constructictivist foudautions 4

CONSTRUCTIVISTFOUNDATIONS

Volume 2, Numbers 2–3

Festschrift forErnst von Glasersfeldcelebrating his 90th birthday

Festschrift forErnst von Glasersfeldcelebrating his 90th birthday

An interdisciplinary journalhttp://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/journal

ISSN

178

2-34

8X

March 2007

Editors: Ranulph Glanville & Alexander RieglerEditors: Ranulph Glanville & Alexander Riegler

Advisory Board William Clancey

NASA Ames Research Center, USA

Ranulph Glanville CybernEthics Research, UK

Ernst von Glasersfeld University of Massachusetts, USA

Vincent Kenny Accademia Costruttivista di

Terapia Sistemica, Italy

Klaus Krippendorff University of Pennsylvania, USA

Humberto Maturana Institute Matríztica, Chile

Josef Mitterer University of Klagenfurt, Austria

Karl Müller Wisdom, Austria

Bernhard Pörksen University of Hamburg, Germany

Gebhard Rusch University of Siegen, Germany

Siegfried J. Schmidt University of Münster, Germany

Bernard Scott Cranfield University, UK

Sverre Sjölander Linköping University, Sweden

Stuart Umpleby George Washington University, USA

Terry Winograd Stanford University, USA

Editor-In-Chief Alexander Riegler

Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium

Editorial Board Pille Bunnell

Royal Roads University, Canada

Olaf Diettrich Center Leo Apostel, Belgium

Dewey Dykstra Boise State University, USA

Stefano Franchi University of Auckland, New Zealand

Timo Honkela Helsinki Univ. of Technology, Finland

Theo Hug University of Innsbruck, Austria

Urban Kordes Institut Jozef Stefan, Slovenia

Albert Müller University of Vienna, Austria

Herbert F. J. Müller McGill University, Montreal, Canada

Markus Peschl University of Vienna, Austria

Bernd Porr University of Glasgow, UK

John Stewart Univ. de Technologie de Compiègne, France

Wolfgang Winter Univ. of Cooperative Education, Germany

Tom Ziemke University of Skövde, Sweden

DESCRIPTION

Constructivist Foundations (CF) is an independent academic peer-reviewed e-journal without commercial interests. Its aim is to promote scientific foundations and applications of constructivist sciences, to weed out pseudoscientific claims and to base constructivist sciences on sound scientific foundations, which do not equal the scientific method with objectivist claims. The journal is concerned with the interdisciplinary study of all forms of constructivist sciences, especially radical constructivism, biology of cognition, cybersemiotics, enactive cognitive science, epistemic structuring of experience, non-dualism, second order cybernetics, the theory of autopoietic systems, etc.

AIM AND SCOPE

The basic motivation behind the journal is to make peer-reviewed constructivist papers available to the academic audience free of charge. The constructive character of the journal refers to the fact that the journal publishes actual work in constructivist sciences rather than work that argues for the importance or need for constructivism. The journal is open to (provocative) new ideas that fall within the scope of constructivist approaches and encourages critical academic submissions to help sharpen the position of constructivist sciences. The common denominator of constructivist approaches can be summarized as follows. • Constructivist approaches question the Cartesian separation between objective world

and subjective experience; • Consequently, they demand the inclusion of the observer in scientific explanations; • Representationalism is rejected; knowledge is a system-related cognitive process rather

than a mapping of an objective world onto subjective cognitive structures; • According to constructivist approaches, it is futile to claim that knowledge approaches

reality; reality is brought forth by the subject rather than passively received; • Constructivist approaches entertain an agnostic relationship with reality, which is

considered beyond our cognitive horizon; any reference to it should be refrained from; • Therefore, the focus of research moves from the world that consists of matter to the

world that consists of what matters; • Constructivist approaches focus on self-referential and organizationally closed systems;

such systems strive for control over their inputs rather than their outputs; • With regard to scientific explanations, constructivist approaches favor a process-

oriented approach rather than a substance-based perspective, e.g. living systems are defined by processes whereby they constitute and maintain their own organization;

• Constructivist approaches emphasize the “individual as personal scientist” approach; sociality is defined as accommodating within the framework of social interaction;

• Finally, constructivist approaches ask for an open and less dogmatic approach to science in order to generate the flexibility that is needed to cope with today’s scientific frontier.

For more information visit the journal’s website http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/journal/

SUBMISSIONS Language: Papers must be written in English. If English is a foreign language for you please

let the text be proofread by an English native speaker. Copyright: With the exception of reprints of “classical” articles, all papers are “original

work,” i.e., they must not have been published elsewhere before nor must they be the revised version (changes amount to less than 25% of the original) of a published work. However, the copyright remains with the author and is licensed under a Creative Commons License.

Author’s Guidelines: Before submission, please consult the guidelines at http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/journal/guidelines.pdf

Submissions are continuously received Send all material to Alexander Riegler, [email protected]

ACKNOWLEDGMENT TO REVIEWERS OF VOLUME 2

The quality of a journal can only be maintained by thoughtful, careful, and constructive reviewing of both board members and external reviewers. We thank the following external reviewers for taking the time to review manuscripts submitted to Constructivist Foundations Volume 2: Paolo Ivan Bolognesi, Gary Boyd, Jane Burry, Giancarlo Corsi, Wolfgang Jonas, Richard Jung, Elvira Knaepen, Claus Pias, Francesco Ranci, Fred Steier.

Constructivist Foundations 2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3 1http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/journal/

Festschrift for Ernst von Glasersfeld

celebrating his 90th birthday

Editors: Ranulph Glanville and Alexander Riegler

Table of Contents

Editorial

Ranulph Glanville & Alexander RieglerEditorial: Ninety Years of Constructing ................. 2

Overview

Ranulph GlanvilleThe Importance of Being Ernst ............. 5

Siegfried J. SchmidtGod Has Created Reality, We Create Worlds of Experience: A Speech in Honour of Ernst von Glasersfeld to Mark the Award of the Gregory Bateson Prize,Heidelberg, 6 May 2005 .......................... 7

Early Work

Paul BraffortErnst Glasersfeld’s First Scientific Paper ............................. 12

Felice AccameErnst von Glasersfeld and the Italian Operative School ....................... 18

Renzo BeltrameThe Theoretical Environment around 1965 .......................................... 25

Duane M. RumbaughErnst von Glasersfeld’s Contributions to the LANA Project ............................. 29

Marco BettoniThe Yerkish Language: From Operational Methodology to Chimpanzee Communication .............. 32

The Philosophy of Radical Constructivism

Jack Lochhead

Ernst to Amherst, Massachusetts.......... 39

Leslie P. Steffe

Radical Constructivism: A Scientific Research Program ............. 41

Dewey I. Dykstra Jr.

The Challenge of Understanding Radical Constructivism ........................ 50

Vincent Kenny

Distinguishing Ernst von Glasersfeld’s Radical Constructivism from Humberto Maturana’s ‘Radical Realism’ ................ 58

Bernard Scott

The Co-Emergence of Parts and Wholesin Psychological Individuation ............ 65

Herbert F. J. Müller

Epistemology Returns to Its Roots ...... 72

Vincent Kenny

Anyone for Tennis? Conversations with Ernst on Being Sporting about Epistemology ............... 81

Radical Constructivism and Teaching

Reinhard Voß

To Find a Daisy in December: Impressions of Ernst von Glasersfeld and an Interview with Him about Constructivism and Education............. 85

Marie Larochelle & Jacques DésautelsConcerning Ernst von Glasersfeld’s Contribution to Intellectual Freedom: One Interpretation, One Example ....... 90

Ana PasztorRadical Constructivism has been Viable: On the Democratization of Math Education .................................... 98

Andreas QualeThe Epistemic Relativism of Radical Constructivism: Some Implications for Teaching the Natural Sciences ................................. 107

Theo HugViability and Crusty Snow .................. 114

Radical Constructivism and Its Implications for Society

Gebhard RuschUnderstanding. The Mutual Regulation of Cognition and Culture ................... 118

Laurence D. RichardsConnecting Radical Constructivism to Social Transformation and Design .... 129

Markus F. PeschlTriple-Loop Learning as Foundation for Profound Change, Individual Cultivation, and Radical Innovation: Construction Processes beyond Scientific and Rational Knowledge..... 136

Stuart UmplebyErnst von Glasersfeld’s Limerick ........ 146

Acknowledgement:

The festschrift was generously supported by the American Society of Cybernetics (ASC) and the Wiener Institut für Sozialwissenschaftliche Dokumentation und Methodik (WISDOM, Austria). Special thanks to Silvia Pizzocaro (Politechnico Milano, Italy) for her translation of Felice Accame’s contribution.

Copyright of photographs and paintings:

Cover page: Werner Horvath, New Austrian ConstructivismPage 1: Jack Lochhead • Other photos: See individual papers for copyright notice All cartoons throughout the festschrift were exclusively made by Mihaly Lenart.

VOLUME 2, NUMBERS 2–3

Constructivist Foundations

2 Constructivist Foundations 2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/journal/

Editorial: Ninety Years of Constructing

n 8 March 2007 Ernst von Glasersfeldattains the age of 90. In celebration of

this, we take great pride in publishing thisfestschrift as our way of saying thank you, andof sending greetings and our affection to thisremarkable, honest and modest man.

A festschrift is a particular publi-cation, and we have a particularapproach. We require that inthe all pieces we will pub-lish, the work of von Gla-sersfeld will take centrestage. We also invite twotypes of contribution:the more normal aca-demic paper, and moreanecdotal pieces whichcarry a more personal mes-sage. We are grateful to ourauthors for helping us realise a festschrift thatattains these aims. We add our thanks, too, tophotographers, artists and poets who haveenriched the von Glasersfeld related

material

we have been able to publish, which, webelieve, enhances the general quality.

Ernst von Glasersfeld has brought aremarkable rigour, energy and single-mind-edness to his pursuit of what he has calledRadical Constructivism (RC). This is a formof constructivism that doesn’t compromise byhedging, but goes straight to the crucial mat-ter of the necessity for us to acknowledge ourpresence in our experience, for the observer toactually observe, for the mind to take part inthe creation of the reality it describes as“sensed.” In this account, we always recognisethat we are present.

It is not out intention to gloss RC here, espe-cially not in the introduction to a festschrift tocelebrate and honour the scholar who has donemost to clarify and elaborate it, so we will stop.Given the more than 20 contributions to thisfestschrift which cover virtually all aspects ofErnst von Glasersfeld’s work, career, and per-sonality, any detailed biography would also besuperfluous. Rather, we provide a “navigation-aid” through these articles.

Overview

In the opening essay,

Ranulph Glanville

writesof meeting von Glasersfeld, and of how thequestions asked of him by von Glasersfeldhave continued to fire his work to this day.

Siegfried J. Schmidt

, who played aleading role in making construc-

tivist approaches popular inthe German-speaking coun-tries in the 1980s, summa-rizes von Glasersfeld’s workand person, with a text basedon his speech marking the

award of the Gregory BatesonPrize presented to von Glasers-

feld in Heidelberg on 6 May 2005.

Early Work

When von Glasersfeld started to publish sci-entific articles in the early 1960s he probablydid not anticipate that almost half a centurylater he would have raised the number ofentries in his bibliography to almost 300 (cf.http://www.vonglasersfeld.com/). Some ofhis first works seem to have completely disap-peared or are no longer available.

Paul Braf-fort

rediscovered Ernst’s first scientific piece:a report on

Operational Semantics: Analysis ofMeaning in Terms of Operations

, whichappeared in 1961 as internal report of theBrussels-based European Atomic EnergyCommunity (Euroatom). We are delight-eghted to (re-)present this piece of Glasers-feld-excavation!

This, and the three publications that fol-low it here were the result of Ernst’s collabo-ration in the

Scuola Operativa Italiana

,headed by his mentor Sylvio Ceccato.

FeliceAccame’s

paper deals with the relationshipbetween the two scientists, whose primaryconnection was their lively interest in repre-sentation and linguistics. The paper of

RenzoBeltrame

further explores the theoretical sta-tus of the research at the Scuola OperativaItaliana and provides a lucid account of Cec-

cato’s position at a time, when von Glasers-feld started to head off for new challenges inthe USA. Scholars in the English-speakingworld have known through von Glasersfeldhimself of the connection with the ScuolaOperativa Italiana and the respect in whichErnst holds Ceccato. But the lack of translatedmaterial has made both this point of origin invon Glasersfeld’s work and the significantcontribution of the Italians to early cybernet-ics, inaccessible. We are grateful to our Italiancolleagues for their willingness to provide ini-tial access.

One challenge lead to Ernst’s work on theLanguage Analogue (LANA) project in theearly 1970s, which gave him the opportunityto explore language use in non-human animal– more specifically, in the chimpanzee Lana.The essay by

Duane Rumbaugh

, the formalproject leader, highlights the important rolevon Glasersfeld played. A central issue waswhether chimpanzees are capable of learningthe grammar of a language, and so von Gla-sersfeld developed an artificial pictogram-based language, Yerkish, which served as com-munication vehicle between human andchimpanzee.

Marco Bettoni’s

paper details thislanguage. This is another area of Ernst’s workthat is mentioned, but which few of us havefollowed in detail. It is wonderful that we havethe opportunity to bring this work back to theattention of interested scholars.

The Philosophy of Radical Constructivism

The second challenge von Glasersfeld com-menced working on in the 1970s was thelong-term development of a new “epistemol-ogy” (a philosophical term he would laterbecome hesitant to use) based on his work inCeccato’s group, the operational and correla-tional approach on which the Lana projectwas built, and his interpretation of JeanPiaget’s

épistémologie génétique

. He called this“Radical Constructivism.”

Ranulph Glanville

A

CybernEthics Research & University College London (UK) <[email protected]>

Alexander Riegler

A

Vrije Universiteit Brussel (Belgium) <[email protected]>

O

anecdotal

radical constructivism

EDITORIAL

2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3 3

EDITORIAL

anecdotal


In his anecdote

Jack Lochhead

(whobrought Ernst from Georgia to Massachu-setts) describes his personal memories of thattime. Together with Lochhead,

Leslie Steffe

was one of the friends whose efforts were deci-sive in enabling von Glasersfeld to continueon this path. In his paper, Steffe first describesErnst’s collaboration on the InterdisciplinaryResearch on Number (IRON) project whichfocused on the question of how children con-struct numbers and solve numerical prob-lems, fuelling the further development of RC.Steffe develops this, in the second part part ofhis paper, with an idea of how RC can act asthe core of scientific research programs andcontribute to other radical constructivistresearch programs whose central problem isto explore the operations involved in con-structive activity.

One of the tenets von Glasersfeld has nevertired of repeating is that “his” theory borrowsfrom many insights of scientists and philoso-phers. In his contribution,

Dewey Dykstra

explores yet another link, the parallelsbetween RC and Buddhist philosophy, whichare clearly visible when it comes to “disequil-ibration” over mismatches between realistexpectations and experiences – a difficultyDykstra identifies as the perpetual problem ofunderstanding RC. While constructivistapproaches share many distinctive featureson the large scale, flavours differ in detail.

Vincent Kenny’s

critical paper focuses on thedifferent forms of “radicality” to be found inthe writings of Ernst and in those of Hum-berto Maturana. In tight-rope walking theradical gap between them he tries to grasponto some of the very different metaphorsoffered by both theorists, ranging from blackboxes to submarines. Kenny claims that thedifficulty to join the theorizing of bothauthors lies in the fact that von Glasersfeld hasfocused on the adaptations and learnings thatgo on at the cognitive level whereas Mat-urana’s work is principally in the biologicaldomain. In another critical contribution,

Ber-nard Scott

argues that Ernst’s assumptionabout the existence of a “subject” and “oth-ers” is one that needs to be further exploredand elucidated. His paper extends his ideasand proposes a co-emergent explanation ofhuman awareness and self-consciousness,and with it the “experiential self.” Scott’s con-structivist account of the “self as subject”avoids the need for any metaphysical assump-

tions by integrating ideas from George Her-bert Mead, Humberto Maturana and GordonPask.

Herbert Müller

also paints a large pic-ture

.

He discusses the place of RC and someof its implications in the development of anepistemology with the aim of differentiating itfrom “traditional metaphysics.” WhileMüller acknowledges the relevance of Ernst’swork for a number of disciplines that sufferfrom conceptual problems such as the mind-brain relation, he urges us to evaluate itsimplications in specific instances. Finally,

Vincent Kenny’s

anecdotal piece rounds offthe section on the philosophy of RC. In hisinterview he asks von Glasersfeld questionssuch as “How much patience does it take to bea constructivist?” and, by referring to thenon-conscious aspect of automatisms insports, he points at issues which still need tobe addressed more explicitly in RC.

Radical Constructivism and Teaching

However that may be, RC has alreadyaddressed and stimulated many aspects inareas other than purely philosophical dis-course, among which education is very prom-inent.

Reinhard Voß’s

interview with von Gla-sersfeld highlights why RC lends itself toquestions of teaching and education as itopposes the widespread idea that teachers cantransmit knowledge through language.

MarieLarochelle and Jacques Désautels’s

article indi-cates how taking a radical constructivist per-spective can liberate educators to create newand valuable types of learning experiences.RC stresses the importance of developing areflexive understanding of the world andprompts teachers to scrutinize the processesand distinctions by which students chart outtheir “world” and to devise models of theirstudents’ future relationship to the universesof knowledge intended for learning.

Ana Paz-tor’s

paper clarifies the operational usefulnessof a constructivist framework or mindset tothe teacher of mathematics (an area in whichErnst, himself, worked), and illustrates withconcrete examples from the author’s ownexperience, the contributions Ernst made inthis field. She devises a “shared experientiallanguage” for teachers to

embody

in order totransform their practice congruently accord-ing to constructivist principles. Utilizing this

language allows the shifting of responsibilityfor success in mathematics from the studentsback to those who guide them in co-con-structing knowledge. Based on the discussionof the epistemic positions of realism and rela-tivism,

Andreas Quale’s

paper focuses on thecharacterization of the teaching of science ina RC framework. The author distinguishesbetween cognitive and non-cognitive knowl-edge that plays through the characterizationof the teaching of science as contrasted to theteaching of religion. Since, he argues, teach-ing should be carried out in the mode ofstory-telling, Quale concludes that tradi-tional ontology is not required for science-teaching.

Theo Hug

concludes the section oneducation with an anecdotal piece whichseemingly weightlessly discusses some ofErnst’s ideas on the backdrop of a skiing tourin the Austrian alps.

Radical Constructivism and its Implications for Society

The final section of the festschrift deals withthe implications of RC for society. It startswith

Gebhard Rusch’s

contribution whichbuilds on the claim that constructivistapproaches bridge the gap between the cogni-tive and social facets of understanding. Ruschproposes we take understanding as consistingof both at the same time: a special kind ofsocial regulation and a special kind of cogni-tive regulation. The paper also contains areview of the German tradition of hermeneu-tics and an attempt to integrate it with socio-logical considerations.

Larry Richards’s

paperprovides an account of the author’s under-standing of Ernst’s theory and contributes apart concrete, part speculative connectionbetween constructivist ways of knowing andconstraint-based approaches to policy for-mulation and social transformation anddesign. For the author it is evident that byraising new questions and stimulating newthinking RC contributes significantly to thedevelopment of a conceptual base for appliedresearch on social activism. Finally,

MarkusPeschl

attempts to explain how wisdom isacquired. He proposes and addresses a needto extend the conception of knowledge con-struction, as featured in RC, to include also a

4 Constructivist Foundations

EDITORIAL

anecdotal


non-cognitive perception of the world on anexistential level. It describes and discusses aparticular learning strategy, “triple-looplearning,” for this, and a model, “U-theory,”to implement this strategy. Both provide avaluable extension of the radical constructiv-ist perspective that focuses on scientific andrational knowledge.

The festschrift concludes with three vonGlasersfeld–related limericks presented by

Stuart Umpleby

, and illustrated with cartoonsspecially drawn by

Mihaly Lenart

(who alsodrew the one in this editorial). Larry Richards is right when he states in hispaper: “The work and thought of Ernst vonGlasersfeld opens a path toward a rich array ofconcepts and ideas with the potential toinform efforts in a wide variety of humanendeavors.” After 90 years of constructingknowledge and wisdom, we can discern noend, or even slowing down. Ernst von Gla-

sersfeld’s active mental and physical life hasnot diminished. He writes, extending thereach of radical constructivism, and keepingit clean. When a few years ago, von Glasers-feld’s house burnt down, and with it he losthis extensive library and many first editions,he set to and rebuilt the house, and is cur-rently constructing furniture. He skis, withstyle and competence that shames many of hisyounger companions. Last autumn, he con-cluded an email in which he discussed somescientific aspects with one of us (A.R.), withthe words “At last we have some reasonableweather and I’m busy chopping wood for thewinter.” So we cannot but agree with JackLochhead who, at the end of his essay, writes,“We continue our preparations for 2017.”

In 2005, the American Society for Cyberneticsawarded Ernst von Glasersfeld its highestaward, the Wiener Medal. The citation reads:

“The Wiener medal of the American Societyfor Cybernetics is awarded to Ernst von Gla-sersfeld for an outstanding and profoundlifelong contribution to both cybernetics andthe ASC.“Von Glasersfeld’s seminal work, developinga contructivist approach to problems raisedby early cyberneticians, has enriched thefield and moved the conceptual base ofcybernetics into a more consistent vision –expanding the nature of how we understandcybernetics, how we enter into cyberneticprocesses of constructing our worlds, andhow we approach the consequences of thisunderstanding.”

We hope the reader will feel a resonance withthis citation through the material in thisfestschrift, and will join all the authors, edi-tors and all the others who have participatedin this festschrift in wishing Ernst the happi-est of birthdays, and many more to come.


The Importance of Being Ernst

shall write about my first meeting withErnst von Glasersfeld, and how his com-

ments then on my doctoral study continue tohelp me clarify what it is I am trying to talkabout; how he challenged me to pursue whathas turned out to be my life’s work so far; andabout how these seem to me now to fit in withthat constellation of ideas. For, as Samuel Beck-ett says:

“

There are many ways of saying in vain thething that I am trying in vain to say.

”

I met Ernst von Glasersfeld through theagency of Jack Lochhead. It was, as far as we canboth work out, the spring of 1978. At that timeI had newly graduated with my PhD in cyber-netics from Brunel University. My supervisorhad been Gordon Pask and my external exam-iner Heinz von Foerster.

Jack told me of the importance and value ofErnst’s work, and invited me to present thework in my PhD at a small seminar thatincluded both Jack and Ernst.

Before I go any further I should say some-thing about my PhD. It consists of a strangework which is contained in a strange docu-ment, including, for instance, a summary ofthe whole thesis in 16 Limericks. It was rejectedunder its original title (“The Object of Objects,the Point of Points – or, something aboutThings”) because, the university said, it had nolibrary classification for “Things.” It was resub-mitted, otherwise unchanged, under the title“A Cybernetic Development of Theories ofEpistemology and Observation, with referenceto Space and Time, as seen in Architecture,” atitle that was accepted and which betterreflected the vocabulary of my research pro-posal, though not the content of what actuallyappeared, or my sentiment! It was examined inearly 1975.

The thesis concerns what I call “Objects”(with a capital initial O). Writing from thestandpoint and understanding I have in 2006,Objects are structures which we might assume(design) to support the proposition (or posi-tion) that each of us sees the world differently,

1

yet, in spite of these differences, we behave as if(believe) the worlds we see are the same. Put

this way, it is clear that if we see the world dif-ferently, it is neigh impossible for us to provethe worlds we see to be the same, and this goesfor all elements of these worlds. We may, anddo, act on the basis that the worlds we see arethe same, but to act on that basis is not to knowit is so. All the elements (including these worldsand the worlds of these worlds) are my so-called Objects. In the thesis, I argued the struc-ture and then explored it, showing how Objetssupported (among other things) not only dif-ferent observations (while believing theObjects observed by different observers werethe same), but also important matters such ashow they might support logical relationships(so green and hill could be put together tomake green hill), and how such relationshipsmight admit communication.

I remarked in the previous paragraph that Iwas writing from my standpoint and under-standing in 2006. This is an important rider. Atthe time (1974), I knew why I had inventedthese Objects, and how to argue for them, butI was not quite sure what their purpose was orwhat they did. I did, of course, realise they sup-ported difference in observations by differentobservers (and at different times) since thatwas my intention for them; but I did notunderstand the nature of the structures, orwhat they implied. To be honest, thirty yearslater there are still aspects of Objects that I donot understand.

One question, which I only partially under-stood at the time, was this: were Objects some-how real, existing in their own right in what Iwould now call some Mind Independent Real-ity – although I had no vocabulary for this atthe time? I did not know. Or, to be more pre-cise, I thought they were not, yet I spoke ofthem rather as if they were: I was caught in thephysicality and physical realism of the science Ihad learnt, and the technological optimism ofmy childhood. And the choice of the wordObject, made for good reason, unfortunatelyalso created problems: for it seems that in gen-eral use we think, primarily, of an object as ahard, physical entity, existing in an objectiveframe; whereas I had used the term (and,implicitly, its various grammatical forms) pre-

cisely for all the various meanings it has inEnglish, including some that flatly contradictothers. Thus, an object is both that thing thatexists independently of me, having a so-calledobjective existence, and an intention in doingsomething. If I do not like this contradiction, Ican object to it, too. This, as it turned out, wasexactly the question Ernst would ask me.

But at the time I wrote my PhD I did notknow of Ernst’s work, and, indeed, it was earlydays for his Radical Constructivism. Nor did Ireally understand the position that would leadto Heinz von Foerster’s essential aphorism inwhich he catches the difficulty that Glasers-feld’s Radical Constructivism somehow setsout to resolve, by reconstructing it. Foerster’sformulation is

“

Only we can decide the undecidable

”

by which he means that, where a question is inprinciple undecidable through logical argu-ment or such like, we are free to chosebetween the alternative answers, according toour personal taste, as we chose, and withoutthere being any way of determining “objec-tively” which choice is correct. Indeed, thenotion of correct became replaced, in vonGlasersfeld’s account, by the word viable.

The key question particularly concerns howwe judge the status of reality – since we areneeded to observe whatever may exist, in orderto know it exists, and to talk about it: in Hum-berto Maturana’s aphorism

“

Everything said is said by an observer

,”

to which von Foerster riposted

“

Everything said is said to an observer

,”

– it is impossible for us to decide whetherwhat we observe exists apart from our observ-ing. To claim that there is an objective universethat exists apart from our observation is not toassert a fact, but to chose one possible answer,one position, and use it as a basis for acting.Similarly, to claim that there is no objectiveuniverse is equally a choice we use as a basis foraction. These choices are not conclusions ofarguments in logic, and can never be resolvedby exclusive choices in an either/or manner.

2

Ranulph Glanville

A

CybernEthics Research & University College London (UK) <[email protected]>

I

anecdotal


OPINION


OPINION

anecdotal


(The question has been deconstructedthroughout history, but almost always reas-sembled, normally taking an axiomatic andunarguable position rather than one logicallydeveloped – precisely because the question itposes is undecidable. The great exception maybe represented by the sceptic, Phyrro, whoargued that what was important was to keepdoubting.)

Glasersfeld’s proposal of what he calls Rad-ical Constructivism may be seen as a renewedapproach to this undecidable question (just asit may be seen as an approach to the so-calledproblems of linguistic relativism). It is radicalin that original (root) sense that it returns tothe root (the Latin root is radox), and examinesthe notion of construction anew. Glasersfeldtakes Piaget’s radical and revolutionary notionof the child’s construction and conservation ofthe object seriously (he talks of this as a drivinginsight in the development of his thinking) andhe is not swayed by the more conventional, andin my opinion compromised, type of construc-tivism in which it is often assumed that there isan independent, objective reality which we,though our short-comings and limitations, areunable to grasp clearly. A consequence ofPiaget’s argument is that it is uncertain that youand I, when we talk of an object, are talking ofthe same thing, or even that there is any suchgiven thing as the object or the real world – oreven you and I – out there in what we talk ofand treat as a real world. For what Piaget pos-tulates is that we must work from the experi-ence we live in, differentiating and thus distin-guishing, forming patterns out of what becomedistinct percepts; which, as we forge the pat-terns, create the concepts we then attach to ourpostulated objects which we use to house theseconcepts (deriving from experience), realisingthem by compressing experience.

A logic by which we can distinguish in thecontinuum of experience is described inGeorge Spencer Brown’s seminal “Laws ofForm,” a cult book in the late 1960s, and is cap-tured in the name of Herbert Müller’s Karl Jas-pers Forum as the question of the possibility ofa “Mind Independent Reality” fuelling a hotdebate on the internet.

It was against such developing concepts andunderstandings that second order cyberneticscame about in the early 1970s. This is a cyber-netics that talks of the observer as in the systembeing observed, rather than an observer of thesystem. Amongst its proponents were Foerster,Humberto Maturana (and his then colleagueFrancisco Varela) and Gordon Pask, and it wasinto this cauldron of currently forming under-standings that I plugged my Theory of Objects,perhaps forming the final basic building blockof second order cybernetics. The gap myObjects were supposed to fill was precisely theone Piaget points to: that we each experienceand thus form our percepts and concepts dif-ferently, and yet we believe that we can talkabout the same thing. Foerster’s examiner’sreport on the PhD Thesis referred to my workas the first formal system for Piaget’s concepts.The question I now realise I was asking waswhat sort of structure would we need todevelop that would allow this: and I came upwith my Objects.

3

Objects tell us of the sort ofuniverse a universe that is built on differenceand construction is.

But, as I wrote above, at the same time Gla-sersfeld was examining Piaget’s concepts, andwas doing so in a less instrumental way. Behindhis public thinking he was, I believe, askingwhat Piaget’s account, and the accounts ofthose with similar views, meant for how weunderstand our being in the world, even thatwe could believe we were in the world.

It was at this moment that our ideas werebrought into the presence of each other.

The question Glasersfeld asked me at theseminar, “Are Objects somehow real, existingin their own right?” stopped me in my tracks. Ihad indeed talked of Objects as though theyexisted independently, out there in some exis-tential real world in a version of the language ofschoolboy physics (though I would have beenhard pressed either to say this, or to indicatewhat sort of existential real world they inhab-ited). Yet they were intended essentially asmentalistic devices and manoeuvres that residein and address the world of observation (and

experience), not as either physical entities oradjuncts to such entities. I realised that I hadeither to drop these Objects (which Ernst soobjected to but which I loved) or meditate onthe notion of reality that they proposed andrequired, to resolve the conflict between thedeeper implications of the world they pro-posed and the habits of language I had grownup with. Over the years this is what I have done.

Heinz von Foerster asked me after he hadfinished examining my PhD, what I proposeddoing with it. I had no idea: innocent that I was,the question had never occurred to me. He sug-gested I should not publish it as a big book, butshould take various parts and ideas and presentthem, extending them as I saw fit. Ernst vonGlasersfeld defined for me where, and in refer-ence to what, I had to do this. If I have suc-ceeded in exploring and explaining anythingabout the world as second order cyberneticsproposes it, then it is because in large part Ernstchallenged me to do so.

Thank you, Ernst, for the insight, the chal-lenge – and the outcomes.

Notes

1. In constructivist terms, constructs theworld differently. The story I tell here is, ina sense, the story of the shift in my under-standing which in 1974 I expressed by “see”and would now express by “construct.”

2. Some may argue that there is other evi-dence, but we chose which it is and how tovalue it. This includes such assertions as“it’s inconceivable that” and “it can’t becoincidence,” so often used to justify ourassumptions, which are assertions of a lackof imagination and an insistence upon thepatterns we find reflecting an inaccessibleactuality.

3. The key (and radical) concept from whichthe Theory of Objects grows is that, in auniverse of observation, everything mustbe both observable and observed (this is acondition of entry into the universe).Therefore, for an Object (such as I) to en-ter the universe it must observe itself. It isthe self observation that allows the Objectto assert – if only to itself – its existence (inthis universe).

Received: 8 September2006Accepted: 5 February 2007

Ranulph Glanville studied architecture and electronic composition followed by cyber-netics (his PhD was examined by Heinz von Foerster, his supervisor was Gordon Pask) and then human learning (PhD examined by Gerard de Zeeuw, supervisor Laurie Tho-mas). He has published extensively in all these fields. Glanville teaches and facilitates the development of programmes and research in Universities around the world.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR


God Has Created Reality, We Create Worlds of Experience

A Speech in Honour of Ernst von Glasersfeld to Mark the Award of the Gregory Bateson Prize, Heidelberg, 6 May 2005

Dear Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear Ernst,

Throughout my long acquaintance withErnst von Glasersfeld and his work, I havefound his ideas and insights to be both intel-lectually fascinating and of considerableassistance in solving life’s more practicalproblems. Fortunately, von Glasersfeld hasalso come to my aid today, as I attempt toexplain his work a little, in order to demon-strate why we are honouring him with thisimportant prize.

Ernst von Glasersfeld once remarked thatwhen we look back over our lives, or the livesof others, we should substitute any demandfor objectivity with the perspective of theobserver, which should be as coherent as pos-sible. His own relationship to works andauthors, he stressed, was never hermeneuticin nature, but was instead determined bywhether they could be of help in solving hisown problems.

I would like to take these two pieces ofadvice as the starting-point for a subject-spe-cific look – in other words, my own – at the lifeand work of Ernst von Glasersfeld.

Born an Austrian national in Munich in 1917,Ernst von Glasersfeld did not enjoy a “stan-dard” academic education, nor did his careerfollow a straight course. His autobiographicalstories describe the many phases of his life: his

multilingual youth in Austria, the South Tyroland Switzerland, his time in Australia as a skiinstructor and racer, his life as a farmer in Ire-land during the Second World War and, after1947, his career as a sports and culturereporter, camping on the shores of LakeGarda in the

Val di sogno

– the idyllic back-drop for his initial encounter with Silvio Cec-cato’s mother. Von Glasersfeld describes thisencounter in the following way. Working onhis typewriter in front of his tent whilst histwo-year-old daughter played naked on thebeach nearby, he noticed a boat being rowedpast on the bay, which soon returned the wayit had come. It was clear that the woman in theboat was interested in the unusual situationplaying out on the beach. After a few days, shespoke to von Glasersfeld,asking what he was work-ing on. “It’s mostly aboutphilosophy, that’s whatinterests me,” von Glasers-feld answered, to whichshe replied: “Philosophy?My son’s a philosopher –you must meet him.” Thus it was that von Gla-sersfeld got to know Silvio Ceccato andbecame his colleague at the Milan Centre ofCybernetics in the


.From 1966 onwards von Glasersfeld alsoworked as a linguist and concept-analyst on aresearch project run by the American Air

Force; from 1970 he was a psychologist andprimate researcher at the University of Geor-gia, Athens, before ultimately becomingEmeritus Professor at the University of Mas-sachusetts, Amherst. During these years, vonGlasersfeld was also in constant demand onthe worldwide lecture circuit. I believe thatthis “atypical” path through life protected vonGlasersfeld from developing a number of neg-ative characteristics which beset the majorityof “standard” academics – namely a fixationwith a discipline’s preset topics and a simpleacceptance of well-worn, discipline-specificpatterns of seeing and thinking. Liberatedfrom set patterns of thinking, von Glasersfeldwas able to turn his attention to those aspectsof his subject which truly interested him. Hecould focus on what he actually wanted toknow, and on how he could express his ideasin the clearest and most precise manner.

Growing up using three languages (helearnt French at school), yet without an actualmother-tongue, further helped liberate vonGlasersfeld from set patterns of thinking.Lacking the intuitive connection to a mother-tongue, one experiences the constructive role

of language. Von Glasers-feld’s early experience ofthe differences betweenlanguages gave him a clearsense “that one must builda different reality witheach language. […] Thisis precisely the point

which led me to constructivism.” (Glasersfeld1999, p. 195). This experience also led vonGlasersfeld to the conclusion that meaningdoes not lie in a text itself, but is

actively

con-structed by the listeners in their own way.

By preparing the subject in this way, wehave already begun to stray onto the intellec-

Siegfried J. Schmidt

A

Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster (Germany) <[email protected]>

My

Purpose: The paper provides an overview of Ernst von Glasersfeld’s life and theory, con-centrating on subjects such as the acquisition of knowledge, language and communication, ethical questions, and aspects of teaching and learning. Conclusions: Ernst von Glasers-feld interests cover a wide range of disciplines. Therefore his work is genuinely rooted in interdisciplinarity. Key words: Philosophy, linguistics, ethics, teaching.

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“One must build a different reality with each language. This is precisely the point which led me to constructivism”


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tual path that leads to the basic principles ofvon Glasersfeld’s constructivism. These prin-ciples are:

[

In constructivism, the subject plays thecentral role of the constructor.

[

It is the active subject who constructssense, meaning and reality through histhoughts and actions.

[

If reality is seen as the result of humanimagination – as an inductively con-structed world of experience (

Erfahrungs-welt

) – it follows that human knowledgecan no longer be expected or obliged torepresent a reality which exists objectively,and that the active observer must acceptresponsibility for his individual construc-tion of reality. Such considerations make itclear that one can, and should, develop atheory of knowledge (

Wissenstheorie

)without being constrained by thedemands of an epistemology (

Erkenntnis-theorie

). Radical constructivism, under-stood here as a theory of knowledge, pro-vides a model of our ability to createknowledge in the sense of

ideas whichwork

. As Jean Piaget has shown, thisknowledge results solely from of ouractions and the operation of our minds.

[

“Cognition serves to organise a subject’sworld of experience, and not the subject’s‘insight’ into an objective, ontologicalreality.” (Glasersfeld 1996, p. 96)

[

The constructivist Ernst von Glasersfelddoes not claim, however, that objectivereality does not exist. Rather, he claimsthat we can not know such a reality.“I understand by ‘reality’ a network ofconcepts, which have proven themselves tobe appropriate and useful – that is, ‘viable’– in the perception of the subject. Theyhave proven this by repeatedly helping thesubject to overcome obstacles successfully,and by aiding the conceptual ‘assimilation’of their experiences.” (Glasersfeld 1997,p. 47).Together, these fundamental principles of

his constructivist thought implicitly connectto similar principles within the wider philo-sophical tradition. Ernst von Glasersfeldrepeatedly reminds us that constructivismwas not exclusively his own discovery. Henotes with modesty how he learnt from thegreat thinkers – thinkers so diverse in rangethat to speak of them in one breath couldpanic a traditional philosopher. Von Glasers-feld learnt from the pre-Socratic thinkers,who argued with irrefutable logic that every-thing we term knowledge is human, gener-ated by our specific way of doing things andthus limited by our human capabilities. Helearnt from the apophantic theology of theByzantines, from Johannes Scotus Eriugena,from Hume and from Locke, from Berkeleyand from Vico. He learnt from Kant, the

American Pragmatists, from Vaihinger’s phi-losophy of “As if,” L. Wittgenstein and from G.Kelly. He has ascribed the first outline of aconsciously constructivist theory to Giam-battista Vico – a theory which states: man canonly know what he constructs himself:

verumipsum factum

. Whatever a man thinks andknows can therefore never represent an onto-logical reality, or as the Latin original from1710 states: “Deus naturae artifex, homo arti-ficiorum deus.” For mankind, the only thingsthat truly exist are those which mankind itselfhas constructed through perception and con-ceptual work, something illustrated in BishopBerkeley’s principle

esse est percipi

. This short construction of a pre-history of

constructivism makes clear why operational-ism (

Operationalismus

) and pragmatismhave become so important for the moderndevelopment of constructivist thought, espe-cially in the work of Percy Bridgman, HugoDingler and above all Silvio Ceccato and hiscolleagues Vittorio Somenzi, Enrico Albani,Guiseppe Vaccarino and Ferruccio Rossi-Landi. They all focus on the central question:what must one

do

, cognitively and practically,in order to achieve a certain result? How doesone operate conceptually, in order to achievea certain conception? “Indeed,” he has repeat-edly stated, “radical constructivists never say:‘This is how it is!’ They merely suggest: ‘Thismay be how it functions.’” (Glasersfeld 2000,p. 4)

The perspective of these questions – a per-spective which moves away from an ontolog-ical orientation on entities to an orientationon processes, their constraints and their out-comes (

Prozessualität

) – helps us to under-stand the significance of Jean Piaget for Ernstvon Glasersfeld.

I shall never forget the context in which Ifirst came across this connection. In 1990,Mauro Ceruti organised a conference on theepistemological theory of Jean Piaget. Theconference was held in the old and beautifullynamed palace

Palazzo della Ragione

in Ber-gamo. The presence of Bärbel Inhelder at theconference, a long-time colleague of Piaget(who had died in 1980), had drawn a largecrowd of prominent thinkers from many dis-ciplines and countries. At one of the confer-ence meals, Ernst von Glasersfeld, Heinz vonFoerster and Paul Watzlawick – the core ofconstructivist thought in Austria – were sit-ting next to each other. It was a picture for the

Ernst von Glasersfeld together with the author, Siegfried J. Schmidt, in Heidelberg, Germany, 2005.

2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3 9

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history books. But let us return to Piaget.Piaget’s decisive principle for undertakingresearch into cognition was: “intelligenceorganises the world while it organises itself.”Knowledge, according to Piaget, does not cre-ate an objective reproduction of reality, butrather supports a process of adaptation to theconstraints set by our environment. Knowl-edge enables an organism to achieve equilib-rium in its environment; that is to say, it sup-ports survival – and every action thatpreserves or restores this equilibrium is aneffective action. Seen inthis light, it is clear whyErnst von Glasersfeld sawPiaget’s theory as, atheart, a

cybernetic

theory.Piaget broke with thephilosophic traditionwhich explored thetruth-value of knowl-edge, and exploredinstead the origins and the application of thisknowledge by studying how children con-struct their reality. Von Glasersfeld sawPiaget’s ideas as the logical extension toVico’s, Berkeley’s, Wittgenstein’s and Cec-cato’s position that cognition cannot repro-duce the real world. According to Piaget,actions and conceptual operations areadapted – or to use von Glasersfeld’s term, are

viable

– when they match the purposes towhich we put them. The traditional conceptof truth is thus replaced in the field of experi-ence with the concept of “viability” (

Viabil-ität

). Von Glasersfeld delineates the genera-tive power which Piaget ascribes tohumankind on three levels:

[

The segmentation level, where we estab-lish stable objects, by concentrating onsimilarities and disregarding differences(

Objektpermanenz

);

[

The relational level, which enables thesubject to think with the aid of cognitiveschemata;

[

The reflexive level, where abstraction isderived from the operations of the subject,forming complex structures such as theo-ries and systems. This concept of knowledge as

action

aswell as

effect

further establishes the connec-tion with cybernetics. Here, too, the primaryconcerns are issues of regulation and self-reg-ulation, of evolutionary constraints on think-ing, interaction and communication – con-

straints illustrated by Gregory Bateson, afterwhom today’s prize is named. Through hisconcept of

constraints

, Bateson avoideddescribing the effects of evolution in causalterms. Ernst von Glasersfeld uses preciselysuch concepts, not only when referring toevolution, but also to the construction ofknowledge, language-acquisition and allforms of communication. When communi-cating, we adapt to the constraints “[…]which result from the way

we

perceive our fel-low man’s use of language” (Glasersfeld 1997,

p.17). In this way, our useof language becomesattuned to that of others:that is, viable under theprevailing circumstances.We can understand eachother without succumb-ing to the illusion that weeach had precisely thesame meaning in mind.

The question of experiential reality (

Erfahr-ungswirklichkeit

), too, can be answered by the

constraints

model: “The world in which welive and perceive ourselves is the world whichwe create and maintain within the constraintswe have hitherto experienced. – What couldbe more cybernetic?” (ibid.)

As a former linguist and philosopher oflanguage myself, I was particularly interestedin Ernst von Glasersfeld’s views on language,not least because themost difficult questionsfor a constructivist lie inthis area. How can onereconcile the cognitiveautonomy of the subjectwith the experience ofsuccessful communication? How are we tounderstand understanding?

Throughout the 1970s, Ernst von Glasers-feld was engaged in an intensive debate withleading linguists and philosophers of lan-guage such as C. Cherry, C. Shannon, S.Langer, C. Hockett or N. Chomsky (fordetails see Schmidt 2000), in which he pro-posed that communication was an instru-mental, goal-oriented and thus deliberateprocess. In cybernetic terms, this process isdetermined by goals as “reference values”(

Referenzwerte

), sensuality as “sensory func-tion” (

sensorische

Funktion

) and technologyas “effector function” (

Effektorfunktion

). VonGlasersfeld’s model of communication

reacted against the behaviourists’ eliminationof aims and objectives from language andcommunication theory. Instead, he devel-oped a

cognitive

language and communica-tion theory, based on the premise that anyanalysis of meaning must always be con-nected to an analysis of concepts or mentalconstructs. The implication of this is that asemantic analysis should be conducted in theform of a cognitive analysis which focuses on“[…] the

conceptual

items a linguistic state-ment invokes and the relations that are pos-ited between them,” rather than on the state-ment’s relationship with an non-linguisticreality or a statement’s truth-value (Glasers-feld 1974, p. 130). For example, when consid-ering the meaning of a verb, or when translat-ing it – and as an experienced translator vonGlasersfeld knew what he was talking about –it is necessary to work out all the

conceptual

situations in which the verb can be used andapplied. Concepts or mental representationsmust always be seen dynamically, as “rela-tively self-contained programs or productionroutines that can be called up and run.” (Gla-sersfeld 1987, p. 219) When the recipient of alinguistic expression has to construct itsmeaning from conceptual elements that healready possesses – that is, elements derivedfrom previous abstractions of actions, inter-actions and communications – then meaningmust be seen as “irrefutably subjective”: as

something which arises inrelation to the previousexperience of the recipient.The presupposition of suc-cessful communication isthus that communicationpartners possess compara-

ble experiences. These experiences compriseall the conventional rules of language use,which result from social interaction andtherefore help to co-orient communicationpartners even though they cannot see insideeach other’s minds. As a consequence, theconcept of subject-dependent meaning mustbe complemented by acknowledging the sig-nificance of other people, of fellow humans.Von Glasersfeld has stated emphatically thatthe development of concepts in autonomouscognitive systems can occur only throughsocial interaction and must also relate to via-ble experiences in a shared field of experience(for details see von Glasersfeld 1997, pp. 59–60, 206; Glasersfeld 1995, pp. 138–143). Cog-

“The world in which we live and perceive ourselves is the world which we create and maintain within the constraints we have hitherto experienced”

“If we were to believe we knew both good and evil, we would be dangerous beings indeed.”


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nitive autonomy and social orientation aretherefore not mutually exclusive. Linguisticexpressions are semiotic embodiments ofsocial experiences – they result from oursocial interaction and continuously workback on our linguistic and non-linguisticexperience and concept formation. As con-straints of social interaction they oblige us toadapt the way we use language to commonusage.

In contrast to many philosophers of lan-guage who frequently praise language as thehighest form of human achievement, vonGlasersfeld remains characteristically soberand sceptical, noting that “if, today, we look atwhat we have done with the help of thatsplendid tool, one may begin to wonderwhether, at some future time, it will still seemobvious that language has enhanced the sur-vival of life on this planet” (Glasersfeld 1976,p. 223). These are the thoughts and words ofsomeone who – as I mentioned above – thinksin processes, and not in ontological identities.

Ernst von Glasersfeld’s radical construc-tivism is often accused of lacking a sustain-able

ethical orientation

, and of justifying – atleast implicitly – the idea that every ethicalconstruction, however aberrant, is simplyone construction amongst others. It has beenrepeatedly shown that such assertions arenothing more than a cynically reductiveapproach to constructivist thought (fordetails see Schmidt 1996). Still, it should benoted that the forefathers of constructivism,amongst them Ernst von Glasersfeld, hadgood reason to be cautious when consideringethical questions. Particularly illuminating inthis respect is von Glasersfeld’s second

Siege-ner Gespräch

from 1984. Asked how he wouldrespond as a constructivist to moral prob-lems, he answered: “If you are asking this con-structivist what he thinks, well, I never straybeyond Plato’s

Phaedrus

: either you knowwhat is good, or you don’t. […] As soon assomebody says “You

must

know

what is

good,

”they’ve already formulated it incorrectly. You

must

feel

what is

good

. There is no theory tosave or spare you this decision.” (1987, p. 430)

Ernst von Glasersfeld believes that thereare good reasons for taking moral decisions,and that specific moral decisions can be justi-fied. In accordance with Heinz von Foerster(Foerster & Bröcker 2002), he also believes,however, that there is no absolute foundationfor evaluative judgements, and that there is

no rational philosophy from which an ethicmay be firmly derived. “If we were to believewe knew both good and evil, we would bedangerous beings indeed.” (Glasersfeld 1996,pp. 335, 347)

Ernst von Glasersfeld has always empha-sised that constructivists must take responsi-bility for their own constructions, and thatthis responsibility is a

social

responsibility.This means that we must see our fellowhuman beings not simply asa

means

, but also as a

pur-pose

. We must alwaysrespect our fellow humanbeing’s cognitive auton-omy. In order to achieve areliable construction ofreality, we clearly need other people. Only inthis way can we construct a better, intersub-jectively valid reality. In other words, we needother people not only for ethical, but also forepistemological reasons.

In the year 2000, I had a particularlyinspiring encounter with Ernst von Glasers-feld during the conference “Learning in theAge of the Internet” held in Brixen, in theSouth Tyrol. His lecture – so clear in tone andbrimming with his years of experience – wasthe high point of the conference.

In his lecture, Ernst von Glasersfeld onceagain explained the fundamental principlesof his concept of a constructivist education.From the outset he made it absolutely clearthat he accepted the two basic pedagogicalgoals of educationalists: that pupils shouldlearn to think independently and consis-

tently, and that those ways of thinking andacting that are currently seen as the mosteffective should be preserved for the next gen-eration. (Glasersfeld 1996, p. 284) However,when it comes to evaluating knowledge, acleft opens between von Glasersfeld and theeducationalists. Traditional concepts ofknowledge see it as value-free and objective,whereas von Glasersfeld sees all knowledge asinstrumental. According to von Glasersfeld,

students should from theoutset be made aware of thereasons why certain ways ofthinking and acting arepreferable. The primaryaim of education shouldnot be to pass an examina-

tion, but to be intellectually more competentand successful. Since it is one of the basictenets of constructivism that there is neveronly

one

correct way, a constructivist cannotpropose a single, authoritative, didacticmethod. Nevertheless, he can explain to a stu-dent why certain attitudes and techniques areunproductive, by using the concepts of con-structivism to reassess and re-conceptualisebasic notions of communication, learning,knowledge, interaction and motivation. Aconsequence of constructivist thought is thusthe idea that learning – in contrast to training– is a product of self-organisation. Knowl-edge is only acquired through active assimila-tion to cognitive structures one already pos-sesses, and is never acquired passively (fordetails see von Glasersfeld 1995, chapter 10).

Teachers must always have the confidencethat their pupils can think independently.Their art resides in “encouraging pupils toformulate problems independently – prob-lems which promote specific ways of think-ing.” (Glasersfeld 1997, p. 209).

Ernst von Glasersfeld’s constructivism isneither a super-theory nor a foundation-the-ory. Indeed, he never even claims to havedeveloped a theory. His constructivism offersus a way “to cope with the world of experi-ence, which can never really be compre-hended” and to solve problems in a

viable

,rather than a “correct,” way. “Correct” and“incorrect,” he says, are terms which alwaysrelate to a concrete goal or to a problem whichneeds to be solved. For a thinker of von Gla-sersfeld’s calibre, such statements show a raresense of modesty – a modesty which resultsfrom a humanitarianism which seeks neither

Siegfried J. Schmidt has been professor of linguistics, literary theory and theory of media and communication at the universi-ties of Bielefeld, Siegen and Münster. 2006 he became Emeritus Professor at the West-fälische Wilhelms- Universität at Münster. He has published more than 700 books and articles in 19 languages in the fields of phi-losophy, linguistics, empirical theory of liter-ature, media and communication theory. He is a member of the Academia Europaea and honorary president of the International Society for the Empirical Study of Literature and the Media.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

One of the basic tenets of constructivism is that there is never only one correct way

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to correct nor train others, but rather to helpthem develop independence. Underlying thisis Ernst von Glasersfeld’s experience of thefinitude and fragility ofhuman actions – its

con-tingentia

, in Aristotle’ssense. Von Glasersfeldgathered this experience asa traveller between lan-guages, cultures and soci-eties – a journey whichtaught him what to avoid,rather than which goals heshould set himself. He was able to liberatehimself from set patterns of thinking, allow-ing him to develop his ideas with clarity,patience and persuasiveness, but without rad-ical fanaticism. He wins over his reader andhis audiences, liberating them from the illu-sory demand for truth, objective knowledgeand eternal values. During my acquaintancewith Ernst von Glasersfeld, I too have had theliberating experience of discovering how

one’s thought processes can become morecreative and open once one accepts the

Vor-läufigkeit all unserer Endgültigkeiten

– the pro-visional nature of what alltoo often seems, or ismade to seem, final.

To talk of Ernst von Gla-sersfeld is to talk of a per-son with many movingand persuasive personalcharacteristics. In all thetime I have known him, he

has always radiated a sense of calm, not onlyin private, but also in public – whether inopen debates with his students at the Univer-sity of Georgia, or during more fractiousexchanges with the opponents of construc-tivism at many a conference. Since my firstencounter with von Glasersfeld at a confer-ence in Madrid in 1977, he has repeatedlyproven himself to be a brilliant speaker andraconteur – time flies when he speaks. Ernst

von Glasersfeld is also a tremendous host,who can not only prepare outstanding des-serts, but is also a highly practical personwhen it comes to technical matters. I stillbenefit today from a knee stool he designed,and which I had built according to his plans.When, in 1982 and 1984, Ernst von Glasers-feld came to Germany to take part in the

Siegener Gespräche

on constructivism, I hadthe honour of hosting him and his wife at myhome in Münster. In those days, the Germanmotorways were still comparatively empty,and during his visit I treated him to many fastcar journeys. He loves fast cars and driving athigh speeds – two things which, to his greatregret, he has to forgo in the USA.

We have much to thank Ernst von Glasers-feld for, both as a thinker and as a man. Inthis talk I have tried to highlight a few aspectsof his thought and character, in order tothank him personally for his work and hisfriendship.

References

Foerster, H. von & Bröcker, M. (2002) Teil derWelt. Fraktale einer Ethik. Ein Drama indrei Akten. Carl-Auer-Systeme Verlag:Heidelberg.

Foerster, H. von & Glasersfeld, E. von (1999)Wie wir uns erfinden: Eine Autobiogra-phie des radikalen Konstruktivismus.Carl-Auer-Systeme Verlag: Heidelberg.

Glasersfeld, E. von (1974) “Because” and theconcepts of causation. Semiotica 12 (2):129–144.

Glasersfeld, E. von (1976) The developmentof language as purposive behaviour. In: S.R. Harnad, H. D. Steklis & J. Lancaster(eds.) Annals of the New York Academy ofSciences, 280, 212–226. Paper presented atthe Conference on Origins and Evolutionof Speech and Language. New York Acad-emy of Science, Sept. 22–25, 1975.

Glasersfeld, E. von (1987) Preliminaries toany theory of representation. In: Janvier,C. (ed.) Problems of representation in theteaching and learning of mathematics.

Erlbaum: Hillsdale NJ, pp. 221–225.Glasersfeld, E. von (1995) Radical construc-

tivism. A way of knowing and learning.The Falmer Press: London.

Glasersfeld, E. von (1996) Radikaler Kon-struktivismus. Ideen, Ergebnisse, Prob-leme. Suhrkamp: Frankfurt/M.

Glasersfeld, E. von (1997) Wege des Wissens.Konstruktivistische Erkundungen durchunser Denken. Heidelberg: Carl-Auer-Systeme Verlag.

Glasersfeld, E. von (2000) Problems of con-structivism. In: Steffe, L. P. & Thompson,P. W. (eds.) Radical constructivism inaction. Building on the pioneering work ofErnst von Glasersfeld. Routledge Falmer:London, pp. 3–9.

Rusch, G. (ed.) (1999) Wissen und Wirklich-keit. Beiträge zum Konstruktivismus.Carl-Auer-Systeme Verlag: Heidelberg.

Schmidt, S. J. (1996) Was leistet ein Vertretereiner historisch-kritischen Hermeneutikfür die Kritik am Radikalen Konstruktivis-mus und an der Empirischen Literatur-wissenschaft? Deutsche Vierteljahres-

schrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Gei-stesgeschichte 70(2): 291–297.

Schmidt, S. J. (2000) Ernst von Glasersfeld’sphilosophy of language: Roots, concepts,perspectives. In: Steffe, L. P. & Thompson,P. W. (eds.) Radical constructivism inaction. Building on the pioneering work ofErnst von Glasersfeld. Routledge Falmer:London, pp. 23–33.

Schmidt, S. J. (2001) Was heißt “Lernen” auskonstruktivistischer Sicht? In: Schmidt, S.J. (ed.) Lernen im Zeitalter des Internets.Grundlagen, Probleme, Perspektiven.Pädagogischer Verlag: Bozen, pp. 33–44.

Siegener Gespräche über Radikalen Kon-struktivismus. Ernst von Glasersfeld imGespräch mit NIKOL (1982, 1984). In:Schmidt, S. J. (ed.) (1987) Der Diskurs desRadikalen Konstruktivismus. Suhrkamp:Frankfurt/M., pp. 401–440.

Translated by Benedict Schofield

Received: 31 July 2006Accepted: 5 February 2007

One’s thought processes can become more creative and open once one accepts the provisional nature of what all too often seems, or is made to seem, final


Ernst Glasersfeld’s First Scientific Paper

A historical note

The first published contribution by Ernst vonGlasersfeld in the fields of linguistics andepistemology was his translation (from Ital-ian to English) of Silvio Ceccato’s

Il linguag-gio con la Tabella di Ceccatieff

, published in1951 by Hermann & Cie in Paris. He thenjoined Ceccato’s “Scuola Operativa Italiana”and became deeply involved in their workwhich found financial support from Eura-tom, and the European Office of the U.S. AirForce (Air Research and Development Com-mand). So he contributed to the Scuola’s

research on Linguistic Analysis and Mechan-ical Translation.

I met Silvio Ceccato for the first time inJune 1956 in Namur (Belgium) where theFirst Cybernetics International Congress was

taking place. Silvio’s presentation was entitled

La machine qui pense et qui parle

(Ceccato1958). We became friends and had fascinatingdiscussions in Milan (with Enzo Morpurgo)and Vulcano (after a session in Messina with

Giuseppe Vaccarino). Both weremembers of the Scuola OperativaItaliana.

When, in 1959, I was hired byEuratom for doing research inAutomatic Documentation andAutomatic Translation (GRISA,

Groupe de Recherches sur l’Infor-mation Scientifique Automatique

),I started an official cooperationwith Ceccato’s team and so metGlasersfeld. We succeeded in gath-ering a number of Europeanexperts and publishing contribu-tions from them.

At Ceccato’s suggestion, Iinvited Ernst von Glasersfeld to the“Séminaire Leibniz” which tookplace in Brussels, in February 1961.The paper he delivered then,

Oper-ational Semantics: Analysis ofMeaning in Terms of Operations

,was included in a Euratom internalreport. Figure 1 shows a facsimile ofits first page. Von Glasersfeld’s shortpapers included in the TechnicalReport submitted to the Air Forceare also mentioned here. He pub-lished three other papers during1962–1963 but which are notreadily available either. So I decidedto make his first paper reader-friendly such that it can be pub-lished here for the first time.

Commented by Paul Braffort

A

ALAMO (France) <[email protected]>

Purpose: At Silvio Ceccato’s suggestion, I invited Ernst von Glasersfeld to the “Séminaire Leibniz” which took place in Brussels, in February 1961. The paper he delivered then, Operational Semantics: Analysis of Meaning in Terms of Operations, was included in a Euratom internal report and is published here for the first time. Conclusion: These early works clearly show von Glasersfeld’s methodological and philo-sophical coherence as well as his faithfulness to Ceccato’s endeavour. Key words: Linguistic, machine translation, Scuola Operativa Italiana.

historical


CONCEPTS

Figure 1:

Facsimile of the first page.

2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3 13

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Operational semantics: Analysis of meaning in Terms of Operations (February 1961)

The Operational Approach to MechanicalTranslation is based on the following assump-tions:a. language is an expression of thought and

trains of thought;b. thought is analyzable in terms of opera-

tions;c. thought operations carried out by man

are, on the whole, the same regardless ofthe particular language in which the think-ing subject intends to express them.An explicit statement of the theoretical

and empirical research that led to theseassumptions is contained in our Report onthe work carried out between January 1959and June 1960. Points c) and b) are the mainsubject of Silvio Ceccato’s contribution. In thefollowing they are taken for granted.

With regard to point c) certain reserva-tions have to be made. We say the thoughtoperations of different language group are

onthe whole

the same, because even a cursoryexamination of two or more languages showsthat the expressions they have evolved to indi-cate certain situations are not equivalent and,further, that the thought operations by meansof which a member of one language groupconstructs a given situation are not alwaysidentical with those used by members ofanother language group (a current example isthe situation in which an Englishman says “Ilike John” while an Italian says “John mipiace”: the first formulates the fact as a result,the second as though it were the result of anactivity of John).

In the following I shall not deal with thiskind of discrepancy which springs from a dif-ference in the ways of correlating rather thanfrom a difference in the meaning of individualwords. Considering only the semantic rela-tions, i.e., the relations between words andtheir nominata, one finds that languages dif-fer considerably; that is to say, although theoperational elements making up a train ofthought may remain the same whether thethought be expressed in English or, say, inGerman, the arrangement or grouping ofthese elements in connection with the words

expressing them will hardly ever be the samein both languages. Hence, any seriousresearch aiming at M.T. must necessarilyinclude thorough analysis of the semanticrelations evolved by the language concerned.

The semantic analysis carried out up to thesummer of 1960 has, on one hand, confirmedus in the opinion that of all the different kindsof words those expressing a developmentalsituation are the most complex in respect ofthe number of operational elements involved;on the other hand, if this preliminary workhad not yet given us a definitive classificationof elements (definitive both with regard totheir number and to their final individua-tion), it had at least supplied us with preciseideas about how to carry out such analysis.

As a result of these considerations it wasdecided, at the start of the project’s secondstage, to concentrate analytical work on themost frequent expressions of developmentalsituations, because a classification of opera-tional elements obtained in this way will pre-sumably require few additions or modifica-tions when being applied, subsequently, toother kind of expressions.

The direct expression of a developmentalsituation is usually called “verb”; the same sit-uation, with an addition of another mentalcategory can also be expressed by a noun(nomen actionis or nomen agentis).

In order to analyse a verb, we take stock ofthe operational elements necessary to makeup the developmental situation expressed byit, and we try to push this analysis far enoughto be able to distinguish the nominatum ofthe verb in question, by at least one opera-tional element, from the nominata of all theother verbs that have been examined.

Since any developmental situationinvolves a temporalisation – i.e., the insertionof several operational elements into a certaintemporal sequence (cf. the German term“Zeitwort”) – our analysis proceeds by split-ting the “meaning“ of the verb into at least twomoments. If, for instance, we consider verbslike “to come,” “to go,” “to move,” etc, (i.e.,verbs that indicate a developmental situationinvolving a change of place) we find that all ofthem refer – apart from other things – to acommon block of operations:

[

at a moment M1 a thing X is localized in aplace L1, and

[

at a moment M2 a thing considered thesame thing X is localized in a place L2.

(Note: here and in the following, “to local-ize” means that one attributes a particularplace to a thing.)

In our notation we represent this as follows:

A simple structure such as this can derivefrom more than one kind of developmentalsituation. In fact, we find that two of the verbsmentioned above – all of which contain thisstructure – can also be applied to more thanone situation; for instance “John goes to thebathroom” and “this pipe goes to the bath-room” – where John is moving, and the pipeis not.

At first sight it might seem that the reasonfor this ambivalence is that by localizing Johnin the bathroom one categorically excludeshis being localized anywhere else at the samemoment, whereas with the pipe this is not so.This would amount to saying: the nomina-tum of “pipe” includes the operational parti-cle “extension,” while the nominatum of“John” does not. The distinction would bevery comfortable, but unfortunately it doesnot always hold. In fact, I can also find the ele-ment of extension in the nominatum of“John” whenever I want to (for instance, if Iknow that his other name is Gulliver, I can, ata pinch, refer to his extension by saying “hegoes from the front door to the bathroom”).

Actually, the ambivalence of the verb ismuch less controllable and we cannot estab-lish any a priori rules. We distinguish the sit-uations to which it refers by what we call the“Notional Sphere,” i.e., a network of specificrelations established between nominata in thecourse of our living experience. It is on thisbasis that we cope with ambiguous words andalso with expressions like “its shadow goesacross the field” – where we are inclined to seemotion when we know that “it” stands for aplane, and extension when we know that “it”stands for a tree. That is to say, in order todecide the question of locomotion/extensionwe use indications obtained, not from theverb and often not even from the sentence,but from a wider context.

If we now ask in what way the situationindicated by the verbs “to come,” “to go,” and“to move” differ from each other, we realizethat, besides the common block of opera-tional elements, each of them contains further

M1 M2X XL1 L2


CONCEPTS

historical


operational elements that distinguish it fromthe others.

In order to say that something “comes,” wehave to have an operational element that spec-ifies the motion or extension of the commonblock as motion or extension reaching a par-ticular point, namely a point with which thespeaker identifies himself in some way (howthis “identification” is arrives at operationallyis another question which, in this context,does not interest us). We can represent thismore complete situation by the formula:

In this kind of analysis it is important tokeep verbs apart from the prepositions whichmay accompany them. If, for instance, we put“to Paris” after “to come,” we not only addsomething to the structure indicated by theverb, but we also change it; the element L

Sp

isreplaced by the definite location “Paris”which no longer necessarily conveys the indi-cation the X reaches a point with which thespeaker identifies himself.

The developmental situation expressed by“to go” is, of course, the inverse of the one indi-cated by “to come,” and we write its formula:

Here, too, we find that specification of L3,for instance by the preposition “to,” may cancelthe indication L

Sp

; and, further, when X is of acertain kind – i.e., an engine – the “change ofplace” need no longer be seen as locomotion orextension, but may also indicate “partialmotion” or “functioning.”)

The developmental situation indicated by“to move” differs in at least two respects fromthe nominata “to come” and “to go.” Firstly,unlike these, it cannot be categorized as “exten-sion,” but exclusively as “motion”; secondly, theverb gives no indication whether the thing X,which in M1 and M2 is localized in differentplaces, will – grammatically speaking – findexpression as subject or as object.

With regard to the first point we can saythat, whereas the operational element added tothe basic block

in the case of “to come” and “to go” did notinterfere with the possibility of applyingeither the category of “motion” or that of“extension,” in the case of “to move” theremust be an element which excludes this dualpossibility. In fact, if we see a thing in oneplace and, at a subsequent moment, inanother place, this is not yet enough to say“the thing moves”; in order to say “it moves”we must see X in L1, then L1 without X and,finally, X in L2. Hence, the explicit formula for“to move” should be:

(Note: in M2 of this structure there is alocation, i.e., the result of localising a thing,but the thing is not present. This would becontradictory, if the location were not simplythe

maintained

result of the localisationeffected for X in M1.

The second question – whether the X ofthe formula is to find expression in languageas “subject” or “object” – is the age-old ques-tion of transitivity or intransitivity. From theoperational point of view “subject,” “object,”and “development” are mental categories,that is to say, the results of a kind of operatingdifferent from that which yields, for instance,differentiata. We have already come acrossresults of this purely mental kind of operatingin the case of “locomotion”/”extension”;these, too, are mental categories. What inter-ests us here, however, is not their intrinsicstructure or the way in which they are made,but rather their application to a purely obser-vational material and the expression of theresulting combinations of language. Thus wehave found that the verbs “to come” and “togo” do not semantize the categorization ofthe situation as “locomotion” or “extension,”but only the situation previous to the partic-ular operational step of applying one of thesecategories. The verbs, however, require a cer-tain part of the material (i.e., the part we haveindicated by X) to be categorized as “subject”regardless of the situation in which they mayoccur. The verb “to move,” on the other hand,leaves open the categorization of the corre-sponding piece, that is to say, it depends onthe context whether X is to be categorized as“subject” or as “object.” Hence the expression“John moves” is equally applicable to the sit-uation where John, changes

his

place and to

the situation where John changes the place ofsomething else. The issue will be decidedexclusively on the basis of other words figur-ing in the expression which may or may notindicate another thing categorized as “object.”That is to say, in “John goes” or “John comes”X is necessarily regarded as the

agent

of theactivity; in “John moves” this is not so, for“John” may indicate X, and in this case X andthe agent will be one and the same thing; butif the expression contains the further indica-tion of something categorized as “object”(e.g., “John moves a pawn”) “John” merelyindicates the agent, while the object “pawn”indicates the X of the development.

In this notation the agent is indicated by

a

,and it is given the place in the structure for-mula that best represents the role it plays inthe developmental situation expressed by theparticular verb.

In the case of verbs like “to come” and “togo,” that is to say, verbs which conventionallytake no direct object, the agent obviouslycoincides with that part of the developmentwhich we indicate by X; hence we write:

In the case of verbs that represent a devel-opmental situation that does not contain apart necessarily categorized as “subject,” thatis to say, a situation in which the agent can,but need not, coincide with X, because X canalso be categorized as “object,” we have twopossible places for “a”: one in coincidencewith X, when the verb is used “intransitively”(Xa); and another, previous to the moment ofthe development concerning the object X, butthat plays no other part in the moments of thedevelopment.

For “to move,” therefore, we write:

and we add the notational rule that thisformula implicitly comprises the alternative:

M1 M2 M3X X XL1 L2 L

Sp

M1 M2 M3X X X

L

Sp

L2 L3

M1 M2X XL1 L2

M1 M2 M3X – XL1 L1 L2

M1 M2 M3Xa Xa XaL1 L1 L

Sp

for “to come,” and

M1 M2 M3Xa Xa XaL

Sp

L2 L3 for “to go.”

M1 M2 M3a X – X

L1 L1 L2

M1 M2 M3Xa – XaL1 L1 L2

2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3 15

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Which is indicated by the same verbwhenever the linguistic expression of thedevelopmental situation does not explicitlyspecify an object.

In the case of developmental situationthat necessarily contain an object, we indi-cate this object by Y, while any other thing thedevelopment may bring into relation with Xor Y is indicated by Z (or other letters).

As an illustration of how this method isapplied I should like to take a group of com-paratively simple and very common verbs, allof which concern some kind of contactbetween physical things:

As in most groups of related verbs, two,three, or more of them may often apply toone and the same situation, but, on the otherhand, there are situations which can beexpress only by one of the verbs. For instance,if one ship hits an iceberg and another strikeson iceberg, they are – in practice – doingmuch the same thing; but hitting a match andstriking a match are two very different things;and this is so, not because the discrepancybetween their meanings makes no apprecia-ble difference in the one situation, whereas inthe other the difference is of practical impor-tance.

In the formulas given below the followingsymbols are used:

M1, … Mn – moments of the development;Xa, X, Y – the thing which executes or under-

goes the development:Xa – if it always finds expression as subject of

the verb,X – if it finds expression either as subject or as

object of the verb,Y – if it always finds expression as object of the

verb;a – the agent responsible for the development;f – the agent employing relative force;i – the conative agent (i.e., acting with inten-

tion);Z – the thing with which X or Y are put in rela-

tion;L1, L2, … Ln, Lm – different locations,

i.e., result of localization;L/1, L/2 … – any location different from

L1, L2, etc…

If we have to translate sentences contain-ing any one of these verbs into another lan-guage, we discover that each one “corre-sponds” to more than one verb in the outputlanguage and that the choice will depend onthe situation with which the sentence is con-cerned. Taking only the most current uses andleaving aside all figurative, metaphorical, oridiomatic occurrences, we shall requireroughly the following group in German:

to clap to pat to striketo slap to smack to stroketo slam to knock to beatto tap to hit to smash

M1 M2

to clap

a X X–ZL1 L2

[

Establishing contact and producing noise;

[

X and Z may be covered by a plural (e.g., “hands”);

[

X and/or Z may remain implicit.

M1 M2

to slap

Xf pX pX–ZL1 L2

[

Establishing surface contact, relative force;

[

pX (part of X) or Z may be soft;

[

pX remains implicit.

M1 M2 M3

to slam

af X X–Z X–ZL1 L2 L3

[

Establishing state in contact and produc-ing noise, relative force;

[

Z remains implicit.

M1 M2 M3

to tap

Xa pX pX–Z YL1 L2 L1

[

Establishing and terminating point con-tact;

[

PX remains implicit;

[

Z may remain implicit;

[

(this does not include the 2nd meaning, i.e., “to tap a barrel”).

M1 M2 M3

to pat

Xi Y Y–Z YL1 L2 L1

[

Establishing and terminating surface con-tact;

[

X must be conative;

[

Y remains implicit;

[

Y or Z must be soft.

M1 M2 M3

to smack

Xa pX pX–Z pXL1 L2 L/1

[

Establishing and terminating surface con-tact and producing noise;

[

PX remains implicit.

M1 M2 M3

to knock

a X X–Z XL1 L2 Ln

[

Establishing and terminating contact;

[

X and Z may remain implicit;

[

X and Z must be hard.

M1 M2 M3

to hit

af X Z X–ZL1 Ln L2

[

Establishing contact, relative force;

[

X may remain implicit.

M1 M2 M3

to strike

af X X–Z X–ZL1 L2 Ln

[

Establishing contact and state of motion in contact, relative force;

[

X and/or Z may remain implicit;

[

L2–Ln may be motion of X in contact with Z (surface of X moving along point of Z, or X moving along surface of Z).

M1 M2

to stroke

Xi pX–Z pX–ZL1 L2

[

Motion in contact with Z;

[

Xi must be conative;

[ PX remains implicit;[ L1–L2 = motion of pX and extension of Z.

M1 M2 M3 M4to beat af X X–Z X X–Z

L1 L2 L1 L2

[ Repeatedly establishing and terminating contact, relative force;

[ X may remain implicit.

M1 M2 M3 M4to smash af X X–Z p1 p2

L1 L2 Ln Lm

[ Establishing and terminating contact, rel-ative force, and change of relation whole/part;

[ Z remains implicit;[ P1 and p2 are parts of X or of Z;[ Ln and Lm are unspecified locations, one

of which must be different from L2.

klatschen tippen treffenklappen antippen streichenschlagen stossen streichln


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Analysing them in the same manner as weanalysed the English verbs,a first examinationhas led to the following results:

These analyses should be considered anillustration of method rather than final anddefinitive results. Above all I should like tostress once more that in each case the analysishas been pushed just so far as to enable us todiscriminate the nominatum of the particularverb from those of the verbs under consider-ation. Obviously some of the pieces that areused here as “elements of meaning” are farfrom being elementary, nor are all of them asclear and unequivocal as they should be (e.g.,the difference of attributing location to theone of two pieces in contact rather than theother). As our vocabulary increases, many ofthe formulas may have to be extended or cor-rected in order to discriminate the develop-mental situations represented by them fromother similar ones, which, so far, have notbeen considered. In other words, the formulasgiven here, although representing more orless accurately some characteristics of thenominata of the respective verbs, are as yetcertainly not exhaustive; they should how-ever, be sufficiently advanced to show that anexhaustive analysis of the meaning of wordscan be achieved in this way.

klopfen anstossen prügelnhauen krachen zertrümmernpochen prallen zerschlagen

M1 M2klatschen a X X–Z

L1 L2

[ Establishing surface contact and produc-ing noise;

[ X and Z may remain implicit;[ (this does not include the 2nd meaning,

i.e., “to gossip”).

M1 M2 M3 M4klappen a X pX X pX

L1 L2 L1 L3

[ Change of direction by circular motioin (partial)

[ PX remain implicit.

M1 M2 M3schlagen af X X–Z X

L1 L2 Ln

[ Establishing and terminating contact, rel-ative force;

[ X may remain implicit.

M1 M2 M3 M4klopfen a X X–Z X X–Z

L1 L2 L1 L3

[ Repeatedly establishing and terminating contact and producing noise;

[ X and Z may remain implicit.

M1 M2 M3 M4hauen afi X pX X pX–Z

L1 L2 L1 L3

[ Establishing contact, relative force, circu-lar motion;

[ PX remain implicit;[ X must be conative.

M1 M2 M3 M4pochen a X X–Z X X–Z

L1 L2 L1 L2

[ Repeatedly establishing and terminating contact;

[ X or Z is soft;[ X and/or Z may remain implicit.

M1 M2 M3tippen Xi pX pX–Z pX

L1 L2 L1

[ establishing and terminating point con-tact;

[ pX remains implicit.

M1 M2 M3antippen Xi pX pX–Z pX

L1 L2 Ln

[ establishing and terminating point contact; [ pX remains implicit.

M1 M2 M3stossen Xa pX–Z pX–Z Z

Li L2 Ln

[Motion in contact, terminating contact;[ pX remains implicit;[ (the situation often also contains the

establishing of contact, but the verb, I think, only implies this).

M12 M2 M3anstossen Xa Xa–Z Xa

L1 L2 Ln

[ Establishing and terminating contact;[ Z remains implicit.

krachen + prep.

M1 M2Xf Xf–ZL1 L2

[ Establishing contact, relative force, and producing protracted noise;

[ X and Z must be explicit.

M1 M2 M3prallen + an Xf Xf–Z X–Z

L1 L2 L/1

[ Establishing and terminating contact, rel-ative force;

[ X and Z must be explicit.

M1 M2 M3treffen a X Z X–Z

L1 L2 L/1

[ Establishing contact;[ L1–L/1 = motion of X;[ Z may remain implicit.

M1 M2streichen a X–Z X–z

L1 L2

[Motion in contact;[ L1—L2 motion of X and extension of Z;[ Z may remain implicit.

M1 M2 M3 M4streicheln Xi pX–Z pX–Z pX–Z pX–Z

L1 L2 L1 L2

[ Repeated motion in contact, relative force;[ L1–L2 = motion of pX and extension of Z;[ PX remains implicit; X must be conative.

M1 M2 M3 M4prügeln Xfi Y Y–Z Y Y–Z

L1 L2 L1 L2

[ Repeated establishment and terminating contact, relative force;

[ Y remains implicit; X must be conative.

M1 M2 M3zertrümmern Xf Y pY1 pY2

L1 pY12 pY2

[ Changing relation whole/part, relative force;

[ PY1, pY2 = parts of Y remaining implicit;[ Y must be explicit.

M1 M2 M3 M4zerschlagen Xf Y Y–Z p1 p2

L1 L2 Ln Lm

[ Establishing contact, relative force, and changing relation whole/part;

[ L1–L2 = motion of Y;[ p1, p2 = parts of Y or of Z;[ Y or Z remain implicit.

2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3 17

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historical radical constructivism

Besides, they show a type of difficulty intranslating (regardless of whether mechanisedor not) which, hitherto, has certainly beenunderrated, if not altogether overlooked: thelack of precise correspondence between wordsof different languages that are often held to be“synonymous.” This, of course, is not really amomentous discovery. In every bilingual dic-tionary one finds thousands of instances of thiskind and human translators are so thoroughlyused to them that they rarely register them con-sciously.

The verb “to hit” – to take one from ourselection – occurring in the sentence “the carhits the wall,” could be translated in German as“prallen,” “stossen,” “krachen,” plus a suitablepreposition; in the sentence “Mary hits John” itwould be rendered by “schlagen” or “hauen”without a preposition (unless there is someprevious indication to the effect that Mary isflying through the air or involved with someother kind of relatively fast locomotion); in thesentence “he hits the target” the German verbwould have to be “treffen,” and there are otheruses of “to hit” which, in translation, would

require some further German verbs. And theverb “to hit” is by no means an exception in thisrespect. Nearly all the verbs used in everydaylanguage require multiple output in anotherlanguage, because the output language hardlyever contains an exact operational replica ofthe original verb to be translated.

Hence, when we translate – i.e., when wereconstruct the correlational net indicated bya particular input text and then express thatcorrelational net in another language – theactual meaning of the input verb is only one ofthe factors that we use in the procedure. Theother factor is the complex of indications thatwe glean from the context of the particularoccurrence and, in a wider sense, from all weknow as a result of previous experience andlearning with regard to the kind of situationreferred to by the input text. This complex ofindications is accumulated in what we call theNotional Sphere.

It is important to realise that reference to theNotional Sphere is instrumental not only in theprocess of translation, but already in the muchmore usual and elementary process of under-

standing a given text. If “to understand” does infact mean to reconstruct a situation, the ele-ments of which are conveyed by the text, it isclear that we have to refer to the NotionalSphere in order to understand sentences suchas “John hits Mary,” “John hits the target,” and“John hits the bottom of the lift shaft” becauseit is only on the basis of some previous knowl-edge about things like Mary, target, or lift shaftthat we can establish the exact part John plays inthe situation generically conveyed by “to hit.”

Since translating presupposes understand-ing the text that is to be translated, there wouldseem to be no possibility of bypassing theproblem. On the other hand, however, theresearch on translation has helped a great dealto show the real extent of the problem and sug-gest ways and means towards its final solution.We now know for certain that the quality oftranslation will always be proportional to theexactness of the semantic analyses and thecomprehensiveness of the network of associa-tions contained in the Notional Sphere, andthat both factors can be indefinitely refinedand improved. [EUR/C-IS/2196/61 f]

A continuing effort in research and developmentResearch by Ceccato and his team was carriedout at the Centro di Cibernetica e di AttivitàLinguistiche (Università di Milano). Financ-ing came from two major contracts runningsimultaneously: one with Euratom (my ini-tiative), and one with the Air Research andDevelopment Command (contract AF 61(052)-212). A comprehensive report of theirfirst achievements was issued on the 4th June1960 (RADC-TR-60-18), cf. also Ceccato(1961). It included, after a major contributionby Ceccato, Ernst’s second paper: Some noteson Inter-Language Correspondence (pp. 117–129 of the report). This report also containeda smaller, more technical contribution byhim: Notes concerning output matrices (pp.170–174 of the report).

As is well known, after the initial years ofenthusiasm, sponsors became more and morereluctant to contribute any further. I leftEuratom in 1963; IDAMI (Italian Institute ofEngineering Information) took over the con-tract with the U.S. Air Force Office of Scien-

tific Research. In 1965 a final report wasissued. It included a paper by Ernst von Gla-sersfeld and Paolo Terzi (1965) on automaticsentence analysis. Finally Ernst joined theGeorgia Institute for Research, and later theUniversity of Massachusetts.

From Ernst’s first papers onwards, Cec-cato’s influence is evident. And maybe Oper-ational Semantics could be considered – eventoday – as a good introduction to the ScuolaOperativa Italiana’s concepts and methods.

Ceccato died in 1997, but in 1987 a follow-up of the Scuola had been founded by FeliceAccame: La Società di Cultura Metodologico-Operativa, publishing Quaderni di Methodo-logia including Ernst’s Il costructivismo radi-cale in 1998, and including with veteranssuch as Vittorio Somenzi, Giuseppe Vaccar-ino and Ernst von Glasersfeld: a lifelongfaithfulness!

