEC. 50. Subdivision and consolidation plans. Any owner subdividing a

tract of registered land into lots which do not constitute a subdivision project as

defined and provided for under P.D. 957, shall file with the Commissioner of Land Registration or with the Bureau of Lands a subdivision plan of such land on which all boundaries, streets, passageways and waterways, if any, shall be distinctly and accurately delineated.

 If a subdivision plan, be it simple or complex, duly approved by the

Commissioner of Land Registration or the Bureau of Lands together with the approved technical descriptions and the corresponding owners duplicate certificate of title is presented for registration, the Register of Deeds shall, without requiring further court approval of said plan, register the same in accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act, as amended. x x x

x x x x SEC. 58. Procedure where conveyance involves portion of land. If a deed

of conveyance is for a part of the land described in a certificate of title, the Register of Deeds shall not enter any transfer certificate of title to the grantee until a plan of such land showing all the portions or lots into which it has been subdivided and the corresponding technical descriptions shall have been verified and approved pursuant to Section 50 of this Decree. x x x

 Upon the approval of the plan and technical descriptions, the original

of the plan, together with a certified copy of the technical descriptions shall be filed with the Register of Deeds   for annotation in the corresponding certificate of title and thereupon said officer shall issue a new certificate of title to the grantee for the portion conveyed, and at the same time cancel the grantors certificate partially with respect only to the said portion conveyed. x x x

 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

  

It is clearly evident from the above provisions that for petitioner- register of deeds to issue a new certificate of title, she must require the submission of the approved subdivision plan together with the approved technical descriptions and the corresponding owners duplicate certificate of title. Therefore, she could not have dispensed with the submission of the subdivision plan and relied solely on the technical descriptions provided in the courts Order.

 Likewise, this Court holds that petitioner should have required proof of

payment of inheritance tax over the portions that were transferred to Rivera because these lots were conveyances from the estate of her alleged grandmother, Maria Consolacion Vidal, in whose name the lots were originally registered under OCT No. 994.

 The following disquisition of the DOJ is thus noted with approval:

  As to the question regarding the presentation of proof of payment of

inheritance tax, respondent Alfonso claims that no inheritance tax is due on the estate simply because there is no inheritance involved as the titles were issued pursuant to a court order in a judicial partition and the adjudicatee Eleuteria Rivera is very much alive at the time of issuance. Again, this deserves scant consideration. It does not matter whether Eleuteria Rivera is alive or not because the subject matter of inheritance tax is not the estate of Eleuteria Rivera but the transfer of property covered by the subject titles by way of inheritance   from the predecessor and alleged parent Maria Concepcion Vidal to the heir who is Eleuteria Rivera. (Underscoring supplied)  The alleged iniquity between the penalty of dismissal meted on petitioner

and the one-year suspension of Vasquez, Jr. is an issue that cannot be resolved in this petition in the absence of facts concerning the administrative proceedings against the latter.

 A final matter. In light of the Affidavit of Desistance executed by Danilo

Bonifacio[54] before the DOJ, the additional circumstance (which the OP had considered in its Decision) that petitioner had allegedly accepted money in exchange for the issuance of a title has become a non-issue against her.

 Serious misconduct, as a valid cause for the dismissal of an employee, is

improper or wrong conduct; the transgression of some established and definite rule of action; a forbidden act or dereliction of duty, which is willful and intentional neglect and not mere error in judgment.[55] It must be grave and aggravated in character and not merely trivial or unimportant.[56] In addition, it must be directly related and/or connected to the performance of official duties.[57] Without question, all of these requisites are present in this case. Petitioner is thus administratively liable for serious misconduct. Petitioner is liable too for dishonesty defined in Civil Service Commission v. Cayobit[58] as . . . the concealment or distortion of truth in a matter of fact relevant to ones office or connected with the performance of his duty. 

It goes without saying that by failing to prevent the irregularity that she had reason to suspect all along or to take immediate steps to rectify it, petitioner had tolerated the same and allowed it to wreak havoc on our land-titling system. Sadly, that confusion continues to rear its ugly head to this day.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

 Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

 

 

SECOND DIVISION

 

 

BIENVENIDO CASTILLO, G.R. No. 182980Petitioner,

Present:

- versus -

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*

ABAD,

MENDOZA, and

SERENO,** JJ.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

Promulgated:

June 22, 2011

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

 

D E C I S I O N

 

CARPIO, J.:

 

The Case

 

Petitioner Bienvenido Castillo (Bienvenido) filed the present petition for review on certiorari1 of the Decision2 dated 23 October 2007 as well as the Resolution3 dated 7 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals (appellate court) in CA-G.R. CV No. 81916. The appellate court reversed the Decision4 dated 3 October 2003 of Branch 22, Regional Trial Court of Malolos,Bulacan (trial court) in P-111-2002. The trial court ordered the reconstitution of the original copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-16755 as well as the issuance of another owners duplicate copy, in the name of the registered owner and in the same terms and conditions as the original, in lieu of the lost original copy.

 

The Facts

Bienvenido filed on 7 March 2002 a Petition for Reconstitution and Issuance of Second Owners Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-16755. The petition reads as follows:

 

1. That petitioner is of legal age, Filipino, widower and with residence and postal address at Poblacion, Pulilan, Bulacan;

2. That petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated at Paltao, Pulilan, Bulacan covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-16755, a zerox [sic] copy of which is hereto attached as Annex A;

3. That the zerox [sic] copy of technical description and subdivision plan of the parcel of land with an area of 50,199 [square meters] (Lot 6-A) are hereto attached as Annexes B and C;

4. That the original copy of the said certificate of title on file with the Register of Deeds of Bulacan was lost and/or destroyed during the fire on March 7, 1987 in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan, certification from the said office is hereto attached as Annex D;

5. That, the owners copy of the said certificate of title was likewise lost and all efforts to locate the same proved futile and in vain, copy of the the [sic] Affidavit of Loss is hereto attached as Annex E;

6. That no co-owners copy of duplicate of the same certificate has been issued;

7. The names and addresses of the boundary owners of said lot are the following:

a. West - Jorge Peralta

b. North - Lorenzo Calderon

c. South - Lorenzo Calderon

d. East - Melvin & Marlon Reyes

with postal address at Poblacion, Pulilan, Bulacan;

8. That said property has been declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 97-19001-00019, zerox [sic] copy of which is hereto attached as Annex F;

9. That the real estate tax for the current year has been paid per official receipt no. 0287074, zerox [sic] copy of which is hereto attached as Annex G;

10. That said property is free from all liens and encumbrances;

11. That there exist no deeds or instruments affecting the said property which has been presented for and pending registration with the Register of Deeds of Bulacan;

 

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that after due notice and hearing judgment be rendered:

1. Declaring the Original Owners Duplicate Certificate of Title No. T-16755 that was lost as null and void;

2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to issue second owners duplicate copy of the said certificate of title upon payment of proper fees.5

 

The trial court furnished the Land Registration Authority (LRA) with a duplicate copy of Bienvenidos petition and its Annexes, with a note stating that No Tracing Cloth of Plan [sic] and Blue print of plan attached.6 As requested by the LRA in its letter dated 17 April 2002,7 the trial court ordered Bienvenido to submit within 15 days from receipt of the order (a) the original of the technical description of the parcel of land covered by the lost/destroyed certificate of title, certified by the authorized officer of the Land Management Bureau/Land Registration Authority and two duplicate copies thereof, and (b) the sepia film plan of the subject parcel of land prepared by a duly licensed Geodetic Engineer, who shall certify thereon that its preparation was made on the basis of a certified technical description, and two blue print copies thereof.8 Bienvenido complied with the order.9

 

The trial court, in an order dated 7 August 2002, ordered Bienvenido to supply the names and addresses of the occupants of the subject property.10 Bienvenido manifested that there is no actual occupant in the subject property.11

 

On 4 October 2002, the trial court issued an order which found Bienvenidos petition sufficient in form and substance and set the same for hearing.12

 

Copies of the 4 October 2002 order were posted on three bulletin boards: at the Bulacan Provincial Capitol Building, at the Pulilan Municipal Building, and at the Bulacan Regional Trial Court.13 The 4 October 2002 order was also published twice in the Official Gazette: on 13 January 2003 (Volume 99, Number 2, Pages 237 to 238), and on 20 January 2003 (Volume 99, Number 3, Pages 414 to 415).14 After two cancellations,15 a hearing was conducted on 12 March 2003.

 

During the hearing, the following were marked in evidence for jurisdictional requirements:

 

Exhibit A - Order of the Court dated 4 October 2002

Exhibit A-1 - Second page of the Order of the Court dated 4 October 2002

Exhibit A-2 - Third page of the Order of the Court dated 4 October 2002

Exhibit A-3 - Registry return receipt of notice to the Office of the Solicitor General

Exhibit A-4 - Registry return receipt of notice to the Land Registration Authority

Exhibit A-5 - Registry return receipt of notice to the Register of Deeds

Exhibit A-6 - Registry return receipt of notice to the Public Prosecutor

Exhibit A-7 - Registry return receipt of notice to boundary owner Jorge Peralta

Exhibit A-8 - Registry return receipt of notice to boundary owner Lorenzo Calderon

Exhibit A-9 - Registry return receipt of notice to boundary owners Melvin and Marlon Reyes

Exhibit B - Certificate of Posting

Exhibit C - Certificate of Publication from the Director of the National Printing Office

Exhibit D - Official Gazette, Volume 99, Number 2, 13 January 2003

Exhibit D-1 - Page 237, Publication of the trial courts Order dated 4 October 2002

Exhibit D-2 - Page 238, Publication of the trial courts Order dated 4 October 2002

Exhibit E - Official Gazette, Volume 99, Number 3, 20 January 2003

 

Exhibit E-1 - Page 414, Publication of the trial courts Order dated 4 October 2002

Exhibit E-2 - Page 415, Publication of the trial courts Order dated 4 October 200216

 

Fernando Castillo (Fernando), Bienvenidos son and attorney-in-fact, testified on his fathers behalf. During the course of his testimony, Fernando identified the following:

 

Exhibit F - Photocopy of TCT No. T-16755

Exhibit G - Blueprint of the subject property

Exhibit H - Technical description of the property

Exhibit I - Affidavit of Loss executed by Bienvenido Castillo

Exhibit I-1 - Entry of the Affidavit of Loss in the book of the Register of Deeds

Exhibit J - Certification issued by the Office of the Register of Deeds, Malolos, Bulacan that TCT No. T-16755 was burned in a fire on 7 March 1987

Exhibit K - Tax declaration

Exhibit L - 2002 Real Estate Tax Receipt

 

Upon presentation of the photocopy of TCT No. T-16755, Fernando stated that the title was issued in the names of his parents, Bienvenido Castillo and Felisa Cruz (Felisa), and that his mother died in 1982. Fernando did not mention any sibling. Fernando further testified that on 6 February 2002, Bienvenido executed an Affidavit of Loss which stated that he misplaced the owners copy of the certificate of title sometime in April 1993 and that all efforts to locate the same proved futile. The title is free from all liens and encumbrances, and there are no other persons claiming interest over the land.17

 

The LRA submitted a Report dated 25 July 2003, portions of which the trial court quoted in its Decision. The LRA stated that:

 

(2) The plan and technical description of Lot 6-A of the subdivision plan Psd-37482 were verified correct by this Authority to represent the aforesaid lot and the same have been approved under (LRA) PR-03-00321-R pursuant to the provisions of Section 12 of Republic Act No. 26.

 

WHEREFORE, the foregoing information anent the lot in question is respectfully submitted for consideration in the resolution of the instant petition, and if the Honorable Court, after notice and hearing, finds justification pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 26 to grant the same, the plan and technical description having been approved, may be used as basis for the inscription of the technical description on the reconstituted certificate. Provided, however, that in case the petition is granted, the reconstituted title should be made subject to such encumbrances as may be subsisting; and provided further, that no certificate of title covering the same parcel of land exists in the office of the Register of Deeds concerned.18

 

The Trial Courts Ruling

 

On 3 October 2003, the trial court promulgated its Decision in favor of Bienvenido. The trial court found valid justifications to grant Bienvenidos petition as the same is in order and meritorious.