References

Ceccato, S. (1958) The machine that speaksand thinks. In: Actes du 1e Congrès Inter-national de Cybernétique, June 1956.Gauthier-Villars: Paris/Namur , p. 288.

Ceccato, S. (ed.) (1961) Linguistic analysisand programming for mechanical transla-tion. Gordon & Breach: New York.

Glasersfeld, E. von & Terzi P. (1965) AutomaticEnglish sentence analysis. Final Report,AFOSR Grant AF EOAR 64-54. IDAMILanguage Research Section: Milan.

Received: 13 September 2006Accepted: 27 February 2007

Born in Paris in 1923, Paul Braffort gradu-ated at the Sorbonne in both Philosophy and Mathematics. He worked with the French Atomic Energy Commisssion, then for Euratom and the European Space Agency. Later he joined The University of Paris 11 (Orsay), the University of Chicago and the “Collège International de Philoso-phie.” He is a member of the OuLiPo (Ouvroir de Littérature potentielle) founded by Raymond Queneau (a Cec-cato’s friend) and François Le Lionnais (who was one of the organisers of the Namur’s International Congress of Cybernetics.

ABOUT THE COMMENTOR


Ernst von Glasersfeld and the Scuola Operativa Italiana

n at least a couple of occasions, Ernstvon Glasersfeld tells of the very first

time he and Ceccato serendipitously hap-pened upon each other and the way theirrelationship developed from that point(Glasersfeld 1998b, pp. 15–17; Glasersfeld1999, p. 15). “It was just by chance” (Glasers-feld 1998b, p. 15), at that time, that Ernstbrought his family to Merano, in 1947,where he had been as a child; they were pen-nyless; and – to save money – they used tospend the good season in Val di Sogno, alongthe bank of Lake of Garda, camping in a tent;Ernst spent the day typewriting articles andtranslations for journals and it was bychance that a curious lady “with a she-com-panion” happened to pass there “on a niceday”; she had noticed him during her boattrips and she wondered what the hell he wasdoing there. Under such circumstances theword “philosophy” worked as the currencyof the linguistic and cultural market: thelady’s son also dealt with “philosophy,” andhe was Silvio Ceccato. Wittgenstein (whose

Tractatus

Ceccato had translated in a versionthat remains unpublished) served as the firsttopic of conversation between the two ofthem. Ceccato invited Ernst to join somediscussions with his friends of that time(Albani, Maretti, Morpurgo, Rossi-Landi;but not Somenzi and not Vaccarino, whomErnst met later) and then asked him to trans-late his

Teocono

and, from 1949, to edit thetranslations for the new-born review of the


, “Methodos”

1

.However, as Ernst had to maintain his fam-ily, the relation with Ceccato persisted rathersporadically till 1959, when, to meet therequirements of a contract offered by the USAir Force, Ernst was summoned to the Cen-tre of Cybernetics and Linguistic Activitiesof the University of Milan, to be part of thegroup of researchers invited to apply opera-tive theory to the mechanical translationfrom one language to another.

Thus, Ernst is a member of the group that,in 1960, signed the first Report on the project(Ceccato 1961), although, as Ernst himselfsays, “

il Maestro

” did not like his contribution(Glasersfeld 1998a, p. 18). I remark this detailas I have the impression that this could beconsidered the first symptom of something“going wrong.” When, later on in 1963, Cec-cato ran short of funds, it was Ernst wholooked for and found a new source of funding.And then he tried (his turn now) to repay hisdebt to Ceccato, inviting him to join the newgroup: but Ceccato refused.

In May 1993 Ernst was in Milan for one ofhis short trips. We organized a meeting withsome friends for an in depth discussion of cer-tain aspects of his thinking. The debate thatfollowed was recorded and edited in theWorking Papers of the

Società di CulturaMetodologico-Operativa

2

No. 41 in 1993 . At acertain moment, replying to an observationof mine, Ernst said that “sometimes one hasthe impression, with Varela and with Ceccato,that they know what is the truth.” Ernstshould not have said that! A note from Cec-cato “addressed to Accame-Glasersfeld” camejust the right time, with a title sounding assevere as an excommunication: “

Il lupo perdeil pelo…”

3

.

With his note Ceccato indicatedthat just on the base of this single statement itwould have been an evident relapse into the

“sceptical side of cognitivism.” Ceccato ofcourse claimed he had no notion of whatVarela could have said (although he was lyinghere, as he was familiar with some of Varela’swork

4

); however, he very well knew that the“current use of the word truth concerns theway by means of which results (to be pre-sented) are obtained – a “doing” and “redo-ing,” that is, continuously (re-)attempting,etc. If results coincide,” Ceccato went on , “onehas become used, among the public, to talkabout truth for words and reality for thethings that are indicated . And experimentswill be repeated again just to see what hap-pens. Just fancy! The inveterate philosopherkeeps on thinking that those words are foreverybody (and particularly for himself) away to get closer to the truth-reality not ofrepetition and control, but of transcendenceof the undue doubling of the perceived”

(

Cec-cato 1993)

.

Ceccato was returning the accusation tothe origin, charging him with all the wicked-ness that (history of philosophy at hand) hadmade it an accusation. It is clear that Ceccato’sreaction was not justified – it is not by accus-ing someone of knowing what the truth is thatit can be demonstrated that one has not leftthe trap of the theoretical-cognitive cage; onthe contrary, it is with just such an argumentthat it can be proved that it is the person react-

Felice Accame

A

Società di Cultura Metodologico-Operativa <[email protected]>

O Purpose: Appreciating the relationship between Sylvio Ceccato and Ernst von Glasers-feld, both as people and in their work. Approach: historical and personal accounts, arche-ological approach to written evidence. Findings: Ceccato’s work is introduced to an English speaking audience, and the roots of Glasersfeld’s work in Ceccato’s is explored. Flaws in Ceccato’s approach are indicated, together with how Glasersfeld’s work over-comes these, specially in language and automatic translation, and what became Radical Constructivism. Conclusions: Glasersfeld willingly acknowledges Ceccato, who he still refers to as the Master. But Ceccato’s work is little known, specially in the English speak-ing world. The introduction, critique and delineation of extension and resolution of Cec-cato’s ideas in Glasersfeld’s work is the intended value of the paper. Key words: philosophy, language, correlational grammar, “Scuola Operativa Italiana,” attention/mind, mental operation.

philosophical-linguistic

proto radical constructivism

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2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3 19

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ing to the accusation who cannot escape thetrap, leaving the cage behind. Rather, it is evenmore obvious that Ceccato’s reactionexpresses the way he lived, in the sense ofexperienced, his relationship with Ernst (andwith me as well).

A few years later, however – in his

C’erauna volta la filosofia

5

,

the last book by Cec-cato, the relationship has turned even moresour. Ceccato mentions an “English collabo-rator” who “was offered a contract for themechanical translation” just at the momenthe was refused funds from the U.S. Govern-ment for his research. On this occasion, notonly does Ceccato not mention that Ernsthad invited him to be part of the new groupof research (and Ceccato declined), but alsohe tells the story as though he should haveexcited envy as a consequence of hisextraordinary achievements; and he en-riches the story with a faked, and verypathetic refusal to move to America, wherehe would have been offered a rainbow lead-ing to the proverbial crock of gold (Ceccato1997, pp. 68–70).

Ceccato first mentions Ernst, without nam-ing him, in a letter to Vaccarino, dated 31August, 1948. “I found “, he says (and weknow from Ernst that things did not goexactly this way), “the suitable translator forthe review’s English essays. He is an Irishman, who has been living in Merano foryears, interested in our researches (he knowsWittgenstein very well); he can translate fromItalian, French and German to English.” Lateron, on October 4, name and surname arerevealed, Ernst is still “the most suitabletranslator I know,” but he has become“English” (Ceccato guesses wrong again asErnst was Czech, born from Austrian par-ents), “who studied in Germany” (Ceccato’sgeographical competence leaves somethingto be desired: Ernst studied in Switzerland,and later, for a short time, in Vienna), who“married a French woman” (ehermm! theEnglish Isabel), who “has been living in Italyfor four years” and “who is interested in phi-losophy.” He lives in Merano (Bolzano), viaDante 49: this information is noteworthy as –according to Ceccato – it is Vaccarino, as thefinancer of

Methodos,

who should contactErnst and make the necessary agreements.Some current fees are indicated, so Vaccarinocan act accordingly.

Later, references to Ernst tend to disappearin Ceccato’s letters. Here, above all, it is clearthat Ceccato debates the basic theoreticalproblems of the operative methodology withVittorio Somenzi; Ceccato also informs Vac-carino and – sometimes – even directly argueswith him, but never does he argue with Ernst.For example, in a letter to Vaccarino datedJuly 20, 1951, he mentions “the Glasersfelds”and he says he “tried to arrange something”with them to stay together. But the reason isthat at the time Ceccato is dreaming of Amer-ica, and would like to improve his Englishthrough long talks with “the Glasersfelds,” tocut a fine figure with a “Rockfeller officer,” thecoming October.

A few days later, on August 5, Ceccato asksVaccarino to find a place where “the Glasers-felds” – as campers looking for beautiful sce-nary – “can pitch their tent.” Any further ref-erences are to Ernst as translator.

The “

Teocono o della via che porta alla ver-ità”

6

was first published in the opening num-ber of

Methodos

, in 1949. As I observed, withOliva, this work “achieves a break with (…)philosophical tradition,” generating a “modelof philosophical production, not only in itshistorical form, but even in the possibilities itoffers for (self) preservation and (self) per-petuation.” We may thus think of it as “theessay of the definition of philosophy”(Accame & Oliva 1971, p. 310).

Written as a set of rules, or “game,” it was pub-lished several times and in different versions.At the point where “the players” are defined,we are warned that there may be a “solitary

teoconist

”

7

: however, “in order

to stir up com-petition,”

the single player

“would have toassume the others’ play as a part of his own” :that would be a true game any way. Ceccatosays these games usually occur in “schools”and “circles.”

Well then, if the original version omitted thenames – left to the reader’s assumed culturalawareness – in a later version of 1988 (the lastone), in

Il perfetto filosofo

8

, Ceccato doesmention a few names: “Platonism, Aristo-telism, Thomism

9

, Marxism,” “Prague Circle”and “Vienna Circle,” “Instrumentalism, Exis-tentialism, Behaviourism,” followed by “Con-structivism” (Ceccato 1988, p. 85).

10

By set-ting constructivism on the same level as otherphilosophical solutions, Ceccato definitively

sentences it to the flames of the methodolog-ical-operative hell. As to whether constructiv-ism were to be more or less “radical,” Ceccatowas really indifferent.

In my afterword to the Italian edition of

Comeci si inventa

[How to invent oneself] (Accame2001), I remind the reader of further occa-sions when Ceccato confirmed his oppositionto Ernst’s thinking – always assuming thatErnst never removed himself from philoso-phy. As I see it, Ceccato’s arguments are weakand a pretext, like those of a teacher wantinga forever acquiescent and subordinate pupil.But Ernst’s easy use of electively sceptical phi-losophers leads one to think that his

parsdestruens

is not

destruens

enough to shift tothe

pars construens,

without risking a fall.

Notwithstanding Ceccato’s assertions, whichErnst never failed to pay attention to, Ernstalways spoke very highly of Ceccato. Ernstdescribes himself as being “mesmerized” byCeccato, considering him a “

Maestro

” and –with no perfidy I believe – “one of the maininnovators in philosophical thought” (Gla-sersfeld 1999, p. 16 and p. 20). Nevertheless,he very honestly points his polite finger towhat he recognizes as the sores in the

corpus

of Ceccato’s theories. I shall indicate some ofthese “sores,” in the following sequence.

I come to the first point by running oversome aspects of a contribution by Ernst to the

Quinto Intrattenimento Metodologico-Operativo

11

, in Rimini, in 1997. “When Iworked with Ceccato in the ’50s and ’60s, Ihad several occasions to attend his demon-stration concerning the constitution of themeaning of ‘something,’ or the Latin

‘id,’”

Ernst says. “He looked at us as a magicianwould, with his right arm behind his back,and he said ‘Pay attention’. Then he moved hisarm in front of him and he said: ‘Here!’ He washolding a piece of chalk, or a key; he explainedit was not the specific object that was part ofthe constitution of the category of “some-thing,” but the conjunction of two momentsof attention. He seemed very limpid.”

So he seemed. “However” (Ernst goes on)“some years later, when I tried to coordinatethe teachings of the

Scuola Operativa

to reacha homogeneous way of thinking, I realizedthat this mime act – as many others – showedthat the

Maestro

had no doubt that his behav-iour could produce specific mental reactions


REVIEW



among us observers. The problem, which maybe unreal but is a problem nevertheless, orig-inated in the impression that, although theunderstandings we produce are products ofour mental operations, they do not seem to bearbitrary.” It is at this point that Ernst remindsus of an expression that (even if used by Cec-cato in the past) he had retained as “opaqueand a bit mysterious”: the “dependences”(Glasersfeld 1997) (a problem that Ceccato“had neither time nor perhaps willingness toexplain”; Glasersfeld 1998a, p. 10).

Ceccato was happy to ignore this mattercompletely. In fact, the analytical indexes ofhis books do not include it. On the contrary,it is Beltrame (1969, pp. 120–122) who widelyexplains the concept in his

Osservazione edescrizione meccaniche

12

, an essay openingthe second part of the

Corso di linguisticaoperativa

13

. Beltrame argues that – whenelaborating a model of mental activity, we arenot only faced with indicating which opera-tions have been carried out, but also “thedependences of their execution.”

For instance, he draws a figure on the pageand he points out that “with a very high prob-ability,” should someone be asked about it, hewould answer it is a “square,” given that anyother definition such as “four-sided,” “rhom-bus,” “quadrangle,” “parallelogram,” “shape”and so on, would be equally legitimate. Bel-

trame explains that – no doubt – a habit to“work” (in the sense of building percepts)“along horizontal and vertical lines” influ-ences the way of operating; mainly when “theline of the shape suggests or sustains move-ments of this kind.” Generalising – that is,extending his arguments to the definition ofcriteria for the “study of dependences” – heremarks how useful it would be, first at all, tomake a distinction between “physical pro-cesses which take place in the environmentand which promote by recourse to a physicalmode” the functioning of some organs and“the previous functioning of one or moreorgans, meant as an exciting or inhibiting fac-tor for the functioning of one or moreorgans.”

Ernst declared himself perfectly persuadedthat “the analysis on the basis of moments ofattention – invented by Ceccato and devel-oped by Vaccarino – is the only acceptableone.” However, Ernst was persuaded too that– at this point – we must say “why some cate-gories are constitued and used,” while “otherpossible ones do not appear.” Indeed, Ernsthad already been given an answer, but he stillmaintained a number of “perplexities.” Totalk about “dependences” implied for him “asort of reference to reality.” Once he had cor-rected Ceccato’s theory with Piaget’s, Ernstovercame his perplexities by arguing that “one

must assume some correspondences of con-figuration between a category and the thingsthat are built before that category is applied tothem.” Finally, to him “that correspondencewould be the first type of dependence thatdetermines what I would call the viability ofcategorial applications” (Glasersfeld 1998a,pp. 11–14).

14

As I see it, all this was the sign ofa profound misunderstanding.

To my mind it is definitively legitimate toextend scientific research to the conditionsunder which results were obtained by adopt-ing exactly the same criteria used to carry oninvestigation about those results. The

ScuolaOperativa Italiana

never meant to elaborate anew theory of knowledge: rather, it proposeda series of issues to support the thesis thatmany things may go better if one keeps onenquiring which operations lead to a result;the school also built a hypothesis to identifythese operations and a method to describeand indicate them. Its programme did not gobeyond this, while nevertheless being awarethat the perceived, the categorized and thesemanticised is always the result of someone’soperations (and not a

per se

result, indepen-dent of anyone). Thus, the extension of theanalysis to the conditions is the result of achoice that can be made or not made, but that– in any case where a relation is present – willalways have reference to the awareness of theactor. From this point of view, the “physical”– as the “psychic” or the “mental” – is simplythe result of a specific way of operating: realityin terms of “its viability,” when the result isembedded in the history of the organ thatdoes the operating.

As a second sore I would mention the con-flict between the genealogical hypotheses ofcategories elaborated by Ceccato and byPiaget. Piaget – Ernst says – “realized that allconceptual structures – most of Ceccato’s“pure categories” resulting from the applica-tion of a state of attention to itself – were notthere since the beginning but appeared pro-gressively with experience”; this led Piaget totalk about “abstraction,” as well as distin-guishing between “empirical abstractions atsensory-motor level” and “reflective abstrac-tions.” That is the point. Ernst believes thatthe principle may be valid for both types ofabstractions, and for Ceccato’s categories aswell. So he comes back to the old example: the“something” is obtained after the “pay atten-tion” and “here!” only when the categorial

From the left: Gianni Sassi, Felice Accame, Marco Sigiani, Gino Di Maggio, Ernst von Glasersfeld. Fondazione Mudima, Milan, 1989.

© Felice Accame

2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3 21

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structure is applied to what is presented. Withnothing at hand, well, there is no “some-thing.” The reflective abstractions of Piagetwould be some “configuration structures ofmental operations emptied of sensory-motormaterial”: this material – although it has dis-appeared – was however necessary to theirconstitution (Glasersfeld 1998a, pp. 13–14).As I see it, the conflict is not worthy of ourattention, and may not exist at all. The exam-ple discussed by Ernst cannot deny thathumans allow themselves the category of“something” which is not identified with any-thing specific. Moreover, Ceccato neverexcluded the evolutive progression of the cat-egorial set. Ceccato’s analysis addresses the

hinc et nunc

of the actor performing the oper-ations: according to him, when the actorperforms the analysis (about the“something,” the “here,” the“now,” the “beginning,” orthe “end”) the sensory-motor, or the perceived,is not interacting. Thedifference between thetwo points of viewcould be resolved byshifting from a syn-chronic analysis to adiachronic analysis.The conflict dis-

appears when we take into account that Cec-cato’s analysis strictly pertains to the results ofattentional combination, since it does nottake into any consideration the way thoseresults interact with the sensory-motor. Incontrast, when Ernst tried to set up an opera-tive model to include both contexts (whileidentifying the categorial steps leading to the“number”) the problem of the heterogeneityof constitutive elements was given only astrictly formal solution (Glasersfeld 1981).

The third sore is nothing but a smallimperfection, belonging to others rather thanto Ceccato’s theory itself. It is a question ofnames. Ceccato’s analysis concerns languageand the mental activity it designates. Whendefining the mental elements used as a linkbetween one meaning and another, Ceccatouses the term “correlators”: since they per-

form the same function at the level of lin-guistic designation, it follows that the

same term is maintained here too.Some mental correlators have corre-

sponding linguistic correlators – butnot all of them, at least not thoseobtained by the same method (someare obtained with a word, forinstance, but this may not apply to

others). Ernst says this provoked anumber of misunderstandings: and as

a consequence the correlationalgrammar elaborated by

Ceccato was not prop-erly recognized by the

interna-tional scien-

tific community (Glasersfeld 1999, p. 19).That may be. But – as I tried to argue on otheroccasions Accame (2002, 1994) – I think thatthe reasons Ceccato’s theory and the whole

Scuola Operativa

were not properly recog-nized are different in nature; these reasons aredeeply rooted in the traditional thinking ofour culture as well as in the rationale of pow-ers this culture contributes, in one way oranother.

And so, with the following fourth, and last– so it seems at least – remark of mine, wecome back to a further sore.

Ceccato – of course – would remain “oneamong the most relevant innovators of thephilosophical thinking” (and he would not bethat glad of such an appreciation): but tounderstand his value some obstacles have to beremoved. The circularity of Ceccato’s defini-tion of “mind” appears to Ernst as one of the“hardest” obstacles.”We may agree to talk of anattentional activity until attention is notapplied either to itself or to something else”Ceccato says. “When attention is applied toitself” (as we already stated) “it generates anactivity called categorial; and when it appliesto the functioning of other organs it generatesthe activity of presence.”

15

But, “mind is thecomplex of these activities, and it keeps a com-plex/elements relation with them. That is acategory in itself” (Ceccato 1966, p. 22). Thus,mind (or “mind” in quotes as Ernst would pre-fer, although, as I see it, there is no differencebetween the two) “is constituted by the catego-rial activity that is an element of mind itself”:a circularity that is accepted only with diffi-culty (Glasersfeld (1999, p. 20). Perhaps I amnot demanding too much, for it is not difficultfor me to accept the fact that if an object to beanalysed is reduced into constitutive elements(that in principle constitute all analysableobjects), no object may be excluded from theanalysis. It is a tautology. If I reduce everythingsurrounding me to atoms – in its etymologicalsense – I have no difficulties reducing myself toatoms too (meaning myself as the actor per-forming the analysis). Thus – careful! – we donot exclude the case that the unit of analysismay be investigated in different ways. The unitresults from a choice made by the analyser, it isnot an independent matter of fact. Thus, Cec-cato’s “attention” – and the “mind” it consti-tutes – may be the object of different analyses:the one by the neurobiologist, for instance,given some declared criteria by which possible

© Felice Accame


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reciprocal correspondences may be fixed. Putanother way, we could assume that the mind

may be

considered a complex of activities –and not that the mind

is

. In both cases wewould have nothing to do with that delightfulsilliness contained in the statement “mind isbrain”

16

(I say delightful since it gives evidenceof the vain materialistic concerns of “trendy”philosophers).

Ceccato’s correlational grammar was elabo-rated by Ceccato in the face of specific andurgent needs. Accordingly, it was little andpoorly developed. In turn, this oftenobscurred the model of mental activity and itsrelation with the language which had gener-ated the correlational grammar itself. Thatthis so is obvious from the rather unpolishedcomposition of the “table” of categories: inthe classification of the implicit mental corre-lators; and in the fact that the “mental” waslimited to “what has been heard about,” aswell as being represented with linguistic des-ignations and formalisations. Further, at thetime, there were research projects and con-tracts waiting to be fulfilled. Like heaven, the-ory could wait. But, when Ernst was facedwith the problem of automatic translationagain, for the second time, he succeeded inapplying relevant and meaningful changes tothe analytical framework. His experience withCeccato and with the Centre of Cyberneticsand Linguistic Activities of University ofMilan was over by that time, and he hadstarted a collaboration with Jehane Burns andPier Paolo Pisani at Idami, also in Milan.Thanks to his

Multistore

(applied to theEnglish language) the operative economybecame a criterion of correlational grammar.I will try to explain at least its starting point:in correlational syntax a sequence of indexeswas assigned to each word; and any index rep-resented a connecting potential and it fulfilleda specific relation with another word or sen-tence. The connection took place on the basisof the complementarity of indices (a way ofratifying compatibility) so as to avoid

a priori

linguistic combinations that could be gram-matically correct, but wrong when reachingthe semantic level, whenever a human inter-vention was needed to “adjust” the automaticresult. Notwithstanding, the average number

of indices of correlation for each word was toohigh, especially in relation to availablemachines: in this case the ELEA 9003 ofOlivetti Electronics Division in Milan. At thispoint it became necessary to insert the princi-ple of re-classification (indexing whole corre-lational structures) and the correlationalprobability (Glasersfeld 1965). With theseinnovations Ernst obtained outcomes rele-vant in technical terms and meaningful interms of models: the amount of human workon mechanical translation was significantlyreduced and, at the same time, the still simply“ideal” or too static framework of the correla-tional grammar was enriched by evolutivedynamics

17

.

From the moment of its birth, the

ScuolaOperativa Italiana

was a strange andunhealthy entity: with no premises, noagenda, headed by a Trimurti

18

with difficultreciprocal relations, and with few disciples.Some of the disciples soon took flight and afew were rejected, a school that was denied,even by its inventor, a school with no real andgenuinely well-formulated theory. Perhaps Itried too hard, caring for the

Scuola

, eventu-ally arriving at the conclusion that the maintheoretical responsibilities should have beenshared between Ceccato and Somenzi

19

, withVaccarino deserving an Academy Award forpatience – while the clever Rossi-Landi soontook flight and did little but look after his owninterests (Accame 1987). Others – I nameBarosso and Beltrame – elaborated the basictheoretical framework while either reaching asceptic-like disengagement (Barosso) or ren-ovating its methodological perspectives (Bel-trame). For some years I wasted my time andenergies trying to grant the

Scuola OperativaItaliana

at least some sort of collective dimen-sion and some rules of correct communica-tion. Notwithstanding all the support fromSomenzi and Vaccarino – in the face of Cec-cato’s faked indifference – I achieved little: anassociation, the

Società di Cultura Metodolog-ica-Operativa

; a new journal –

Methodologia

–as the inheritance of

Methodos

; five symposiaand some public debates; in 1989 a newsletter,which still survives. This effort of minestarted in 1985, with the preparation of thefew booklets of the

Critica sociale delle

Scienze

20

. Through this I got in touch againwith Ernst. I owed Ernst my very first meetingwith Ceccato, in 1964, but since he had left forAmerica, I had lost contact.

Ernst, however, missed nothing by going toAmerica. He had met Somenzi and Vaccarino(Glasersfeld 1999, p. 17) – too late for the firstand too early for the latter, who elaborated hisown system of semantics only later, proposinga form of thinking distinct from Ceccato’s.The


was falling tobits all over the place, while Ceccato – unde-ceived yet impatient for the

hinc et nunc

– afew, damned and immediate tokens ofapproval – contributed by letting the schoollose that modest influence and any scientificcredibility it may have acquired. Very few –among those directly concerned – were able tounderstand the countribution that the evolu-tion of Ernst’s thinking indirectly gave to thetheoretical nucleus of the

Scuola OperativaItaliana

. Ceccato (as we have seen) excommu-nicated him; Vaccarino was much too buriedin his own system to recognise any alternativeor different research line; but Somenzi, not-withstanding his suspicious doubts on “con-structivism,” (and to be honest, also, to someextent, Rossi-Landi) did not miss the huge rel-evance of Ernst’s experimentation with thechimpanzee Lana, so strongly opposed by theobscurantist Chomsky and the surroundingChomskians. The chimpanzee was committedto communicate to humans (via computer) bymeans of a language that – a frequently forgot-ten critical detail – was built by Ernst on thebasis of correlational grammar (Somenzi 1987and afterword to Premack 1978).

I have to apologize to Ernst, who knew meas a presumptuous kid. I owe him memoriesof moments that – when happening – Iwished could last forever: a discussion on themethodology of literary critics (Glasersfeld1968; the themes were more or less thoseones), Isabel crushing a nut and offering it tome, Sandra on the cover of

Gli effimeri

(S. vonGlasersfeld 1964)

21

, some dinners – withCharlotte, with Bruna Zonta, with my wifeAnna – a painting by her enriching the coverof the Italian edition of

Come ci si inventa

, thewalks along the beach at Rimini, in September1997, at nightfall.

2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3 23

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Notes

1. And also for the translation of

Il linguag-gio con la tabella di Ceccatieff (The Lan-guage with Ceccatieff’s Table)

[translator],the first book by Ceccato, published inItalian and English by Hermann & Co. inParis in 1951.

2.

The Society of Methodological-OperativeCulture

[translator]. 3. “The wolf looses its sheep’s clothing”

[translator].4. We had talked together about

Autopoiesie cognizione

written by Varela and Hum-berto Maturana.

5.

Once upon a Time Philosophy

[transla-tor].

6.

The Teocono or The Way to The Truth

[translator].7. A teoconist is presumably a solitary play-

er of the game developed in

Teocono

[translator].8.

The Perfect Philosopher

[translator].9. [Editors’ and translators’ comment:] Th-

omism is the philosophical school thatfollowed in the legacy of Thomas Aquinas(1224/1225–1274). The word comesfrom the name of its originator, scholasticphilosopher and theologist, whose sum-mary work is the

Summa Theologiae

.Aquinas worked to create a philosophicalsystem which integrated Christian doc-trine with elements taken from the phi-losophy of Aristotle. Aquinas is generallyagreed to have moved the focus of Scho-lastic philosophy from Plato to Aristotle .

10. This version was enriched by embarass-ing elements of occasional chronicle,mainly inaccurate, and by a very cultivat-ed sense of persecution. Even the versiontitle –

Hide and seek

– is not suitable forthe original. Who is not interested in thenarrative forms of someone frustratedand unsuccessful (preferring to aim atlearning tools letting him free from phi-losophy) would had better forget this ver-sion.

11.

Fifth Methodological-operative meeting

[translator].12.

Mechanical Observation and Description

[translator].13.

Course of operative linguistics

[translator]. 14. Where Ernst says “configuration,” he

complains about the missing Italian wordfor “pattern.”

15. The original Italian is

attività presenzia-trice

[translator].16. On the presumed problem of circularity

in Ceccatos’s theory see Panetta (1999),pp. 142–145.

17. The development of the Multistore pro-gram made a detailed analysis of the cor-relators necessary, which in fact was to beErnst’s interest in the following years. SeeGlasersfeld (1998), p. 10.

18. [Editors’ and translators’ comment:] Insome schools of Hinduism, the Trimurti(or

the Hindu trinity

) is a concept thatholds that God has three aspects, whichare only different forms of the same oneGod. The three aspects of God are Brah-ma (the Source/Creator),Vishnu (the

Preserver/Indwelling-life) and Shiva (theTransformer-Destroyer/Creator).

19. Someone may find this observationstrange. But I am convinced about that:the role of Vittorio Somenzi was promi-nent in the early phases of the

Scuola Op-erativa Italiana

. His voluntary exil wasprovoked by unresolvable theoreticalfrictions with Ceccato – frictions that ofcourse also invested the ethical sphere.But Somenzi never lost any hope to seehis methodological-operative principlesrecognized and developed. On the base ofunedited sources I sustained this thesis inan essay I delivered to Claudio Del Belloin summer 2005, in order to assist thepublication of a book by Somenzi,

Comenon detto

, which he gave us some time be-fore his death.

20.

Social Critics of Sciences

[translator].21. The book is dedicated “

to Ernst and to Is-abel

.” I can remember it.

References

Accame, F. (1987) Percorsi metodologico-operativi nell’opera di Rossi-Landi. Il Pro-tagora XXVII: 11–12.

Accame, F. (1994) L’individuazione e la desig-nazione dell’attività mentale. Espansione:Rome.

Accame, F. (2001) Afterword. In Foerster, H.von & Glasersfeld, E. von (2001) Come cisi inventa. Odradek: Rome, pp. 179–186.

Accame, F. (2002) La funzione ideologicadelle teorie della conoscenza. Spirali:Milan.

Accame, F. & Oliva, C. (1971) Prefazioneall’Antologia di Methodos. Pensiero e Lin-guaggio in operazioni 2(7–8): 280–289.

Beltrame, R. (1969) Osservazione e descriz-ione meccaniche. In: Ceccato, S. (ed.)Corso di linguistica operativa. Longanesi:Milan, pp. 115–139.

Ceccato, S. (ed.) (1961) Mechanical Transla-tion: The correlational approach. Gordonand Breach: New York. Italian originalpublished in 1960.

Ceccato, S. (1966) Un tecnico fra i filosofi, IIvol. Marsilio: Padova.

Ceccato, S. (1988) Il perfetto filosofo. Laterza:

Rome, Bari.Ceccato, S. (1993) Reumatismi delle spugne a

priori e porpore a posteriori. Methodolo-gia Working Papers 42.

Ceccato, S. (1997) C’era una volta la filosofia.Spirali: Milan.

Glasersfeld, E. von (1965) Multistore: Un pro-cedimento per l’analisi correlazionaledell’inglese. Automazione e automatismi9(2): 5–28.

Glasersfeld, E. von (1968) Alla ricerca di datiprecisi. Nuovo 75(2): 36–40.

Glasersfeld, E. von (1981) An attentionalmodel for the conceptual construction of

Felice Accame was born in 1945 in Varese. He is teaching communication theory at the Technical Center of Coverciano. Accame is president of the Society of Methodological-Operative Culture. Since 1985 together with Carlo Oliva he moderates the trans-mission “Hunting to the daily ideology” of the Popular Radio of Milan.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR


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units and number, in Journal for Researchin Mathematics Education 12(2): 83–94.

Glasersfeld, E. von (1997) Lotta con una vec-chia perplessità. Relazione al QuintoIntrattenimento Metodologico-Opera-tivo, Rimini.

Glasersfeld, E. von (1998a) Cronaca di cons-apevolezza operativa personale. Quadernidi Methodologia 5: 9–16.

Glasersfeld, E. von (1998b) Il costruttivismoradicale. Società Stampa Sportiva: Rome.

English original: Glasersfeld, E. von(1995) Radical constructivism. FalmerPress: London.

Glasersfeld, E. von (1999) Omaggio al Mae-stro. Quaderni di Methodologia 7: 15–21.

Glasersfeld, S. von (1964) Gli effimeri. Lerici:Milan.

Panetta, M. (1999) Il rapporto tra pensiero elinguaggio nella filosofia analitica e nellatecnica operativa di Ceccato. Quaderni diMethodologia 7: 121–145.

Premack, A. J. (1978) Perché gli scimpanzépossono leggere. Armando: Rome.

Somenzi, V. (1987) Le obiezioni a VonGlasersfeld. Alfabeta 102.

Translated by Silvia Pizzocaroand Ranulph Glanville

Received: 27 August 2006Accepted: 5 February 2007

Updated: 23 April 2007


The Theoretical Environment around 1965

he years around 1965 marked the con-clusion of an important phase in the

development of the ideas of the Scuola Oper-ativa Italiana (SOI).

1

Glasersfeld had activelyparticipated in this fascinating developmentstarting from 1947 (Glasersfeld 1999). More-over, during the first half of the sixties he wasinvolved full-time in a Mechanical Transla-tion project at the

Centro di Cibernetica e diAttività Linguistiche

of the University ofMilan; this project was an important test ofthe new ideas.

Around 1965, Ceccato had completed hiscritical revision of the historical theories ofknowledge, and he had also proposed a fewelementary operations to describe mentalactivity with a completely constructive con-structivist approach. The use of these newtools led all of us in Ceccato’s team to measurethe deep and subtle dependence of mentalactivity on context, and this awareness wouldstrongly contribute to differentiating theresearch lines of the SOI components.

Glasersfeld fully accepted this depen-dence: as his idea of

viability

would show, aswell as his experiments on learning with thelinguistic chimpanzees. I worked at the

Cen-tro di Cibernetica

during those years, and Ithink it is interesting to recall the attainmentsthat we considered stable at that time, and theawareness that we had on the open problems.I shall refer to Ceccato’s papers, which are thesource of the theoretical framework of thewhole team.

Ceccato concluded the revision of the his-torical theories of knowledge with a radicalcriticism of the notion of knowing. The main

point of this criticism was the erroneous wayof defining knowing in terms of a relationshipbetween two entities rather than as a constitu-tive activity that starts from scratch. Since thetwo elements of a relation must be mentallyconstructed before putting them into rela-tionship, knowledge would be introduced as a

definiens

into its definition.Let me quote an early formulation of this

criticism (Ceccato 1951, p. 21):“[O]bserver, observatum, observation areborn together; the observer and the obser-vatum, or one of the two, are not bornbefore and observation afterwards. Butthis operational awareness has been lack-ing, and at least three thousand years ofphilosophical and scientific work were ori-ented by this lack. One began by maintain-ing that observer and observatum subsistbefore and independently from observa-tion, each as such in itself. One executes,that is to say, the operation of: 4K) Dou-bling the observer into ‘observer as such initself, but awaiting to observe’ and‘observer who observes,’ and the observa-tum into ‘observatum as such in itself, butawaiting to be observed’ and ‘observedobservatum.’ This way of operating iscalled ‘passivism.’ And then: 5K) One addsobservation, more or less as activity of theobserver on the observata, activity thattransforms the observata from ‘observataawaiting to be observed’ into ‘observedobservata’ (idealism), or as activity of theobservata on the observers, activity thattransforms the observers from ‘observersawaiting to observe’ into ‘observers who

observe’ (realism). Observation thusintroduced is precisely the symbolizatumof ‘knowing’.”We can find many rewordings by Ceccato

of this criticism, frequently in Italian andmainly with reference to perception (Ceccato1962, 1965, 1967a, b). He also wrote a brief,historical sketch in a satirical tone, which hadan English version as well (Ceccato 1949).

The knowing activity was thought of as aflow of elementary mental operations, whichconstitutes a known thing when a sequence ofthese operations is thought as a result. Anexample of the transition from the criticismto this constructive approach, can be found inthe following passage (Ceccato 1963, pp. 10–11):

“[T]hings […] were at first […] distortedby a speculative tradition […] whichtaught that the brain should be considerednot in terms of organs and their functions,but as the passive mirror of the eventsaround it. These events were to be foundinside the brain as duplicates of things out-side it. […] A determining factor [in thediscovering of the error] was the observa-tion that, of a thing which remains thesame in its form and material, we oftenspeak in different and even contradictoryways. We may speak of a cup, for instance,as a part (in relation to the tea service) andyet as a whole” (in relation to its handle,rim, and so on). We may regard a finger-nail as the beginning of the finger, or as itsend. […] We concluded […] that at leastsome of the things which we designate bywords are quite independent of the bodiesin our environment, and cannot thus rep-resent a duplication; instead, they arisefrom operations which we ourselves per-form.”Among the elementary operations, a

selective function of attention was intro-duced in a way that can be traced back to W.James’

The Principles of Psychology

(James

Renzo Beltrame

A

National Research Council of Italy <[email protected]>

T

Purpose: Ernst von Glasersfeld has actively contributed to the development of the ideas of the Scuola Operativa Italiana (SOI) from 1947. The paper outlines the theoretical status of the SOI research around 1965, which also marks the conclusion of an important phase of this development. The aim is to contribute to better understanding of the continuity of Glasersfeld’s research. Key words: Cognition, Italian Operational School, Ceccato.

Cognitive-psychological & historical


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1890). Here I offer a short quotation (Cec-cato 1964a, p. 8):

“The application of the attention, besidesbringing to mind the functioning of theother organs, isolates a ‘tantum’ of it. […]In that they are results of this paying ofattention, leaving aside the question ‘whatis the functioning organ and the ‘tantum’of functioning,’ let us give these results thename ‘praesentiata’.”Clearly, a physiological counterpart of the

“praesentiata” is described. However, it wasnot stressed, here and in other places, thatsuch a description had the methodologicalcharacter of a definition.

About fragmentation, we find (Ceccato1967a, p. 200):

2

“As to the functioning of the organs whichthe attention makes present and breaksinto fragments, a list of these elements aswell would be indispensable in order to seewith what stones the building of the mindhas been constructed. […] This list alreadyexists more or less, even if it is ratherimprecise and oscillating, when one gath-ers together, in dictionaries for example,the names both of colors, flavors, […] andthose of the types of lines and surfaces intowhich various figures can be broken down,and which correspond to our movements.[…] In order to ensure that the picture iscomplete, another path has been chosen,that of seeking to pair up these elementswith physical situations according to thestimulus-response relationship, […]therefore introducing the order of thenumeric series; whereas forms are treatedby analytic geometry.”The things that were called attentional

structures, or mental categories, are probablythe most original idea in the mental activityscheme. Let me quote a short, formal presen-tation of these mental constructs from Cec-cato (1967a, p. 199):

“[W]e give the various attentional struc-tures, which we will call Y, a formal system-atization according to the widely usednotation of the Warsaw School: (1) Y is anS (where S represents a state of attention).(2) Y is a D1SS (where D1 represents thebinary operator of which the S’s are thearguments: operation D1 consisting inmaintaining a first state of attention whena second is added). (3) Y is a D2S D1SS ora D2D1SS S (where D2 represents the

binary operator of which the argumentsare a single S or a combination of S’s: oper-ation D2 consisting of memorizing andtaking up one S or a combination of S’s).”However, we need a further rule, such as:

(4) Y is a D3 YaYb (where D3 represents thebinary operator of which the arguments Yaand Yb are type (3) Ys) that is mentioned inthe comment on rule (3).

Such kinds of structures were proposed todescribe both simple mental constructs (e.g.,“singular,” “plural,” “some,” “other,” “begin,”“end,” etc.), and more complex structuresthat had strong methodological relevance(e.g., the causal schemes, the times, modes,and aspects of verbs, etc.), although the latterwere described with a coarser granularity.

Mixed constructs were nevertheless pro-posed, in which mental categories were asso-ciated with constructs that involve praesenti-ata. Among them, let me quote a proposal forthe mental activity by which we think of phys-ical things and their mutual interactions(Ceccato 1967a, p. 201):

“[L]et us add the temporal and spatiallocalization of the represented thing or ofthe perceived thing. We obtain the possi-bility of pairing with these, respectively,another represented or perceived thing intemporal or spatial relationship, providedthat the representative or perceptive oper-ating be repeated […] We have thus oper-ated enough to reach the psychical and thephysical; the first in that objectifying hasbeen performed at least twice, temporallylocalizing the results and putting theminto relationship with each other; the sec-ond because the results put in relationshipwith each other have been localized spa-tially. One should not expect to find thoseresults of objectifying operation alwaystaken as two distinct things, in as much asit is possible to link them respectively withduration and with extension, that is toconsider them as the same thing. […] Inany case, when more than one physical orpsychical construction is put into play, therelationships which they have betweenthem will no longer be our mental history,but theirs.”This idea had a great methodological rele-

vance, because it outlined that physical thingswere thought of as being subject and objectsof their mutual interactions. Since these inter-actions are independent from the mental

activity of the person who predicts orobserves them, the scheme of the mentalactivity organically included a constraint thatarises from our common experience. Such anearly inclusion was determinant in preventingthe SOI approach from becoming a new typeof mentalism.

The previous mental constructs werethought to imply the sensory memory: that is,they never span above 1–2 seconds. A furtherelementary activity was introduced todescribe a mental activity that spans overlonger intervals of time: for instance, linguis-tic activity (Ceccato 1964a, pp. 13–15):

“A second more comprehensive modulusis the substitutive one, characterized bymaking two units of the first degree [theadditive previous one] follow one anotherthrough a unit, it too of the first degree,which constitutes the relationshipbetween them. This happens in that (a) theunit used as the first term of the relation-ship, is maintained once it is completed,(b) in regard to this maintained unit, themental category of relationship comesabout, and (c) this too, once completed, ismaintained upon the addition of the sec-ond term of the relationship. […] “In order to avoid confusion between thiskind of relationship, of cuts and sutures ofan attentional sort, and the relationshipsdue to physical nature, we propose tospeak of correlators for the relationships,of correlata for the terms of the relation-ship, of correlational structure for theresults of correlating […]“The comprehensiveness of this modulusof construction is given by the fact that anentire structure can act as an element in anew structure, giving rise to more or lessextended correlational nets. […] correla-tional nets […] rarely go above 6–7 sec-onds.”The following graphic representation was

generally used for the correlation:

Nested correlations were used to representcorrelational nets.

Another elementary operation was intro-duced to extend the spanning of the correla-tional nets beyond 6–7 seconds. However, it

correlator

1st correlatum 2nd

correlatum

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was described as function (Ceccato 1967a p.206):

“The correlational procedure could nothowever be prolonged beyond six orseven seconds, without the first elementsbeing inevitably lost. Our memory, as aholding of presence, would not allow it.That which permits us to continue thecorrelational net is another of the func-tions of the memory […], the summariz-ing one, with which it is possible to takeup in condensed form the thought whichhas already been performed; a functionwhich in language for the most part isdesignated with pronouns: ‘Mario andLuigi went happily on their brand-newbicycles. They …’”Although correlation and correlational

net were introduced with a general valence,they were mainly used with reference to lan-guage and they had a central role in theMechanical Translation project (Ceccato1964b). In a linguistic context, conjunctions,prepositions (Glasersfeld 1965), and the syn-tactic categories nearly always designate cor-relators; pronouns usually involve a summa-rizing activity; and punctuation and articles(Glasersfeld 1963) frequently acquire this lastfunction as well. In this theoretical frame-work, the linguistic activity took the follow-ing meaning (Ceccato 1967a, p. 214):

“Designating, that is, expressing andunderstanding, means connecting thefunctioning of the hearing and voiceorgans with the functioning of the of theorgans of thought and its contents.”Here, “thought” has the technical mean-

ing of correlational net. We have to read thesentence as saying that we speak of designat-ing when a connection occurs between thetwo orders of functioning; otherwise, wewould contradict the principle that a physicalprocess involves only physical things.

A problem clearly arose. The research onMechanical Translation showed that, inmodeling what we considered a suitableunderstanding of the current sentence, themain difficulty was to describe and use theknowledge that we had acquired from theprevious sentences (Ceccato 1964a, 1967b,p. 19):

“Whoever follows a speech, or reads a text,carries into each successive sentence thatwhich he had learned in the precedingone. […] as the discourse progresses, the

context of each word broadens and makesany doubt difficult.”Alternative ways of understanding a sen-

tence are most always possible. Different pre-vious knowledge, and the pressure of timeconstraints, make each alternative more orless probable.

We met the same problem in studyingvisual perception (Ceccato 1965, pp. 20–21):

“We know […] that by showing a certainthing we will not necessarily obtain thesame response from everyone, […] Weencounter this relative liberty on the planeof the most elementary perception. […]The liberty of the response is even greaterwhen observation and description regardan event.”The physical situation that acts as stimulus

does not determine the perceptual result: heretoo, alternatives are always possible beyondthe classical alternating figures of psychology.The pressure of time constraints, and the pre-vious mental activity still make each alterna-tive more or less probable.

We were fully aware that neither a physio-logical approach to a theory of human behav-ior, nor an anthropological one, offered a reli-able solution to the problem. The followingway of describing memory functions offers asample of that awareness (Ceccato 1967a, p.202):

“Let us […] consider the various functionswhich memory performs. It can keeppresent that which has just barely beendone (that is, memory as the continuationof presence, such as eidetic images); it canmake present again that which has beenabsent (that is, memory as retrieval).Then, it operates on the past not only pas-sively, but also selectively and throughassociation (that is, memory as elabora-tion, as creation), but above all, it operateson the past by condensing it, by sum-marizing it. Furthermore, it makes a pro-pulsive force of it; it makes it act on theoperating under way. Finally, memory canmake present not only that which hasalready been made present by the atten-tion, but also, although to a lesser degree,the operating of organs which has passedunnoticed. In this way, memory and atten-tion complement each other, and theattention has before it a field that is broad-ened from the simple present to includeour whole life.”

The general problem of describing a men-tal activity that has the suitable dependenceon the context is still open; and the sentence“Furthermore, it makes a propulsive force ofit; it makes it act on the operating under way”simply makes claims for a dynamics of mentalactivity.

The question “When does a person speakor write a given phrase?” received an intialresponse: “When the person has made therelated set of mental operations,” whichbegan to be felt as a mere rewording of theoriginal question, although it implied a radi-cally new approach. The question began to besubstituted by “When will a person perform agiven set of mental operations?,” whichrequires changing from a descriptiveapproach to mental activity to a predictiveone. Two factors, however, hindered the freeuse of the predictive approach.

The first factor was a side effect of the stud-ies on Mechanical Translation. In MT, we startfrom a written text and we deal with the activ-ity of understanding it. The constitutive activ-ity of the various designata is assumed to becarried out, and low or no interest arises inpredicting the occurrence of the mental activ-ity.

The people in the SOI were sufficientlymindful of avoiding the Platonism that isimplicit in freezing a number of mental con-structs by fixing a description of their consti-tutive activity. They used the descriptiveapproach in education, or in increasing ourconsciousness about mental constructs thathave a strong methodological impact, and thedevelopment of a dynamics of mental activitywas rather slow.

The second factor was related to a charac-teristic of the organ-function relationship.This relation was proposed as link betweenthe mental activity and its realization in thebiological architecture. However, we soonbecame aware of the need to rehash deeply thenotion of organism that we could extrapolatefrom our machines. Let me quote an earlyexample of this awareness (Ceccato 1962,pp. 40–41):

3

“…sotto l’aspetto modellistico valga unavvertimento. La distinzione in organi efunzioni (come di solito è intesa e, certa-mente, come viene applicata quando ci siriferisce alle macchine) porta ad attribuireogni cambiamento al funzionamento degliorgani, mentre questi rimarrebbero uguali.


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[…] Ma nell’uomo non è da supporre chele cose stiano in questi termini. […]Nell’uomo […] gli organi svolgono sì

fun-zioni cicliche

; ma essi sono soggetti anchead una

funzione monotonica

, che forse ètutt’uno con ciò che chiamiamo memoria,e che è certo una caratteristica del materialeoperante proprio dei viventi.”We might model learning, and more gen-

erally individual differences, through a mono-tonic function of the organs, which would alsoaccount for different personal histories. How-ever, a monotonic function introduces a vari-able way of functioning with the related phys-ical changes in the organs, and this makes the

organ-function scheme useless. A one-to-onecorrespondence between the elementarymental activities and physical processes is abetter solution, and the dynamics of the men-tal activity follow from the dynamics of thephysical architecture that realizes it.

Unfortunately, biology inherited an exten-sive use of the organ-function scheme; a deeptransformation of the experimental tech-niques is necessary to pass from this schemeto the interactor-interaction scheme, which isnot affected by the previous difficulties. Biol-ogy thus did not give the help that we hadplanned to develop a dynamics of mentalactivity.

Through his research on learning and onthe criteria for the relevance of mental con-structs, Glasersfeld thus continued his partic-ipation in the pioneering phase of the SOI,facing one of the main problems that this firstphase left open.

Notes

1. We do not have a standard English trans-lation of SOI. “Italian OperationalSchool” seems sufficiently clear to me.Bibliographies of Ceccato and of otherpersons who contributed to the SOI can befound at: http://www.methodologia.it/biblio.htm

2. Here and in the following, I quote a paperof 1967, which has a clear conciseness.

3. I quote this Italian text because it appearedvery early, and I offer here an English re-wording: “Our usual distinction betweenorgans and functions (certainly when weapply it to our machines) assigns thechanges to the way of functioning of theorgans, and leaves the organs un-changed… However we cannot assumethat this scheme holds for humans. In hu-mans… the organs perform cyclic func-tions, but they also have a monotonicfunction, which we can probably identifywith memory, and that is certainly a char-acteristic of the biological material.”

References

Ceccato, S. (1949) Il teocono. Methodos 1(1):34–54.

Ceccato, S. (1951) Il linguaggio con la tabelladi Ceccatieff. Actualités Scientifiques etIndustrielles. Hermann & Cie: Paris.

Ceccato, S. (1962) La macchina che osserva edescrive. La Ricerca Scientifica 32: 37–58.

Ceccato, S. (ed.) (1963) Mechanical transla-tion: The correlation solution. Technicalreport at Centro di Cibernetica e di Attiv-ità Linguistiche Università degli Studi diMilano.

Ceccato, S. (1964a) Correlational analysis andmechanical translation. Technical report atCentro di Cibernetica e di Attività Linguis-tiche Università degli Studi di Milano.

Ceccato, S. (1964b) Automatic translation oflanguages. Information Storage andRetrieval 2: 105–158.

Ceccato, S. (1965) A model of the mind. In:Caianiello, E. (ed.) Cybernetics of neuralprocesses. CNR: Rome, pp. 21–79.

Ceccato, S. (1967a) Concepts for a New Sys-

tematics. Information Storage andRetrieval 3: 193–214.

Ceccato, S. (1967b) Correlational analysis andmechanical translation. In: Both, A. (ed.)Progress in machine translation. NorthHolland: Amsterdam, pp. 77–136.

Glasersfeld, E. von (1963) The functions of thearticles in English. Technical report at Cen-tro di Cibernetica e di Attività LinguisticheUniversità degli Studi di Milano.

Glasersfeld, E. von (1965) An approach to thesemantics of prepositions. In: Josselson, H.(ed.) Proceedings of Las Vegas conferenceon computer-related semantic analysisXIII. Wayne State University: Detroit MI,pp. 1–24.

Glasersfeld, E. von (1999) Omaggio al mae-stro. Quaderni di Methodologia 7: 15–21.

James, W. (1950) The principles of psychol-ogy. Dover: New York. Originally pub-lished in 1890.

Received: 20 June 2006Accepted: 24 January 2007

Renzo Beltrame is Senior Research Associ-ate at the Pisa Research Area of the National Research Council of Italy. He has been at the National Research Council of Italy since 1962. From 1960 to 1976 he was in Ceccato’s team.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR


Ernst von Glasersfeld’s Contributions to the LANA Project

rnst von Glasersfeld’s contributions tothe LANA Project (the Language Ana-

logue Project) were very important to itsseven years of success, 1971–1977, duringwhich the effort was led by the senior authorof this paper, supported by NICHD 06016and 38051. Indeed, his contributions havehelped perpetuate research into the languageskills of apes and sea mammals to this day.Ernst was a member of the original team of1970 that formulated the proposal to theNational Institutes of Health for four years’funding to develop a computer-monitoredkeyboard-situation appropriate to researchon the language skills of which the great apesmight be capable. Those skills had a 50-yearhistory of interest even at the time the NIHproposal was prepared. A recent survey ofapes’ skills from their historic roots is thefocus of a recent book by Hillix and Rum-

baugh (2004). Ernst’s sterling contributionsare documented in his two chapters (von Gla-sersfeld 1977a, b) in a book published in 1977with the title

Language Learning by a Chim-panzee. The LANA Project

(Rumbaugh 1977).The proposal captured the interest of the

NIH and resulted in an award of funds to sup-port the research. The National Institute ofChild Health (NICHD) funded the award in1971, a reflection of their keen interest in theparameters of language acquisition. In theproposal we anticipated that, to the degree thecomputer-monitored system and methods ofinquiry led to the definition of language skillsin a young ape, we might have the potentialfor better understanding of and resolving bar-riers to language acquisition by children andadults challenged by the constraints of mentalretardation and other causes of brain damage.

Ernst’s several contributions included thewriting of an interpretive correlational gram-mar that would evaluate the structural cor-rectness of statements formulated by a subjectusing the system, monitored by a PDP8 com-puter with only about 8 kilobytes of memory.It was programmed by Ernst and his col-league, Pier Pisani.

Both Ernst and Pier were with of the Uni-versity of Georgia. Other team members wereJosephine V. Brown (developmental psychol-ogist), Susan Essock (experimental psycholo-gist) and Duane M. Rumbaugh (general-experimental and project director), all withGeorgia State University; the late HaroldWarner (biomedical engineer), the late Tim-othy V. Gill (behavioral research technician),and Charles Bell (electronics technician), allthree with the then-named Yerkes RegionalPrimate Research Center of Emory Univer-sity. Their individual roles and collective suc-cess with our first ape subject, the chimpanzee(

Pan troglodytes

), Lana, are recounted in theabove referenced book on the project.

Collectively, we agreed that our ape shouldlearn a number of stock sentences. They were

called that because they were to be taught inspecific detail for use by Lana to obtain a vari-ety of incentives and states – foods and drinks(e.g., chow, banana, candies, cabbage, bread,orange, etc.), states of entertainment andcuriosity (e.g., a movie, music, making a win-dow open), and social company. The lexiconwould consist of geometric symbols servingas words. Each word would be embossed on aLucite key for the subject’s use on the key-board to be monitored by a computer.

It was Ernst who suggested that the geo-metric symbols that we designed to functionas words might be called lexigrams. Thegroup readily accepted that term for them andit lives to this dayin language research projectsat the Language Research Center of GeorgiaState University and the Great Ape Trust ofIowa.

Although Ernst’s grammar for the systemwas relatively fixed in its structure, in that anumber of stock sentences entailed only thesubstitution of one word (e.g., Pleasemachine give piece of (insert cabbage, chow,apple, and so on here; Please machine make(insert music, slide, or movie here; and so on),it afforded flexible use of words between cat-egories as well. In brief, it had some degree offlexibility.

Ernst recommended that we call thegrammar

Yerkish

in honor of Robert M.Yerkes, the early primatologist of Yale Uni-versity who founded the laboratory thateventually carried his name. (The early his-tory of the laboratory was at Yale Universityand then in Orange Park, Florida. In the1960s it was moved to Atlanta, Georgia,where Emory University served as its spon-sor.) His recommendation was accepted.The grant that supported the LANA Projectwas awarded to the Yerkes Regional PrimateResearch Center (now known as the YerkesNational Primate Research Center) inAtlanta, Georgia. The project was conductedat the Yerkes Center.

Duane M. Rumbaugh and Charles Bell

A

Great Ape Trust of Iowa (USA) <[email protected]>

E

historical


OPINION

Duane M. Rumbaugh was born in Maynard, IA, 1929, and received his Ph.D. from the University of Colorado in general-experi-mental psychology in 1955. He then taught at San Diego State College for 15 years, where he also research primates' learning abilities at the San Diego Zoo. In 1969, he became Chief of Behavior at the Yerkes Pri-mate Center of Emory University, Atlanta, GA, where, with a close colleague and engi-neer, Harold Warner, the LANA chimpanzee language project was conceived and devel-oped. He directed the project, with NICHD support, initially awarded in 1971. After a long career with Georgia State University, also in Atlanta, Rumbaugh retired in 2000. He now is Lead Scientist Emeritus of the Great Ape Trust of Iowa. Charles Bell has his degree in electronics engineering. He very ably built and main-tained the computer-monitored keyboard.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS


OPINION

historical


For Ernst, language required a lexicon, dis-placement (e.g., symbolic function), andgrammar. Ernst held that the lexigramsneeded to be artificial and not iconic represen-tations of things and events in Lana’s experi-ence. As stated above, he led the developmentof the computer program for automatic parserof the language that was capable of evaluatingthe lexicon and the grammar. Color back-grounds were used to designate semanticclasses – for example, any violet lexigram cor-responded to an autonomous actor, and anyred lexigram represented something edible.Nine different shapes were presented in vari-ous combinations to make discriminable lexi-grams. The lexigrams actually used by Lana atany given time were reproduced as facsimilesin a row projected immediately above Lana’sconsole of keys so that she could see what shehad said.

Ernst’s language system allowed for 46 log-ical classes of word-lexigrams. Examples of theclasses of lexigrams included familiar pri-

mates, unfamiliar primates, nonprimates,inanimate actors, absolute fixtures (cage,piano, room), relative fixtures (window,door), transferable (balls, etc.), parts of thebody, edible units locational prepositions (in,on, etc.), additive conjunctions, ingestion ofsolids, ingestion of liquids, relational motoracts (groom, tickle), locomotion, and so on.The language constructed was described byErnst as a “correlational” grammar, which wasimplemented earlier in the “multistore parser”for English. It was not generative or transfor-mational in the Chomskian sense. His correla-tional grammar mapped the conceptual sys-tem of Yerkish onto the linguistic system.

Ernst described the parser as indicating therelationships into which a given lexical itemmight legally enter. There were some 30 “cor-relators” that connected types of items – forexample, one connected autonomous actorsperforming a stationary activity as in “Lanadrink.” Another example was for a movableactor changing places, as in “Tim move.” Yet

another example was as in predication, as“Banana black.”

Yerkish had only an active voice, and threemoods: interrogative, indicative, and impera-tive. The parser responded to strings that werecorrect in Yerkish, and rejected others.

According to Ernst’s analyses, Lana had a“strong tendency toward grammaticality” (Glasersfeld, 1977b, p. 128–129). She was, ofcourse, rewarded for grammatical strings butnot for non-grammatical strings. He con-cluded that the grammaticality of Lana’s“utterances” was enabled by the design of thelanguage which reflected the conceptualstructures common to humans and chimps.Lana expressed her representations of situa-tions through the choice and ordering of herlexigrams. He also concluded that Lanalearned “rules” of grammar that “are relativelyclose to the rules that govern conceptual rep-resentation… ”

In 1975 the project was extended to workwith mentally retarded children and young

© Duane Rumbaugh

Figure 1:

The chimpanzee Lana in the experimental chamber.

2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3 31

OPINION

historical


adults (Parkel, While, & Warner, 1977). Wewere ecstatic to see that they learned upwardsof 80–90 lexigrams and used them to commu-nicate with their parents and friends as theycould not do otherwise.

Thus, Ernst von Glasersfeld’s creative con-tributions in the early years of the LANAProject, coupled with those of all the otherteam members, helped open the door andkeep it open for future research. Apes werecapable of, at least, the basic skills for humanlanguage, and their accomplishments were

uniquely put to human need. –

We thank him.

References

Hillix, W. A. & Rumbaugh, D. M. (2004) Ani-mal bodies, human minds. The languageskills of ape, dolphin, and parrot. Kluwer:New York.

Glasersfeld, E. von (1977a) The Yerkish lan-guage and its automatic parser. In: Rum-baugh, D. M. (ed.) Language learning by achimpanzee. The LANA Project. Aca-demic Press: New York, pp. 91–130.

Glasersfeld, E. von (1977b) Linguistic Com-munication: Theory and definition. In:

Rumbaugh, D. M. (ed.) Language Learn-ing by a Chimpanzee. The LANA project.Academic Press: New York, pp. 55–72.

Parkel, D. A., White, R. Z. & Warner, H. (1977)Implications of the Yerkes technology formentally retarded human subjects. In:Rumbaugh, D. M. (ed.) Language learningby a chimpanzee. The LANA project. Aca-demic Press: New York, pp. 274–283.

Received: 15 February 2006Accepted: 5 February 2007

Figure 2:

Lana in action. Bottom left: Excerpt of the lexicon.

© Duane Rumbaugh


The Yerkish Language.From Operational Methodology to Chimpanzee Communication

Introduction

Could an ape participate in a chat sessionover the Internet? At first sight the questionmay seem silly, but I claim that it could – atleast in part – be taken seriously and in thispaper I will try to show why. To begin with,let us step back a little and have a look atsome questions that the scientific commu-nity would probably accept as more “sound.”Is language no longer the exclusive domainof man? Can an ape create a sentence? Areexplanations of language learning and use by

an ape also useful for understanding some ofthe abilities involved in human language andvice-versa? How can these questions beanswered in a scientific manner?

Today science seems to have overcome theold behaviourist stimulus–response bond andfinds itself in a somewhat better position to tryto answer this and related questions. But about40 years ago, when Ernst von Glasersfeld cre-ated “Yerkish” – an artificial language for useby apes in computer-mediated communica-tion (CMC) with machines and humans – thesituation was much more uncomfortable.

Origins of Yerkish – The LANA project

One day in the fall of 1970 Ray Carpenter, oneof the fathers of primatology in the UnitedStates, came to the almost regular Saturdaygolf meeting with von Glaserfeld bringingwith him an intriguing idea: The YerkesNational Primate Research Center inAtlanta

1

(Georgia), the first and foremostinstitute of primate research in the USA, wasplanning to investigate the possibility ofcommunication between humans and greatapes via a computer by means of a visual lan-guage. The great apes (gorillas, orangutans,chimpanzees) would probably never learn aspoken language, Carpenter said, but theywere quick and clever with their fingers andAlan and Beatrice Gardner had successfullytaught ASL (the American Sign Languageused by deaf people) to a chimpanzee calledWashoe.

2

Despite impressive results in teaching signlanguage to the great apes, in those years aswell as during the following two decades, lin-guists and psychologists – who wanted tobelieve with Chomsky that language was ahuman prerogative – doubted that “

an apecan truly create a sentence

” (Terrace et al.1979, p. 891) and claimed that “

they show nounequivocal evidence of mastering the conver-sational semantics or syntactic organization oflanguage

” (Terrace et al. 1979, p. 901). Theyalso said that sign language did not have aproper syntax and therefore was not really alanguage. Moreover they suggested that theGardners were like parents with a baby: theysaw and heard demonstrations of linguisticcapabilities that no one else could see or hear.

The Yerkes Center plan was to build acommunication system with a simplified lan-guage, a keyboard, and a small computer to

Marco Bettoni

A

Swiss Distance University of Applied Sciences (Switzerland) <[email protected]>

Purpose: Yerkish is an artificial language created in 1971 for the specific purpose of explor-ing the linguistic potential of nonhuman primates. The aim of this paper is to remind the research community of some important issues and concepts related to Yerkish that seem to have been forgotten or appear to be distorted. These are, particularly, its success, its promising aspects for future research and last but not least that it was Ernst von Glaser-sfeld who invented Yerkish: he coined the term “lexigrams,” created the first 120 of them and designed the grammar that regulated their combination. Design: The first part of this paper begins with a short outline of the context in which the Yerkish language origi-nated: the original LANA project. It continues by presenting the language itself in more detail: first, its design, focusing on its “lexigrams” and its “correlational” grammar (the connective functions or “correlators” and the combinations of lexigrams, or “correla-tions”), and then its use by the chimpanzee Lana in formulating sentences. The second part gives a brief introduction to the foundation of Yerkish in Silvio Ceccato’s Operational Methodology, particularly his idea of the correlational structure of thought and concludes with the main insights that can be derived from the Yerkish experiment seen in the light of Operational Methodology. Findings: Lana’s success in language learning and the success of Yerkish during the past decades are probably due to the characteristics of Yerkish, par-ticularly its foundation in operational methodology. The operation of correlation could be what constitutes thinking in a chimpanzee and an attentional system could be what deliv-ers the mental content that correlation assembles into triads and networks. Research implications: Since no other assessment or explanation of Lana’s performances has considered these foundational issues (findings), a new research project or program should validate the above-mentioned hypotheses, particularly the correlational structure of chimpanzee thinking. Keywords: Yerkish, artificial language, correlational grammar, operational methodology, Silvio Ceccato, machine translation, chimpanzee communication.

historical; cognitive-psychological


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2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3 33

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explore computer-mediated communicationbetween humans and apes. The computerwould record everything the ape typed on thekeyboard and there would be no subjectivebias as to what the ape had or had not typed.This plan seemed a great idea to von Glasers-feld and when Carpenter asked him if hewould like to design the special language andthe computer system for handling it, heimmediately accepted. In his turn, von Gla-sersfeld recommended that his long-termresearch partner Pier Paolo Pisani

3

, a compu-ter specialist, also join the effort.

After a number of conferences among themembers of the project team, in early winter1970 a proposal was submitted to theNational Institute of Health requesting fundsfor a 4-year period. In spring 1971 the grantwas awarded (NIH grants HD-06016

4

andRR-00165). The team immediately begandesigning and building the system and a fewweeks later everyone was introduced to thesubject of the research, a young female chim-panzee called Lana (born October 7, 1970).

5

In the first phase of the project a Plexiglas

cubicle the size of a small room was built onto an existing wall that had a window to theoutside of the Yerkes Center. One of the Plexi-glas walls was dedicated to the keyboard, asquare array unit of initially 5x5 keys, withspace for other units to be added as Lana gotmore proficient. By sequentially pressing thekeys of the keyboard, code signals standing forwords were sent to the computer, which con-tained the vocabulary and the grammar ofYerkish, the automatic parser for checking thecorrectness of sentences, and the rules foractivating a dispenser in response to requeststhat Lana was to formulate in Yerkish wordsymbols (Glasersfeld 1995, p. 11). The com-puter itself and the terminal with a keyboardfor the researchers were placed just outsidethe room: from here the experimenters couldinteract with Lana by typing sentences thatwere displayed above her keyboard and theycould also see how she was behaving duringthe computer-mediated communication ses-sion.

6

Next to Lana’s keyboard was the row of

food and drink dispensers, activated throughthe computer; they would provide all sorts offood and drink (like apple, bread, chow,banana, milk, juice etc.) and it was hoped thatLana would learn to feed herself by means ofrequest sentences typed on the keyboard.

Beside providing food and drink, the com-puter could respond to correctly formulatedrequests by playing taped music or sounds,projecting movies and slides as well as open-ing and shutting the above-mentioned win-dow. Above the keyboard was a sturdy hori-zontal bar that Lana had to hang on to in orderto switch on the system (Fig. 1).

The Yerkish language

Language as a communicatory system hasthree indispensable characteristics (Glasers-feld 1977a, p. 66): a) it has a set, or lexicon, ofartificial signs; b) it has a set of rules, or gram-mar, that governs the creation of sentences assequences of lexical entries; c) its signs areused as symbols (Glasersfeld 1974).

The lexicon of Yerkish was developed byvon Glasersfeld starting from a list of thingsthat would presumably interest a youngchimpanzee (and the experimenters) andcould be available in the project. The words ofthis preliminary vocabulary were about 150,but in the beginning only 25 were put on thefirst panel of keys. Each key had an abstractdesign representing not a letter but the “word-design” for a single concept. Ernst von Gla-sersfeld coined for these word-designs thename “lexigrams” and created them by meansof non-representational design elements toemphasize their symbol-character (Fig. 2)and to prevent critical linguists from sayingthat Lana recognized them just because theywere familiar pictures. Whenever Lanapressed keys the respective lexigrams wereprojected on to a row of small windows abovethe keyboard, one after the other from left toright. This helped Lana to see how far alongshe was in typing the sentence – seven was themaximum length of a sentence. Moreoverprojecting the lexigrams in this row was usedto flash messages from the human trainers toLana and to make conversations possible.

After compiling the lexicon of Yerkish, thelexical items were divided into classes. SinceYerkish was designed on the basis of a “corre-lational” approach to language (Glasersfeld1970), the lexigram-classes were defined interms of the functional characteristics of con-cepts and not, as in a traditional lexicon, interms of morphology and the roles theywould play in sentences (noun, verb, adjec-tive, etc.). For instance, items with functional

characteristics like being able to eat, drink,groom, tickle, give things or make things hap-pen were collected in the lexigram class“autonomous actor” and divided into foursub-groups: “familiar primates” (lexigram

Lana

and lexigrams for the first names oftechnicians and experimenters, like

Tim

or

Shelley

), “unfamiliar primates” (lexigram

vis-itor

), “nonprimates” (lexigram

roach

) and“inanimate actor” (lexigram

machine

). Sev-eral lexigrams were assigned to classes desig-nating relational concepts like the class “par-titive proposition” (lexigram

of

), the class“semantic indicator” (lexigram

name-of

) andthe class “attributive marker” (lexigram

which-is

). Like the lexicon, the grammar of Yerkish

was also “correlational”: in fact von Glasers-feld derived it from the correlational gram-mar implemented from 1960 to 1970 in hisprojects for the machine translation ofEnglish sentences (Hutchins 2000). As a con-sequence the Yerkish grammar was an inter-pretive device and consisted of the rules of a

Figure 1:

Lana at the lexigram board. Photo Ernst von Glasersfeld.


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correlator

LH correlatum RH correlatum

triad

primitive syntax that governed which lexi-gram sequences (i.e., sentences) were to beconsidered correct (i.e., any input that itcould interpret) and which mistaken (anyinput that it could not). There were threeclasses of sentences: statements, requests, andquestions. Requests were differentiated fromthe others by first pressing a key called“please”; questions had to begin with a ques-tion mark. To know when to check the cor-rectness of Lana’s typing, the computerneeded a signal to indicate the end of a sen-tence, like a period.

The correlational approach to language isbased on the assumption that sentencesexpress in language sequences of mental oper-ations (attentional operations) performed atthe cognitive level (Ceccato 1964, p. 14). Themost important among the mental operationsare obviously those that establish connectionsamong conceptual operands and thus buildup complex structures. These relational con-cepts, that Ceccato called

correlators

(Ceccatoet al. 1961, p. 36), are connective functionsused at the mental level in the process of cor-

relating. In natural lan-guages correlators areindicated in a variety ofways, either implicitly orexplicitely. A correlatoris always a binary func-tion in that it links twomental operands –expressed in language byeither single words orword combinations –and thus forms a newunit (a triad) called a“correlation” (Fig. 3).Implicit correlators areindicated in phrases orsentences merely by thejuxtaposition of the twolexical items they link,and “explicit” correla-tors are indicated byspecific words (such aspropositions, conjunc-tions, etc.). In the fol-lowing we will use “cor-relator” both for therelational concepts andfor the linguistic devicesthat express them.

In 1974 the Yerkishgrammar used by Lana operated with some30 correlators. Five of these are, for example,correlators that connect an operand of theclass “actor” with an operand of the class“activity.” In the following examples we des-ignate the correlators by the letter “C” and thenumber used to identify them in the LANAproject; a correlation is then written as list ofcorrelators and operands using Polish nota-tion (prefix notation with operators left oftheir operands). Examples of sentences andtheir correlations in Yerkish: 1. Lana drink

(C_01 Lana drink)2. Tim carry Lana

(C_02 Tim (C_14 carry Lana))3. Please machine give M&M

(C_00 Please (C_05 machine (C_017 giveM&M)))

4. Please machine make movie(C_00 Please (C_06 machine (C_18 makemovie)))

5. Please machine give piece of banana(C_00 Please (C_05 machine (C_17 give(C_026 (C_25 piece of) banana))))

6. Please Tim give milk to Lana(C_00 Please (C_05 Tim (C_21 (C_17give milk) (C_22 to Lana))))

7. Tim give apple which-is red to Lana(C_05 Tim (C_21 (C_17 give (C_31 apple(C_10 which-is red))) (C_22 to Lana)))

8. Please Tim move out-of room(C_00 Please (C_07 Tim (C_21 move(C_22 out-of room))))

9. Please Shelley move behind room(C_00 Please (C_07 Shelley (C_21 move(C_22 behind room))))Compare the sentences of example 1 and

2. They require two different correlatorsC_01 and C_02 because the performed activ-ity they link with the actor performing themare different: correlator C_01 (example 1)connects an autonomous animate actor witha

stationary activity

whereas correlator C_02(example 2) connects an autonomous ani-mate actor with a

transferring activity

. Sentences 3 and 4, although very similar,

require two different correlators C_05 andC_06 because the intended effect they linkwith the agent causing it are different: corre-lator C_05 (example 3) connects a causativeagent with a change of position whereas cor-relator C_06 (example 4) connects a caus-ative agent with a change of state.

Use of Yerkish by Lana (chimpanzee)

Lana’s training began with a panel of three orfour keys for learning a set of preliminaries,such as that it was the sequence of lexigramsin the row of windows above the keyboardthat counted, not their position in the panel,or that it was always necessary to press the

Figure 3:

A correlator as a binary function.

machine name-of candy out-of

Lana eat tickle into

Figure 2:

Lexigrams table developed by von Glasersfeld in 1971.

2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3 35

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period key at the end of a sentence. She firstlearned to press a single key in order toobtain a piece of food or an M&M candy.Lana progressed rapidly in her training andwithin the first 2 weeks of training shelearned to concatenate keys to form a stocksentence like “Please machine give M&M”(example 3) or “Please machine makemovie” (example 4).

When she got the first 25-lexigrams panel,she quickly learned to watch the row of win-dows above the keyboard to check what shehad typed. It took her no time to find out thatwhen she made a typing error she could erasewhat she had typed by pressing the period key(which made the computer cancel the inputbecause it contained an error). Lana learnednot only to use several stock sentences appro-priately, but also to build novel sentences thatwere syntactically correct.

Unfortunately the director of the projectwas convinced that understanding in com-munication with Lana could be proved sta-tistically: as a consequence, in order to col-lect statistical evidence of her “skills,” Lanawas subjected to repetitive tests like a rat in amaze. It was clear from simply watching herbehaviour, that, like a human child, she lostinterest after the nth repetition and pressedkeys without looking. Her statistics thereforetended to be worse than those of rats. On theother hand, she did things that no rat couldever do. When Tim, the graduate studentwho worked with her in these experiments,repeated the same question for the nth time,she typed in the response:

“Please Tim moveout of room”

(see example 8). This was aboveall remarkable because Lana had encoun-tered expressions such as “out of,” “in frontof,” and “behind” only in the context ofboxes and wooden blocks on a table and thenotion that her room was a kind of box youcould “move out of ” was entirely her own.On another occasion, when Shelleyappeared outside the Plexiglas cubicle, Lana,rushed to the keyboard and typed:

“PleaseShelley move behind room”

(see example 9).Shelley, who had no idea what it could mean,did not take any action so that Lana, who wasexpecting a specific intervention, threw upboth her arms in an unmistakable human-like gesture of despair and once more typedthe same phrase. Eventually Shelley lookedat the array of dispensers and noticed thatthe one for slices of banana had got stuck.

She went out of the cubicle and to the otherside of the transparent wall – which fromLana’s point of view could quite reasonablybe conceptualized as “behind room.” Lanawatched her clear the dispenser and immedi-ately typed:

“Please machine give piece ofbanana”

(see example 5). On this and manyother similar occasions, Lana, by means oforiginal, spontaneous, and appropriateutterances, made it quite clear that she wasindeed capable of forming concepts and ableto use the lexigrams in language. Lana dem-onstrated that she was able to participate ina manner of living that we call language, i.e.,that she could experience a recursive coordi-nation of behavioural coordinations, a pro-cess which allowed her to have a recursiveinfluence on what she was experiencing.

In September 1974 Lana’s lexigram boardconsisted of 3 panels of 25 keys each(Glasersfeld 1977b, p. 128). The total of 1577grammatical 6-lexigram strings produced byLana in this month can be assigned to 125sentence types. Four types are requests forfood and account for 1288 tokens. Of theremaining 289 tokens, 228 represent 76 typesthat were spontaneously formulated by Lana– none of them were produced as a result oftraining. In some cases their occurrence waseven a rather imaginative transference of ameaning acquired in a very specific contextto a substantially different context.

These and similar facts persuaded vonGlasersfeld that Lana was well able to com-municate by means of symbols and alsoclearly indicated that understanding com-munication with Lana could not be testedstatistically but shown only by the appropri-ateness of individual utterances. Unfortu-nately they did not convince the conven-tional experimental psychologists involvedin the LANA project of the necessity to devisemore appropriate research methods.

Later experiments in other projects (Sav-age-Rumbaugh et al. 1980) suggested thatLana had difficulties in expanding her lin-guistic domain

7

beyond the limits of thedomain of interactions through a computerin which she had participated. On the otherhand Kanzi, a bonobo, though he had neverbeen taught, learned Yerkish very well andeven some English by simply listening andparticipating in the laboratory environmentduring his mother Matata’s training sessions(Savage-Rumbaugh & Lewin 1994).

Silvio Ceccato and the correlational structure of thought

The correlational approach to language thatvon Glasersfeld applied in developing Yerkishwas based on investigations of mental activi-ties that Silvio Ceccato had begun in 1939(Ceccato 1964/1966). Together with a groupof scholars living in Italy he proposed fromthe beginning to study thought and its con-tents in terms of operations (Ceccato 1951,1953). Because of this “operational approach”or “operational methodology,” Ceccato'sgroup was called the "Italian OperationalSchool.” His research activity was devoted tounderstanding the basic structure anddynamics of thought production, to thedevelopment of an operational solution to theproblem of semantics (connection of thoughtand language) and to applications of opera-tional methodology in machine translationexperiments.

The basic assumption of operationalmethodology is that the essential function (oractivity) for the constitution of any mentalcontent is the function of attention. In fact, itis easy to notice that without attention we donot have mental content, i.e., no mental life.Our clothes are in contact with our body: dowe feel them? Not if we do not pay attentionto them. We are typing on the computer key-board: are we aware of our finger touching akey? Not if we do not pay attention to it. Sim-ilarly we do not notice the noise of traffic out-side or understand what someone in thegroup is saying if we do not pay attention. Inother words, the dynamism of physical inter-action between our organism and our sur-roundings proceeds on its own account with-out constituting any mental content unless wedirect our attention to the functioning of thedifferent organs of hearing, touch, etc.

Attention, however, is not limited to thisfunction of making present the functioning ofother organs; in fact, attention is not appliedcontinuously but for discrete intervals oftime, ranging from a tenth of a second to asecond and a half: after this time, attentiondetaches itself and after a short pause can beapplied again. In this way, as it is applied anddetached repeatedly, it fragments into dis-crete pieces (so-called “praesentiata” orrecepts) the functioning of other organs and


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builds an oscillation similar to alpha waves inthe brain or to the rhythmic contractions ofthe heart. This conception of a pulsatingattention and of discrete microunits of mentalactivity has been recently confirmed by neu-rophysiological experiments suggesting that“the seemingly continuous stream of con-sciousness consists of separable buildingblocks” (Lehmann et al. 1998, 2000).

A third function of attention could becalled the “generating” function. Why?Because it allows attention not only to beapplied to other organs but to be applied tonothing (a state of simple vigilance, an emptyattention) or to its own functioning instead,thus generating discrete attentional frag-ments that are not pieces of hearing, touch,vision or other sensorial activity but purelyattentional microunits (attentional states).

We would however never build a seem-ingly continuous stream of consciousness, ifthere were not: 1. “Categorization” as the function which

enables the mind to produce

concepts

bycombining attentional states into morecomplex combinations (macrounits).

2. “Perception” as the function whichenables the mind to produce

percepts

byapplying some results of categorization torecepts.

3. “Correlation” as the function whichenables the mind to assemble concepts andpercepts into thoughts.The operation of categorization received

this name because it produces mental con-structs that Ceccato, in honor of Kant hascalled “mental categories.” Thus mental cate-gories comprise those mental constructswhich are made only by combinations of dis-crete attentional fragments and do not con-tain anything originating from observation.Examples of mental categories are the more orless complex combinations (concepts) ofattentional microunits designated by wordslike “thing,” “object,” “beginning,” “end,”“part,” “whole,” “element,” “group,” “set,”“point,” “line,” “and,” “or,” “singular,” “plural,”“space,” “time,” “number,” “1,” “2,” “3,” etc.Each category is differentiated from the oth-ers by the number of discrete attentionalstates (fragments) which it comprises and bythe way in which they are combined.

The operation of correlating is what con-stitutes thinking. It assembles the attentionalunits in a binary tree. The basic structure of

thought, according to Silvio Ceccato is alwaysa triad, called a “correlation,” composed oftwo correlates assembled together by a corre-lator (Ceccato 1961, 1967). This triad has acharacteristic dynamism, an order of opera-tional precedence in that the first correlate, orfirst mental construct is the first in time to beconstituted (or activated) and is then heldpresent (active) during the constitution of thecorrelator, which in its turn is held presentduring the constitution of the second corre-late, or second mental construct. The corre-lates can be concepts, percepts or entirethoughts but the correlator is always a purelyattentional microunit, a mental category.

Correlation constitutes the dynamism ofthought, of which the triad is the smallestunit. The larger units of thought are obtainedby using a correlation as a term in anothercorrelation, which in its turn can become apart of a third correlation, and so on, until agreater or smaller correlational network isassembled. Pronouns and other words withrecall functions then make it possible forcomplete correlational networks to be reusedas elements in other correlations.

Language and thought

A fundamental function of language consistsin ensuring that thoughts can be reified. Oneway of reifying thoughts is by designatingthem, i.e., by establishing a viable correspon-dence between the polyphonic structure ofthought and a linear sequence of perceivableitems.

Given a background of an operationalmethodology, with its attentional model ofmental contents and its correlational modelof thinking, we are now in a position toexplain language in a completely differentway: an operational way!

Traditional grammars explain, forinstance, vocabulary items (the lexicon) byassigning them as elements to classes such as“noun,” verb,” “adjective,” etc. by virtue ofsome feature that is identified as common toall the members of a class. Since many mem-bers do not display all the required character-istics of their class, grammars usually proceedby subdividing a class according to the specificor “exceptional” features of certain items. Onemight call this the botanist’s, zoologist’s orretailer’s approach: as with trees, flowers,

birds, reptiles, dishwashers or chairs this kindof explanation is useful with the word items ofa natural language only for the purpose ofdescribing a catalogue.