 

The dispositive portion reads:

 

WHEREFORE, the Register of Deeds for the province of Bulacan is hereby ordered, upon payment of the prescribed fees, to reconstitute the original copy of Original Certificate of Title No. 16755 and to issue another owners duplicate copy thereof, in the name of the registered owner and in the same terms and conditions as the original thereof, pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No. 26, as amended by P.D. No. 1529, in lieu of the lost original copy. The new original copy shall in all respects be accorded the same validity and legal effect as the lost original copy for all intents and purposes. Provided, that no certificate of title covering the same parcel of land exists in the office of the Register of Deeds concerned.

 

SO ORDERED.19

 

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Notice of Appeal on 18 November 2003. The OSG stated that it was grave error for the trial court to order reconstitution despite absence of any prayer seeking such relief in the petition and on the basis of a mere photocopy of TCT No. T-16755. Counsel for Bienvenido filed a motion for early resolution on 25 January 2006.

 

The Appellate Courts Ruling

 

On 23 October 2007, the appellate court rendered its Decision which reversed the 3 October 2003 Decision of the trial court. Bienvenidos counsel withdrew from the case on 11 October 2007 and was substituted by Mondragon and Montoya Law Offices.

 

The appellate court ruled that even if Bienvenido failed to specifically include a prayer for the reconstitution of TCT No. T-16755, the petition is captioned as In re: Petition for Reconstitution and Issuance of Second Owners Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-16755, Bienvenido Castillo, Petitioner. The prayer for such other reliefs and remedies just and proper under the premises is broad and comprehensive enough to justify the extension of a remedy different from that prayed for.

 

However, the appellate court still ruled that the trial court erred in ordering the reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. T-16755 and the issuance of another owners duplicate copy thereof in the name of the registered owner. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 26 specified the order of sources from which transfer certificates of title may be reconstituted, andBienvenido failed to comply with the order. Moreover, the documentary evidences presented before the trial court were insufficient to support reconstitution. The loss of the original copy on file with the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan may be credible, but Bienvenido failed to adequately explain the circumstances which led to the loss of the owners copy. The tax declaration presented is not a conclusive evidence of ownership, but merely indicates possession. The plan and technical description of the property are merely additional documents that must accompany the petition for the LRAs verification and approval.

 

The dispositive portion of the appellate courts Decision reads:

 

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated October 3, 2003 of Branch 22, RTC of Malolos, Bulacan in P-111-2002 is hereby SET ASIDE and a new judgment is entered dismissing the Petition therein.

 

SO ORDERED.20

 

On 3 December 2007, Bienvenidos counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or for New Trial.21 The motion asserted that Bienvenido presented sufficient documents to warrant reconstitution of TCT No. T-16755. Aside from the photocopy of TCT No. T-16755, Fernando presented the plan and technical description approved by the LRA. Moreover, to support the Motion for New Trial, Fernando went through Bienvenidos papers and found the Deed of Absolute Sale22 from the original owner, Elpidio Valencia, to spouses Bienvenido andFelisa. Fernando also found the cancellation of mortgage23 of the property covered by TCT No. T-16755 issued by the Development Bank of the Philippines. Fernando also submitted a copy of the Extra-Judicial Partition24 by and among the heirs of his mother. The property covered by TCT No. T-16755 was partitioned among Bienvenido, Fernando, and Fernandos siblings Emma Castillo Bajet (Emma) and Elpidio Castillo (Elpidio).

 

In Fernandos affidavit attached to the Motion for Reconsideration and/or for New Trial, Fernando stated, but without presenting any proof, that Bienvenido passed away at the age of 91 on 14 February 2006.

 

 

The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the Motion for Reconsideration and/or for New Trial. Bienvenidos petition failed to satisfy Section 3(f) of R.A. No. 26. The Affidavit of Loss is hearsay because Bienvenido failed to affirm it in court. Therefore, the loss of the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-16755 is not established. The plan and technical description approved by the LRA are not independent sources of reconstitution and are mere supporting documents. The documents submitted in support of the Motion for New Trial are not newly discovered, but could have been discovered earlier by exercise of due diligence.

 

In its Resolution25 dated 7 May 2008, the appellate court denied the Motion for Reconsideration and/or for New Trial.

 

Issues

 

 

The following were assigned as errors of the appellate court:

 

I. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that the documentary evidence presented by petitioner in the lower court are insufficient to support the reconstitution prayed for.

 

II. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that petitioner failed to establish the circumstances which led to the loss of his duplicate owners copy of TCT No. T-16755.

 

III. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that there is no merit in the motion for new trial filed by petitioner.26

 

The Courts Ruling

 

The petition must fail. There can be no reconstitution as the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the present case.

 

Process of Reconstitution of

Transfer Certificates of Title under R.A. No. 26

 

Section 3 of R.A. No. 26 enumerates the sources from which transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted. Section 3 reads:

 

Sec. 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:

(a) The owners duplicate of the certificate of title;

(b) The co-owners, mortgagees, or lessees duplicate of the certificate of title;

(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;

(d) The deed of transfer or other document, on file in the registry of deeds, containing the description of the property, or an authenticated copy thereof, showing that its original had been registered, and pursuant to which the lost or destroyed transfer certificate of title was issued;

(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the description of which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased, or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had been registered; and

(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.

 

 

Bienvenido already admitted that he cannot comply with Section 3(a) to 3(e), and that 3(f) is his last recourse. Bienvenido, through Fernandos testimony, presented a photocopy of TCT No. T-16755 before the trial court. The owners original duplicate copy was lost, while the original title on file with the Register of Deeds of Malolos, Bulacan was burned in a fire on 7 March 1987. The property was neither mortgaged nor leased at the time of Bienvenidos loss of the owners original duplicate copy.

 

Section 12 of R.A. No. 26 describes the requirements for a petition for reconstitution. Section 12 reads:

 

Sec. 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), and/or 3(f) of this Act, shall be filed with the proper Court of First Instance, by the registered owner, his assigns, or any person having an interest in the property. The petition shall state or contain, among other things, the following: (a) that the owners duplicate of the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-owners, mortgagees, or lessees duplicate had

been issued, or, if any had been issued, the same had been lost or destroyed; (c) the location and boundaries of the property; (d) the nature and description of the building or improvements, if any, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names and addresses of the owners of such buildings or improvements; (e) the names and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, of the owners of the adjoining properties and of all persons who may have any interest in the property; (f) a detailed description of the encumbrances, if any, affecting the property; and (g) a statement that no deeds or other instruments affecting the property have been presented for registration, or if there be any, the registration thereof has not been accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or authenticated copies thereof, to be introduced in evidence in support to the petition for reconstitution shall be attached thereto and filed with the same: Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in Section 2(f) or 3(f) of this Act, the petition shall be further accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property duly approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration office (now Commission of Land Registration) or with a certified copy of the description taken from a prior certificate of title covering the same property.