However, for users and developers of a lan-guage – for instance children acquiring itfrom their interactions or machine transla-tion researchers using it in experiments – themain purpose is not description but the inter-pretation and production of sentences, i.e., ofcombinations of items. For this reason theusefulness of the explanation depends on itsability to accurately specify in operational(functional) terms the items involved. Thischaracterisation in functional terms is exactlywhat the correlational approach provides bymeans of a minute and rigorous discrimina-tion of a word-item’s eligibility as correlatumor correlator within a correlation (Glasersfeld& Pisani 1968, pp. 1–2).

To reify a simple correlation into a linguis-tic form, each single element must be desig-nated by means of at least two indications:one to say what it is (referential function) andthe other to say what function it performs in

Marco C. Bettoni was born in Legnano (Italy) in 1952. Since September 2005 he is Director of Research & Consulting at the Swiss Distance University of Applied Sci-ences (www.ffhs.ch) where his main research topics are knowledge coopera-tion, knowledge networking, distance coop-eration, distance- and e-learning and communities of practice. After receiving his master degree in mechanical engineering in 1977 (ETH Zürich) he has worked until 1991 for indus-trial (Rieter, Siemens), banking (UBS) and academic (ETH) organizations in the domains of machine design, engineering education, IT management, IT development and knowledge engineering (Artificial Intel-ligence). Between 1991 and 2004 he was Professor for Knowledge Technologies at the Basel University of Applied Sciences (FHBB). In June 2003 ETH Zürich (www.ethz.ch) appointed him as “guest researcher” for investigating the role of knowledge-ori-ented cooperation in Knowledge Manage-ment.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3 37

EMPIRICAL



the correlation (correlational function),whether that of correlator or that of first (lefthand) or second (right hand) correlatum. Inorder to supply these indications, languagescan offer basically two means: on the onehand they use a particular, phonic or graphicmaterial (spoken or written words), and onthe other hand they use the order of succes-sion into which this material is put (wordsequence). Only by providing these six indi-cations can we identify two expressions suchas “green bottle” and “bottle green” as two dif-ferent correlations or units of thought.

Mostly a correlation will be designated byemploying two or three words (or whole sen-tences in a correlational net), which is to say,the required indications are distributedamong two or three words, but usually thecorrelations that occur more frequently areindicated by only two words, one for the firstand one for the second correlatum, whereasthe correlator remains tacit. How can weunderstand a correlation of this kind in whichthere is no explicit word for the correlator? Insome cases the correlator is indicated bychanges in the form of the designation of oneof the correlates but in all other cases the indi-cation of the appropriate correlator has to bededuced from a wide-spread knowledge, acommon cultural heritage behind any lan-guage, for which Ceccato has coined the terms“Notional Sphere” (Ceccato 1961 et al., p. 62)and “Constellation” (Ceccato 1961 et al.,p. 63), which were precursors of methods ofknowledge representation such as frames andscripts in early Artificial Intelligence research(Sowa 1984, p. 128). Knowing how certainthings are related allows the designation to bemade more efficiently by reducing the num-ber of explicit indications, thus making com-munication more rapid, flexible and adjust-

able (Ceccato & Zonta 1980, p. 78). Forexample, consider the expressions “

to eat anapple

” and “

to eat an hour

” (for instance in:“

You may also need

to eat an hour

before train-ing

…”): without a general culture whichallows us to distinguish between food itemsand time intervals the correlation expressedin the previous sentences could not be cor-rectly produced or interpreted.

As a consequence of this tight connectionto knowledge and experience, language can-not merely be considered as a strictly organ-ised and classified system of words andphrases: it must also be approached as anextremely intuitive arrangement of things,intuitive in its production and intuitive in itsinterpretation (Glasersfeld 1965, XIII–1).This is not to say that language does notinclude logical functions and logical implica-tions, but it embraces very much more: forinstance, interpretations that are “correct”merely because they are much more probablethan others, given our experience of the worldwe live in and our knowledge of how certainthings are related (notional sphere).

Conclusion

Since the great apes are the closest relatives tohuman beings, experiments in teaching thema language can shed some light on the humanmind. Although Lana could not speak, shelearned to communicate in the Yerkish lan-guage. Lana was the first ape to work with acomputer keyboard, the first to show thatchimpanzees could form syntactically correctsentences, could recognize written symbols,could read and could complete incompletesentences appropriately. On many occasionswithin the context of the LANA project, by

means of appropriate Yerkish sentences shemade it quite clear that she was not only capa-ble of forming concepts and of using lexi-grams but also able to participate in a mannerof living that we call language, i.e., that shecould experience a recursive coordination ofbehavioural coordinations, through whichshe could recursively influence what she wasexperiencing.

The key question in her language acquisi-tion is how Lana learned the appropriate syn-tactic forms and word order for expressingcomplex relations in Yerkish as well as a kindof common sense background knowledge.How did she correctly concatenate the lexi-grams? How did she learn to do that? Was itmerely due to good training practice on thepart of the primatologists? Our hypothesis isthat the success of Lana is primarily due to thefact that she learned the grammar rules ofYerkish. How? By matching her conceptualabilities with the correlational structure ofYerkish. As a consequence we see the successof Yerkish during the past decades (originallywith Lana since 1973 and later with otherapes, such as Kanzi) as a demonstration of theviability of the operational methodology thatis its foundation. We hence propose thatLana’s conceptual system be considered as acorrelational system in which the operation ofcorrelation is what constitutes the chimpan-zee’s thinking and an attentional system deliv-ers the mental contents that correlationassembles into triads and networks. Since noother assessment or explanation of Lana’sperformances has considered these funda-mental issues, we strongly suggest that a newresearch project or program be conducted toinvestigate the above-mentioned hypothesisof the importance of Yerkish in Lana’s successin language learning.

Notes

1. Yerkes National Primate Research Center,http://www.yerkes.emory.edu/

2. Alan and Beatrice Gardner about Washoe:see Gardner, R.A. & Gardner, B.T. (1969)and (1971)

3. Piero Pisani, a computer scientist who hadworked with von Glaserfeld in his auto-

matic translations projects, first in Italyand later in USA.

4. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?CMD=Display&DB=pubmed

5. The Georgia State University LanguageResearch Center, http://www2.gsu.edu/~wwwlrc/chimps.htm

6. “The Amazing Apes,” a TV program pro-duced in 1977 by Bill Burrud, which in-

cludes a six-minute feature on thechimpanzee Lana, seen during trainingsessions of the LANA project where Lanacommunicates via her keyboard with re-searcher Tim Gill. The movie can beviewed at http://www.greatapetrust.org/research/general/lana.php#

7. Also mentioned in Maturana and Varela(1987), pp. 215–217


EMPIRICAL



References

Ceccato, S. (1951) Language and the table ofCeccatieff. Hermann & Cie: Paris.

Ceccato, S. (1953) Consapevolizzazionedell’Osservare, mod. 3", Atti del Con-gresso di Metodologia. Ramella: Torino.

Ceccato, S. (1964/1966) Un tecnico fra ifilosofi. Vol. 1 & 2. Marsilio: Padova.

Ceccato, S. (1964) A model of the mind.Methodos 16: 3–78.

Ceccato, S. (1967) Correlational analysis andmechanical translation. ORIGINALCITATION. Reprinted in: Nirenburg, S.,Somers H. & Wilks, Y. (eds.) (2003) Read-ings in machine translation. MIT Press:Cambridge.

Ceccato, S. & Zonta, B. (1980) Linguaggio,Consapevolezza, Pensiero. Feltrinelli:Milan.

Ceccato, S., Beltrame, R., Glasersfeld, E. von,Perschke, S., Maretti, E., Zonta, B., &Albani, E. (1961) Linguistic analysis andprogramming for mechanical translation.Feltrinelli: Milan & Gordon & Breach:New York.

Gardner, B. T. & Gardner, R. A. (1971) Two-way communication with an infant chim-panzee. In: Schrier, A. M. & Stollnitz, F.(eds.) Behavior of non-human primates.Vol. 4. Academic Press: New York, pp. 117–184.

Gardner, R. A. & Gardner, B. T. (1969) Teach-ing sign language to a chimpanzee. Science165: 664–672.

Glasersfeld, E. von (1965) An approach to thesemantics of propositions. In: Proceedings

of the conference on computer-relatedsemantic analysis, December 3–5, 1965,Las Vegas USA. National Science Founda-tion & Office of Naval Research, U.S. AirForce, pp. XIII 1–24.

Glasersfeld, E. von (1970) The correlationalapproach to language. Thought and Lan-guage in Operations 1(4): 391–398.

Glasersfeld, E. von (1974) The Yerkish lan-guage for non-human primates. AmericanJournal of Computational Linguistics 1,microfiche 12.

Glasersfeld, E. von (1977a) Linguistic com-munication: Theory and definition. In:Rumbaugh, D. M. (ed.) Language Learn-ing by a Chimpanzee: The LANA project.Academic Press: New York, pp. 55–71.

Glasersfeld, E. von (1977b) The Yerkish lan-guage and its automatic parser. In: Rum-baugh, D. M. (ed.) Language Learning bya Chimpanzee: The LANA project. Aca-demic Press: New York, pp. 91–129.

Glasersfeld, E. von (1995) Radical construc-tivism: A way of knowing and learning.Falmer Press: London.

Glasersfeld, E. von (2000) Silvio Ceccato andthe Correlational Grammar. In: Hutchins,W. J. (ed.) Early years in machine transla-tion. John Benjamins: Amsterdam, pp.313–324.

Glasersfeld, E. von & Pisani, P. P. (1968) TheMultistore System MP-2. ScientificProgress Report, Grant AFOSR 1319–67.Georgia Institute for Research: Athens.

Hutchins, J. (ed.) (2000) Early years inmachine translation. John Benjamins:Amsterdam.

Lehmann, D., Koenig, T., Pascual-Marqui, R.D., Koukkou, M. & Strik, W. K. (2000)Functional tomography of EEGmicrostates of visual imagery and abstractthought: Building blocks of consciousexperience. Brain Topography 12: 298.

Lehmann, D., Strik, W. K., Henggeler, B.,Koenig, T. & Koukkou, M. (1998) Brainelectric microstates and momentary con-scious mind states as building blocks ofspontaneous thinking: I. Visual Imageryand abstract thoughts. Int. J. Psychophysi-ology 29: 1–11.

Maturana, H. R. & Varela, F. (1987) The treeof knowledge. The biological roots ofhuman understanding. Shambhala: Bos-ton.

Rumbaugh, D. M. & Washburn, D. A. (2003)Intelligence of apes and other rationalbeings. Yale Universitiy Press: New Haven.

Savage-Rumbaugh, E. S., Rumbaugh, D. M.,Smith, S. T., & Lawson, J. (1980) Refer-ence: The linguistic essential. Science 210:922–925.

Savage-Rumbaugh, S., & Lewin, R. (1994)Kanzi: The ape at the brink of the humanmind. John Wiley Publishers: New York.

Sowa, J. (1984) Conceptual structures. Infor-mation processing in mind and machine.Addison-Wesley: Reading.

Terrace, H. S., Petitto, L. A., Sanders, R. J. &Bever, T. G. (1979) Can an ape create a sen-tence? Science 206: 891–902.

Received: 30 September 2006Accepted: 28 January 2007


Ernst to Amherst, Massachusetts

emory is no less of a construction thanreality. So the truth of how Ernst

decided to move from Athens to Amherst ismost likely floating in foam sliding down theside of a drained pint. My first clear memoryof Ernst is dinner with him and John Richardsat a Philadelphia Magic Pan during the 1975Piaget Conference. For years afterwards Isearched out Magic Pans, yet never againfound the same magic. Dinner was a longdiscussion of

Zen and the Art of MotorcycleMaintenance

punctuated by occa-sional diversions thatslammed into thewall. This was my firstintroduction to Radical Constructivismand on the whole I liked it. Why somepeople are immediately attracted tothis perspective while others are repelledis as much a mystery to meas are the apparently intelli-gent people who after care-ful consideration find waysof rejecting Constructiv-ism. Piaget had preparedme for modest acceptanceof the extent to which weconstruct our reality. ButErnst and John wanted meto understand that it was Iwho had constructed theMagic Pan’s brick walls so that none of uscould walk through them. Had I constructedthose walls differently perhaps they would nolonger be an obstacle.

A dozen years later Ernst and I were inHungary at the ICME conference watchingthe Hungarians reconstructing their walls.During lunch at a Budapest cafe Boyan Pen-kov told how he had found himself hidingcopies of Pravda so the Bulgarian authoritieswould not know he was reading it. Then a fewmonths later in Amherst as the Berlin Wallactually came crashing down, Boyan insistedthat it would never happen in Bulgaria. Somuch for walls.

In 1975 Ernst was still working on the Lanaproject and I was playing with turtles. So wecooked up a scheme where I would bring a

turtle to Athens to see if Lana could learn toprogram in LOGO. I doubt if all of the world’scurrent problems can be traced to our failureto pull off this experiment. But things might

be fundamentally different if weall had to construct realitiesthat included chimps who

were busy writing com-puter programs.

Over the next ten yearsErnst made several tripsto Amherst in an effortto help us struggle withthe implications of con-structivism for educa-tion. I made trips toAthens including onethat seems to have

caused the Columbia Shuttle toexplode andanother that frozepipes all overGeorgia.

We met at vari-ous conferences:Piaget in Philadel-phia and PME allover North Amer-ica.

For a PME inMontreal Ernst

and Charlotte drove up from Athens toAmherst only to suffer on north in theexhaust fumes of my diesel Rabbit. I was eagerto show them the sights of my home state ofVermont but unfortunately had not accu-rately constructed our car’s wake.

My efforts to torture Ernst also includedcross country skiing. Without understandingquite how large the footsteps were that I wasattempting to follow I loaned Ernst a pair ofboots that were too small. Then I eagerlydragged him through our woods ending anyinterest he may have had in the cross countryaspect of skiing. We finished up at the top of asledding hill which Ernst plunged down in abeautiful series of linked telemarks. This waswell before telemarking became a commonsight on American ski slopes and the image

made a powerful impression on me. Basicallyit set my ski goals for the next two decades.Perhaps it did the same for Ernst.

In 1987 Ernst retired from the Universityof Georgia and moved to Amherst, Massachu-setts. Charlotte’s daughter Lisa was workingin Northampton, 10 miles distant, so themove brought them closer to her. Ernst was awelcome addition to my research team atUMass; especially since I had a grant fromNSF to develop an interdisciplinary sciencecourse based on an explicitly constructivistperspective. After three years and hundreds ofhours of discussion a team of faculty fromphysics, chemistry, biology and science edu-cation discovered that while we all used theterm “energy” in a mathematically commonmanner we could not jointly agree on how theconcept should be presented. Academics haveconstructed the disciplines so they cannot bemerged.

I believe Ernst and I share a conviction thatConstructivism has something important tosay about education. But exactly what thatimportant something is appears to be increas-ingly elusive. The Constructivist craze, nowcrushed by the Bush Regime, never capturedwhat we felt was most important. Construc-tivism carries within itself the conviction thatit is only one of many ways of perceiving expe-rience. Thus it is not surprising that specificeducational recommendations springingfrom Constructivism can invariably bereached via another path and often one thatseems completely at odds with Constructiv-ism. For years Art Whimbey and I were easilyable to collaborate on the books we wroteeven though Art was a strict behaviorist whoconsidered constructivism to be the worstkind of bunk. Yet rarely did we have reason toargue about how a classroom should be run.

So why then do I feel Constructivism isuseful? I believe it is only through Construc-tivism that one can appreciate the critical roleof the learner. While a teacher may be impor-tant he or she is never essential and can in nomanner determine the learning outcome.This realization should have profound impli-cations. But with the realization rare and

Jack Lochhead

A

DeLiberate Thinking (USA) <[email protected]>

M

historical


OPINION

Why some people are immediately attracted to this perspective while others are repelled is as much a mystery to me as are the apparently intelligent people who after careful consideration find ways of rejecting Constructivism


OPINION

historical


unpopular the profound implications willhave to wait.

I suspect Ernst moved to Massachusetts inthe hope of getting back into skiing, a sport hehad given up over 20 years earlier when he leftItaly for Georgia. But for his first years in Mas-sachusetts there was little evidence of this.

Ernst constructed a short ski run through thewoods on the hill behind his house but oursnow conditions gave him little opportunityto practice. Then in March of 1990, 25 yearsafter Ernst gave up skiing for good, we spent 5days at Jay Peak in Northern Vermont. Itwisted my ankle on the first day and madefantastic progress on a chapter I was writing.Ernst froze in the Vermont winter with condi-tions which were windy and icy.

Five years elapsed and then Ernst suggestedthat we submit a paper to the

Journées Interna-tionales sur la communication, l'éducation et laculture scientifiques et industrielles

which metin Chamonix, March 1995. After a gap of 30years Ernst was back to skiing in the Alps! Wereturned the following year, stayed longer andincluded a run down the Mer de Glace, thelongest lift-served run in the world. Duringthis run I managed to spray Ernst, rather thor-oughly, with a can of draft Guiness which I

opened without first calculating the effect ofaltitude on pressurized cans.

In 1997 we diverted to Alta in Utah. HereErnst discovered, 2 weeks after his birthday,that at Alta anyone over 80 can ski for free. Wewere hooked. The following year we encoun-tered a poleless skier dressed in an Englishsports jacket. Pandamonium had indeed cometo Alta.

In May of 1998 Ernst returned from a sem-inar in Austria with the news that he had skiedup and down the Wildspitze. Viability mayrequire more than one instance but belief andconfidence do not. Ernst now knew he couldski the mountains of his youth.

Somewhere in the midst of all this Ernstlearned that Chamonix might allow free skiingafter age 100. We continue our preparationsfor 2017.

Received: 2 October 2006Accepted: 5 February 2007

Jack Lochhead is an innovator, developer and researcher in the field of Cognitive Instruc-tion. At the University of Massachusetts, 1975–1990, he established new programs in research and teaching and he led the team at Mount Holyoke College that created Sum-merMath. He has had teaching positions at the Univ. of Massachusetts, Mount Holyoke College, Harvard Univ. and the Univ. of the Western Cape in South Africa.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Ernst von Glasersfeld sunning at St. Anton (Austria) 1999 (Photo by Jack Lochhead).


Radical Constructivism:A Scientific Research Program

is easy to read Glasersfeld’s texts on rad-ical constructivism and interpret them

as indicating that he regards radical construc-tivism as a finished model of knowing. How-ever, after working with Glasersfeld for arather extended period of time while he wasdeveloping his model of knowing, I fullybelieve that he does not regard radical con-structivism in that way. Rather, my interpre-tation is that he regards it as a continuallyevolving model whose evolution is fueled andsustained by the novel scientific work of itsadherents.

1

I feel justified in my beliefbecause, as I worked with Glasersfeld, Ilearned that his scientific work indeed fueledand sustained his philosophical and episte-

mological inquiry. So, I was delighted that myaccount of how Glasersfeld regards radicalconstructivism is compatible with AlexanderRiegler’s characterization of the constructiv-ist community at large as “a coherent andlargely consistent scientific effort to provideanswers to demanding complex problems”(Riegler 2005, p. 1).

I came to know Glasersfeld as a scientistthrough our intensive collaboration in theproject, Interdisciplinary Research on Num-ber (IRON). Through that collaboration, Iexperienced radical constructivism as a wayof thinking and learning when doing science.It was a part of who we were and how wethought, and I still regard it as a living, grow-

ing model of knowing and learning. Glasers-feld captured the intensity with which weapproached our work in IRON

2

in a passagein

Thirty Years Radical Constructivism

:“We had heated arguments and for all of usit was a powerful lesson, hammering in thefundamental fact that what one observersees is not what another may see and thata common view can be achieved only by astrenuous effort of mutual adaptation.”(Glasersfeld 2005, p. 10)This passage points to the countless hours

we spent trying to reach some semblance of aconsensus concerning video-recorded mate-rial of children’s numerical operating and theway in which we operationalized the basictenets of radical constructivism. So it is natu-ral for me to portray Glasersfeld as a scientistas well as to portray how his scientific workwas a constitutive part of his development ofradical constructivism.

In the following text, I provide a briefaccount of our interdisciplinary work on howchildren construct number. After that, I por-tray IRON as a progressive research programin the sense of Lakatos (1970) and explainhow Glasersfeld’s work was essential in con-stituting the program as progressive. I alsosuggest how our work in IRON contributes toother radical constructivist research pro-grams whose central problem is to explore theoperations that are involved in constructiveactivity.

Explaining how children construct number

The IRON project began in 1975 after Gla-sersfeld joined the Psychology Department atthe University of Georgia in 1969 and after hiscolleague Charles Smock had introduced himto the work of Piaget. One might wonder whyan epistemologist, mathematics educators,and a philosopher of mathematics would

Leslie P. Steffe

A

University of Georgia (USA) <[email protected]>

It

Purpose: In the paper, I discuss how Ernst Glasersfeld worked as a scientist on the project, Interdisciplinary Research on Number (IRON), and explain how his scientific activity fueled his development of radical constructivism. I also present IRON as a progressive research program in radical constructivism and suggest the essential components of such programs. Findings: The basic problem of Glasersfeld’s radical constructivism is to explore the operations by means of which we assemble our experiential reality. Concep-tual analysis is Glasersfeld’s way of doing science and he used it in IRON to analyze the units that young children create and count in the activity of counting. In his work in IRON, Glasersfeld first conducted a first-order conceptual analysis of his own operations that produce units and number, and then participated in a second-order analysis of the language and actions of children and inferred the mental operations that they use to produce units and number. Further, Glasersfeld used Piaget’s concept of equilibration in the context of scheme theory in a second-order analysis of children’s construction of number sequences and of more advanced ways and means of operating in the traffic of numbers. Research Implications: The scientific method of first- and second-order conceptual anal-ysis transcends our work in IRON and it is applicable in any radical constructivist research program whose problem is to explore the operations by means of which we construct our conceptions. Because of the difficulties involved with introspection, conducting second-order conceptual analyses is essential in exploring these operations and it involves analyz-ing the language and actions of the observed. But conceptual analysis is only a part of the research process because the researchers are by necessity already involved in creating occasions of observation. The “experimenter” and the “analyst” can be the same person or they can be different people. Either case involves intensive and sustained interdiscipli-nary thinking and ways of working if the research program is to be maintained over a substantial period of time as a progressive research program. Key Words: Scientific research program, attentional model, conceptual analysis.

philosophical-epistemological


CONCEPTS


CONCEPTS



spend countless hours in heated argumentsconcerning children’s construction of num-ber. Perhaps the most salient reason is thatexplaining how children construct number isan extraordinarily compelling problem thathas far-reaching implications for solvingother such problems. In addition, it was ourintention to establish a constructivist researchprogram in mathematics education thatincluded mathematics teaching as a centralcore. Also on our agenda was initiating a con-structivist revolution in mathematics educa-tion to countermand the stranglehold thatbehaviorism had on the field in the UnitedStates after the demise of the modern mathe-matics movement.

3

But our most immediategoal was to synthesize our different ways ofthinking for the purpose of constructing anexplanatory model of children’s constructionof number.

We each brought results from our preced-ing work to our discussions in IRON. Ibrought an experiential model of children’snumerical operating that was developed as aresult of longitudinal teaching experimentsand Glasersfeld brought his attentional modelfor the construction of units and number.Before we began the interdisciplinary work ofIRON, Glasersfeld, being the passionate andconsummate scholar that he is, had read asubstantial portion, if not all, of the books by

Piaget and his collaborators.

4

This was a fun-damental factor in our work because it notonly grounded our work in Piaget’s geneticepistemology, it also grounded our work inthe scientific work of the Genevans.

5

It is crucial to point out that we each had

our own purposes for engaging in interdisci-plinary work. My educational purpose was todevelop an itinerary for children’s construc-tion of number that would be useful in themathematics education of children and Gla-sersfeld’s scientific purpose was to “study howintelligence operates, of the ways and means itemploys to construct a relatively regularworld out of the flow of its experience” (Gla-sersfeld 1984, p. 32).

6

Although we collabo-rated on developing a model of how childrenconstruct number, the fact that we did havedifferent purposes illustrates the power of ourinterdisciplinary collaboration.

The preliminary work

An experiential model

Initially, I experimented with using

Piaget’sanalysis of children’s construction of numberas a guide when working with children.Piaget’s analysis had led him to the followingposition:

“The development of number does notoccur earlier than that of classes (classifi-catory structures) or of asymmetricaltransitive relations (serial structures), butthere is, on the contrary, a simultaneousconstruction of classes, relations andnumbers.” (Piaget 1966, p. 259) His minimal criterion for children’s con-

struction of number was operative one-to-one correspondence that, in his model, wasmade possible by the emergence of the arith-metical unit. The stages in the construction ofone-to-one correspondence exactly paral-leled those of the construction of operativeclassification and seriation (Piaget 1966,260ff), so I focused on classifying, ordering,and one-to-one correspondence as activitiesthat might engender children’s constructionof number. Unfortunately, this effort provedto be of questionable value. So, I abandonedPiaget’s analysis as a guide in how I operatedand turned to teaching young children forrather extended stretches of time

so that

thechildren

might teach me what their ways and

means of operating with number might belike (Steffe, Hirstein, & Spikes 1976). It is ofgreat interest to me now that others studyingchildren’s construction of reading and writinghave taken a similar approach to how to makeprogress in children’s education (Ferreiro1991).

A major thing that I learned was that theactivity of counting is children’s primarymeans of solving their arithmetical situations.I also learned that there are major differencesin the units that children create when count-ing. For example, when finding how manycheckers were hidden by two cloths, one hid-ing seven and the other five, some childrenwould sequentially put up seven fingers insynchrony with uttering “1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,” andthen continue sequentially putting up theremaining three fingers in synchrony withuttering “8, 9, 10.” They would then fold allfingers down and continue by sequentiallyputting up two more fingers in synchronywith uttering “11, 12” and then say, “twelve.”This was in contrast with children whocouldn’t count unless they could actually seeand/or touch the checkers, and in contrastwith children who would simply start with“seven” and count on five more times (i.e., 7;8-9-10-11-12”). There were other moreadvanced ways of counting as well as othervariations of units.

The first way that I described aboveregarding how some children counted isindeed spectacular because the children cre-ated their own units to count [sequentiallyputting up fingers] when intending to countcheckers. In fact, at the time I believed that theact of sequentially putting up fingers whilecounting was the first indication of the pres-ence of Piaget’s arithmetical unit. When chil-dren had to actually see and/or touch thecheckers in order to count, these acts still indi-cated that the children were creating units tocount while counting, but they were moreimmediately tied to their perceptual experi-ence in counting. When children simply said,“seven,” and then continued counting fivemore times, this was a more solid indicationof Piaget’s arithmetical unit. Piaget (1970)was well aware of the importance of units, buthis characterization was restricted to arith-metical units and he did not provide anaccount of units at the sensory-motor level.For Piaget, arithmetical units are createdwhen; “Elements are stripped of their quali-

Leslie P. Steffe earned a B.S. in mathematics and physics from Morningside College in Sioux City, Iowa; a M.S. in mathematics from Kansas State Teachers College in Emporia, Kansas; and a Ph.D. in mathematics educa-tion from the University of Wisconsin in Madison, Wisconsin. During his doctoral program, he served as a research associate in the Wisconsin Research and Develop-ment Center working with Henry Van Engen on research and development activ-ities concerned with elementary school mathematics education. He joined the fac-ulty of mathematics education at the Uni-versity of Georgia in 1967 where he currently serves as a distinguished research professor. He is best known in mathematics education for his interdisciplinary research with Ernst von Glasersfeld and as the men-tor of outstanding doctoral students.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3 43

CONCEPTS



ties” (Piaget 1970, p. 37). He gave no accountof children’s construction of units that pre-cede or follow arithmetical units nor did hegive an account of mechanisms that do thestripping.

When I began working with Glasersfeld in1975, as I suggested above, I had an extensivecorpus of video-recorded material of childrensolving numerical problems as well as anexperiential model of the units children createin counting activity. But I was yet to constructa theoretical model for how the mind makesthe units that I observed the children makingas well as a theoretical model for children’scounting that explained the differences that Ihad observed. More importantly, I was yet toexplain how children constructed number.

A hypothetical model of children’s construction of units and number

Although Glasersfeld was never involved inthe actual teaching experiments with chil-dren that I directed, he was highly engaged inthe conceptual analyses

7

of an extensive cor-pus of the video-recorded material of chil-dren solving numerical problems. I will neverforget late one morning circa 1978 when Gla-sersfeld declared to me that, “I now under-stand what mathematicians mean by a set!!”This event signaled a major breakthrough inour attempts to understand how the mindmakes the units in counting that I hadobserved, and it occurred prior to the publi-cation of his seminal paper on the conceptualconstruction of units and number (Glasers-feld 1981). In formulating his model, Gla-sersfeld drew on his work with Silvio Ceccatowhom he credits as the first to interpret thestructure of certain abstract concepts as pat-terns of attention (Ceccato 1974). Accordingto Glasersfeld,

“Attention is not to be understood as astate that can be extended over longishperiods. Instead, I intend a pulselike suc-cession of moments of attention, each oneof which may or may not be ‘focused’ onsome neural event in the organism. By‘focused’ I intend no more than that anattentional pulse is made to coincide withsome other signal (from the multitudethat more or less continuously pervadesthe organism’s nervous system) and thusallows it to be registered. An ‘unfocused’pulse is one that registers no content.”(Glasersfeld 1981, p. 85)

Glasersfeld’s model of pulsating momentsof attention provided an explanation of themental operation that is involved in the con-struction of ordinary items of experience andthe role these items play in the construction ofnumerical units. He called the operation“unitizing.” A group of co-occurring sensory-motor signals becomes a “whole” or “object”when an unbroken sequence of attentionalpulses is focused on these signals and thesequence is framed or bounded by an unfo-cused pulse at both ends. The unfocusedpulses provide closure and set the sequence ofcontiguous focused pulses apart from priorand subsequent attentional pulses.

A focused moment of attention registerssensory material and an unfocused momentof attention can be regarded as a blank space.The records of making a sensory-motor item,or an item of experience, were graphicallyillustrated in terms of an

attentional pattern

asshown in Figure 1 (Glasersfeld 1981, p. 87).

Figure 1:

An attentional pattern: Sensory-motor item

The unfocused moments of attention aredesignated by “O” and bound the focusedmoments of attention designated by “I.” Theletters a, b, … , k designate sensory materialselected by attention and this sensory mate-rial is registered as records of experience. Iemphasize that the

attentional pattern

or

rec-ognition

template

is established as a result ofindividual–environment interaction and theprocess it symbolizes constitutes a model ofthe operation that is involved in compound-ing sensory-motor signals together in theimmediate here-and-now to form items ofexperience – the unitizing operation.

Sensory-motor items are isolated in expe-rience and there may be no element of recog-nition in their establishment. If a child doesrecognize an experiential item as having beenexperienced before, this constitutes thebeginnings of categorizing items together.Categorizing, however, goes beyond the sim-ple recognition of a sensory-motor item. Itinvolves a sense of similarity in the wayexplained by Inhelder & Piaget (1964) whendistinguishing graphic and nongraphic col-lections.

“We use the term “collection” rather than“class” in the strict sense, because theformer term carries no implication of ahierarchical structure of class-inclusions.However, these collections are no longergraphic, and objects are assigned to onecollection or another on the basis of simi-larity alone. (p. 47)Assigning objects to a collection in this

sense requires an abstraction beyond theabstraction that is involved in recognizing aparticular sensory-motor item. It involvesmore because sensory-motor items areformed in the moment and there may be norecollection of a preceding experience eventhough a current item may be recognized.Categorizing sensory-motor items togetherinvolves recollection of previously experi-enced items,

9

and re-focusing attention onthe items is an act of taking them together, aprocess that Glasersfeld called reprocessing orattentional iteration.

Reprocessing sensory-motor itemsencourages focusing attention on the unitarywholeness of each item, which is an operationof unitizing the sensory-motor items. Theunitary item produced is diagrammed in Fig-ure 2 (1981, p. 89).

Figure 2:

The attentional structure of a unitary item

Glasersfeld used the notation in Figure 2 todesignate a single attentional momentfocused on the unitariness of a sensory-motoritem. In this, n is used to denote the necessityof having some, but no particular, sensory-motor material on which to focus. This devel-opment of the unitizing operation opens thepossibility of the child categorizing non-homogeneous items together on the basis oftheir unitariness or wholeness – “things” thatgo together because they

are put together.

Gla-sersfeld referred to these types of collectionsas lots to indicate that the categorization wasnot constrained to any particular perceptualmaterial.

Reprocessing the items of lots encouragestripping sensory content from the unitaryitems, which produces an abstract unit itemnotated in Figure 3 on the next page (Glasers-feld 1981, p. 91).

00a b kI I I…

00nI


CONCEPTS



The construction of the abstract unit itemopens the possibility of using that item torecursively reprocess the items of lots. Thisrecursive reprocessing can produce an atten-tional structure called a composite unit – a unitof abstract units – diagrammed in Figure 4.

Figure 4:

The attentional structure of a composite unit.

I have chosen to portray the compositeunit in Figure 4 as containing only fiveabstract unit items to emphasize the role thatfigurative patterns play in the initial construc-tion of composite units containing five orfewer items (Glasersfeld 1982b). These struc-tures are what Glasersfeld meant by the emer-gence of sets in children.

9

Even though the above development of theattentional model is not complete, it doesportray what Glasersfeld brought to the scien-tific work on children’s construction of num-ber. After explaining a series of abstractionsthat produced these items, he commentedthat:

“It now remains to be seen whether thismodel provides a new and more successfulapproach to an understanding of the stillproblematic activities of counting and theoperations involved in establishing specificnumerosities.” (Glasersfeld 1981, p. 94)The preceding quotation captures the ini-

tial thrust of our collaborative scientific workin IRON, where our attempt was to use whatwas then an evolving version of Glasersfeld’shypothetical model in constructing the unititems that children create as they count. Anindispensable step in constructing a model ofchildren’s counting types involved our recur-sively returning to critical segments of thevideotaped material that I had developed.This was an indispensable step because Gla-sersfeld’s attentional model constituted a newway of thinking about how children constructunits of all kinds, so a continual reinterpreta-

tion of the critical video segments was essen-tial. The conceptual analysis in which Glasers-feld engaged to produce the attentional modelwas extraordinarily insightful scientific work,and his collaborative conceptual analysis inconstructing a model of children’s countingtypes was every bit as insightful.

A model of children’s counting types

Glasersfeld wasn’t as interested in his inter-pretations of the children’s mathematicalactivity as he was in how the others in theproject thought about the children’s mathe-matical activity. He did make his own inter-pretations of the children’s numerical waysand means of operating, but he alwayschecked his interpretations with the othermembers of the interdisciplinary project, andthis was the source of our heated argu-ments.

10

Through our collaborative work, Ilearned that conceptual analysis is an essentialpart of doing science in mathematics educa-tion and I have used this kind of analysis in allof my subsequent work in IRON and beyond.

Through our discussions, an importantinsight came to the fore that opened the wayfor major progress. The insight was that chil-dren create the items they count in the activityof counting. This is clearly demonstratedwhen a child appears to count specific itemsin a situation where no items of that kind arewithin the child’s perceptual field in the waythat I described children establishing puttingup fingers as unit items when counting hid-den checkers in my experiential model. Creat-ing motor unit items as substitutes for hiddenunitary items is the culmination of a ratherintricate development in the child. Involvedin that development is the progressive abilityto create unit items on the basis of, first,visual, auditory, and tactual perception, andthen proprioceptive sensation (Steffe, Gla-sersfeld, Richards, & Cobb 1983, p. 116).

Creating perceptual unit items

When children use their unitizing operationrecursively to unitize sensory-motor items, asI noted above, Glasersfeld used “unitaryitems” to refer to the result. In the model ofcounting types, we decided to call the unititems that children create when counting uni-tary items

perceptual unit items

to distinguish

them from the unitary items. We also calledchildren who are restricted to creating per-ceptual unit items when counting unitaryitems

counters of perceptual unit items

.

11

That some children of even six years of age

are restricted to creating perceptual unit itemsin counting was not anticipated by Glasers-feld’s model of units and number, nor was theabstraction that is necessary for children tomake the next step in creating items in count-ing when the unitary items are hidden fromthe children’s view. But it did provide anessential tool to explain how children usemotor acts like putting up fingers, hittingtheir desk with a pencil, or some other rele-vant motor act as countable items that aresubstitutes for hidden unitary items that theyintend to count.

Creating motor and verbal unit items

When children use their unitizing operationto unitize the proprioceptive sensation that isinvolved in counting, we called the results ofthe operation motor unit items. It was neces-sary to use children’s capability to producevisualized images of unitary items to explainhow children substitute motor unit items forhidden unitary items that they intend tocount. It seemed natural to call the re-pre-sented unitary item a figural unit item andcharacterized the substitution as occurring atthe level of re-presentation. We also calledchildren who are restricted to creating motorunit items as substitutes for hidden unitaryunit items when counting

counters of motorunit items

. Counters of motor unit items always start

counting with “one” as do counters of verbalunit items, which is the next unit item we iso-lated in children’s counting. When childrenunitize the vocal productions when countingmotor unit items, the vocal productions cometo be used as substitutes for the motor unititems. The motor unit items are dropped outbecause simply saying a number word signi-fies them.

Creating abstract unit items

The abstract unit item was the next countableunit item in the progression of the types ofunits children create while counting. Count-ing-on, as I describe below, is the behavioralindicator of the ability to use the abstract unititem in acts of counting. Given, for example,the following task: “There are seven marbles

0(0 I 0 0 I 0 0 I 0 0 I 0 0 I 0)0

Figure 3:

The attentional structure of the abstract unit item.

0)(0nI

I00

2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3 45

CONCEPTS



in this cup” (rattling the marbles in the cup).“Here are four more marbles” (placing fourmarbles on the table). “How many marblesare there in all?” Glasersfeld analyzed count-ing-on as follows.

“If the child says there are seven in the cup,and proceeds to count the additional mar-bles, “8, 9, 10, 11 – eleven!” it suggests thatin uttering “seven” the child knows that thenumber word, in the given context, standsfor a specific collection of individual uni-tary items that satisfy the template called‘marble’ and that, if counted, they could becoordinated with utterances of the num-ber words from ‘one’ to ‘seven.’ The childknows this and therefore does not have torun through the activities that would actu-ally implement it on the level of sensory-motor experience.” (Steffe et al. 1983,p. 42)Such counters can also mentally “run

through” counting activity starting withother number words and count so many moretimes. They can turn anything whatever intocountable items because counting hasbecome a reflective process in Piagetian termsand, as such, it is “operative” rather than “fig-urative”.

12

Fueling and sustaining the radical aspect of radical constructivism

Even though the above discussion of our workon counting types is necessarily brief, I havesketched some of the results of Glasersfeld’s sci-entific work on matters of crucial importancein the mathematics education of children aswell as in radical constructivism. It is impor-tant to point out that our work formed anessential connection with Piaget’s genetic epis-temology (Glasersfeld 1982a). In a paper thatrepresents his early analysis of Piaget’s geneticepistemology (Glasersfeld 1974), Glasersfeldprovided an extensive discussion of Piaget’sresearch that undermines the belief that, theknower and the things of which, or aboutwhich, he or she comes to know are, from theoutset, separate and independent entities. Thebasic research that he drew from is Piaget’saccount of the child’s construction of the con-cept of an object that has some kind of perma-nence in his stream of experience (Piaget

1955). In the paper, Glasersfeld portrays howthe infant comes to be but one element orentity among others in a universe that he or shehas gradually constructed for him-or herselfout of the elementary particles of experience.This powerful insight into the child’s construc-tion of his or her ordinary items of experienceserves as a justification that, from the outset,the knower and the things of or about which heor she comes to know are separate and inde-pendent entities is not viable.

The connection between Glasersfeld’smodel of the unitizing operation and Piaget’saccount of the child’s construction of experi-ential reality resides in the realization that theunitizing operation provides an opening tostudy mental operations of the mind that areinvolved.

“Radical constructivism maintains – notunlike Kant in his Critique – that theoperations by means of which we assembleour experiential world can be explored,and that an awareness of this operating …can help us do it differently and, perhaps,better.” (Glasersfeld 1984, p. 18)Our work using the attentional model in

specifying the types of units children use incounting constituted an exploration of thoseoperations of the mind that are involved inassembling not only experiential reality, butmathematical reality as well. Husserl also pro-posed, “that the mental operation that unitesdifferent sense impressions into the conceptof “thing” is similar to the operation thatunites abstract units into the concept of num-ber” (Glasersfeld, 2006, p. 65). So, given thatchildren construct what Glasersfeld calls

experiential

realities out of elementary parti-cles of experience, one can infer that childrenconstruct their mathematical realities usingtheir experiential realities. That is, one caninfer that a child’s mathematics is abstractedfrom his or her experiential reality and it isnot given from the outset as an entity inde-pendent of the child. This analysis definitelyserved in fueling and sustaining the radicalaspect of radical constructivism:

“Radical constructivism is, thus, radicalbecause it breaks with convention anddevelops a theory of knowledge in whichknowledge does not reflect an “objective”ontological reality, but exclusively anordering and organization of a world con-stituted by our experience.” (Glasersfeld1984, p. 24)

Radical constructivism as the core of scientific research programs

Glasersfeld’s work in IRON demonstrateshow radical constructivism can constitutethe core of a scientific research program.

“All scientific research programmes maybe characterized by their ‘

hard core

.’ Thenegative heuristic

13

of the programmeforbids us to direct the modus tollens atthis ‘hard core’.” (Lakatos 1970, p. 133) Lakatos used “hard core” but I prefer to

use just “core” because the adjective “hard”can indicate a non-changing core althoughthis is not what Lakatos intended: “Theactual hard core of a programme does notactually emerge fully armed … . It developsslowly, by a long, preliminary process of trialand error” (p. 133). Although I wouldn’t saythat it has changed by trial and error, it isindeed the case that the core of IRON haschanged since it began.

First- and second-order analyses

Glasersfeld’s model of units and numberdefinitely should be a part of the core of anyradical constructivist research programwhose goal is to explore the operations bymeans of which we construct our concep-tions. When I consider the architecture ofthe units and composite units that we pro-duced when constructing the counting-types model, and the operations that chil-dren perform using these units as input,

14

Iconsider the counting types model as modi-fying the attentional model. For example,the concept of a figural unit item arose inanalyzing children’s counting behavior andthis unit is not presented in the attentionalmodel. The motor and verbal unit itemswere also not presented. These unit typescertainly are not restricted to children’scounting [e.g., sign language]. So, there is areciprocal relationship between the atten-tional model and the counting-types modelin that essential elements of the latterbecome knowledge of the analyst that can beused in further analyses.

Glasersfeld produced his model of unitsand number by using mental operations toanalyze his own conceptions of units andnumber. So, I refer to his analysis as a first-order analysis. The goal of a first-order anal-


CONCEPTS



ysis concerns specifying the mental opera-tions that produce particular conceptions ofthe analyst. It is an analysis of first-ordermodels, which are models the analyst hasconstructed to organize, comprehend, andcontrol his or her experience; that is, the ana-lyst’s own knowledge. The distinction I ammaking between the mental operations thatproduce particular conceptions of the ana-lyst and those conceptions is crucial inunderstanding how the knowledge ofresearchers can be used in radical construc-tivist research programs concerned withexploring the operations by means of whichwe construct our conceptions. It is crucialbecause these operations are involved in pro-ducing second-order models.

When the goal is to explore operations bymeans of which human beings constructmathematics, following Piaget (1970), thisinvolves exploring children’s constructiveactivity.

15

In the exploration, we constructsecond-order models, which are models anobserver constructs of the observed person’sknowledge in order to explain their observa-tions (Steffe, et al. 1983, p. xvi). Because thegoal of the analyst in constructing second-order models concerns constructing concep-tual operations that explain the observedlanguage and actions or interactions of theobserved person, I refer to it as a second-order analysis. The analysis in which weengaged to produce the counting-typesmodel was a second-order analysis in whichwe used the results of Glasersfeld’s first-order analysis. The reciprocal relationshipbetween first- and second-order analyses isbasic in radical constructivist research pro-grams because it illustrates that researchersand their ways and means of operating andobserving constitute the research programs.

The fundamental principles of the core

The fundamental principles of radical con-structivism that Glasersfeld presented in1989 were already a defining a part of thecore of IRON even though the principles hadnot been as explicitly stated.

“1. Knowledge in not passively receivedbut built up by the cognizing subject.“2. The function of cognition is adaptive,and serves the organization of the experi-ential world, not the discovery of onto-logical reality.”

When I first read these principles, I dis-tinctly recollect how they encapsulatedmuch of the content of radical constructiv-ism that was known to me at that time. Thesecond principle, of course, is a restatementof the radical aspect of radical constructiv-ism. I mention them because they cut acrossradical constructivist research programs ofall kinds.

16

But I do not regard the funda-mental principles as explanatory principlesin the way that we used the attentional modelfor units and number in constructing expla-nations of the units that children create incounting. Rather, researchers constructmodels in what Lakatos called the protectivebelt of the core of the research program thatcorroborates the core principles, such asGlasersfeld’s analysis of Piaget’s research onchildren’s construction of permanentobjects and our analysis of children’s count-ing types.

A progressive research program

Although the book

Children’s counting types:Philosophy, theory, and application

was alandmark publication in IRON, we onlyused those core principles that were useful tous in the work that produced the book.Essentially, after the publication of thisbook, we still had not explained how chil-dren construct number sequences. We hadexplained the units that children create inthe activity of counting and hypothesizedthat they formed a developmental progres-sion, but we had not explained children’scounting in terms of number sequences norhad we specified the accommodations thatproduced the number sequences. So, Iretreated into mathematics education andGlasersfeld retreated into his theoreticalwork. I launched a new teaching experimentbecause, in mathematics education, buildingexperiential models precedes building theo-retical models.

At the same time as I began the teachingexperiment, Glasersfeld was fortunatelyworking on a paper in which he interpretedPiaget’s concept of equilibration and the twoactivities that constitute it, assimilation andaccommodation, in the context of schemetheory. There was no agreement between thetwo of us that we would work on mutuallycompatible problems, but I wouldn’t say thatit was fortuitous either because we were bothconcerned with exploring operations by

which we construct our experiential worlds.In what I consider as one of Glasersfeld’s mostimportant papers for mathematics education,he commented that:

“Piaget’s conception of assimilation andaccommodation remain incomprehensi-ble unless it is placed within the frame-work of his theory of knowledge and, spe-cifically, into the context that he calls

schéme

. “Schemes” are basic sequences ofevents that consist of three parts. An initialpart that serves as trigger or occasion. …The second part, that follows upon it, is anaction … or an operation … . These twoare, as a rule, explicitly mentioned whenschemes are discussed. The third part isoften only implied, but that doesn’t makeit any less important: it is what I call theresult or sequel of the activity.”

17

(Glasers-feld 1980, p. 81).Analogous to the collaborative scientific

work that produced our explanation of chil-dren’s counting types, Glasersfeld’s concep-tual analysis of scheme, assimilation, accom-modation, and perturbation

18

, served in ourcollaborative scientific work in accounting forchildren’s construction of number sequencesafter the teaching experiment had concluded.Five stages emerged in the constructive activ-ity – two pre-numerical counting

19

schemesand three distinctly different numericalcounting schemes

20

along with an explana-tion of the transitional accommodations(Steffe, Cobb, & Glasersfeld 1988). We alsoaccounted for children’s construction of add-ing and subtracting schemes within each ofthe stages. These number sequences quicklybecame part of the explanatory constructs ofthe IRON research program and were subse-quently used to explain children’s construc-tion of multiplying and dividing schemes(Steffe 1994).

Although Glasersfeld retired from theUniversity of Georgia in 1987 and joined theScientific Reasoning Research Institute at theUniversity of Massachusetts, that did not stopour scientific collaboration. After the workwith children’s construction of multiplyingand dividing schemes, another problem shiftoccurred in IRON that became known as thereorganization hypothesis:

children’s frac-tional schemes can emerge as accommodationsin their numerical counting schemes

. Glasers-feld worked as a consultant on this projectthroughout its duration and was more than

2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3 47

CONCEPTS



tangentially involved in the conceptual analy-ses of the video-recorded material that wasproduced when teaching children fractions.That the hypothesis was confirmed (Olive1999; Olive & Steffe, 2002; Steffe, 2002; Tzur1999) is, according to Lakatos, essential toclaim that the IRON research program is aprogressive program because the confirma-tions involved novelties not predicted by thehypothesis.

“Finally, let’s call a problem shift progres-sive if it is both theoretically and empiri-cally progressive, and degenerating if it isnot.” (Lakatos 1970, p. 118) The explanatory constructs of IRON were

continually expanded to include an organiza-tion of schemes of action and operation that Icall the mathematics of students. Aspects ofthese schemes would be explanatory princi-ples of other radical constructivist researchprograms that explicitly include dynamicequilibrium, assimilation, accommodation,and scheme theory because they elaborateGlasersfeld’s concept of scheme in significantways such as the counting-types model elab-orated his attentional model of units andnumber. Toward that end, the architecture ofa scheme presented by Glasersfeld does notinclude, for example, reversible schemes,recursive schemes that take the scheme as itsown input, schemes that are the result ofcoordinating a more basic scheme with theoperations involved in producing a unit ofunit of units, or schemes that function at dif-fering levels of interiorization. So, rather thanpresent the numerical schemes of the IRONresearch program per se as a part of theexplanatory constructs of compatibleresearch programs, the schemes’ architectureis what is relevant.

Final comments

I have tried to say enough to portray IRON asan evolving and changing scientific researchprogram. From the time we started to worktogether onwards, Glasersfeld developed thefundamental principles of radical construc-tivism concurrently with using them in inter-disciplinary scientific work. Although theresults of his analytical work proved to be ofmore immediate use than the results of hisphilosophical and epistemological work, thesecond fundamental principle of constructiv-ism is essential in establishing what I think ofas a constructivist school mathematics.

The primary difference between a con-structivist and a conventional school mathe-matics resides in one’s conception of schoolmathematics. In the latter case, school math-ematics is regarded as a thing-in-itself inde-pendently of human thought and experienceand, in the former case, school mathematicsis constituted by the results of conceptualanalyses, which are models of mathematicalthinking and learning. These models consistof an organization of mathematical schemesof operation and the accommodations ofthese schemes that children produce as aresult of interactive mathematical communi-cation. The models can open possibilities formathematics teachers to construct their ownschool mathematics in conjunction with theirchildren. In fact, the models should beregarded as providing possibilities for teach-ers to explain their students’ mathematicallanguage and actions and for teachers’ goalsetting. Thinking of a constructivist schoolmathematics as a dynamic organization ofmathematical schemes of operation in themental life of teachers casts mathematics edu-

cation as a very exciting field and marks it asan evolving and changing professional prac-tice. Glasersfeld has said in many places thatradical constructivism doesn’t tell you what todo. His comment marks an essential attitudein how radical constructivism is used. Onedoes not simply

apply

radical constructivism.Rather, one builds

living models

of radicalconstructivism that do not countermand itsbasic principles such as a constructivistschool of mathematics.

The members of the IRON research pro-gram did indeed set a revolution in motion inschool mathematics and Glasersfeld was atthe vortex of that revolution. But the influ-ence of constructivism manifest in profes-sional recommendations for reform in math-ematics education primarily concerned thefirst principle of radical constructivism with-out consideration of the second principle(National Council of Teachers of Mathemat-ics 1989, 2000). As a result, recommendationsfor what was to be taught were not based onthe second principle. But the constructivistrevolution in mathematics education has notrun out of steam, and as long as radical con-structivist research programs like the IRONprogram remain in a progressive phase, theseresearch programs will serve to sustain andintensify the revolution. That is the legacy ofErnst von Glasersfeld’s work in mathematicseducation.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Amy Hackenberg, JohnOlive, Erik Tillema, Ron Tzur, Pat Thompson,and two anonymous reviewers for their com-ments on earlier drafts of this article.

Notes

1. Here, I am speaking of radical constructiv-ism on the intersubjective level (cf. Glaser-sfeld 1995, p. 120).

2. The philosopher, John Richards, was aninitial member as well as Patrick Thomp-son and Paul Cobb who were then doctor-al students.

3. See Steffe & Kieren (1994) for an historicalaccount of the rise of constructivism in

mathematics education and the zeitgeistin which we operated.

4. In fact, Glasersfeld said that he used “rad-ical” for the first time in a paper in whichhe interpreted the epistemological aspectsof the work of Piaget (Glasersfeld 1974).

5. I use “Genevans” to refer to not only toPiaget, but to his collaborators as well.

6. John Richard’s purpose was to reconsti-tute the philosophical foundations ofmathematics.

7. Conceptual analysis was imported by Gla-sersfeld through his work with Ceccatoand widely used in the IRON project. Aconceptual analysis is an analysis of whatmight constitute the mental operations ofothers. When used to explain children’sbehavior, the aim is to produce thick de-scriptions of conceptual operations that,were children to have them, might resultin them thinking in the way they do (Th-ompson & Saldanha, 2003).


CONCEPTS



8. When an attentional pattern is used in cat-egorizing sensory-motor items together,Piaget’s (1955) studies on object perma-nence indicate that children have devel-oped the capability to use attentionalpatterns to produce visualized images ofsensory-motor items that they can recog-nize (Glasersfeld 1995). These images pro-vide the child with an awareness of anexperiential item apart from its location inimmediate experience.

9. I have only underscored the emergence ofcomposite units. Children must learn touse these nascent structures as input foroperating further, such as disembedding asubpart from a composite unit, joiningtwo composite units together, removingitems from composite units, etc.

10.Our attempts to establish intersubjectiveagreement were very difficult because the

counting types model came to supersedethe experiential model at a higher level ofabstraction with new organization andstructure.

11.To find how many checkers are in a lot ofcheckers, these children need to actuallysee or feel the checkers in order to createperceptual unit items in counting.

12.Children do not count abstract units perse. Rather, they use the records of experi-ence in their abstract unit item to producea figurative or a sensory-motor unit itemsin an act of counting.

13.The paths of research to be avoided.14.A composite unit, similar to an arithmeti-

cal unit, implies an ensemble of operationsthat produce a unit of units.

15.Piaget attempted to explain the constructionof mathematics developmentally in his pro-gram of genetic epistemology. The work in

IRON is similar with the exception that thework is embedded in mathematics teachingand learning as well as in development.

16.IRON wasn’t the only research programinfluenced by Glasersfeld. He has alsoworked in family therapy (Steffe & Gale1995), science education (Larochelle, Bed-narz, & Garrison 1998), and psychothera-py (Kenny 1988), among others.

17.Schemes can be interpreted as negativefeedback loops (Glasersfeld 1995).

18.Dynamic equilibration, assimilation, ac-commodation, perturbation, and schemeare all core principles.

19.We called these two counting schemes theperceptual counting scheme and the figu-rative counting scheme.

20.We called these numerical countingschemes the initial, tacitly nested, and ex-plicitly nested number sequences.

References

Ceccato, S. (1974) In the garden of choices. In:Smock, C. D. & Glasersfeld, von E. (eds.)Epistemology and education. FollowThrough Publications: Athens GA, pp.125–142.

Ferreiro, E. (1991) Literacy acquisition andthe representation of language. In: Kamii,C., Manning, M. & Manning, C. (eds.).Early literacy: A constructivist foundationfor whole language. Washington DC: NEAProfessional Library, pp. 31–55.

Glasersfeld, von E. (1974) Piaget and the rad-ical constructivist epistemology. In:Smock, C. D. & Glasersfeld, E. von (eds.)Epistemology and education. FollowThrough Publications: Athens GA, pp. 1–24. Reprinted in: Glasersfeld, von E.(1987) The construction of knowledge:Contributions to conceptual semantics.Intersystems Publications: Seaside CA.

Glasersfeld, von E. (1980) The concept ofequilibration in a constructivist theory ofknowledge. In Benseler, F., Hejl, P. M. &Kock, W. K. (eds.) Autopoisis, communi-cation, and society. Campus Verlag:Frankfurt/M., pp. 75–85.

Glasersfeld, von E. (1981) An attentionalmodel for the conceptual construction ofunits and number. Journal for Research inMathematics Education 12(2): 33–96.

Glasersfeld, von E. (1982a). An interpretationof Piaget’s constructivism. Revue Interna-tionale de Philosophie 36(4): 612–635.

Glasersfeld, von E. (1982b). Subitizing: Therole of figural patterns in the developmentof numerical concepts. Archives de Psy-chologie 50: 191–218.

Glasersfeld, von E. (1984) An introduction toradical constructivism. In: Watzlawick, P.(ed.) The invented reality. W. W. Norton:New York, pp. 17–40.

Glasersfeld, von E. (1989) Constructivism ineducation. In: Husen, T. & Postlethwaite,N. (eds.) International encyclopedia ofeducation (Supplementary Volume). Per-gamon: Oxford, pp. 162–163.

Glasersfeld, von E. (1995) Radical construc-tivism: A way of knowing and learning.Falmer Press: London.

Glasersfeld, von E. (2005) Thirty years radicalconstructivism. Constructivist Founda-tions 1(1): 9–12.

Glasersfeld, von E. (2006) A constructivistapproach to experiential foundations ofmathematical concepts revisited. Con-structivist Foundations 1(2): 61–72.

Inhelder, B. & Piaget, J. (1964) The earlygrowth of logic in the child. The NortonLibrary: New York.

Kenny, V. (1988) Radical constructivism,autopoiesis & psychotherapy. The IrishJournal of Psychology 9(1): 25–82.

Lakatos, I. (1970) Falsification and the meth-odology of scientific research programs.In: Lakatos, I. & Musgrave, A. (eds.) Criti-cism and the growth of knowledge. Cam-bridge University Press, Cambridge, pp.91–195.

Larochelle, M., Bednarz, N. & Garrison, J.(eds.) (1998) Constructivism and educa-tion. Cambridge University Press: Cam-bridge.

National Council of Teachers of Mathematics(1989) Curriculum and evaluation stan-dards for school mathematics. Author:Reston VA.

National Council of Teachers of Mathematics(2000) Principles and standards for schoolmathematics. Author: Reston VA.

Olive, J. (1999) From fractions to rationalnumbers of arithmetic: A reorganizationhypothesis. Mathematical Thinking andLearning 1: 279–314.

Olive, J. & Steffe, L. P. (2002) The construc-tion of an iterative fractional scheme: Thecase of Joe. Journal of MathematicalBehavior 20: 413–437.

Piaget, J. (1955) The child’s construction ofreality. Routledge & Kegan Paul: London.

Piaget, J. (1966) Some convergences betweenformal and genetic analyses. In: Beth, E. W.& Piaget, J. (eds.) Mathematical episte-mology and psychology. D. Reidel: Boston,pp. 259–280. First published in 1965 by

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Presses Universitaires de France, Paris asVolume XIV of the “Études d’ Épistémolo-gie Génétiqué”

Piaget, J. (1970) Genetic epistemology.Colombia University Press: New York.

Riegler, A. (2005) Editorial. The constructiv-ist challenge. Constructivist Foundations1(1): 1–8.

Steffe, L. P., Cobb, P. & Glasersfeld, von E.(1988) Construction of arithmeticalmeanings and strategies. Springer: NewYork.

Steffe, L. & Gale, J. (eds.) (1995) Constructiv-ism in education. Lawrence ErlbaumAssociates: Hillsdale NJ.

Steffe, L. P. & Hirstein, J. & Spikes, C. (1976)Quantitative comparison and class inclu-sion as readiness variables for learning first

grade arithmetic content. TechnicalReport No. 9. Project for MathematicalDevelopment of Children: Tallahassee, FL.ERIC Document Reproduction ServiceNo. ED144808.

Steffe, L. P. & Kieren, T. (1994) Radial con-structivism and mathematics education.Journal for Research in Mathematics Edu-cation 26(6): 711–733.

Steffe, L. P., Richards, J., Glasersfeld, von E., YCobb, P. (1983) Children’s counting types:Philosophy, theory, and application. NewYork: Praeger.

Steffe, L. P. (1994) Children’s multiplyingschemes. In G. Harel, & J. Confrey (eds.)Multiplicative reasoning in the learning ofmathematics. SUNY Press: Albany NY, pp.3–39.

Steffe, L. P. (2002) A new hypothesis concern-ing children’s fractional knowledge. Jour-nal of Mathematical Behavior 20: 267–307.

Thompson, P. W. & Saldanha, L. (2003) Frac-tions and multiplicative reasoning. In: Kil-patrick, J. & Martin, G. (eds.) Researchcompanion to the NCTM Standards.National Council of Teachers of Mathe-matics: Washington DC, pp. 95–114.

Tzur, R. (1999) An integrated study of chil-dren’s construction of improper fractionsand the teacher’s role in promoting thatlearning. Journal for Research in Mathe-matics Education 30: 390–416.

Received: 25 August 2006Accepted: 11 December 2006

Ernst von Glasersfeld holding skis at St. Anton (Austria) 1999 (photo by Jack Lochhead).


The Challenge of Understanding Radical Constructivism

To say “it is” is to grasp for permanence.To say “it is not” is to adopt the view of nihilism.Therefore a wise personDoes not say “exists” or “does not exist.”– Nagarjuna, Mulamadhyamakakarika, 2nd century C.E. (Garfield 1995, Chapter 15:10)

o honestly agree or disagree with some-one’s position, one must first under-

stand that person’s position. Only then canone really decide about the other person’sposition.

Many people have expressed disagreementwith von Glasersfeld’s notion of radical con-structivism.

1

The list of references to theexpressions of disagreement in print is verylarge. In addition there are probably gigabytesof such expressions on-line. Much of thedebate has been on a philosophical level,removed at least somewhat from applica-tion.

2

But some have gone so far as to claimthat radical constructivism is dangerouswhen applied to education.

3

Most, if not all, of these lines of disagree-ment with radical constructivism have oneaspect in common. They are expositions ofhow radical constructivism contains contra-dictions with the basic premises of realism.Unfortunately, this common thread is notacknowledged.

A fundamental difference

The basic position of radical constructivism isfundamentally incommensurate with that ofrealism. Von Glasersfeld (1999a, [13]) putsforth the essential difference:

“What differentiates radical constructivismfrom the tradition, is the proposal unequiv-ocally to give up the notion that knowledgeought to be a veridical ‘representation’ of aworld as it ‘exists’ prior to being experi-enced (that is, ontological reality).”

Coming from a different experience, his-tory and philosophy of physics, Max Jammer(1957, p. 2) seems to be referring to the samething when in the middle of the last centuryhe wrote:

“As a result of modern research in physics,the ambition and hope, still cherished bymost authorities of the last century, thatphysical science could offer a photo-graphic picture and true image of realityhad to be abandoned.”Still, the realist position is alive and well in

physics, as evidenced by this comment fromde la Torre and Zamorano (2001, p. 103):

“…we postulate the objective existence ofphysical reality that can be known to ourminds… with an ever growing precision bythe subtle play of theory and experiment.”It appears that a consequence of the realist

position is: everything is ultimately about thetruth, which can be known. Furthermore, inrealism, when comparing two statementsabout the world it must be possible to deter-mine which is closer to the truth. On the otherhand, in radical constructivism, truth is notthe point because such truth is not accessible.In radical constructivism our ways of know-ing do not access such truth. Hence, the twopositions could hardly be more different.

The problem with the debates about radical constructivism

The issue of initial assumptions

Every position, paradigm or ideology thatdescribes the nature of human knowing isbased on its own particular set of initialassumptions. Initial assumptions are at besttaken on belief and fit with experience.

4

Itappears the initial assumptions of a cultureare uncritically adopted as an implicit part ofone’s milieu by those less careful or thought-ful. Initial assumptions cannot be known tobe true. They cannot be proved.

If one discovers an initial assumption doesnot fit experience, then the logical structurebuilt on this assumption is at least suspect, ifnot demolished. No challenges to radical con-structivism seem to explore this avenue.

Initial assumptions are usually very hard,if not impossible, to test. Even if one were tocome to understand another view and its ini-tial assumptions, understanding the initialassumptions generally reveals how well theytoo fit experience.

5

In the end we come backto the realization that to choose a set of initial

Dewey I. Dykstra, Jr.

A

Boise State University (USA) <[email protected]>

T

Purpose: This contribution to the Festschrift honoring Ernst von Glasersfeld gives some insight into the perpetual problem of understanding radical constructivism (RC). Parallels with the Middle Way school of Buddhism appear to shed light on this challenge. Conclusions: The hegemony realism has over the thinking of even the most highly edu-cated in our civilization plays a major role in their failure to understand RC. Those still subject to realism in their thinking interpret statements by those in RC in ways incom-patible with RC. Until realists disequilibrate over mismatches between realist expecta-tions and experiences, no alternative way of thinking is accessible to them and misinterpretations of RC will continue. Practical implications: While we cannot change someone else’s understanding, in our interactions with them we can focus on creating situations in which those who do not understand us might disequilibrate. If we are suc-cessful, they are likely to begin to escape the domination of realism in their thinking. Value: This insight may enable eventual success in our assisting others to understand RC. Key words: Realism, Buddhism, disequilibration.

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assumptions from which to operate is eitheran act of faith or an arbitrary decision.

The standards of logic

Each paradigm generally operates by the rulesof logical operations agreed upon by all acrossparadigms.

6

The structures and conclusionsof each paradigm are merely the properresults of these logical operations startingfrom a particular set of initial assumptions.For this reason the structures and conclusionsof one paradigm cannot be expected to beconsistent with another paradigm based ondifferent initial assumptions.

These things being the case, the structuresand conclusions from a paradigm can only bejudged faulty or incorrect, if it can be demon-strated that there is an error in logic at somepoint after the initial assumptions, that faultydata have been used or that the conclusionsdo not fit experience. A claim that a conclu-sion from one paradigm is false because itdoes not fit another paradigm is trivial and

non-sequitur

. Conclusions from within a par-ticular paradigm are not intended to apply toanother paradigm and cannot logically berequired to apply to that other paradigm’s dif-ferent set of initial assumptions. It is impor-tant to note that since such conclusions areintended to fit experience, another paradigmwith different initial assumptions may indeedhave an entirely different conclusion to fit thesame experience. Both sets of conclusions areequally valid, each in their own paradigm.

Sadly, few, if any, of the arguments offeredin the many publications and gigabytes of on-line discussion attempt to point out an errorin logic from the basic premise of radical con-structivism or from faulty data. They all makethe strategic blunder of pointing out errors inradical constructivism as if it must be com-mensurate with realism. Hence, much efforthas been expended in this program to proveradical constructivism wrong, but to no avail.

There are two problems with this strategy.One, as has been pointed out, is the logicalerror that conclusions must be universallyapplicable instead of dependent on the initialassumptions from which they are derived.The other is that such lines of reasoning revealthat their architects are not operating fromthe initial assumptions of radical constructiv-ism. Such arguments are not likely to impressthe thoughtful observer of such debates, letalone change someone’s mind.

To challenge a view

Observing then that thoughtful people workdiligently and carefully to reason appropri-ately from initial assumptions and that theinitial assumptions too are subjected tointense scrutiny to check how well they fitexperience, how can one judge a paradigm?Beyond previous experience, the only way isto test its usefulness. Do the predictionsmade from it fit experience? Can it be used tosuccessfully accomplish desirable goals? Asvon Glasersfeld (1999a, [3]) has put it:

“Ultimately, of course, a way of thinkingmust not only be claimed feasible but, inorder to become attractive, its advantagesmust be shown in action.”We shall come back to some evidence of

the usefulness of radical constructivism laterin this piece.

Evidence of the logical error: An example

Consider an example illustrating the logicalerrors made by realists attempting to proveradical constructivism wrong, useless ordangerous. The point in bringing up thisexample and commentary is not to demon-strate the superiority of one view overanother, but the logical errors typically madein such arguments.

One can see the persistence of realistassumptions in the following comment byOwen (1999, [4]) in response to von Glasers-feld’s paper (1999a).

7

(Sentences have beennumbered in arabic numerals surroundedby curled brackets to facilitate reference inthe following analysis.)

“{1}The Archimedian predicament aboveis joined by the much-discussed paradox-icality when radical constructivism triesto observe itself and construct a theoreti-cal similitude of itself that can be {i}selected as the most ‘efficient’ among oth-ers by means of a criterion of judgmentthat is likewise selected in a non-arbitrarymanner, while {ii} avoiding the appear-ance of violating its own Canon of thesubjectivity of efficiency or utility. {2}How can a Doctrine of the Subjectivity of‘Knowledge’ describe itself in generallyvalid terms? {3 } After all, we cannot claimthat the Doctrine of radical constructriv-

ism is a prior principle or schematum forthe synthetic understanding of itself. {4}I falter here, as Kant did: I am seeking tomake objectively valid statements about adocument that specifies such statementsare logically undecidible. {5} One is dis-couraged from doing the heavy liftingrequired here when no matter how intel-lectually conscientious one is, the reduc-tion to ‘a mere matter of personal opin-ion’ cannot be logically defeated. {6} Orthe retort, ‘Well, if radical constructivismworks for you, that’s fine!’ {7} No matterwhat radical constructivism officiallystates, its originators were seeking episte-mological ‘Truth’.”

8

In the rather long sentence {1} twoattributes of radical constructivism deemedincompatible are presented. Attribute {i}refers to a desire for radical constructivismto be “most “efficient” among others bymeans of a criterion of judgment that is …selected in a non-arbitrary manner.” Ofcourse, it would be “violating its own Canonof the subjectivity of…utility,” (attribute{ii}) if it were to attempt to demonstrate it isthe most superior by non-arbitrary criteriaof judgment. Stated this way there doesappear to be a paradox. But, in radical con-structivism, one would neither claim to havethe most efficient explanation or theory northat there could be non-arbitrary criteria ofjudgment. One might claim that an explana-tion fits or enables one to be effective atsomething, but having the most efficientexplanation is not required. We can neverprove there is not another “more efficient”explanation out there. Nonetheless, to beeffective or even apparently more effective,does no more than to suggest a degree of fitwith experience.

Sentences {2} & {3} explicitly reveal thebelief that the goal of radical constructivismis validity. That Owen wrote to this effect isevidence that his thinking about radical con-structivism is subject to realist criteria. Cer-tainly, if by validity one means truth, orcloser proximity to truth, then this is neitherthe goal nor the claim of radical constructiv-ism.

The intent expressed in sentence {4} is tomake “objectively valid statements.” This is arealist goal, not a radical constructivist goal.In sentences {5} & {6} the dilemma presentedis the conflict between the desire to logically


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defeat something that does not yield to suchmethods. Apparently, intellectual “heavylifting” is only rewarded by achieving thegoal of logically disproving something or atleast the possibility of logically disprovingsomething. Finally, in sentence {7} is theclaim that radical constructivist adherentsare really “seeking epistemological ‘Truth’,”in spite of what is stated explicitly in the arti-cle Owen is commenting upon. It seemsclear, at least from these words, that the real-ist view is most consistent with the desiredmethods and goals: that thinking and logiccan enable us to prove which of two positionsis closer to a veridical picture of reality.Again, apparently, the point is to come to atrue picture of reality, which can be arrivedat through our mental efforts.

9

We see similar evidence that truth is thebe all and end all in determining value in sci-entific explanation among critics of radicalconstructivism in the writing of Matthews(1998, p. 5):

“There is a not-too-subtle differencebetween the constructivist formulation‘making sense,’ and the realist formula-tion ‘finding out.’ The former has no epis-temological or referential bite; the latterhas both. Things can make perfect sensewithout being true; and making still moresense does not imply any increase in truthcontent.”… and from Kragh (1998, p. 129):“The epistemology characteristic of con-structivists is either relativistic or agnostic,in the sense that they do not admit any dis-tinction between true and false accounts ofnature…, Denying the existence of anobjective nature, or declaring it withoutinterest, scientists’ accounts are all there is,and it is with these accounts the construc-tivist sociologist is solely concerned. How,then, do scientists manage to producetheir results and build up a corpus of con-sensual knowledge about what they callnature?”In these two passages there seems to be

the implicit expectation that the sense madeby mere students is extremely unlikely toresemble what scientists decided before.This suggests a belief about human nature,e.g., that most people are not capable ofmaking the same sense of phenomena thatscientists have in the past. Apparently, inthis view, scientists are the few special peo-

ple who can make proper sense of the phe-nomena.

Both authors do seem to be able to giveaccurate descriptions of these facets of radi-cal constructivism, but just as they are clearin their descriptions, they clearly fail to rec-ognize the logical error of expecting radicalconstructivism to be consistent with the ini-tial assumptions it has discarded: those ofrealism.

10

This does not make radical con-structivism right, but it renders the argu-ments of these authors invalid. From theradical constructivist position, attemptingto make such arguments is inappropriate.

Where did these non-radical constructiv-ist notions come from? The most likely ori-gin could be the realism so prevalent in west-ern culture. This realism is pervasive in ourculture and there is little or no exposure toan alternative experienced by most of soci-ety. It goes unexamined by most members ofthe culture. The realist origins of the oft-described difficulties are even more plausi-ble when one takes a critical look at manysuch passages on difficulties with radicalconstructivism. Owen clearly expresses dis-belief in the words of the article on which heis commenting. In paragraph 52 of von Gla-sersfeld’s article (1999a) we find the follow-ing:

“The value of the constructivist model –and I emphasize once more that radicalconstructivism makes no ontologicalclaims and is intended as no more, butalso no less, than a useful model ofknowledge and the activity of knowing –will have to be determined by its applica-tion to basic problems we run into in theconstruction of our experiential worlds.”It appears then that one major challenge,

possibly

the

major challenge, in understand-ing radical constructivism is the pervasive,implicit grounding we all have in realismfrom our culture and our own nature. Untilone gets past this hurdle, one cannot bedescribed as understanding radical construc-tivism. Throughout the discussions, argu-ments and debates concerning radical con-structivism, reference to Truth maintains itspresence as revealed by the words of veryintelligent, sincere detractors. This is evi-dence of the difficulty of letting go of realistcriteria, which are not part of radical con-structivism. Such criteria are unnecessary andcounter productive in radical constructivism.

A possible parallel with Buddhist thought

There are probably readers of these wordsmore conversant with Buddhism

11

than theauthor, but it appears that there is a school ofthought in Buddhism that arrived at ideassimilar to those in radical constructivism,albeit by a different path.

12

It has beenexplained that these schools of thought are tobe considered a sequence one moves throughor can move through in thinking about thenature of what we know and how we knowit.

13

The final school of thought is called theMiddle Way. An expression of the Middle Wayis the opening passage by Nagarjuna. TheMiddle Way appears to have encountered andcontinues to encounter challenges very simi-lar to those faced by radical constructivism.What light might this shed on the challengesmounted against radical constructivism?

The central idea in the Middle Way whenfirst translated into English was referred to as“emptiness.” This word is still used in the lit-erature. What it refers to is the notion thatwhen we attempt to go beyond the conven-tional existence of anything, we find no ulti-mate essence. The consequence is that theconventional existence of something has abeginning, middle and end. For Buddhiststhis is characteristic of the world we know.This beginning, middle, and end, sometimesput as arising, existing, ceasing, applies alsoto what we think things are – all things:objects, ideas, etc. Thus conventional exist-ence is an expression of emptiness. Von Gla-sersfeld (1999b, [6]) appears to haveintended something similar when he wrote:

“Considered as a proposed way of think-ing and not as a description of the waythings are, the question to ask about theconstructivist model is simply: does it givea viable account of the knowledge I rely onin my actual living. I obviously believe itdoes – but this in no way denies the possi-bility that tomorrow or the next day amore elegant or effective model might beconstructed.”Without ultimate essence there is no ver-

idical picture of essential or ultimate reality.Any current viable account of experience thatexists now, arose and we can expect it to bediscarded at some point in the future foranother viable account that we considermore useful at that point.

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A text on the Middle Way was written bythe Buddhist scholar, Nagarjuna, in the sec-ond century C. E. This text is still studied byBuddhist scholars today. In it Nagarjunaexplains and defends the Middle Way in verseform. The book from which the openingtranslation was taken includes a very interest-ing and useful commentary. What is consid-ered to describe the Middle Way in a nutshellis Chapter 24, verse 18 (Garfield 1995):

“Whatever is dependently co-arisenThat is explained to be emptiness.That, being a dependent designation,Is itself the middle way.”It appears that what is meant here is that

the impermanence of everything we knowconventionally means that everything weknow conventionally lacks ultimate essence;it is empty. Any essence we might perceive isour own imputation, human construction.In addition the designation “empty” is itselfempty; hence, emptiness is empty of ultimateessence, also. This notion that emptinessitself is empty seems to be very similar to aclaim repeated by radical constructivists(Glasersfeld 1999a, [4]):

“I would be contradicting one of the basicprinciples of my own theory if I were toclaim that the constructivist approachprovides a true description of an objectivestate of affairs.”Challenges to the Middle Way come from

essentialism in its various forms. Essentialismentails the notion that the ultimate essence ofsomething exists and can be known. A conse-quence of this ultimate essence of somethingis permanence, hence it does not arise nordoes it cease and it can have no cause either toarise or to cease. There are two extremes inessentialism. In the case of the reification ofthe phenomenal world then emptiness(dependence) cannot exist, but ultimateessence does. In the case of the reification ofemptiness, nihilism, the phenomenal worldcannot exist, hence the ultimate essence of thephenomenal world is permanent non-exist-ence. These two extremes in essentialismseem to be realism and solipsism, respectively.Either physical reality exists or it does not. Ifit exists, then we can work on knowing it bet-ter and better. The only other option in essen-tialism is non-existence.

The nature of the responses Nagarjunamakes to challenges to the Middle Waybecome evident when one reads the commen-

tary. Repeatedly he shows how positionsinvolving either extreme of essentialism, leadto contradiction. The only way to avoid thesecontradictions is to avoid the extremes ofessentialism. Avoiding the contradictionsenables one to be consistent with the funda-mental Buddhist tenets.

14

This middle paththen holds emptiness, as well as all of the phe-nomenal world, as empty.

Every challenge to the Middle Way is effec-tively countered by Nagarjuna in essentiallythis same way. The many examples of Nagar-juna’s counters to the challenges suggest thatthe chief challenge to understanding the Mid-dle Way has its origins in not being able to stepoutside of essentialism,

i.e.

, realism. Hence,even in cultures considered to be majorityBuddhist, the notion of the Middle Way wasmisunderstood, apparently in a way very sim-ilar to the misunderstanding of radical con-structivism.

This may help us to understand better ourown situation in which so many seem to mis-understand radical constructivism. Even in asetting in which a similar philosophical posi-tion is officially sanctioned, there is resistanceof the same sort. Apparently the situation isnot simply a matter of our realist culture butof something deeper in the human experienceand functioning.

15

What

can

we do?

Considering possible responses to the chal-lenge of understanding radical constructiv-ism, we need to keep in mind important fea-tures of radical constructivism:1. Meaning exists only in the mind, hence it

cannot be transmitted (Glasersfeld, inpress)

2. The only person who can make newunderstanding for a person is that person.

3. In the case of communication, meaningcan be negotiated, but at best we can only

take

this negotiated meaning

as shared

.4. Meaning or understanding is formulated

to fit experience, and so revised whenneeded.The consequence of these features of radi-

cal constructivism is that we should strive toemulate von Glasersfeld (1999b, [1]) – as heexplained:

“I entered the fray neither to preach nor toconvince, but in the hope of being criti-

cized in a way that might push me to thinkand above all to express my thoughts moreclearly.”Certainly, given the number of recurrences

of application of realist criteria to radical con-structivism and the number of responses tothese misapplications in different words anddifferent contexts, it appears that there is nomagic bullet, no set of words that can be usedto avoid initial misunderstanding of what isintended by radical constructivism.

16

Theresults of von Glasersfeld’s eloquence overmany years now support this contention. Theprocess of constructing a new understandingis a process, not something that can be handedout to anyone who will read or listen. Simi-larly, the practitioners of the BuddhistMadhyamaka (Middle Way) philosophypoint out that a crucial feature is meditativepraxis that enables the experience of the emp-tiness of all phenomena. This significance ofprocess in knowing, both on the part of radi-cal constructivism and of the Buddhist Mid-dle Way, is in stark contrast with the realismthat dominates Western philosophy and sci-ence with the focus on final product.

Disequilibration as central to change in understanding

The problem of realists understanding radi-cal constructivism is analogous to that in sci-ence education (Dykstra 2005). Those teach-ing science usually have significantlydifferent understandings of the phenomenathan their students. This has been known forsome time and is well documented (Duit2006). Much effort has been expended bymany very diligent, sincere, intelligentinstructors, yet the outcome is most studentsleave with the same understanding of thephenomena they came with, new terms not-withstanding. Meaning was not transmittedto the students (Duit 2006). Of course, thisnegative result has to be explained. The realistadopts the elitist doctrine that only a few spe-cial students can properly receive what hasbeen transmitted. radical constructivismoffers an alternative.

If meaning cannot be transmitted, then isinstruction for all a hopeless cause? It appearsthat attempts to transmit meaning in science


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instruction generally fail. To attempt to trans-mit something entails something that can betransmitted. In realism this meaning, oftencalled knowledge, is assumed to have thisproperty. That the attempt to transmit “sci-ence knowledge” is such a spectacular failurein science education suggests a substantialfailure of the realist program to fit experience.

An alternative exists to this dismal pros-pect. The Swiss Genetic Epistemologist, JeanPiaget, and his colleagues studied the think-ing of children and students for more than 60years. This work focused not on what happensin school, but on what appears to be happen-ing in the minds of young human beings.Piaget and his co-workers developed anexplanatory model for the developmentalprocesses they observed in many students(Piaget 1985). Human beings establish andmaintain equilibrium between their concep-tions of their world and their experiences intheir world. When they perceive disequilibra-tion, they move to re-establish equilibrium.This can happen in either of two ways. Theoffending experience can be ignored oravoided, swept under the carpet, so to speak.On the other hand, conceptions of the worldcan be changed such that the offending expe-rience no longer offends.

In this model, human beings are con-stantly experiencing their world. There is aconstant, not always conscious, checking ofthese experiences against expectations basedon existing explanatory schemes. As long asexperiences are consistent with existingexplanatory conceptions, these experiencesreinforce those conceptions. It should benoted that a significant part of this process isthe selective ignoring of certain differencesthat in the applicable conception are deemedunimportant. This processing of experiencethat matches or fits existing explanatory con-ceptions is called by Piaget “assimilation.”Under these conditions, existing explanationsaccount for experience, hence there is neitherneed nor motivation to revise or devise newexplanatory conceptions. There is equilib-rium between experience and existing expla-nation.

When experience is encountered that isperceived not to fit existing explanation andthis mismatch cannot be ignored, a state ofdisequilibration between explanation andexperience is experienced. Once avoidance isnot an option, then a process of self-regula-

tion is initiated and existing explanation ismodified and tested until the new or modifiedexplanation fits these new experiences. Anaccommodation is developed. The disequili-bration can be minor or monumental. Eitherway the new explanation fits experience betterthan the previously existing explanatory con-ceptions.

If one wishes to engage someone in devel-oping new understanding, disequilibration iskey. This is central for any teacher who wishesstudents to leave the instructional setting withnew understanding. The teacher needs tounderstand the students’ thinking about aphenomenon. With this understanding inmind, the teacher needs to search for exam-ples of experience with the phenomenon thatdo not fit the students’ thinking. Havingpicked an example, to maximize the chancesthat students disequilibrate, the teacher willengage the students in making and explainingpredictions about the example. This engagescommitment to the explanation by the stu-dents and makes explicit features of theirexplanatory conceptions. The prediction setsup a test of their explanations. If the teacherhas developed a sufficient understanding ofthe students’ understandings, then when theyexperience the example experience, they willnot be able to assimilate it. Disequilibration isthe result. If the teacher has not developed asufficient understanding of the students’understandings, then they will be able toassimilate the new experience. Disequilibra-tion does not occur and no change in existingexplanations will be necessary. Even thoughthe students do not change their understand-ings, the event provides evidence for theteacher to develop a better understanding ofthe students’ understandings.

If, in the classroom, it is safe for their pre-dictions to be found not fitting their explana-tions, then it is safe to speculate about and testalternative explanations, on the evidence ofthe new experience. These alternative expla-nations can be tested. This process of elicita-tion of explanatory conceptions, comparingthese conceptions with experience, andresolving discrepancies can be cycled overadditional experiences that do not fit explana-tion at each cycle. The result is always explan-atory conceptions that fit more experienceand usually fit more closely.

Dykstra (2005) shares data in evidencethat change in understanding the phenomena

can be the result of this approach to instruc-tion. On established diagnostics of students’conceptions, course averages for non-sciencemajors routinely change by four or five timesthe amount the class averages change for sci-ence and engineering majors that experienceconventional instruction on the same topics.The large change in understanding is not justachieved by a few special students, but essen-tially by all who are willing to participate inthe process.

17

The instruction described ispursued with the goal of engaging students inexamining and testing their own sense of thephenomena. This is in contrast to typicalinstruction in which the activity has theexclusive goal of transmitting the knowledgeto the students by telling and showing them.

The structure of the canonical knowledgedoes not drive this instruction. Instead, thestudents’ understanding and the experiencesit can be applied to drive the instruction. It isnot a focus on the phenomena, nor is it an

Dewey I. Dykstra, Jr., currently a Professor of Physics at Boise State University in Boise, ID, USA, began his interest in science by reading science fiction in grade 3. Active in science fairs through the middle and high school grades in Maryland, at Case Institute of Technology in Cleveland, OH he earned a B. S. in Physics in 1969. For three years he taught Physics and Physical Science at East Technical High School in Cleveland, OH and the next year 9th grade Physical Science and senior Physics at Middletown High School in Middletown, MD. While earning a Ph. D. in condensed matter Physics at The University of Texas at Austin, he stumbled upon a description of the work of Jean Piaget and its applications to thinking about physics learning. On the Physics faculty at Okla-homa State University and at Boise State University, Dykstra’s work has focused on understanding the nature of understanding physical phenomena and how, why, and under what circumstances this understand-ing appears to change. Having heard of con-structivism already from others, he was not exposed to the writing of Ernst von Glasers-feld until 1989. Since then, Ernst has been a valued mentor. Dykstra sometimes finds time to play bagpipes.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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attempt to guess what scientists figured out inthe past. It is a focus by the students on theirown understanding and testing it carefullyagainst experience with the phenomena. Inother words, it is the process that makes thechanges in understanding possible.

Disequilibration:Key to breaking the bonds of realism

If this approach to education can shed anylight on engaging people in constructing anunderstanding of radical constructivism, itseems to be in inducing disequilibration. Onecannot disequilibrate someone else, but onecan create settings in which people are morelikely to disequilibrate themselves. The effortto accomplish this induction of disequilibra-tion must be understood as a process. We donot have the luxury of having an impartialthird entity, such as some physical phenome-non to check against. Consequently, all wehave to share is our words and the gestures wemake. The only experience another has towork with to test their explanation of what weare talking about is experience with our words

and gestures. Just as experience with a physi-cal phenomenon neither conveys nor provesthe truth of an explanation, our words andgestures do not convey or prove meaning tosomeone else. In the case of radical construc-tivism the process is more complicated andrequires more time than the phenomena ofintroductory physics.

18

It is necessary in our interactions withrealists that we recognize they do not realizewe are working with a profoundly different setof initial assumptions. Society is set up byrealists to be compatible with their view. Theywill work very hard at interpreting what wesay in their terms. They cannot “hear” whatwe are saying in our own terms, because theyhave yet to construct the requisite ideas.Before they begin to develop another way ofthinking, they have to disequilibrate. We haveto calculate to say and do things, to bring theirattention to things that do not fit their realistexplanations of their world, i.e., things that donot make sense to them. We run the risk oftheir concluding we are deluded or misled.This is the equivalent of sweeping the experi-ence, and us, under the carpet. On the otherhand, there will be some who draw near to thediscrepancy they perceive and begin todevelop new conceptions in interactions with

us. We cannot afford to let the risk of beingwritten off deter us from our efforts to inducedisequilibration. Without disequilibration,no change in understanding happens.

It should be clear that this process requirespatience. We see this in Ernst von Glasersfeld’sapproach. For many his calm and patientdemeanor, coupled with his willingness tointeract, have provided necessary ingredientsto enable us to construct our understandingsof radical constructivism. We can only hopeto emulate him in our own efforts to help oth-ers understand.

Thank you Ernst for engaging with us inconstructing our own new understandings,for being our mentor.

Acknowledgements

In addition to the mentorship of Ernst vonGlasersfeld, I am indebted to Geshe Lhakdorand Allan Wallace for the opportunity tointeract with them about Buddhist philoso-phy. A very large number of students havehelped immeasurably by being willing toshare their understandings with me. Contri-butions have also been made by two anony-mous reviewers of this manuscript.

Notes

1. For the reader who is not familiar withradical constructivism there are twosources that serve as good starting pointsfor making sense of radical constructiv-ism. The shorter of these two is the article

Knowing without metaphysics

(Glasersfeld1999a). The article is accessible on-line. Amore extensive description is in the book

Radical constructivism: A way of knowingand learning

(Glasersfeld 1995).2. A few examples: Bickhard (1995); Phillips

(2000); Suchting (1992).3. For example: Matthews (2000); Kragh

(1998); Nola (1998).4. Since the objects of interest here are para-

digms concerning the explanation of ex-perience, any paradigm whose initialassumptions do not fit experience willhave a hard time surviving the need for fit

to experience. “Being explained” entails fitbetween explanation and that which is tobe explained. Since the attempt is to ex-plain experience, it is not an assumptionthat initial assumptions in a paradigmmust fit experience. It is a consequence ofthe belief that experience can be explained.Fitting experience is the point of the pro-cess. An explanation that does not fitwould neither be viable nor an explana-tion. This is not uniquely Piagetian. It isfundamental to the process of any attemptto explain a specified set of experiencesfrom any paradigm. It is certainly the basisof science.

5. It is important to keep in mind the differ-ence between understanding a view andaccepting that view.

6. By “logic” and “logical operations” I meanto distinguish initial assumptions, de-scriptions of experience and conclusions

from the logical operations used to deriveconclusions from the assumptions and de-scriptions of experience. The logical oper-ations are in the “if…, then…” and the“because…” parts of explanation.

7. This passage is reproduced exactly as it ap-pears on-line. The only thing changed isthe font and font size.

8. It should be noted that in the case of thisparticular author, reading the note in itsentirety reveals the author is working onmaking sense of radical constructivism.This is relatively rare. Most negative pub-lications about radical constructivism areattempts to disprove it, not understand it.

9. Alan Wallace (2006, personal communi-cation) suggests: “The fundamental ques-tion as I see it is: are you seeking tounderstand reality as it exists indepen-dently of perceptual experience andthought? Or are you seeking to understand


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the world of experience (Lebenswelt),which does not exist independently of per-cepts and concepts? Philosophical realistsare concerned with the former, whereasBuddhists (especially Madhyamikas[Middle Way adherents]) are concernedwith the latter.” In radical constructivismthe position is that our experiential realityis all we can access. We have no way to ac-cess something that might be independentof perceptual experience and thought.This suggests a certain similarity betweenthe positions of Buddhism and radicalconstructivism in contrast to realism.

10.One should note that Riegler (2001) showshow one can understand science from aradical constructivist point of view. Ofcourse, the drive to find truth is not part ofthis way of understanding science.

11.Others associated with radical construc-tivism have explored connections betweenBuddhist thought and radical constructiv-ism. The interested reader should consultVarela, Thompson & Rosch (1991). In thepresent piece the point is not primarily thesimilarities between the two philosophies,but that both have faced analogous on-slaughts from defenders of realism.

12.It is the case that Buddhism practices sim-ilar ideals to those of radical constructiv-ism. In particular both are based on theextent to which they fit experience. This isone of many differences in Buddhismfrom religions we in the west are generallyfamiliar with. The consequence is thatBuddhist philosophy evolves as does ourunderstanding in radical constructivism.

13.This explanation of the relationship be-tween these philosophical schools was giv-en in verbal interaction by Geshe Lhakdor,Director of the Library of Tibetan Worksand Archives, Dharamsalla, India, Decem-ber, 2005.

14. The Four Noble Truths in Buddhism andtheir implications serve as the foundationon which Buddhism and its philosophyare built. They are: (1) All life in cyclic ex-istence is suffering. (2) There is a cause ofthis suffering, namely, craving caused byignorance. (3) There is a release from suf-fering. (4) The path to that release is theeightfold Buddhist path of Right View,Right Understanding, Right Speech, RightAction, Right Livelihood, Right Effort,Right Mindfulness and Right Concentra-tion (Garfield 1995, p. 294). The order in

this list of the eightfold path has been ad-justed to conform to the standard in Tibet-an Buddhism.

15.One wonders with access to cinema pre-mises, such as that in

The Matrix

, and ac-cess to virtual reality, if there is the slowevolution of culture beyond realism. Sad-ly, many young people seem more inter-ested in material gain. In this context itappears

The Matrix

is still science fiction,with the emphasis on fiction.

16.The typical conclusion first jumped toabout radical constructivism while stillrooted in realist foundations is that radicalconstructivism is nothing more than theabsurd assertion of solipsism.

17.The elitist notion implied in the realistcriticism by their assumption that merestudents making sense about phenomenacannot lead to what scientists have decidedis without merit in the light of this data.

18.The shift from the goal of students “get-ting” the distilled wisdom transmitted toengaging students in making sense of theirexperiences seems similar to Piet Hut’s(2003) reference to “goal-as-path” formsof Buddhism in contrast to what might begoal-as-result forms.

References

Bickhard, M. H. (1995) World mirroring ver-sus world making: There’s gotta be a betterway. In: Steffe, L. P. & Gale, J. (eds) Con-structivism in education. LawrenceErlbaum Associates: Hillsdale NJ, pp. 229–267.

de la Torre, A. C. & Zamorano, R. (2001)Answer to question #31. Does any piece ofmathematics exist for which there is noapplication whatsoever in physics? Ameri-can Journal of Physics 69(2): 103.

Duit, R. (2006) Students’ and teachers’ con-ceptions in science: A bibliography.Retrieved from http://www.ipn.uni-kiel.de/aktuell/stcse/stcse.html on 29 Jan-uary 2007.

Dykstra, D. I. Jr. (2005) Against realistinstruction: Superficial success maskingcatastrophic failure and an alternative.Constructivist Foundations 1(1): 40–60.

Garfield, J. L. (1995) The Fundamental Wis-dom of the Middle Way: Nagarjuna’s

Mulamadhyamakakarika. Oxford Univer-sity Press: New York.


Glasersfeld, E. von (1999a) Knowing withoutmetaphysics: Aspects of the radical con-structivist position. Karl Jaspers ForumTarget Article 17. Retrieved from http://www.kjf.ca/17-TAGLA.htm on 11 Sep-tember 2006. Originally published in 1991in: Steier, F. (ed.) Research and reflexivity(Inquiries into Social Construction). SagePublications: London, pp. 12–29.

Glasersfeld, E. von (1999b) Construction inreligion and art. Response 5 to commen-tary 5 by G. Morgenstern to Karl JaspersForum Target Article 17. Retrieved fromhttp://www.kjf.ca/17-R5MOR.htm on 12September 2006.

Glasersfeld, E. von (in press) The constructiv-ist view of communication. Presented atthe 2003 Memorial Meeting for Heinz vonFoerster, Vienna. Retrieved from http://

www.vonglasersfeld.com on 5 March2007.

Hut, P. (2003) Conclusion: Life as a labora-tory. In: Wallace, B. A. (ed.) Buddhism anscience. Columbia University Press: NewYork, pp. 399–416.

Jammer, M. (1957) Concepts of force. Har-vard University Press: Cambridge MA.Republished in 1999 by Dover Publica-tions: Mineola NY,

Kragh, H. (1998) Social constructivism, thegospel of science, and the teaching of phys-ics. In: Matthews, M. R. (ed) Constructiv-ism in science education. KluwerAcademic Publishers: Norwell MA, pp.125–138.

Matthews, M. R. (1998) Introductory com-ments on philosophy and constructivismin science education. In: Matthews, M. R.(ed) Constructivism in science education.Kluwer Academic Publishers: NorwellMA, pp. 1–10.

Matthews, M. R. (2000) Appraising construc-tivism in science and mathematics educa-

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tion. In: Phillips, D. C. (ed.) Construc-tivism in education: Opinions andsecond opinions on controversialissues. National Society for the Studyof Education: Chicago, pp. 161–192.

Nola, R. (1998) Constructivism in scienceand in science education: A philosoph-

ical critique. In: Matthews, M. R.(ed.) Constructivism in scienceeducation: A philosophical exam-ination. Kluwer Academic Pub-

lishers: Norwell MA, pp. 31–60.Owen, R. (1999) Difficulties with con-

structivism. Commentary 24 to KarlJaspers Forum Target Article 17.Retrieved from http://www.kjf.ca/17-C24OW.htm on 11 September 2006.

Phillips, D. C. (2000) Anopinionated

account of theconstructivist

landscape. In: Phil-lips, D. C. (ed.) Con-

structivism in education: Opinions andsecond opinions on controversial issues.National Society for the Study of Educa-tion: Chicago, pp. 1–16. (See also the Edi-tor’s Introduction to each section of thebook).

Piaget, J. (1985) The equilibration of cogni-tive structures: The central problem ofintellectual development. Chicago: Uni-versity of Chicago Press.

Riegler, A. (2001) Towards a radical construc-tivist understanding of science. Founda-tions of Science 6 (1–3): 1–30.

Suchting, W. A. (1992) Constructivism de-constructed. Science and Education 1(3):223–254.

Varela, F., Thompson, E. & Rosch, E. (1991)The embodied mind: Cognitive scienceand human experience. MIT Press: Cam-bridge MA.



Distinguishing Ernst von Glasersfeld’s “Radical Constructivism” from Humberto Maturana’s “Radical Realism”

The leaking constructivist boat adrift in an ocean of realism

It is not my intention to compare their entireworks in this short paper. It would be likecomparing apples and pears – they have pro-duced very different models and for very dif-ferent purposes. While Ernst von Glasersfeldhas always limited himself to a sharp focus onepistemology, Humberto Maturana hasdeveloped several different models relating tothe different areas of cellular biology, experi-mental epistemology, neurophysiology, lan-guage, visual perception, and the “definitionof the living,” among others. Indeed, in recentyears Ernst von Glasersfeld (1995) has writtenthat he now tries to avoid even using the term“epistemology” and writes about human“knowing.”

“…(this book) is an attempt to explain away of thinking and makes no claim to

describe an independent reality. That iswhy I prefer to call it an approach to or atheory of knowing. Though I have usedthem in the past, I now try to avoid theterms ‘epistemology’ or ‘theory of knowl-edge’ for constructivism, because theytend to imply the traditional scenarioaccording to which novice subjects areborn into a ready-made world, whichthey must try to discover and ‘represent’to themselves. From the constructivistpoint of view, the subject cannot tran-scend the limits of individual experience.”(Glasersfeld 1995, pp. 1–2) In his early studies Ernst von Glasersfeld

noted a problem in Wittgenstein’s (1933)assertions about comparing our picture ofreality with the reality in question in order todetermine whether or not our own picturewas true or false. Ernst von Glasersfeld(1987) comments:

“How could one possibly carry out thatcomparison? With that question,although I did not know it at the time, Ifound myself in the company of Sextus

Empiricus, of Montaigne, Berkeley, andVico … the company of all the coura-geous sceptics who … have maintainedthat it is impossible to compare ourimage of reality with a reality outside. Itis impossible, because in order to checkwhether our representation is a ‘true’ pic-ture of reality we should have to haveaccess not only to our representation butalso to that outside reality

before

we get toknow it. And because the only way inwhich we are supposed to get at reality isprecisely the way we would like to checkand verify, there is no possible escapefrom the dilemma.” (Glasersfeld 1987,pp. 137–138). So here is a very clear condemnation of

“epistemological cheating” – the impossiblefeat of trying to peep around our perceptual“goggles” to see if our “picture” is approxi-mating to the “real reality” or not. Over thepast 20 years Ernst von Glasersfeld has put alot of effort into understanding just wherehis work and the work of Humberto Mat-urana differ, especially in the fundamentalmatters of epistemology. Apart from hisgrave reservations about key concepts ofMaturana’s work such as the “observer” (andhow he comes about), “consciousness,”“awareness,” and “language” (its genesis, andthat it precedes cognition, etc.), Ernst vonGlasersfeld shares the perplexity of otherauthors regarding the ways in which Mat-urana can be seen to be “smuggling realism”back into his opus in one form or another(Mingers 1995, Johnson 1991, Held & Pols1987). In Maturana’s writings there are manypassages where one gets the impression thathe edges over into the terrain of “realism” inhis discussions and phraseologies. Inattempting to understand this Ernst von Gla-sersfeld (1991) tries to explain that Maturana

Vincent Kenny

A

Accademia Costruttivista di Terapia Sistemica (Italy) <[email protected]>

Purpose: Ernst von Glasersfeld has dedicated a lot of effort to trying to define just where his views and those of his friend Humberto Maturana part company, epistemologically speaking (Glasersfeld 1991, 2001). As a contribution to unravelling this puzzle I propose in this article to delineate just where they seem to differ most and why these differences arise. Approach: Part of my contribution is to propose drawing a distinction between von Gla-sersfeld’s Radical Constructivism as the last viable outpost of constructivism before enter-ing into the domain of solipsism, in contrast to Maturana’s position which is saved from being located within the solipsistic domain by virtue of his ideas on “structure determined systems” and his theory of how language arises in human experience. Findings: Von Glasersfeld’s puzzle arises due to what Kant called “transcendental illusion,” that is, the error of trying to encompass two mutually untranslatable phenomenal domains within the same language framework. Conclusions: After an examination of some of the crucial differences between von Glasersfeld and Maturana I typify Maturana’s positioning as that of “radical realism” in contrast to von Glasersfeld’s “radical constructivism.” Key words: Epistemology, transcendental illusion, radical realism, map–territory.


radical constructivism & biology of cognition

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“… is obliged to use a language in hisexpositions that has been shaped and pol-ished by more than two thousand years ofrealism – naïve or metaphysical – a lan-guage that forces him to use the word‘to be’ which, in all its grammatical forms,implies the assumption on an ontic real-ity.” (Glasersfeld 1991, p. 66)However, I believe that there is more

involved here than the constraints of the “lan-guage of realism,” because Maturana (1986)has frequently not helped matters by insertingpassages in his writings which are epistemo-logically ambiguous. For example, he hasclaimed that it is an “epistemological neces-sity” to expect that there is a “substratum” asthe ultimate medium in which everythingtakes place. Such remarks can lead one toquestion whether or not he is smuggling“realism” back into his model.

In this brief article I will try to throw a littlelight on Ernst von Glasersfeld’s puzzle aboutwhere he and Maturana part epistemologicalcompany. I will try to trace several importantdifferences in their theories, relating my dis-cussion to how they variously define the waythe person experiences their living. I will tryto point out some forks in the road where they

wander off in different directions, beingmindful that while Maturana has tried consis-tently to build up a major overarching philo-sophical model, von Glasersfeld has strictlylimited himself to the epistemological task ofdelineating what human knowing can be andcannot be.

Structure-determinism and the dilemma of “choice”

A good starting point for this task is the issueof how “free” or “constrained” we are in ourinteractions with our world and others. BothErnst von Glasersfeld and Humberto Mat-urana can be read as dealing with how muchfreedom to manoeuvre we have in copingwith life’s events. Ernst von Glasersfelddescribes how we must “fit” with the con-straints of the environment, while HumbertoMaturana’s notion of structure determinismcan be read as implying that the system has no“real choice” when it comes to the moment oftaking action. Let us look a little more closelyat these two positions.

The relation of fitting that von Glasersfeld(1984) has in mind is conveyed in his meta-phor of a key fitting a lock:

“A key fits if it opens the lock. The fitdescribes a capacity of the key, not of thelock. Thanks to professional burglars weknow only too well that there are manykeys that are shaped quite differently fromour own but which nevertheless unlockour doors. …. From the radical construc-tivist point of view, all of us – scientists,philosophers, laymen, school children,animals, and indeed , any kind of livingorganism – face our environment as a bur-glar faces a lock that he has to unlock inorder to get at the loot.” (Glasersfeld 1984,p. 21).

To continue his elaboration, von Glasersfeld(1995) says that our knowledge does not con-stitute a picture of the world.

“It does not represent the world at all – itcomprises action schemes, concepts, andthoughts, and it distinguishes the onesthat are considered advantageous fromthose that are not. In other words, it per-tains to the ways and means the cognizingsubject has conceptually evolved in order

to fit into the world as he or she experi-ences it.” (Glasersfeld 1995, p. 114)In this relationship of knowledge to “real-

ity” we see that it is a matter

not

of searchingfor an iconic representation of reality butrather the search for ways of “

fitting”

the con-straints that the environment provides. Thereal world is “contacted” by the system onlywhere his modes of fitting the constraintsbreak down and do not manage to allow himto circumnavigate the encountered impedi-ments. It is also clear from his use of the met-aphor of lock/key that one may be outfittedwith a range of alternative keys one of whichmay work better than others to open the lock.This is an idea common to other constructiv-ists, notably among them George Kelly(1955), whose constructivist theory appliedto clinical psychology and psychotherapy waspremised on the notion of “constructive alter-nativism.” Kelly believed that in order to con-tinue to learn and to positively elaborate thepersonal construct system, the person mustchoose those alternatives which will lead tothe extension and/or definition of the con-struction system. Survival simply means con-structing

any alternative means whatever

which manage to get by the constraints. In anygiven environment there may be an infinitevariety of viable alternative solutions.

“There are other consequences of the con-structivist approach to knowing that aresometimes met with indignation. If viabil-ity depends on the goals one has chosen –goals that necessarily lie within one’sworld of experience – and on the particu-lar methods adopted to attain them, it isclear that there will always be more thanone way. When a goal has been attained,this success must, therefore, never beinterpreted as having discovered

the

way.This goes against the notion that repeatedsuccess in dealing with a problem provesthat one has discovered the workings of anobjective world. Solutions, from the con-structivist perspective, are always relative –and this, in turn, makes clear that

problems

are not entities that lie about in the uni-verse, independent of any experiencer.Instead, problems arise when obstaclesblock the way to a subject’s goal.” (Glasers-feld 1988, p. 88) While Ernst von Glasersfeld, on the one

hand, seems to share with George Kelly theoutlook of “constructive alternativism,” on

Vincent Kenny about himself: “I was born in Ireland and studied for degrees in philoso-phy and psychology at Trinity College Dub-lin in the 1960s. I graduated from there at a time when these subjects were still called “Mental and Moral Science” and have spent my subsequent years wondering which was which. Since the 1970s I have worked applying constructivist ideas in the very dif-ferent fields of psychotherapy, consulting to organisations, and to tennis psychology – working with professionals in the ATP and WTA tours. I live in Rome, where I also work much of the time. My main current position is as director of the “Accademia Costruttivista di Terapia Sistemica” in Rome, which is a new center for training in radical constructivist psychotherapy approaches. I have a long-term writing project with Ernst von Glasersfeld – a book on the application of radical constructivism to the area of psychotherapy – which I seem reluctant to finish.”

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the other hand, as I have previously observed(Kenny 1989), Maturana would seem to pre-empt out any alternative structural compen-sations at the moment of interacting with theperturbation at hand:

“Maturana is

not

a constructive alterna-tivist because at the moment of choosingthere are no other alternatives possible.The ‘choice’ made was determined by thesystem’s coherence. It had to be made.Kelly himself would also appear not to bean alternativist with his emphasis on‘choice’ as a form of self-involvement andself-ordering, rather than saying muchabout the ‘objects chosen’.” (Kenny 1989,p. 120). So while for von Glasersfeld the person

may hold several alternative “keys,” for Mat-urana the person

is

the key, and the person’sstructures have

implied

the character of the“lock” – or brought it forth – as part of theircognitive domain in such a way that thereexists an effective structural intersectionbetween the “person-as-key” and the “lock.”

The structural autonomy of the system isparamount for Maturana. This means thatthe system can only do what it does at anyparticular moment of doing.

There are noother choices in the system.

A system is alwaysin its proper place and cannot be mistaken.For Maturana, at the moment of takingaction the system has

no

other choice thanwhat it does. The system does what its struc-ture is set up to do. Unlike von Glasersfeld’simages of “bumping into” the constrainingfeatures of the environment, for Maturana itis as if the system/medium structural coher-ences were “full up-” and every-“thing” wasin its reciprocally complementary position-ing – there being little or no space for new orextra elements to easily enter into the picture.In other words, there

are

no spare compo-nents “hanging around” in the environmentwaiting for us to bump into them.

From this point of view, to speak of havinga range of “choices” is misleading. Since theseimplicative construct pathways are alreadylaid down within the ongoing system onecould argue that the “choices” are illusorysince the structures of the system alreadycontain the preferential direction of move-ment and action.

Even though he has usually avoided label-ling his approach, Maturana once said jok-ingly to me that if Ernst was a “radical con-

structivist” then he (Maturana) was a“radical radical constructivist,” because atthe moment of perceiving there

is

no alterna-tive other than what our structure-deter-mined system dictates that we

must

do inorder to compensate effectively to the currentperturbation

On this analysis, the fact of having “nochoice” is a crucial parting of the waysbetween Ernst von Glasersfeld and Hum-berto Maturana. Humberto Maturana’s posi-tion is that our system specifies our mediumin such a way that it is co-existent, co-exten-sive, conterminous with our own embodiedexistence.

So in this relationship of knowledge toreality, for von Glasersfeld the notion of“truth” is replaced by that of “viability” and“fit.” For Maturana it is not so much an issueof “fitting” or “viability” as it is an issue ofstructural coherences of the system in itsmedium. Maturana tries to elaborate this bydescribing the ways in which the observerbrings forth his own reality, and in doing sogenerates a pattern of structural synchrony orstructural coherences.

The inside–outside distinction

In their rejection of “realism” both authorshave been obliged to demonstrate how theyavoid the epistemological quagmire of solip-sism. Here there is another difference thatopens up in their various approaches, withvon Glasersfeld taking the road of

denying

that he is saying that “nothing exists outsideof people’s heads,” and repeating that he is

not

saying that reality does not exist. As a wryaside he says that: “In practice, solipsism isrefuted daily by the experience that the worldis hardly ever what we would like it to be”(Glasersfeld 1995, p. 113). For Maturana’spart, his refutation of solipsism takes offalong the road of languaging (coordinationsof coordinations of actions) – which seems inmy view to lead him to the area of “structuralrealism.”

Ernst von Glasersfeld reminds us thatconstructivists must be unwavering agnos-tics as regards “existence” because whatevermay lie beyond our experience is inaccessibleto our reasoning. He has many timesattempted to clarify that his concern is with

what can be known rationally; he does notdeny that mystics and artists may access some“ulterior reality” in their own ways but onlythat such access must not be confused with arational theory of knowing.

Among his many refutations of being asolipsist, Maturana refers to his theory of“languaging” which states that languagecomes about through the coordinations ofthe coordinations of actions among people ina co-ontogenic structural drift. The fact thatlater on we come to use this language toinvent notions such as “solipsism” saying thatthe mind alone creates the world, is a notionsimply refuted by the fact that his (Mat-urana’s) view of language development ispremised on the precedent existence of peo-ple who are coordinating their activitiestogether – clearly not a solipsistic context!Maturana and Varela positioned this prob-lem as part of an epistemological Odyssey,“sailing between the Scylla monster of repre-sentationism and the Charybdis whirlpool ofsolipsism” (Maturana & Varela 1987, p. 134).

As part of his strategy to deal with the“outside world” and not be trapped in accu-sations of solipsism, von Glasersfeld pro-poses the use of the notion of the “black box.”This also helps in the task of avoiding theconfusions of epistemological cheating bypretending that we can compare our “pic-ture” of the world to the “actual reality.” Hecomments:

“If it is the experiencer’s intelligence orcognitive activity that, by organizingitself, organizes his experience into a via-ble representation of a world, then onecan consider that representation a model,and the ‘outside reality’ it claims to repre-sent, a black box.” (Glasersfeld 1987,p. 156)This helps emphasise that for von Glasers-

feld there is a clear separation of what is“inside” the person and what is “outside” asthe “environment” or “reality.” It means thateverything that is outwith oneself – the envi-ronment, other people, children, dogs, etc. –are all black boxes from the observer’s pointof view. It means we can never “really know”what others are thinking or what they “reallymean.” It means that we can never know thatwhat another person is feeling is “really like”what I am feeling. We can never find out whatthe other is “really like” because all we have togo on are our interpretations of what our

2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3 61

CONCEPTS



senses tell us about our experience of them.The most we can do is to construct models ofthe others which establish and “explain” cer-tain regularities in our experiences of theseothers. Our task, also in the “interpersonal”domain, is to “get by the constraints” whichare continually posed to us. One has to“squeeze between the bars of the constraints”– but how one manages to achieve this is notdetermined by the environment.

To be more clear about his use of the con-cept of “adaptation” and viability in this con-text von Glasersfeld notes that:

“What organisms adapt to, and what ulti-mately determines the pragmatic viabil-ity of their constructs, are certain regular-ities in the input–output relations theorganism registers, with respect to theblack box which they experience as ‘envi-ronment’ or ‘world.’ … The structures hecalls ‘things,’ ‘events,’ ‘stages,’ and ‘pro-cesses’ are the result of the particular wayin which he himself has coordinated his‘particles of experience.’ (Glasersfeld1987, p. 113)However for Maturana this distinction of

“inside/outside” is blurred to the point ofirrelevance. Since the person’s structure-determined system has instantiated its cogni-tive domain there is little sense in even mak-ing this “inside/outside” distinction.

“This circularity, this connection betweenaction and experience, this inseparabilitybetween a particular way of being andhow the world appears to us, tells us thatevery act of knowing brings forth aworld … all doing is knowing, and allknowing is doing.”(Maturana & Varela1987, p.26)This contrasts sharply with von Glasers-

feld’s notion that the environment is a “blackbox” for the observer. Instead for Maturanathere is no “outside-as-black-box” becausethe “system-in-its-medium” is the result ofmillions of years of co-ontogenic structuraldrift. Rather, for Maturana, the person oper-ates not only as if there is

no

“black box” but

as if there were no “outside” at all

. So here we can see the radical conse-

quences of the fact that the structure-deter-mined system is implicative in nature. Thestructure-determined system

implies

a veryspecific medium as a structural extension ofitself. In implying this medium the systembrings forth a world where it is in adaptive co-

evolution, and where the “inside–outside”distinction is meaningless for understandingthe “causes” of our experiences.

In Bateson’s (1972) terms, whenever sci-entists use the notion of the “black box” theyare making a conventional agreement to

stoptrying to explain

things at a certain point – atleast temporarily. In this sense, von Glasers-feld’s use of the notion of the black box is hisway of clearly signalling the limits to his task– of specifying what can and cannot beexplained in his model of knowing, and whatwill necessarily be left out.

This characterises von Glasersfeld’s viewthat there

is

a strict “inside–outside” differ-entiation of the person/environment rela-tionship – and this is another place whereMaturana takes off in a different direction.Maturana uses different metaphors to that ofvon Glasersfeld’s black box when hedescribes the organisational closure of theautonomous system. He has often used theimage of an aeroplane pilot flying and land-ing his plane (on a dark night with zero visi-bility) by using his instrument panel, or theimage of a submarine captain guiding hiscraft “sightless” to the outside world, butwho, by using his electronic instruments,succeeds in his task. So here, while von Gla-sersfeld uses the “black box” imagery to becareful to maintain his “inside/outside dis-tinction, Maturana (1987) instead depictsthe person as operating blind to, and out ofall awareness of, what an observer would callthe person’s “medium” or environment (per-haps like Piaget’s “self uncognizant ofitself ”).

“All that exists for the man inside the sub-marine are indicator readings, their tran-sitions, and ways of obtaining specificrelations between them. It is only for us onthe outside, who see how relations changebetween the submarine and its environ-ment, that the submarine’s behaviourexists and that it appears more or less ade-quate according to the consequencesinvolved.” (Maturana & Varela 1987,p. 137)

and also they say that, “… for the operation of the nervous sys-tem, there is no inside or outside, but onlymaintenance of correlations that continu-ously change (like the indicator instru-ments in the submarine) …” (Maturana& Varela 1987, p.169)

Radically different

At this point I will try to clarify some of thedifferences between Ernst von Glasersfeldand Humberto Maturana by positioningtheir approaches in relation to Realism. Bothauthors define themselves in epistemologicalpositions far away from that of “naïve real-ism.” Let us recall, in summary form, some ofthe primary features of both theorists – whythey are variously radical in their departuresfrom the mainstream of thinking.

Ernst von Glasersfeld’s model is radical because he says that “the map is

not

the territory.”

[

The “map” cannot ever be the territory.

[

The “map” can never be compared to thepresumed territory.

[

The “map” is where we know and createmeanings for our experiential world.

[

Environment is a “black box.” We canonly know what it is not.

[

We are forever banished from the Gardenof Eden of Ontological Truths.

[

“Inside–Here Vs Outside–There” is a fun-damental distinction, reminding us thatwe can say nothing about the ontologicalstatus of the world we experience.

[

Environment is a type of “obstacle race.”

[

The notion of “fit” and “viability” is cen-tral in describing the relationship of theperson to their world. From a whimsical viewpoint, this model

appears to me as if an endless experientialSudoku puzzle where we may exclude oreliminate numbers from every cell, but wemay never fill in the “actual number” whichoccupies any cell. The whole matrix mustalways remain blank! With this in mind it iseasy to understand the frustrations withwhich many readers greet von Glasersfeld’smodel!

Von Glasersfeld (1987) describes the situ-ation as follows:

“…the only indication we may get of the‘real’ structure of the environment isthrough the organisms and the speciesthat have been extinguished; the viableones that survive merely constitute aselection of solutions among an infinity ofpotential solutions that might be equallyviable … What I suggest now, is that therelationship between what we know, i.e.,our

knowledge

, is similar to the relation-


CONCEPTS



ship between organisms and their envi-ronment. In other words, we constructideas, hypotheses, theories, and models,and as long as they survive, which is to say,as long as our experience can be success-fully fitted into them, they are

viable

.”(Glasersfeld 1987, p. 139)

Humberto Maturana’s model is radical because he says that “the map

is

the territory.”

[

There is no distinction between “map”and “territory” because we create ourreality by living it, enacting it. For thisreason the observer ends up in a positionwhich is indistinguishable from that ofthe realist observer.

[

At the moment of perceiving one cannotdistinguish a hallucination from a per-ception.

[

At the moment of perceiving/acting youhave no “choice” – you do that which yourstructure-determined system is set up todo.

[

To all intents and purposes “the map isthe territory.”

[

Environment is an intimate part of theevolution and survival pattern of theunity “person + medium.”

[

The “Inside–Outside” distinction per-tains to the position of an observer. Mat-urana reminds us to be very careful in ourobserver’s “book-keeping” regardingfrom what point of view we are makingour statements.

[

Environment is implied by the structureof the person, and as such is “co-exten-sive” with the bodyhood of that person.Environment cannot be an “obstacle,”even though the person can make a “miss-take.”

[

The notions of “fit” and “viability” arereplaced by Maturana’s emphasis on theminimum “unit of survival” which isdefined as “the person + medium.” Herethe survival of both is in question, andnot just whether one manages to “fit theconstraints.” Survival depends on thesimultaneous double conservation of“internal coherence” and of “external fit-ting.” Clearly, in these two summaries we have

two very different forms of “radicality” lead-ing to different positions in the range of epis-temologies.

Where von Glasersfeld and Maturana part company

It is clear that having created two differentmaps these two authors end up in differentworlds. It is interesting to note that despitetheir many conversations and familiarity withone another’s writings, they are unable to puta consensual finger on where exactly they donot agree – or to explain how it is that they endup in very different worlds – “worlds apart.”

Recently, Maturana (2004) has jokinglydescribed himself as, “a super-realist whobelieves in the existence of innumerableequally valid realities. Moreover, all these dif-ferent realities are not relative realitiesbecause asserting their relativity would entailthe assumption of an absolute reality as thereference point against which their relativitywould be measured.” (Maturana 2004, p. 34).

Over millions of years of co-ontogenicstructural drift with a medium, the structuresof the human body are configured in an infer-ential, anticipatory and implicative manner.The structures anticipate the

ongoingness

ofthose congruent structural features of theenvironment. A Martian examining a humanbody on Mars could come up with a veryaccurate description of what our environ-ment is like, doing a kind of “reverse engineer-ing” from the body’s structures to infer thenecessary properties of the medium withwhich the human system is structurally inter-sected for survival. For example, the fact thatwe have lungs implicates the existence of amedium with oxygen and other gases forbreathing; the presence of a stomach impli-cates a medium with consumable foodobjects; the structure of the eyes implicatesthe presence of a certain range of light waves,and so on through the whole range of bodilystructures. Maturana (2004) himself puts thisa bit more romantically where he says:

“The fundamental condition of existence istrust. When a butterfly has slipped out of itscocoon, its wings and antennae, its trunkand its whole bodyhood trust that there willbe air and supporting winds, and flowersfrom which to suck nectar. The structuralcorrespondence between the butterfly andits world is an expression of implicit trust.When a seed gets wet and begins to germi-nate, it does so trusting that all the neces-

sary nutrients will be there for it to be ableto grow.” (Maturana 2004, pp. 198–199). Maturana describes a world where organ-

ism and medium are structurally intersected,co-extensive and coessential. There is no“separation”; there is no “in here/out there”except for some observer. All of this meansthat Maturana is not at all a “constructivist”(indeed he has always denied it) but ratheroccupies a novel position in the epistemolog-ical chart which I see to be based upon a formof “structural realism.”

I want to suggest that this “super-realist”position can be seen as a novel location in thevaried terrain of the epistemologies whichalready contain these well-known features,among many others:

Naïve Realism, Direct Realism, CriticalRealism, Representationalism, Trivial Con-structivism, Critical Constructivism, Con-strained Constructivism, Communal Con-structivism, Pragmatism, Scepticism, SocialConstructionism, Phenomenalism, InternalRealism, Radical Constructivism, RadicalIdealism, and what I would now like to call

radical realism.

It is “radical realism” because the implica-tion of Maturana’s theory is that we candirectly and intimately know the “reality” weare living because it is we ourselves who havemade it. It is not a black box for us, it is

our

cog-nitive domain and we can know about oureffective actions in this domain. So the way Iintend the term “radical realism” arises fromthe fact that our sense of “objective reality”derives radically from our “subjective reality-making.” This in turn derives from the impli-cativeness of structure determinism. So this isthe sense in which I read Maturana as a “radicalrealist.” We have no choice in the world we our-selves have instantiated through our structure-determined system. What we do next is alwaysstructure-determined and thus has the sense of“inevitability” that we attribute to an “objectivereality.” With the dissolution of the “inside/outside distinction we attribute our lived expe-rience of our

own structural objectivity

to whatan observer would call our “environment.”

Considering this mapping of Maturana ascontrasted with von Glasersfeld, we can under-stand how it is that Maturana is often misun-derstood as a “determinist,” “behaviourist,”“cognitivist,” “reductionist” etc which are allpositions defined in part by their sharing a real-ist epistemology.

2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3 63

CONCEPTS



Conclusion

While von Glasersfeld claims that the personor cognitive system may make contact withontological reality

only

when and where theirschemes to eliminate perturbations breakdown – when our constructions are invali-dated, we can know only what the world is

not

– for Maturana this is not the case because hehas positioned his observer-actor in themidst of a process of structural coherences(co-ontogenic structural drift etc.). For Mat-urana this means that the system cannotmake a “mistake,” and that it is always in the“right place” because of its long history ofstructural drift in the medium.

We can also appreciate how Ernst von Gla-sersfeld therefore holds the bulwark positionon the extreme borders of “idealism” justbefore it goes on to various forms of solipsis-tic closure. As von Glasersfeld says,

“… a model is a good model whenever theresults of its functioning show no discrep-ancy relative to the functioning of theblack box. That relation, I claim, is analo-gous to the relation between our knowl-edge and our experience. Given that thereis nothing but a hypothetical connectionbetween our experience and what philos-ophers call ontological reality, that realityhas for us the status of a black box.” (Gla-sersfeld 1995, p. 157) In this analogy I believe we have a major

clue for understanding where von Glasersfeldand Maturana part company. Von Glasersfelduses the analogy of organism/environment toillustrate how he conceives of the relationshipof what we know to our own experiencing.However, as an analogy it can only take us sofar because on the one hand von Glasersfeldis locked into the strictly limiting domain ofexperiencing and how one may variouslyconstruct meaning for these experiences. Inthe case of organisms and their environmentwe are in a very different phenomenaldomain of activity. This is where Maturana’sstructure determinism takes care of survival– it is a question of “know-how,” and not, asfor von Glasersfeld, a question of “say-how”(saying or describing or cognitively con-structing sense out of our experiences). Ineffect, we cannot really compare these twodomains proposed in this analogy becausevon Glasersfeld is describing the interfacingof a domain of experience with the domain of

explanations in order to produce rationalknowledge, while for Maturana the organ-ism/environment is a matter of flowing in thephenomenal domain of structural coupling(of experiencing the structural relatedness) –out of which, later, the system-observer mayor may not have to enter the domain of expla-nations to work out what “really happened”during a given experience. From this point ofview, von Glasersfeld is always already at thebusiness of producing rational knowledge,while Maturana may describe the person orsystem as being simply in a drift of ongoingstructural transformations, without neces-sarily arriving to a domain of “reflections.”

For von Glasersfeld the main focus is onthe cognitive effort to make sense of experi-ence, rather than on describing events in thephysiological or biological domain. Thebodily senses have already produced theexperiences which must now be organised tomake sense, and to fit with the existing frame-work of sense that we have built up. But also,in the mind, because there is no “embodi-ment,” we can invent or imagine all sorts ofthings to be going on. In fact this is what themind does best; endless inventions, conjec-tures and hypotheses are churned out givenhalf an excuse. This in effect is the source ofthe problems of many impatients

1

in psycho-therapy who enter into self-paralysing self-interrupting loops of negative, frightening,destructive and maladaptive ideas – whichproduce a very poor “fit” indeed. This is anexample which helps to clarify the fact thatfor von Glasersfeld the constraints that wehave to “fit” with are not necessarily inherentin an ontological reality (Glasersfeld 1987, p.140).

Rather, the dominant constraints arisefrom within our own patterns of constructionsand the ways in which we have learned toorganise these into a working system

. By now, at the end of this article, it seems

clear that the solution to the puzzle of vonGlasersfeld as to how and why his theorisingand that of Maturana become so different liesin what Kant called the “

transcendental illu-sion”

– the error of trying to use the same lan-guage descriptions for two incompatible phe-nomena, or for two different phenomenaldomains that are non-collapsible (or mutu-ally untranslatable). I have tried to grasp thisdifference by shifting backwards and for-wards across what seems to be an unbridge-able gap between these two theorists.

This kind of puzzle may arise due to theerror of attempting to apply concepts andlanguage descriptions beyond the domainwherein they were evolved or constructed. InGeorge Kelly’s terms we are attempting toapply a construct way beyond its “range ofconvenience,” creating only the illusion ofhaving “described” or even “explained” theother phenomena arising in a differentdomain.

In trying to warn us about the error of“

transcendental illusion

,” Kant (1968) urgesus to pay adequate attention to the differen-tiating boundaries which mark off one terri-tory as appropriate and another as not for theapplication of certain categories. He says he iswarning us about

“… actual principles which incite us totear down all those boundary-fences andto seize possession of an entirely newdomain which recognises no limits ofdemarcation.” (Kant 1968, p. 299) In the present case it is perhaps important

to realise that the theorising of von Glasers-feld and Maturana takes place in two very dif-ferent domains of activity: one in the philo-sophical domain of inquiry into ourpossibilities for knowing; the other in theconstruction of a biological basis for knowl-edge, language, consciousness and more.

Along with Piaget, von Glasersfeld recog-nises that there are two very differentdomains of “survival,” one at the biologicallevel where there is at stake the viability of theorganism/environment relation; and theother at the level of “cognitive reflection”where what is at stake is the viability of theperson’s conceptual network or “constructsystem.” It is clear that the process of adapta-tion in the biological domain is different inmany ways to adaptation in the cognitivedomain. There are different forms of “viabil-ity” and “instrumentality” pertinent in thetwo different domains of action – on the bio-logical level it is literally a matter of survival,while on the conceptual level it is a matter ofmaintaining one’s internal coherence orequilibrium. It is interesting to note againhere that for Maturana “survival” is definedas the

simultaneous

conservation of

both

one’s internal coherence (organisational clo-sure)

and

the conservation of one’s fit or rel-evance to one’s niche. This is another majordifference in the focus of the writings andresearch of the two authors under examina-


CONCEPTS



tion here. Ernst von Glasersfeld oncedescribed constructivism as “a theory of whatthinking produces” – which is sometimescalled knowledge – and this shows clearly thedomain of optimal application of his model,which indeed has seen more successful appli-cations in the field of teaching and trainingthan in any other.

So while von Glasersfeld is extremely care-ful to stay with his definition of RC as a “the-ory of knowing” and avoids any attempts ortemptations to describe what “exists,” Mat-urana’s writings do seem to be replete withaffirmations of what exists, such as thedescription of the “living” as

being

“autopoi-etic.” Indeed, the main disagreements thatvon Glasersfeld expresses in relation to Mat-urana’s writings are to do with asking howMaturana comes to take as “given” many dif-ferent features of his theory, as if he

knew

how“things really are.” This is a major parting ofthe ways since von Glasersfeld’s entire effortis to present a model of how the cognisingsubject is able to construct their knowledgewithout any reference to a “given” or “pre-existing reality.”

It seems therefore that the main impossi-bility in “joining” the theorising of von Gla-sersfeld with that of Maturana lies in the factthat von Glasersfeld has focussed on theadaptations and learnings that go on at the“cognitive” level whereas Maturana’s work isprincipally in the biological domain. Perhapsif Maturana is taken seriously in his repeateddenials that he is a “constructivist” we wouldmore readily recognise the non-collapsibledistance between him and von Glasersfeld.To this end I have found it useful to locateMaturana’s approach as existing in the inter-stices of theory between the various “con-structivisms” and the various “realisms.”Since Maturana seems to “go beyond” theepistemological positioning of von Glasers-feld’s Radical Constructivism, and sinceMaturana is clearly outwith the domain ofthe “realists” (despite the impressions of“leaking realism”), I think the name “radicalrealism” describes this interstitial epistemo-logical space which Maturana has broughtforth in his theorising over the past 40 yearsor so.

Note

1. I use the term “impatients” for those whoparticipate in psychotherapy because themedical term “patient” has nothing to dowith what goes on in psychotherapy, andmoreover, unless the person has a certainimpatience about getting on with thingsthey are unlikely to make much progressin changing their life experiences.

References

Bateson, G. (1972) Steps to an ecology ofmind. Ballantine books: New York.

Foerster, H. von & Glasersfeld, E. von (2001)Come ci si inventa. Odradek: Rome.

Glasersfeld, E. von (1984) An introduction toradical constructivism. In: Watzlawick, P.(ed.) The invented reality. Norton: NewYork, pp. 17–40.

Glasersfeld, E. von (1987) The constructionof knowledge: Contributions to concep-tual semantics. Intersystems Publications:Salinas CA.

Glasersfeld, E. von (1988) The reluctance tochange a way of thinking. The Irish Jour-nal of Psychology 9(1): 83–90.

Glasersfeld, E. von (1991) Distinguishing theobserver: An attempt at interpreting Mat-urana. Methodologia 8: 57–68.


Held, B. & Pols, E. (1987) Dell on Maturana:

A real foundation for family therapy? Psy-chotherapy 24: 455–481.

Johnson, D. K. (1991) Reclaiming reality: Acritique of Maturana’s ontology of theobserver. Methodologia 9: 7–31.

Kant, I. (1968) Critique of pure reason(Translated by N. Kemp Smith). Mac-millan: New York.

Kelly, G. (1955) The psychology of personalconstructs. 2 Volumes. Norton: New York.

Kenny, V. (1989) Anticipating autopoiesis:Personal construct psychology and self-organizing systems. In: Goudsmit, A. (ed.)Self-organisation in psychotherapy.Springer-Verlag: Heidelberg.

Maturana, H. (1986) The biological founda-tions of self consciousness and the physicaldomain of existence. (personal communi-cation.)

Maturana, H. R. & Poerksen, B. (2004) Frombeing to doing: The origins of the biologyof cognition. Carl-Auer: Heidelberg.

Maturana, H. R. & Varela, F. J. (1987) The treeof knowledge: The biological roots ofhuman understanding. New ScienceLibrary: Boston.

Mingers, J. (1995) Self-producing systems:Implications and applications of auto-poiesis. Plenum Press: New York.

Piaget, J. (1971) Insights and illusions of phi-losophy. Meridian: New York.

Wittgenstein, L. (1933) Tractatus logico-philosophicus. Kegan-Paul: London.



The Co-Emergence of Parts and Wholes in Psychological Individuation

Introduction

Chapter 6 of Ernst von Glasersfeld’s book(1995)

Radical Constructivism: A Way of Know-ing and Learning

is entitled, “ConstructingAgents: The Self and Others.” In the third to lastparagraph of that chapter, he states, “…thesubject creates not only objects to which inde-pendent existence is attributed but also

others

to whom the subject imputes such status andcapabilities as are conceivable, given his or herown experience” (Glasersfeld 1995, p. 128).Much as I admire von Glasersfeld for so elo-quently setting out the principles of radicalconstructivism, I believe his assumption aboutthe existence of a “subject” and “others” is onethat can be usefully unpacked and elucidated.As its stands, von Glasersfeld’s reference to a“subject” posits an entity whose genesis stillhas to be explained.

1

The thesis of co-emer-gence proposed here is intended to providesuch an explanation. The explanation providesa constructivist account of the self as the agentof construction. It thus avoids the need for anymetaphysical assumptions about the nature ofthe self, as von Glasersfeld seems to believe isthe case when, in the final paragraph of thechapter referred to, he states,

“As to the concept of self, constructivism –as an empirical epistemology – can pro-vide a more or less viable model for theconstruction of the experiential self; butthe self as the locus of subjective awarenessseems to be a metaphysical assumptionand lies outside the domain of empiricalconstruction.” (Glasersfeld 1995, p. 128)

2

The metaphysical status of the subjectleaves von Glasersfeld open to critiques from“postmodernists” and “social construction-ists,” who both emphasise that the “subject” isconstructed or occurs “in language” (see, e.g.,Salmon (1989) and McCarty and Schwandt(2000). From the standpoint of rational sci-ence, those positions lack coherence and clearempirical foundations. The thesis presentedhere can be seen as an attempt to develop therequired coherent, well-founded explana-tion.

3

The paper began as a collage of extractsfrom various sources, including some of myown earlier papers, which, as a set, wereintended to provide the context and justifica-tion for the thesis proposed. Through discus-sion at the PIE conference (see footnote 1)and further reflection, I have refined andmodified that set and present them here as

what I hope is a reasonably comprehensiblelinear narrative. I begin with a discussion ofthe cybernetic concept of “organisation.” Thisis followed by a more extended discussion ofthe genesis of self-consciousness and person-hood, drawing on the seminal ideas of Piaget,Mead and Vygotsky and the more recentcybernetically inspired formulations of vonFoerster and Maturana. There is then a brieflook at the logic of interpersonal interactionand the notion of “theories of mind.” Thisleads on to an overview of Gordon Pask’scybernetic conversation theory, which, withits distinction between two kinds of organisa-tion, the “mechanical” and the “psychologi-cal,” affords a useful synthesis of much thathas gone before. Finally, there are somethoughts on implications about ethics, withreference to the views of von Foerster and vonGlasersfeld.

I would like to draw the reader’s attentionto the writings of Ranulph Glanville whichalso address foundational concerns aboutethics and the nature of selves and others froma cybernetic perspective. (See, e.g., Glanville1988, 2002). There is not space here to indi-cate the many parallels between Glanville’sdiscussion of “subjects” as self-reproducing“objects” and the thesis developed in thispaper. I have written about Glanville’sapproach in Scott (2005).

On organisation

Ashby in his 1956

Introduction to Cybernetics

writes: “Cybernetics might in fact be definedas the study of systems that are open to energybut closed to information and control – sys-tems that are “information tight” (Ashby1956). Von Foerster, Pask, Maturana, vonGlasersfeld, Glanville and Luhmann have allbeen particularly alive to the epistemologicalconsequences of this “organisational clo-sure.”

4

In brief, an organism does not receive

Bernard Scott

A

Cranfield University (UK) <[email protected]>

Purpose: The purpose of the paper is to provide a constructivist account of the “self as subject” that avoids the need for any metaphysical assumptions. Findings: The thesis developed in this paper is that the human “psychological individual,” “self” or “subject” is an emergent within the nexus of human social interaction. With respect to psychological and social wholes (composites) there is no distinction between the form of the elements and the form of the composites they constitute, i.e., all elements have the form of composites. Further, recursively, composites may serve as elements within higher order composites. Implications for a rational theory of ethics are discussed. Originality/Value: The thesis contributes in a fundamental way to the research pro-gramme of radical constructivism by demonstrating that metaphysical assumptions about the nature of the “subject” are not an a priori necessity. Although the thesis in itself is not original, the paper offers a useful synthesis of ideas from a number of key thinkers in the disciplines of cybernetics, biology, psychology and philosophy. Keywords: Psychological individuation, co-emergence, collective, self-consciousness, interpersonal interaction, theory of mind, conversation theory, conscience.

cognitive-psychological


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CONCEPTS



“information” as something transmitted to it,rather, as a circularly organised system itinterprets perturbations as being informative.It is important to note that this use of the term“information” is clearly different from theusage in computer science (“informationprocessing” meaning, strictly, data process-ing, the transmission of data and the transfor-mation of one data “pattern” into another) orby Shannon and Weaver (a measure of thesurprise value of a “message”) or Stonier (ameasure of the extent to which a system is“ordered”). The use of the term by Ashby isessentially the same as that of Gregory Bate-son in his aphorism “Information is a differ-ence that makes a difference” and that of JersiKerzinski (“Information cannot be separatedfrom its utilisation”), and that of Heinz vonFoerster (“The environment contains noinformation; it is as it is”).

Here are some remarkably parallel com-ments on “circularity” of organisation fromAlfred Korzybski, the founder of “GeneralSemantics.” From his book

Science and Sanity

(1958, p. 12): “Language […] represents the highest andlatest physiological and neurological func-tion of an organism. It is […] of uniquelyhuman circular structure, to use a logicalterm – or of spiral structure, to use a four-dimensional or a physico-chemical-aspectterm […] In these processes an ‘effect’becomes a causative factor for futureeffects, influencing them in a manner par-ticularly subtle, variable, flexible, and of anendless number of possibilities. ‘Knowing,’if taken as an end-product, must be con-sidered also as a causative psychophysio-logical factor of the next stage of thesemantic response […] This structuraland functional circularity introduces realdifficulties […] Before we can be fullyhuman, we must first know how to handleour nervous responses – a circular affair.” Both Gregory Bateson and Heinz von Foe-

rster cite Korzybski’s “the map is not the terri-tory” with approval.

As von Foerster notes, consideration of thecircularly closed organisation of living sys-tems obliges one to adopt a constructivistepistemology,

5

as developed for example byJean Piaget. Piaget (1972) develops his“genetic epistemology” from the notion of theliving system with “cybernetic circuits inequilibrium.” His cognitive structures arise

because “the representation is in the act.”From the starting point of acknowledgingthat living systems are organisationallyclosed, we now go on to consider how, in phy-logenesis and ontogenesis, such systemsbecome “self-conscious.”

On the development of self-consciousness

“Universal grammar” – that which is com-mon to all “languages” when viewed, à laChomsky, in the abstract as syntactic and lex-ical systems – requires a logical syntax withnegation. In Piaget’s account, this logic isimminent in the logic of action and the con-cept of reversibility (actions may be“undone”). Integration of sensori-motorschemata into coordinated wholes both gen-erates “object permanence” in the environ-ment and a differentiation of subject fromobject. With the “semiotic function,” theorganism may represent its own actions (cf.Maturana’s phrase “interact with its owninteractions,” Maturana 1969) There is anaccompanying “awareness of awareness”; inso far as the organism’s actions are part of acoordinated, co-adapted whole, there isawareness of self (cf. Kagan 1979, p. 293),though, as yet, no stable “self-image” or “self-consciousness.”

As there is a “sensori-motor” or “enactive”logic of action, so there is a tacit logic of inter-action. An organism’s adaptations coordi-nate sensory and motor activity. In the“dance” of social activity, these coordinationsbecome coordinated. Piaget (1956, p. 256)says of the former: “Without a mathematicalor logical apparatus, there is no direct ‘read-ing of facts,’ because this is a prerequisite.Such an apparatus is derived from experi-ence, the abstraction being taken from theaction performed upon the object and notfrom the object itself.” This is essentially whatMead says of social interaction: its logic arisesas an abstraction from the experience ofinteraction. (Mead’s ideas are elaborated onfurther, below). In this logic, the distinctionbetween participants arises and with it, the“social signs” that will serve later to encodelogic. Together, the “tacit” logics of actionand interaction provide the “semantic base”that, when “digitalised” as “units of mean-ing,” gives rise to a syntax.

Language arises as behaviours (“languag-ing”) that coordinate “coordinations of coor-dinations” (Maturana & Varela 1980; cf.Vygotsky 1962; Luria 1961).

Through mutual coordinations, organ-isms may come to compute themselves andothers as “selves,” giving rise to the “I/Thou”relationship. That is, by becoming observersof “others,” we “transcend into the domain ofself-observation” where “I am the observedrelation between myself and observingmyself” (Foerster 1980).

6

Maturana (1995) makes essentially thesame points in a more elaborated form (thereader should perhaps be aware that von Foe-rster’s and Maturana’s ideas are very closelyaligned, von Foerster at one time having beena mentor for Maturana), that “[t]he experi-ence that we connote as we use the word con-sciousness is one of self-distinction as we dis-tinguish ourselves making distinctions”(p. 163) and that “consciousness takes place asa particular relational dynamics when anorganism operates as participant in a domainof recursive distinctions in language.” (ibid.)Thus, for Maturana, consciousness is experi-enced by participants in “languaging.”

“Languaging takes place as recursive con-sensual coordinations of consensual coor-dinations of behaviour […] There is arecursion whenever […] the re-applica-tion of an operation occurs on the conse-quences of its previous application […]Any level of recursion may recursivelybecome a domain of objects that operatesas a ground level for further recursions.”

Bernard Scott is Head of the Flexible Learn-ing Support Centre, Cranfield University, Defence Academy, Shrivenham. Previous appointments have been with: the Univer-sity of the Highlands and Islands Millennium Institute, De Montfort University, the Open University and Liverpool John Moores Uni-versity. Dr. Scott’s research interests include: Theories of learning and teaching, course design and organisational change and foun-dational issues in systems theory and cyber-netics. He has published extensively on these topics. Dr. Scott is a Fellow of the Cybernetics Society and an Associate Fel-low of the British Psychological Society.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3 67

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“Objects arise in language in the firstrecursion of consensual coordinations ofconsensual coordinations of behaviour.[…] Observing arises as an operation in asecond recursion that distinguishes a dis-tinction […] The observer appears in athird order recursion that distinguishesdistinguishing […] . Self-consciousness(self-awareness) arises in a fourth orderrecursion in which observing the observertakes place.” (ibid., p. 164).“The self arises as an experience in theexperience of self-consciousness […] self-consciousness and self take place in thedynamic relations of languaging […] Thedistinction of the self is an overwhelmingexperience […] . once it takes place thedistinction becomes the referentialground for all other distinctions […] Theexperience of the self as an object obscuresits original constitution as a relation […]in the relational dynamics of languaginganimals.” (ibid., p. 165).I have tried to summarise Maturana’s

observations, as his somewhat idiosyncraticprose style and arcane vocabulary can be a lit-tle daunting and obscure what, in fact, is avery rigorous line of argument.

In the next section, I develop the key ideaof the co-emergence of individuals and collec-tives in psychological individuation. I go on inthe sections that follow to elaborate on thisprocess, first by looking in more detail atMead’s concept of the self as a social processand then, in turn, by fleshing this out by usingconcepts from the more recent literature oninterpersonal perception. My account of selfand other dynamics and psychological indi-viduation culminates in a brief overview ofkey ideas from “conversation theory” (CT) asdeveloped by Gordon Pask. CT is a compre-hensively rich theoretical framework, partic-ularly useful for unifying much work that hasgone before.

7

Emergence as singularity

Above von Foerster’s use of the phrase “tran-scendence into another domain” was noted indiscussing the emergence of self-conscious-ness as a singular event. Thom, amongst oth-ers, has extended the classic mathematicalconcept of a “singularity.” This problem exer-

cised the mind of the great 19th Century logi-cian, George Boole, throughout his life. Hereis a simple example, taken from his writings,of the “law of change of quantity to quality” atwork.

Take an arbitrary circle as a starting pointand draw smaller circles of fixed diameterwhose centres all lie on the perimeter of thefirst circle:

As the number of smaller circlesapproaches infinity, a new form emerges:

There are now two “new circles,” each con-centric with the first circle.

The key proposition of this paper is thatwith respect to psychological and social wholes(composites) there is no distinction betweenthe form of the elements and the form of thecomposites they constitute, i.e., all elementshave the form of composites. The above is asimple model for this. In words, “A psycholog-ical individual is a composite of concepts – buta concept, as a stable, reproducible system is acomposite of concepts, is a psychological indi-vidual. Recursively, a social system is a com-posite of psychological individuals and as astable, reproducible system is itself (has theform of) a psychological individual.”

Note that the model serves well for thetacit, non-languaging “awareness of aware-ness,” experienced to some extent by all livingcreatures (the pre-linguistic “re-ligio” experi-ence of self that Kagan discusses). The dia-logic form of I/Thou awareness in which “I”/“Thou” languaging emerges is not encom-passed. The form of such a model is discussedbelow in the section “The logic of interper-sonal perception.”

George Herbert Mead: Self as social process

Mead’s (1934) key concept is that of the “sig-nificant symbol.”

8

A better label, perhaps, is“the social sign.” Its significance lies in the factthat communication employing such a signsystem is between participants who can “takethe perspective of the other.” Such signs notonly have an agreed or shared meaning, in thesense that an external observer notes that theyare used in similar ways by the participants,they also have agreed or shared meaningsfrom the perspective of the participants. Inbrief, the participants, too, are observers.

Human consciousness and awareness, asnow known, is an evolved phenomenon. Inmodern times, Rastafarians have a concept ofself and “super-self” encapsulated in the for-mula “I and I.” Some accounts of the cogni-tion of Australian aborigines suggest that sim-ilarly, they lack a distinct concept ofindividuality: the “individual” psyche is indirect contact with the powers that have cre-ated the cosmos.

Mead’s account is a framework sufficientto account for this variety of consciousness.The “I” emerges in the dialectic of reciprocalrole taking: taking the other’s perspective. The“generalised other” is internalised. Thoughtbecomes an inner dialogue between perspec-tives: the self is a social process. “Self-image”is a social construct and, as noted, may takedifferent forms in different cultures.

It is difficult to do justice to Mead’s workin a few sentences. What I admire most is the“holistic” nature of his thought. His concernwith thought and language is contained in hislarger concern with the relation between anindividual and the society of which he is apart. From these concerns, he constructs amore general cosmology and epistemology(Mead 1938 and Miller 1973).


CONCEPTS



In Mead’s analysis, the semiotic function,the use of speech and tool using co-evolve.The hand uses a tool in a social context. Skillsare transmitted through sign and gesture.With skilled manipulation comes the internaltrial and error of “inhibited” responses.“Social signs” first appear as “inhibited”(reflected upon) intention movements.

Mead’s conclusion, that thought is aninternalised dialogue, comes close toVygotsky’s (1962) thesis but, whereasVygotsky is at some pains to distinguish the“inner monologue” from the “external dia-logue,” Mead conceives the former, too, as adialogue, as conversational in form. UnlikeVygotsky, Mead has his concept of “the self asa social process” to guide his thinking.Vygotsky’s vision does not extend that far; hesees only the oppositions: in “internalspeech,” we know what we are thinking about.At one point, he does use the

phrase “when weconverse with ourselves” and likens the abbre-viated, “tacit” knowing of intimates to theabbreviations in inner speech, but the conver-sational aspect of inner speech is not empha-sised, it remains

tacit in Vygotsky’s thought.Newson and Newson, in a critique of

Piaget’s account of cognitive development,come very close to a similar position to that ofMead, in their insistence that “Knowledgeitself arises within an interaction process”[…] “Knowing, and being able to communi-cate what we know need to be viewed as oppo-site sides of the same coin” (Newson & New-son 1979, p. 272). They argue that thesemiotic function arises out of the “primor-dial sharing situation” (cf. Werner & Kaplan1963), in which mother (or other adult) andinfant “share” an experience. This sharing is“sensori-motor, affective, pre-symbolic,” inshort, shared awareness. Here Newson andNewson come close to discussion of, to coin aphrase, the effect of affect on affect. Humanbeings (and other organisms) are capable of

feeling each other’s feel-ings and feelings may beshared, including a feel-ing (or “sense”) of one-ness and deep, tacitunderstanding.

The effects of affectare not directly observ-able as overt stimuli,responses and reinforc-ers, though, presumably,

there are physiological concomitants. Thesubtle role of affect in human communicationis largely missed in “behavioural” approachesto analyses of infant-caretaker interaction.There is a case to be made for the re-evalua-tion of “learning theory” approaches to childdevelopment, with perhaps a place beingfound for the application of these constructsin the “microstructure” of the interplay ofaffect in dyadic interaction. An effective andintellectually satisfying “social behaviour-ism,” as proposed by Mead, might then serveto unify extant theories and approaches.

The logic of interpersonal perception

The work of Laing, Phillipson, and Lee (1966)was one of the first studies of interpersonal per-ception that clearly articulated the way inwhich human communication entails bothsender and recipient having perspectives ofeach other’s perspectives, that is, metaperspec-tives. This requirement is imminent in G. H.Mead’s writings on the nature of a significantsymbol, one that “arouses in the sender thesame response as in the receiver” (Mead 1934).

Laing, Phillipson, and Lee’s constructionfor dyadic communication is shown inTable 1.

In developmental psychology, being ableto compute such perspectives and metaper-spectives is known as having “a theory ofmind” (Whiten 1991; Baron-Cohen andWing 1994). Howard’s (1971) theory of meta-games has a similar structure for a two-personnon-zero sum game, such as “prisoner’sdilemma.” The fundamental point of the con-structions is that they permit an analysis ofpower relations and conflict and stabilitybetween participants. As Laing et al point out,

if one participant, say A, has an accurate viewof the other’s, B’s, perspectives and metaper-spectives, whatever they are, and if B’s view ofA is inaccurate, A is in a potential position ofpower or influence over B. Consider, forexample, the relations between parent andchild, teacher and learner.

9

In Laing, Phillipson, and Lee’s model for

the dyad, two perspective levels above the baselevel are drawn. Howard’s results show that, ingeneral, if one is to represent all possible con-figurations of perspectives of perspectives forn persons that account for possible stability(coordination of action) or lack of it, it is nec-essary to have n factorial levels above the baselevel. This fact is in itself a possible reason forerror in human communication.

10

We may conceive of a system where thereis, in the words of Peter Cariani (personalcommunication; see also Cariani 2000),“[S]witching between regenerative, stable,resonance states […]Those systems that canreproduce their own organization […] arepotentially conscious […] They are organisa-tionally closed by virtue of their circularinternal dynamics.” We may then conceive of

two

such entities synchronised in interaction,where each is being “in-formed” of the otherand where we can see the dynamics of the onereproduced in the other and vice versa,clearly showing the stable “eigen values”where both are “computing” the same“object” and are “computing” that they both“know” that is what is happening. They mayboth then “compute” a second “object” suchthat they both “know” the second “object”stands for or “represents” the first “object,”i.e., the second “object” is a Meadian “signif-icant symbol.”

Gordon Pask’s conversation theory

From different starting points, Pask (1975)has arrived at similar conclusions to those ofMead. He characterises the “psychologicalindividual” as a “self-replicating system ofmemories and concepts.” Figure 1 shows his“skeleton of a conversation,” the necessarydistinctions made by an external observer.First order signalling takes place in the causalaction of processes on processes: knowingleads to doing leads to knowing; memoriesreproduce concepts that reproduce memo-

A(B(A(T))) Level of Understanding or Not B(A(B(T)))

A(B(T)) Level of Realisation or Not B(A(T))

A(T) Base Level (Agreement or Not) B(T)

Table 1:

Dyadic interpersonal perception (after Laing, Phillipson, and Lee 1966): A and B are participants. T is the topic, proposition or object being contemplated or perceived. A(T) means A’s perception of T; A(B(T)) means A’s perception of B’s perception of T … and so on.

2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3 69

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concepts(processes)

memories(processes)

concepts(processes)

memories(processes)

participant A(e.g., teacher)

participant B(e.g., learner)

Behavioural interaction with shared “modelling facility”in which concepts may be instantiated or exemplified

knowing

doing

ries. Thus, levels of cognition are distin-guished as a “hierarchy of control.” A conceptis a procedure that “recognises, reproduces ormaintains a relation,” e.g., in context, ridinga bicycle, performing a calculation. Adescription of a concept is a “task structure”that says “what may be done.” A memory is a(metacognitive) procedure that “recognises,reproduces or maintains concepts,” forexample, in context, justifying a method orproviding a “chain of explanation” showinghow the understanding of particular con-cepts is derived from or entails the priorunderstanding of other concepts. A descrip-tion of a memory is an “entailment mesh”that says “what may be known.”

Entailment meshes and task structures,which are coherent and consistent, describe“domains” (e.g., a learnable/teachable thesis)that support “viable” (reproducible) conver-sations (“psychological individuals”).

Second order signalling takes place in the“provocative” interaction of participants.Understanding implies shared perspectives;the cognitive processes of the two partici-pants are to some extent synchronised. Inteaching and learning (Pask’s main concern),the cognitions of one participant are literallyreplicated in the other. One becomes theother. Pask argues that the distinctions madeby the external observer of a conversationmust, logically, also be made to characterisethe cognition of an isolated psyche (cf. Ryle1971). Here, replication is literally self-repli-cation. The “psychological individual” is astable systemic whole, is “organisationallyclosed.” Thus Pask distinguishes a level oforganisation, of coherent structure abovethat of the biological, that applies both topersons and the social systems that theyform. In his “inner conversation,” the personexplains and justifies himself to himself. Inobserving himself, he makes the same dis-tinctions as when acting as the externalobservation of a conversation. In the “outerconversations” that constitute social institu-tions, the participants agree and disagree andnegotiate shared descriptions, explanationsand justifications. Self-analysis reveals a sim-ilar interaction between “participating atti-tudes” and “points of view.”

The following is attributed to Gordon Pask(quoted in Bateson 1972, pp. 307–309).

“I phrase it from the point of view of a‘philosophical mechanic’; that is to say

[…] If you think in mechanical terms, youcan think of a population of general-pur-pose computers called ‘brains,’ in which,given a suitable programming language, itis possible to run classes of programs.Now we are at liberty to redefine an indi-vidual as being not one head, one general-purpose computing machine, but onenamed class of programs. And we caninterpret the reproduction of this namedclass of programs, not at all in a biologicalsense, but in the sense of reproducing andperhaps evolving a class of programs bear-ing the same name. This is consonant withthe motive of the individual to reproducehimself; it does not introduce the problemof overpopulating the world with general-purpose machines; and it does allow forthe perpetuation of the individual and theproper interpretation of the term ‘con-sciousness,’ as an inbuilt wish to repro-duce that which specifies

me

. This isn’t ofcourse such a strange point of view,because although you may be mildlyoffended if I call you a class of programs,you should really be equally offended if I

insisted that you lived inside your head.Isn’t it evident that you are distributedthrough a lot of these general-purposemachines? Don’t you love? Don’t you dis-like? Don’t you take part in the self-imagesof other people? If you do you are sayingthat you partake of the nature of a class ofprograms. This is simply a statement ofthat fact.“I use the word ‘program’ to designate anywell-defined ‘formula for’ or class of ‘for-mulae for’ with the possibility of havingunderspecified goals in it; in other words,it’s a heuristic procedure. I refer to theindividual as a class of ‘formulae for […]me,’ where ‘me’ is my name. And theimportant point about this is that these“formulae for” might be run in any conve-nient machine, including the brain […] “In a sense there are two parallel sorts ofevolution: there is biological evolutiongoing on, and then, because of this inter-pretation of the individual, one can per-ceive a separate sort of evolution that Irefer to as ‘symbolic evolution,’ which isperhaps exemplified by this conference.

Figure 1:

Pask’s “skeleton of a conversation.” The horizontal arrows refer to “provocative interaction” between participants. Pragmatically, any utterance has the form of a command, interpreted (in context) at the level of knowing (learn! remember!) or at the level of doing (do!). For B to understand A, he must be able to instantiate A’s concepts (as models or exemplars) and also be able to show how A’s concepts are inter-related as learnable, memorable wholes.

© Constructivist Foundations


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To avoid overpopulating the world withgeneral-purpose machines, what we haveto do is control the symbolic evolutionprocess. To do so, I believe that the firstthing we must do is redefine what wemean by an individual, get away fromthis idea of individuals as heads.”

Implications for ethics

“We need to make parents and teachers pure, before we can make children so” (Mary Boole 1972, p. 10).

In recognising that self-awareness andself-reflection arise in “languaging,”which is necessarily a social affair, vonFoerster has been lead to develop a the-ory of ethics (see, for example, von Foe-rster 1993). He notes that

conscience

and

conscious

have the same roots, a pointalso developed by C. S. Lewis (1967).The essence of the argument is that weare conscious (we “know with” our-selves,

L. con-scio,

) precisely becausewe “know with” others. Awareness of

the mutuality and interdependence is the rootof conscience: we know,

without being told,

that the “other” is what makes us a “self,” that

we owe her our respect, our care, our love forhelping us be a “self” at all. Unfortunately, alltoo often, this tacit knowledge is not fully alivein us. We err; we sin.

At an earlier point in the chapterreferred to in the introduction to thispaper, von Glasersfeld discusses how“the individual needs the corrobora-tion of others to establish the intersub-jective viability of ways of thinkingand acting, entails a concern for others

as autonomous constructors” (Glasers-feld 1995, p. 127), thus, though not devel-

oping a thesis of co-emergence ofself and others as outlined in thispaper, he clearly sees the interde-pendence of self and others and

comes to similar conclusions tothose of von Foerster that con-structivism provides a rationalbasis for the development of

ethics, noting, however, that “itis in the choice of goals that eth-ics must manifest itself ” (ibid).With freedom to construct

comes responsibility forone’s actions.

Notes

A version of this paper was presented at theconference on

Problems of Individual Emer-gence

(PIE), Amsterdam, 16–20 April 2001.1. I have written more about von Glasers-

feld’s contributions to constructivist epis-temology elsewhere (Scott 2001).

2. This metaphysical assumption about thestatus of the subject is a recurrent themethroughout von Glaserfeld’s seminalbook. I have not had opportunity to ex-plore how consistent are his views therewith those expressed in his other writings,earlier or later.

3. Whilst writing this paper, I came acrossThibault’s (2004) account of self and otheremergence. As far as I can judge, his argu-ments and critiques with respect to Mead,Piaget and Vygotsky are very similar tothose I present in this paper. However,whereas in this paper, I draw extensively

on the cybernetics tradition to provideconceptual foundations (von Foerster,Pask, Maturana), Thibault’s draws mainlyfrom developmental linguistics and dis-course analysis.

4. Various forms of “closure” are distin-guished in the literature. The usage herefollows that of Pask and Maturana, a sys-tem is organisationally closed if amongstits products are those elements that arenecessary for the system’s persistence (re-production) as a system (a composite ofelements).

5. The earliest account of this argument fromvon Foerster that I am aware of is in vonFoerster (1960). The reader is directed tovon Foerster (2003) where that paper andmany later ones in von Foerster’s oeuvrecan be found.

6. Mead in a similar way distinguishes the “I”and the “Me,” the process of being a self

distinct from the out-come of the process of

observing, objectifying self as a “self-im-age.”

7. CT in its comprehensiveness is also tech-nically and terminologically complex. Forreasonably accessible introductions, seeGlanville (1993) and Scott (1980, 1982,1993).

8. Mead here is using the word “significantsymbol” to refer to socially constructedobjects that coordinate behaviours. This isin contrast to the more commonly heldview that a “symbol” is a special kind of to-ken that represents an object. For an ex-tended discussion of “What is a symbol?,”see Scott and Shurville (in press).

9. For more on power relations see Scott(2006).

10.I have developed this argument elsewhere(Scott 1997).

2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3 71

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Miller, D. L. (1973) George Herbert Mead.University of Texas Press: Austin.

Newson, J. & Newson, E. (1979) Intersubjec-tivity and the transmission of culture. In:Oates, J. (ed.) Early cognitive develop-ment. Croom Helm: London, pp. 281–286.

Pask, G. (1975) Conversation, cognition andlearning. Elsevier: Amsterdam.

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Whiten, A. (1991) Natural theories of mind:Evolution, development and simulation ofeveryday mindreading. Basil Blackwell:Oxford.



Epistemology Returns to Its Roots

Introduction

Ernst von Glasersfeld (2005, p. 10) wants togo to the roots of epistemology, of “the prob-lems of knowledge and knowing” (Glasersfeld1995, p. 1), by examining the subjects’ ele-mentary operations for structuring experi-ence. He replaces the ontology of Westernphilosophy by a “functional fit” (or “viabil-ity”) of concepts. He sees his work as indebtedto that of von Uexküll, Piaget (Glasersfeld1995, Ch. 3), Bridgman, Ceccato, von Foer-ster, Maturana, Varela, and others; it is also inaccordance with earlier studies, for instanceby Vico, Berkeley, Bentham, the critical andposthumous work of Kant (1936; Glasersfeld1985a, pp. 18ff; 1991, [5]; 1995). As Riegler(2005) points out, there is a plurality of con-structivisms with a common basis; the field isdeveloping and presents conceptual and prac-tical opportunities and challenges.

I became aware of epistemological RadicalConstructivism (RC) in 1999, while searchingto access the mind–brain relation puzzle, andwas glad to find authors who wanted an episte-mology without traditional metaphysics, whichcoincided with my need. They have made thiseffort a central feature of their work. As von Gla-sersfeld has pointed out, much of what one cansay about these matters has been said before – itmay now be a question of clarifying one’s think-ing, of seeing the wood for the trees.

Here I want to contribute (from my point ofview

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) to the understanding of von Glasers-feld’s work, and constructivism in general, inthe context of the development of epistemol-ogy. My aim is not to repeat his historical sur-veys (such as Glasersfeld 1995, Ch. 2), but toevaluate his work, and some of what I think isimplied in it, within this development, elabo-rating on aspects which have struck me asimportant. This is my personal bias; I have alsoincluded a few of my own ideas for discussion.

A. Knowledge: Two options in occidental thought

Epistemology has as main purposes todevelop and strengthen our stance (epi-histanai = stand above; under-stand = standbelow; ver-stehen = stand in front of); and toget a handle or grip (com-prehend, grasp,can; be-greifen, er-kennen, können). Of andon what? There are two main possibilities forthis largely language-determined functionallayer of “knowledge,” which influences per-ception and action in addition to the genetic-instinctual layer:

(i) The constructivist option of usingworking-entities (working-structures),

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inprinciple ad-hoc and temporary, structuredwithin otherwise not-structured experience(of mind-and-world) and invested withtrust; and

(ii) the traditional metaphysical-ontolog-ical option of postulating pre-structured,persistent, and usually also mind-indepen-dent, and indeed mind-exclusive, reality(MIR) and truth.

The metaphysics puzzle

Many people prefer the pre-structured option(ii), in the belief that it provides an outsidesource of certainty; however, it implies tran-scending one’s experience to an imaginedmind-independent source. This is a form ofwishful thinking: before it can provide cer-tainty, one must first postulate the MIR-source, and then certify it as real or true by aleap of faith. In the words of Heinz von Foer-ster: “Objectivity is a subject’s delusion thatobserving can be done without him. Involv-ing objectivity is abrogating responsibility –hence its popularity.” (Glasersfeld 1995,p. 149) It implies an inversion of thinking,

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inwhich agency, including goal-setting, is dis-placed from the subject onto postulatedexternal entities, a circular procedure whichactually reduces option (ii) to option (i). Butview (ii) is commonly maintained by exclud-ing the circularity from awareness, and often

Herbert F. J. Müller

A

McGill University, Montreal (Canada) <[email protected]>

Purpose: Understanding the place of Ernst von Glasersfeld’s Radical Constructivism (RC), and some of its implications, in the development of epistemology. Design: Characteriza-tion of two main options for the content of “knowledge” (without and with belief in mind-independent structures), sketch of their history in occidental thought; comparison of their properties concerning subjectivity, objectivity, second-order cybernetics, reliability of mental tools, and the needs and mechanisms for certainty and overall structures. Results: Awareness that we structure mental working tools can, as RC suggests, replace belief in mind-independent reality, and this change dissolves the conceptual problem of metaphysics-ontology, but also eliminates the certainty expected from it, which raises the possibility of relativism. Working-concepts cannot be deconstructed because they imply no ontological claims. Subject(s) are necessarily included in all knowledge (which does not mean solipsism): because subjective experience encompasses all mental tools, including those of objectivity and mathematics, while in contrast the subject itself cannot become an objective system. Practical reliability of mental tools differs from subjective certainty, which requires an ontological leap of faith to positive beliefs: for specific tools including automata, and for positive holistic structures. However, in agreement with the construc-tivist view, holistic views can instead have an unstructured center, with reliability = viability, which prevents relativism. In sum, belief in mid-independent reality is needed for certainty if desired; for all other purposes constructivism is more helpful. Implications: The change in view suggested by von Glasersfeld’s work is of relevance for a number of fields of study with conceptual problems (such as the mind-brain relation). However, due to their generality, the implications will need evaluation in specific instances. The question of certainty needs attention for practical reasons. Key Words: Subject-inclusiveness, cybernetics, back-up function.