 

 

We compared the requirements of Section 12 to the allegations in Bienvenidos petition. Bienvenidos petition complied with items (a), (b), (f) and (g): in paragraph 5 of the petition, he alleged the loss of his copy of TCT No. T-16755; paragraph 6 declared that no co-owners copy of the duplicate title has been issued; paragraph 10 stated that the property covered by the lost TCT is free from liens and encumbrances; and paragraph 11 stated that there are no deeds or instruments presented for or pending registration with the Register of Deeds. There was substantial compliance as to item (c): the location of the property is mentioned in paragraph 2; while the boundaries of the property, although not specified in the petition, refer to an annex attached to the petition. The petition did not mention anything pertaining to item (d). There was a failure to fully comply with item (e). By Fernandos admission, there exist two other co-owners of the property covered by TCT No. T-16755. Fernandos siblings Emma and Elpidio were not mentioned anywhere in the petition.

Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 prescribes the requirements for a notice of hearing of the petition:

 

Sec. 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the preceding section, to be published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the provincial building and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land is situated, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing.

The court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein whose address is known, at least thirty days prior to the date of the hearing. Said notice shall state, among other things, the number of the lost or destroyed certificate of title, if known, the name of the registered owner, the names of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, the owners of the adjoining properties and all other interested parties, the location area and boundaries of the property, and the date on which all persons having any interest therein must appear and file their claim or objections to the petition. The petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting and service of the notice as directed by the court.

 

The trial courts 4 October 2002 Order was indeed posted in the places mentioned in Section 13, and published twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette: Volume 99, Number 2 dated 13 January 2003 and Volume 99, Number 3 dated 20 January 2003. The last issue was released by the National Printing Office on 21 January 2003.27 The notice, however, did not state Felisa as a registered co-owner. Neither did the notice identify Fernandos siblings Emma and Elpidio as interested parties.

 

The non-compliance with the requirements prescribed in Sections 12 and 13 of R.A. No. 26 is fatal. Hence, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition for reconstitution. We cannot stress enough that our jurisprudence is replete with rulings regarding the mandatory character of the requirements of R.A. No. 26. As early as 1982, we ruled:

 

Republic Act No. 26 entitled An act providing a special procedure for the reconstitution of Torrens Certificates of Title lost or destroyed approved on September 25, 1946 confers jurisdiction or authority to the Court of First Instance to hear and decide petitions for judicial reconstitution. The Act specifically provides the special requirements and mode of procedure that must be followed before the court can properly act, assume and acquire jurisdiction or authority over the petition and grant the reconstitution prayed for. These requirements and procedure are mandatory. The Petition for Reconstitution must allege certain specific jurisdictional facts; the notice of hearing must be published in the Official Gazette and posted in particular places and the same sent or notified to specified persons. Sections 12 and 13 of the Act provide specifically the mandatory requirements and procedure to be followed.28

 

 

We cannot simply dismiss these defects as technical. Liberal construction of the Rules of Court does not apply to land registration cases.29 Indeed, to further underscore the mandatory character of these jurisdictional requirements, the Rules of Court do not apply to land registration cases.30 In all cases where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a statute, and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is prescribed by a statute, the mode of proceeding is mandatory, and must be strictly complied with, or the proceeding will be utterly void.31 When the trial court lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case, it lacks authority over the whole case and all its aspects.32 All the proceedings before the trial court, including its order granting the petition for reconstitution, are void for lack of jurisdiction.33

 

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 23 October 2007 and the Resolution dated 7 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81916.

 

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22486             March 20, 1968

TEODORO ALMIROL, petitioner-appellant, vs.THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF AGUSAN, respondent-appellee.

Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. for petitioner-appellant.Office of the Solicitor General for respondent-appellee.

CASTRO, J.:

          On June 28, 1961 Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of land situated in the municipality of Esperanza, province of Agusan, and covered by original certificate of title P-1237 in the name of "Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo." Sometime in May, 1962 Almirol went to the office of the Register of Deeds of Agusan in Butuan City to register the deed of sale and to secure in his name a transfer certificate of title. Registration was refused by the Register of Deeds upon the following grounds, inter alia, stated in his letter of May 21, 1962:

1. That Original Certificate of Title No. P-1237 is registered in the name of Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo, and by legal presumption, is considered conjugal property;

2. That in the sale of a conjugal property acquired after the effectivity of the New Civil Code it is necessary that both spouses sign the document; but

3. Since, as in this case, the wife has already died when the sale was made, the surviving husband can not dispose of the whole property without violating the existing law (LRC Consulta No. 46 dated June 10, 1958).

          To effect the registration of the aforesaid deed of absolute Sale, it is necessary that the property be first liquidated and transferred in the name of the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased wife by means of extrajudicial settlement or partition and that the consent of such other heir or heirs must be procured by means of another document ratifying this sale executed by their father.

          In view of such refusal, Almirol went to the Court of First Instance of Agusan on a petition for mandamus(sp. civ. case 151), to compel the Register of Deeds to register the deed of sale and to issue to him the corresponding transfer certificate of title, and to recover P5,000 in moral damages and P1,000 attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. It is Almirol's assertion that it is but a ministerial duty of the respondent to perform the acts required of him, and that he (Almirol) has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

          In his answer with counterclaim for P10,000 damages, the respondent reiterated the grounds stated in his letter of May 21, 1962, averred that the petitioner has "other legal, plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law by appealing the decision of the respondent to the Honorable Commissioner of Land Registration," and prayed for dismissal of the petition.

          In its resolution of October 16, 1963 the lower court, declaring that "mandamus does not lie . . . because the adequate remedy is that provided by Section 4 of Rep. Act 1151", dismissed the petition, with costs against the petitioner.