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also the outward leap of faith. This has a longhistory.

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Pre-Socratic thinkers did not share a com-mon opinion on the question of whether real-ity needs our structuring or is found pre-structured (see also Glasersfeld 1985a,pp. 24ff; 1995, Ch. 2). A long-term commit-ment to option (ii) was the result of the meta-physical-ontological teachings of Plato andAristotle of pre-existing but inaccessible truthand reality. This required an ontological leap-of-faith, and became a leading theme of occi-dental thought, transmitted from the Greeksto Arabic, scholastic-theistic, and later to nat-uralistic epistemology. It helped to achievestability and collective unity of structuredthinking, secured by faith in a postulatedmind-external certainty, for about 1500years. The price was incomprehensibility,particularly when there was an attempt toinclude the central subjective and holisticaspects of mind (cf. Glasersfeld 1991, [5];2001, [41]; and part J of this paper). The pos-tulated MIR structures get in the way of criti-cal thinking.

Still, modern science originated fromhere; but the leap-of-faith procedure waslargely maintained, and merely transferredfrom MIR-God to MIR-Nature. Correctionwas therefore difficult even after sciencebecame independent of theism, and relapsesinto some type of MIR-belief resulted almostinvariably, including by those who set outexplicitly to abandon metaphysics (cf. Gla-sersfeld 1995, pp. 25ff). The ontological sub-ject-object split persisted, because it was notclearly changed into a pragmatic one, andthus the desire for MI-certainty (ii) contin-ued (cf. Glasersfeld 1991, [16]).

Post-Cartesian (enlightenment) episte-mologies were largely motivated as efforts toovercome such obstacles to the correction,but the attempts remained incomplete,

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andsome thinkers missed even that incompletechange. The so-called “Copernican Revolu-tion” of Kant (who showed that the subject’sactivity is needed for objective reality) wasignored or denied by many realists. Attemptswere often made (e.g., by logical positivists)to eliminate metaphysics, for instance bydeclaring metaphysical questions to be mean-ingless, or pseudo-problems. But this missedthe point that something similar is needed forthinking, as Kant had observed. Everyoneuses metaphysics-ontology.

The obstructive nature of MIR-belief isillustrated by the fact that even those verybright people who used it as the basis of theirthinking (and implied it to be the generalbasis of thought) were stymied by their wishto exclude the subject in studies that includedthe mind. At the present late stage of the revi-sion, we are trying to re-gain access to theoriginal structuring process (i) within experi-ence, and to make it work reliably when con-fronting uncertainty and ambiguity.

B. Radical constructivism

Von Glasersfeld’s work comes in at this point.He proposes replacing the search for postu-lated already-structured MIR-entities (ii) byshowing that structures are results of humanactivity (i). This change has re-opened theway for studies of basic structures. “Re-pre-sentations” point not to mind-independententities but to structures previously formedwithin experience. A typical example is the

construction of the concept of plural (the“awareness of having recognized [an item]more than once”; Glasersfeld 1985b [19]ff;1995, pp. 93f).

RC replaces metaphysics-ontology by“viability” of mind-and-world structures (a“tremendous shock for believers in represen-tation”; Glasersfeld 1995, p. 14). This meansbeing aware of the subject-inclusive opera-tional origin of concepts, and reflects theneeds of various scientific and practical disci-plines (such as linguistics, mathematics, edu-cation); it gives RC a broader than purelyphilosophical base. Constructivism is “amethod for knowing” (Glasersfeld 1995,p. 22); it requires a continuous effort of struc-turing and testing. Constructivism meansmore responsibility (Glasersfeld 1985a, p. 27;1991, [37]), both individual and collective. Itmeans creating working-structures asneeded; MIR-assumptions are redundant.

An epistemological view cannot be theresult of empirical findings, the latter alreadypre-suppose an opinion on where the struc-tures in experience come from. “[T]he theory

Ernst von Glasersfeld at the Douglas-McGill Symposium on “Mind-Construction-Brain”, organized by the author, Herbert Müller, on 28 September 2001 at Douglas Hospital in Montreal (Canada). (Photo by Douglas Hospital).


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of knowing does not depend on […] more orless empirical findings. […] It is based on thesimple realization that, as our thinking, ourconceptualizing, and our language are devel-oped from and in the domain of our experi-ence, we have no way of incorporating any-thing that lies beyond this domain”(Glasersfeld 2005, p. 11). “We can, of course,use metaphors to grope beyond our limits,but as these metaphors are not redeemable inthe experiential domain to which we haveaccess, they can never shed their status of ‘asif ’” (Glasersfeld 2001, [16]).

RC concerns fundamental aspects of epis-temology; it is not the same as “social con-struction,” although both have points in com-mon (Glasersfeld 1995, p. 141). Mostconcepts are socially shared, and dealing withsocial questions pre-supposes an epistemo-logical point of view.

C. Working metaphysics-ontology

To address the metaphysics difficulty moredirectly, one can go a step further by general-izing from the well-accepted scientificmethod of creating working-hypotheses: to“operational” or “working-” (or “as-if”-)metaphysics-ontology (working-reality and -truth). Re-interpreting inaccessible type (ii)mind-independent metaphysics-ontology asa type (i) working-tool gives it a status likethat of the language- and number-tools; themetaphysics puzzle dissolves. But the cer-tainty expected from type (ii) ontology-meta-physics dissolves as well (cf. parts G and Hbelow).

The operational or working-structures,including theories, do not exist outside struc-turing and (individual and collective) use,and thus remain in principle within reach andcomprehensible. They imply no (“ontic”)claims of mind-independent validity, andserve either circumscribed tasks, or else holis-tic purposes such as unity and communalityof experience. They can compete with eachother, but are mutually exclusive only in anoperational sense.

All reality needs structuring (deliberate ornot), and some of it requires inventing: art,language, or self-image need our invention;hurricanes and toothaches are structured butnot invented by humans; this opinion differs

from that of von Foerster (1992), and vonFoerster and von Glasersfeld (1999), whoappear to equate construction with invention.

The subject–object and subject–other dis-tinctions become structured too duringdevelopment (Jean Piaget; see Glasersfeld1991, [27]ff, 1995, Ch.3). Structures, and thedistinctions between them, originate inreflection, a pause in experience (Wilhelmvon Humboldt; Piaget; von Glasersfeld (2001,[25–36]).

Deconstruction-proofing, and back-up versus MIR-fallback

Working-structures cannot be deconstructedontologically (in the sense of Heidegger andDerrida) because they claim no ontic (pre-structured) base.

This enables the constructivist method toback up type (ii) views, which can be de-con-structed (for instance by showing that thenotion of fictitious inaccessible MIRs is notneeded for them, since they are extrapolatedfrom mental tools). This back-up function(that is, the working-structure is used toreplace the abandoned MIR-structure) mightbe a useful conceptual tool, for instance in sci-entific theory-building.

Since (ii) cannot back up (i), the relationbetween (i) and (ii) is asymmetrical. Whilebacking-up or replacing (ii) by (i) serves con-ceptual clarification, a move from (i) to (ii) isa fall-back – by default and/or by design –from responsible agency onto assumed mind-independent certainty provided by postu-lated guarantors.

The number of possible practical actionpatterns is increased in working-ontology:they are created as needed rather than deter-mined by fixed dogmata that pre-determineand restrict the choice.

Working-science

MIR-science (type (ii)) can be transformed toworking- (or as-if-)MIR-science (type (i)).Science neither needs, nor can it produce, tra-ditional metaphysics-ontology. “Science is thecollection of recipes and procedures thatalways work […] Our faith [in it] restsentirely on the certainty of reproducing orseeing again a certain phenomenon by meansof certain well-defined acts” (Paul Valéry,quoted by von Glasersfeld 1995, p. 117).

The physicist Percy Bridgman proposed(1927), like Piaget, that all concepts result

from subjects’ operations: however, he stilltalked about external nature, though he had“little to say about it,” and added “what thismeans we leave to the metaphysician todecide.” von Glasersfeld wrote that he isagnostic about a mind-external reality (1991abstract, [17]ff; 1995; etc.). It may be moreconsistent, I want to suggest, to define reality-structures (ontology-metaphysics) in princi-ple as ad-hoc working-tools only, even if theyare used on a permanent basis (Note 1 andpart C, above). Like words, numbers, trian-gles, and dimensions, they are there becausewe need and structure, posit, and use them:that solves the puzzle. Assumption of things-in-themselves that cannot be proved or dis-proved is redundant.

D. The encompassing: Subject-inclusiveness is fundamental

The inclusion of subjective experience in allknowledge is a central aspect of constructiv-ism (but does not imply solipsism = exclu-sive subjectivity without objectivity). “Allcognitive activity occurs within the experi-ence of goal-directed consciousness” (Gla-sersfeld 1985a, p. 31; but in principle at leastone needs to include all aspects of experi-ence; see below). There is no way of gettingout of subjectivity, either individually or col-lectively: the subject is an intrinsic compo-nent of all mental structures, such as con-cepts and theories. This is, in myunderstanding, a defining aspect of con-structivism, and needs to be kept at the cen-ter of efforts to deal with it.

In theories that exclude the mind (such astype (ii) exclusive objectivity) the subject(s)are likely to re-surface at some point. Exam-ples are the ad-hoc addition of “conscious-ness” in particle physics, or the “anthropicprinciple” in cosmology. But subject(s) mustbe included from the outset. If they areadded to a type (ii) view at a later time, as inthese instances, a return to a type (i) view isneeded in order to deal with an aura of arti-ficiality and an ontological subject–objectsplit.

This subject-aspect of experience too hashad a historical development in epistemol-ogy: in phenomenology and related efforts.

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Constructivist development beyond phenomenology

Subject-inclusiveness is a theme (“existential-ism”) of phenomenology since Kierkegaard(1843/2005). He rejected claims of mind-independent pre-structured truth and realityas not relevant for individual experience –Hegel’s (1807/1949) notion of the absolutespirit as well as science’s claim of the universalvalidity of exclusive MIR-objectivity.Nietzsche (1888) wrote that the idols of MIR-metaphysics were vanishing (“Götzen-Däm-merung”). Jaspers emphasized that experi-ence is “encompassing” (“the encompassingin which we are and which we are ourselves”;1991, p. 39). On the other hand, existential-ism without specialization can amount tofuzzy generalities;

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also, phenomenologistshave often suffered MIR-relapses.

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Constructivism is, inter alia, a furtherdevelopment of phenomenology, mainly intwo respects. Firstly, it examines how struc-tures (including goal-structures) are createdwithin experience; they are not (as phenome-nologists implied) discovered – there or else-where – in ready-made form. Secondly, it canaccommodate objective studies: theories andobjective methods develop within experienceas working- (or as-if-) MIR; this leads to ajoint subjective-objective (working) view.

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With its back-up ability (part C, above) con-structivism can combine both methods.

In principle, all other aspects of experi-ence (qualia, feeling and emotions, others,world, universe, the whole, the unstructuredcenter) must also be included in discussionsof experience, even when they are difficult tocommunicate, or at present not conscious;they can become conscious experience.

E. The subject is not observable

The subjective aspect of experience (or con-sciousness) has “to remain empiricallyinscrutable”; it cannot become objectivebecause “the reflecting self […] becomes thegovernor and cannot contemplate itself fromthe outside” as an object (Glasersfeld 2001,[32]). There is no subject in exclusively-objective studies. The unobservability of thesubject is a fundamental fact which is in prin-ciple recognized in constructivism, but usu-ally neglected in MIR-views. This point will

need consideration in the discussion of “sec-ond-order cybernetics” (below).

The mind-brain question cannot beapproached by MIR-views, because mindcannot be made into an object; as von Gla-sersfeld puts it (2001, [41]): “In order to dothat [understand consciousness objectively],I would have to step out of [consciousness],and at the same time remain conscious, inorder to face my own consciousness.” Brainfunction studies take place within theencompassing mind but cannot in turn reachthe mind. This does not mean that objectivestudies have no value, quite the opposite; butit means that subjective experience is pri-mary.

The relation of objective studies (forinstance of brain function, or of quantumphysics) to subjective experience (conscious-ness, observer, mind) is asymptotic, not oneof identity (notions like “the embodiedmind” or “the mind-brain” attempt to renderthe mind objective and thus imply a misun-derstanding of this relationship). Objectivefunctions can approach but not reach subjec-tivity, and in contrast to geometry, the differ-ence cannot be neglected without eliminat-ing ourselves, as happens in MIR-views.Words can become MIR-objects (for instanceas elements of grammar and syntax, inprinted form, etc.), and word-concepts too,but the ongoing experience which theyexpress cannot.

To accommodate experience, scientistsmust acknowledge that all working-struc-tures (and the distinctions between them)happen within mind or experience; keepingexperience at the center, without solipsism.When maintaining this awareness, one cansafely alternate between working-objectivity,working-idealism, working-subjectivity, etc.

The inverted thinking

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of MIR-belief is atypically human problem. Animals too struc-ture their own worlds (see Horvath 1997), butthe human capacity for distancing (reflec-tion) is greater, in part related to languageuse, i.e., the large-scale association of specificcommunicable sounds to images (Glasersfeld1995, Ch. 7; a classical example is Archi-medes, who was so distant from eventsaround him that he did not notice that aRoman soldier was going to kill him while hereflected on geometric problems).

The aim of the objective method is toeliminate observer-bias, not the observer.

F. Cybernetics, subjectivity, and objectivity

As a general principle, MIR-objectivitybecomes as-if-MIR-objectivity in construc-tivism. But there are some conceptual diffi-culties when goal-directedness is studied,which can be viewed objectively as well asdeveloped subjectively. This question comesup in second-order cybernetics, which isendorsed by a number of constructivists.

The information-mechanisms of von Foe-rster, Maturana, and others support the con-structivist view, but do not describe mind;they are mental structures within mind, likeall theories. Von Foerster’s “Principle ofUndifferentiated Encoding” (derived fromwork by the 19th century physiologist J.Müller on “nerve physics” and “specific senseenergy”; Glasersfeld 1995, p. 115; Riegler2005) says that neural activity encodes quan-titative information, not external reality. Thisis a negative statement about mental struc-tures, which still have to be created by a sub-ject. In positive terms: during dreaming,mental structures, including their meanings,are activated centrally rather than by periph-eral input (Ceccato, quoted by von Glasers-feld 1995 pp.97–98); the same applies for freeassociations, and pathological functions suchas hallucinations.

Systems in cybernetics and physics

The objective study of goal-directedness is thetopic of cybernetics, the work of NorbertWiener in physics, and of Heinz von Foersterin psycho-physiology, and their collabora-tors. Von Glasersfeld remarks (1995, p. 148)that cybernetics understands reality as aninteraction between observer and observed.“Cybernetics of cybernetics” (or second-order cybernetics), wants to introduce thesubject (mind) as an autonomous agent-sys-tem into cybernetics of biological systems (cf.Umpleby 1991, 2002). This is clearly animportant aim, but its conceptual aspect pre-sents difficulties that need discussion.

I as a subject can observe an observing sys-tem as an object. But what I observe is not thesubjective experience of the (observed)observing system, whether that refers to ananimal, another person, or even to myself inthe case where I can study my brain function


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as needed while (or after) I have various sub-jective experiences.

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(In contrast there aremany “autonomous” biological systems,including bee-hives and ant-colonies, thatcan be objectively studied but do not imply“subjectivity” or “consciousness” in the senseof the present discussion.)

One may compare these efforts with theearlier one of John von Neumann (cf. Baggott2004, p. 243), who found that to understandthe statistical nature of quantum-mechanics(QM) he had to re-introduce the subject intoQM, in terms of a “system III” (observer or“consciousness”) in addition to system I, theobject under study, and system II, the measur-ing device. But system III is not identical with,nor a part of, system II, and he concluded that“the probability wave collapses when it inter-acts with a consciousness.” An opaque con-clusion of this type may follow if one startsfrom naturalistic MIR-belief (that exclusiveobjectivity describes “the reality”); but since itis not comprehensible, it has not made QMunderstandable. The word “consciousness”not withstanding, the “system III” is likely tobe understood in MIR-terms, because sys-tems are objects of thinking. The difficultiespersist in that field (quite “officially” inexpressions like “quantum weirdness” –uncertainty, wave-particle duality,Schrödinger’s cat, etc. – ; cf. for instance Lind-ley 1996; constructivists might counter thatthe weird aspect is the MIR-view; see also thesection on gestalt-tools, below).

The same conceptual difficulty emerges insecond-order cybernetics and might interferewith its acceptance. Experience is primary,theories and observations occur within it.The problem is the incomprehensibility ofMIR-belief (objectivity) itself, which vonNeumann retained because he did not explic-itly abandon it, and which is also implied instudies of cybernetic systems.

G. Reliability of mental tools

With the change from type (ii) to type (i)epistemology, the questions of reliability andcertainty become prominent, since the pos-tulated external guarantor dissolves. Ernstvon Glasersfeld has presented descriptionsof how some mental tools are created, and oftheir properties. Since mental structures are

the nuts and bolts of mental function, I willbriefly discuss a few of them here, followingvon Glasersfeld’s procedures, with emphasison the question of their reliability.

Regularities, laws, and the method of reason

Outside of religion and politics, certaintyrefers mostly to natural laws (“regularities”in nature), which we experience and struc-ture, in the same way as object-constancy insubject-inclusive operations (Glasersfeld1985a, pp. 31ff; Glasersfeld 1995, p. 128).Natural laws are reliable, not dependent onMIR-theistic beliefs, and are commonlybelieved to result from type (ii) MIR. But itturns out that they can be modified whenneeded; this shows them to be type (i) as-if-MIR laws.

After abandoning MIR-ontology, itremains that “only reason can protect manfrom fanaticism and superstition” (Kant).Reason still means clarification of thinking,sorting out helpful from unhelpful mentalstructures. The reasoning method “de-con-structs” non-viable structures and makes uslook for better ones. – As von Glasersfeld hasmentioned, Kant himself came close to atype (i) view in his opus postumum. Relatedto this question is von Glasersfeld’s work onthe operational analysis of the basic steps inmathematics and abstraction.

Arithmetic tools

In a recently “revisited” study, von Glasers-feld (1995, Ch. 5, Ch. 9; 2006) discussed theoperational foundations of structures inarithmetic. After structuring the concept of“plural” (see part B, above), a simple arith-metical statement like 3 + 4 = 7 can be“unpacked” into the operations of countingtwo collections of items. Then by coordinat-ing a number-word sequence with them, andconsidering the two collections as one, onearrives at the same result every time.

The mathematical reliability is based onwhat von Glasersfeld calls (2006, p. 68) a“hypothetical trick,” a non-mathematicalprocedure that is “abstracted.” “The cer-tainty of the results […] springs on the onehand from the fact that one operates in ahypothetical mode and therefore obligesoneself not to question what one has hypoth-esized; and on the other hand, on implicitfaith in one’s memory of meanings attrib-

uted, of operations carried out, and of resultsthey produced.”

This analysis shows the operational originof arithmetic procedures and other algo-rithms, and consequent reliabilities that onetends to take for granted; it also epitomizesthe RC-method. The “hypothetical trick” canbe taken as a prototype of type (ii) MIR-pos-tulates and beliefs, as well as of their type (i)“working” equivalents.

Geometric tools

Von Glasersfeld (2006, pp. 66–67) also offersan operational basis for geometric conceptssuch as point (“the center of attention”), line(“drawing”), or plane (“moving a line side-ways”).

Like numbers, the geometric entities arenot found; they are human mind-and-worldworking-tools structured and used for deal-ing with experience, and for stabilization.The mentioned reasoning for “point” in par-ticular is of the mental-operation type anddoes not even involve motor action; in theorya point “has zero dimensions.” They are ele-ments of the gestalt-operation in geometry.(However, if one physically draws a point, aline, or a plane, the result always has proper-ties that in principle require treatment asthree-dimensional objects, though the addi-tional ones are usually “neglected”; Glasers-feld 1995, p. 185; drawings are imperfect,though still effective, means to communicatemental structures, which are implied to bethe same for all.)

But then, how real are points, or lines?They are in the mind, like all mathematicalstructures (cf. Lakoff & Núñez 2000); objec-tive aspects are their working derivatives thatcan for many purposes be handled as-if theywere MIR units. The visual system has objec-tive mechanisms to detect objective points,lines, and edges.

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They are the physiologicalbasis for the corresponding mind-and-world-tools of the structuring subject, ele-ments of gestalt-formations. With points andlines, one can draw a tree, a house, or ahuman face; but these objects are not made ofpoints or lines, nor of gestalt entities; evenless of the underlying physiology. Extrapolat-ing from here, one can draw triangles, circles,cubes, asymptotes, etc., tools for exploratorytasks in structuring and handling visualexperience, together with other visual toolssuch as color, or tactile ones such as solidity,

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etc. The tools are elements of subject-inclu-sive working-reality, just as numbers orworking-metaphysics (and indeed all mind-and-world structures) are.

Gestalt-tools and MIR-reference

Our notion of the world is predominantlyvisual. Visual gestalt formations have a qual-ity of permanence and definition that is lack-ing in probabilistic reliability. With thegestalt-tools we can package experience intoitems suitable for handling and communica-tion. When words are attached to them, theycan become metaphysical entities, becausewords, as communication tools, have a built-in supra-individual aspect: the word-gestaltconcepts lend themselves to a mis-interpreta-tion of universality and absoluteness, ifdesired. In that way, type (i) statistical reli-ability can give way to a leap to type (ii) cer-tainty of MIR-knowledge. The Pythagoreansnot withstanding, numbers are less likelythan gestalt-formations to be consideredidentical to or referring to a fictitious MIR-world.

But evidently the reliability of gestalt-tools is limited: on TV a forward moving carmay show its wheels turning backward. How-ever, we see what we know (“it isn’t so”), andthat corrects the problem. Gestalt-tools arealso used in trying to interpret the double-slitexperiment of QM (cf. Baggott 2004; Lindley1996). One may ask whether macroscopicgestalt-notions such as “corpuscle” and“wave” are valid (viable) here (and mutuallyexclusive). Physicists tell us that QM has reli-able mathematical procedures, but is difficultor impossible “to understand” (presumablyin visual gestalt terms). In using a visualimage of reality, one needs to remain aware ofthe limitations of visual gestalt tools.

H. Probabilistic reliability versus leaps of faith to certainty, and the question of relativism

The procedures are more reliable for countingthan elsewhere: the operations of arithmeticare simple (“digital,” even if you do not counton your fingers) and can be repeated by any-

one, with identical results if procedural mis-takes are avoided. But, as von Glasersfeld hasshown (see above), in mathematics too thereis a difference between reliability of procedureand certainty of faith. Certainties are derivedfrom posited and certified (MIR-) structuresthat are no longer scrutinized and may evenbe out of awareness. That can facilitate lifemuch, at variable risk.

One posits an ad-hoc working-hypothesis(or accepts an intuition, revelation or, mostcommonly, an authority’s opinion or com-mand at face value), certifies it as reliable(true, real) by leap of faith, and/or by aban-doning critical thinking, and in turn derivescertainty from the certified – and often exter-nalized – structure. The certainty procedureinvolves forgetting and/or excluding fromawareness (1) the circularity of the operation,(2) the MI-step, and often also (3) the leap-of-faith. These steps mark the differencebetween reliability of procedures and cer-tainty.

Knowledge is probabilistic except for suchleaps of faith; numbers can sometimes makethe probability more precise. In contrast, cer-tified structures are the only available sourceof persistent certainty, including in mathe-matics. They are results of human postulates,leaps of faith, circular reasoning, and forget-ting. In some instances, the name of the trickought to be self-deception. The constructiv-ist insight undoes the forgetting; thereaftercertainty retains awareness of its risk (i.e.,doubt).

For certainty, type (ii) knowledge (leap toMIR-belief) is effective, but it may interferewith critical thinking; for all other purposestype (i) knowledge (such as constructivism)is more helpful.

The rejection of MIR-belief may evoke afear of relativism – that reality and truthdepend on arbitrary opinions. But working-structures cannot remain arbitrary, sincethey can be maintained only if they are viable.Social structures can be more varied, butdepend on consensus, such as concerningexpected effectiveness. For instance, UnitedNations decisions may at times be inade-quate, but they are probably not arbitrary;another example is the confidentiality of pro-fessionals toward their clients, an expectationand standard that is documented in rules ofconduct, but does not have to imply MIR-belief.

I. Automata and inversion of agency

The use of automata is closely related to theleap of faith to an MIR-view.

Von Glasersfeld quotes Gottlob Frege(who triggered the development of analyticphilosophy) on mathematical abstractions(2006, p. 65): “the things that we numbermust be distinguishable, whereas the[abstract] units of arithmetic are not.”

Since the subject is omitted, this statement(“are not”) omits the operational aspect.Frege appears to have seen the result of “abs-tracting” (= “taking away” from the eventsthat gave rise to it) as pre-structured, notoperational. It would then not only be extrap-olated from a specific procedure and general-ized (a “placeholder” with some flexibility ofconcept-images, Glasersfeld 1995, pp. 91ff),but also be mind-independently automated,taken away from the subject’s activity.

If the acts of counting are considered oneat a time, the arithmetic units are not identi-cal. Each can be made distinguishable by pay-ing attention to it, but they are usually treatedas identical. The operational question is: howmuch can and should we distinguish? Treat-ing numbers and numerical relations as iden-tical, as mind-independent and trustworthyalgorithms or automata, can be our (the sub-jects”) view, deliberately or by default. Com-puters are used on that basis: the subject s’ actis delegated to trusted automata (Glasersfeld2006, note 15). The automation can haveramifications that, even in mathematics, areat first unexpected, such as infinity, imaginarynumbers, or negative probabilities. But thesubject-agent remains, in principle, a constit-uent part of the process (Glasersfeld 1995,pp. 96ff).

Implied (mind-independent) automatismof logical-mathematical symbols, withimplied completeness-in-themselves, seemsto be a feature of analytic philosophy in itspursuit of truth. This aspect disappears whenit is acknowledged that the mind encom-passes these tool-structures; then the com-pleteness is in the mind, but its center cannotbe structured (see part J, below).

Delegation of responsibility to automata ofvarious kinds (including airplanes, the postalservice, governments, but also to some wehave not invented, like the functions of ourown bodies) is inevitable: because we have no


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choice, for instance, and/or because our atten-tion has limits. But this trust and inversion ofagency may become counter-productive if theautomata fail or develop unexpected func-tions and place us in the position of a sorcerer’sapprentice, who tries to re-gain control.

In view of the ever-increasing amount ofobjective (actually how-to) information, it isperhaps the most difficult aspect of the con-structivist view to remain aware of the pri-macy of ongoing (subjective) experience. Inpractice we can delegate agency (and respon-sibility) on a temporary (or as-if) basis, butsimultaneously acknowledge that in principlewe remain responsible throughout.

9

J. Holistic structures

Belief systems are also used for certainty bytrying to structure experience as a whole, withthe help of postulated overall structures.Indeed, if the whole is not included in someway (at least in principle) the view is incom-plete.

Mystery, rationalism, and the unstructured center

Holistic structures include the subjective cen-ter of ongoing experience, which cannotbecome structured; that would require animpossible objectivity and packaging of sub-jective experience. Positive holistic structuresare consequently inevitably paradoxical ormystical, but may be adopted by means ofabsolute belief, in order to obtain overallmeaning and stability via a leap of faith(“credo quia absurdum,” Tertullian). The par-adoxes may, however, prevent some peoplefrom accepting theism and other positiveholistic beliefs. But constructivism canaccommodate holism, and may offer a way todissolve the paradoxes.

For one, constructivism can back up posi-tive holistic structures (which are put onhold). This consideration does not make mys-ticism rational (cf. Glasersfeld 1995 pp. 24ff),and does not justify irrational behaviour, butit provides a rational understanding of thepresence and irrational function of mysti-cism. Namely, that the irrationality is a conse-quence of the unstructured origin withinwhich all rational thinking takes place.

And secondly, holism and the objectivemethod can both be tools in experience with

a negative center. Non-theistic (and non-positive) stability practices are used success-fully in some cultures, with the help of med-itation. They have an unstructured (nega-tive) center-point such as nirvana (which isfree of paradoxes). Seen from there, positivetheistic structures appear as imperfect pre-liminary tools, a temporary convenience onthe way to the goal of dealing more directlywith the unstructured center (cf. Percheron1958, pp. 38–40).

The reliable rational logical (language)and mathematical (counting) methods onthe other hand cannot offer the overallcoherence of a holistic view with inclusion ofsubjective experience, nor can the objectivemethod (which usually implies the gestalt =reality view) do this. The ex-positivist PaulFeyerabend wrote (1999, pp. 32–33) “[i]fdiscourse is defined as a sequence of clearand distinct propositions […] then dis-course has a very short breath indeed, […] Ifthe history of thought depended on a dis-course of this kind, then it would consist ofan ocean of irrationality interrupted, briefly,by mutually incommensurable islands ofsense.” But just that is the start-point of con-structivism: we do not try to find senseready-made, we have to make sense withinthe unstructured.

10

K. Conclusion: Constructivism in the history of epistemology

Constructivism restores to epistemology theunstructured origin of thinking, and the sub-ject(s) as agent(s) of all structure-formationand -use. The pre-structured reality view isthen no longer an end-point for epistemology(Whitehead had suggested that all occidentalphilosophy is a footnote to Plato), instead ithas been a long-term but nevertheless tempo-rary means for obtaining certainty from pos-tulated (mostly mind-external) authorities:the viability concept of Ernst von Glasers-feld’s Radical Constructivism is a step beyondthis stage. Rather than maintaining MIR-belief for certainty, it helps to de-constructontology; one can then use viable experience-structures and achieve stability of stance andreliability of grasp by operational (and co-operational) means.

In this way, constructivism can offer acomplete view (of “life,” of “reality”).

Many conceptual aspects of constructivism(some of which have been briefly discussed inthis paper) will need further scrutiny. Exam-ples are, among others, the relation of struc-turing to inventing; of constructivism andphenomenology to cybernetics; the relevanceof constructivism for science and teaching; theoperational basis of basic concepts; reliabilityof mental tools versus certainty by circular rea-soning plus forgetting where it comes from;the differences between “Anglo-American”and “Continental” opinions on the need toinclude ongoing experience; agnosticism ver-sus redundancy of ontology; the back-upfunction of constructivism. One would, ofcourse, also want to consider the work of otherconstructivists, and of non-constructivists, intheory formation. These are important –though not easy – questions; but dealing withthem could, besides increasing responsibility,also make life more interesting.

Herbert F. J. Müller, born 1924 in Cologne, studied medicine at the University of Cologne (Dr. med., 1951). Medical intern-ship and postgraduate training (psychiatry, neurology, electroencephalography) in New Jersey, New York, Rio de Janeiro, Düs-seldorf, and at McGill University in Montreal (Associate Prof. of Psychiatry). Now retired from clinical work at Douglas Hospital, Montreal. – Studying the mind-brain rela-tion, it became clear to me in 1994 that to access this question the notion of pre-struc-tured mind-independent reality must be abandoned. As this requires a more general review of concept use and epistemological questions, I started editing the Karl Jaspers Forum http://www.kjf.ca/ in 1997. In 1999 I became aware of radical constructivism (chiefly the work of Ernst von Glasersfeld), which has many features in common with my present work. A symposium on the mind-brain relation, in which von Glasers-feld participated, took place at the Douglas Hospital (McGill University) in September 2001. My present work concerns the con-ceptual basis of this point of view – which I label “structuring with zero-derivation” or “zero-reference” – and its relation to other areas.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3 79

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Notes

1. A recent description of my position ofzero-derivation (0-D) of mind-and-worldstructures and of the inversion of thinking(i.e., relegation of agency to outside thesubject) can be found in Müller (2005). Asmentioned in various contexts in thepresent paper, it differs in some respectsfrom von Glasersfeld’s opinion, and Ihope this can be understood as a contribu-tion to discussion rather than criticism.

2. I employ the term “entity” or “structure”here as a general expression for mentaltools, for instance concepts, theories, butalso more basic ones such as words, num-bers, gestalt-formations, objects, and in-cluding qualia as well.

3. In case they are understood as workingstructures, the two possibilities interactand complement each other. – Similar isthe Chinese distinction (3rd century BC)between (i) the dark weak force (Yin), and(ii) the bright strong force (Yang), andtheir interaction.

4. Empiricists, positivists, and realists havetended to continue using traditional type(ii) metaphysics-ontology (“every idea isthe idea of a being,” wrote Hume – proba-bly a mind-independent being); but mostalso insisted that they did not use meta-physics, because it had “no meaning.”Kant claimed that things-in-themselvesare “necessary for reason,” not experi-enced (as noumena). Phenomenologistswanted to discover structures withoutmaking ontological assumptions, but fellback onto ontological positions of one oranother type. Heidegger even declaredthat “phenomenology is ontology” (1953,p. 37); this actually implies that phenom-ena = noumena, apparently without giv-

ing up the idea of absolute validity ofnoumena; and furthermore that thesenoumena can be known.

5. The mathematician Kurt Reidemeister(1954) saw existentialism as non-objective(“unsachlich”), avoiding obligations(“unverbindlich”), and (p.24) includingmystical thinking. These features resultfrom dealing with subjectivity, which can-not become objective. But he criticized thephenomenologists without mentioningthe views of his fellow-mathematician andphenomenologist Edmund Husserl, whoadvocated a view of essences (“Wesens-Schau”).

6. A switch to working-ontology helps to ad-dress the mind-brain relation question:knowledge of brain activity develops with-in the mind, not vice versa (see my TargetArticle 45 in the Karl Jaspers Forum http://www.kjf.ca/).

7. Let us say that in some years from now itwill be possible for you to undergo a brainscan which simultaneously measuresblood flow, electrical and chemical neu-ronal activity, and informational aspectsof brain activity. If that gives a reasonablycomplete assessment of what your braindoes (the functions of many interactingbrain systems in fact) while you are in var-ious subjective activities (experiences) ofperceiving, thinking, feeling, remember-ing, meditating, alertness, drowsiness,etc., is any of this, or some mathematicalexpression of a combination of the mea-sures, the same as what you experience? Topose this question is to answer “no” – Iwould think. But there are some realistswho claim that brain, or brain activity,equals mind.

8. The philosopher Alva Noë (2006) ob-serves that the work of Hubel and Wiesel

has been conducted on the erroneous as-sumption that vision is a passive event inthe brain.

9. This can lead to a correction procedure forinverted thinking. As one example ofmany: when it is suggested that the mind(subjective experience) has to originate ina theory, it is readily shown that this is im-possible because theories originate in themind, and not vice versa.

10.Holistic structures (of instrumental “rea-son”) cannot without self-contradictionbridge irrationality, which is an essentialaspect of theism (“credo quia absur-dum”). The Pope has recently (2006)pleaded for a connection between faithand reason, mainly by referring to the in-fluence of the Hellenistic “logos” on theGospel according to St. John (“In princip-io erat verbum, et verbum erat apudDeum, et Deus erat verbum”, Nestle &Aland 1963). He hoped for a widening ofthe concept of scientific reason, so as to in-clude faith. But he did not explain how todo that; and the Vatican has in the pastemphasized that, to believe in God, an“ontological leap of faith” is required. Thetwo requirements (coherent reason andontological leap of faith) are not mutuallycompatible. – This type of difficulty is notconfined to theisms; it supervenes also inMIR-naturalistic views which are extend-ed to holisms, such as when the block-uni-verse is said to render free will impossible(cf. TA91 in the Karl Jaspers Forum http://www.kjf.ca/). The use of the block-uni-verse notion usually implies a type (ii) be-lief that “physical reality has fourdimensions,” rather than “can in some re-gards best be handled using four dimen-sions,” as one would say in a type (i)constructivist view.

References

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Bridgman, P. (1927) The logic of modernphysics. MacMillan: New York. Introduc-tion and first chapter retrieved from http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/

philosophy/works/us/bridgman.htm on30 June 2006.

Feyerabend, P. K. (1999) Conquest of abun-dance. A tale of abstraction versus the rich-ness of being. (Edited by Bert Terpstra).University of Chicago Press: Chicago.

Foerster, H. von (1992) Ethics and second-order cybernetics. Cybernetics & HumanKnowing 1: 9–19. French original pub-lished in 1991 in: Ray, Y. & Prieur, B. (eds.)Système, ethique. Perspectives en thérapie

familiale. ESF editeur: Paris, pp. 41–55.Foerster, H. von & Glasersfeld, E. von (1999)

Wie wir uns erfinden. Carl Auer: Heidel-berg.

Glasersfeld, E. von (1985a) Einführung in denradikalen Konstruktivismus. In: Watzlaw-ick, P. (ed.) Die erfundene Wirklichkeit.Wie wissen wir, was wir zu wissenglauben? Piper: München, pp. 16–38.English version: Glasersfeld, E. von (1984)An introduction to radical constructivism.


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Glasersfeld, E. von (1985b) L’approche cons-tructiviste: Vers une théorie des représen-tations. Séminaire sur la représentation,21 novembre 1985, no 7, CIRADE, Uni-versité du Québec à Montréal. Publishedin: Jonnaert, P. & Masciotra, D. (eds.)(2004) Constructivisme, choix contem-porains. Hommage à Ernst von Glasers-feld. Presses de I’Université du Québec:Sainte Foy, pp. 213–224. Posted, with anEnglish translation by H. F. J. Müller, asTarget Article 73 in the Karl Jaspers Forumhttp://www.kjf.ca/ on 31 July 2004.

Glasersfeld, E. von (1991) Knowing withoutmetaphysics: Aspects of the radical con-structivist position. In: Steier F. (ed.)Research and reflexivity. Sage Publica-tions: London, pp. 12–29. Posted in theKarl Jaspers Forum http://www.kjf.ca/ asTarget Article 17 on 4 May 1999.

Glasersfeld, E. von (1995) Radical construc-tivism. A way of knowing and learning.Studies in mathematics education series 6.Falmer Press: London.

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Glasersfeld, E. von (2005) Thirty years radicalconstructivism. Constructivist Founda-tions 1(1): 9–12.

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approach to experiential foundations ofmathematical concepts revisited. Con-structivist Foundations 1(2): 61–72.

Hegel, G. W. F. (1949) Phänomenologie desGeistes. Felix Meiner: Leipzig. Originallypublished in 1807.

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Horvath, P. (1997) Jakob von Uexküll. VonMückensonnen und Umweltröhren.Retrieved from http://members.surfeu.at/patrick.horvath/uex.htm on 30 June 2006.

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Lakoff, G. & Núñez, R. E. (2000) Where math-ematics comes from. Basic Books: NewYork.

Lindley, D. (1996) Where does the weirdnessgo? Why quantum mechanics is strange,but not as strange as you think. BasicBooks: New York.

Müller, H. F. J. (2005) People, tools, andagency: Who is the kybernetes? Construc-tivist Foundations 1(1): 35–48.

Nietzsche, F. W. (1994) Der Fall Wagner.Götzen-Dämmerung. Nietzsche contraWagner (Edited by P. Pütz). Goldmann:Munich. Orginally published 1888–1889.

Noë, A. (2006) Beyond the eye. Review of D.H. Hubel & T. Wiesel, Brain and visual

function. The story of a twenty-five yearcollaboration. Times Literary Supplement(5 May 2006): 12–13.

Nestle, E. & Aland, K. (1963) Novum Testa-mentum Graece et Latine. 22nd edition.Württembergische Bibelanstalt: Stuttgart.Originally published in 1903.

Percheron, M. (1958) Buddha in Selbstzeug-nissen und Bilddokumenten. (Translatedby J. Rassat). Rowohlt: Hamburg.

Pope Benedict XVI (2006) Glaube, Vernunft,Universität. Papstrede an der Uni Regens-burg. http://www.radiovaticana.org/ted/Articolo.asp?c=94864

Reidemeister, K. (1954) Die Unsachlichkeitder Existenzphilosophie. Vier kritischeAufsätze. Springer: Berlin.

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Umpleby, S. (1991) Strategies for winningacceptance of second order cybernetics.Presented at the international symposiumon systems research, informatics andcybernetics. Baden-Baden, Germany,August 12–18, 1991. Posted as Target Arti-cle 87 in the Karl Jaspers Forum http://www.kjf.ca/ on 11 March 2006.

Umpleby, S. (2002) The design of intellectualmovements. Published in the proceedingsof the annual meeting of the InternationalSociety for the Systems Sciences, Beijing,China, August 2–6, 2002. Posted as TargetArticle 86 in the Karl Jaspers Forum http://www.kjf.ca/ on 11 March 2006.

Received: 1 July 2006Accepted: 2 March 2007


“Anyone for Tennis?” – Conversations with Ernst on Being Sporting about Epistemology

hile I was in New York for the tennistournament at Flushing Meadows in

August 2005, as part of my work with tennisprofessionals, I decided to take time out to goup to Amherst to visit Ernst and engage himin more conversations about how radical con-structivism can be useful. In this case on howit might help me in my work with the tennisplayers’ usual range of problems with theirperformance during the tournament. Theseproblems include attentional control wherethe player needs to be able to manage selectiveattention effectively (the ability to keepfocused on what is most important whilescreening out all else) and also to manage con-centration (the ability to sustain focusedattention for long periods of time). Failure tomanage these and to fall into “distraction” ofone type or another results in unforced errors.One of the main “distractions” is “over-think-ing.” During the learning process, it is obvi-ously necessary to consciously analyse newtechniques, new strokes and so on, but thesame kind of cognitive attention in a realmatch situation can be fatal to one’s chancesof winning. The correct form of focus in thetennis game is non-conscious.

I call these problems ones of “self-inter-ruption” in that the player interferes withtheir own performance by allowing theirattention to focus on something whichought to remain “invisible.” One youngfemale player was showing an extremelyerratic service; sometimes hitting a series ofaces in her game, sometimes a series of dou-ble-faults. I thought I noticed something too“focused” in her way of making the habitual“test-bouncing” of the ball on the courtbefore launching it in the air for the service.When I inquired with her about what shewas so focused on, she admitted, embar-rassedly, that her five “test-bounces” weredone in such a way that the first four bounces

of the ball marked the four corners of a per-fect square. As if this form of “square design-ing” on the floor of the clay court was not badenough, she explained that the fifth bouncehad to land dead centre in this square. Shefelt that if she managed to bounce the fifthball perfectly centred – a “bull’s eye” – thenshe would hit a great service. If not, then shewould probably make a poor service, or evena double-fault.

Now it is clear that all of this incredibletension and “superstitious behaviour” is noway to be planning your service game, butnonetheless many players have idiosyncratic“tics” and ritualistichabits embedded in theirgame. This is OK until itreaches the level of self-interruption that thisyoung player showed. My friend and col-league Corrado Barazzutti who is a previousworld-class tennis player (who was in the topseven at the time when ahead of him wereBorg, Connors, McEnroe, Vilas, Gerulaitis,Edberg, Lendl and other all-time greats) hadhis own paralysing experience in a tourna-ment in the 1980s when he was unable to stopthe preliminary ball-bouncing. It was not thathe bounced the ball 5, 7 or even 15 times – hewas simply caught in the preliminary windingup action for the service which had become aloop in itself, and he was not able to bring thepreliminary ball-bouncing to a stop. In theend he had to serve under-arm as childrenhave to do at the beginning.

So I brought these types of problems toErnst, ever insisting that RC shows itself to beuseful and not just a model of knowing. Withgreat patience Ernst always agrees to humourme in these conversations (many of which willin the end form a part of the book that he andI have been writing over the past three years ormore) and what follows below is a transcrip-

tion of some passages of the resulting conver-sations which I recorded on videotape at hishome.

Vincent Kenny:

In a certain sense, what I amdealing with here is a “mind-body” conflicton the part of the tennis player. His “mind”interferes with the otherwise smooth perfor-mance of his “body.” This is what I call “self-interruption.” What is a sensible view of themind-body issue from the radical construc-tivism point of view?

Ernst von Glasersfeld:

No less! (laughs) Well, Ihave no proper model for that. Because the

mind in a way is con-sciousness, and I acceptconsciousness as anexperiential fact, but I’veno idea how it works. I

don’t think anyone has. There have been sev-eral books written about this in the past 5 or 6years – I looked at some of them – they are all… it’s a playing with metaphors, there is nohandle on it. I’ve always said that to me it ispart of the mystical, and there is nothing I cansay about that. Except that I know certainways in which it works – that’s the wrong wayof putting it – rather I know certain effects itcan produce, but how it does that I don’tknow.

So when you ask about mind-body rela-tion in terms of psychosomatic influences,well I don’t know how they work. One has toaccept them experientially, as you say with thetennis players. But if you play golf it is muchworse, because in golf you have 5 minutesbetween each shot, where you can imaginewhat you want to do, and what you could dothat would be bad, so that by the time that yougo to hit that ball, if you let that go on, you seethat its not going to work. It is like meditation,you have to let your mind go altogether if youwant to play golf.

Vincent Kenny

A

Accademia Costruttivista di Terapia Sistemica (Italy) <[email protected]>

W

anecdotal


OPINION

How much patience does it take to be a constructivist?


OPINION

anecdotal


In tennis as well!

EVG:

Yes, but in tennis at least it is a constantthing, you are active all the time. In golf youare not because the walking in between theshots doesn’t keep you busy. So I don’t knowwhat to tell you…

You have written about a radical construc-tivist

frame of mind

, where you talk of theneed to rebuild a number of concepts from aradical constructivism point of view – con-cepts like “knowledge,” “truth,” “communi-cation,” “understanding” and so on. Thatfrom a radical constructivism point of viewthese have to be redefined. Would you saysomething about this task, about this frameof mind?

EVG:

I think that one starting point is the real-isation that

whatever

reality is like, we cannotfind out. We can make… – not even

hypothet-ical

models because hypothetical models aremodels that you think you will be able to verifyat some point –… with reality you cannot dothat, they are fictions. Kant I think had a verygood expression he called “heuristic fictions,”and that is what reality is. He said that of the“thing in itself” which most readers of Kantdon’t take in, that it is a fiction. They think thatKant has anchored himself in reality with the“thing-as-such” or the “thing-in-itself.” Butthis is nonsense, he didn’t. He considered it auseful heuristic fiction.

So if you start with the notion that youcannot find out what reality islike, you automatically have tomodify your concept of truth,because traditionally truth isan exact replica of reality.What is correct is if it is “like reality.” You can’thave that anymore. So what is truth? Truthbecomes what I call viability – it is what youhave found to be working, to be successful.

Now how do you establish what is success-ful? That’s rather complicated because thereare several dimensions on which it can besuccessful. It can be successful in that it justworks this time – but you don’t know if it willwork tomorrow again or not. So viability – inthe sense that you apply it to action patternsor thought patterns – is built up in time. Asthey are successful on more than one occa-sion they become more reliable.

You see that’s the one thing that Popper,who was a great man, never realised that. Hehad such a thing about

inductive inference

–

that it didn’t give truth – he didn’t see that

whatever

we do is based on inductive infer-ence. Meaning that we look back and we askourselves “what has worked,” and in thissense you establish a number of action andthought patterns that you consider reliable,but there again you mustn’t think that theyare absolutely reliable. The moment maycome when they are nolonger reliable. So thatdoes away with truth.

Talking about viabil-ity…

EVG:

It is very com-plex because viabilityalso has a subjectivecomponent.

Who

decides what is viable?

You

decide. And I think that becomes veryclear if you take the example of people inprison – some people have been in prison foryears, and manage perfectly well to live. Theymay have regretted all sorts of things but theydid not lose their sanity, they didn’t becomefundamentally damaged by it. Whereas oth-ers can’t manage to find a viable way of livingin prison. So, it is subjective too in that sensethat it is you who decides what is viable.

There must be a lot of different bases fordeciding what is viable. One obvious one is“bodily sensations.” If I feel good then that’s

good enough. I probablydon’t have to think toomuch about it. If I feel badthen I have a choice…. I canadapt to it, or I can lower my

criteria. I can decide. It is how I see mostpeople living, by accepting and adapting tothings that they really shouldn’t accept.

EVG:

They have reduced their expectationsand everything.

So reducing expectations is one way ofdeciding if something is viable – you “settlefor less.” There must be several differentcriteria you could specify that people usehabitually for deciding viability?

EVG:

Well I’m sure there are many ways ofdoing it. For me perhaps the most importantwas learning to focus my attention where Iwant it to be. That you don’t allow your atten-tion to focus on things that you don’t want. Ifyou have a twisted ankle, you stop focusing

attention on the ankle. It is part of relaxation.When I was quite young and skiing muchmore than I do now, I met a chap who wasone of the coaches. There was an avalancheaccident somewhere fairly close to us. Fourpeople were dug out 36 hours later. All alive,but two of them had very bad frostbite andlost toes and whatnot. But the other two

didn’t. And the coachsaid that the two whodidn’t have the frost-bite damage were thetwo who had prac-tised autogenic relax-ation – that kept theircirculation goingwhile being buriedunder the snow. Thatimpressed all of us

enormously because avalanches were some-thing that were very close to us always. So welearned a little bit of that.

… of the autogenic training?

EVG:

Yes. It is very primitive really, there’snothing mysterious to it. You just learn torelax bit by bit, your fingers and toes etc,until you lie quite flat and nothing moves. Ifyou do that seriously for 3 or 4 weeks, youcan manage to go asleep whenever you wantto, which is an enormous advantage. I don’tknow that I would survive an avalanche, butit serves your purpose when you go to thedentist for instance. You just relax com-pletely and you take your mind off yourteeth. It doesn’t kill the pain but it makes itmuch more bearable. I think that’s an impor-tant thing – it should be given to peoplewhen they are children. This is somethingwhich some of the oriental philosophyimplies, the Buddhist notion of cutting outthe self, and all that. That’s a form of freeingyour attention.

It is what I try to do with the tennis players– to redirect their attention away from neg-ative thoughts, from being impatient withthemselves etc… How much patience doesit take to be a constructivist?

EVG:

Well it takes a long time to be consis-tent. It’s very easy I think to pick up the firstideas of constructivism, but then to

apply

them to your daily thinking

that

takes a longtime. But they say it takes seven years to playgolf, it takes longer to be a constructivist.

It’s very easy I think to pick up the first ideas of constructivism, but then to apply them to your daily thinking that takes a long time. But they say it takes seven years to play golf, it takes longer to be a constructivist

Who decides what is viable?

You

decide

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How much longer?

EVG:

I think that’s individual. I still findmyself occasionally saying things – (laughs) Ilaugh at the moment I say them (“how couldyou say that?” I ask myself) – well that’s after40 years! I remember Ceccato who had beenat it for a long time in his own way – he didn’tcall it constructivism – but taking the notionthat you can’t talk about “reality,” he some-times after a lecture came and said “howcould I have said that” (having talked of “real-ity”). Because you see the habits of speech,the habits of expression that you have growninto before you ever thought of epistemologyor anything like that, they are very strong.

You

deal with tennis players, if you tell a playerwho is fairly good but not good enough tochange the grip on his racket, how long doesit take for him to really get into that, to do itautomatically?

A long time.

EVG:

With tennis I would say at least severalweeks.

Oh yeah. This is a good example because inthe last few years I have seen a number ofplayers who have had to try to change theirservice because their way of serving was noteffective, with too low a percentage of firstservice balls effectively in play. What he hasto do is to unlearn all those habits of serv-ing…

EVG:

(interrupts) excuse me, but what he hasto do is to undo connections that are auto-matic, they are not conscious … and that’s thedifficulty.

Yes, and that’s a big suffering – to undo non-conscious habits. And the immediate conse-quence is that his game gets much worse. Sohe plays much worse because he now has noservice game at all. In order to change hisservice, the player has to re-learn the newservice in the real game context – in theactual tournament situation. This meansthat the player has to turn up in the variouscountries following the ATP programme tosign up for the tournament knowing that hecannot win it. He also has to see himselfdrop in the world rankings – losing his ATPpoints and so on. A lot of players get too ner-vous, watching their rankings slip, watchingthe sponsors get nervous about renewingcontracts etc. Many players never manage tostick it out long enough to develop the newservice game. They freeze when they see theyare getting worse, that their game is disinte-grating, and there is little sign of the light atthe end of the tunnel.

So here we have a very general questionabout human learning. How do you changeyour human living insome way – and beable to sustain thedisintegration of per-formance that mustnecessarily be lived.All learning has thisproblem.

EVG:

Well … all learning except for the veryyoung. The very young have very little habit-ual acting. So it is easy. But that’s why childrencan be taught a sport much more easily thanadults.

My mother grew up with

telemark

and sodid I. Then at the end of the 1920’s she startingseeing the other style and she wanted to dothat because it was much faster, much better.She literally broke down and cried becauseshe couldn’t do it. It took her years longer thanme, but I could adapt to the new style withouttoo much difficulty. But with her, it was muchharder – every movement on skis has got to beautomatic you know. She fell you know, fall-ing for a good skier is just the end you know,you feel like giving up. It is very real tangiblesuffering.

How old was she when she tried to make thatchange?

EVG:

She must have been in her late 30s. Andshe was very good you see.

Then there is the other problem that onecan’t do change on your own – you needjudicious feedback from others. For example,the tennis player needs to see himself onvideo…

EVG:

… and when he sees himself he is horri-fied! When I saw the first movie of myself ski-ing I was absolutely horrified. You do a lot ofthings that you aren’t aware of.

But in more general terms of human learningand communications, what other ingredientsapart from feedback and disintegration ofperformance habits are needed to make aneffective constructivist communication net-work? One with reflexive criticism etc. Whatother constructivist ingredients would weneed to make it work, … to make a researchproject work constructively? …

EVG:

In order to make it work, and I speakfrom a certain amount of experience becauseI’ve run a research project you know, you needan enormous amount of patience, and theknowledge that it is very difficult to change

your own ways of see-ing. If you don’t, youget irritable and thatdoesn’t help. In oneresearch project we hada computer program-mer who was a genius,

but to get on with him I had to learn

that

youknow, and it wasn’t easy at all. He was brilliantand accepted the constructivist notion abso-lutely, but when we came to something that Ithought was worth doing but he didn’t, then itwas very difficult to phrase that in some waythat was

compatible

. But in the end I succeededwith a lot of patience, of rewording, differentexamples, …. and above all never thinkingthat he was stupid! Because he wasn’t you see.You had to accept that this was an intelligentperson’s reaction, and cope with it. Which isdifficult.

Because the first thing that people react withis that the other is “stupid.” It is clear that get-ting irritated with children is the wrong thingto do. We often hear exasperated parents say-ing “Are you stupid or something..?” It’s themost common reaction to someone whodoesn’t share your point of view – whyshould this be the case?

EVG:

Because you have something that worksfor you very reliably, and of course you think

You have something that works for you very reliably, and of course you think that that is the way things really are

Vincent Kenny was born in Ireland and studied for degrees in philosophy and psy-chology at Trinity College Dublin in the 1960s. Since the 1970s he has worked applying constructivist ideas in the very dif-ferent fields of psychotherapy, consulting to organisations, and to tennis psychology – working with professionals in the ATP and WTA tours. His main current position is as director of the “Accademia Costruttivista di Terapia Sistemica” in Rome, which is a new center for training in radical constructivist psychotherapy approaches.

ABOUT THE INTERVIEWER


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anecdotal


that that is the way things really are. Weshould remember what Montessori saidabout children so many years ago: “Help themto do what they want to do, but don’t forcethem to do what you do.” She said that over100 years ago.

Unfortunately one often goes back to anon reflexive way of acting. This is a very dif-ficult problem. Ultimately, what it boils downto is that it is all very well to be aware that youare operating within constraints and themodels that you make are only the ones that

fit into the constraints. But if the constraintsget very tight it is very difficult to maintainthat notion – the notion that it is you whoconstructs your world.

A person does not consciously constructthe world in which his wife gets a terrible dis-ease. So is that

his

construction? Of coursenot. But it is his construction in the sense thathe is operating within extremely tight con-straints. It is like being in prison if you like.Your constraints have suddenly shrunk. Andyou begin to blame the constraints.

Is that reasonable?

EVG:

It’s the only thing you can blame. Youdon’t know why, you don’t know where theycome from; you don’t know what’s going on.In your experience there is extremely little towork with. And that’s very hard. I find myselfgetting irritated sometimes … so how can Iblame other people?



To Find a Daisy in December

Impressions of Ernst von Glasersfeld and an Interview with Him about Constructivism and Education

the eyes of many, Ernst von Glasersfeld isa man and scientist quite different from

others. This is particularly important in ourpostmodern times,which celebrate outerappearance and publicefficiency – pretenceover being.

In the first place, itwas the

man

Ernst vonGlasersfeld whoimpressed me. Later, Irecognized that it was aspecial

Haltung

(atti-tude) that had shapedand pervaded his wholeperson, thinking and acting, his scientificwork, his appearance in public and privatecontexts. It was that whole attitude – which isobviously more than the sum of its parts – thatappealed to me as a model for my own theo-retical reflections and ways of acting in thefield of systemic-constructivist education.

“The systemic-constructivist approachdescribes a

Haltung

(attitude) characterizedby the recognition of autonomy, respect,appreciation, empathic curiosity, responsibil-ity and the quest for viable developments andsolutions.” (Voß 2005, p. 53)

First encounter in Sulitjelma (1988)

Sulitjelma is an old mining town in the moun-tains of Norway above the arctic circle. Whenin June 1988 some 170 clinicians and scientistsfrom several countries met there, this sleepyvillage awoke to new life for a couple of days.Indeed, it was like joining a “Greek kitchen,” asthe invitation from the Norwegian familytherapists had announced: a cosy place of inti-mate, personal and in-depth conversation.The aim of the conference was to bring

together experts in epistemology and clinicaltherapy to discuss the question of how to relatesecond-order cybernetics to daily therapeutic

practice. Among theparticipants of thismeeting were Heinzvon Foerster, Ernst vonGlasersfeld, HumbertoMaturana, Lynn Hoff-man, the clinical teamsfrom Galveston(Anderson, Goolish-ian), Milano (Boscolo,Cecchin) and Tromsö(Andersen, Flam), andothers.

The first joint dinner was meant to bringpeople together in a pleasant and relaxedatmosphere to become acquainted with oneanother. Places at the table were allocated bydrawing lots. Next to me was an older man, talland athletic, his hair turning gray. He almostseemed aristocratic to me; a very nice andfriendly man, polite, reserved, nearly shy,modest and careful. I conversed with a manwho turned to me with great empathy andinterest. Unlike the usual behavior of themajority of scientists, his did not show anyattempt of self-promotion. We talked aboutthe place of the meeting, which evoked manymemories of my childhood in a German min-ing town.

The next morning in the plenary, Ernst vonGlasersfeld gave me the impression of a calm-ing influence between the “wizard and enter-tainer” Heinz von Foerster and the ratherintellectually reserved appearance of Hum-berto Maturana. In an upright posture (bothphysically and mentally) he presented hispositions in a precise way. He did not pretendto proclaim certain knowledge, but his wholepresentation was marked by his characteristicmodesty, with which he created a uniqueatmosphere.

First Heidelberg conference on systemic-constructivist school education (1996)

On the occasion of my first nationwide con-ference on systemic-constructivist schooleducation, organized in cooperation withthe International Society of Systemic Ther-apy, I found myself together with Ernst vonGlasersfeld in a small pub in the historic partof Heidelberg. He recounted stories from hislife which gave me the impression that con-structivism had been important to him sincehis early childhood days.

“I grew up in-between three languages,without a mother tongue so to speak.Under such conditions you quickly recog-nize how different the worlds are thatyou’re speaking of … And gradually I real-ized that one has to construct a differentWirklichkeit (reality) in each language.

”

(Glasersfeld in: Foerster & Glasersfeld1999, pp. 192, 195).Born in Munich to Austrian parents,

Ernst von Glasersfeld grew up in Switzerlandand Austria. After only three semesters atuniversities in Zurich and Vienna, he emi-grated to Australia, where he worked as a ski-instructor. Later, he was a farmer in Irelandfor several years. In 1946, he moved to Italy,where he worked as a journalist and as acooperator at the Ceccato’s Scuola OperativaItaliana. He was already in his 50s when heentered the Scientific Community without aformal qualification such as a PhD. From aGerman perspective, this seems almostincredible. From 1970 onwards, he taughtcognitive psychology at the University ofGeorgia, Athens (em. 1987). Later he becamean Associate Member of the Scientific Rea-soning Research Institute at the University ofMassachussets, Amherst.

Reinhard Voß

A

University of Koblenz (Germany)

<[email protected]>

In

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The systemic-constructivist approach describes an attitude characterized by the recognition of autonomy, respect, appreciation, empathic curiosity, responsibility and the quest for viable developments and solutions


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“Well, of course, if you have the feeling thatyou can do it, that’s fine and you won’t stoplearning.”

(Glasersfeld in: Foester & Gla-sersfeld 1999, p. 41)

Lecture at the University of Koblenz (2001)

On the occasion of a brief visit to Ernst vonGlasersfeld’s house in Amherst, I invited himto give a lecture at the University of Koblenz.He did so in December 2001. Waiting for thestart of his lecture, he took a walk along theRhine. On his return, I witnessed an enthu-siastic Ernst, beaming all over his face. Hepresented a tiny flower that he had found,exclaiming: “A daisy in December!”

After his impressive lecture, we sattogether in a little wine-cellar by the Moselle(i.e., the river that meets the Rhine inKoblenz). In a relaxed atmosphere, drinkingwine and eating dainties, I discovered yetanother side of the man who only minutesago had cast a spell over his audience with hisscientific talk. Bright and appreciative, boy-ish and full of humor, he enjoyed the simple,country-style food. The variety of Germanbread especially filled him with enthusiasm,evoking memories of his Austrian years,which contributed to a lively conversation.

Some time later, a fire accident destroyedErnst von Glasersfeld’s house in Amherst,which he had built with his own hands. Hisentire private and scientific property fell vic-tim to the flames … and, far in his 80s, hereconstructedthe buildinghimself.

“The trouble is that the word ‘viable’ saystoo much. The only thing that matters is toget by.” (Glasersfeld in: Foester & Glasers-feld 1999, p. 129)

Ernst von Glasersfeld has succeeded infinding a viable fit between the man and thescientist and in embodying a

Haltung

(atti-tude) that represents constructivism. He wasprepared to get involved with a “differentway of thinking” and to deal with a matterthat is often “demanding and uncomfort-able” for those affected. Ernst von Glasers-feld, in an interview with me on questions ofconstructivism and school:

1

Dealing with an uncomfortable matter – An interview with Ernst von Glasersfeld

There are so many images of, opinions aboutand prejudices against radical constructiv-ism. Could you please explain to a freshmanor to a teacher who is interested in construc-tivism, because he or she is looking for new,helpful perspectives to put into practice,what radical constructivism means for you?

EVG:

I believe that this is not difficult. First Iwould say that constructivism cannot be con-sidered as a form of metaphysics. Construc-tivism is not a reflection of the world, but sim-ply a way of thinking. I think thatconstructivism offers a possibility to put oursystem of experi-ences into a certain

order and in my opinion this is the mostimportant thing. What distinguishes con-structivism from other theories of cognitionis above all the relation between what we callknowledge and the so-called reality, that is aworld as it may be before we know and cap-ture it. In the conventional theory of cogni-tion, this relation has always been conceivedas a copy or representation of something orwhatever you would like to call it. Construc-tivism abandons these ideas completely andbelieves that what we construct as an imagi-nation of the world has to fit into reality. Thisfitting is a very simple term, more simple thanthe kind of fitting we are talking about whenwe are buying a pair of shoes. First, the shoeshave to be big enough for our feet to fit into,but not so big that we get blisters when wewalk. The kind of fitting in the theory of cog-nition is only the first part: there is no ‘too big.’In other words, everything works that passesthe conditions of the real world. That is a rad-ical difference. Indeed, the expression ‘radi-cal’ came from this realization. This, ofcourse, has considerable consequences oneducation.

There are many forms of constructivismsuch as social constructivism, radical con-structivism and methodical constructivism.This often confuses teachers and studentswho want to approach constructivism. Doyou believe that these different ways ofapproach have something in commonbeyond epistemological and philosophicaldifferences?

EVG:

Yes, sure, otherwise people could hardlyspeak of constructivism. One thing they havein common is, for sure, the realization thatwhat we call knowledge has to be

built up

bychildren, pupils, students and all learners. Itcannot be adopted as a whole. They have tobuild it up step by step. From my point ofview, this is a trivial form of constructivism.As a second condition I would add, and mostconstructivists agree with this to a certainextent, that we no longer see knowledge as arepresentation of one reality, but as a possibleway of behavior within a world that we cannotdescribe properly. These are the two things onwhich, I believe, all constructivists agree moreor less.

Would you content yourself with these basicconsensual tenets or would you rather sug-

© Reinhard Voß

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gest that it is equally important to recognizethe differences between specific constructiv-ist approaches?

EVG:

Yes, sure, because there will be confu-sions if one does not pay attention to the dif-ferences. The people in America who callthemselves “social constructionists” assumethat language and society exist

a priori

. To mymind, this is an unprov-able assumption. I cannotagree with it, becausefrom my point of view atfirst every child has tobuild up language bythemselves from pieces oftheir own experience.This experience cannot be given to a child.They have to build up their own understand-ing of society, before they can recognize socialphenomena as what they are. These are con-siderable differences.

You were a ski-instructor in Australia. Lateryou worked as a university professor formany years. You have been a teacher in fact.With your constructivist way of thinking,did you behave differently from other teach-ers who had not been engaged in construc-tivism?

EVG:

Those were two different things. As aski-instructor, I definitely did not think aboutconstructivism. But my experience as a ski-instructor became very important to me lateron when I built up constructivism. When youteach people skiing, the main difficulty is thatalmost all the movements a skier has to makeare directed against their instinctive behavior.When you go downhill, for example, and itgets steeper and steeper, your instinct tells youto lean backward. But then your skies runaway from you. You have to do the exact oppo-site: when it gets steeper, do something like aheader. That is very difficult because thewhole automatic system of the body worksagainst it. How can you finally get a beginnerto try to behave like that? In this case, we asski-instructors learn quickly to let the begin-ner go through something like a wave in theground which is pushing him forward. Thisway he leans to the front and cannot movebackwards. If that happens once or twice, thebeginner realizes that it works and so he canbring his instinctive reactions under control.I think this is very important, although itworks a bit differently, in the field of educa-

tion. Here, we do not work against instincts,but very often against the fact that no termsexist at all. But when you can lead pupils intoa situation in which it is possible or even prob-able that they will develop certain chains ofthought, maybe they will develop the rightthoughts. And if they have developed the rightthoughts, first the pupils will realize that they

did it themselves, that itwas their own produc-tion, and second, that itworked. With this, onecan build up motivationto face new problemswithout being told how ithas to be done.

Right now I have to smile a bit, because Inoticed that you said “right.” In fact, you donot use this term often. You never say: The“right” movement, the “right” behavior. Butyou use “pushing,” and maybe we shouldkeep that in mind for everyday practices ineducation.

EVG:

Yes, “right” is always relative. It is howthe teacher wants to appear.

You have clearly influenced a part of Ameri-can education, first of all in mathematics andnatural sciences. How would you, from atemporal distance of 15 years, if I am right,describe the importanceand the usefulness of radicalconstructivism for schoolsand teaching? Could youmake the differences withthe traditional way of teach-ing a bit more explicit? Ifthe two of us were visiting aschool class now, how would you be able totell whether the style of teaching was moreconstructivist or traditional?

EVG:

I think you can see that very easily.When you find the teachers explaining howsomething has to be, as a matter of fact, whenyou find them giving the answers to the pupilsthemselves, they are no constructivists forsure. Because one of the main characteristicsof the constructivist way is to have the pupilsfind the answers themselves. The answersshould not be given to them. All you can giveis an orientation to think in the right direc-tion. That is a radical difference. When theopponents of constructivism say that thissounds all nice but that it would take years

before they found the solution themselves,this objection, to my mind, is exaggerated. Itis not true. Once a pupil has found out that heor she can find answers, it often goes quickly.And when pupils have learned how to findanswers themselves, it is possible to give themanswers from time to time by telling them:“Try it yourselves.” They will transfer it rightaway into their own way of thinking andbehaving and try it out. In this case it will besomething self-made and nothing they had totake over from someone.

I very well understand what you are sayingbecause I have had the same experience. Doyou have an explanation for why teachers sooften say: “Children cannot do this.” Why isthis point of view so popular even amongcommitted educators?

EVG:

There are certainly a number of reasons,but one of the main reasons is the fact thatteachers traditionally consider themselves asthe keepers of knowledge and still have theidea that they pass it on piece by piece. Andvery often teachers still have the illusion thatconcepts can be transmitted through lan-guage. In my opinion, this all an illusion. Bymeans of language one can only, as HumbertoMaturana says, orientate, but one can nevertransmit. One can never send ideas from oneperson to another like in a postal package.

On our study trip across theUnited States, we met manyteachers who did not refer toradical constructivism but toDewey, Piaget, Vygotzky oreven only to secondary liter-ature on constructivism.

How do you assess the chances and dangersof a pragmatic, if that is what you want tocall it, or trivialized constructivism?

EVG:

Differently, I would say. Dewey nevercalled himself a “constructivist.” But he wrotea lot and had many good ideas that are abso-lutely compatible with constructivism. Thewhole pragmatism – I have said that before inmy writings – is very close to constructivism.The difference, the main difference which Isee, is that the pragmatists have always pro-claimed that instead of taking over

truth

, theywould take over the functioning of ideas. Butat the same time they have spent little time onfinding out how this practice is built up. Butthis is exactly what constructivism wants. And

“Very often teachers still have the illusion that concepts can be transmitted through language”

“The trouble is that the word ‘viable’ says too much. The only thing that matters is to get by”


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this links constructivism to Piaget, who actu-ally was the main constructivist in the pastcentury. He brought constructivism back tothe agenda again. In his cognitive psychology,he tried to explain the building-up of knowl-edge schematically. And in my opinion, this isthe main task of constructivism.

On this campus (University of Koblenz) forexample, many students are interested inMaria Montessori, and I believe there is acertain affinity. I would not go as far as call-ing her a constructivist, but a lot of what shesays could be brought in relation to con-structivism. What do you think?

EVG:

I would say that every person who hasdealt with Montessori and comes to construc-tivism must realize that constructivism is thefundament. Maria Montessori developed thepractice brilliantly and almost everything shesaid can be directly taken over to the construc-tivist way of thinking. But she was not inter-ested in theory. She did not formulate a basictheory. That is no disadvantage; she just didnot need it.

I personally experienced constructivist posi-tions as effective, helpful and useful, at thebeginning in the field of therapy and later ineducation and teaching. The 1996 “schoolconference” in Heidelberg was an attempt tocreate a platform for systemic-constructivistthinking in school education. What can wedo to give teachers an understanding of con-structivism? Or, in the words of Fritz Simon,how can we “infect” them with constructiv-ism the same way people get infected with aflu virus? How would you explain the useful-ness of constructivism in educational prac-tice to experienced teachers who are lookingfor a new orientation?

EVG:

This is a difficult question. I think themain opportunity to convince teachers of con-structivism is to get theminvolved in situations inwhich they themselveshave to learn somethingand to stimulate them toreflect on their ownlearning. That means togive them a problemthey have no idea of andlet them write a journal for themselves aboutwhat they think, how they think and how theyprogress with the problem. That can take a

while if the problem is complicated. But whenthey get closer to a solution, they will realizethat they have to do everything themselves andthat it does not help at all to have the solutiongiven to them. This solution they could repeat,learn by heart and so on, but that would notmean that they had understood anything. Tounderstand it, they have to construct it them-selves. I believe their own experience with thisprocess is the best methodto convince them to orga-nize their own teachingthis way.

But, as a consequence,this means we also need a different practiceof teacher training and of university educa-tion. It should give students the opportunityto learn not only from theories, but alsofrom practices and from meta-reflections ontheories and practices.

EVG:

Yes, sure, but this is impossible by meansof lectures alone.

My last question: at a dinner in Heidelbergwe talked about the influence and the mean-ing of constructivism in the future. Yousounded a bit pessimistic then. Has youropinion changed over the past few years?

EVG:

I was pessimistic insofar as I did notbelieve that constructivism would turn out tobe a common attitude. In this point nothinghas changed, I think. I believe this will take along time, for reasons I have talked aboutnumerous times before. Starting to think con-structivistically, one realizes that one has tochange radically everything one has thoughtbefore. There are almost no former opinionsone can hold on to. And this is a hard and veryunpleasant thing to do. Most people are afraidto do it and therefore they rather push con-structivism aside. I do not know if that will bea common opinion after some time. If you

remember what happenedto Vico, who was the firstconstructivist, it does notlook very promising.

Maybe one more ques-tion for me personally. Ihave found the useful-ness of constructivism in

practical experience. Therefore, I have cometo the conclusion that the main thing is aform of ethics. That it is a

Haltung

(an atti-

tude) which works. It is a question of valuesand anthropology, of responsibility and tol-erance. Can you agree with this?

EVG:

This is a very delicate question. As fortolerance, I’d say “yes!” Being a constructivist,you must be tolerant for the very reason thatit is a main principal of constructivist think-ing to consider no model, no matter how wellit works, as the only model. One has to apply

that straight away to con-structivism, and I’d sayconstructivism certainlyis not the only way to behappy. There are others.Where ethics, in the sense

of values and general ideas about values, isconcerned, I always say: “Constructivism is atheory of rational thinking.” In my opinionethics is a non-rational matter. Ethics, as wellas aesthetics, lie outside the rational and can-not be realized rationally. This is my point ofview, with which you can be satisfied or not,but this is how I see it.

Is there maybe a correlation with your per-sonality, with your modesty, that you liveeverything in your own person and do notpay too much attention to it as a subject?

EVG:

I agree with Heinz von Foerster, whomade the wonderful remark: “Ethics tell mehow to behave myself, morals let me preachhow others should behave.” Therefore I pleadfor ethics and not for morals. Tolerance – thatis an attitude which often gets attacked. Peoplehave told me, in more than one situation, thateven constructivism could not do anythingagainst Hitler. But I can only answer: “Theconventional theory of cognition, too, couldnot do anything against Hitler.” One cannotclaim that any theory of thinking, of rationalthinking, can influence ethics in any way.

But with regard to practices and a practicalunderstanding of theories, I would like totake a different point of view. I think it isimportant to touch these issues in a world ofless and less tolerance? Don’t you think thatthis emphasis would underline the relevanceof constructivism in our time?

EVG:

Yes, I absolutely agree with you on thepoint about tolerance. A number of times Ihave written that the concept of viability inconstructivism – the term for the constructs,the theories, the conceptions and so on whichare accepted as functioning – that this concept

“Starting to think constructivistically, one realizes that one has to change radically everything one has thought before”

“The conventional theory, too, could not do anything against Hitler”

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consists of at least two levels. The first levelrefers to the observation that I recognize some-thing as useful to my own experience. The sec-ond level, which is a higher level, refers to theobservation that I can interpret others in thesense that they use the same or at least analo-gous principles. In this case these principleswould be more viable at exactly this level. Tobuild up a viable reality, I do need the

others.To some extent I need the acknowledgement ofothers, although this acknowledgement isalways a result of my own interpretation ofother people. But my interpretation must bepossible, after all, and sometimes it is not. Thisis not a question of arbitrariness. In this senseI agree with the point of tolerance. But toler-ance is only a beginning of ethical principles.

If this is the beginning, what comes next?

EVG:

There would be questions which Heinzvon Foerster calls the undecidable questions.I am always responsible for deciding on themmyself.

Therefore responsibility is important in anycase.

EVG:

Yes. When you construct your own

Wirklichkeit

(reality), the one in which youlive, you are responsible. That is unavoidable,and it is one reason why constructivism seemsto be an uncomfortable matter for many peo-ple. If you were a biologist for example, youcould say that this is because of your genes andthat you cannot help it. If you were a behav-iorist, you could say that the environment isjust what it is and that you cannot do anythingabout it. As a constructivist you cannot dothis.

Thank you very much.

Bibliography

Foerster, H. von & Glasersfeld E. von (1999)Wie wir uns erfunden haben. Carl Auer:Heidelberg.

Voß, R. (ed.) (2005) Unterricht aus kon-struktivistischer Sicht. Beltz: Weinheim &Basel.

Note

The interview was originally published inGerman under the title “Sich auf eineungemütliche Sache einlassen” in Voß (2005).

The paper was translated by B. Grusenick(University of Leipzip), S. Neubert (Univer-sity of Cologne), and C. Punstein (Universityof Koblenz)

Received: 22 August 2006Accepted: 5 February 2007

Reinhard Voß, teacher, family therapist, is a professor for school education at the Uni-versity of Koblenz in Germany.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR


On Ernst von Glasersfeld’s Contribution to Education:One Interpretation, One Example

three short stories said to have inaugu-rated the genre of detective fiction,

Edgar Allan Poe brought to life a character,Auguste C. Dupin, whose comments in manyways bring to mind the comments andthoughts of that other well-known characterof our day and age we know as Ernst von Gla-sersfeld.

1

Auguste C. Dupin and Ernst vonGlasersfeld are alike in holding the view thatwe are always arriving too late on the scene tobe able to behold a pure, as-yet un-inter-preted world. Rather, the world that we areseeing and experiencing is one that has beenconfigured according to both the notions thatwe entertain about it and the distinctions withwhich we have laden it; further, such notions

and distinctions constitute practical means ofour own invention, devised to co-ordinateand manage our experience of the world (Gla-sersfeld 1993). Ultimately, whenever we claimto describe the world-in-itself (or the “onto-logically preexisting world,” to resort to philo-sophical parlance), we in fact are describingthe product of the mapping process that hasenabled us to make our way in this world andto actualize our projects within it (inclusiveeven of the “dud” roadmaps – that is, the cog-nitive itineraries that have proved non-viableor indeed fatal to our assumptions andviews). In short, we are describing what can bedone in the world and not, to paraphraseGeertz (1988), seeing the world as it really is

when only God is looking! Thus, from thisperspective, knowledge is said to be opera-tive, as it allows us to operate, act and antici-pate, just as it can, obviously, lead us intodead ends, as is shown in one of the cases nar-rated by detective Dupin.

In “The Purloined Letter,” published circa1845, Dupin comments on the failure of theParis Prefect of Police to locate a letter of par-amount importance, tying this inability tothe police chief ’s habits of comprehendingthe world and assessing the capacities of oth-ers – in this instance, the thief, Minister D,who also happened to be a poet. As Dupininforms us, in the Prefect’s view a poet is bydefinition a fool and a scatterbrain; therefore,the kind of person who would think to hidethe letter nowhere else than in some unlikelyspot or other. On the basis of this assumption,the Prefect and his men painstakinglysearched the thief ’s apartment, ripping up theinlaid pieces of the parquet floor, scrutinizingthe bindings of his entire book collectionbeneath a microscope, peering inside the hol-lows of the chair legs and sinking long needlesinto the chair cushions – all to no avail. Fur-ther, throughout their searches, theyremained completely oblivious to the letterthat had been placed prominently on displayatop a fireplace mantle!

All of which goes to show – and on thispoint Dupin the detective and Glasersfeld theepistemologist again think alike – the impor-tance of developing a reflexive understandingof the world; in other words an understandingthat is conscious of its assumptions and that,as a result, is conscious of being

one

mannerof understanding or

one

“take” among otherpossible manners of understanding or “takes.”By the same token, this does not mean that alltakes or intellectual constructions are equal or

Marie Larochelle

A

Université Laval (Canada) <[email protected]>

Jacques Désautels

A

Université Laval (Canada) <[email protected]>

In

Purpose: According to the constructivist perspective tirelessly promoted by Ernst von Glasersfeld for more than 40 years now, the world we see is of a piece with our way of understanding and locating ourselves within it; ultimately, whenever we claim to describe the world-in-itself, we in fact are describing the product of the mapping process that has enabled us to make our way in this world and to actualize our projects within it. Obviously, this kind of perspective has consequences for the way both educational action and research on this theme are conceived of and accomplished. That, at least, is what we shall attempt to show in this article. Implications: In keeping with the claim that knowledges are con-stituted not in reference to reality “itself” but to practices and activities, constructivism advocates examining cognition in action – that is, in terms of how the latter is enacted in the field. Accordingly, constructivism also seeks to prompt teachers to: (1) scrutinize the processes and distinctions by which students chart out the world; (2) and to personally devise, on the basis of this experience, a model – or models, rather – of their students’ future relationship to the universes of knowledge intended for learning. Likewise, con-structivism also aims to prompt researchers to perform some very careful detective work into the ways in which this charting process is played out and thus to opt for a compre-hensive rather than an experimentalist approach. Conclusions: To adopt the constructiv-ist perspective also means to “de-siloize” knowledge production and to recognize that this production occurs in all spheres of society. From this point of view, constructivism can thus be viewed as a way of challenging the claims of a certain scientific establishment to alone possess the requisite standing for interpreting the world.Key words: Learning, teaching, research, methodology.

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interchangeable. Indeed, the Prefect’s failedefforts at finding the letter offers a telling illus-tration of how this is not so. On the otherhand, if he and his men had previously devel-oped the habit of thinking reflexively, theymight have been able to vary their investiga-tive approaches somewhat. In addition, theymight well have been able to work up not onebut several composite drawings of the thiefand, as a result, would have multiplied theirpotentialities for action, as Glasersfeld wouldsay.

Now, such a perspective, which holds thatour ways of doing and making things bear astrong relationship to our ways of under-standing the world, also comes freighted withsome very strong demands in relation toteaching and to research in education. That,at least, is what we shall attempt to demon-strate in this text, which, inevitably, repre-sents

one

interpretation of radical construc-tivism and, owing to this fact,

one

example ofwhat can be accomplished with this theory.

Teaching in a constructivist mode

If one is to conceive of teaching from a radicalconstructivist perspective, one must first beable to demonstrate reflexivity toward one’sown beliefs and convictions, one’s own wordsand deeds. Just as importantly, one mustdemonstrate the same capacity in respect ofwhat one ascribes to others, including stu-dents. Thus one must constantly remind one-self that one’s descriptions are

situated

andthat, whenever the topic of the conversationbecomes, for example, students’ cognition,the descriptions, explanations and assess-ments then being aired are those of anobserver bringing to this exercise his or herown classifications, connections and projects.It is not the point of view held by studentsconcerning their own cognitive activity, asGlasersfeld (2000) has emphasized:

“Piaget sometimes mentioned the dangerof confusing an observer’s view of anorganism in its observed environment andobserver’s inferences about the view theorganism generates within the domain ofits own experience. In his own writings,Piaget did not always make this distinctionclear, and I think that we ourselves quiteoften do not pay enough attention to it.