          Hence the present appeal by Almirol.

          The only question of law tendered for resolution is whether mandamus will lie to compel the respondent to register the deed of sale in question.

          Although the reasons relied upon by the respondent evince a sincere desire on his part to maintain inviolate the law on succession and transmission of rights over real properties, these do not constitute legal grounds for his refusal to register the deed. Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the register of deeds to determine; this function belongs properly to a court of competent jurisdiction.1

          Whether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to harass, is not the duty of a Register of Deeds to decide, but a court of competent jurisdiction. (Gabriel vs. Register of Deeds of Rizal, et al., L-17956, Sept. 30, 1953).

          . . . the supposed invalidity of the contracts of lease is no valid objection to their registration, because invalidity is no proof of their non-existence or a valid excuse for denying their registration. The law on registration does not require that only valid instruments shall be registered. How can parties affected thereby be supposed to know their invalidity before they become aware, actually or constructively, of their existence or of their provisions? If the purpose of registration is merely to give notice, then questions regarding the effect or invalidity of instruments are expected to be decided after, not before,

registration. It must follow as a necessary consequence that registration must first be allowed, and validity or effect litigated afterwards. (Gurbax Singh Pablo & Co. vs. Reyes and Tantoco, 92 Phil. 182-183).

          Indeed, a register of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of Republic Act 1151 from exercising his personal judgment and discretion when confronted with the problem of whether to register a deed or instrument on the ground that it is invalid. For under the said section, when he is in doubt as to the proper step to be taken with respect to any deed or other instrument presented to him for registration, all that he is supposed to do is to submit and certify the question to the Commissioner of Land Registration who shall, after notice and hearing, enter an order prescribing the step to be taken on the doubtful question. Section 4 of R.A. 1151 reads as follows:

          Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land Registration. — When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or memorandum to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage, or other instrument presented to him for registration, or where any party in interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds with reference to any such matter, the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration either upon the certification of the Register of Deeds, stating the question upon which he is in doubt, or upon the suggestion in writing by the party in interest; and thereupon the Commissioner, after consideration of the matter shown by the records certified to him, and in case of registered lands, after notice to the parties and hearing, shall enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made. His decision in such cases shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds: Provided, further, That when a party in interest disagrees with the ruling or resolution of the Commissioner and the issue involves a question of law, said decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty days from and after receipt of the notice thereof.

          The foregoing notwithstanding, the court a quo correctly dismissed the petition for mandamus. Section 4 abovequoted provides that "where any party in interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds . . . the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration," who thereafter shall "enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made," which shall be "conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds." This administrative remedy must be resorted to by the petitioner before he can have recourse to the courts.

          ACCORDINGLY, the Resolution of the lower court of October 16, 1969, is affirmed, at petitioner's cost. 1äwphï1.ñ

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

 

A.M. No. RTJ-92-836 August 2, 1995

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs.JUDGE JESUS V. MATAS, RTC, Branch 2, Tagum, Davao del Norte (acting Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 18, Digos Davao del Sur) and EDUARDO C. TORRES, JR., OIC, Clerk of Court, RTC, Tagum, Davao del Norte, respondents.

 

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In his Memorandum dated 26 February 1992, then Deputy Court Administrator, now Court Administrator, Ernani Cruz Paño informed the Court of a letter he received from Atty. Ma Dolores L. Balajadia, Deputy Clerk of Court, Third Division of the Sandiganbayan, notifying his office that Judge Jesus V. Matas and Eduardo C. Torres, Jr. were accused in Criminal Case No. 17378 of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. He then recommended that the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) be authorized to file the proper administrative charges against Judge Matas and Torres, provided that, pending the outcome of Criminal Case No. 17378, proceedings in the administrative case be suspended after the filing by the respondents of their comment.

The said recommendation having been approved, the OCA filed with this Court an administrative complaint charging the herein respondents with the violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act committed as follows:

1. That on or about the month of March, 1987 respondents Judge Jesus V. Matas, Eduardo Torres, Jr., OIC Clerk of Court and in connivance with private citizen George Mercado concealed from J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises his (George Mercado's) knowledge of the petition for the issuance of new owner's duplicate copies OCT Nos. P-12658, 12659, P-12661 and T-9857, and filed Misc. Case No. 1626 before the sala of respondent Judge and took cognizance of the same notwithstanding the fact that his Court has no jurisdiction over Kapalong and Sto. Tomas, Davao where subject properties covered by the aforesaid titles where located.

2. That notwithstanding the fact that the properties are owned by J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises, respondent Judge issued an Order directing the posting of said Order and petition for at least ten days prior to the scheduled hearing on April 20, 1987 at the Office of the Clerk of Court, the Municipal Hall, Barangay Hall or Barangay School where the properties are located;

3. That thereafter on April 6, 1987 respondent Judge likewise issued an Order directing only the Station Commander of Sto. Tomas, Davao to comply with the posting despite the fact that some of the properties involved in Misc. Case No. 1626 are situated in Kapalong, Davao; and

4. That a day after the hearing where J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises was not present, respondent Judge forthwith issued an Order for the issuance by the Register of Deeds of Davao of new owner's duplicate of aforesaid titles to George Mercado thus, causing injury to J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises whose owner's duplicate copies in its possession were cancelled without due process.

Attached thereto is the original copy of the information in Criminal Case No. 17378 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Judge Jesus V. Matas, RTC, Branch 2, Tagum, Davao del Norte (Acting Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 18, Digos, Davao del Sur) and Eduardo Torres, Jr., OIC Clerk of Court, RTC, Tagum, Davao, et al."

After the filing by the respondents of their separate verified answers, this Court referred the case to Associate Justice Jorge S. Imperial of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report, and recommendation.

On 17 December 1992, the OCA received respondent Torres's motion to dismiss the complaint as against him on the ground of mootness because he had ceased to be employed in the judiciary and had been cleared of all his accountability with the Supreme Court as of 13 April 1992. The Court referred this motion on 26 January 1993 to Justice Imperial for inclusion in his investigation, report, and recommendation. It turned out, however, that the said motion had been filed with the Court of Appeals as early as 14 November 1992 and had already been denied by Justice Imperial in his resolution of 6 January 1993 in the light of this Court's ruling in Administrative Case No. 223-J (Perez vs. Abiera, 11 June 1975).

The hearing of the case commenced on 11 January 1993. However, after having presented two witnesses, the counsel for the private complainant and the OCA representative moved for a suspension of the proceedings because they intended to amend the complaint. Justice Imperial granted the motion and gave the complainants ten days within which to file with this Court the amended complaint.

The complainants then submitted to this Court an amended complaint adding the following grounds for administrative discipline, viz.:

(a) gross inexcusable negligence, and

(b) gross ignorance of law.

and modifying portions of the specification of the charges by:

(a) Deleting from paragraph 1 of the original complaint the word Kapalong;

(b) Deleting the original paragraph 3 and making as the new paragraph 3 the original paragraph 4 which was modified to read as follows:

3. That a day after the hearing where J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises was not present, respondent Judge, acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, with undue haste and/or gross inexcusable negligence, to favor George Mercado, and grossly ignorant of the laws involved, and knowingly fully well that his order dated 24, 1987 [sic] was not complied with, forthwith issued an order dated April 21, 1987 for the issuance of the Register of Deeds of Davao of new owner's duplicate of aforesaid titles, which George Mercado caused to be cancelled later when he registered the deeds of sale over the said properties in his favor, thus, causing injury to J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises whose owner's duplicate copies in its possession were cancelled because of fraudulent acts of respondents and without due process.

Attached thereto is the amended information in criminal Case No. 17378 before the Sandiganbayan.

This Court admitted the amended complaint, forwarded it to Justice Imperial, and required the respondents to file their respective comments thereon.

Respondent Torres filed his comment (denominated as Answer). Respondent Judge Matas, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss, which this Court referred to Justice Imperial for inclusion in his investigation, report, and recommendation. The investigating Justice deferred the resolution thereof

until the termination of the investigation. Later respondent Judge Matas filed his comment on the amended complaint.

Thereafter, the hearing was continued with the parties submitting, per their agreement, their evidence in the form of affidavits to which were attached all pertinent supporting documents.

The hearing ended on 8 August 1994, and the parties submitted their respective lengthy memoranda. Not to be outdone, Justice Imperial submitted a 44-page report, typed single-space on legal size bond paper wherein he patiently narrated the minute details of the antecedent facts and meticulously analyzed the arguments of the parties on the issues involved, namely:

1. Whether or not the respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of Miscellaneous Case No. 1626;

2. Whether or not respondent Judge acted with gross and inexcusable negligence and gross ignorance of law when he took cognizance of and decided Miscellaneous Case No. 1626 in favor of petitioner therein, George Mercado;

3. Whether or not respondents conspired with George Mercado to conceal from J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises the pendency of Miscellaneous Case No. 1626.

As to the first issue, the respondent Judge argues that the parcels of land subject of Miscellaneous Case No. 1626 are located in Kapalong, Davao del Norte. The so-called Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Davao del Norte, where the said parcels are claimed to be located never legally existed as a municipality because it was carved out of Kapalong and created into a separate municipality by then President Carlos P. Garcia and not by Congress. Conformably with Pelaez vs. Auditor General (15 SCRA 569 [1965]), the creation of the Municipality of Sto. Tomas is void since 1 January 1960 upon the effectivity of R.A. No. 2370. That Sto. Tomas does not legally exist as a municipality was affirmed in the decision of this Court of 29 September 1988 in Municipality of Kapalong vs.Hon. Felix L. Moya (166 SCRA 70 [1988]). Since the subject parcels of land are in fact located in Kapalong, the same are within the administrative area over which his court, Branch I of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao del Norte, can exercise jurisdiction pursuant to Administrative Order No. 7.

The respondent Judge adds that, even granting for the sake of argument, that the Municipality of Sto. Tomas legally exists and is within the administrative area of Branch IV, RTC of Davao del Norte, his court can still exercise jurisdiction over the case because one of the parcels involved is located in Kapalong, a fact recognized in the original administrative complaint. Furthermore, Miscellaneous Case No. 1626 is not a real action but a personal one, and it being so, his court has jurisdiction over it, since the petitioner therein, George Mercado, is a resident of Kapalong.

In resolving the first issue, Justice Imperial adopts the ratiocinations of the Sandiganbayan in its denial of the respondent Judge's motion to quash the information in Criminal Case No. 17378 that at the time he committed the questioned acts in Miscellaneous Case No. 1626, the Municipality of Sto. Tomas was not yet declared non-existent, that this Court has yet to come up with a modification of Administrative Order No. 7 to effect the necessary amendment therein insofar as Sto. Tomas is concerned; and that, in any event, it is not impossible at all that this Court may decide to maintain the territorial jurisdiction of Branch IV of the RTC of Davao del Norte over the barrios of Kapalong which were converted into the municipality of Sto. Tomas.

Nevertheless, Justice Imperial concluded:

While it is true that Judge Matas acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of Miscellaneous Case No. 1626, it is likewise true that his mere acting without jurisdiction should not subject him to an administrative action for gross inexcusable negligence and/or ignorance of the law. In the case at bar, Judge Matas' act not being without basis whatsoever nor motivated by bad faith, it cannot be said with certainty that respondent Judge Matas acted with gross inexcusable negligence and/or gross ignorance of the law. Just because he believed, though erroneously, that the action was in personam or that he had jurisdiction over the four (4) properties, since one of the properties (OCT No. P-9855) was located at Kapalong and all the properties were included in one petition, should not be taken against him to the extent of being held liable administratively for gross inexcusable negligence and/or gross ignorance of the law. To hold otherwise would be to subject every Judge whose decision is reversed, to be charged with gross negligence or gross ignorance of the law.

The second issue primarily revolves on the failure of the respondent Judge to require publication of the petition in the Official Gazette and notices to the registered owners. Justice Imperial resolved the issue in this wise:

In the case at bar, the respective certificate of title of the properties in question on file with the Register of Deeds are existing, and it is the owner's copy of the certificate of title that was alleged to have been lost or destroyed. Thus, it is Section 109 of P.D. 1529 which was approved on June 11, 1978 that becomes effective and is applicable, a reading of which shows that it is practically the same as Section 109 of Act No. 496, governing reconstitution of a duplicate certificate of title lost or destroyed. Consequently, it is sufficient that the notice under Section 109 is sent to the Register of Deeds and to those persons who are known to have, or appear to have, an interest in the property as shown in the Memorandum of encumbrances at the back of the original or transfer certificate of title on file in the office of the Register of Deeds. From a legal standpoint, there are no other interested parties who should be notified, except those above-mentioned since they are the only ones who may be deemed to have a claim to the property involved. A person dealing with registered property is not charged with notice of encumbrances not annotated on the back of the title.