“Especially in discussing education, wetend to focus on the child or the student aswe see them, and we may not stress oftenenough that what we are talking about isbut

our

construction of the child, and thatthis construction is made on the basis ofour own experience and coloured by ourgoals and expectations.” (p. 8)From this point of view, and though radi-

cal constructivism does not constitute a the-ory of teaching, as Glasersfeld has repeatedover and over again, this mode of thinkingnevertheless sets out a certain number of con-straints. On the one hand, there is the require-ment of coming to grips with the fact that as ateacher, one acts according to one’s under-standing of students’ cognition. And, on theother hand, there is also the requirement ofputting this understanding to the test. Indeed,if the goal is to aid students in complexifyingtheir conceptual networks and indeed gener-ate new ones, then the viability of this under-standing has to be borne out in a two-wayexchange with students such that there is thepossibility, where necessary, of transformingone’s constructions and integrating one’s stu-dents’ viewpoints into it (or at least what onemakes of their viewpoints!). In other words, itis critical to delve into the processes and dis-tinctions whereby students configure theworld. It is equally critical to develop, on anongoing basis, a model (or, rather,

models

ifone is to avoid succumbing to the same pitfallas the Prefect) of students’ manners of con-ceiving not only the knowledges to which theyare to be given an introduction but also their“business of being a student” (

métier d’élève

,as explicated by Perrenoud 1995).

2

Teachingfrom a constructivist perspective thus entailscommitting oneself to a recursive dialogicalprocess, a conversation on “problematic sub-jects,” to borrow from Bateson (1981), andtherefore in a particular form of social com-munication, encounter or interaction.

Until now, however, as Glasersfeld (2000)has also noted, radical constructivists havepaid scant attention to this social encounter interms of any sustained effort at theorization.This apparent disinterest of theirs has givenrise to harsh criticism concerning construc-tivism’s value and relevance for shedding newlight on social interactions

3

or providinginsight into encounters of the kind occurringin a classroom learning situation. For indeed,as the sociology of education has taught us,

this type of situation cannot be reduced to amere encounter between epistemic subjectsdevoid of any projects or sociocognitive his-tory, on the one hand, and (for example) uni-versally enjoying a harmonious relationshipwith the culture of writing that is a distin-guishing characteristic of Modern Education(Vincent, Lahire & Thin 1994). Nor can thissituation be conceived of as though unfoldingin a space devoid of issues of power or controlover meanings, especially in view of theimportant role ascribed to the continualquantification and discipline of performance(output) and, more generally speaking, of theindividual (Foucault 1975). Furthermore, itcannot be approached as though the techno-logical artifacts and devices used in this spacedid not also, in a way, shape the way in whichstudents learn how to learn. For example, aruler, a compass, a protractor, a scale or a geo-graphical map all serve – as is the case with anytechnology – to define and delimit a space ofuses and, for this reason, they constitute pow-erful mediators of cognitive activity (Callon1989). In short, respecting social interaction,there is an abundance of research questions,models and methods that warrant conceptu-alization and testing if one holds to the objec-tive of producing a more valuable fit betweenradical constructivism and the classroom. Atthe same time, it is important to guard againstviewing the classroom as a situation entirelyunder the sway of biographical, social or tech-nical determinisms.

Just so, and therein lies one of the aspectsbrought sharply into focus by constructivism,the learning situation bears a number of fun-damental uncertainties in respect of its play-ing out over time.

4

What is more, as severalclassroom experiments have brilliantly illus-trated, it is indeed possible to uncover – in realtime – previously undetected sources of lee-way and to convert the norms, constraintsand agendas framing the classroom encoun-ter into learning resources. For example,Wood, Cobb and Yackel (1994), whoseresearch was based in part on work by Gla-sersfeld, have showed how it is possible, asearly as primary school, to institute commu-nities of practice in which the students them-selves foster mathematical learning andgrowth; this the students achieve by engagingin argument-based discussions on ways notonly of solving a problem but also of definingit, all the while managing the need for these


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students to take the same cycle-end examina-tion as the other children in their school dis-trict. In the same vein, Aikenhead (1992) hasshown how secondary students (ages 15 to 17)in a STS (Sciences-Technologies-Societies)program became well acquainted with thepolitical, legal and ethical issues surroundingthe various uses made of a technical artifact(in this instance, a breathalyzer) and werethus able to develop an informed point ofview on technoscience,

5

this they accom-plished while also demonstrating their abilityto perform as well as the other students onstandardized science examinations. Likewise,Roth (1998) has shown how the introductionof a technology – in this case, a glue gun – setthe stage for a dual transformation amongstprimary schoolchildren. To begin with,thanks to one child’s contribution of a gluegun to a classroom activity centring on theconstruction of various artifacts (bridges,towers, etc.), the other children were able toobtain harder, more resistant bonds and, aswell, more solidly structured pieces. The firstoutcome was thus to transform the materialand discursive practices enacted in the class-room. And, in a second outcome, the struc-ture of interactions between the variousactors also underwent a process of transfor-mation when, in particular, some of the stu-dents taught their classmates how to use thistool. Further still, as the glue gun in questionwas an electric model and the classroom wasequipped with only two wall sockets, the stu-dents had to cluster close to the electric outletsto do their building work, which immediatelycreated unforeseen opportunities to share,negotiate and circulate knowledge.

To sum up, and despite the reservations wehave touched on above, drawing on radicalconstructivism for the purposes of conceptu-alizing and carrying out educational actionopens onto picturing this action in terms ofthe multiplication of possibilities for teachersand students alike.

6

Clearly, embracing suchan option is likely to run counter to teachers’cherished or ingrained classroom habits, foras long as we teachers continue to situate our-selves in the capacity of discoverers or as themere spokespeople for a preorganized world,the impact of our discourses and practices willgive little cause for concern. Our interven-tions amount to driving home such messagesas “that’s the way it is,” “facts are facts,” “thefigures speak for themselves” and so on; fur-

ther, any difficulty of comprehensionencountered by students is merely a questionof cognitive immaturity or erroneous concep-tions that a solid teaching approach, seasonedwith a bit of passion or drive, should be ableto root out (Larochelle 2004; Larochelle &Bednarz 1998).

On the other hand, once one accepts theclaim that it is not possible to perceive theobjects of the world without also having a the-ory of the world (Douglas 1999), or the claimthat facts are indeed produced – that is, fabri-cated (as was stated by Bachelard and, a longtime before him, by Vico) – then it is a wholeother (educational) story that comes intoview and it is an entirely different type of rela-tionship to knowledge and to others that isprivileged (Désautels, Garrison & Fleury2002; Larochelle 2000). For, at that point, the(inevitable) confrontation underlying alleducational action no longer unfolds asthough between a group of subjects (the stu-dents)

versus

a world of objects –that is, a setof knowledges that have emerged out ofnowhere and that, from that point on, affordno opportunity for negotiation or owner-ship-taking. Rather, this confrontation stemsfrom the encounter occurring

between

groupsof actors, or

between

groups of “describers ofthe world” (students and biologists or geogra-phers, for example); further, by injecting newsymmetry into the relationships obtaining inthe classroom, a basis is laid not only for thediscussion, negotiation and indeed hybrid-ization of the descriptions in question, butalso for learning an “appropriate” way ofusing the descriptions thus co-developed.

Doing research in a constructivist mode

Radical constructivism also produces itsshare of consequences for the design andconduct of a research project. For indeed,with the claim that knowledges are consti-tuted not in reference to reality “itself ” but topractices, activities, places and groups orcommunities of action (Barnes 2001;Bichofsberger 2002) comes also an appeal toexamine: the relational and operational char-acter of these knowledges; their local, situ-ated character (knowledges embody pointsof view, positions, and so forth, in a givensociety at a given time); and, finally, their

potentially controversial character, since theybring into play experiences of the world and“ways of worldmaking” (to borrow fromGoodman 1992) that make for potentiallyrocky contact and integration, as is shown bythe difficulty encountered in interdiscipli-nary work of managing to “see what the othersees” (Petrie 1986; Vinck 2000). In otherwords, constructivism urges the researcher tofocus on cognition-in-action and to performsome very careful detective work into theways in which this process is played out andnegotiated in “real life” places and times.

From this position it is possible to distin-guish at least three major implications forresearch:

1. To begin with, and on this point ourviews converge with several of the findingsand insights afforded by symbolic interac-tionism and discursive psychology, construc-tivism prompts the researcher to examine the“making and doing” of actors. And, on thissame basis, it also militates in favour ofresearch designs of investigation that havemore in common, to borrow from the imagecontained in a recent article by Cyrulnik(2003), with a goat path (that is, a winding,rocky trail cut into the side of a steep hillside)than with those research superhighways rep-resented by laboratories or, worse yet, exper-imental research settings where, as Stengers(1987) has so aptly noted, more often thannot, the outcome is to shut up the very peoplewho are being questioned. Thus the perspec-tive informing the researcher’s investigationis a comprehensive one – one, moreover thatis consistent with radical constructivism’sproject of developing a model that describes“how we know what we know” (Glasersfeld1983) or, in the present case, that describeshow actors know what they know.

2. Secondly, constructivism advocatesopting for a conception of language thatbreaks decisively with the representationistconception currently predominant in thefield of education. According to the latterconception, the interaction occurringbetween speakers is viewed as a mutualadjusting of their respective mental states –“as expressed in words” – following a series ofdata processing runs by each speaker (Brassac2004). In other words, it is through a two-phase process that speakers eventually man-age to convey their respective meanings toone another, with the “substance” of their

2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3 93

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verbal exchange being assimilated to a “con-tent” of the mind.

By contrast with the foregoing, in the con-structivist model (according to which cogni-tion is considered to be an activity and a prac-tice, as was mentioned above), a discursiveproduction is, in itself, said to constitute acognitive activity. As Chauviré (2000) hasemphasized, there is no need to imagine “asilent mental process forming a lining to theutterance of a sentence” (p. 54) and unfold-ing in some mind housed inside a brain. Fur-thermore, an utterance is posited as beingpotentially indeterminate and contextual –even for the person uttering it, who might be“surprised by his own words” (Brassac 2004,p. 11). It therefore follows that interactionbetween speakers is not viewed in terms ofadjustment but instead of a joint dialogicalproduction of meanings that may, moreover,be re-subjected to negotiation when one ofthe speakers next takes his or her turn.

7, 8

Against this backdrop, the implications ofAustin’s program of

How to Do Things withWords

can be seen more fully – if perhaps inan unlikely or unfamiliar light.

9

Or, as Mat-urana (2006, p. 96) has summed up: “Lan-guage is a manner of coexistence in coordina-tion of doings, not a property or a faculty ofthe brain or what we call the ‘mind’.”

Such is the perspective informing thenotion whereby constructivism compelsadopting a conception of language that rec-ognizes the latter’s constitutive role in orga-nizing experience and the shaping of thingsand events. As Bourdieu (1993, p. 33) noted,“Words do things because they create a con-sensus on the existence and meaning ofthings.” Words therefore do not merely serveas the outer garb of thought (Merleau-Ponty1976, p. 212). Nor has their meaning been“indexed” once and for all, since meaninggrows out of contexts of usage, not to men-tion customary ways of reacting andresponding; in short, meaning grows out ofthe history of the speakers (Quéré 1994).

3. Finally, by privileging a pragmatic con-ception of knowledge, radical constructivismdisrupts the social hierarchy of knowledgeand the accompanying “racism of intelli-gence” (to quote again from Bourdieu 1980)that consists in ascribing the ability to pro-duce valid bodies of learning and knowledgeto certain groups only. Constructivism thusbids researchers to “de-siloize” knowledge

production and, on the contrary, to considerthat “the production of knowledge occurs inall spheres of society” (Darré 1999, p. 45) –including spaces that are often associatedwith the consumption rather the productionof knowledge, such as the world of farmers(Darré 1999), nurses (Aikenhead 2005) orteachers (Desgagné 2005). Or, to put it a bitdifferently, by adopting this perspective, theresearcher also recognizes the capacity ofthose usually referred to as the task perform-ers “to conceptualize their actions and to pro-duce and co-produce knowledge” (Darré1999, p. 46); and, as corollary to the preced-ing, this knowledge is thus not viewed as aresidue or a debased version of an institu-tionally legitimated knowledge but indeed asa form of production in its own right.

10

As it so happens, drawing on constructiv-

ism for research purposes may, once again,throw a wrench into a researcher’s customarymethodological reflexes, all the more so sincethere is no escaping the relativization ofviewpoints that is promoted by constructiv-ism. It is no longer possible to obtain an over-arching vantage point – a dictum that appliesto all discourses, including those of research-ers claiming to adhere to constructivism.There is no way of speaking or acting asthough the phenomena, substances andevents that we are speaking of and that we areclaiming to encode had appeared out of thinair and existed independently of our ways ofcontaining the world in our discipline-basedframeworks and projects.

It is critical to be able to specify the placefrom which one speaks and to account for thevarious assumptions and commitments bywhich one configures the world and, as aresult, be able to reintroduce, following thesuggestion of Foerster (1982, 1992), “theproperties of the observer into the descrip-tion of his or her observations.” The reintro-duction of such properties represents a majorbreak with the usual scientific text whichrests, on the contrary, on a rhetoric that tendsto erase all traces of human activity and tofacilitate the “naturalization” of the affirma-tions in question – that is, to persuade readersthat they are indeed beholding a given fact orphenomena, and indeed the world, as it reallyis (Gross 1990; Larochelle & Désautels2002).

11

Thus, as was the case above concerningeducation, with radical constructivism it is a

whole other (research) story that comes intoview just as it is an entirely different type ofrelationship to knowledge and to others thatis privileged.

Concluding remarks

For more than 40 years now, Ernst von Gla-sersfeld has been urging us to share in theceaseless making of this dual narrativethrough, notably, numerous seminars andworkshops as well as the hundreds of contri-butions he has penned in a broad range offields (such as psychology, philosophy, lin-guistics, cybernetics and, of course, educa-tion) and on themes often assumed to be self-evident, particularly in mathematics and sci-ence teaching (such as the notions of truth,objectivity and the transparency of language).

As is clear from the abundance of publica-tions being written under the banner of con-structivism, Glasersfeld’s urging has not goneunheard, just as, moreover, the range of modesof appropriating constructivism’s potentiali-ties for generating, evolving and actualizingaction and research in the field of education

Marie Larochelle is Full Professor at the Fac-ulté des sciences de l’éducation of Université Laval. For many years, she has actively researched socioepistemological problems related to the teaching/learning of scientific knowledge. Her publications have been pri-marily in the field of science education and constructivism. Her current research inter-ests focus on how students and future sci-ence teachers figure or represent the tensions, disagreements and socioethical issues that shape the practice of the techno-sciences.Jacques Désautels is Full Professor at the Fac-ulté des sciences de l’éducation of Université Laval. For more than 20 years, he has been concerned with the pedagogical and ideolog-ical dimensions of science teaching. He has author or co-authored several works and articles, written from a socio-constructivist perspective, in the field of science education. His current research interests focus on the type of power/knowledge relationship fos-tered by the teaching of the technosciences.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS


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testifies to the many, varied paths being pur-sued in Glasersfeld’s multidirectional foot-steps!

12

All things considered, the really astonish-ing thing would be that no such diversityshould have occurred. As has been pointedout by Heinz von Foerster, one of Ernst vonGlasersfeld’s long-time friends, with radicalconstructivism, we have now resolutelyentered into the “realm of nontrivialmachines.” By this image, Foerster (1997) isreferring to the whole of those machines, sys-tems and organizations which, once fed astimulus A, do not then necessarily produceB, since their history and projects also mobi-lize them to do what they do – making a sham-bles of our expectations and predictions alongthe way. They are disobedient machines,enthusiastically engaging in “venturesome

thinking”

(

la pensée qui se risque

, in Barthes’swords) – the type of thinking to which thework of Ernst von Glasersfeld testifies mostconvincingly. This non-orthodoxy is, in ourview, really quite wonderful, particularly inview of the intellectual freedom Ernst vonGlasersfeld has passed on to us, thanks towhich one may devise ways of acting andmaking one way forward in the world, includ-ing the world of education.

However, as with every groundbreakingcontribution, Glasersfeld’s work brings intoplay stakes whose importance should by nomeans be underestimated. For, above all,challenging the idea that our knowledgereflects the ontologically preexisting worldamounts to challenging (to borrow fromLatour 1999, pp. 27–28) “the most fabulouspolitical capacity ever invented” – namely, the

capacity “to make the mute world speak, tostate the truth in the absence of discussion,[and] to put an end to interminable debatesvia some indisputable authority derivingfrom things themselves.” From this perspec-tive, radical constructivism may also be con-sidered as a way of engaging in politics other-wise.

Acknowledgements

This paper was written within the frameworkof a Social Sciences and Humanities ResearchCouncil of Canada research project. Theauthors wish to thank Donald Kellough forthis translation as well as their Faculty’sadministration for its financial contributiontoward translation costs.

Notes

1. The introduction to this article is based onexcerpts from the address given by MarieLarochelle on 18 June 2006 on the occa-sion of the Université Laval (Québec, Que-bec) graduation ceremony at which Ernstvon Glasersfeld was awarded the degree ofdoctor of education

honoris causa

. In theseexcerpts, Larochelle brought out a similar-ity between Glasersfeld and Dupin, thecelebrated detective portrayed by EdgarAllan Poe. She realized only recently, whilere-reading the preface to Glasersfeld’s1987 book

The Construction of Knowledge

,that its author, Heinz von Foerster, hadalso noted this very same similarity. In-deed, some 20 years had gone by since shehad last read this preface, with the resultthat in June 2006, she genuinely imaginedthat she was working from an associationthat had previously gone unnoticed!

2. The fecundity of this perspective in termsof revisiting certain problems of teachingand learning science has, moreover, be-come widely recognized and has, in the lastfew decades, generated an extensive pro-gram of research that has systematicallyelicited the views of students of all agesconcerning particular concepts (e.g., thatof particle, ecosystem, revolution, objec-tivity, and so on) as well as the fields from

which such concepts have emerged (Whatis science? What is history? etc). By way ofexample, see Audigier (1993), Désautels &Larochelle (1998), Leach, Driver, Scott &Wood-Robinson (1996).

3. For example, according to Gergen (1995),radical constructivism involves a dualismthat results in postulating the individualand society as two independent entities. Itis not possible in this article to examine thevarious arguments he brings to bear, butin our view it would be worthwhile takingup the solution proposed by Kuhn (1983),who showed that production of scientificknowledge is a simultaneously cognitiveand social process. The paradigm (set oftheories, exemplars and standards) is con-stitutive of the science community thatconstructs the paradigm, and the stabiliza-tion of this paradigm proceeds throughthe recruitment, into this community, ofnew members who in turn learn to workwithin the framework of the paradigm andpursue the standard task of resolving enig-mas until such time as new controversiesarise. In other words, paradigm and com-munity are mutually constitutive, in a cir-cular manner that recalls the recursiveprocesses seen stabilizing around eigen-behaviours, as Foerster (1997) has sug-gested. In a similar manner, individualsand societies are mutually constitutive, as

part of a process of interpenetration oroverlap; by way of corollary, the emer-gence of the sovereign individual or thesovereign society is the result of analyticaldistinctions made by observers from a par-ticular perspective.

4. It is thus possible to model an educationalsituation as a complex, dynamic and inde-terminate system whose future changescannot be predicted and which may in-deed evolve toward a range of differentstable states (attractors, eigen-values, etc.)or, on the contrary, become chaotic.

5. For example, the students were given alook into the “interpretive flexibility” ex-hibited by scientists toward data in situa-tions requiring them to establish, forexample, the norms governing acceptableblood alcohol levels. In the process, theywere able to acquire some critical distancetoward the commonly conveyed, idealizedimages and opinions of science.

6. In a recent article intended to provide anoverview of the question, Kirschner,Sweller and Clark (2006) maintain thatvarious forms of teaching based on con-structivism (such as discovery teaching,inquiry teaching or problem-based teach-ing) have proved to be a failure wherelearning is concerned. For several reasons,their argument does not hold water. Tobegin with, from a methodological point

2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3 95

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of view, the authors do not explicate howthey went about constituting the corpus ofresearch on which they base their verdict.Nor do they provide much in the way ofspecifics relating to the theoretical andmethodological frameworks characteriz-ing the research work that they examined,or to the overall context of inquiry inwhich the various research projects wereconducted. The authors stick to a “rheto-ric of outcomes (or effectiveness),” where-as one would have thought them willingand able, on the basis of their blanket as-sessment, to articulate a robust, full-fledged line of argument. One would havealso expected them to conduct a careful,comprehensive discussion of constructiv-ism – which is patently not the case here.Instead, one is treated to a few definitionsof their own cobbling and that amount tolittle more than clichés (e.g., p. 78). In-deed, one well wonders what these authorsactually understand about constructivism– they who claim to adhere to a mechanis-tic and realist theory of cognition (short-and long-term memory), who approachlearning as though it were some sort ofchest of drawers (in this drawer, workingmemory, in that one, long-term memory,etc.) and who, quite obviously, are unfa-miliar with the models of self-organiza-tion bearing on memory, for example(Clancey 1997). They have, on the otherhand, demonstrated a most surprisingability to tie constructivism to such thingsas permissiveness or the absence of guid-ance. Only a woeful ignorance of the real-ity of education, constructivism and thescientific literature on the subject can ex-plain their assertion that a teaching ap-proach drawing on the tenets ofconstructivism will reduce education to aself-guided experience, with teachers nolonger having to “orient” students’ effortsto construct a conceptual structure, for ex-ample. Such is clearly not the case, as theresearch of Woods et al. or Aikenhead, cit-ed in the body of this text, has so amplyshown. Likewise, their lumping togetherof constructivism and discovery teachingbespeaks a dismaying degree of misunder-standing on their part, as it is constructiv-ism’s claim that knowledges are not,precisely, an immediately or spontaneous-

ly transparent product and thus cannot bemade the end goal of some artless, naïveprocess of discovery. In short, there aregrounds for asking oneself whether the au-thors were taking aim at the wrong targetand whether indeed the real cause for con-cern is not their own folk conception ofconstructivism. Admittedly, exhaustingthe list of objections would take quitesome doing, and besides, the space re-quirements of this footnote would nodoubt make any such attempt here entirelyunfeasible. In another recent publicationof ours, however, we develop a more full-bodied critique of this kind of writing,which these times of educational reformhave produced on a scale approaching thatof a glut. (Désautels et al. 2005).

7. Along the lines of the educational situa-tion referred to above, this model of lin-guistic interaction would benefit frombeing “socialized,” and from ascribinggreater importance to the negotiation of“positioning relationships” (

rapports deplaces

) that are often brought into play inthis type of interaction – i.e., involving ne-gotiation of the authority deriving fromsuch things as social status, institutionalposition, gender, age, prestige, experience,“high marks,” etc. (Kerbrat-Orecchioni1987).

8. For an illustration of this discursive nego-tiation process as it is engaged in by sec-ondary students, see Larochelle &Désautels (2001).

9. Translator’s note: Certainly one of themost fruitful models to explore and expli-cate the “economy of linguistic exchang-es” in reflexive or constructivist terms is tobe found in Pierre Bourdieu’s seminal

Ceque parler veut dire

, 1982, which wasbrought out in an English edition by J. B.Thompson (translated by G. Raymondand M. Adamson) under the title of

Lan-guage and Symbolic Power

by HarvardUniversity Press: Cambridge MA in 1991.The French title of Bourdieu’s work –which, more literally rendered, equateswith

What Speaking Means –

was intendedas a wink at J. L. Austin’s

How to Do Thingswith Words

, whose title itself contained agently mocking allusion to do-it-yourselfmanuals (first brought out in 1962 byClarendon Press and translated into

French as

Quand dire, c’est faire

by Seuil:Paris in 1970).

10.One outstanding case of this is to be foundin the

Association française contre les myo-pathies

. Infantile spinal muscular atrophy,an incurable neuromuscular disease, wasoriginally considered to be an orphan dis-ease. In numerous cases, doctors did noteven know what name to give the disease,much less what palliative care to suggest.Eventually, parents were the ones who, asthey gradually formed an association, tookcharge of the exceedingly difficult task ofdocumenting cases, establishing compari-sons and classifications, providing the ini-tial descriptions of the developmentalpath of children suffering from the diseaseand of disease stages. In this regard, onemay say that parents were the ones whoproduced the first knowledge about thisterrible disease. See Rabeharisoa & Callon(1999).

11.It is the imposition of a particular intellec-tual layout (

Introduction, Method and Ma-terials, Results, Discussion

), serving tobracket off, in steps, the contingencies in-herent to research (as well as any traces ofthe observer) that enables the text to pro-duce this genuinely political effect. In thisconnection, Madigan, Johnson and Lin-ton (1995) have performed a most instruc-tive analysis of the

American PsychologicalAssociation

(APA) style sheet, which inseveral fields is considered the sacrosanctauthority on the rules governing the com-position of articles and research reports.

12.Several works illustrate the diversity of in-terpretations that have been developedabout this subject, with this diversity con-stituting – to follow Kuhn (1983) – one ofthe conditions for the practice and devel-opment of knowledge referred to as scien-tific. For a summary of the debates ineducation, see, in particular: Glasersfeld(1991), Jenkins (2002), Larochelle, Bed-narz and Garrison (1998), Phillips (2000),Steffe and Gale (1995), Steffe and Thomp-son (2000), and Tobin (1993). For anoverview in other fields, see Volume 23 of

Social Studies of Science

(1993); see also is-sues 18 and 19 of

Cahiers critiques dethérapie familiale et de pratiques de réseaux

(1997, 1998) and issue 17 of

La Revue duMAUSS

(2001).


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Ernst von Glasersfeld together with one of the authors, Marie Larochelle, in Québec, 18 June 2006.

© Sylvie Guignon


Coming to Our Senses: From Constructivism to Democratization of Math Education

The child cannot conceive of tasks, the way to solve them and the solutions in terms other than those that are available at the particular moment in his or her conceptual development. The child must make meaning of the task and try to con-struct a solution by using material she already has. That material cannot be anything but the conceptual building blocks and operations that the child has assembled in his or her own prior experience. — Glasersfeld (1987, p. 12)

Introduction

Having been trained in the Platonism of tra-ditional mathematics, my first “Learning III”experience that Bateson defined as one inwhich “there is a profound reorganization ofcharacter” (Bateson 1972, p. 301) occurred inthe late 80s when I started studying Neuro-Linguistic Programming (NLP). NLP is a set

of models of subjective experience created forthe purpose of making explicit and emulatingin oneself and others strategies of excellence(Dilts et al. 1980). Its primary tenet (formu-lated originally by A. Korzybski) is “The mapis not the territory,” which, in the words ofWatzlawick (1984), means that “the name isnot what it names; an interpretation of realityis only an interpretation and not reality itself.Only a schizophrenic eats the menu instead ofthe foods listed on the menu” (p. 215). Iembraced this tenet, and as a consequence ashift in my world view occurred that turnedmy life around: I moved from the modernist’sbelief in an objective reality accessible by rea-son and observation to the postmodernist’sbelief in subjectivity (Pasztor & Slater 2000).

Having grown up in a communist country,Watzlawick’s (1984) words struck a chordwith me: any system that denies that it oper-ates on a map of reality, rather than on reality

itself, will not only be unable to recognize andadjust to changes in its perception of reality,but will also be unable to tolerate any otherrepresentation of reality. I have had first handexperience of examples that “go from theridiculous to the gruesome” of a totalitarianregime’s “paradoxical, recursive logic” thattypically characterizes paranoia: “It is inher-ent to the concept of paranoia that it rests ona fundamental assumption that is held to beabsolutely true. Because this fundamentalassumption is axiomatic, it cannot and neednot demonstrate its own veracity. Strict logi-cal deductions are then made from this fun-damental premise and create a reality inwhich any failures and inconsistencies of thesystem are attributed to the deduction, butnever to the original premise itself” (ibid., pp.223–224). Whoever criticizes the premises ofthe system is therefore declared to be anenemy and will not be tolerated.

Ten years later, my then therapist and nowco-author and friend, Mary Hale-Haniff,introduced me to constructivist therapies.What a shake-up I had when I read in LynnHoffman’s (1990) paper an account of Heinzvon Foerster criticizing NLP’s tenet, “Themap is not the territory,” and confronting itwith his own view that “

The map

is

the terri-tory

”! Once again, I embarked on a “LearningIII” experience, and it all fell into place whenI read von Glasersfeld’s (1984) introductionto radical constructivism. It clicked. It

fit

per-fectly with most aspects of my life – some con-scious, some unconscious. It

fit

with my dis-satisfaction with the hierarchical teacher–student, physician–patient, therapist–clientand other similar relationships, and my deepdistrust of statistics and other quantitativeresearch methodologies. I came to under-stand that NLP’s epistemology was incongru-ent with its overall intents. Its map-territory

Ana Pasztor

A

Florida International University (USA) <[email protected]>

Motivation: Paralleling my own transformation from a Platonist to a radical constructivist, mathematics education has been experiencing for more than a decade a movement that started in theoretical foundations mostly originating in von Glasersfeld’s work, and then reached professional organizations, which have been leading extensive efforts to reform school mathematics according to constructivist principles. However, the theories espoused by the researchers are, as yet, too abstract to lend themselves readily to imple-mentation in the classroom. Purpose: I define a shared experiential language (SEL) for the constructivist teacher to embody in order to transform her practice congruently according to constructivist principles. While SEL is comprised of Neuro-Linguistic Programming (NLP) subjective experience distinctions, what “makes it tick” is the constructivist epistemol-ogy with its insight that for consistent understanding to happen, new knowledge has to attach to prior experiences in a process of co-construction. Throughout the paper, I elab-orate and validate this insight by numerous examples. Practical implications: Utilizing SEL allows understanding of mathematics to be rooted in each student’s individual sensory experiences, thus shifting the responsibility for success in mathematics from the students back to those who guide them in co-constructing knowledge. This, in turn, should allow everybody access to understanding and so it should no longer be socially acceptable to fail in mathematics. Key words: Radical constructivism, math education, Neuro-Linguistic Pro-gramming, sensory experience, behavioral cues, democratization.

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distinction presupposed the existence of areality that preexists the observer and fromwhich information is filtered onto our indi-vidual maps (Hale-Haniff 2004). NLP modelswere designed to “force” the client to changelimitations in her map. Thus, the therapist–client relationship once again became a hier-archical and coercive one.

I was suddenly able to observe that numer-ous fields such as education, science, psycho-therapy, linguistics, organizational studies,etc., were undergoing a paradigm shift frompositivism to constructivism, to a world viewin which adherence to authority and externalcontrol is replaced by reliance and trust insubjective experience. This, in turn, wouldnecessarily lead to a democratization of therespective field, since knowledge or expertiseis not the privilege of a small “talented” elite,but can be constructed by each personaccording to their previous experience.

Hardest to understand in the shift to radi-cal constructivism – even to the theorist – isthe distinction between its tenets and state-ments such as ‘there exists an external reality,but we do not have direct, unmediated accessto it’ or ‘there exists no independent reality.’ Inmy contribution, I will illustrate the practicalimpact of such a distinction on mathematicseducation. In particular, I will focus on thedemocratization of mathematics (cf. Pasztor2004a) – the shift away from the “transmis-sion” model of education towards a theory ofknowledge and a new methodology, in whichthe process of understanding or coming toknow is a matter of constructing, from ele-ments available in the student’s own experi-ence, conceptual structures that lead to “a via-ble path of action, a viable solution to anexperiential problem, or a viable interpreta-tion of a piece of language,” and “there is neverany reason to believe that this construction isthe only one possible” (Glasersfeld 1987,p. 10).

Von Glasersfeld’s writings are among thevery few academic ones that have deeplyaffected my personal life as well (as if therewas a non-personal life …) Sometimes, whenI ask my husband to, say, put the garbage outand he fails to do so and later I question himabout it, he may reply, “But you didn’t tell meto do so.” In such a case, I respond, “You can-not say that I didn’t

tell

you, the only thing youcan say is that you didn’t

hear

me tell you.”Thus, von Glasersfeld entered our marital life.

The traditional approach to mathematics education

The traditional, positivist approach toinstruction has been referred to as “the Age ofthe Sage on the Stage” (Davis & Maher 1997,p. 93), due to its “transmission” model ofteaching, where teaching means “gettingknowledge into the heads” of the students(Glasersfeld 1987, p. 3), that is,

transmitting

knowledge from the teacher to the student.The underlying philosophy is that knowledgeis out there, independent of the knower, readyto be discovered and be transferred into peo-ple’s heads. It is “a commodity that can becommunicated” (Glasersfeld 1987, p. 6). The

ontology

presupposed in this view is that thereis one true reality out there, which exists inde-pendently of the observer. Furthermore, wehave access to this reality, and we can frag-ment, study, predict and control it (Lincoln &Guba 1985; Hale-Haniff & Pasztor 1999).

However, as von Glasersfeld (1987, p. 4)points out, while trying to access reality, wehave been caught in an age-old dilemma: Iftruth is defined as “the perfect match, theflawless representation” of reality, w

ho is tojudge “the perfect match with reality”?

To answer this question, Western philoso-

phy has taken a route in which, given the righttools, pure reason is believed to be able totranscend all social and cultural constraintsand the confines of the human body, includ-ing those of perception and emotion. Mathe-matical reasoning has been seen as the purestexample of reason: “purely abstract, transcen-dental, culture-free, unemotional, universal,decontextualized, disembodied, and henceformal” (Lakoff & Nuñez 1997, p. 22; formore “fine-tuned” criticism cf. Lakatos1976). The traditional scientist, mathemati-cian, or, in general, researcher, is out to findobjective truth. In doing so, she is trained tobe value-neutral in order to be able to objec-tively judge “the perfect match” with reality.She is a “cool, detached, solitary genius, theone who has the answers that others don’thave, as if the truth could be owned” (Pert1997, p. 315).

In practice, however, there is a direct “rela-tionship between claims to truth and the dis-tribution of power in society” (Gergen 1991,p. 95). Those at the top of the educational sys-

tem hierarchy are the “objective” experts ofknowledge; they determine teaching goalsand criteria of assessment. Accordingly, thetraditional teacher–student relationship is ahierarchical, authoritarian relationship.

The constructivist view of knowledge and its implications for mathematics education

In contrast to positivist philosophy, construc-tivist philosophies have adopted a concept ofknowledge that is

not

based on any belief in anaccessible objective reality. In the radical con-structivist view, knowing is not matchingreality, but rather finding a

fit

with observa-tions. Constructivist knowledge “is knowl-edge that human reason derives from experi-ence. It does not represent a picture of the‘real’ world but provides structure and orga-nization to experience. As such it has an all-important function: It enables us to solveexperiential problems” (Glasersfeld 1987,p. 5). With this theory of knowledge, theexperiencing human turns “from an explorerwho is condemned to seek ‘structural proper-ties’ of an inaccessible reality … into a builderof cognitive structures intended to solve suchproblems as the organism perceives or con-ceives” (ibid.).

Now, let us look at the two views that areso often confused with the tenets of radicalconstructivism (Pasztor 2004a): 1. there existsa mind-independent reality (MIR), albeitonly indirectly accessible, and 2. there existsno MIR. The first view is close to the positivistontology, except now we do not have the pos-sibility of a “perfect match,” but only that of amediated match. Still,

who is going to judge the“better” match

?A constructivist view is inconsistent with

both

of these ontological views. As vonGlasersfeld (2004a, [2]) states, the construc-tivist holds “that all coordination and, there-fore, all structure is of the organism’s ownmaking,” and therefore he has no way ofknowing anything about the ontological real-ity of these constructs. In fact, he has no wayof knowing anything about an MIR. Further-more, as soon as we posit the existence or non-existence of an MIR, we have caused a splitbetween the knower and the known. The one


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who knows whether an MIR exists or does notexist becomes the expert, the authority. In theconstructivist view, a third person has no wayof knowing anything about my or your ownexperience. As von Glasersfeld (2004b, [4])says, “‘someone else’ is always my construc-tion.” The only expert of your experience isyou. This view, as I will show, can make a tre-mendous difference in math education.

For more than a decade now, mathematicseducation in the US has been experiencing atop-down reform movement that started withthe theoretical foundations of mathematicseducation that mostly originated in von Gla-sersfeld’s work, and then moved to the profes-sional organizations, which then started andhave since been leading extensive efforts toreform school mathematics according to con-structivist principles (NCTM 2000). So far,however, the reform has been moving onlyvery slowly into the mathematics classroompractices. Besides complex political reasons(Alacaci & Pasztor 2002), one of the reasonsfor this is that the theories espoused by theresearchers to implement constructivist prin-ciples are, as yet, too abstract to readily lendthemselves to implementation. One of thegoals of my own research efforts in math edu-cation has been to help translate the languageof these theories into the experiential lan-guage of students.

Abstract mathematical concepts are

meta-phorical

and are built from people’s sensoryexperiences (Lakoff & Nuñez 1997; Lakoff &Johnson 1999). The constructivist teacher’srole is to make sure that they

fit

the students’

individual experience

. Frustration and confu-sion ensue if the teacher’s metaphorical map-ping is rooted in an a-priori construction,rather than in the student’s own

experience.English (1997) provides a very good exampleof what happens in such a case. It concerns theuse of a line metaphor to represent our num-ber system, whereby numbers are consideredas points on a line. The “number line” is usedto convey the notion of positive and negativenumber, and to visualize relationshipsbetween numbers. It turns out that studentsfrequently have difficulty in abstractingmathematical ideas that are linked to thenumber line (Dufour-Janvier, Bednarz &Belanger 1987, quoted in English 1997, p. 8).“There is a tendency for students to see thenumber line as a series of ‘stepping stones,’with each step conceived of as a rock with a

hole between each two successive rocks. Thismay explain why so many students say thatthere are no numbers, or at the most, one,between two whole numbers.”

While students are often able to reorganizetheir experience in a way that makes it

fit

theconstraints of the problem at hand, oftentimes the teacher needs

to provide for the stu-dents

“precisely those experiences that will bemost useful for further development or revi-sion of the mental structures that are beingbuilt” (Davis & Maher 1997, p. 94). This ideais wonderfully demonstrated by Machtinger(1965) (quoted in Davis & Maher, 1997, pp.94–95) who taught kindergarten kids to con-jecture and prove several theorems aboutnumbers, including even + even = even,even + odd = odd, and odd + odd = even.She did so by defining a number

n

as “even” ifa group of

n

children could be organized intopairs for walking along the corridor and as“odd” if such a group had one child left overwhen organized into pairs. Since walkingalong the corridor in pairs was a daily experi-ence for the kids, learning the new informa-tion became a matter of just expanding orreorganizing their existing knowledge.

But this is

not

always possible. In particularit is not possible when the teacher uses incom-patible metaphors to explain mathematicalideas. I was shocked and saddened by thegreat regret with which the 86-year-old CarlJung remembered in his 1962 memoirs theterror that he experienced in math classes.While his teacher gave the impression thatalgebra was very natural, the young Jungfailed to understand what numbers actuallywere. He knew they were not flowers, nor ani-mals, nor fossils – they were nothing he couldimagine. They were just amounts thatresulted from counting. To his greatest confu-sion, these amounts were replaced by lettersthe meaning of which was a sound. Histeacher tried hard to explain the purpose ofthis strange operation of replacing under-standable amounts by sounds, but to no avail.This, what seemed to Jung to be a randomexpression of numbers through sounds suchas “a,” “b,” “c,” or “x,” did not explain anythingabout the nature of numbers. His frustrationpeaked with the axiom, “if a = b and b = c,then a = c,” since by definition it was clear that“a” denoted something different from “b,”and so could not be equaled with “b,” let alonewith “c.” He was outraged. An equality could

be “a = a,” but “a = b” was a lie and deceit. Hisintellectual morality resisted such incongru-ities that blocked his access to the understand-ing of mathematics. To his old age Jung hadthe uncorrectable feeling that if he could haveaccepted the possibility of “a = b,” that is, of“sun = moon, dog = cat, etc.,” then mathe-matics would have infinitely absorbed him.Instead, he came to doubt the morality ofmathematics for his entire life. Like so manyothers, he came to doubt his own self-worth,which, back then, prevented him from askingquestions in class (Jung 1962).

In practice, “[f]or too many people, math-ematics stopped making sense somewherealong the way. Either slowly or dramatically,they gave up on the field as hopelessly bafflingand difficult, and they grew up to be adultswho – confident that others share their expe-rience – nonchalantly announce, ‘Math wasjust not for me’ or ‘I was never good at it.’”(Askey 1999). Ruth McNeill shares her storyof how she came to quit math: “What did mein was the idea that a negative number timesa negative number comes out to a positivenumber. This seemed (and still seems) inher-ently unlikely – counterintuitive, as mathe-maticians say. I … could not overcome mystrong sense that multiplying intensifiessomething, and thus two negative numbersmultiplied together should properly producea

very

negative result” (McNeill 1988, quotedin Askey 1999).

Most mathematical concepts being meta-phorical and understanding a metaphormeaning successfully mapping concepts fromour individual experience onto new domains,teaching the metaphorical structure of math-ematics becomes indispensable. It shifts thedefinition of “mathematical understanding”from a goal that only a few “talented” or“gifted” people can reach, to a process rootedin

all

people’s individual experience.

Is 2 + 2 still 4?

If objectivity of mathematics is just a myth,what happens to basic facts such as“2 + 2 = 4?” Are we denying them? The ques-tion is very nicely answered in a dialoguebetween von Foerster and von Glaserfeld intheir (1999) book. The following is an excerptfrom the book (translated from German bymyself).

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von Glasersfeld

: “Mathematics is of coursea free invention, but very often this is misun-derstood, because people say, ‘Well, if it isfreely invented, why is 2

×

2 always 4?’ … Thefree invention of course doesn’t mean thatonce you have assumed certain rules, you mayintentionally break these rules. It is just like inchess, where you assume that the chess figuresmove in a certain way. The situations that youthen construct, and the moves that are thenpossible, arise as consequences of applyingthe accepted rules. As I see it, this is the samein math. There one creates certain rules, andthe first rules concern numbers. Countingrests on more complicated rules than mostpeople are aware of. They can count, but arenot always clear about everything they dowhile counting. … To count, you must firsthave the concept of unit. Then you must per-ceive units, that is, you must be able to con-struct them according to your perception.You have to be able see them, or show them,or push them on a table, or shift them on a rodon the abacus. And with each unit that youshift, you have to utter one of the numerals ofa fixed sequence of numerals. You must notalter the sequence. If you follow these rulesthen it is no magic that 2 + 2 is always 4. Youcould only get a different result if you sud-denly started counting, ‘1, 2, 7, 6’ instead ofthe normal order, thus breaking an acceptedrule. In that case 2 + 2 would be 6.”

von Foerster

: “That would be like playingchess and moving the threatened king twosquares instead of one. Then you would bestepping out of the game.”

von Glasersfeld

: “Yes – and if my opponentexplained why this is so, then I would discoverthat I broke a rule. This also shows that it is therules that determine when my king is incheck-mate. We don’t invent this during thegame ….”

von Foerster

: “In mathematics this is ofcourse the same – here the rules imply a vari-ety of things that one could not easily havepredicted.”

von Glasersfeld

: “Piaget has this nice exam-ple where a child first finds out that it makesno difference whether he counts eight mar-bles placed in a circle clockwise or counter-clockwise. It always amounts to 8. And Piagetputs it very nicely that this 8 is not a perceivedfact, but the result of rule-based actions. Aslong as we perform these actions according tothe rules, we come to the result determined by

these rules. And with the action of countingthe directions plays no role, but according tothe rules, we may count each unit only once.This is the number constancy” (Foerster &Glasersfeld 1999, pp. 133–134).

So, while mathematics is a human con-struction, it is not an arbitrary creation. It is“not a mere historically contingent socialconstruction. What makes mathematics non-arbitrary is that it uses the basic conceptualmechanisms of the embodied human mind…Mathematics is a product of the neural capac-ities of our brains, the nature of our bodies,our evolution, our environment, and our longsocial and cultural history” (Lakoff & Nuñez2000, p. 9).

Operative learning and learning states

In constructivism, the meaning of learninghas shifted from the student’s “correct” repli-cation of what the teacher does to “the stu-dent’s

conscious understanding

of what he orshe is doing and why it is being done” (Gla-sersfeld 1987, p. 12). “Mathematical knowl-edge cannot be reduced to a stock of retriev-able ‘facts’ but concerns the ability to computenew results. To use Piaget’s terms, it is

opera-tive

rather than

figurative

. It is the product ofreflection – and whereas reflection as such isnot observable, its product

may

be inferredfrom observable responses” (Glasersfeld1987, p. 10). Operative knowledge is con-structive. “It is not the particular responsethat matters but the way in which it wasarrived at” (Glasersfeld 1987, p. 11).

But how is the student to attain such oper-ative knowledge in mathematics, when the“structure of mathematical concepts is stilllargely obscure” (Glasersfeld 1987, p. 13)?Most definitions in mathematics are

formal

rather than

conceptual

. In mathematics, defi-nitions “merely substitute other signs or sym-bols for the definiendum. Rarely, if ever, isthere a hint, let alone an indication, of whatone must

do

in order to build up the concep-tual structures that are to be associated withthe symbols. Yet, that is of course what a stu-dent has to find out if he or she is to acquire anew concept” (Glasersfeld 1987, p. 14).

To illustrate this point, let us look at anexample. While talking about my research toJ, a doctoral student in Computer Science in

his mid thirties, I asked him to solve a wordproblem. “Word problem? I

hate

word prob-lems!” was J’s response even before he knewwhat the word problem was. The word prob-lem was this: “Joey has a new puppy. His sister,Jenna, has a big dog. Jenna’s dog weighs eighttimes as much as the puppy. Both petstogether weigh 54 pounds. How much doesJoey’s puppy weigh?” J listened to the prob-lem, and then asked me to repeat it. As I didso, J made the following notes, turning hisback to me:

puppy:

x

big dog: 8

x

x

+ 8

x

= 549

x

= 54Then he stopped and said he didn’t know

his multiplication table. “So anyway, what isthe answer?” I asked. J blushed and becamerestless. “What do you mean?” he asked. Ireplied, “Well, what was the question?” AfterJeff repeated the problem’s question, I askedagain, “So, how much does the puppy weigh?”Again, J didn’t answer but became insteadmore and more insecure. “Why, did I dosomething wrong? I must have screwed upsomewhere.” “No,” I replied. “All I have inmind is

how

do you get that

x

?”J was so fixed on getting the exact number

as a result, that it never occurred to him tosay something like “The puppy weighs 54divided by 9, whatever that is.” Instead, hequestioned his whole approach thinking hehad “screwed up somewhere.” I asked himwhy he hated word problems. He replied,“Because they make me feel stupid.” How? Iinquired. “Well, if I don’t get an immediateanswer, I feel stupid. It is stuff I should know.It is expected of me.” Jeff went on to talkabout the time when he came to hate wordproblems. He never understood what theteacher did in class – he failed to see any pat-tern in these word problems. The teacherhad them solve word problems either undertime pressure or at the board, in front of theentire class. He felt threatened and neveractually got over it.

There is a general agreement across theconstructivist research in mathematics edu-cation that for consistent understanding tohappen, new knowledge has to attach to stu-dents’ prior experiences. But just what

kind

ofprior experiences? Which ones are optimal fornew learning? How can a teacher behave in away as to resurrect those experiences? What


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are resource states of learning? How are atten-tional units of those states configured? Howcan a teacher know when she is eliciting anun-useful experience? Even though people’ssubjective experiences are private, can stu-dents and teachers come to share a languageof experience? How?

Making

sense

of math – literally!

These and similar questions have guided mywork in the last two decades, helping me setresearch goals such as exploring the relation-ship between mathematical knowledge andthe subjective experience it gets attached to inthe process we call understanding.

While holding a constructivist epistemol-ogy, I have been able to facilitate successfulmathematics understanding in my studentsby using a shared experiential language (SEL)that allows a direct, two-way communicationbetween the teachers and students. SEL isbased on NLP models and comprises catego-ries of subjective experience such as sensory(see-hear-feel) modalities, submodalities,sensory strategies, and behavioral cues, aswell as ways for the teachers to separate stu-dent’s meanings from their own (Hale-Haniff& Pasztor 1999; Hale-Haniff 2004; Pasztor2004b).

Sensory modalities: The see/hear/feel building blocks of our experience

According to Damasio (1994), at eachmoment in time our subjective experience ismanifested in what he calls an “image”: a

visual image

, that is, an internal picture; an

auditory image

, that is, sounds – discrete oranalog; a

kinesthetic image

, that is, a feeling oran internal smell or taste; or a combination ofthese. For example, while J’s representation of“even number” is manifested in a fuzzy visualimage of the number two, accompanied by “afeeling of 2ness,” and my own representationis a sharp visual image of “2

n

,” written inwhite on a blackboard and situated right infront of me, my friend Mary represents “evennumber” by hearing the actual definition of“even number.”

Many people argue that they do not thinkin images, but rather in words or abstract sym-bols. But “most of the words we use in ourinner speech, before speaking or writing a sen-tence, exist as auditory or visual images in ourconsciousness. If they did not become images,however fleetingly, they would not be any-thing we could know” (Damasio 1994, p. 106).

Damasio (1994) goes as far as to require asan essential condition for having a mind theability to form internal (visual, auditory,kinesthetic) images, and to order them in theprocess we call thought. His view is that “hav-ing a mind means that an organism formsneural representations which can becomeimages, be manipulated in a process calledthought, and eventually influence behaviorby helping predict the future, plan accord-ingly, and choose the next action” (p. 90).

Sensory images are often referred to as“mental representations” – a term that, as vonGlasersfeld (1987) explains, can be quite mis-leading: “In the constructivist view, ‘concepts,’‘mental representation,’ ‘memories,’ ‘images,’and so on, must not be thought of as static butalways as

dynamic

; that is to say, they are notconceived as postcards that can be retrievedfrom some file, but rather as relatively self-contained programs or production routinesthat can be called up and run (cf. Damasio’s1994 dispositional representations). Concep-tions, then, are produced internally. They arereplayed, shelved, or discarded according totheir usefulness and applicability in experien-tial contexts. The more often they turn out tobe viable, the more solid and reliable theyseem. But no amount of usefulness or reliabil-ity can alter their internal, conceptual origin.They are not replicas of external originals,simply because no cognitive organism canhave access to ‘things-in-themselves’ and thusthere are no models to be copied” (p. 219).

How constructivism honors other ways of knowing and communicating

Positivist methodology privileges auditory-verbal communication, often to the exclusionof other modalities. Thus we teach the ver-bally oriented conscious mind, and oftenignore visual and kinesthetic aspects of expe-

rience. However, if we intend to communicatein a holistic manner

engaging all of our senses

,we need to also honor other ways of knowing.“For the constructivist teacher – much like thepsychoanalyst – ‘telling’ is usually not aneffective tool. In this role, the teacher is muchless a lecturer, and much more of a coach (asin learning tennis, or in learning to play thepiano). A recent slogan describes this by say-ing ‘the Sage on the Stage has been replaced bythe Guide on the Side.’ It is the

student

who isdoing the work of building or revising [… hisor her] personal representations. The studentbuilds up the ideas in his or her own head, andthe teacher has at best a limited role in shapingthe student’s personal mental representa-tions. The experiences that the teacher pro-vides are grist to the mill, but the student is themiller” (Davis & Maher 1997, p. 94).

The holistic, constructivist view presup-poses that the teacher should have the poten-tial to attend to all aspects of sensory experi-ence and communication

both

in herself andin the student’s system. In addition to audi-tory-verbal aspects, visual and kinestheticexperience may also be privileged, with bothunconscious (tacit) and conscious communi-cation and perception considered. Whenteachers are (implicitly) trained to ignorecommunications related to intra-personal,emotional, and unconscious experience, weare imparting positivist principles. Most of ushave been socialized largely according to pos-itivist thinking, conceptualizing emotions assudden and intense experiences that comeand go at certain times; something that a saneor balanced person learns to keep under con-trol so that rational thinking and control canprevail. On the other hand, the holistic, con-structivist view depicts emotional experienceas ongoing, simultaneous with and support-ive of, the rest of experience.

Kinesthetic experience is ever-present(although not always consciously accessible)in form of “body images.” “By dint of juxtapo-sition, body images give to other images aquality of goodness or badness, of pleasure orpain. I see feelings as having a truly privilegedstatus… [F]eelings have a say on how the restof the brain and cognition go about theirbusiness” (Damasio 1994, pp. 159–160).

It is important to note that experience thatis kinesthetic to one person (e.g., the student)is accessible primarily visually to the other(e.g., the teacher). For example, as the student

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feels his or her face get hot, the teacher mightnotice him blush. Or, as the student feels asense of pride welling up in him, the teachermight notice him taking a deep breath as hesquares his shoulders. Thus learning to detectnew categories of sensory experience in one-self and others involves enhancing perceptionof new categories of both kinesthetic andvisual experience. Becoming more con-sciously aware of categories of sensory experi-ence other than auditory-verbal, the teacherenhances her ability to accommodate to thestudents’ experiences.

Submodalities: Refining the see/hear/feel building blocks

Each sensory modality is designed to ‘per-ceive’ certain basic qualities called

submodal-ities

, of the experience it represents (Bandler& MacDonald 1988; Pasztor 1998; Hale-Han-iff & Pasztor 1999).

Visual

submodalities referto qualities such as: location in space, relativesize, hues of color or black and white, pres-ence or absence of movement, rhythm, degreeof illumination, degree of clarity or focus, flator three-dimensional; associated or dissoci-ated (seeing oneself in the image, or viewingfrom a fully associated position).

Auditory

submodalities refer to qualities such as loca-tion, rhythm, relative pitch, relative volume,content: voice, music, noise.

Kinesthetic

sub-modalities include such qualities as: locationof sensations, presence or absence of move-ment (and if moving, the physical locations ofsequential sensations), the type of sensations:temperature, pressure, density, duration,moisture, pervasiveness of body areainvolved, sense of movement and accelera-tion, changes in direction and rotation.

Submodalities are distinctions that sepa-rate experiences from one another. As such,their significance comes to bear only when wecontrast submodalities of images that repre-sent different experiences. To illustrate this,let us look at the submodalities of differentexperiences of my husband, specifically athow different contexts are manifested in com-pletely different sets of submodalities. Myhusband is an architect and he is quite profi-cient in geometry. First, here is what hereports regarding his experience of abstrac-

tion: “As part of a math problem involving tri-angles, an

abstract

triangle occurs first as afuzzy shape without any material ‘body.’ Itdoesn’t have a surface; not even a clear bound-ary. Its size is also changing between a coupleof inches to one or two feet. It is quite far frommy face and its distance is unspecific but it isstill in the room. As a consequence, its shape,size, and location can easily be manipulated.As it is manipulated, such as made equilateralor rotated, these parameters change rapidly.The boundary becomes more defined, the sizeconcrete, and the distance fixed. It stillremains, however, a line-drawing without abody or surface. It is always a colorless figure,either gray or black and white.” In contrast,for my husband imagining an emergency tri-angle on the road propped up behind a car “isa vivid picture with concrete shape, thickness,material, etc. It is red with white edges in flu-orescent colors set against the gray asphaltbackground. I see it at a distance of 10 feet inlife size, that is, the same size I would probablysee it driving by and looking at it from thissame distance. I feel some anxiety in my stom-ach as I probably connect this picture uncon-sciously with a car break-down or an acci-dent.”

Sensory strategies: sequences of see/hear/feel blocks leading to a particular outcome

Our thought processes are organized insequences of images that have become consol-idated into functional units of behavior lead-ing to a particular outcome and often exe-cuted below the threshold of consciousness.They are called

sensory

strategies

(Dilts et al.1980) Each image triggers another image or asequence of images. For example, you hear X’sname, this triggers your remembering X’sface, close up, somewhat distorted, and pink-ish red, which, in turn, triggers a negative feel-ing. Over time, each image or sequence ofimages comes to serve as a stimulus that auto-matically triggers other portions of the per-ceptual or recalled experience it represents.The creation of such triggers happensthrough learning and depends on variouscomplex subjective, social, cultural and otherfactors. I will illustrate the idea of sensory

strategy with a few examples from a pilotproject I conducted in the academic year1999–2000 with a class of fourth graders withthe aim of teaching them SEL and through it,awareness of their mental processes whilesolving math problems.

Ramon chose the following problem tosolve:

Which measure is the best estimate todescribe the length of the salamander below(picture followed text)? Circle the best estimate:3 inches 3miles 3 pounds.

Here is what he reported: “What I did waspicture a huge ruler in front of my face and Isaw the numbers 1,2,3,4,5,… I looked at thepicture [in the book] and compared it with 3inch and it was right. Besides, pounds isweight and miles is larger than inch.”

Kevin’s strategy for implementing a pat-tern is also quite remarkable. I asked the classto multiply 1

×

1 (= 1), 11

×

11 (= 121), 111

×

111 (= 12321), and 1111

×

1111 (= 1234321).Then I asked them to continue the pattern.Kevin reported the following for calculating11111

×

11111: “First I looked, then [knock-ing with his left hand on his head just abovehis left ear] I heard ‘tap, tap-tap, tap-tap-tap,tap-tap-tap-tap, tap-tap-tap-tap-tap, andthen back down tap-tap-tap-tap, tap-tap-tap,tap-tap, tap.” He followed this by writing123454321.

We each have our strategies in terms ofwhat we see, hear, or feel, of getting out of bedin the morning, multiplying two numbers,deciding when to buy gas, or knowing thatsomething is right. For example, Melanie inmy pilot project repeatedly demonstrated adistinct problem solving strategy that lets herknow that the result “is right.” Let us look, forexample, how she solved the following multi-ple choice problem:

Alana entered the countyspelling bee. She spelled 47 words correctlybefore she made a mistake. If she had spelledthree more words correctly, she would havespelled twice as many words as last year. Howmany words did she spell correctly last year?

A

.25

B.

27

C.

32

D

. 35

Here is how Melanie explained her solu-tion (in terms of what she saw, heard or felt)in her homework: “I added each number toitself and 25 + 25 = 50. The problem says 47then + 3 = 50. I did not feel anything but inmy head I saw 47 + 3 = 50. I also saw that 50was really gold and yellow and it was blinkingand heard it beep. Beep, beep, beep, beep itsounded really fast and loud. My head was


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here [smiley face] and the numbers were here[smiley face below the first smiley face, shiftedto the right, suggesting that she saw them infront, somewhat to the side]. The numberswere that big. The other numbers were blackbesides 50. The numbers were very clear. I sawthe numbers for about a minute. I saw thenumbers after the question. I saw the num-bers in numbers not letters. The same thinghappened with 25 + 25 = 50.”

In my pilot project, I often asked the kidsto “try on” each other’s sensory strategies. Bydoing so, they were by comparison able togain more awareness of their own strategies. Iwas amazed at the ease with which the kidsadopted Melanie’s decision strategy of seeingthe correct answers blink.

Tools for separating the teacher/investigator’s meaning from that of the student

Just as cognitive organisms can never matchtheir conceptual and sensory organizations ofexperience with the structure of an indepen-dent objective reality because they simply donot have access to any such reality, so can we,teachers, never match the model we have con-structed of the students’ conceptualizationsand sensory strategies with what actually goeson in their head. The best we can do is applyvon Glasersfeld’s principle of

fit

by constantlycalibrating information and feeding it back tothe students to test for accuracy and recogni-tion, and accordingly adjusting our model

s

.How can we do this? How can we make surethat we separate our own meanings fromthose of the students?

For one, while attending to the students,we, as teachers, can pay attention to the com-munication

process,

not just the

content.

While content generally refers to

what

istalked about, or

why

it is talked about, processrefers to the

how

of the way problems andsolutions are communicated. Process, or pat-tern-based distinctions occur at different log-ical levels of communication than content-based distinctions do (Bateson 1972). Attend-ing only to content makes it far more likelythat the teacher will associate elements of thestudent’s communications with her own pri-vate meanings rather than with the student’s.

By also attending to process rather than onlyto content, the teacher can detect order or pat-tern, using other ways of knowing besidesrational logic, such as attending to physiolog-ical and language cues.

Although sensory experience is simulta-neously available to all senses, people attendto various aspects of see-hear-feel experienceat different times, which is manifested in theirlanguage. For example, let us take the case oftwo children trying to work together on amathematics problem. One child does “notsee” what they are supposed to do, while theother states she doesn’t get “a feel” for whatthey are supposed to do. In this scenario,communication flow is obstructed becauseeach child is attending to a different sense sys-tem, or logical level of experience (Bateson1972). By noticing this, the teacher can helpthe children translate their experience so itcan be shared and attention can again flowfreely. Sensory system mismatches often takeplace between teachers and children. Forexample, if a child says, “Your explanation issomewhat foggy,” the teacher’s response ofmatching the visual system by asking “Whatwould it take to make it clearer?” might be abetter fit than the kinesthetic mismatch of “Soyou feel confused?”

People’s sensory strategies are processesthat cause “changes in body state – those inskin color, body posture, and facial expres-sion, for instance – [which] are actually per-ceptible to and external observer.” (Damasio1994, p. 139). These physical reactions areimportant cues for the external observationand confirmation of people’s sensory strate-gies. The primary behavioral elementsinvolved are: language patterns, body posture,accessing cues, gestures, and eye movements(Dilts et al. 1980; Pasztor 1998; Hale-Haniff &Pasztor 1999).

Attending to the sense system presup-posed in people’s language is based on theassumption, derived from constructivist ther-apy case studies and literature, that sensoryexperience or “the report of the senses”reflects the interaction between body andmind, and that one can attend to communi-cation behavior as a simultaneous manifesta-tion of sensory experience. For example, con-structivist therapies are particularlysuccessful in using linguistic metaphors suchas “That’s a murky argument,” “Things wereblown out of proportion” or “Shrink the

problem down to size” (visual); “This is anunheard of solution,” “It has a nice ring to it”or “He talks in circles” (auditory); and “It feelsright,” “The solution hit me” or “This is hotstuff” (kinesthetic), as an expression of peo-ple’s sensory experiences (Bandler & Mac-Donald 1988; Pasztor 2004b).

Most often, we do not need training tounderstand the language of behavioral cues.For example, if a person is using gross bodymovements – large motor movements com-pared to fine motor movements – we instinc-tively know what the relationship betweenlevel of detail and abstraction in the submo-dalities of his internal processing is. It wouldbe really odd for that person to say, “I got thedetails, now give me the big picture.” Themore precise the body language, the moreprecise the “chunk size” of information theperson is processing. We can also tell the highdegree of detail by the narrowing of the gaze –it’s almost as if the person was focusing on aparticular area of the fine print as opposed ona diffused thing, like noticing a page or a com-puter screen. Duration and intensity of gaze,coordination of eye and head movements,head tilt and angle, chin orientation (up,down and middle) – some of these are access-ing cues. They might tell us the state that peo-ple are in, the configuration of their attention,level of detail, what they are attending to.Sometimes people lean their head to one sidewhen they are receiving new information, andto another side when it is “a rerun.” Noticingthese cues can be very helpful to see that theperson is receptive to what we’re saying orwhen their system is closing down a bit. In thelatter case, how can we shift the way we arepresenting information so that they openback up again?

Let us say a person wanted to learn the sub-ject area and we noticed their physiologystarting to shut out new information. Beingable to map the precise point where they shutdown and to figure out what was going on thatcaused them shut down can be helpful tofacilitate their getting back in state.

Awareness of behavioral cues also has thebenefit of dispelling misconceptions that par-ents and teachers often have about the chil-dren’s behavior. You have probably heard par-ents or teachers say to their children, “Theanswer is not on the ceiling!” while forcingthem to look down on their notebooks whendoing their homework or taking a test. In

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doing so they inadvertently keep the childrenfrom accessing information visually andinstead lock them into the kinesthetic modal-ity. This is of particular significance in math-ematics, where visualization is often the key tosolving a problem. You have probably alsoheard parents or teachers say to their children“look at me when I talk to you.” When peoplelisten, they have a natural tendency to turntheir ear toward the sound source, so facing itwill not come naturally to them. Sometimeswe force our children to look at us while wetalk, and then we complain that “you haven’theard a word of what I said, have you?” Youhave also probably heard parents or teacherssay to their children, “Stand still when I talk toyou!” While I do not have much room here todiscuss behavioral cues in much detail, I wantto emphasize that being able to recognizetheir correlation to internal processing mightbe a critical tool for helping someone accessoptimal learning states. It may also be all ittakes to categorize a child as “gifted,” asopposed to “at risk.”

Democratization of math education: Utilizing SEL

The premise for utilizing SEL is that if theteacher embodies the distinctions of subjectiveexperience that encompass SEL in her neurol-ogy and mindfully reflects them in her com-munication with the students, then she is ableto share the students’ experiences at a deepsensory level and thus she is able to literally“make more sense” of her students. A some-what humorous incident exemplifies this. Ipresented to my pilot project class the follow-ing problem: “Imagine a five by five by fivecube [made of unit cubes]. Paint is poureddown over the top and the four sides. Howmany [unit] cubes wouldhave paint on them?” Whilesome kids said, “All,”some others felt real con-fused. Upon elicitingtheir see-hear-feel expe-riences using the distinc-

tions of SEL, I was able to understand that thekids who had said, “All,” had imagined a thin-ner paint that got underneath the cube andinto the cracks between the unit cubes, whilethe ones who felt confused, imagined thepaint “too” thick and concluded that it my notcover the cube evenly enough to have wholeunit cubes covered. Ultimately, I was able toseparate students’ images of the paint frommine, and thus realize that I had actually spec-ified the problem poorly.

The key to utilizing SEL is to model stu-dents’ subjective experience to help themamplify successful learning states by bringingthem into consciousness, and, if necessary, tohelp them shift un-resourceful learning statesso that they become resourceful.. The premiseis that experiences are like a series of domi-noes: the more dominoes are falling, the moredifficult it is to break un-useful learning pat-terns. If we can find the first domino or whathas knocked down the first domino, so tospeak, then the person has much more choicethan when his negative response – be it anger,frustration, or helplessness – is real high. It ismuch more likely that a student has choicewhile his response to a negative state of learn-ing is still small, and it gives him a sense ofcontrol to be able to change it. Through theprocess of modeling students’ experiences wecan slow down their processing so they areable to gain conscious control over their sen-sory strategies and thus gain conscious math-ematical competence.

By rooting mathematics understandingin each student’s indi-vidual sensoryexperi-ences, weare shift-ing theresponsibil-ity for success in

mathematics from the students back to thosewho guide and lead the process of co-con-structing knowledge. This, in turn, shouldradically change prevailing beliefs aboutwho should be studying mathematics andwho should be successful at it: everybody hasaccess to understanding, not just those whopossess the “math gene” – it should not besocially acceptable anymore to fail in mathe-matics.

Acknowledgements

I gratefully acknowledge the support of theNational Science Foundation grant CNS-

0454211 with the CATE Center at Flor-ida International University. I wouldalso like to thank Mary Hale-Haniff for

having accompanied andoften guided me on myvoyage through para-

digms.

Ana Pasztor is Professor of Computer Sci-ence at Florida International University in Miami. She earned her doctorate in mathe-matics at Darmstadt University, Germany. Presently, she teaches classes in logic, com-puter ethics, and cognitive science. She has numerous refereed publications in a wide range of areas such as abstract algebra, log-ics of programming, artificial intelligence, requirement engineering, design, and more recently, the structure of subjective experi-ence, cognitive alignment in women in math and science, and cognitive issues in mathe-matics education. Her most recent research concerns constructivism as it relates to con-sciousness studies in cognitive science and pragmatics, as well as the implementation of constructivist principles in the school math-ematics classroom. Ana Pasztor is also a Master Practitioner of Neuro-Linguistic Programming (NLP). She has worked on re-defining NLP within the constructivist para-digm in a way that allows her to embody and apply its models in a congruent and consistent way.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR


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assessment preparation materials on stu-dents’ learning of school mathematics – Astudy. The Journal of MathematicalBehavior 21: 225–253.

Askey, R. (1999) Why does a negative a nega-tive = a positive? American Educator 23(3): 10–11.

Bandler, R. & MacDonald, W. (1988). Aninsider’s guide to sub-modalities. MetaPublications: Cupertino, CA.

Bateson, G. (1972) Steps to an ecology ofmind. Balantine Books: Toronto.

Damasio, A. R. (1994) Descartes’ error. Gros-set/Putnam: New York.

Davis, R. B. & Maher, C. A. (1997) How stu-dents think: The role of representations.In: English, L. (ed.) Mathematical reason-ing. analogies, metaphors, and images.Lawrence Erlbaum Associates: Mahwah,NJ, pp. 93–115.

Dilts, R., Grinder, J., Bandler, R., Bandler, L. &Delosier, J. (1980) Neuro-Linguistic Pro-gramming, Volume I: The study of thestructure of subjective experience. MetaPublications: Cupertino, CA.

English, L. (1997) Analogies, metaphors, andimages: Vehicles for mathematical reason-ing. In: English, L. (ed.) Mathematical rea-soning. analogies, metaphors, and images.Lawrence Erlbaum Associates: Mahwah,NJ, pp. 4–18.

Foerster, H. von & Glasersfeld, E. von (1999)Wie wir uns erfinden: Eine Autobiogra-phie des radikalen Konstruktivismus.Carl-Auer-Systeme Verlag: Heidelberg.

Gergen, K. J. (1991) The saturated self. BasicBooks: New York.

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radical constructivism. In: Watzlawick, P.(ed.) The invented reality. W. W. Norton &Company: New York, pp. 17–40.

Glasersfeld, E. von (1987) Learning as a con-structive activity. In: Janvier, C. (ed.) Prob-lems of representation in the teaching andlearning of mathematics. LawrenceErlbaum: Hillsdale, NJ, pp. 3–18.

Glasersfeld, E. von (2004a) Learning, cyber-netics, holograms. Karl Jasper ForumTA73 R8. http://www.kjf.ca/.

Glasersfeld, E. von (2004b) Representationand communication. Karl Jasper ForumTA73 R10. http://www.kjf.ca/.

Hale-Haniff, M. (2004) Transforming themeta model of NLP to enhance listeningskills of postmodern family therapy. Dis-sertation, Nova Southeastern University,Graduate School of Humanities and SocialSciences.

Hale-Haniff, M. & Pasztor, A. (1999) Co-con-structing subjective experience: A con-structivist approach. Dialogues inPsychology 16.0. http://hubcap.clem-son.edu/psych/oldpage/Dialogues/16.0.html.

Hoffman, L. (1990) A constructivist positionfor family therapy. In: Keeney, B. P., Nolan,B. F. & Madsen, W. L. (eds.), The systemictherapist. St. Paul: MN, pp. 23–31.

Jung, C. (1962) Erinnerungen, Träume,Gedanken von C. G. Jung. Recorded andpublished by Aniela Jaffé. Rascher Verlag:Zürich & Stuttgart.

Lakatos, I. (1976) Proofs and refutations. Thelogic of mathematical discovery. Cam-bridge University Press: Cambridge, MA.

Lakoff, G. & Johnson, M. (1999) Philosophyin the flesh. Basic Books: New York.

Lakoff, G. & Nuñez, R. E. (1997) Cognitivefoundations for a mind-based mathemat-

ics. In: English, L. (ed.) Mathematical rea-soning. Analogies, metaphors, andimages. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates:Mahwah, NJ, pp. 21–92.

Lakoff, G. & Nuñez, R. E. (2000) Where math-ematics comes from: How the embodiedmind brings mathematics into being.Basic Books: New York.

Lincoln, Y. S. & Guba, E. G. (1985) Naturalis-tic inquiry. Sage Publications: NewburyPark, CA.

McNeill, R. (1988) A reflection on when Iloved math and how I stopped. Journal ofMathematical Behavior 7: 45–50.

NCTM (National Council of Teachers ofMathematics) (2000) Principles and stan-dards for school mathematics. http://stan-dards.nctm.org/protoFINAL/.

Pasztor, A. (1998) Subjective experiencedivided and conquered. Communicationand Cognition 31 (1): 73–102.

Pasztor, A. (2004a) Radical constructivismhas been viable: On math education andmore. Karl Jasper Forum TA73 C41. http://www.kjf.ca/

Pasztor, A. (2004b) Metaphors: A construc-tivist approach. Pragmatics & Cognition12 (2): 317–350.

Pasztor, A. & Slater, J. (2000) Acts of align-ment: Of women in math and science andall of us who search for balance. Peter LangPublishing: New York.

Pert, C. B. (1997) Molecules of emotion.Scribner: New York.

Watzlawick, P. (1984) Components of ideo-logical “realities.” In: Watzlawick, P. (ed.)The invented Reality. W. W. Norton &Company: New York, pp. 206–248.

Received: 24 August 2006Accepted: 2 December 2006


The Epistemic Relativism of Radical Constructivism: Some Implications for Teaching the Natural Sciences

Epistemology vs. ontology: The role of cognition

The theory of Radical Constructivism (RC)has generated considerable controversywithin the philosophy of science and scienceeducation. This is to a large extent due to itsposition of

epistemic relativism

, emergingfrom the two fundamental propositions ofthis theory put forward by Ernst von Glasers-feld (1995):1. Knowledge is not passively received, but is

actively built up by the cognizing subject.2. The function of cognition is adaptive, and

serves the subject’s organization of his/herexperiential world, not the discovery of anobjective ontological reality.

Note that these propositions make explicitreference to

cognitive

knowledge, and to

cog-nition

as the procedure for gaining suchknowledge.

Proposition #2 is the problematic one; it isfrequently interpreted (by the critics) asimplying that learning cannot give us knowl-edge of the real world! It highlights a distinc-tion between issues of

epistemology

(thenature of human knowledge) and

ontology

(existence, or being). Specifically, it maintainsthat ontological knowledge (e.g., about theexistence of an objective reality) is based onpreferred belief, and as such is

not within thescope of cognition

. It does not deny the possi-bility of an objective reality, existing indepen-dently of all subjects, but asserts that it is inprinciple not possible to obtain cognitiveknowledge of such an entity. The operative

word here is “cognitive”: many of the objec-tions raised against RC arise from a failure todistinguish between cognitive and non-cog-nitive knowledge.

Thus, the notions of

cognition

, and of

cog-nitive

vs.

non-cognitive knowledge

, need to beclarified. The Oxford English Dictionary(1996) defines cognition, rather tersely, as“…knowing, perceiving or conceiving, as anact or faculty distinct from emotion and voli-tion.” Let us expand on this:

First, to avoid any misunderstanding itshould be emphasised that the terms “cogni-tion” and “experience,” as used in this paper,have quite different meanings. Any and all

per-ceptions

(of outside stimuli) and

reflections

(onsuch stimuli) would classify as instances of

experience

, in this very general sense. The term

cognition

, on the other hand, refers to themental faculty that we use to construct

cogni-tive

knowledge

out of such experiences. Inother words, we need to distinguish betweenour

experiential world

(the totality of all thatwe experience, at any one moment) and the

knowledge

that we construct on the basis of ourexperiences: this knowledge can then be of thecognitive kind (of which science is the primeexample), or it can be non-cognitive.

Cognitive knowledge is based on

reason-ing

, using rules and procedures that can beagreed on and communicated. (Prime exam-ples are, of course, science and mathematics.)On the other hand, non-cognitive – some-times called “affective” or “emotive” – knowl-edge deals with personal experiences that can-not be communicated: emotion, volition,preferences, beliefs, etc. A simple example,illustrating this difference: I can know (cogni-tively), and communicate to you, how New-ton’s law of gravity operates, and how itdescribes observable features of the Solar Sys-tem; and I can know (non-cognitively), but

Andreas Quale

A

University of Oslo (Norway) <[email protected]>

Purpose: The relativism inherent in radical constructivism is discussed. The epistemic positions of realism and relativism are contrasted, particularly their different approaches to the concept of truth, denoted (respectively) as “truth by correspondence” and “truth by context.” I argue that the latter is the relevant one in the domain of science. Findings: Radical constructivism asserts that all knowledge must be constructed by the individual knower. This has implications for teaching, here imagined as a sharing of knowl-edge between teacher and students: it should be done, not by “reporting the true facts” of whatever is being taught, but rather by “telling a story” about it. An explicit distinction is made between the notions of cognitive and non-cognitive knowledge. It is argued that cognitive knowledge (such as in mathematics and science) is characterised by rules that can be unambiguously agreed on by actors who choose to “play the game”; and hence such knowledge is directly communicable from the teacher to the students. Implications: In telling the story of science, the teacher can verify that the students “have got it right,” even though they are all constructing their knowledge individually. In contrast, for non-cognitive knowledge (emotion, preferences, belief, …) there are no such unam-biguous rules to agree on, and therefore it is not communicable in this way: in telling this story, the teacher has no way of verifying that the same knowledge is actually being shared. Conclusion: Science teaching should be carried out in the mode of story-telling; it does not need an epistemology of realism. Key words: Relativism, truth, scientific epistemology, science education.

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not

communicate to you, how it feels for meto like a particular piece of music.

Let us be a little more specific, to illustratethis distinction (between cognitive and non-cognitive knowledge) in more detail: A per-son can experience the act of observing andstudying a concrete physical process – say, abody falling under gravity. But this experiencedoes not, in itself, constitute cognitive scien-tific knowledge. Such knowledge must be

con-structed

by applying the agreed rules of sci-ence: here, measuring times and distances offalling, and establishing quantitative relationsbetween these. And in addition, this activity(of studying falling bodies) can also generatemany kinds of non-cognitive knowledge,such as feelings of satisfaction (on the experi-ence of understanding the scientific content)or frustration (at not getting it right).

This raises another question, of impor-tance for science education. It has been pro-posed by some authors that non-cognitiveknowledge of this kind is indeed relevant forthe students, and hence should be includedunder the heading of science, in the hope ofmaking it more “relevant” and palatable tothem. Now, this is a matter of educationalstrategy – a choice of pedagogical policy, so tospeak – and therefore not arguable in scien-tific terms. So, let me just state my position onthis issue: Science is an ambitious humanenterprise, where we use our

cognitive

abilitiesto construct knowledge designed to makesense of certain parts of our experientialworld. Note that this does

not

disparage theimportance of non-cognitive aspects ofengaging in scientific activity: the sense ofwonder, the feeling of relevance and personalinvolvement, the satisfaction of understand-ing natural processes and using them to makedevices to control our environment, etc.These aspects surely play a large part in bothscientific research and the learning of science.But they should not be conflated with scienceitself – in very simplistic terms, I am propos-ing that it is useful and valuable to maintain adistinction between what is to be learnt andour various motivations for learning it!

The defining propositions #1 and #2 implythat the conception of knowledge in RC isinherently

individualistic

: each person mustconfront her own

experiential world

, definedas the totality of her individual perceptionsand reflections, and construct her knowledgeof the world from that. Thus, acquisition of

knowledge is a strictly individual enterprise,and the knowledge obtained will reside in theknower: i.e., the person who is in possessionof said knowledge. Note, however, that thisindividualistic view of knowledge, as con-structed by and residing in the individualknower, should

not

be taken to imply that RCrejects the social aspects of learning! On thecontrary, it is recognised that the construc-tion of knowledge by an individual is alwaysdone

in a social environment

, which will con-strain the learning process. One might saythat the social experiential world, whichincludes other people, provides an

ontologicalframework

for the individual’s construction ofknowledge. This is an important issue in RC,but it will not be further discussed here; thepresent paper will focus on the individualisticaspects of learning and knowledge, as indi-cated above.

The question then arises: “How is it possi-ble to

communicate

and

share

such individualknowledge – say, between teacher and stu-dent, or between scientific co-workers?” Aswe shall see, this is where the cognitive/non-cognitive distinction becomes important.

Relativism vs. realism: The notion of truth

RC features an

epistemic relativism

, rejectingthe idea that cognitive knowledge can have anontological underpinning – that it can beknowledge of an objective reality of somekind. And, as we know, the word “relativism”is often used in academic discourse withstrongly negative connotations.

In the present context, the opposingepistemic positions of

realism

and

relativism

may be described briefly as follows:

[

Realism asserts that there exists an objec-tive physical reality independently ofhuman observers,

and

that science canattain true knowledge of this reality – i.e.,discover an objectively true representationof it.

[

Relativism asserts that it is not cognitivelymeaningful to speak of such an objectivereality.

Any

piece of knowledge is (andmust be) constructed by individuals, forsome specific purpose and in some partic-ular context; and its truth value can thenonly be determined relative to this purposeand context.

Note that this distinction makes explicitreference to the notion of

truth

. Indeed, muchof the criticism against relativism – and thusalso against RC – arises from a perception thatit, in some sense, “denies truth.” So, let us takea closer look at this notion.

First, a relativist epistemology does notdeny the possibility of obtaining knowledgeof the world. On the contrary, it allows us togain such knowledge – generally consisting ofboth cognitive and non-cognitive elements.The issue here is the

truth value

of this knowl-edge: whether it can be said to be true, in somesense.

Philosophical arguments addressing truthvalues are commonly based on the so-called

correspondence theory of truth

. This assertsthat a proposition is true if it gives a correctdescription of (some aspect of) the real world.It is then often assumed that knowledge itselfmust imply truth: a proposition

p

that some-one knows to be true, has to be true. To avoidtautological reasoning, one introduces thenotion of knowledge as “justified true belief”:it is not enough that somebody

knows

some-thing – there must also be some

justification

for believing this knowledge to be true.This theory raises difficult questions, espe-

cially when applied to

scientific

knowledge.For instance, it tends to continually

demotepast true knowledge

, as science evolves withtime. Thus, scientists some two centuries agobelieved in the phlogiston theory of fire – infact, they

knew

this theory was true. Nowa-days, however, it is regarded as

false

, i.e., as notdescribing the nature of fire correctly. So, itseems that the knowledge (true belief) of thattime was not really justified. But what then ofour present knowledge? Is it true (justifiedbelief) – or at least more true (more justified)than previous beliefs were? How can we knowthat a given justification, offered in support ofsome belief, is in fact good enough? Is scien-tific knowledge

approaching

, in some sense,true knowledge about the universe? How canwe recognise this true knowledge, if and whenwe arrive there? How can we even know whenwe are “getting closer” to it?

The issue here is: does the notion of

trueknowledge

make sense, as an objectivedescripton of the world we experience? Herethe epistemic positions of realism and relativ-ism give sharply different answers: realismsays yes, while relativism says no! RC, being arelativist theory,

rejects

the correspondence

2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3 109

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theory (with its associated notion of justifiedtrue belief), and its conception of objectivetruth

.

Instead, it adopts the relativistepistemic position of

truth by context

. Thisstates that a proposition cannot be true orfalse

in itself

(i.e., objectively), but only

rela-tive to some given

context

: a conceptualscheme, a social group or practice, a personalconviction, …

Examples of this abound in mathematicsand science. Consider e.g., this proposition:the interior angles of a triangle add up to 180degrees. This is true in Euclidean geometry,i.e., in the context of the Euclidean geometricaxioms, but false in (say) elliptic geometry,which has a different axiomatic base. Anotherexample: The universe is many billions ofyears old, as agreed by most scientists today,or only some six thousand years old, as at leastsome creationists

1

believe. Here both sideswould presumably claim that they

know

theirposition to be the correct one – or, at least, tobe more correct than that of the other. Thepoint is that, from the viewpoint of RC, thetruth values of the two positions are definedrelative to different contexts; and hence eachof them can lay claim to being true, relative toits context.