The only piece of evidence that would show the alleged ownership of the J.K. Mercado over the four (4) parcels of land, subject of Misc. Case No. 1626 is the alleged private Memorandum of Agreement entered on November 19, 1981 by and between George Mercado and J.K. Mercado. Said agreement was never entered on the Certificate of Titles in the name of their original/former owners on file with the Register of Deeds at the time of the filing or pendency of Misc. Case No. 1626. As such, how can private complainant expect to be notified.

Respondent Judge Matas, dated March 24, 1987 issued the following Order anent notice of the petition, to wit:

. . . At Least ten (10) days prior to the scheduled hearing, a copy of this Order and the petition shall be posted at the expense of the petitioner on each bulletin board of the following: the office of the Clerk of Court; the Municipal Hall and the Barangay Hall or if there be none, the Barangay School where the subject property is located. If there is no bulletin board in any of the aforementioned places, the posting shall be made on a conspicuous place, near the main door. . . . (emphasis supplied.)

Clearly, respondent Judge Matas had ordered proper and sufficient notice of the petition. Furthermore, he had the right to rely on the 1st indorsement and certification of PFC Ciriaco Obenza that posting was made (quoted on page 5 and numbered 11 of this report). The mere fact that said certification did not specifically mention that posting was also made in the bulletin board of the Clerk of Court does not rule out the posting thereon considering the presumption that official duty has been done.

While it is true that no posting was made at Kapalong, where one of the properties was located per the petition and OCT No. P-9855, the fault, if any, should be placed upon respondent Torres who made the request only to the Station Commander of the Integrated National Police of the Municipality of Sto. Tomas (none to Kapalong) to cause the posting, although the order of Judge Matas specifically provided for posting "where the subject property is located.

However, there is no clear evidence that respondent Torres acted with malice and/or gross negligence in doing so, considering the certification of the Register of Deeds that the four (4) properties were all located at Sto. Tomas (Exhs. "A-5-A" to "A-8-A") thereby misleading Torres under the circumstances to have the posting made only in Sto. Tomas.

As to the third issue, Justice Imperial said:

A reading of the evidence and arguments of complainant in support of its claim that there was conspiracy by and between respondents and George Mercado shows that the same is founded on mere inferences and conjectures.

Thus, complainant concludes that there was complicity because Judge Matas assumed jurisdiction over the case of which he has none and despite conflicting allegations in the petition, as well as erroneous posting and notices, arguing in its Memorandum as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

Moreover, the conclusion of petitioner that there was conspiracy between George Mercado and respondent Judge Matas because the latter acted with "undue haste" in rendering the Decision one (1) day after the reception of evidence in support of the petition is unfounded. The issue involved is simple and the petition was unopposed and thus there was no reason to delay its resolution. In fact, Miscellaneous Case No. 1626 is not the first and only case that was decided by Judge Matas, either in open court immediately upon the termination of the presentation of evidence and/or a few days thereafter, to wit: [enumeration of nine (9) Miscellaneous Cases, Exhibits "9-M-13" to "9-M-21," inclusive].

xxx xxx xxx

Consequently, even assuming, arguendo, that undue injury resulted to complainant and unwarranted benefits was obtained by George Mercado, in view of all the foregoing, respondents did not act with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, gross inexcusable negligence or gross ignorance of the law.

Justice Imperial then recommends that the respondents, Judge Jesus V. Matas and Mr. Eduardo C. Torres, be absolved from all the charges in the Amended Complaint.

We agree with him except as regards his opinion that the respondent Judge had no jurisdiction over Miscellaneous Case No. 1626. There is, obviously, a confusion between jurisdiction and the exercise of jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction is the power and authority to hear, try, and decide a case; it does not depend on the regularity of the exercise of that power (Herrera vs. Barreto, 25 Phil. 245 [1913]; Century Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Fuentes, 2 SCRA 1168 [1961]). It is conferred by substantive law, and, insofar as the Regional Trial Courts are concerned, by B.P. Blg. 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) or by other statutes. On the other hand, the manner of the exercise of jurisdiction is, unless otherwise provided by the law itself, governed by the Rules of Court or by orders which are, from time to time, issued by this Court. Under Section 17 of B.P. Blg. 129, the exercise of jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and their judges is basically regional in scope (Malaloan vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 249, 260 [1994]), but under Section 18, it may be limited to the territorial area of the branch in which the judge sits. The said section reads:

Sec. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. — The Supreme Court shall define the territory over which a branch of the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority. The territory thus defined shall be deemed to be the territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of determining the venue of all writs, proceedings, or actions, whether civil or criminal, . . . (emphasis supplied)

Pursuant to this provision, the Court issued Administrative Order No. 7, series of 1983, (Exhibit "O"), defining the territorial areas of the Regional Trial Courts in Regions I to XII. Under the said order, the territorial areas covered by the RTC of Davao del Norte are as follows:

1 Branches I and II with seats at Tagum — comprising the municipalities of Asuncion, Kapalong, Mabini, Maco, New Corella, Pantukan, San Vicente and Tagum.

2 Branch III with seat at Nabunturan — comprising the municipalities of Compostela, Mawab, Monkayo, Montevista, Nabunturan, New Bataan and San Mariano.

3 Branch IV with seat at Panabo — comprising the municipalities of Babak, Carmen, Kaputian, Panabo, Samal and Sto. Tomas.

In the Malaloan case, which involves a related Administrative Order No. 3 issued on 19 January 1983 defining the limits of the exercise of jurisdiction by the RTC's in the National Capital Judicial Region, this Court held:

In fine, Administrative Order No. 3 and, in like manner, Circular Nos. 13 and 19, did not per se confer jurisdiction on the covered regional trial courts or its branches, such that non-observance thereof would nullify their judicial acts. The administrative order merely defines the limits of the administrative area within which a branch of the court may exercise its authority pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

In the instant case, it cannot be said that Branch I of the RTC of Davao del Norte, then presided by the respondent Judge, had no jurisdiction over Miscellaneous Case No. 1626 which is a "Petition for the Issuance of Owner's Duplicate Certificates in lieu of Lost O.C.T. Nos. P-12658, P-12659, P-12661, and P-9855."

Section 2 of P.D. No. 1529 states that Courts of First Instance (CFI) shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of title to lands including improvements and interests

therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. Under Chapter X of the decree entitled "Petitions and Actions After Original Registration"is Section 109 which governs petitions for issuance of lost or stolen owner's duplicate certificate of title. Clearly, petitions for replacement of lost duplicate certificates, as in Miscellaneous Case No. 1626, are cognizable by the RTCs.

Now, on the venue or the place where such petitions may be instituted. Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529 provides that the application for land registration shall be filed with the CFI (now RTC) of the province or city where the land lies. Under Section 108 of the same decree, all petitions motions after original registration shall be filed and entitled in the original case in which the decree of registration was entered.

Notably, the certificates involved in Miscellaneous Case No. 1626 were each obtained not pursuant to a decree issued in a judicial registration proceeding, but pursuant to a patent issued by the Director of Lands and registered in accordance with Section 122 of Act No. 496 (now Section 103 of P.D. No. 1529). Nevertheless, applying Sections 2, 17, 108, and 109 of P.D. No. 1529, we may say that the petition for replacement of lost duplicate certificates in Miscellaneous Case No. 1626 was properly taken cognizance of by Branch I of the RTC of Davao del Norte presided by the respondent Judge, since that petition stated that the lots covered by the lost duplicates are situated in Kapalong and Sto. Tomas which are both in the province of Davao del Norte.

Hence, no lack of jurisdiction, gross ignorance of law, or gross inexcusable negligence can be ascribed to the respondent Judge. If at all, there was an unwitting violation of Administrative Order No. 7 which places Kapalong within the territorial area of either Branch I or II of the RTC of Davao del Norte, and Sto. Tomas, within Branch IV of the same court. He exceeded the territorial area of his Branch, for at the time Miscellaneous Case No. 1626 was filed, Sto. Tomas, which was composed of the barrios of Kapalong, was not yet declared as non-existent. It was only in the decision of 29 September 1988 in Municipality of Kapalong vs. Moya that the non-existence of Sto.Tomas as a municipality was confirmed.

Yet, even on this score, in point of adjective law the error consisted merely of the impropriety of the venue of the petition. That procedural lapse is not so pervasive as to affect the validity of the proceedings, absent a showing of bad faith therein. Considering that objections to venue may even be waived, and the amorphous status of Kapalong in relation to Sto. Tomas during the period material to the questioned proceeding, it would be too much to require accurate resolution of the issue and unfailing compliance therewith by the respondent judge.

As correctly held by Justice Imperial, there is no proof of conspiracy between the respondents and George Mercado. Neither is there any evidence that private complainant J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises suffered damage or injury in its claimed right and interest in the lots covered by the lost certificates subject of Miscellaneous Case No. 1626.

In his order granting the petition, the respondent Judge merely declared as null and void the "lost" owners' duplicate copies of the original certificates of title (OCT) and directed the issuance of new duplicate copies which, perforce, remain in, the names of those appearing in the original copies of the OCT's in the custody of the Register of Deeds. He did not order the issuance of new ones in the name of George Mercado despite the latter's presentation of purported deeds of sale in his favor.

The private complainant claims to be the owner of the lots by virtue of a Memorandum of Agreement executed between it and George Mercado on 19 November 1981 (Exhibits "W" and "W-1") wherein the latter acknowledged that the lots belong to the former and undertook to execute the necessary documents of conveyance in its favor. This Memorandum of Agreement was not annotated in the

OCT's. And, the private complainant has never satisfactorily explained why it failed to enforce its rights under that agreement at anytime before the latter filed Miscellaneous Case No. 1626 in 1987. Necessarily then, the fact of Mercado's recognition of the complainant's "ownership" of the lots remained a private matter between Mercado and the complainant. By its own negligence, the private complainant made possible any representation or misrepresentation by George Mercado, and it cannot now be heard to say that the respondent Judge acted on the petition of George Mercado "notwithstanding the fact that the properties are owned by" the private complainant, as alleged in paragraph 2 of both the original and amended complaint.

Thus, the recommendation of Justice Imperial is in order.

But, before writing finis to this case, we need to stress two principles in disciplinary proceedings against judges.

One, the investigating Justice or Judge designated by the Court to conduct an investigation, submit a report, and make the appropriate recommendation does not have an authority to grant or deny a motion to dismiss the case. His authority is not co-extensive with the power or authority of his office. In this case, the investigating Justice should not have denied respondent Torres' motion to dismiss. Even if the reason for the denial were correct, he should have merely noted the motion and considered it in his report and recommendation, which the Court had suggested in the referral to him of the motion.

Secondly, it must be noted that this Court had impliedly set aside the proviso in the resolution of 17 March 1992 that after the filing of comment by the respondents on the administrative complaint, proceedings thereon should be suspended pending the outcome of Criminal Case No. 17378 before the Sandiganbayan.

The demands of public interest and public policy would not be expeditiously served if administrative cases should be made to await the termination of criminal cases or civil cases based upon the same facts or incidents from which the administrative cases arose. In view of the public trust character of a public office which exacts accountability and utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency at all times, administrative cases must be resolved as expeditiously as possible. It is primarily for this reason that in administrative cases only substantial evidence is required, not proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, or preponderance of evidence as in civil cases (Section 5, in relation to Sections 1 and 2, Rule 133, Rules of Court). We thus rule that the pendency of a criminal case based on the same facts or incidents which gave rise to an administrative case does not suspend the administrative proceedings. However, in consideration of the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed and the sanctions imposed, in the former and in the latter, the findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding in the other.

WHEREFORE, the instant complaint is DISMISSED, and respondents JUDGE JESUS V. MATAS and EDUARDO C. TORRES, JR. are hereby ABSOLVED of all the charges against them in the Amended Complaint.