Teaching: A sharing of knowledge

RC states that each individual learner mustconstruct her own knowledge, without anyobjectively defined guidelines for the “rightway” to do this. Once this is accepted, it isimmediately apparent that one needs to reap-praise the role of the

teacher

in the educa-tional process. One may even ask, rhetori-cally: Do we really need teachers, in thetraditional sense – i.e., persons with knowl-edge of some topic, who have the responsibil-ity of conveying this knowledge to the learn-ers? Or, should the “constructivist teacher”just make the relevant material available tothe learners, and surrender to them theresponsibility of learning – in effect, let them“teach themselves,” by individually construct-ing their knowledge through a processing ofperceived data (which they will do anyway,according to RC!) In short: is teaching, in theclassical sense, even possible in RC?

In general, teaching may be defined as:action by an agent (the teacher) to influence

the learning process of a recipient (thelearner). The teacher has an

agenda

– to con-vey to the learner a certain body of (cognitiveor non-cognitive) knowledge. Hence, con-trary to what is often claimed, there is norequirement in RC of “learner indepen-dence”: while it is true that learners will con-struct their own knowledge (since that is howall learning is done), it is the teacher’s task totry to

guide

this process of construction in theright direction – and it is the teacher whodecides which direction is “right” here! Thus,the teacher is in possession of a certain bodyof knowledge that she wants to

share

with thelearners.

(Note that it is implicit in this scenario ofteaching that the students also possess a cer-tain autonomy: they are, in principle, free toaccept or reject the insights that the teacher isinviting them to share with her. Our obliga-tion as science teachers is to teach as best weknow how: use our ability to empathise withthe students, present the material in a wayadjusted to their level of preknowledge, striv-ing for original and “fresh” approaches, etc.But even so, we may observe that some stu-dents will indeed “fail,” and drop out, for avariety of reasons: they find science to beuninteresting, or even unattractive; they feelthat it is too difficult, and not worth the effort;they decide that they are more interested inengaging in something else; etc. And this istheir right; we (the teachers) are not required,or obliged, to force science onto them, if theychoose not to accept it!)

How can individual knowledge of any kindbe meaningfully shared between knowers?The answer offered by RC is: by personalinteraction, within the framework of a

com-mon language

. Through a continual process ofsocialisation into various groups (familymembers, work-place colleagues, fellow stu-dents, etc.), each one of us learns to attachmeanings to particular words, and to expectthat other members of the group will alsoattach similar meanings to them. This enablesus to interact, communicate and share knowl-edge, making the tacit assumption that we are“talking about the same thing.” However, thisnotion of sharing does have limitations: Wemay discover, in the course of this interaction,that we are not “on the same wave length”after all, contrary to what we had initiallyassumed. In the words of von Glasersfeld(1995): “Two individuals do share their

knowledge, until (perhaps) something hap-pens in the interaction between them thatleads them to discover that they do not!”

For this notion of sharing, the distinctionbetween

cognitive

and

non-cognitive

knowl-edge

becomes important. Cognitive knowl-edge (e.g., of science) is based on rules of rea-soning, as noted above; hence it can be shared,in the sense that two individuals can agree to“play by the same rules.” Non-cognitiveknowledge, on the other hand, derives fromindividual experiences: volition, emotions,preferences, beliefs, etc.; and here there are norules of reasoning to agree on! In this case,there is no direct sharing of experiences; aperson can have no idea whether another hasthe same experience as she has. A simpleexample: a believer (in a particular religion)cannot communicate to another person howit

feels

to experience this belief. And evenwhen the two claim to share their faith, theyhave no way of

checking

whether they actuallydo: all they can do is to use the same language,with words describing the faith, and assumethat they both “mean the same thing” by thosewords.

Returning to the issue of

teaching

: Ifknowledge (of any kind) is of such an individ-ual and private character, how can it betaught, i.e., conveyed by a teacher to her stu-dents?

The answer, as proposed by RC, willdepend on the type of knowledge in question.For

cognitive

knowledge, the teaching willrequire demonstrating “the rules of thegame”: the methodology used to deal with thecontent matter of this knowledge. The mes-sage conveyed to the students would then, ineffect, be: “These rules govern the material tobe studied here; if you want to work in thisfield, you must learn them, and play by them.”(A crude analogy: If you want to become pro-ficient at chess, you must learn the rules of thisgame, and practise them by playing often…)

Science

, in particular, is an example of cogni-tive knowledge, defined by a certain method-ology generally denoted as “scientific”: data,hypothetic-deductive reasoning, theoreticalmodels, observational techniques, computa-tional procedures, etc. In this perspective, the

teaching of science

is about demonstrating sci-entific methodology to the students, andtraining them in using it.

Non-cognitive

knowledge, on the otherhand, will contain elements that cannot be


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conveyed by such demonstrable rules. As aconcrete example, consider a school of theperforming arts, teaching a course in

musicappreciation

. Here there are indeed some rulesto be demonstrated: structural elements suchas musical scales and schemas of composi-tion, how to play a given instrument, etc. – allexamples of cognitive knowledge. But theserules cannot by themselves make evident the

quality

of the music that one is invited toappreciate – the students cannot be taught,solely through using the rules, to

enjoy

themusic! The teacher may feel (i.e., know, non-cognitively) that she enjoys listening to

A

, butdoes not care much for

B

. However, there is noway she can communicate the

feeling

of thispreference to the students: i.e., demonstrateto them that they should also prefer

A

to

B

!What she can do is tell them about her expe-rience with the music, invite them to listen toit, and try to

inspire

in them an enjoymentthat fits with her description. Now, there is ofcourse nothing wrong with this; much knowl-edge is of a non-cognitive character, andhence must be taught in such an “inspira-tional mode.” Still, it does illustrate an impor-tant difference between cognitive and non-cognitive knowledge, in an educational con-text.

Concerning the teaching of science, thiscan be regarded as the act of demonstratingthe rules of science and inviting the studentsto “play the game,” as noted above. However,it should be emphasised that these rules do

not

require the epistemic assumption of sci-entific realism: that science aspires to find atrue description of the natural world. RCadvocates a pragmatic view, where the rules ofscience are presented as chosen by scientists,for the purpose of constructing knowledge ofcertain phenomena observed in the world, toanswer certain questions that scientists like toask about these phenomena – and then justi-fied only by the success of these answers.

Another important point: it is

not

assumed that these “rules” are manifest andclear to the students from the start. On thecontrary, they are an integral part of the sci-ence that is to be learnt. The students are, ineffect, at the beginning of a long process ofknowledge construction, which will (hope-fully) lead eventually to a better understand-ing of the various implications of these rules– i.e., to an improved mastery of scienceitself!

It is, of course, possible to adopt – as manyscience teachers do – the epistemic position ofrealism, that the goal of science is to search fortrue knowledge of the world, as a propositionfor the students in a science class. But this isthen

non-cognitive knowledge

: a personallypreferred belief that the teacher is inviting thestudents to share with her. It does not followfrom the methodology of science.

Concerning knowledge, one question thatis often asked in the discussion of relativismvs. realism is: “What is it knowledge

of

?” Thisis a natural question for a realist: to her,knowledge must be

knowledge of something

,with the implication that this “something”exists independently of the knower – an

exter-nal reality

. But a relativist does not think inthose categories: RC takes knowledge to beconstructed by the knower, as a model of(some part of) her experiential world – andthat is all there is to it! The notion of an exter-nal reality, existing independently of humanknowers, simply does not apply!

Thus the relativist position is one of

instru-mentalism

: the terms entering into proposi-tions of knowledge are constructed, with thegoal of obtaining a satisfactory description ofthe phenomena that are being studied; but thequestion of whether these terms refer to“existing objects” is not answerable by cogni-tive argumentation, and is therefore dis-missed as cognitively irrelevant. One simpleexample: it is generally agreed that the con-cepts of

electric

and

magnetic vector fields

, andthe Maxwellian field equations that governtheir behaviour, give a good description ofvarious physical phenomena commonly des-ignated as

electromagnetic

; but it does not fol-low that these vectors actually “exist outthere,” as objects to be discovered and studied.For one thing, they can be equally well repre-sented by other mathematical entities: e.g., byfour-dimensional tensors, as is done in rela-tivity theory.

RC states that knowledge (of any kind)must be constructed individually by eachlearner. So, the teacher’s dilemma is: how canshe

control

this learning process such as tomake the learners construct the “right”knowledge – that which she wants to sharewith them? The simple answer is: she cannot– there is no way for her to ensure with cer-tainty that the learners have “learnt cor-rectly”! Knowledge cannot be simply trans-mitted: i.e., imprinted on the learner, to be

retrieved in identical form for inspectionlater. The question is then:

“

What is the mean-ing of “shareable knowledge,” if we cannotcheck whether it is really shared?

”

The answer, again as proposed by RC, is

that knowledge may be considered to beshared between two persons only insofar as

they can agree that they share it

. In otherwords: they share it until something happensthat lets them discover that they do not! Toillustrate, imagine that I am in communica-tion with another person about some topic ofcommon interest to us both. It may thenappear to me that the two of us are in com-plete agreement on our knowledge of thistopic – until the other says (or does) some-thing that reveals to me that her understand-ing of the matter is different from mine! Ofcourse, it may be that this never happens; if so,I should remain satisfied that the two of us doindeed share this knowledge. The same mayalso hold

vice versa

, for the situation as seenfrom the other’s point of view; and in thatcase, we should have a

mutual sharing

of theknowledge.

Loosely speaking, then, we share, to theextent that we think we do! This statementsimply serves to highlight the unavoidablelimitation on our capability, as human beings,to “know each other’s minds.” In practice, itdoes not constitute a problem. For instance,the practitioners of any given academic disci-pline will for all practical purposes share (inthis sense) the established knowledge charac-terising that discipline – indeed, this mutualsharing may be taken to provide a workingdefinition of the term “established knowl-edge.” (For instance, one would not expecttwo scientists, both working within the fieldof chemistry, to suddenly discover that theydo not have the same understanding of theperiodic table of elements!)

Having established the concept of

knowl-edge sharing as fundamental in education, wenow turn to the issue of how such sharingcan be attained through the act of teaching.The question is: “Granted that the teachercannot control the learning process going onin the minds of her students, how can she atleast try to influence it – i.e., convey herknowledge to the learners, to achieve amutual sharing of it between her and them?”This is, of course, just another version of theage-old question: “What characterises goodteaching?”

2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3 111

CONCEPTS


Teaching: Telling a storyThe traditional notion of reality, as having anabsolute and demonstrable existence inde-pendent of human construction, is rejectedby RC – at least, as an ontological basis forcognitive knowledge. Instead, the theory pre-fers to speak of “our common experientialworld,” highlighting the basic epistemicpremise of the theory: that it is precisely thisworld that we can experience and obtain cog-nitive knowledge of, not some abstract “real-ity” hiding behind the scene of our perceptionand construction.

So, how do we teach it? In other words,how can cognitive knowledge be delivered bya teacher – i.e., conveyed to, and shared with,a learner? The answer of RC is that it shouldbe conveyed in a narrative form: the teachingof any topic is essentially tantamount to tell-ing a story about it!

It should be remarked that this is not anew idea: throughout human history the artof narration has provided the basic tech-nique for passing on knowledge of all kinds,whether by word of mouth or in writing.Thus, for whatever content to be taught, theteacher will: (i) demonstrate the “rules of thegame” – for instance, a mathematical frame-work (relevant for many sciences), or thesystem of chromatic scales (relevant formusical composition); and (ii) “tell a story,”2

using these rules to describe and structurethe content that is to be conveyed. In deliver-ing this narrative, the narrator (teacher)must then rely on the power of a commonlanguage – imagery, metaphors, culturalconnotations, etc. – and (in a school scena-rio, at least) on testing the learners, to checkwhether shared knowledge seems to havebeen generated.

Now, specifically considering science edu-cation, we ask: How does RC impact on that?In particular, we address one criticism oftenraised against RC in the context of teaching:“How can we teach science if we leave thelearners free to construct their knowledge ofit in any way they may fancy? Surely, it is theteacher’s obligation to keep the learners “onthe right track” – to make sure that they learnscience correctly?”

To answer this, we first note that the con-troversial nature of RC is particularly appar-ent in the natural sciences. The conception ofteaching as storytelling would probably not

be considered very provocative in mosthumanistic and social academic disciplines(see, e.g., Phillips 2000). The differencederives from the epistemic nature of theknowledge that is being taught.

On the one hand, it would seem generallyacceptable to say that knowledge within thehumanistic and social disciplines is generatedand disseminated along the lines of RC: i.e., asknowledge constructed by individuals, inter-acting in (and socially constrained by) theircommon environment. For instance, one willgenerally not be offered definitive andexhaustive answers to questions like: “Whatare the true merits of Shakespeare’s play Oth-ello?” or “What were the true causes of theFirst World War?” On the contrary, suchissues would more often be addressed by tell-ing a story: presenting and arguing the meritsof evidence and viewpoints bearing on thetopic of discussion, or criticizing related workas presented by others – with no pretension ofhaving found the “true” or “final” account ofthe matter. Differently put: the humanisticand social disciplines tend to feature an epis-temology of relativism, where knowledge isconstructed by the learner, with no claim thatit is possible to attain “objectively true knowl-edge.”

On the other hand, the epistemic positiontraditionally adopted in the natural scienceshas been that of realism, with its assumptionthat there exists an objective reality indepen-dent of human cognition – with an underly-ing assumption that a scientific theory can be“right,” in the sense of giving a true or correctdescription of this reality. It then makes senseto look for the Final Theory of physics unify-ing all known interactions (Weinberg 1993);and to worry that once we have found thecorrect theory, the era of interesting scientificdiscovery will be over, since we shall thenhave reached the End of Science (Horgan1996).

So, we ask: “How can the teacher providefor her students to learn science correctly, ifthey are free to construct their knowledgeindividually, as claimed by RC? Specifically,how can she share her knowledge of the sub-ject with them, if her mode of delivery is to bethat of “telling the story of science” – and thenletting them construct from this story what-ever they may – instead of informing them ofthe “correct facts” (laws, observational data,etc.) that constitute science?”

Telling the story of scienceRecall that in RC, knowledge is regarded as astructure that the learner makes (constructs)and imposes on her experiential world. In par-ticular, science (as defined by its methodol-ogy) is seen as a human project to imposestructure on certain aspects of the world, inorder to better understand and/or controlthose aspects. As we all know, this project hasbeen eminently successful: it has given us sta-ble, useful and reliable knowledge, offeringhitherto unprecedented understanding andcontrol of our natural environment! How-ever, RC maintains that this knowledge can-not legitimately be considered as (actually orpotentially) “true,” in the sense of reportingthe correct constitution of the natural world.Differently put: scientific knowledge shouldnot be regarded as a mapping aiming to give afaithful representation of nature; rather, it islike a story, composed and written by scien-tists to describe those aspects of the world thatthey are interested in. In this imagery, then,science teaching is essentially an act of tellingthe story of science. (Of course, this notion of“teaching as story-telling” may be perceivedby many as being a little vague; a more preciseformulation would be “teaching as a presen-tation of presently viable structures describ-ing our experiential world.” On the otherhand, the metaphor of story-telling is anappealing one; it captures well the spirit inwhich all teaching should be done – the shar-ing of knowledge between teacher and stu-dents, for mutual enjoyment.)

This conception of science, as a story to betold, does not fit in well with an epistemologyof scientific realism, where one major goal ofscience is to find and report the truth. The actof telling a story may easily be invested withnegative significations, such as “making it allup,” or even outright “lying”! Thus, many sci-ence teachers would probably protest stronglythe claim that they are just telling stories:“…that may be how things are done in the artsand humanities, but certainly not in science;our task is to teach the students the facts of thereal world!” In the relativist epistemology ofRC, however, scientific knowledge is notdesigned to give a factually true description ofthe world, but to provide a successful model ofit. Indeed, it may well be argued that the con-structivist (relativist) approach to science


CONCEPTS


teaching is actually more realistic than the tra-ditional approach of realism; the latter reliesheavily on purported “facts of the real world,”which are in effect fictitious – i.e., mind-inde-pendent metaphysical entities not accessibleto cognitive knowledge sharing.

It may be noted that there are many otherstories, constructed to portray various aspectsof the world. Some are of the academic variety– say, as produced by the humanistic or socialdisciplines. Others are told (in differentmedia) by writers, artists, performers andpreachers. The crucial point here is that sci-ence is not to be considered as intrinsicallymore “true” or “correct” than any of thesealternative stories. In this light, even the so-called pseudo-sciences, such as astrology orpyramidology,3 are just different stories(which we need not accept!) – not being sci-ences, they cannot and need not be disprovedby scientific arguments, any more than afairytale can or needs! (Except, of course,when they make claims that can be tested bythe methods of science – and even then, wecan only state that the claims are not sup-ported by scientific testing.)

Let us elaborate on this second item: sup-pose that the biology teacher, in teachingabout evolution in her class, discovers thatsome of her students are believers in creation-ism. Should she then try to persuade thesestudents that they are mistaken – that Dar-winian evolution gives the correct descrip-tion, and that the Creation story told in theBible is wrong? The answer, from the view-point of RC, is: “No, she should not – andindeed she cannot with honesty do so, sincethe criteria of being right or wrong do notapply here!” Her obligation as a biologyteacher is to present to the students the storyoffered by biological science: the theory ofevolution, with the arguments and evidencethat support it. If, in the end, the studentsdecide to stay with their belief in the biblicalexplanation as more satisfactory – well, that istheir privilege. It is not a teacher’s responsibil-ity to convert her students to the “true doc-trine of science.” Or, more succinctly: Theteacher’s job is to teach, not to preach!

Indeed, this example highlights an essen-tial difference between these two conceptionsof science teaching: the realist “reporting thetrue facts of the world” vs. the relativist “tell-ing a story to describe the world.” Traditionalscience teaching tends to be carried out in a

somewhat authoritarian fashion, with theteacher telling the learners what the world isreally like and requiring that they accept thisas the truth. A story-telling scenario, on theother hand, leaves more room for the learnersto form their own images and metaphors,develop and present their own ideas, formu-late their own explanations – in short, to con-struct their own knowledge. In fact, I wouldpropose that one mark of a good storyteller isthat she invites her listeners to join in as thestory unfolds – i.e., to use their imagination toenrich the narrative by giving colour and tex-ture to its plot and characters – whether themedium of delivery is by word of mouth orwritten text. This applies to any kind of storythat is worth telling: a fairytale, a novel, a playat the theatre, etc. and I maintain that it alsoapplies to the teaching of science.

Note that there is no detailed prescriptionof how the story is to be told: i.e., whether theteacher should lecture (or avoid lecturing),whether she should encourage the students towork in groups (or engage them in individualproject assignments), etc. RC does not tellteachers how to teach. It provides a “back-ground stage,” as it were, for the act of teach-ing: reminding the teacher that she is telling astory, and calling on her to use whateverinstruments (lecturing, group assignments,etc.) she feels are the best suited for “connect-ing” with her audience. This requires (on thepart of the teacher) not only a thoroughknowledge of the subject, but also the abilityto empathise with the learners. She must takeinto account their preknowledge and precon-ceptions, level of maturity and receptivity,and attitudes of interest or indifference – andthen use her narrative skills (choice of lan-guage, metaphors, tone of voice, etc.), invit-ing them to construct and present their ownknowledge of what she is trying to tell them,in such a way as to (hopefully) generate amutual feeling that this knowledge is sharedbetween teacher and learners. In a word, agood teacher must be a good story-teller!

To conclude, RC asserts that scienceshould not be taught in the mode of “…pre-viously people thought (erroneously) … butnow we know (correctly) …” In other words,the advance of scientific knowledge shouldnot be represented as a “progression towardsthe truth”; we can never know if and when ourknowledge has actually reached this state oftruth, or even how close to it we may be at any

time. Rather, we should present the advanceof scientific knowledge as a progression in thekind of stories we tell about nature. The onlyguideline for this progression is that theknowledge produced should respect the con-straints imposed by our experiential world,and give satisfactory answers to the questionswe ask – i.e., that it must conform to the “rulesof the game” that determine the form of suchquestions at the time of asking. Indeed, onlyin this (almost tautological) sense is it mean-ingful to speak of today’s science as being“more advanced” than yesterday”s: it is bettersuited to answer the questions we are askingof it today!

Finally, it is worth noting that the rejectionof truth as a valid epistemic category appliesnot only to theories of “proper” science, e.g.,physics or biology, but also to theories of epis-temology, such as RC itself. Thus, RC shouldnot be regarded as being “right” or “wrong,”in the sense of giving a correct or incorrectdescription of its subject matter. Rather, it is(like science) a story told to make a point – andthus successful only to the extent that the lis-teners actually feel that the point was worthmaking!

The position of RC with respect to scien-tific epistemology, and the teaching of sci-ence, may be briefly summed up as follows:[ Science is, in essence, a powerful and evoc-

ative story that we tell about the world.This story is well able to stand on its ownfeet; it does not need an “objective reality”to support the knowledge that it offers.

[ Teaching science is not intrinsically differ-ent from teaching other subjects: the goalis to convey to the learners a body of share-able knowledge, and the appropriatemethod of conveyance is then narration,i.e., telling a story.

Andreas Quale is associate professor at the department of Teacher Education and School Development at the University of Oslo. In 1974, he received a doctoral degree in theoretical physics from the University of Oslo. His present research interests include the epistemology of science, with particular application to teaching physics.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3 113

CONCEPTS


PostscriptAn anonymous referee has raised the followingquestion: “How do the constructivist princi-ples, as outlined in the present paper, apply tothe teaching of skills involving rote or practicallearning, such as arithmetic, Latin grammar,driving a car, or piloting an airplane?” This isan important issue, and an adequate treatmentof it would require a separatepaper. Here is a verybrief outline of the

RC position on this issue, with a particularview to the teaching of science.

In the approach adopted in the presentpaper, the primary aim of science teaching is togenerate scientific understanding and knowl-edge in the students. RC recommends that thisbe done through the medium of story-telling.However, in the course of the teaching the stu-dents will inevitably discover that they have toengage in some rote learning, and some acqui-sition of practical skills: various mathematicaland/or statistical techniques need to be mas-tered; a lot of factual information (such as e.g.,

the Mendeleyev table of elements, inchemistry) must be assimilated; some

training in the use of experimentalhardware and software is neces-

sary; etc. Items of this kind con-stitute, so to speak, the “rules ofthe game,” which any student

has to grasp and follow, in orderto attain knowledge in whatever fieldthat is being taught. The teacher’s task

is then to guide the students in theirlearning of these rules. Her mode of

teaching will still be that of story-telling, but now with an instruc-tional component: in effect, shewill demonstrate the material to

her students, and then tell themthat “these are the rules, and you

yourselves will have to make theeffort necessary to master them (byrote and/or by practising), and fol-low them, if you want to study sci-ence!” In fact, RC argues that this applies

to the teaching of any kind of content,not only science. There will be certain

skills that have to belearnt; they maybe of an intellec-

tual nature (e.g., the mastery of grammar, forlanguage studies), or more physical skills(e.g., piloting an aircraft). Any such skill maythen be demonstrated by a teacher, but in theend the students must acquire it themselves,through personal effort – it cannot be learntby demonstration alone.

Notes

1. Creationism: a doctrine which holds thatGod created the world, with the species oflife that inhabit it, much along the lines de-scribed in the book of Genesis.

2. Or, using a related metaphor: “paint a pic-ture.”

3. The idea that there are messages of wis-dom to be found in the measures of theGreat Pyramid in Egypt.

References


Horgan, J. (1996) The end of science. Addi-son-Wesley: New York.

Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd edition(1996) Oxford University Press: Oxford.

Phillips, D. C. (ed.) (2000) Constructivism ineducation. University of Chicago Press:Chicago.

Weinberg, S. (1993) Dreams of a final theory.Random House: New York.

Received: 17 April 2006Accepted: 27 February 2007

Viability and Crusty Snow

Between the World of Skiing and AcademiaRemembering the Wildspitze Tour in 1998

Theo Hug

A

University of Innsbruck (Austria,) <[email protected]>

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OPINION

2007, vol. 2, no. 2–3 115

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hen Ranulph Glanville and AlexanderRiegler asked for proposals for contri-

butions for this festschrift, they distinguishedbetween two types of contribution: academicpapers and “more personal items including

biography, reminiscence and anecdote.”

1

Ifthey had invited me ten years ago, the answerwould have been rather easy. I probablywould have proposed a chapter on somephilosophical or didactical aspects of Ernst’stheory of knowledge. But now, after the expe-riences we have hadtogether, the decisionis not so easy any-more.

Of course, onemight say that theeditors were aware ofErnst’s distinctionbetween rational the-ory and scientific rea-soning on the onehand and the worldsof mysticism andmystic wisdom onthe other (Glasersfeld1997): all a contribu-tor has to do is todecide whether he orshe is bringing for-ward rational argu-ments or telling sto-ries about cooking,music, love, moun-taineering, skiing,etc. So, what’s the problem?

Well, there is no problem, but there is thedifficulty in allowing for personal items whenfocussing on academic interests and in allow-ing for rational aspects when focussing onpersonal items for someone who has had thechance to get to know Ernst personally. Atleast for me the search for apposite words inEnglish is not easy in view of the successfulinterplay between his philosophical ideas, hishandling of everyday problems of life and hisability to cope with difficult situations. Butlet’s give it a try and look back at one of themost striking experiences we have hadtogether.

2

It was in an academic context that I metErnst for the first time. He was invited to ourInstitute of Education in Innsbruck where hegave a seminar and an evening lecture on

“Konstruktivismus statt Erkenntnistheorie”in May 1997 (see Glasersfeld 1998). After theseminar we had some time for relaxed dis-cussions and I realized that Ernst was alsointerested in skiing and mountaineering.Since all turned out very well, we decided toplan for another seminar.

When Ernst came to Innsbruck again inspring 1998 we had a little bit more timesince there were two seminar parts to com-plete. One evening Ernst told us of his skiing

experiences in Australia and especially thosein Tyrol. We realized that skiing was animportant part of his life and that he was ableto give us lots of details about tours and highpeaks in the Tyrolean Alps. After a while, Iproposed going for a skiing tour after theseminar, which ended on Friday (8May1998).

“Mr. Glasersfeld,” I said, “would you liketo go on a skiing tour on Saturday?”

“That’d be nice,” he said, “but my physicalcondition is not too good and I haven’t beenskiing a lot recently.”

“Well, you know – there are manyoptions,” I made another effort, “and wecould even ascend the Wildspitze.”

That was too much for the moment. Hemuttered something between “crazy” and“kidding” and I thought that I had gone toofar, not least because, the Ötztaler Wildspitze

is the highest summit in Tyrol (3772 m). Weconsidered a visit to one of the ski-regions,where on weekends hundreds of people nor-mally spend the day on the slopes and in thehuts and restaurants around the slopes.

But the topic was not done. Next day hepulled me aside and asked:

“You didn’t mean what you proposed yes-terday in earnest, did you?”

“Of course, I meant it as a serious pro-posal – not in fun!” I answered.

And I explainedthat the “Pitzex-

press”,

3

a funicularand lifts would bringus above 3000meters, where wewould have to godown 150 meters atfirst where we wouldthen have to put theskins on our skis.From there it is lessthan two hours tothe summit on analpine, but not toodifficult, routeacross the glacier.

“Well, in that casewe could try it,” hesaid, and we decidedto do so.

After collectingthe equipmentneeded, we – Andrea

Haller, Eva Hiptmair, Thomas Himmelfre-undpointner and I – started the tour to-gether with Ernst early in the morning on 9May 1998.

Ernst walked the way up as if he had beentouring all winter (see Figure 1). It was abeautiful day and we had no difficulties inreaching the ski-depot (see Figures 2–4 andcover photo). We were all deeply impressedby the scenery and we were proud that Ernsthad made it.

During the break he told us of his experi-ences on former tours in the areas we couldsee. Needless to say, he knew many moresummits than all of us together did.

After a fine rest period we buckled up ourbackpacks and started on our way down (seeFigure 5). Ernst enjoyed skiing down withwide verves (see Figure 6), sometimes mak-

W

21


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ing fun of my “bouncing style.” From time totime we took short breaks because some of usgot tired (see Figure 7). Obviously, not all ofus made use of the “secret weapon”

4

properlyenough.

When we reached the prepared skiingslopes again we realized that we had to hurryup in order to catch the last “Pitzexpress”which would bring us down to the parkinglot. While the others took the normal waydown to the lift Ernst and I decided to take ashort cut. The “short cut” turned out to be along way round leading us into a very steepmogul piste.

Partway, Ernst overturned heavily andskittered down almost the rest of the scarp.That was the moment when I cursed my ideaof the Wildspitze tour and was afraid that wewould need a helicopter. But Ernst made anastonished remark on his downfall andstarted strapping his skis again. He saidsomething like “Jetzt habe ich aber einenStern geschlagen!”

5

After overcoming some other hurdles we allarrived back home happily and had pizzasand some drinks.

Next day, when most of us had sore mus-cles, Ernst asked who was willing to join himfor skiing (sic!). He and Andrea spent the dayon the Pitztaler slopes while Eva, Thomasand I needed time out for relaxation.

A lot of remarkable details and notionscame up when we discussed the Wildspitzeexperience. I can recall most vividly Ernst’sanswer when I stated that the fact that hecoped with the challenges of the tour in sucha bodacious way could be taken as an exampleof viability.

“No,” he disagreed vehemently, “If onemanages to go up just one time, it is no exam-ple of viability!”

Well, unfortunately, in this case we did nothave the chance to test the criterion of replica-tion.

The same argument applies to interactionwith snow conditions. One of the most diffi-cult types of snow for skiers to deal with iscalled “Bruchharsch” (crusty snow). If one isable to ski down a hill covered with crustysnow just one time without falling down,according to Ernst’s understanding, this doesnot count as an example of viability.

On the other hand, if one can handlecrusty snow effectively and repeatedly, thereare chances that one can deal with difficult sit-uations and be successful in other areas, too.One year after our Wildspitze experience,Ernst gave an example of such a “transfer ofcompetency.”

One day, a wheel of the small tractor heuses to transport wood got into a hidden holeand the tractor toppled over and began toburn. Ernst jumped off the tractor as it leanedover and tried to stop the fire immediately.Since the wind spread the fire more quicklythan he could put it out, he had to call the firebrigade, which extinguished it quickly.

He took the experience as a proof that onehas to be lucky in order to have really instruc-tive experiences.

“Of course,” he wrote in an email, “one cansay that ‘there are no fools like old fools.’ But Isay that one has to be familiar with crustysnow in order to jump off a toppling tractor atthe right moment!”

In my view, these examples illustrate that weneed both well-proven procedures andacquaintanceship with obstacles and specialchallenges when we are feeling our waythrough interspaces and searching for scopesof action (cf. Glasersfeld 1996, p. 28). Alongwith that, successful ways of combining ratio-nal efforts and the “worlds of mysticism” areneeded, if we want to enable viability.

If humanity is to find a viable equilibriumfor survival on this planet, both scientists andmystics will have to acknowledge thatalthough the rational coordination of actualexperience and the wisdom gleaned frompoetic metaphors are incommensurate, theyneed not be incompatible. The most urgenttask seems to be to develop a way of thinkingand living that gives proper due to both.”(Glasersfeld 1997, p. 7)

In his writings and even more in his way ofliving, Ernst shows how this can be done. Andwhen it comes to the point where bridging thegap seems impossible or a hurdle cannot beovercome, there is a word that might helpkeep the future open: pazienza. Naturally andculturally, this refers to another language andanother story which may be told on anotheroccasion.

5

3

4

Theo Hug is associate professor of educational sciences at Innsbruck University (Austria). His areas of interest include media education and media literacy, e-education and micro-learning, methodology of qualitative research, theory of knowledge, and philosophy of science.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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2007, vol. 2, no. 2–3 117

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Notes

1. The title of this contribution is an attemptto translate the title of video portrait“Viabilität und Bruchharsch” (Hug 2000).

2. Needless to say, the descriptions in thisshort essay depict selected parts of my ver-sion of the story. The “Construction ofMemory” (Kumar, Hug & Rusch 2006) is acomplex issue and there are other optionsfor focussing, foregrounding and version-ing our Wildspitze tour together withErnst.

3. Retrieved from http://www.pitztaler-gletscher.at/ on 28 August 2006.

4. Of course, I cannot show all pictures andgive away all secrets here. But at this point,I think it fair to give the Kwizda-Secret away.Ernst got to know it on the occasion of theWildspitze-tour, and he is not the only oneusing this wonderful restitutional fluid. Re-trieved from http://www.kwizda.at/otc/ on28 August 2006).

5. I do not have a clue as to how this can betranslated aptly. Of course, I know some ofthe examples Ernst referred to in his semi-nars when explaining different uses of theword “hit.” But I cannot think of somethinglike “hitting a star” – and “Well, that was ahard fall!” is not a spot-on translation at all.

References

Glasersfeld, E. von (1996) Grenzen desBegreifens [Limits of understanding].Benteli Verlag: Bern.

Glasersfeld, E. von (1997) The incommensu-rability of scientific and poetic knowledge,Methodologia 17: 1–7. Retrieved fromhttp://www.oikos.org/vGknowl.htm on28 August 2006.

Glasersfeld, E. von (1998) Konstruktivismusstatt Erkenntnistheorie. In: Hug, T. (ed.)Technologiekritik und Medienpädagogik.Zur Theorie und Praxis kritisch-reflexiverMedienkommunikation. Schneider-Ver-lag Hohengehren: Baltmannsweiler, pp.9–21.

Hug, T. (ed.) (2000) Viablität & Bruchharsch.Ein Portrait des radikalen Konstruktivis-ten Ernst von Glasersfeld. Innsbruck Lec-tures on Constructivism, available at

http://www.uibk.ac.at/ezwi/research/

archiv/ezwi1/konstrukt/bestell.htmlKumar, K. J., Hug, T. & Rusch, G. (2006) Con-

struction of memory. In: Volkmer, I. (ed.)News in public memory. An internationalstudy of media memories across genera-tions. Lang: Frankfurt/M, pp. 211–224.

Copyright

Photos 3, 4, and 7 by Eva Hiptmair; coverphoto and photos 1, 2, 5, and 6 by Theo Hug.


7


Understanding: The Mutual Regulation of Cognition and Culture

“Try not to think of understanding as a ‘mental process’ at all. – For that is the expression which confuses you.” – Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosoph-ical Investigations, § 154)

he concept of understanding has a Janus-like nature.

1

Its shows faces in two differ-ent, not to say opposite, directions: first, itoffers a psychic or mental face. Understand-ing appears as a cognitive process or mentaloperation ending up with some recognition,insight, knowledge or discovery. At the sametime, however, the concept of understandingshows its social and interactional nature whenit comes to learning and to the evaluation ofknowledge, competences or abilities. Some“authority” – be it mother nature in the caseof the experiments of scientists or a schoolteacher in the case of examinations – selectsthe viable from all the offered and tested solu-tions.

As indicated by the history of hermeneu-tics and by the cognitivist tendency to avoidthe use of “understanding” (and instead say

“comprehension” or “information process-ing”), the double nature of understanding,despite more than 2000 years of theorizing,still seems to be misunderstood or, eventually,not understood at all. The following reflec-tions on the semantics of understanding, thehistory of hermeneutics and constructivistconcepts of understanding try to demonstratethat cognitive and social approaches towardsunderstanding do not at all oppose but ratherthey complement each other. Both faces ofunderstanding match pretty well and togethermake up an important part of the big pictureof the mutual regulation of cognition and cul-ture. The following lines essentially proposeto take understanding as both at the sametime: a special kind of social regulation as it isconstrained by the cognitive autonomy ofactors (i.e., regulation at the social levelthrough the conditions of cognitive auton-omy of actors), and as a special kind of cogni-tive regulation (i.e., regulation at the level ofcognition through social conditions of act-ing), a social selection of cognitive concepts

and operations, styles and preferences as it isconstrained by the cultural environment,especially by the partners and counterparts ininteractions and communication. The phe-nomena of understanding, thus, instance theunderlying setting of cognitive

and

socialconditions of communicating, acting andinteracting. Understanding is the way thatcognitive autonomous individuals com-mune.

The semantics of understanding

Two dominant meanings of understandingcan be observed in ordinary language use: (i) “Understanding” in the sense of compre-hend, access mentally, realize the meaning ofsomething, have the ability or know how to dosomething, have a good command of some-thing, have learned something.

This field of meanings characterizesunderstanding as a psychic process or anintellectual ability (what the mind does). Thequality of understanding, thus, directlydepends upon the quality of mental presup-positions and talents, the quality of cogni-tions from perception and recognition up tomemory and reasoning.

(ii) “Understanding” in the sense of corre-spond with someone, congenial thinking andacting, get along well with someone, havesimilar interests or aims, not take somethingamiss.

Here, understanding refers to states orqualities of social relations, a parallel or com-plementary way of looking at things, a famil-iarity of reasoning, thinking and acting, akind of empathy or closeness originatingfrom the idea of knowing the points of view,the motives or the affections of the other.

While the first group of meanings clearlyfocuses upon cognitive processes and theirrespective qualities the meanings of the sec-

Gebhard Rusch

A

Siegen University (Germany) <[email protected]>

T

Purpose: Demonstrate that cognitive and social approaches towards understanding do not at all oppose but rather they complement each other. Constructivist concepts of understanding paved the way to conceive of understanding as a cognitive-social “mecha-nism” which mutually regulates processes of social structuration and, at the same time, cognitive constructions and processing. Findings: Constructivist approaches bridge the gap between the cognitive and the social faces of understanding. They demonstrate how comprehension and cultivation, cognition and cultural reproduction are mutually linked to each other by the cognitive-social “mechanism” of understanding. As a consequence, the unavoidable immunisation against communicative demands from others jeopardizes the achievements of our communicative culture. Practical implications: Communicators are even more responsible for success or failure of communication than recipients. Moreover, as educators they are responsible for both cultural reproduction and the reinforcement of creativity and innovation. This double bind can only be managed with strong and resistant personal relations. All construction of meaning and all interpretation should be conceived of as a pro-construction, a hypothetical provisional reading made for the tough going of public or scholarly discourse. Original value: Concept of understanding integrating philosophi-cal, psychological and sociological approaches within a constructivist theory of communi-cation and reception. Key words: Understanding, communication, reception, cognition, structuration, hermeneutics.

cognitive-psychological, sociological


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2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3 119

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ond field arrange along the social dimensionsof understanding. Unlike the first set of mean-ings, which is provided with its own concept,namely “comprehension,” the second groupcrystallizes comparably in a term covering therange of social meanings of understanding.This asymmetry, again, may indicate a lack ofattention paid to the social dimension as anecessary complement. Instead, the socialdimension is subsumed under the cognitiveas a special kind of process or operation,namely the supposition, imagination or men-tal simulation of being in the place of theother, the role-taking (as the interactionistsput it), the change of perspectives or the kindof mental immersion into the person of theother (Sich-Hineinversetzen in

den anderen

).This is exactly the methodological credo of W.Dilthey’s hermeneutics. He proposed differ-entiating the humanities from the sciences,because nature other than human action, lit-erature and art, history and politics, etc. doesnot follow human intelligence and affection.

The double faces of understanding are nonew achievement. They can already be foundin history. Etymologically, the Grimm Dictio-nary for older German proves the concept ofunderstanding (“verstehen”) to have meantboth, “perceive, recognize” and, most inter-estingly here, “take somebody else’s place,substitute somebody else” (Grimm & Grimm1956, Sp. 1660–1701). The Oxford EnglishDictionary, too, points to some German rootsof the English “understân” and presents evi-dence for the meaning of “taking a risk.” Sincethe 15th century the common meaning of“comprehend,” “to be familiar with,” “toapprehend the character or nature of a per-son” is accompanied by a social reading,handed down by a text from the 18th century:“1745 J. Mason

Self-Knowledge

I.iii. (1758), 32Nothing is more common than to say, when aPerson does not behave with due Decencytowards his Superiors, such a one does notunderstand himself” (Oxford English Dictio-nary, p. 984). “Understanding” is used here inthe sense of “to know one’s place, or how toconduct oneself properly” (Oxford EnglishDictionary, p. 984). The social reading is alsosupported by “to give heed, attend to” from10th to 14th century, and “to stand under,” “tosupport or assist; to prop up” from the 12thup to the 17th century (Oxford English Dic-tionary, p. 985). Most instructive, however,with regard to the sociogenetic function of

understanding is a meaning from the 16thcentury: “to receive intelligence,” and anexample from the 12/13th century: “to be sub-ject

to

one” (op.cit., 986).Summing this up we come to conclude

that the term understanding covers a seem-ingly inconsistent semantic field includingsuch different, not to say: contradictory itemsas “risk,” “familiarity,” “subordination,”“apprehension,” “comprehension,” “knowl-edge,” “support,” “intelligence” or “attention.”

A spotlight at the history of hermeneuticswill show that most of that theorizing con-tributed to this confusion instead of offeringsubstantial clarification.

A short history of hermeneutics as theory of understanding

Hermeneutics as the theory of understandingor – in other words – as the

art of interpreta-tion

(ars interpretandi) initially originatesfrom the problem of how to handle writtentexts adequately. While in the oral culture thespeaker was the authority who decided onunderstanding, the initial source of words andphrases was no longer present in the case ofwriting. The literal culture misses the refer-ence to some evidence for the assigned mean-ings usually present in face-to-face communi-cation in the person of a speaker or author.

Therefore, the ancient ars interpretandican be regarded as an immediate reaction tothe rise and distribution of writing, especiallywith respect to the asymmetry of the distribu-tion of literacy among the people: the social(i.e., religious, political, aesthetical) elites forcenturies kept and cultivated the secret ofwriting almost exclusively; they learned to usewriting and scripture to stabilize their powerand govern the illiterate mass of people bytelling and teaching them what was encodedin the scripture.

The principles of interpretation had beena matter of debate from the beginning: (i) theAlexandrine School (e.g., Eratosthenes,Aristarchos from Samothrake) preferred agrammatical, rhetorical and etymologicalinterpretation aiming at the intention of theauthor. On the other hand, (ii) the PergamonSchool (e.g., Krates from Mallos) taught anallegorical interpretation, transferring the lit-

eral sense of a text into other contexts (i.e., fig-urative sense).

These two positions were the very firstwhich – in principle – marked the two possi-ble poles of the interpretation-debate: (i) The

intentionalist

position, which may be charac-terized as conservative because it sticks to theprinciples of oral communication, and (ii)the

allegorist

, or “modern” position, takingthe openness or under-determination of themeaning of written text as a legitimation for amore creative reading. Both positions, how-ever, share the view, that writing cannot andwill never be able to stand for itself, but is inneed of interpretation, comment or explana-tion.

The conflict between these two positionsalso dominated the further development ofhermeneutics in the Middle Ages. Mostimportant are the works of Origines andAugustine, namely their doctrines of the

mul-tiple senses

of the written. Origines distin-guished three senses of the written: (i) thesomatic – literal, historical-grammatical, (ii)the psychic – moral, and (iii) the pneumatic –allegorical, mystical sense. Augustine evendifferentiated four senses of the written: (i)the sensus litteralis, the literal sense, (ii) thesensus allegorius, the figurative sense, (iii) thesensus moralis, the moral, ethical sense, and(iv) the sensus anagogicus, the sense withinthe history of salvation. Actually, these doc-trines were designed to function as strategiesto cope with the increasingly obvious fact ofsemantic openness and under-determinationof pragmatically decontextualized writings.While the number of literate people slowlyincreased, the barriers between the tradi-tional social classes became more and morefragile, trade and crafts slowly developed themiddle classes, and writing became a socialtechnique present in all domains of humanaction – private and professional. The propo-nents of the multiple-sense-doctrines – andthat was a kind of trick – at the same timeaccepted the semantic openness of writingand restricted or controlled it by formal crite-ria. Therefore, the main advantages of thesedoctrines were: (i) to harmonize (or neutral-ize) the extremes of the intentionalist and theallegorist position by integrating them into amore abstract position as formal andmethodical principles; (ii) and the mostimportant aspect: a certain type of relationbetween the different senses, namely, congru-


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ity, correspondence, accordance, consistency,etc. represents an abstract, formal, seeminglylogical and controllable criterion for theappropriateness of interpretations. This stepfinally emancipated the ars interpretandifrom the culture of oral communication.From then on all kinds of interpretations of allkinds of texts (spoken or written) could beargued for by formal correctness or adequacy.The authority of the authors had finallybecome totally superfluous. The interpreters,the commentators, the teachers, etc. – fromthen on – presumed this authority.

The doctrine of the consistency of literal,allegorical, grammatical, etc. dimensions ofreadings dominated the hermeneutical the-ory throughout the Middle Ages. It was prac-tised as a hermeneutics of problematic pas-sages of texts, hardly recognizable phrases,unknown words and terms. It was the socalled hermeneutics of text pieces (Stellen-hermeneutik).

Actually, this is still the dominating para-digm of interpretation courses everywhere inschools and universities – independent fromthe changing fashions and so-called methodsof interpretation, e.g., Close Reading, Historyof Ideas, Psychoanalysis, Structuralism, NewCriticism, History of Mentalities, Feminism,Post-Structuralism and Deconstruction.Despite all their differences all theseapproaches set out from the basic assumptionof the coherence of readings of literary texts.And they must do so, because their plausibil-ity and persuasive power depends on coher-ence in the first place. A tour along the lines ofhermeneutical traditions will illustrate this.

At the beginning 19th century FriedrichSchleiermacher picked up general hermeneu-tical ideas of the enlightenment period

2

andinvestigated the problem of understandingfrom a philosophical point of view – therebystrongly influenced by Immanuel Kant’s ide-alism. In his famous works

Hermeneutik undKritik

(1838) and

Über den Begriff der Herme-neutik, mit Bezug auf F. A. Wolfs Andeutungenund Asts Lehrbuch

(1829) he realised andemphasized that: (i) understanding writtentexts (written language) is not in principledifferent from understanding people (spokenlanguage); (ii) understanding written or spo-ken text always and unavoidably is a matter of– as it were –

lucky guesses

, a matter of hypoth-eses about the meaning, which in the ongoingcommunication or reading process may (or

may not) turn out as suitable, consistent,fruitful or just personally satisfying; Schleier-macher pointed out that (iii) because onenever knows for sure whether one under-stands correctly or truly,

misunderstanding

has to be taken as the usual (and not as theexceptional) case; From this he concludedthat, although (iv) working on a text and itscontexts may then reduce the degrees of mis-understanding, one will never really knowwhen this work is finished. It is only given upafter some time, mostly for pragmatic rea-sons.

So, Schleiermacher: (i) generalizedhermeneutics as a theory of understanding ofall kinds of texts; and (ii) universalized mis-understanding as the natural basis and out-come of communication.

Almost a hundred years later, WilhelmDilthey elaborated on the psychologicaldimensions of understanding. Like Schleier-macher, he conceptualized the process ofunderstanding as a

reconstructive creation

ofthe author’s situation, motives, intentionsand actions. Like Schleiermacher, Diltheygeneralized this concept of understanding tocover all types of communication. But, unlikeSchleiermacher, Dilthey believed in

trueunderstanding

among all human beingsacross the borders of space, time, history andculture. This belief, finally, paved the way forDiltheys most influential – and most disas-trous – idea: the opposition of the humanities(Geisteswissenschaften) and the sciences(Naturwissenschaften). For Dilthey, under-standing in the sense of going deeply into thethoughts and actions of the other was the onlyadequate way to treat human utterances (ver-bal or non-verbal). So understanding as theprocess of interpretation became the rationalprocedure for the explication of humanaction, whereas explanation as a kind of syllo-gistic procedure on the basis of observed reg-ularities or natural laws (e.g., in the sense ofthe Hempel and Oppenheim Scheme)became the rational tool for explicating allother natural phenomena.

Martin Heidegger with his existentialistapproach again widened or further universal-ized the concept of understanding. Hedefined “understanding” as a basic and neces-sary task of human beings in order to realizeher/his own identity as well as the identity ofthe environment around him/her. In thissense, understanding becomes the

elementary

operation

one has to perform as a cognitivebeing that is thrown into existence. Under-standing texts, then, is only part of the com-plex and lifelong process of creating an under-standing of the world. This view includes allcognitive activity within the frame of under-standing. Actually, this is Heidegger’s contri-bution to universalizing, i.e., existentializing,the concept of understanding.

Hans Georg Gadamer follows Heideggerin universalizing hermeneutics. He takesunderstanding as a

constituent of human sociallife

. Interpretation, then, has to reflect criti-cally the

historical conditions

of understand-ing and, thereby, has to fuse the

intellectualhorizons

(Horizontverschmelzung) ofauthors and readers across all historical andcultural borders. This idea is based upon two– contradictory – assumptions, (i) that histor-ical conditions of text production are contin-gent and unique, and (ii) that the interpreter,who is aware of this, will be able to fullyunderstand ancient sources by clarifying suchpresuppositions. But historical relativism onthe one hand and hermeneutical optimism onthe other hand do not match very well. There-fore, Gadamer was heavily criticized for thisand other inconsistencies in his work, espe-cially by Hans Albert.

3

Similarly, Albert’s cri-tique also holds for other conceptions gener-alizing or universalizing hermeneutics eitheras the very basis of the humanities (e.g., PaulRicoeur) or as their fundamental method-ological principle (e.g., Emilio Betti).

The critical-theory approach to under-standing, as represented by Karl Otto Apeland Jürgen Habermas (following H. Marcuseand Th. Adorno), aims at a better, more egal-itarian and more satisfying social life. Onestep to attain this goal is supposed to be a bet-ter understanding of each other. This, how-ever, was thought to be achieved by a criticalhermeneutics and symmetrical communica-tion (i.e., no asymmetry in power, status,authority etc. among communicants) withinan

ideal communicative situation

.The phenomenological and reception-

aesthetics approach in the line of EdmundHusserl, Roman Ingarden, Wolfgang Iser andHans Robert Jauß appears to be a radicalreduction of hermeneutics (i) to the reader’sor recipient’s perspective and (ii) to the psy-chological dimension of the reading process.The author and her/his intentions and mean-ings are further marginalized. The

construc-

2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3 121

CONCEPTS



tion of meaning by readers

(in past andpresent) becomes the central aspect. But thisapproach only seemingly answers the ques-tion of the proper meaning of texts. Historical(collections of) documents of reading are,without any doubt, interesting material. But,recalling Schleiermacher, we must realize thatthese readings are at best lucky guesses. And,remembering Gadamer, we have to considerthe historical relativity of these readings, too.Altogether, this means that the basic herme-neutical problem of understanding anotherperson or her/his utterances has been compli-cated even more by reception aestheticsinstead of being solved.

One of the latest developments, decon-structionism, celebrates a simple sign-theo-retical insight, namely, that “meaning of asign” presupposes the difference betweensigns and the difference between sign and des-ignation. Because of these differences, how-ever, Jacque Derrida’s sign-philosophy endsup with the assertion that an understandingof signs must be absolutely impossible. In thisrespect Derrida’s position meets the latestdevelopments of the German systems-philos-ophy as it was created by the theoretical soci-ologist Niklas Luhmann. From his point ofview, successful communication is improba-ble because of the closure and operationalautonomy of the systems involved (i.e., firstand foremost the difference between con-sciousness and communication). Positionslike these mark the one pole of a kind ofunderstanding-possibility scale running fromimpossible (e.g., post-modern positions)along several degrees of probability (e.g.,hermeneutics, interactionism, cognitive sci-ence) towards the mostly unreflected evi-dence of true understanding (e.g., in naiveeveryday hermeneutics).

Summing up this brief overview we cometo assume that Schleiermacher was one ofthe first who realized the full complexity ofthe communicative problem hermeneuticswas once invented to solve. Since thenhermeneutics has developed in differentdirections, mainly philosophical, psycholog-ical and historiographical approaches tounderstanding. This also secretly trans-formed hermeneutics into a philosophy ofordinary language, psychology of readingand a history of text-production and –recep-tion. These frames of thinking paved the wayfor a more and more independent develop-

ment of the branches in the study of under-standing, the psychological and linguistic onthe one hand and the philosophical and lit-erary-historical branch on the other hand.While the former slowly mutated to cogni-tion theory and artificial intelligenceresearch (i.e., the information-processingparadigm), it not only generated a largenumber of models and theories of text pro-duction, perception and reception but alsoproduced some new disciplines such as psy-cholinguistics and cognitive sciences. Thiscould hardly be explained without the fun-damental idea of understanding as a mental,intellectual operation. At the same time, thedivergence of the two worlds of research inunderstanding seems to reach its peak at thisstage of development. It must be an irony offate that it was Wilhelm Dilthey himself whopromoted this development with his separa-tion of the humanities and the sciences.

The information-processing approach to understanding

The following presents only a very brief char-acterization of what here is called the “infor-mation-processing approach.” This is only toindicate that special frame of thinking and torecall some of the major representatives andconcepts of this paradigm.

(i) One of the most significant features oftext-processing approaches is – by and large –the avoidance of the term “understanding.”Instead, they generally employ the terms“comprehension” and “processing.” One mayspeculate that these concepts are taken as sub-stitutes for “understanding” because of theirdifferent (i.e., non-hermeneutical) connota-tions. While “understanding” is supposed tobe an object of thinking for philosophers, phi-lologists and literary scholars, terms like“comprehension” and “information process-ing” promise to designate more seriousobjects of inquiry and research as done bypsychologists, linguists, neuroscientists etc.This terminological demarcation no longerindicates a sub-differentiation of the conceptof understanding but completely differentapproaches or paradigms.

(ii) The tradition most of the proponentsof the comprehension-approaches may feel

related to directly refers to Immanuel Kant,the German idealist, who was the first tointroduce – besides his basic categories – theterm “schema” (Schemate) for mental or cog-nitive structures (scenes) which let the thingsappear in our perception (on the stage of con-sciousness). Then, H. Ebbinghaus introducedthe idea of an active, creative memory. AndF. C. Bartlett investigated the constructivenature of remembering. G.A. Miller exploredthe breadth and functioning of workingmemory and reported his findings in hisfamous “Magical Number 7”-article. M. Min-sky, T. Winograd, D. E. Rumelhart, P. H. Lind-say, D. A. Norman, R. Schank, W. Kintch, T. A.van Dijk, P. N. Johnson-Laird and many oth-ers developed models of semantic memory,the concepts of frames and scripts, proposi-tional representations of discourse, story-grammars, the concept of macrostructures,the theory of mental models etc. This wholeenterprise is to work out theories, models andmachines that conceptualize, represent orgenerate what human information processorsdo – starting from sensory perceptions andending up with related behavioural outputs.

(iii) The present state of affairs may besummed up as follows: information process-ing is viewed as an interactive process betweene.g., text and reader. This process is directedby top-down and bottom-up operations.Information processing requires an organizedmultidimensional knowledge base which issupposed to be kept in memory (short-termand long-term memory). As a cognitive pro-cess, information processing is generative,constructive and creative, synthetical (asUlric Neisser put it) rather than analytical orreconstructive. Information processing is ahierarchical and sequential process tendingtowards the creation of coherent and subjec-tively satisfying or appropriate structures andfunctioning. At the same time this processshows some tolerance for ambiguities andinconsistencies. Information processing,however, is socially contextualized or embed-ded. That is to say, there is some impact ofsocial and situational factors on cognitiveoperations. Remarkably, this aspect has beenreinvented by cognitive scholars like TerryWinograd:

“My current work is moving in the direc-tion of a fourth domain for understandinglanguage (besides linguistic structure,relation of linguistic structure and world,


CONCEPTS



cognitive processes, G.R.):

The domain ofhuman action and interaction

. In thisdomain the relevant regularities are in thenetwork of actions and interactions withina human society. An utterance is a linguis-tic

act

that has consequences for the partic-ipants, leading to other immediate actionsand to commitments for future action.”(Winograd 1980, p. 233). Finally, those insights brought about some

cognitive situation-models. Also, “social cog-nition” has been investigated in terms of con-cepts for social partners, social relations andsocial institutions. All this, however, onlydemonstrates that the dominant view of theinformation processing approaches never-theless by and large remained cognitivistic,psychological or neuro-physiological.

With this in mind we come to concludethat from the information processing point ofview understanding is conceptualized only asa certain type of cognitive operation or pro-cess associated with conceptual coherence,problem solving and affective or emotionaleffects.

From a constructivist cognitive-social per-spective – as will be outlined in the next sec-tions – there is no need to reduce the phenom-ena of understanding to cognitive activity.Instead, understanding can be treated in itsfull complexity.

Constructivist approaches to understanding

Do constructivist approaches to language,communication and understanding reallyenable a more complex view integrating boththe faces of understanding? Turning to thewritings of the most prominent proponentsof the constructivist paradigm, Ernst vonGlasersfeld und Heinz von Forster, we learnsome elementary lessons. Ernst von Glasers-feld’s concept of understanding may be char-acterized as the

construction of viable inter-pretations.

Heinz von Foerster’s positionseems a bit more systemic and intrinsic inputting forward a concept of understandingas the

creation of eigen-values

of cognitivesystems.

“To put it as simply as possible. To ‘under-stand’ what someone has said or written

implies no less but also no more than tohave built up a conceptual structure froman exchange of language, and, in the givencontext, this structure is deemed to becompatible with what the speaker appearsto have had in mind. This compatibility,however, cannot be tested by a directcomparison – it manifests itself in noother way than that the speaker subse-quently says and does nothing that con-travenes the expectations the listenerderives from his or her interpretation.”(Glasersfeld 1995, p. 143)This quote from the chapter “To under-

stand understanding” already shows themain traits of a constructivist approach.First, understanding is taken as a cognitiveoperation, namely: “building a conceptualstructure.” Second, understanding is taken asan operation performed by a listener, readeror observer. Third, the constructed “concep-tual structure” has to meet certain require-ments. It has to correspond with future expe-riences and with expectations the listener hasestablished with respect to the speaker.

Heinz von Foerster explicated cognitionwithin the frame of a biological and systemicapproach. He proposed the idea of modellingthe functioning of cognitive systems alongsome mathematical metaphors as a complexprocess of calculation – if not to say: comput-ing. The cognitive construction of a reality(Wirklichkeit) thus becomes a process of cal-culations within a self-referential, opera-tionally closed and self-organising neuronalsystem. The self-referential mode of operat-ing, furthermore, implies a self-referentialkind of calculation. This, however, is bestrepresented by so called eigen-value func-tions.

“This finding (or solution) helps us tounderstand the organism which in a recur-sive way continually prepares its behaviour(acting on its own motor activity), namely,in accordance with restricting conditionsand as long as a stable behaviour isachieved.” (Foerster 1993, p. 279, mytranslation)This approach, then, allowed for a new

explication of the concept of objects in termsof cognitive calculation.

“An observer watching the whole processand having no access to the sensations ofthe organism as they are restricting itsmovements will recognize that the organ-

ism has learned to cope successfully with acertain ‘resistance’, a certain

object

. Theorganism itself may believe that it now

understands

that object (or has learnedhow to handle it). Because, though, theorganism can only know its own behaviordue to the nervous activity these ‘objects’strictly speaking are signs for the various‘eigen-behavior’ of the organism.” (Foer-ster 1993, p. 279, my translation)Here, Heinz von Foerster offers a kind of

definition for understanding as constructionof eigen-values or eigen-behavior respec-tively. For the organism this means to under-stand in the sense of

knowing how to behave

oroperate. At first sight, this explication clearlyfavours the cognitive process view of under-standing. And like Glasersfeld, Foersteremphasises the aspect of – at least a limited –stability or invariance of the objects or inter-pretations constructed.

Apparently, this approach so far does notdiffer significantly from hermeneutic or cog-nitivist conceptions in both (i) postulating akind of cognitive operation as a basic processof comprehension or information processingand (ii) demanding certain qualities for thatprocess or its results respectively. It differs,though, in the kind of quality demanded ofthe conceptual structure. It is not a formalcondition like the coherence of the listener’sinterpretation or the correspondence of themultiple senses of the speaker’s words.Instead, the conceptual structure has to meetsome pragmatic or operational requirementslike the correspondence with future observa-tions or the coherence of the interpretation ofthe speaker’s utterances and the expectationsderived from that. Here, the social and inter-actional dimension of understanding appearsto be a necessary complement of the cognitivefunctioning.

Because there is no direct transfer ofmeaning from one head into another (cf. Gla-sersfeld 1996, p. 230), because of the cognitiveautonomy of the individual, the constructionof subjective readings, meanings or interpre-tations is the only and unavoidable way toact.

4

Moreover, the interpretations andexpectations of the listener – as conceptualstructures – do share the destiny of andunderlie the same constraints as any othercognitive construction (process pattern orstructure). They may survive, as long as they

fit

into the overall conceptual framework, the

2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3 123

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situational, discursive and opera-tional context of an individual’sacting and communicating (cf.op.cit., 232). It needs no further explanationhere, that

fit

does imply neither identity orequality nor any similarity of the conceptualstructures held by speaker and listener. It doesnot imply any accor-dance of content ofwhat the speaker hassaid and meant andwhat the listener hasheard and realised asher/his interpretation.

Fit

does only meancompatible, reconcil-able, co-existentialwithout conflict.Accordingly, as long asand in the way interpre-tations, ascriptions ofmeanings andderived construc-tions fit or survivewithin an ever changing con-ceptual environment, and as long as and inthe way they prove as viable constructions,understanding is possible despite the “intrin-sic uncertainty” of interaction and communi-cation. To put it more precisely:

understand-ing is the only possible way to cope with thisintrinsic uncertainty

. Understanding is possi-ble because it does not and cannot depend onthe equality or accordance of the content asexpressed by the speaker’s words and asascribed to the words perceived by the lis-tener. Instead, it is grounded upon first theinstantaneous and then the later experiencesof successful and fluent continuation of inter-action, cooperation or communication which– if it comes to reasons – itself rests uponworking (sic) hypotheses about the orienta-tions, attitudes, knowledge or intentions ofthe respective other.

We may now question the consequencesFriedrich Schleiermacher drew from hisinsights. The unavoidability of guessing(erraten) what a speaker means, does not inprinciple exclude understanding. Misunder-standing, by far, is not the regular case. Wemust, however, realise – and this is implied bythe viability-principle – that the number ofalternative compatible interpretations may belarge. Many variants of understanding of aspeaker’s words may be possible even far

beyond all the well knownlexical and contextual ambi-

guities. In addition, we have toaccount for the pragmatics

of the evaluation ofeveryday interactionand communication.While in science, falsi-fication (sensu Pop-per) may be or hasbeen a guiding meth-

odological principle,

the ordinarypractice in everyday interaction and commu-nication is not after awkward and long-winded testing of reliability, trustworthinessor truth. Instead, a kind of hermeneutic good-will-principle (Prinzip des hermeneutischenWohlwollens

5

) usually governs communica-tion. It leads people – by and large – to insin-uate or assume that the other is not wilfullylying or cheating, is in good order cognitivelyand physically, etc. Those insinuations on theone hand and a lack of opportunity, time andinterest to intensively check for possiblefuture incompatibility of interpretations onthe other hand make possible that (i) manyalternative interpretations may co-exist, and(ii) a majority of cases of potential misunder-standings will never be recognized. But, allthose undetected misunderstandings simplydo not make any difference to anybody.Understanding may later turn out to be anillusion. But until then and as long as theinterpretations fit into the syntheses of actionand communication, as long as they show thisoperational validity and prove to be viablethey meet all the pragmatic and operationalrequirements. There is nothing more tounderstand, at that very moment. Under-standing – we come to conclude – not onlydepends on the subjective personal concep-

tual inventories of interpreters, on contextsand the proper perceived messages, but alsoon time, namely: the future.

6

So far, following the major constructivist

authorities, we have taken the perspective ofthe recipient as is usually the case in herme-neutics. But what about the speaker and her/his view at the communication process?

There is a piece from Ernst von Glasersfeldon this topic in one of his writings aboutteaching and learning:

“Ein Trainer braucht nur das Verhalten sei-ner Schüler zu beobachten, um festzustel-len, ob sie das gelernt haben, wofür sieabgerichtet werden sollten. Ein Lehrer hin-gegen kann nur

erschließen

, ob sie verstan-den haben, was sie verstehen lernen sollten.Die Schlußfolgerungen des Lehrers sinddarum nicht nur in der Praxis unsicher, siesind

prinzipiell

unsicher, denn die Gedan-ken und Ideen eines Menschen können nieunmittelbar mit denen eines anderen ver-glichen werden. […] Lehrer können daherannehmen, dass ihre Schüler verstandenhaben, wenn die Weise, in der sie handelnund reagieren mit dem Verständnis desLehrers vereinbar erscheint.” (Glasersfeld1997, pp. 204f: A trainer just has to observethe behaviour of his subjects to decidewhether they have learned what they weretrained to do. A teacher, however, can only

derive

, whether the students have under-stood or not, what they should learn tounderstand. Therefore, the teacher’s con-clusions are uncertain not only in practicebut also

in principle

because the thoughtsand ideas a person holds can never be com-pared directly with those of any other per-son. . […] Therefore teachers may supposethat their students have understood whenthe way they act and react seems compati-ble with their own understanding. Mytranslation)Looking at communication from the point

of view of the communicator, i.e., the speaker,writer or performer, it is obvious that – inprinciple – the speaker has to “understand”the listener’s reactions in a way analogous tothe listener’s interpretation of the speaker’swords. Naturally, the speaker, like any otherperson, has no privileged access to the lis-tener’s mind. However, and at this point welightly touch the field of human semiosis, thespeaker’s

intention

to work on the recipient inorder to bring about a certain re-action (overt


CONCEPTS



behaviour or intellectual move) makes all thedifference. As already pointed out by Hum-berto Maturana in his

Biology of Cognition

communicating is essentially the

orientation

of others. The speaker, because of his inten-tion, knows – or at least, to be taken seriously,should know – what he is after: he expects cer-tain behaviour of the listener when uttering acertain phrase. Accordingly, the request toopen a window is accompanied by the expec-tation to see the addressee go and open a win-dow. And this expectation

7

or wish, the idea ofthe expected or desired re-action then servesas a kind of functional value within thespeaker’s current action and orientationscheme. The speaker – so to speak – makes bestuse of his having moved first, i.e., with his ini-tial communicative approach he sets the con-ditions and defines the overall criteria for suc-cess or failure within that communicativeepisode. Therefore, a teacher cannot but eval-uate his observations of the students’ behav-iour – as re-action to his own communicativeapproaches towards them – in the light of hisown expectations and understanding. Like ateacher, the speaker has to decide and, more-over, is in the only position to decide whetherthe observed re-action matches his intentionsand expectations.

Picking up Heinz von Foerster’s eigen-value metaphor, the speaker – with his inten-tion and as first mover – defines the eigen-value of the whole communication episode.He first brings in his communicative aims as akind of interactional value or attractor leadinghis own action towards the listener. Then, thelistener unavoidably gets involved in that pro-cess as the addressee or “victim” of externaldemands. The more aesthetically seducing,the more impressive, persuasive, forceful orlasting the approach towards the recipient, theless ignorable it is. Less ignorable, however, arethe speaker’s interventions in terms of pertur-bating, modulating or changing the self-refer-ential and cognitively autonomous operationof the listener as a cognitive system, the stron-ger the impact on his cognition. Moreover, thespeaker’s work on the gradual adjustment ortuning of the listener to perform the inten-tionally desired behaviour is also usuallyactively reinforced by the listener through hisaffective disposition to keep social contact andnot be rejected, to be a good sport, to showinterest in the other and cooperate. It is not bychance that this reminds us of the hermeneu-

tic principle of good will. Usually such a com-municative episode ends when the speaker haseither succeeded in orienting the other the wayhe intended or when he has given up becauseof too much negative feedback e.g., noobserved reaction, permanent errors finallycausing aggression or resignation, etc.

Success of communication, though, alwaysmeans that the speaker realises his intentions– at least to some acceptable degree. And it isin this sense that the speaker’s intention gov-erns the whole communication as a kind ofepisodic eigen-value.

Heinz von Foerster himself suggested theapplication of the mathematical model of

bistable functions

to the process of interactionor communication.

“… zwei Subjekte, die miteinander rekur-siv interagieren,

nolens volens

stabile Eigen-verhaltensweisen ausbilden” (Foerster1993, p. 279; Two subjects interactingrecursively

nolens volens

each produce sta-ble eigen-behaviour. My translation).In this case a bistable function converges

towards two stable eigen-values each generat-ing the other as output. This kind of correla-tion, though, seems to come close to purefunctional dependency. Therefore, we have toquestion bistable functions as a model forcommunication of cognitive, namely, non-trivial systems. Functional dependency andnon-triviality of systems clearly contradicteach other.

Recalling the question put forward at thebeginning of this paragraph now – after hav-ing examined the positions of the two mostinfluential constructivists to some extent –allows for a first positive but careful answer:besides the dominant view of understandingas a cognitive process, constructivist authorsalso open a perspective on the interactionaland communicative dimension of under-standing. They assume a functional role eitheras a kind of referential instance or as an ele-ment in the value range of eigen-value func-tions as represented by the cognitive operationof each of the participants. Nevertheless, theconstructivist approach to understanding asexplicated so far still seems to be kind of stuckin hermeneutic coining. The last chapter,therefore, tries to further think in the directionas indicated by von Glasersfeld and von Foer-ster, but at same time unchain constructivistthinking from hermeneutic predispositions.Let’s see what happens.

Understanding as cultivation: Cognitive operation under social control

8

Following the path shown by von Glasersfeldand von Foerster we may now put the piecestogether.

(i) A communicator (speaker, writer, etc.)tries to attain her/his goals by performing ver-bal and non-verbal behaviour respectively.Vocal or verbal action is successful when theactor observes the desired or intended effects.“Translating” this into the semantics ofunderstanding we may say that the communi-cator

means

something with his utterancesonly with regard to the related expectations,wishes or intentions. The meaning of theutterances, therefore, is nothing else than thecommunicative expectations held by thecommunicator himself. Only if these expecta-tions match with the observed effects ofaction, the actor/communicator may statethat the recipient or addressee did under-stand. “

Understanding

,” we may concludefrom this, means “

to meet the expectations of acommunicator

.”(ii) It is most important to realize that the

communicator is the only instance or author-ity to decide whether the communicativeexpectations are met or not. The communica-tor, however, is not alone able to

decide aboutthe understanding

of the partner. Moreover,he cannot even avoid showing some evalua-tive reaction (e.g., confirmation, disappoint-ment, paraphrasing, commenting, explicat-ing, etc.) in view of the recipient’s behaviourbecause this is part of his current actionscheme of orientation. Finally, such feedbackeven becomes a kind of social obligation. Andthis is the case because the recipient on theother hand does not have any access to thecommunicator’s intentions or expectations.The recipient learns about the operationalvalue and the social adequacy or appropriate-ness of his responses only by observing andexperiencing the action of the speaker. If thespeaker finds his intentions realized throughthe responses of the listener this usually in oneway or another is emphasised and confirmedby either explicitly stating that the other hasunderstood or by rewarding the communica-tive success with all kinds reinforcing positive

2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3 125

CONCEPTS



feedback like praise, attention, little gifts,pleasant affections, etc. In many cases therecipient – especially as a child – may even besurprised by experiencing such positive feed-back and by learning that it was understand-ing what she/he did. Such positive experi-ences will easily be connected to theperformed behaviour which in turn, thus,becomes reinforced and kept in memoryready to be reproduced in similar situations.Apparently, and here we think of the godJanus again, this is at the very beginning of thecognitive construction of expectations andexpectations of expectations, a process whichbasically enables social coordination andcooperation through the interlocking ofactions and expectations. This, exactly, iswhat David Lewis (1975) called

convention

.

9

Understanding, then, turns out to besomething like a

state or, better, a quality in asocial relation

based upon the ascription or

attribution

of understanding to a recipient (alistener, reader or viewer). Eventually, this iswhat Kenneth J. Gergen had in mind when hewrote:

“Understanding is not contained withinme or within you, but is that which we gen-erate together in our form of relatedness.… understanding … is a social achieve-ment.” (Gergen 1988, pp. 46f). At this point we also have to recall the

quote from Ludwig Wittgenstein (1963)which serves as the motto for this article:

“§154. But wait – if ‘Now I understand theprinciple’ does not mean the same as ‘theformula … occurs to me’ (or ‘I say the for-mula,’ ‘I write it down,’ etc.) -does it followfrom this that I employ the sentence ‘NowI understand …’ or ‘Now I can go on’ as adescription of a process occurring behindor side by side with that of saying the for-mula?If there has to be anything ‘behind theutterance of the formula’ it is

particular cir-cumstances

, which justify me in saying I cango on – when the formula occurs to me.Try not to think of understanding as a‘mental process’ at all. – For

that

is theexpression which confuses you. But askyourself: in what short case, in what kind ofcircumstances, do we say. ‘Now I Knowhow to go on,’ when, what it is, the formula

has

occurred to me?In the sense in which there are processes(including mental processes) which are

characteristic of understanding, under-standing is not a mental process.(A pain’s growing more or less; the hearingof a tune or a sentence: these are mentalprocesses.)”

10

Here, we do not think of understanding asa mental but as a cognitive-social process.And from that we learn about the transcate-gorial logic of understanding. This is a logic ofcognitively autonomous systems interactingand mutually orientating each other. The“mechanism” of understanding underlies allinteraction and linguistic exchange from twosides at the same time: cognition and socialstructuring, speaker and listener. At the levelof this cognitive-social interplay we may reallylearn what it means to

speak

and

understand

alanguage. A similar insight might already havedriven John Austin (1962) to come up with histheory of speech acts. Speaking, for Austin, isaction. And this includes constative as well asperformative utterances. Considering, thus,Austin’s illocutionary forces, again we meetthe speaker’s intentions as governing anddefining the whole communicative episode,especially, the

relation

to the addressee (e.g.,criteria for success and failure, the actual illo-cutionary role of an utterance, and, therefore,the selection of locutionary acts). At thispoint, finally, we should also call anotherprominent witness and pioneer of radicalconstructivism, Paul Watzlawick, to empha-sise the determining role of the

relation aspect

.In the famous “Pragmatics of Human Com-munication” the second of the “tentative axi-oms” says: “Every communication has a con-tent and relationship aspect such that

thelatter classifies the former

and is therefore ametacommunication” (Watzlawick, Beavin,Jackson 1967, p. 54; my italics). However,from the point of view of the attribution the-ory of understanding, communication hasmore than a “relationship aspect.” Muchmore, and essentially, it is or makes up a socialrelation which is established in the initialphase through the approaches of a communi-cator who, thereby, relates her-/himself to anaddressee.

(iii) The instances of understanding inhuman interaction and communication areboth cognitively and socially emphasised.This is because understanding means successfor both the communicator and the recipient.The speaker realises her/his communicativegoals while the recipient is rewarded with

praise, attention or positive emotional feed-back. The most important effect of this two-fold and double emphasis is the reinforce-ment and social coding of the respectiveactions. Conventionalization, as a principle ofsocial coding, self-regulation and self-organ-isation among cognitively autonomous sub-jects, is but one result of the intersection ofcognitive and social processes. It brings aboutstrong rational and emotional ties betweenthe participants. And this, finally, means cre-ating a

community

. (iv) The interactional logic of understand-

ing also demands that attention is paid to therole changes of communicator and recipientduring their interaction. As already pointedout with regard to the interlocking of expec-tations and effects of communicative inter-ventions the changing of roles reinforces thematch of a communicator’s intentions and arecipient’s action. During e.g., languageacquisition, the learner

is pushed

(if noturged) to autonomously create or find a wayto perform the requested, desired, appropri-ate or adequate behaviour. Having learned toconnect auditions with (socially) appropriatebehaviour the student may himself

push oth-ers

by vocally reproducing such auditions.Remembering the third of Paul Watzlawick’saxioms, this may also be, to some extent, amatter of punctuation. Anyway, at this point,the subject – so to speak – emancipates from“standing under” and (re-)gains its ownsocial integrity or authority through theacquisition of linguistic competences. Experi-ences like these, then, help to establish andfoster knowledge about linguistic action,about the meaning of (the use of) phrases andtheir illocutionary forces. This knowledge,however, is not only knowledge about how topush others but knowledge about own mentaland overt operation. Pushes from others,thus, become

pulls

or requests. Own (re-)action becomes dispositional. This alsobrings about the competence to

pull

for com-municative intervention, to put another per-son on the spot by addressing her or him com-municatively, e.g., to begin a

dialog

and keepit running.

(v) The attribution of understandingbrings about even more essential conse-quences. Most important is the fact, that theascription of understanding means a

social orcultural selection of cognitive operations

. Fromthe operational point of view of the recipient,


CONCEPTS



however, there is ex ante no internal criteriondistinguishing cognitions followed by attri-butions of understanding and others.Impressed or disturbed by the approaches ofa communicator the recipient goes on to gen-erate behaviour autonomously following hisown rationality and affections. His cognitionsex ante do not show any special internal dif-ference in quality or function as to contributeto understanding or not. Cognition rathergains special quality only ex post when under-standing has been attributed. The ascriptionitself together with the correlated feedbackturns the attention of the recipient to the pre-ceding mental and motor behaviour, andthereby accentuates and emphasises it.

As mentioned above the etymology of“understanding” shows a meaning from the16th century which seems to grasp the point.Understanding as “reception of intelligence”comes quite close to understanding as socialselection of cognition. There are two forcesdriving this selection: first the reinforcementof cognitions through understanding, andsecond the inhibition of those which are notfollowed by understanding attributions. Thisis how understanding

selects socially and cul-turally compatible eigen-behaviour

of cogni-tive systems. Incompatible behaviour isinhibited by negative sanctions. This socialchannelling of cognition, i.e., the “mecha-nism” of understanding, thus, turns out to beone of the

basic principles of social and culturalreproduction

.(vi) The two dominant ordinary meanings

of understanding as explicated in the first sec-tion of this article, namely,

“Understanding

”in the sense of

“comprehend, access mentally,have the know how to do something, etc. “

and

“Understanding”

in the sense of

“correspondwith someone, congenial thinking and acting,etc.”

go together

with the attributionapproach pretty well. Usually, the attributionof understanding is associated with theascription of intelligence, of intellectual per-formance and capacity. Someone who under-stands is considered to be at least as smart asthe one who gave something to understand.At the same time, the close personal relationestablished through the performance of adesired response and the following positivefeedback and confirmation does indeed pro-mote the assumption of correspondence,

accordance or even congeniality. It is not bychance that the border between civilizationand barbarism, psychological health anddeviance or illness runs along a line markedby success and failure of understanding. Afterall, the two faces of understanding turn out tobe the two sides of the same coin: social inter-action under the conditions of cognitiveautonomy.

(vii) The attribution approach to under-standing also clarifies and reassigns the

responsibilities for success or failure in under-standing. It can no longer be only a defective,poor or stupid cognition of a recipient caus-ing failure but also – and in many cases – itactually is the incompetence of the communi-cator in helping the addressee to find her/hiseigen-way to understanding. Understandingis far from being a matter of course. The com-municator must try hard to achieve it. Teach-ers do know about this. It is their professionto guide and moderate the students’ attemptsto come up with an appropriate, and at bestan excellent response.

(viii) Communicative experiences (activeand passive) gathered over the years of onto-genetic cognitive development teach peopleto employ hypotheses about the communica-tors’ intentions. Such hypotheses, then, guidethe syntheses of behaviour which may be –with a certain probability – expected, ade-quate, appropriate or right. But these hypoth-eses not only serve to accelerate and improveunderstanding. At the same time, they allowfor a self-attribution of understanding. In theend, and if supported by specific political andlegal conditions (e.g., democracy, powerfulindividualism, personal rights, distributionof power, free expression of opinion, etc.), thismay give rise to immunisations from commu-nicative demands (in conversation, educa-tion, interpretation) and, thereby, cause seri-ous problems for social relations, teachingand learning. People who immunize them-selves against communicative demands nolonger feel obliged to listen or try to modify orextend their cognitive inventory by learning.The simple self-ascription of understandingindependently of any feedback by a commu-nicator is substantially supported by thedevelopment of a culture of media receptionas is the case in our societies since the readingrevolution of the 18th century. Here, commu-

nication and understanding suffer from thecognitive refinement of their own prerequi-sites.

Conclusion

Constructivist approaches bridge the gapbetween the cognitive and the social faces ofunderstanding. They demonstrate how com-prehension and cultivation, cognition andcultural reproduction are mutually linked toeach other by the cognitive-social “mecha-nism” of understanding. With Schleierma-cher, Heidegger and Gadamer, constructivistapproaches share the view that understandingis a universal basis and tool of social and cul-tural being. Other than the authorities ofhermeneutics, constructivist positionsemphasise the social and cultural impregna-tion of cognition and – at the same time – thecognitive “nature” of culture and society.

Interpretation – to finally come to theend – in a constructivist hermeneutics cannotbe taken as a kind of re-construction of anoriginal or true meaning of a text. Instead,interpretation should be conceived of as a pro-construction, a hypothetical provisional read-ing made for the tough going of public orscholarly discourse. At best those construc-tions prove to be viable – at least for someshort period of time.

Gebhard Rusch, born in 1954 in Magde-burg, Germany; studied linguistics, compar-ative literature, history and philosophy at the universities of Bielefeld and Siegen, Pro-motion in 1985, habilitation in media studies in 1998, since then guest professorship at the university of Innsbruck, Austria; since 2004 professor at the institute of media research at Siegen University. Numerous publications, books and articles, on commu-nication and media theory, systems analysis, organisational communication, epistemol-ogy, philosophy of science, theory of history and the dynamics of cultural systems. Co-editor of the constructivist journal DELFIN (1983–2001), Co-editor of the media stud-ies journal SPIEL.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3 127

CONCEPTS

cognitive-psychological, sociological radical constructivism

Notes1. “Janus is the Roman god known as the cus-

todian of the universe. He is the god of be-ginnings and the guardian of gates anddoors … Two heads back to back representJanus, each looking in opposite directions… Janus also represents the transition be-tween primitive life and civilization, be-tween rural and urban existence. He alsomaintains the balance between peace andwar and youth and old age … He intro-duced money, cultivation of the fields andthe law. He was considered the protector ofRome.” (Brinker 2004, my italics).

2. This period gave birth to the hermeneuticsof e.g., Johann Conrad Dannhauer and hisIdea Boni Interpretis (1630) and Herme-neutica Sacra (1654), Johann Clauberg andLogica Vetus et Nova (1654), Johann Mar-tin Chladenius with his Einleitung zur rich-tigen Auslegung vernünfftiger Reden undSchriften (1742), Georg Friedrich Meierand his Versuch einer Allgemeinen Ausle-gungskunst (1757), Alexander GottliebBaumgarten and his Acroasis Logica (1761)as well as Johann August Ernesti and his In-stitutio Interpretis Novi Testamenti (1761).

3. See also Abel (1948/1949) for a similar butearlier critical approach to hermeneutics.

4. We may also call these readings, interpre-tations and constructions of meaning“radical” in the sense of Donald David-son’s (1984) concept of radical interpreta-tion. As pointed out by Matthias Günther(2002, p. 195, with reference to Davidson1986) the concept of radical interpretationgenerally holds for all cases of linguisticunderstanding.

5. “Die hermeneutische Billigkeit (aequitashermeneutica) ist die Neigung eines Aus-legers, diejenigen Bedeutungen fürhermeneutisch wahr zu halten, welche mitden Vollkommenheiten (Verständlich-keit, Wahrheit, Klugheit; G.R.) desUrhebers der Zeichen am besten überein-stimmen, bis das Gegenteil erwiesenwird.” (Meier 1757, § 39).

6. As pointed out in Rusch (2003) the epi-sodic structure of communication clearlyseparates four different phases: initializa-tion, performance, controlling and evalu-ation. These phases follow an underlyingbasic operational principle of sensory-motor coordination and learning, namely,the coupling of (self-) observation and

motor activity which – together with thedevelopment of a concept of causality – re-sults in action schemata (i.e., knowledgeand ability to do or bring about s.th. inten-tionally. (cf. Piaget 1937). As we may learnfrom Jung (1995) who takes communica-tion as (social) control of the ability to act– through internalization (self-control)and institutionalization (conventions) – iteven paves the way for the conceptualiza-tion of the communicator as a self (per-sonally and socially).

7. Expectations work like the phantasma inKarl Bühler’s Theorie of Language or as akind of mental model (Kenneth Craik; PhilJohnson-Laird) kept ready for compari-sons and inferences related to ongoingperception.

8. Basic ideas of the following have been pre-sented in a number of German-languagepublications; cf. Rusch (1986, 1987, 1990,1992, 2000, 2003).

9. Clearly, this also allows for institualizationand social structuring, e.g., in the sense ofA. Giddens (1984).

10.Cf. also Wittgenstein (1963), §§ 153, 155,182.

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Connecting Radical Constructivism to Social Transformation and Design

Introduction

I first met Ernst von Glasersfeld in 1977 at ajoint conference of the Society for GeneralSystems Research and the American Associa-tion for the Advancement of Science, in Den-ver, Colorado. He was participating on a panelchaired by Heinz von Foerster that alsoincluded Francisco Varela, Margaret Mead,Joe Goguen and Kenneth Boulding. This wasthe same conference at which Varela pre-sented his calculus for self-reference (1975).This was also the first academic conference ofany type that I had ever attended, and I was,quite frankly, awestruck. While I do notremember much of the content of the panel, Ido remember being impressed by how Ernstbrought together so many of the disparateideas I had been studying, and now listeningto, into what seemed like a coherent and sim-ple, yet audacious framework. Sitting acrossfrom him at lunch that day, I came to realizethis framework as the roots of “radical con-structivism.”

My teacher and mentor at the University ofPennsylvania, Klaus Krippendorff, encour-aged me to pursue some of the ideas of radicalconstructivism in relation to my own research

at the time, which I had labeled “constrainttheory.” My interest was in using conceptsfrom cybernetics to develop a way of thinkingabout policy formulation that was radicallydifferent than the way I had learned in mystudies of operations research. In particular, Ifound the specification of “desire” in policymodels in the form of goals and/or objectivesto be inadequate and often dysfunctional; Ineeded another way to think about values,and the notion of constraint offered such analternative.

In 1981, I was asked by Stuart Umpleby ofGeorge Washington University to organizethe program for a conference of the AmericanSociety for Cybernetics (ASC) in Washington,DC. It was to be the first such conference ofthat organization since 1974, so I proposedthe theme “The New Cybernetics.” One of myfirst thoughts was that Ernst von Glasersfeldmust be invited as a presenter. At this and aseries of subsequent conferences, includingthree Gordon Research Conferences, the sec-ond co-chaired by Ernst (with Heinz von Foe-rster as chair) and the third chaired by Ernst(with Paul Pangaro as co-chair), my appreci-ation for Ernst’s ideas on a variety of subjects,especially language, grew stronger, culminat-

ing in a special ASC conference in 1988 called“Texts in Cybernetic Theory.” Rod Donaldsonhad approached me, as President of the ASC,with an idea for inviting three leading theo-rists in cybernetics to prepare papers thatmight summarize key aspects of their think-ing, and then organize a conference at whichthe participants would study and discussthose papers. Rod organized the conferenceand held it in Felton, California. Ernst wasselected to prepare one of the three papers,along with Humberto Maturana and WilliamPowers. That paper, “An Exposition of RadicalConstructivism” (1988), is a basic source forsome of my thoughts below.

Three other events involving Ernst vonGlasersfeld deserve mentioning for theirinfluence on the ideas in this paper. In 1988,Stuart Umpleby organized a team of eightAmerican systems scientists to travel to theSoviet Union for a special conference witheight Soviet systems scientists. I was honoredto join Ernst, Donald Campbell, George Klir,and others, as a member of this team. For twoweeks, I had the opportunity to get to knowErnst not just as an intellectual giant, but as aperson. I found him kind, gentle, andextremely patient, and I couldn’t help think-ing that there must be a relationship betweenthe ideas he formulated and advocated andhis way of being. I have since realized how thepredominance of the concept of an external,independent, absolute “truth,” as carried inthe prevailing languages of the world (not justthe West), has contributed to the meanness,impatience, greed, and violence (even war)that we experience in our societies. This con-cept of truth is antithetical to the tenets ofradical constructivism. The conference washeld in Tallin, Estonia, and it was there thatremarks by Ernst linked his distinctionbetween “fit” and “match” to my constrainttheory.

At an ASC conference in Amherst, Massa-chusetts, in 1991, I gave the opening address

Laurence D. Richards

A

Indiana University East (USA) <[email protected]>

Purpose: This paper intends to connect ideas from the radical constructivist approach to cognition and learning to ideas from the constraint-theoretic approach to social policy formulation. It then extends these ideas to a dialogic approach to social transformation and design. Method: After demonstrating a correspondence between von Glasersfeld’s fit/match distinction and my constraint-oriented/goal-oriented distinction with respect to policy formulation, the paper evaluates the basic assumptions of radical constructivism and builds from them a framework for thinking and talking about a desirable society and ways to participate in its realization. Findings: The ideas of von Glasersfeld’s radical construc-tivism contribute significantly to the development of a conceptual base for applied research on social activism by raising new questions and stimulating new thinking. Practical implications: Social activism in everyday affairs can be a way of living in the “world.” Conclusion: The work and thought of Ernst von Glasersfeld opens a path toward a rich array of concepts and ideas with the potential to inform efforts in a wide variety of human endeavors. Key words: Constructivism, cybernetics, language, dialogic process, social activism.


second-order cybernetics

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CONCEPTS



that I had titled “Why I am Not a Cyberneti-cian” (1993). It was intended as a tribute tothe great minds of cybernetics, those whodemonstrated qualities and insights to whichI could aspire but not yet lay claim, includingErnst von Glasersfeld. Ernst gave the addressimmediately following mine, which he called“Why I Consider Myself a Cybernetician,”later published in

Cybernetics and HumanKnowing

(1992). I found it somewhat ironic,given the titles of our presentations, that Ernstcited the cybernetic concept of “constraint” asone of the more important influences on hiswork.

My most recent encounter with Ernst vonGlasersfeld was on the occasion of a visit tohis country home in Amherst, where he andhis lovely and talented wife Charlotte havelived for a number of years. Judy Lombardi,Mark Enslin, Carol Huang and I made thetrip in May 2006 to present Ernst with theNorbert Wiener Medal of the AmericanSociety for Cybernetics. We all had a won-derful conversation during which we beganto probe some of the assumptions of radicalconstructivism. That conversation gave methe motivation for the direction I have takenin this paper.

I offer this introduction, in the spirit of aFestschrift, as a way to understand how theideas presented below have evolved. They didnot arise simply by reading books and papers.They are the result of interactions with Ernstvon Glasersfeld and numerous others over aperiod of many years, interactions for which Iam sincerely grateful and humbled. Consis-tent with the ideas of radical constructivism,I make no attempt to “match” my ideas withthose of Ernst’s radical constructivism. I donot even claim a “fit”; my attempt is to find afit between my ideas and my own conceptionof radical constructivism.

“Fit” and “match”

In describing what makes radical constructiv-ism

radical

, von Glasersfeld observes:“This radical difference concerns the rela-tion of knowledge and reality. Whereas inthe traditional view of epistemology, aswell as of cognitive psychology, this rela-tion is always seen as a more or less pic-turelike (iconic) correspondence ormatch, radical constructivism sees it as an

adaptation in the functional sense.” (Gla-sersfeld 1984, p. 20)The predominant view in Western episte-

mology is that knowledge is a

representation

of an external, independent reality, one thatthrough proper inquiry can be approachedabsolutely. An alternative to the concept of“match” is “fit.”

“A key fits if it opens a lock. The fitdescribes a capacity of the key, not of thelock. Thanks to professional burglars weknow only too well that there are manykeys that are shaped quite differently fromour own but which nevertheless unlockour doors.” (Glasersfeld 1984, p. 21)Knowledge arises out of necessity or

desire; if it works for us, we accept it and actaccordingly. When it doesn’t work, it changes,or adapts, to provide a different fit. That ourknowledge fits our needs/desires temporarilydoes not imply that it is the only knowledgethat would fit, nor does it imply that there isany correspondence to an external, indepen-dent reality. The idea of an external, indepen-dent reality is itself a construct, one that oftenserves us well. However, application of thatconstruct to cognitive processes and societalaffairs has created undesirable, even life-threatening dysfunctions that require a differ-ent framework.

Constraint theory and negative reasoning

The concept of “constraint” was central to thecybernetics of W. Ross Ashby (1956). In par-ticular, he developed a concept of informa-tion as a reduction in variety. That is, we saywe have information when the possibilities wemight have to consider become less thanbefore we had the information; informationconstrains the possible explanations, out-comes or options available. Ashby also real-ized that systems consisting of only four orfive variables, each of which can take on as fewas four or five states, can be astronomicallycomplex. Approaching the analysis of suchsystems

positively

by trying to isolate thecausal relations among the variables is impos-sible. In his paper “Constraint Analysis ofMany-Dimensional Relations” (1964), Ashbysuggests that the rigorous investigation ofrelations in complex systems is more effi-ciently undertaken by taking a

negative

approach, i.e., identifying the explanations,outcomes or options that are prohibited by arelationship or subset of relationships than byattempting to determine which outcomes arepermitted by the entire set of relationships inall their complexity. Sometimes, a simple setof constraints may be sufficient to provide theinformation we need to do what we want todo; if not, we continue to probe. While weaccept the set of constraints temporarily asbounding the system observed, they are a setof distinctions created by an observer, to dealwith a system identified by the observer. Theycannot be assumed to represent the objectivereality of an external system. They simplywork for our purposes.

Gregory Bateson in “Cybernetic Explana-tion” (1972) uses the term “restraint” insteadof “constraint,” referring to the approach ofcybernetics as “negative explanation” – focus-ing on what is not possible or desirable, ratherthan what is. He challenges the causal theoryof biological evolution, stating that trackingof a network of causes and effects is a

positive

approach to explanation that does not work;identifying the restraints that prevented evo-lution from tracking other pathways is a

neg-ative

approach. von Glasersfeld picks up onthis when labeling himself a cybernetician:

“From my point of view, then, what Bate-son remarked about the theory of evolu-tion is equally applicable to the

construc-tion of knowledge

, to our

acquisition oflanguage

, and to any interaction that wemight call

communication

. None of thesedevelopments or activities can beexplained in terms of causes, but we can goa long way towards explaining them interms of constraints. For me, therefore, theworld in which we find ourselves living, isthe world that we have been able to con-struct and maintain within the constraintswe have so far experienced. –What couldbe more cybernetic than this?” (von Gla-sersfeld, 1992, p. 25)Constraint theory is a way of thinking

about complex systems. It has been applied ina number of fields, including managerialdecision making processes (“satisficing,”“bounded rationality,” Simon 1964), multi-disciplinary systems research and design(Friedman, 1976), analysis of systems struc-ture (Krippendorff 1979), and artificial intel-ligence (constraint satisfaction, constraintpropagation, Dym & Levitt 1991), to name a

2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3 131

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few. My interest was in the design of social sys-tems through policy formulation (Richards1977, 1978, 1983, 1991, Gupta & Richards1979). I defined policy formulation broadly asany action taken, formal or informal, officialor unofficial, with the intent to constrain col-lective human behavior, whether at a group,organizational, or societal level. Policy con-strains behavior, through laws, rules and reg-ulations at one extreme and slogans, admoni-tions and expressions of principle at the other,and a myriad forms in between.

There is an overlap between this use of theword policy and my use of the word culture;culture also constrains human behavior.However, culture encompasses all those con-straints that emerge with no apparent intent,including values, attitudes and preferences.This use of the word culture is not to be con-fused with the use that refers to the traces left(i.e., artifacts – art, literature, music, science,technology, etc.) from interactive processesoperating within the constraints.

It is this overlap between policy and culturethat presented my dilemma. Models in sup-port of policy formulation had virtuallyalways dealt with values and desires as eithergoals (concrete outcomes in time and space)or objectives (single or multiple criteria to bemaximized, minimized or otherwise opti-mized). But, where do these goals and objec-tives come from, whose are they, and whathappens when they change? This

positive

approach to policy formulation (and plan-ning) has been called the “rationalistic” or“analytic” approach. Graham Allison (1971)compared a rational actor model of decisionmaking with organization process andbureaucratic politics models in his analysis ofthe policies applied during the U.S.–Cubamissile crisis of 1962, and John Steinbruner(1974) compared an analytic paradigm with acybernetic paradigm in analyzing U.S.–NATOnuclear sharing policies during the period1956-64. Both Allison and Steinbruner foundthe “rationalistic/analytic” approach to beinadequate for describing how policies wereactually formulated and applied. However, therationalistic approach still dominates the lan-guage of policy-making and therefore con-strains the conversations that might otherwiselead to creative and value-rich policy.

My approach was to treat values anddesires as constraints – i.e., to formulate thatwhich is not wanted or needed, and to create

processes in which these constraints get dis-cussed and transformed. I called this way ofthinking

negative

reasoning

, and, whenapplied specifically to planning exercises,

neg-ative planning

, distinguishing a constraint-oriented approach to policy formulationfrom a goal-oriented approach. (The word

negative

is used here in the sense of a photo-graphic negative; systems get defined by whatthey cannot do or by what we do not wantthem to do, an inversion of the positive.) Anapplication to the personnel policies of a per-sonal finance company, where executives hadset high goals for reducing the turnover ofloan officer trainees, demonstrated that theexecutives could actually agree on a muchbroader range of turnover than they had pre-viously thought by responding to questionsabout what they “did not want” as conse-quences of the turnover (Richards 1983). Inan application to technology policies of theU.S. National Aeronautics and Space Admin-istration (NASA), an approach to analyzingalternative technologies for a new space trans-portation system showed that selection oftechnologies that kept options open for mul-tiple systems (as opposed to an “optimal” sys-tem) in 15–20 years, by focusing on what was“not acceptable” in the present, could miti-gate the uncertainty of currently unknowntechnologies that might emerge over thatperiod of time (Richards 1996). (Note: Bothof these examples were made possible byaccess given me to conduct research with therespective organizations. The application ofinterest in this paper is much broader –namely, the facilitation of participation insocial design and transformation by all mem-bers of a society.)

Ashby’s mathematical formulation of con-straint analysis provided the basis for depict-ing data on constraints in spatial diagramsthat could then be manipulated. The form ofthe data drove the form of question that couldbe asked in collecting the data – namely ques-tions about what is unacceptable, rather thanwhat is most preferred. I could then manipu-late the diagrams to evaluate alternative poli-cies for their flexibility and robustness. WhenI presented some of these constraint diagramsin Tallin, Estonia (Richards 1988), Ernstremarked that they reminded him of the keyand lock metaphor. The spaces created by theset of constraints were analogous to the lock,within which many possible keys could oper-

ate. This was precisely what I wanted fromthese diagrams – a presentation of the rangeof possible outcomes or behaviors that couldbe accommodated within a set of constraintsand that could change or be changed as a con-sequence of an action.

Radical constructivism and its assumptions

Von Glasersfeld (1991) identifies four roots ofradical constructivism. First is the philosoph-ical root planted by the “skeptics,” that wecannot know the world separate from ourexperience of it. What we say we know is aconsequence of our experience, and we can-not know how our experience relates to thatwhich is experienced. Second is the scientificroot planted by the “pragmatists,” that theconduct of scientific research results in whatworks, not what is true in any absolute sense.That a theory works under certain conditionsdoes not imply that it is true of the world, noreven that it is approaching such truth. Thirdis the psychological root planted by “cognitiveconstructionists,” that the mental operationswe rely on to act in the world arise by acting inthat world, not by developing representationsof that world. We literally create the world weexperience while living it, relying on processesof adaptation to adjust the mental constructsthat regulate (constrain) our actions. Fourthis the biological root planted by the “evolu-tionists,” that the processes of natural selec-tion and adaptation drive evolutionarychange, not a progressively more accuratematching of organism or species attributeswith an external environment. These pro-cesses are analogous to the processes thatdrive cognitive development and the con-struction of knowledge, namely, adaptationand viability, not a progressive matching ofthoughts, language and knowledge to anexternal, ontological reality.

Jean Piaget brought many of these rootstogether is his studies of cognitive develop-ment in children. Neither he, nor anyonesince, has been able to explain the cognitiveconstruction of “reality” in a child by infer-ring a progressive matching of language andconcepts with an objective, external, indepen-dent reality. To the contrary, all observationsof the development of language in childrenpoint to language acquisition as independent


CONCEPTS



of “meaning” or “understanding” of others;its initial function is simply to coordinateactions with other humans in a way that is via-ble. What we observe as learning in the childis adaptation through assimilation andaccommodation. Again, von Glasersfeldidentifies the feature of radical constructiv-ism that makes it radical in this way:

“…one must grasp the idea that adapta-tion is not an activity, but the result of theelimination of the non-adapted, the non-functioning, and that consequently, any-thing that manages to survive

is

‘adapted’to the environment in which it happens tofind itself living. Once this is understood,one realizes that what matters is not to

match

the world, but to

fit

into it in spite ofwhatever obstacles or traps it mightpresent. Applied to cognition, this meansthat ‘to know’ is not to possess ‘true repre-sentations’ of reality, but rather

to possessways and means of acting and thinking thatallow one to attain the goals one happens tohave chosen

.” (Glasersfeld 1991, p. 16)This begs some questions: What goals?

From where do these desires come? Is there adistinction of significance between desiresconsciously chosen and those unself-con-sciously acted on? Where is choice in the con-structivist’s framework? These questions areanalogous to the ones I asked with respect topolicy formulation. How can I think and talkabout the desires and values that are bothimplicit and explicit in policy alternatives in away that accommodates the changing desiresand values of the members of the organiza-tion or society to which those policies are tobe applied? In short, what is the role of policyand the policy formulation process in a desir-able society? Where do the unself-consciousprocesses of culture cross paths with the con-scious processes of social design and activism?

Von Glasersfeld has a response in the formof assumptions of a radical constructivistmodel of cognition:

“It therefore seems legitimate to try andconceive a model that may show how whatwe call knowledge can be ‘constructed’without reference to anything outsideexperiential confines. The notion ofmodel, however, inevitably containsassumptions that lie outside the domainthe model may explain. In the case of con-structivism it is the assumption of a con-sciousness that is able to remember, to

reflect upon experience, and to developlikes and dislikes. It is the least a model ofcognition must assume.” (Glasersfeld2005, p. 11)

Language and conversation theory

“If the constructivist movement has doneanything at all, it has dismantled the imageof language as a means of

transferring

thoughts, meanings, knowledge, or ‘infor-mation’ from one speaker to another. Theinterpretation of a piece of language isalways in terms of concepts and concep-tual structures which the interpreter hasformed out of elements from his or herown subjective field of experience. Ofcourse, these concepts and conceptualstructures had to be modified and adaptedthroughout the interactions with otherspeakers of the language. But adaptationmerely eliminates those discrepancies thatcreate difficulties in actual interactive situ-ations – adaptation ceases when thereseems to be a

fit

. And fit in any situation isno indication of

match

. To find a fit simplymeans not to notice any discrepancies.”(Glasersfeld 1991, p. 23)Central to radical constructivism is the

role of language. In radical constructivism,the meanings of words, phrases, sentences,etc., and the uses of language, are constructedby individuals through experiences that wecall interaction with others. Adaptation of ourlanguage occurs as we experience failures andsuccesses in meeting our needs and desireswith respect to coordinating our actions withthose of other humans. In this sense, the phe-nomenon of language is like other phenom-ena we experience and build into our systemof knowledge, with one major difference:unlike other phenomena, language is our onlyaccess to these other phenomena, as well as tothe concept of language itself. The recursiveproperty of language, language about lan-guage, opens up the possibility for a second-order coordination of the coordination ofaction – i.e., the phenomenon of languaging(Maturana 2006). For this recursion to beuseful, the language on language must shiftfrom a language of elements and relations toa language of dynamics – hence, languag

ing

.Otherwise, it simply creates logical paradoxes

that frustrate and confuse us, if we pay anyattention to them. This is not a trivial shift,but one I claim currently necessary to get tothe concept of society and its transformationand design. Language, as we know it, has theproperty of rigidifying concepts, of removingthe dynamics (von Foerster 1976). Forcingdynamics into language is the job of the poetand requires awareness, reflection and vigi-lance.

With a concept of dynamic recursion inlanguage, and the language of dynamics to gowith it, further recursions become possible(Maturana 1988). Languaging on languagingbecomes awareness (or observing). Observ-ing on observing (observing ‘observing’) cre-ates the concept of the observer. Observingoneself as an observer observing becomesself-consciousness. It is important to distin-guish self-reflection from self-consciousness.Self-reflection is seeing oneself as an

other

;there is a distance between the self projectedand the description reflected. In self-con-sciousness, there is no distance; projectingand describing happen simultaneously – inthe moment, so to speak. The assumptions ofa radical constructivist model as presentedabove, namely a “consciousness that is able toremember, to reflect upon experience, and todevelop likes and dislikes,” require both self-consciousness and self-reflection. It is in self-consciousness that desires emerge as likes anddislikes, and that the phenomenon of choiceis experienced. Self-consciousness arises as aconsequence of recursions in language; self-reflection is an action taken to evaluate one’sdesires as though they were the desires of oth-ers. With the experience of choice as alterna-tive paths for action, coupled with a self-reflection on desires with respect to the con-sequences of our actions, we have a concept ofsocial responsibility, and with it a concept ofsociety emerges. Without a concept of socialresponsibility, I would not need a concept ofsociety – the set of processes out of whichdesires and desirability arise.

Another branch of this tree of dynamicsworth mentioning is the conversation theoryof Gordon Pask (1976, 1987). Conversation inthis formulation is manifest among partici-pants as a particular dynamics of interactionin language that begins with some form ofasynchronicity, moving toward synchronic-ity. This dynamics is sustained by the partici-pants through a preference for

recurrent

inter-

2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3 133

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action and will continue until the participantsachieve an adequate synchronicity (e.g.,agreement or agreement to disagree) or theyget tired or bored and choose not to partici-pate further. The intensity of this dynamics isunique to conversation, and provides an ave-nue for thinking about the processes of soci-ety – namely, a network of conversations. Par-ticipants in a society can hold conversationwith themselves (i.e., among one’s roles, per-spectives, points of view), with other partici-pants, or with the abstraction we call society.It is the latter category of conversation thatconnects policy and social design, and partic-ipation therein, to radical constructivism.Society is a construct, one I need in order tothink and talk about values and desires. Thenthe process of policy formulation can be con-structed as a conversation between a partici-pant and society, and the actions of the poli-cymaker constrain the processes of society.

The added importance of language when itbecomes dynamic is that we can no longer saywe live in the world; we live in language.Everything we know and do, we know and doin language. It is not sufficient to say that wecannot know the external world, or evenwhether there is one; the concept of an exter-nal, independent reality as an ontologicalcuriosity is irrelevant except to the extent thatwe create the concept of such a reality in lan-guage as a way, one way, to coordinate ouractions with others. My language tells me toact as though there is a reality. The danger ofthis language is in the objectification of theidea of an external reality, with the conse-quence of forgetting that this is a constructand not to be trusted. While I continue to useand rely on this language, I try to keep alwaysin mind that there are as many realities asthere are potential people, and these realitiescan change from one moment to another.

Dialogic process and dialectical reasoning

The Paskian dialogic provides a way to envi-sion participation in social transformationand design from a dynamic point of view, asopposed to a causal point of view (Richards1987, 1997, 2001; Richards & Young 1996).Every conversation is an opportunity to par-ticipate. The dynamics, once experienced,cannot be reversed. Events, rhythms, pertur-

bations, etc., are set in motion and ripplethrough the network of conversations I amcalling society. Social design becomes a dia-logic process and participation social activ-ism. Participation cannot be measured bywhether or not the participant “caused” a par-ticular change, only by whether or not theparticipant experienced being in a conversa-tion. That change occurs as a consequence isgiven by the formulation, even if the partici-pant does not directly experience it. Changecannot

not

happen.If I accept that I participate in social trans-

formation and design whenever I am engagedin a conversation, how can I think about par-ticular interactions in the conversation suchthat the consequences are socially desirable? IfI think about society as a set of processes – i.e.,patterns of dynamic relations, I can thinkabout those patterns that I want to avoid orprevent. I can then think about the dynamicsthat will be triggered by particular interac-tions in terms of the set of constraints on theprocesses or patterns. This constitutes the“work” of the activist – avoiding or prevent-ing the undesirable while change is happeningall around. It is the set of constraints on theprocesses (what I call knowledge, in a broadsense) that provides the stability needed to beable to distinguish the society as a society inthe first place. These constraints are carried inour language and get tested in every conversa-tion. Social transformation does not onlyhappen to a society; it also happens in a soci-ety, in the network of conversations. This doesnot imply that social transformation has to bea mere “tweaking” of the society. If society isaccepted as a dynamic concept, as opposed toa static one (e.g., a set of institutions and thetransactions among them), and this dynamicconcept is accepted as desirable, then eachinteraction in a conversation has the potentialto trigger major shifts in thinking and action.Out of conversations come new ideas andalternatives. Choice and freedom are manifestin conversation.

How do I think about the “desirable”? As astarting point, I have no alternative but toaccept that my desires may be different thanthose of others. A desirable society could beone in which all the participants can pursuetheir desires unobstructed by the pursuits ofothers. This does not fit my experience, evenwhen I specify my desires as constraints – i.e.,that which I do not want to happen. Conflicts

in the pursuit of desires are so prevalent in myexperience that I assume this is the experienceof others as well. A way out of this dilemmamight be to think of the dialogic process ofsocial transformation and design as one thatcontinually pursues the desirable. That is,participation in a process of social transfor-mation and design, through conversation,that continually seeks the desirable is a firstcondition of a desirable society. Social processbecomes a process of “designing,” the designprinciples for which include (1) an accep-tance that any action or interaction will notdilute the participation of another, and willpreferably enhance it, and (2) an acceptancethat, in conversation, everything can change.When conflicts arise, desires are explored inconversation for new alternatives, new waysof thinking

and

new desires. Conflictsbetween pursuits of desires become desirableas stimuli for conversation.

While the idea of constraint, and there-fore of negative reasoning, continues to beuseful in this formulation of social transfor-mation and design through dialogic process,the shift in thinking from causality todynamics points toward another perspectiveon reasoning. If conflicts in the pursuit ofdesires are taken as desirable, as an opportu-nity for creativity, interactions in conversa-tions can be conceptualized in terms ofdimensions of conflict. I identify two suchdimensions, the compatible/incompatibledimension and the supportive/oppositionaldimension (Brün 2003, #288).

Dialecticalreasoning

is realized in conversation when anidea or alternative is presented along with itsopposing and/or incompatible ideas or alter-natives. The dialogic process then seeks newideas and alternatives, along with

their

opposing and/or incompatible ideas andalternatives, and so on. When compatibleand supportive ideas and alternatives arisethat do not violate the principles of thedesign process, they can become, tempo-rarily at least, a part of the design. Of course,once a part of the design, they will no longerbe useful as stimuli for conversation untiltheir presence creates a conflict again. Theywill, however, constrain the dynamics in thenetwork of conversations as these con-straints have been deemed temporarilydesirable.

In order to make the connection to socialtransformation and design, I have strayed


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from the original discussion of radical con-structivism. If I now trace the stream ofthought backwards, the point of departureoccurs when language is transformed into adynamic phenomenon. Building on theassumptions of a radical constructivist modelthat von Glasersfeld so carefully specified, thedynamic view of language led to an extensionof a stream of thought into a particular con-cept of society and participation therein.

Of course, for those who might adhere toan elitist view of society (that is, there arethose of us who will dominate and those of uswho will be dominated, and the human mis-ery that follows is simply “the way thingsare”), this stream of thought is not only unac-ceptable; it is heretical. It is here that radicalconstructivism can play an important practi-cal role. The argument of radical constructiv-ism is so clear that exposure to it can leave nodoubt that “the way things are” is a fabrica-tion, leaving no safety net for its believers. Theelitist point of view is an intolerant one thatdefends its intolerance by referring to anexternal, objective reality as the source ofabsolute truth. If we accept that some havegreater access to this external reality by virtueof their wealth, education, religion, national-ity, etc., we grant them the power to domi-nate. This is what radical constructivism can-

not

tolerate.

Implications and concluding remarks

The concept of social transformation anddesign that I present here, with a basis in lan-guage, suggests a social activism in everydaylife, a way of living. We live in language, andevery time we speak or write, or use otherlanguages (visual, mathematical, gestural,musical, etc.), we alter our society. We carrythe constraints on the patterns of dynamicsthat constitute the processes of society in ourlanguage, and those constraints shift as aconsequence of interacting in that language– a never ending cycle, yet perhaps desirable.The concept of a fixed, objectified end stateas the product of social design is not desir-able because we do not agree on what thatend state should be. If we can agree that weexperience conflict in our pursuit of desires,then a process that engages us in the genera-tion of new ideas, new knowledge, new val-

ues and desires would be a desirable “prod-uct” of social design – a design for design

ing

.Ernst von Glasersfeld’s work and thought

provides a rich source of ideas for initiatingdiscussion and research on society and itstransformation and design, and other humanendeavors, much of which has yet to bemined. It raises new questions and stimulatesnew thinking. Radical constructivism canalso serve as an anchor for applied research onsocial activism and its variations. I hope Ihaven’t distorted the ideas to an unacceptablelevel by extending them into the domain ofdynamics. If I have, it is certainly not out ofany disrespect or lack of appreciation andadmiration for Ernst. To the contrary, muchof my thinking would not have happenedwithout, at least, my version of Ernst’s frame-work for radical constructivism.

I have not yet addressed one of theassumptions of a radical constructivist model– the ability to remember. I claim that, despiteall the studies and literature on the subject ofmemory, the concept of remembering is stillrelatively undeveloped. It is central to ournotions of time and history, and we experi-ence what we call remembering continuallywhile we are awake and often while we areasleep. “Memory” has become objectified inour language, and we accept it as given, eitheras a container for our thoughts over time or asa mechanism for explaining habitual relation-ships we no longer need to think about. Aconsequence of this objectification is that wethen think about learning and adaptation asphenomena that take “time” – we experiencea perturbation, a deviation from the norm, wethink about it, and then we attempt an adjust-ment or correction. When we take the lan-guage of remembering into the domain ofdynamics, time itself becomes dynamic andmalleable, and concepts like instantaneousremembering become useful:

“The Art of Instantaneous Remembering:Try and project an event you care for, whileit happens to you, into an imagined past,so that you can experience the event simul-taneously ‘now’ and ‘once upon a time’.”(Brün 2003, #118)This is a skill of the performer, and there-

fore of the activist as a performer. Skilled per-formers experience their surroundings, in themoment, and make instantaneous adjust-ments, without time delay. The type of think-ing that goes into making these adjustments is

not one of means-ends rationality; it has to bea different way of thinking that does notrequire connecting causes to effects. It mayinvolve imaging the patterns of dynamics andtheir potential constraints such that anyadjustment within the constraints is accept-able – an immersion in the dynamics of thesurroundings. Whatever this way (or ways) ofthinking is, it requires the performer to befully aware and self-conscious, without think-ing through every movement or utterance oranalyzing alternatives before making adjust-ments. For the social activist, performanceserves to stimulate conversation by generatingperturbations and provocations that serve asasynchronicities. I leave further developmentof the concept of remembering for future con-structivist and dialectical exploration.

By way of a conclusion, I offer this quotefrom Ernst von Glasersfeld:

“…I believe I have come to adopt a cyber-netic way of thinking… I became aware ofthis in the many conversations with stu-dents who were worrying about theirfuture and asked for advice. I heard myselftelling them that it was far more importantto know what one did

not

want to do, thanto have detailed plans of what one did wantto do. One day it dawned on me that this

Larry Richards is currently Professor of Management and Vice Chancellor for Aca-demic Affairs at Indiana University East, Richmond, Indiana, USA 47374. He previ-ously held positions as Founding Chair of the Department of Engineering Manage-ment at Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia, and Founding Dean of the School of Management and Aviation Science at Bridgewater State College, Massachusetts. He is a past president of the American Soci-ety for Cybernetics and the American Soci-ety for Engineering Management, where he became a Fellow in 2002. His current research interests include the integration of cognitive and computational perspectives on decision making, the organization and presentation of information in policy sup-port systems, the implications of dialectical/dialogic approaches to social design and transformation, and the role of “time” in everyday thought and action.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3 135

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was plain cybernetic advice:

It is more use-ful to specify constraints rather than goals.

–And then I explained it by adding that inone’s teens or twenties one usually hasalready discovered a number of things thatone cannot stand, whereas it is quite

impossible to foresee what, ten or twentyyears later, will provide the satisfactionsneeded to maintain one’s equilibrium.”(Glasersfeld 1992, p. 25)The connection between radical construc-

tivism and the constraint-theoretic approach

to policy formulation seems clear. The exten-sion of radical constructivism into conceptsof social transformation and design by treat-ing language as a dynamic phenomenon isperhaps more fuzzy. I leave the fuzziness as aprovocation, a stimulus for conversation.

References

Allison, G. T. (1971) Essence of decision:Explaining the Cuban missile crisis. Little,Brown: Boston.

Ashby, W. R. (1956) An introduction to cyber-netics. Chapman & Hall: London.

Ashby, W. R. (1964) Constraint analysis ofmany-dimensional relations. General Sys-tems IX: 99–105.

Bateson, G. (1972) Cybernetic explanation.In: Bateson, G., Steps to an ecology ofmind. Ballantine Books: New York, pp.399–410.

Brün, H. (2003) Irresistable observations.Non Sequitor Press: Champaign, Illinois.

Dym, C. & Levitt, R. (1991) Knowledge-basedsystems in engineering. McGraw-Hill:New York.

Foerster, H. von (1976) Objects: Tokens for(eigen-)behaviors, ASC CyberneticsForum 8(3–4): 91–96.

Friedman, G. (1976) Constraint theory: Anoverview. International Journal of SystemsScience 7: 1113–1151.

Glasersfeld, E. von (1984) An introduction toradical constructivism. In: Watzlawick, P.(ed.) The invented reality. W. W. Norton:New York, pp. 17–40.

Glasersfeld, E. von (1988) An exposition ofradical constructivism. In: Donaldson, R.(ed.) Texts in cybernetic theory. AmericanSociety for Cybernetics conference work-book: Felton CA, pp. III.1–III.25.

Glasersfeld, E. von (1991) Knowing withoutmetaphysics: Aspects of the radical con-structivist position. In: Steier, F. (ed.),Research and reflexivity. Sage Publica-tions: London, pp. 12–29.

Glasersfeld, E. von (1992) Why I considermyself a cybernetician. Cybernetics andHuman Knowing 1(1): 21–25.

Glasersfeld, E. von (2005) Thirty years of rad-ical constructivism. Constructivist Foun-dations 1(1): 9–12.

Gupta, S. & Richards, L. (1979) A language for

policy-level modelling. Journal of theOperational Research Society 30(4): 297–308.

Krippendorff, K. (1979) On the identificationof structures in multivariate data by thespectral analysis of relations. Proceedingsof the XXIII Annual North AmericanMeeting of the Society for General SystemsResearch: Houston TX, pp. 82–91.

Maturana, H. R. (1988) Ontology of observ-ing: The biological foundations of selfconsciousness and the physical domain ofexistence. In: Donaldson, R. (ed.) Texts incybernetic theory. American Society forCybernetics conference workbook: FeltonCA, pp. IV.1–IV.53.

Maturana, H. R. (2006) Self-consciousness:How? When? Where? ConstructivistFoundations 1(3): 91–102.

Pask, G. (1976) Conversation theory: Appli-cations in education and epistemology.Elsevier: Amsterdam.

Pask, G. (1987) Conversation and support.Inaugural address for the guest professor-ship in general andragology at the Univer-sity of Amsterdam.

Richards, L. (1977) Beyond planning: Con-trollability vs. predictability. Proceedingsof the XXI Annual North American Meet-ing of the Society for General SystemsResearch: Denver CO, pp. 314–323.

Richards, L. (1978) Constraint theory: Aframework for social modelling. Proceed-ings of the XXII Annual North AmericanMeeting of the Society for General SystemsResearch: Washington DC, pp. 379–388.

Richards, L. (1983) Constraint theory: Anapproach to policy-level modelling. Uni-versity Press of America: Lanham MD.

Richards, L. (1987) Untangling the dilemmasof social design. Paper presented at theAnnual Meeting of the American Societyfor Cybernetics: Urbana IL. Unpublishedmanuscript available from the author.

Richards, L. (1988) Constraint theory: A rad-ical departure for the practice of model-

ling. Paper presented at the Second US-USSR Conference on Systems Theory andManagement: Tallin (Estonia). Unpub-lished manuscript available from theauthor.

Richards, L. (1991) Beyond planning: Tech-nological support for a desirable society.Systemica 8(2): 113–124.

Richards, L. (1993) Why I am not a cyberne-tician. The Newsletter of the AmericanSociety for Cybernetics. September 1993:2–5.

Richards, L. (1996) Analysis of robustness inthe formulation of technology strategy.Engineering Management Journal 8(4):21–32.

Richards, L. (1997) An agenda for participa-tion. Paper presented at the Annual Meet-ing of the American Society forCybernetics: Urbana IL. Unpublishedmanuscript available from the author.

Richards, L. (2001) The praxis of thinking:Deliberate vs. improvised. Paper pre-sented at the Annual Meeting of the Amer-ican Society for Cybernetics: VancouverBC. Unpublished manuscript availablefrom the author.

Richards, L. & Young, R. (1996) Propositionson cybernetics and social transformation:Implications of von Foerster’s non-trivialmachine for knowledge processes. SystemsResearch 13(3): 363–369.

Simon, H. (1964) On the concept of organiza-tional goal. Administrative Science Quar-terly 9: 1–22.

Steinbruner, J. D. (1974) The cybernetic the-ory of decision: New dimensions of politi-cal analysis. Princeton University Press:New Jersey.

Varela, F. (1975) A calculus for self-reference.International Journal of General Systems2: 5–24.



Triple-Loop Learning as Foundation for Profound Change, Individual Cultivation, and Radical Innovation

Construction Processes beyond Scientific and Rational Knowledge

1. Introduction

On one occasion when I visited Ernst vonGlasersfeld at his home in Amherst, MA (itmust have been around 1996) we were talkingabout questions concerning the limits ofrational and scientific knowledge (and know-ing) and its relationship to the notion of wis-dom. I experienced Ernst as an honestlysearching person, even in these epistemologi-cal borderline cases. He explained to me that

he understood the radical constructivistapproach as a theory that tries to give anexplanation of how scientific/rational knowl-edge is produced and spread (see also the quo-tation in section 4.1 of this article). Actually,we did not come to a “solution” or conclusion,but he gave me a little book with the title

Überdie Grenzen des Begreifens

[ “On the limits ofknowing”] (Glasersfeld 1996) – to my knowl-edge, it has not been translated into English.In his introductory article Ernst gives some

hints on how he sees the relationship betweenrational/scientific knowledge and wisdom; hesummarizes this relationship in the followingquotation.

“Einigen wenigen Künstler und Dichtern[…] gelingt es hier und dort, den Eindruckzu erwecken, als gäbe es keine Schnitt-stelle, keine Grenze zwischen dem Mysti-schen und dem Rationalen. Denken Sieetwa an das Lächeln der Mona Lisa oder,besser noch, an das Lächeln jener archai-schen Hermes-Köpfe aus dem frühestenGriechenland. Da gibt es Momente, wodieses Lächeln uns so bewegt, dass wirmeinen, wir verstünden es. Doch sobaldwir es zu fassen versuchen, um zu erklärenwas uns so viel zu sagen scheint und uns sosehr bewegt, sobald wir es vernunftmäfligbegreifen wollen, kommt uns die Zuver-sicht abhanden, und wir sagen schliefllichetwas verlegen, das Lächeln sei zweideutig.Doch damit vertuschen wir nur die Tatsa-che, dass wir keine rationale Deutunghaben. Für mich ist das eine der vielenErfahrungen, die mir belegen, dass allesMystische eben jenseits des rationalenBegreifens oder der rationalen Schnittstel-len liegt” (Glasersfeld 1996, p. 29).

1

Now, several years later, there seems to be achance of reuniting or at least of bringingcloser together these seemingly incompatibledomains. Francisco Varela (e.g., Varela,Thompson & Rosch 1991; Varela 2000;Depraz, Varela & Vermersch 2003) plays one ofthe key roles in this process, which has beendeveloped further by many others. In this arti-cle I want to give a short overview and developa strategy which I refer to as “

triple-loop learn-ing

”; it opens up a perspective on how the

Markus F. Peschl

A

University of Vienna (Austria) <[email protected]>

Purpose: Ernst von Glasersfeld’s question concerning the relationship between scientific/rational knowledge and the domain of wisdom and how these forms of knowledge come about is the starting point. This article aims at developing an epistemological as well as methodological framework that is capable of explaining how profound change can be brought about in various contexts, such as in individual cultivation, in organizations, in processes of radical innovation, etc. This framework is based on the triple-loop learning strategy and the U-theory approach, which opens up a perspective on how the domains of scientific/rational knowledge, constructivism, and wisdom could grow together more closely. Design/Structure: This article develops a strategy which is referred to as “triple-loop learning,” which is not only the basis for processes of profound change, but also brings about a new dimension in the field of learning and knowledge dynamics: the existential realm and the domain of wisdom. A concrete approach that puts into practice the triple-loop learning strategy is presented. The final section shows, how these concepts can be interpreted in the context of the constructivist approach and how they might offer some extensions to this paradigm. Findings: The process of learning and change has to be extended to a domain that concerns existential issues as well as questions of wisdom. Profound change can only happen if these domains are taken into consideration. The triple-loop learning strategy offers a model that fulfills this criterion. It is an “epistemo-existential strategy” for profound change on various levels. Conclusions: The (cognitive) processes and attitudes of receptivity, suspension, redirecting, openness, deep knowing, as well as “profound change/innovation from the interior” turn out to be core concepts in this pro-cess. They are compatible with constructivist concepts. Von Glasersfeld’s concept of func-tional fitness is carried to an extreme in the suggested approach of profound change and finds an extension in the existential domain. Key words: Double-loop learning, individual cultivation, (radical) innovation, knowledge creation, knowledge society, personality devel-opment, presencing, profound change, triple-loop learning, U-theory, wisdom.

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2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3 137

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domain of rational knowledge and wisdom/mystical could grow closer together. It is con-cerned with the question of

profound change

(and [radical] innovation) not only in thedomain of knowledge, but also in the domainof personality or

individual cultivation

.What are the implications of these consid-

erations in a larger context? Looking moreclosely at what is at the heart of the modernknowledge society (e.g., UNESCO 2005,European Commission (2004), etc.), one candiscover that the focus on knowledge andknowledge processes has an interestingimplication: whereas during the first and sec-ond industrial revolution the individualmore or less vanished and was “dissolved” byautomation, the role of the

individual

(and inparticular of

his/her knowledge

and

personal-ity

) has become more important in a knowl-edge based society/economy (compareLevy 1997; Rifkin 2004, Friedman 2006, andmany others). Vibrant knowledge and espe-cially (creative) development of new knowl-edge or profound change are domains, whichcan

not

be automated in most cases. Thoseparts of knowledge which can be automatedare on the other side of the spectrum (rang-ing from highly dynamic and changingknowledge processes to rigid behavioral pat-terns or deductive paradigms) – the domainof knowledge automation (e.g., classicalmanagement and storage of explicit knowl-edge, classical/first generation knowledgemanagement paradigms [e.g.,Holsapple 2003], classical AI (“GOFAI”)paradigms [Boden 1990], etc.) will be ofminor interest in the context of this paper(focusing rather on radical change/dynamicsof knowledge), although it is clear that thiskind of knowledge is a conditio sine qua nonfor every domain of survival (be it biological,cultural, social, etc.).

The return of the individual in a knowl-edge based society implies that we have totake a closer look at the domain of

personal-ity

: the more the focus is on highly sophisti-cated knowledge, deep understanding, com-plex contexts, creative minds, profoundchange, etc., the less it is possible to simplyreplace the person or automate his/her par-ticular cognitive and personal faculties.

Taking seriously the developments andgoals of knowledge society has crucial impli-cations and challenges: the more the focus ison knowledge and knowledge creation, the

more important will be the role of the indi-vidual, of his/her intellectual

as well as

per-sonal, ethical, etc. cultivation. Ideally, thiswould mean a return of the value of the

per-son

and his/her “

individual cultivation

.” Indi-vidual cultivation concerns the formation ofpersonality, values, habitus,

2

the “core,” etc.of a person (compare for instance Senge etal. 2004). In many cases these issues areclosely related to the domain of

wisdom

.However, in most cases only rather simpleand “low” level types of knowledge andknowledge transfer (e.g., classical (explicit/fact) knowledge (transfer), know-how, theo-retical and recipe knowledge, and, in somerare cases, reflective capabilities) are offeredat today’s schools, colleges, universities, andeducational institutions (compare alsoPeschl (2003, 2006a) for a more detailed clas-sification of knowledge types and processes).In the domain of individual cultivation thesituation is even worse than in the intellectualrealm.

2. Taking the domain of wisdom seriously: From double-loop to triple-loop learning

What do we mean by individual cultivation?What is the theoretical background of indi-vidual cultivation? More advanced forms oflearning try to go beyond the classical trans-fer model. That is to say, the understandingof learning as a process of transferring moreor less stable chunks of knowledge from onebrain to another is replaced by a moredynamic perspective: learning as a continu-ous and active

process

of adaptation and con-struction in which knowledge is developed inpermanent

interaction

between the cognitivesystem and its environment.

3

Knowledge isnot passively mapped into the brain, butactively constructed by perceiving, acting,and interacting with the environmentalstructures – there is a feedback loop betweenthe realm of knowledge and of the environ-ment. Hence, knowledge is a

process

whichfunctionally fits into the environmentalstructures. This understanding of knowledgehas its roots in constructivist concepts (e.g.,Foerster 1973; Glasersfeld 1984, 1991, 1995;Maturana 1980, and many others) and in a

situated

perspective of cognition (e.g.,Clark 1997; Hutchins 1995). This kind oflearning and knowledge acquisition isreferred to as

single-loop learning

or Kolb-learning (compare also Kolb 1984; Argyrisand Schön 1996; Scharmer 2000; Senge etal. 1990, 2004, Peschl 2006a, etc.).

In Peschl (2006a) several limitations ofsingle-loop learning have been discussed.The most crucial problem has turned out tobe the limitation that this strategy of learningdoes not allow for the construction of para-digmatically new knowledge and radicalinnovation (see Peschl 2006a for details). Inorder to overcome some of the limitations ofsingle loop learning a second feedback loop isintroduced. It puts into practice a kind ofmeta-learning strategy. This second feedbackloop takes into consideration that any kind ofknowledge is always based on assumptions,premises, or a paradigm (Kuhn 1970).

In general, knowledge always has to beseen as being embedded in and pre-struc-tured by a particular

framework of reference

.Knowledge receives its meaning and struc-tures from this framework of reference. Nor-mally, this framework of reference is notexplicitly present in our processes of cogni-tion, learning, or knowledge construction.This implies that we do not have a consciousexperience of these premises, assumptions,etc. on which our thinking and constructingis implicitly based. It has to be made explicitby active exploration of one’s own assump-tions, premises, ideological attitudes, etc.This can be achieved by introducing a processof

reflection

and “stepping out” of one’s nor-mal way of thinking.

Due to its implicit and relatively inacces-sible character it appears as if this frameworkof reference is stable; due to this constancy itis a kind of “blind spot” in our thinking, per-ception, and understanding. Taking a closerlook reveals, however, that this framework ofreference is not as stable as it seems. The dou-ble-loop learning strategy takes thesechanges in the framework of reference intoconsideration by introducing a second feed-back loop. This implies that a completely newdynamics becomes possible in the whole pro-cess of learning and knowledge creation: onestarts to change the framework of reference.Each modification in the set of premises or inthe framework of reference causes a radicalchange in the structure, dimensions, dynam-


CONCEPTS

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ics, semantics, etc. of the resulting space ofknowledge. By that process a completely newspace of knowledge opens up and entirelynew and different theories, knowledge, pat-terns of perception, interpretation patterns,etc. about reality become possible. Themethod being applied in this process is basi-cally the technique of

reflection

. It is a processof

radically questioning

and consistentlychanging the premises and studying theirimplications on the body and on the dynam-ics of knowledge. Double-loop learning hasits roots in cybernetics, learning theory, incognitive science (e.g., Peschl 2001), and inthe domain of organizational learning (e.g.,Senge 1990; Argyris et al. 1996).

2.1 Triple-loop learning

Double-loop learning is focused mainly onthe intellectual and cognitive domain and itsdynamics. However, if one is interested inprofound change a

new level

, implying a newdynamics, has to be introduced; profoundchange does not only happen in the cognitivedomains, but touches a more fundamental

level – an

existential

level that includes theperson and his/her attitudes, values, habitus,etc. Whereas it is possible to “play games” onthe cognitive/intellectual level (in the sense oftrying out or simulating intellectual posi-tions without being touched existentially bythem), one can experience that there exists alevel, where “intellectual games” are not pos-sible any more. We are then confronted witha level going beyond the domain of cognitiveor intellectual questions touching the self inthe very center.

Similarly to the case of double-loop learn-ing, we discover that the whole intellectualframework, the whole domain of knowledgeand representation, our sets of premises,assumptions, etc. are

embedded

in a morefundamental domain (see Figure 1): thedomain which could be described as “theself ” – that is, the level where I am myself inan

existential

sense. Of course, this domain isa construction as well, but the degrees of free-dom for the processes of construction arerather limited. Furthermore, as one canexperience every day, a lot more effort is nec-

essary to make changes in this domain thanto change one’s intellectual, philosophical,political, etc. position. Philosophically, onecan refer to this domain as the “person.” Itgoes beyond the level of personal skills, com-petencies, personality, etc. because it tran-scends the domain of personality traits,behavioral and cognitive patterns, solelyquantifiable data, etc. It touches the personon his/her fundamental level of being and, inmany cases, concerns the domain of

wisdom–

in most cases it is rather difficult to talkabout it in classical scientific terms. As will beshown in the sections to come and as has beendiscussed excessively by classical philosophy(starting from the Greeks), the notion of wis-dom goes far beyond the cognitive and clas-sical knowledge domain – one of its maincharacteristics is that it is concerned withexistential questions which are closely relatedto the domain of the self. Wisdom goesbeyond what Polanyi (1966) and the morerecent discussions in the field of knowledgemanagement (e.g., Krogh et al. 2000; Nonakaet al. 1995, 2003, and many others) refer to as

tacit knowledge

. The introduction of this exis-tential domain implies a third loop in ourmodel of learning processes:

triple-looplearning

.

2.2 Learning as change on various levels: An overview

Hence, the goal of learning processes on thatlevel is

profound change

. What does that meanand how can it be realized? While classicallearning strategies focus on changes in thedomain of knowledge and the intellect, thetriple-loop approach also includes changeson the existential level and in the domain ofthe “will/heart”.

4

Looking more closely vari-ous levels of “intensity” of change, the follow-ing can be identified (compare alsoScharmer 2000 or Senge et al. 2004):

i. Reacting and downloading.

The simplest wayof responding to change either arising in theinternal or external environment or that is theresult of the cognitive system’s own activities(e.g., if one is confronted with or has caused aproblem, change, task, or challenge) is to sim-ply react. In other words, already existing andwell established behavioral, perceptual, orcognitive patterns are applied to solve theproblem or the learning/adaptation task. Thisis the most convenient and most economical

realityphenomenon…

knowledgeknowledge

knowledgeknowledge

behavior

mismatchdifferencecorrection

changes

change of knowledgeover time

reflection (cognitive)radical questioning

changesdenterminesstructuresmodulates

premises,paradigm

framework ofreference

attitudes/habitusvalues

being/person

cogn

itiv

e/in

telle

ctua

ldo

mai

n/le

vel

exis

tent

ial

dom

ain

changesdenterminesstructuresmodulates

“presencing”(Senge et al. 2004

“existentialreflection”

Figure 1:

Triple-loop learning. The double-loop learning process is embedded in the more fundamental process of a third loop of change. This loop concerns the existential level.

© Constructivist Foundations

2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3 139

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way of reacting to change, because it onlyrequires downloading of already prefabri-cated solutions, knowledge, etc. The price ofthis simple response is quite high: (i) the reac-tions are highly rigid and (ii) the resultingsolutions or changes do not go very deep andin most cases do not even scratch the under-lying issues of the problem. It has to be clear,however, that all these processes are alwaysembedded in a feedback loop (see Figure 1) inwhich the border between externally trig-gered changes and produced changes isblurred. As an implication, it becomes evi-dent that this mode of learning offers – froma constructivist and cybernetic perspective –only very limited possibilities (other thancycling through already predetermined,rather rigid, and well established action-reac-tion feedback-loops).

ii. Redesign and adaptation.

Alternatively, it ispossible to not only apply already existingpatterns, but to use these patterns as a blue-print that is adapted slightly to the current sit-uation. From a cognitive perspective this is ahighly efficient learning strategy, because it isnot as rigid as level (i) learning processes, butit can be done with minimal cognitive effort:namely, to make use of already existing pat-terns, change them slightly (e.g., changingvalues of variables) and apply them to the newsituation, task, etc. From the field of cognitive(neuro-)science these processes are wellunderstood – these are the classical learningand adaptation processes well known fromthe domains of connectionism or computa-tional neuroscience (Bechtel et al. 2002;Hebb 1949; Peschl 2001; Rumelhart etal. 1986, and many others). From this per-spective it becomes clear that these processesare mathematically equivalent with processesof

optimization,

i.e., we search for an opti-mum in an already pre-structured space (ofsolutions). What we do in single-loop learn-ing is structurally equivalent with these level-(ii) processes of redesigning and adaptation.Taking a constructivist and second-ordercybernetic perspective seriously forces us togo one step further because these processes ofadaptation and redesign are always embeddedin a feedback loop where the results of the(cognitive/knowledge) adaptations have adirect influence on the environmentaldynamics, triggering changes in the cognitivesystem’s experiences. Hence, a new cognitive

dynamics is triggered which forces us to goone step further.

iii. Reframing.

In most cases downloading,adaptation, and optimization (i.e., level-(i)and level-(ii) learning/change processes) aresufficient for mastering everyday problemsand challenges. In a way these solutions arenot very interesting from the perspective ofradical change, because they do not bringforth fundamentally new knowledge,insights, or understanding. As has been dis-cussed in the context of double-loop learning,fundamental cognitive change is always con-nected with reflection and stepping out of the– more or less consciously – chosen frame-work of reference: i.e., going beyond theboundaries of the pre-structured space ofknowledge and “reframing” it in the sense ofconstructing and establishing new dimen-sions and new semantic categories. This pro-cess concerns the level of mental models, pre-mises, and assumptions and their change.Here, the notion of the

observer

and his/herrelationship to the observed systems comesinto play; reframing is about taking theobserver’s position seriously (e.g.,Maturana 1991; Glasersfeld 1995) in thesense that one reflectively steps out of his/herown experiences and tries to look at the situ-ation as a whole in a reflective act (e.g.,Glasersfeld 1989). “On the level of reflectiveabstraction, however, operative schemes areinstrumental in helping organisms achieve acoherent conceptual network that reflects thepaths of acting as well as thinking which, atthe organisms’ present point of experience,have turned out to be viable.” (e.g.,Glasersfeld 1989). Going one step further,this process of reflection leads to the con-struction of alternative conceptual frame-works enabling the reframing of already wellestablished cognitive structures.

iv. Profound existential change and “presenc-ing”.

On a more fundamental level, changegoes beyond reframing and no longer con-cerns only intellectual or cognitive matters.On that level, questions of

finality, purpose,heart, will

, etc. come to the fore. As has beenshown above, that is the domain of the triple-loop learning strategy. “Why do change initi-atives based on culture and learning some-times also fail? One explanation is that therhetoric of change was in disconnection to

what really matters most […] Thus a fifthapproach to coping with change is to focus ondeep intention, purpose, and will. Now theresponses of [previous] levels […] becomepart of an even more subtle set of contextualvariables, which are referred to as purpose,(shared) vision, or common will.”(Scharmer 2000, p. 9) In this mode, change isnot solely based on cognitive reflection anymore, but more importantly on

existentialreflection

and learning. In a way, the goal is tobring the existential level, the person, his/herwill, his/her acting, as well as his/her cognitivedomain into a status of inner unity. Whatmight sound esoteric is in fact a very oldtheme and philosophical issue going back atleast to Aristotle’s (1985) Nicomachian Ethicsand to most Western and Eastern philosophi-cal and religious traditions. Very often thesequestions concern the domain of

wisdom

.Due to its existential character Scharmer(2000) and Senge et al. (2004) refer to thismode of change/learning as “

presencing

.”As can be seen in Figure 1 these modes of

change/learning cannot be seen as being sep-arated from each other. It is only in the modeof analysis that these domains have to be dis-tinguished. In the mode of action thesedomains and loops are closely intertwinedand depend on each other. I want to refer tothis perspective of learning which takes intoaccount all the above levels of change (andespecially the existential level) as “

individualcultivation

.”

3. Individual cultivation, presencing and U-theory

3.1 An epistemo-existential strategy for profound change

How can that profound existential change orlearning process be realized? What steps arenecessary to implement this process of indi-vidual cultivation that is suggested by the tri-ple-loop learning strategy? There are manyways of supporting this process of individualcultivation, ranging from classical upbring-ing in families and (not only school and uni-versity) education to the very old classicalconcept of the relationship between a masterand his/her student(s) (e.g., in the ancient


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Greek philosophical schools, in Western andEastern religious traditions of monasteries,etc.). However, taking a closer look at mostmodern educational institutions reveals thatthey are not capable of offering such an edu-cational setting any more.

On a more general level, a relatively new(and at the same time very classical) theoreti-cal framework capturing this process of indi-vidual cultivation and profound change hasbeen developed by C.O.Scharmer (2000,2001, forthcoming) and Senge et al. (2004); itis referred to as “U-Theory” or “presencing.”In the following section I am going to presenta condensed overview of a further develop-ment and adaptation of this approach inorder to get an idea of which processes arenecessary for profound learning and changein a constructivist context.

One can describe that process as a U-shaped curve that is realized in a series ofstates: the left branch going down the “U”focuses on issues of

observation

, perception,

sensing

, discovery of patterns of thought andcognition, and on how to leave these patternsbehind oneself in order to be cognitively andemotionally “prepared” for profound change.At the bottom one finds him-/herself in thestate of presencing: it can be characterized asa condition of high receptivity and opennessand as a state where radically new knowledge/change can emerge. The upward branch dealswith issues concerning the

realization

, proto-typing, and embodying these changes in the(external or internal) environment.

3.2 Sensing and seeing radically different: From downloading to letting go and presencing

Suspending.

A conditio sine qua non for anyform of profound change, learning, or inno-vation is an attitude of suspension: in order toachieve the goal of profound change, it is nec-essary to detach and free oneself from well-established patterns of perception andthought. That means that – in the first place –it is necessary to suspend one’s instant recipes,judgments, solutions, etc. Being confrontedwith a new situation or a complex problem weare always temped to simply downloadalready well-proven and well-establishedsolutions (compare the downloading processof the level-(i) form of change). From an epis-temological perspective this means that we

are projecting our knowledge, judgments,patterns, and mental models onto the world.Both from our experience and from cognitiveneuroscientific as well as constructivist-epis-temological considerations it is evident thatwe will never reach the ideal of “pure recep-tiveness”; the goal of suspension is not toclaim that this is possible, but to put moreemphasis on this cognitive activity of beingreceptive – understood as an “epistemologicalattitude or virtue” that can be trained. It turnsout to be extremely helpful for most processesthat strive for profound change and deeplearning. Apart from constructivist claimsthat learning primarily consists in eliminatingperturbations induced by interactionthrough a process of accommodation (in thesense of Piaget 1992, cf. Glasersfeld 1989

5

),the phase of suspending aims at being recep-tive and open to what happens in the worldand at trying to lower the level of constructionand projection activities. This seems to be acontradiction but, as will be shown insections 4.2ff, both aspects are necessary fortriggering profound change.

Shifting the focus from projecting toreceptiveness does not imply that our cogni-tive/knowledge structures will become“images” of our environment in a naïve realistsense; rather it is a necessary condition foropening up the view for new perspectives andfor new perceptual and cognitive categories(compare also Varela, Thompson &Rosch 1991; Varela 2000; Depraz, Varela, andVermersch 2003). As will be shown below, thegoal of the activity of suspending as well as ofletting go and presencing is to establish aspace that enables a process of organic co-construction of profound change based ondeep understanding. In a social/collectivecontext this process of suspending is a pre-condition for a successful process of dialogue(cf. Bohm 1996; Isaacs 1999; Schein 1993),which is one methodological means of howthis process can be realized.

Redirecting.

In this step one redirects his/herattention towards the interior: “ […] youchange the

direction

of attention, which tunesout the spectacle of the world, so you canreturn to the interior world. In other words,you substitute an

apperceptive

act for percep-tion.” (Depraz, Varela, and Vermersch 2003,p. 31) Metaphorically speaking, one turnshis/her gaze back towards the source of this

perceptual act and tries to look at and con-sciously through his/her perceptual patterns.“It is the idea that normally the habitual thingis that one should redirect attention outward.Redirect it to what is emerging as an object, asa content, which has its own intentionality.The point about redirection is that youreverse that. You keep it within, but towardthe source, toward the source of the mentalprocess rather than the object” (Varela 2000,p. 6). “Suspension will lead to very earlyemerging events, contents, patterns, gestures,whatever. Then you can actually redirect yourattention to them. That’s where the new is. Sothe suspension creates a space, the new comesup, and then you can redirect. Redirection is aspecific gesture” (Varela 2000, p. 5). This pro-cess of redirecting goes beyond reflection; itaims not only at uncovering and questioningpremises and cognitive patterns, but atexploring the source of these patterns and, bythat, opening up a new space, a space thatenables the emergence of new constructions,new profound insights, fundamental change,etc. Here again, the notion of the observerplays a crucial role, because the person who isgoing through that cognitive process of redi-recting has to explicitly and consciouslyacknowledge his/her role as an observer whois capable of both being inside and “outside”the system and of constructing a new perspec-tive or of exploring his/her own experiencesof observation.

Letting go.

In order to reach this state of emer-gence it is – at first – necessary to

let go

whatone has discovered in this process of redirec-tion and exploration of one’s own premises,assumptions, etc. “ […] you have to changefrom voluntarily turning your attention fromthe exterior to the interior, to simply accept-ing and listening. In other words, […] you gofrom “looking for something” to “lettingsomething come to you,” to “letting some-thing be revealed.” What is difficult here isthat you have to get through an

empty time,

atime of silence, and not grab onto whateverdata is immediately available, for that’salready been rendered conscious, and whatyou’re after is what is still unconscious at thestart.” (Depraz, Varela, and Vermersch 2003,p. 31) Of course, this process can cause exis-tential fear in some cases, because one losesthe (epistemological) ground on which one isstanding and which normally provides a

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rather stable cognitive framework. This is awell-known state in the constructivist frame-work (if it is adopted in a reflected manner).Being in a state of receptivity always meansbeing in a relatively passive role which bringsabout a higher chance of being (epistemolog-ically and existentially) hurt. However, sur-rendering into this rather receptive and openstate does not imply that one is completelypassive; rather, the contrary is the case: in away one finds oneself in an active state ofextremely high attention towards what iscoming up without trying to project one’sown expectations, plans, knowledge, etc. It isa slightly paradoxical situation: on the onehand one is waiting seemingly passively forwhat is going to happen and on the otherhand this is a highly active state concerningone’s attention and receptiveness. These pro-cesses of trying to get empty and at the sametime to be attentive towards what is going on“out there” are well known from art and reli-gious traditions as well as from Husserl’s phe-nomenological approach (e.g., the concept ofepoche).

Presencing.

In this state one enters into an“

intimate epistemological dance

” with reality.In other words, due to the high level of recep-tiveness and attention it is possible to “catchthe wave” of the environmental dynamicsand “surf” it in a process of smooth and inti-mate interaction between the cognitive andenvironmental dynamics. This is E.v.Glasers-feld’s (1984, 1991, 1995) functional fitness inits perfect realization; or Maturana’s (1970,1980) concept of (structural) coupling in itsmost sophisticated form. Epistemologically,this leads to a process of what Rosch (1999)and others refer to as “deep or primary know-ing.” In that moment, constructivist and(weak) realist attitudes come very close andalmost collapse. In this context, a close rela-tionship and connection between construc-tivism and weak realism becomes evident.What is important in our context of the ques-tion of profound change and learning are thefollowing points:

[

This is a way of constructing highlysophisticated and profound knowledgeabout an environmental aspect with aminimum influence of projection. By thatit is possible to achieve a profound under-standing of the phenomenon under inves-tigation. This understanding goes beyond

a purely cognitive and intellectual pene-tration; it also includes the existentialdimension in the sense that the person isrelated to the phenomenon under investi-gation.

[

This is a prerequisite for enabling pro-found change or learning. Having a deepunderstanding about a phenomenonimplies that one also knows or “sees” itspotential(-ity); i.e., one comes to see whatcould or what wants to emerge out of theinteraction between one’s cognitive activ-ities and the environmental dynamics.

[

One does not only enter into a “contem-plative” dance of understanding with real-ity, but also into an organic process of co-construction, co-formation, co-design,co-influencing, co-changing. Thus thepotentials/-ities of both the cognitive sys-tem and the environment/phenomenon itis interacting with begin to organicallyconnect into a joint dynamic in which rad-ically new structures, processes, dynamics,knowledge can start to emerge.

[

For these processes to happen, both sys-tems and their close interaction are neces-sary; both systems which are involved aremutually respected in and respectingtheir dynamics, possibilities, determina-tions, and limitations. The goal is not toproject one’s own prefabricated knowl-edge and mental models on the phenom-enon and try to change it according tothese ideas. Rather, the goal is to organi-cally co-evolve and co-develop a dynamicwhich brings both partners into a statewhere it is possible to enter into a processof mutual blossoming and realizing moreof one’s finalities.

[

Metaphorically speaking, one can com-pare this process to the interactionbetween a good artist and the materialshe/he is working with: both unfold andblossom in the process of this interactionby respecting as well as cultivating thepotentials/-ities of the other. In a way, thestone already has the form of the statue(in potentia) in itself and the artist bringsforth this form by both being inspired bythat stone and by his own cognitive activ-ities, mental models, plans, talents, etc.

[

If one took this approach seriously, thiswould have an enormous impact on ourunderstanding, and foremost on our wayof doing science. Bortoft (1996) gives an

example of what such science could looklike.What is happening in this downward

branch of the U-theory can be summarizedas follows: “Thus what we’re talking abouthere is reversing two of your usual thoughtprocesses, the first of which is the conditionof the second: (i) You have to re-direct yourattention from the exterior to the interior.(ii) You have to change the quality of yourattention, moving from an active search to anaccepting letting-arrive

.

This means thatwhile the first reversal actively movesbetween the dueling poles of the exterior andthe interior, the second reversal moves fromactivity to a passive and receptive waiting,thereby doing away with any duality remain-ing from the first reversal.” (Depraz, Varela,and Vermersch 2003, p. 31) It is important tonote that these processes are not only intel-lectually challenging, but also have a deepimpact on the domain of intent/finality, andon the emotional and existential level,because they touch the innermost domainsof the person (or organization) who/which isgoing through this process. From what hasbeen said above it is clear that these processesand their results are highly fragile and it isvery difficult to make them explicit in naturallanguage. However, they are a conditio sinequa non that profound change in the sense oftriple-loop learning can happen. It is onlythis kind of change that makes a real differ-ence (compared to classical adaptive or opti-mization approaches) and may bring aboutradically new knowledge, radical innovation,completely new social, political, or organiza-tional structures, etc.

3.3 Acting profoundly differently: from presencing to embodying and institutionalizing

Letting-come and crystallizing.

As a conse-quence of this state of presencing it is possi-ble that profoundly new interaction patterns,knowledge, perspectives, etc. can emerge.This is not only a form of radical innovation,but a kind of

emergent innovation

. It does notso much arise from an external source whichprojects his/her ideas on the phenomenon;rather, it has its source both inside the cogni-tive system and in the object/phenomenon tobe changed (and in their interaction). In away this new structure

crystallizes

in an


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emergent process of letting-come. Of course,it is not the result of just passively sittingthere and waiting (see above), but it hassomething to do with an attitude of beingpatient, receptive and epistemologicallyhumble: i.e., to wait with a high level of atten-tion, intellectual accuracy, and to get into avery close and almost intimate relationshipwith the phenomenon that one wants tostudy and/or change. This process of letting-come is the other side of the process of let-ting-go. In other words, one shifts the focusfrom surrendering to looking at what wantsto emerge and what is new. This is an episte-mologically fragile process in which newideas and changes emerge and converge(“crystallize”) towards a specific vision, con-cept, idea, etc.

Enacting and prototyping.

At some point it isnecessary that what has emerged in this pro-cess of presencing and crystallizing starts tomanifest in some kind of external form – beit in material form, or in a concrete plan, ina concrete action, etc. Of course, this veryfirst externalization can only be a kind of

prototype

which gets “tested” in the environ-ment. The goal of that state is, however, thatwhat has emerged in the interior gets exter-nalized so that it can be verified, seen by theothers, discussed by the others, slightlyadapted, etc.

Embodying and institutionalizing.

The finalstep consists in implementing the adaptedprototype in the daily routines, in estab-lished practices, in everyday action, in therepertoire of reaction patterns, etc.

These steps do not have to be seen as recipewhich can be blindly executed to end up withfundamental change. Rather, it is a frame-work helping us to orient ourselves in thisrather complex domain. These steps do nothave to be executed in the above order –rather, it is necessary to introduce loops andjumps in this order. The instruments used inorder to implement this framework will differaccording to the specific domain in which it isapplied.

Finally, it has to be mentioned that thisway of looking at profound change processescan not only be applied on an individual level(“individual cultivation”), but also in the

col-lective

domain of organizations, social sys-tems, etc.

4. Implications for constructivism? Learning from the triple-loop learning strategy and U-Theory

4.1 Going beyond scientific and rational knowledge?

The radical constructivist theory has chosenas one of its main goals the development of amodel of how rational knowledge is pro-duced.

“Will man nun die Unterscheidung zwi-schen dem wissenschaftlichen Wissen undder Weisheit […] fester untermauern, somuss man eine Antwort auf die Frage fin-den, wie wir zu diesem brauchbaren ratio-nalen Wissen kommen […] Wir brauchenalso ein allgemeines theoretisches Modell,das die Produktion des rationalen Wissenseinigermaflen plausibel macht […] Das istdie eigentliche Aufgabe der konstruktivi-stischen Theorie” (Glasersfeld 1996,p. 21).6

From the discussion above, it follows thatthis goal leads to an unnecessary narrowingof the scope of the (radical) constructivisttheory. In fact, constructivism is one of theleading epistemologies in the fields of psy-chotherapy, coaching, personality develop-ment, organizational science, etc. Althoughthese fields are very often concerned withtopics going far beyond the domain of ratio-nal knowledge, in most cases the constructiv-ist approach covers – according to its ownrules – mostly the epistemological, rational,methodological aspects and/or meta-aspects,e.g., by using the epistemological/method-ological authority of constructivism toexplain that we “only” give validity to most ofour fears, perception, etc. of reality by con-structing them.

The approach presented in the sectionsabove goes one step further and extends thenotion of knowledge by introducing what hasbeen referred to as the “existential domain.”As has been mentioned in the introductoryquotation by Glasersfeld this knowledge isvery difficult to grasp and to make explicit (iteven goes beyond the domain of tacit knowl-edge, e.g., Polanyi 1966). However, this doesnot imply that it is worthless or that it is not

necessary to consider. On the contrary, as hasbecome evident in the triple-loop learningstrategy (cf. 2.1) this domain is rather thefoundation on which all the other epistemo-logical processes are embedded.

Hence, the notion of construction is notlimited to rational knowledge, but alsoincludes these existential issues. Of course,they are always reflected in the “rational”domain, but they concern a domain whichcan be referred to as the sphere of wisdom cov-ering not only questions of (rational) knowl-edge, but also of the existential dimension ofthe person(-ality). This implies that it is nec-essary not only to extend the notion of knowl-edge, but also of learning. From that perspec-tive, learning is not only about knowledgetransfer, knowledge construction, knowledgeprocesses, reflection, etc., but also includesthe development and change at the more pro-found level of the person(-ality). How this canbe realized has been shown by the processesinvolved in the U-theory/presencing.

4.2 Searching for a new balance between cognitive activities of construction and projection on the one hand and receptivity and openness on the other hand

Generally speaking, the approach of U-theoryoffers an “epistemo-existential framework” ofhow the strategy of triple-loop learning can berealized. From a constructivist perspective it“plays with fire”: it walks on the borderlinebetween (weak) realism and constructivism.

Turning this seeming disadvantage froman epistemological problem into a challenge,one can start to understand that this approachof presencing is a chance that could bringthese (seeming opposite) positions closertogether. Of course, it is clear that penetratinginto reality “as it is” remains impossible; how-ever, this approach offers a suggestion whichnot only takes the problem of primacy of pro-jection (which is a “slight” epistemologicaltendency of constructivism) into account butalso tries to actively lower the influence andpredominance of constructive and cognitiveactivities. In other words, it gives back some“epistemological rights” to the world in thesense of respecting its “active” role in the pro-cess of knowledge generation. The goal is notto resurrect realism, but to find and establish anew balance between the two poles of cogni-tive activity and projection on the one hand

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and the influence of the dynamics and struc-ture of the environment (on the constructiveactivities) on the other hand – or, even better,to develop an attitude which implies thatthere is an epistemologically vital need for apermanent struggle and to seek to achieve thisbalance between projection and receptivity/openness. As is suggested by the presencingapproach, it is necessary to cultivate a highdegree of epistemological attention and anattitude of radical suspension, redirecting,reflection, letting-go, and openness in orderto overcome these obstacles of projection.

4.3 Carrying the concept of functional fitness and viability to its extremesFrom a constructivist perspective this focuson receptivity implies that the concept offunctional fitness/viability (Glasersfeld 1984,1991, 1995, 2000) is carried to its extremes inthis approach: as has been stated above,almost a kind of “epistemological fusion”between reality and knowledge/cognitionseems to take place in this process of presenc-ing. This is not some “esoteric” state, but con-cerns a philosophically and intellectuallychallenging process: namely, the intellectualeffort to profoundly understand (someaspect of) the environment. From the con-structivist perspective, the interesting pointis, however, that one does this with the fullawareness that one is the author of this pro-cess of (constructing) understanding, butnevertheless tries to decrease this influence asmuch as possible. The result is a knowledgeprocess that is receptive to and “honestly”respects the dynamics and limits of reality,and at the same time fully enacts the cognitiveactivities of construction. In other words,both the cognitive system and the environ-mental structures are fully and activelyinvolved in this process and enter into adynamic of mutual triggering, co-construc-tion, co-creation, respecting, and mutuallybringing each other into a state of unfoldingand blossoming.

In a sense, the epistemological process ofmutually getting closer carries Glasersfeld’sconcepts of functional fitness and viability toan extreme: in this dance-like cooperation thetwo parties (i.e., the cognitive system and itsknowledge dynamics on the one hand and theenvironmental dynamics on the other hand)arrive at a state of profound understanding. Itcan be characterized as an epistemologically

intimate fit, like a key and a lock. The interest-ing point in the context of the U-theory con-cerns the fact that it does not suffice to remainsolely in the domain of knowledge, but that itis necessary to “step down” in the existentialdomain in order to end up in such an intimaterelationship with the environment. That isthe point where the epistemological andontological seem to collapse and where thedomain of wisdom is touched – in a way themost concrete and the most abstract arejoined in that moment/domain. It is on theborder between the rational/scientific knowl-edge and wisdom (cf. Glasersfeld 1996, p. 21).

4.4 “Unlocking” both the environment and the cognitive system: Extending the concept of viability by the aspect of profound change

As has been shown above, one implication ofthis intimate epistemological relationship isthe possibility of entering into a process ofprofound change – both in the cognitive sys-tem and/or in the environment. This opensup the aspect of co-construction in the con-structivist perspective in a more fundamentalsense: co-construction is no longer limited tocognitive or physical structures, such as theinteraction between one or more cognitivesystems and (symbolic) artifacts. The conceptis extended in the sense that out of that inti-mate coupling between cognitive (as well asexistential) and environmental dynamics(i.e., “deep knowing”), profound change on anexistential level may emerge. Both the envi-ronmental and the cognitive dynamics maymutually “unlock” each other’s potentials.The change does not have its cause from someexternal source or influence, but from insidethe participating systems and their potentialscoupling into a joint system. Thus, goingthrough this process of presencing enables a“profound change from the interior” as anemergent process rather than having someexternal instance projecting or attributinghis/her own ideas and plans on the entitywhich is in this process of change.

In that context the concept of viability isextended beyond the epistemological point offunctional fitness (e.g., successful predic-tions). It also means bringing oneself (andprobably the other system[s] involved) into astate of finality in the following sense: due tothe profound understanding of the systemsinvolved, which has been gained in the down-

ward U-process, it is possible to realize theirdeepest potentials. From an outside perspec-tive that process is interpreted as profoundchange of the system(s) involved. That is whatthe triple-loop learning strategy is about.

4.5 Instead of a conclusion: Open questions and new perspectivesInterestingly, the classical distinction betweenknow-how and know-what (see alsoGlasersfeld 2000) is called into question inthis approach. Of course, the aspect of changealways has a focus on the know-how (“fac-ere”); however, due to the existential dimen-sion the applied know-how cannot be seen asbeing completely uncoupled from the “what”question and, even more importantly, fromthe question of finality.

Closely related to this question are theissues concerning a purely instrumentalistand/or functionalist understanding of knowl-edge. From what has been presented above,the question of the role of “contemplativeknowledge” (in the sense of knowledge that isnot primarily effective) arises. More gener-ally, it seems that profound change needs akind of space of “gratuité” (e.g.,Peschl 2006b): an “enabling space” which is –in a first step – free of function, purposes,goals, etc. The approach of the U-theory pro-vides one way that such a space could emerge.Although there seems to be high compatibil-ity with the constructivist approach, it isunclear what the role of this “non-instrumen-tal knowledge” could be in that paradigm.

Finding a good balance between receptiv-ity and openness on the one hand and con-struction and projection on the other is aquestion almost as old as epistemology. Boththe constructivist approach and the conceptspresented in this paper are in the middle ofthis struggle for the “right balance.” While theconstructivist has a slight tendency towardsthe active role of cognition (i.e., primacy ofprojection) the U-theory approach followsthe more “weak realist” tendency of being asreceptive, unbiased, and open as possible.

Looking at the question of how profoundchange or the radical new can emerge in aconstructivist framework one has to admitthat they are more “accidents” in this episte-mological context – “accidents” because thetendency of constructivism to project alreadyexisting (interpretation) cognitive patternsand to apply successful and well-proven


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(behavioral) strategies has failed and one isforced to go for alternative strategies ofknowledge construction. The approachdeveloped in this paper seems to be such analternative, which respects both the justifiedepistemological constraints of constructivismand the necessity for openness and receptivityto the new and unexpected. Both poles areconditiones quae non for profound change.Both approaches have their pros and cons andit remains an open question as to how to finda good equilibrium and where that equilib-rium is located. It seems that this is an ongo-ing struggle and epistemological effort, whichis an opportunity rather than a disadvantage,because we are forced to keep the level ofalertness and reflection on this question high.It is a kind of “epistemological thorn in theflesh” which will not lead to a uniting of con-structivist and (weak) realist positions, but toa thoughtful and reflected way of handlingthis non-trivial problem of being aware ofone’s own construction and projection activ-

ities and at the same time offering the envi-ronmental dynamics a high level of possibili-ties for perturbation.

The triple-loop learning strategy as well asthe presencing approach provides a frame-work in which these processes of profoundchange can emerge. A lot of work has to bedone to implement these concepts anddevelop concrete methods for various con-texts, however. These contexts comprise boththe individual (e.g., individual cultivation,vision, etc.) and the collective domain (e.g.,organizational change, radical innovation,etc.). The constructivist approach does notonly offer a sound epistemological frame-work, but also a rich repertoire of methodsand approaches from a wide field of disci-plines (e.g., therapeutic domain, organiza-tional learning, etc.) that have their roots inthe constructivist tradition. If these methodswere combined with approaches from otherfields (such as phenomenology), a highlysophisticated and powerful paradigm for rad-

ical/profound change could emerge. This par-adigm would not only have a deep impact onthe process of how profound change can bebrought about, but could also trigger a newunderstanding of science that is compatiblewith the constructivist approach and that hasa broader perspective on knowledge, itsdynamics, and its permanent renewal andinnovation.

Notes1. A rough translation for this quotation:

“Some artists manage to give the impres-sion that there is no clear border betweenthe mystical and the rational […] Think,for instance, of the smile of Mona Lisa orof the smile of the archaic Hermes-statuesin ancient Greece. There exist moments inwhich we are so moved by this smile thatwe think that we could understand it.However, as soon as we try to explain orrationally understand it we lose confi-dence and finally state, in a rather embar-rassed way, that it is “ambiguous.” By thatwe try to cover the fact that we do not havea rational interpretation. For me, that isone of many experiences which prove thatthe mystical is beyond the border of the ra-tional.”

2. The term “habitus” has its roots in Latin(habere – to have) and is a philosophicalterminus technicus (e.g., Aristotle 1985,ethics, etc.) referring to a very well estab-lished (learned/internalized) behavioralpattern (in most cases used in an ethicalcontext or in the context of virtues, per-sonality, etc.).

3. The term environment covers a wide fieldranging from people to things and even tothe “internal environment.” It is both giv-en and the result of a (cognitive) process ofco-construction.

4. Classical philosophy shows that there is aclose relationship between the “heart” andthe will. Both are concerned with the ori-entation, the finality, etc. of the humanperson.

5. “The learning theory that emerges fromPiaget’s work can be summarized by sayingthat cognitive change and learning takeplace when a scheme, instead of producingthe expected result, leads to perturbation,and perturbation, in turn, leads to accom-modation that establishes a new equilibri-um” (Glasersfeld 1989, p. 128).

6. A rough translation: “If one wants to sup-port the distinction between scientificknowledge and wisdom with more pro-found arguments, one has to find an an-swer for the question of how to produceusable rational knowledge […] We need ageneral theoretical model that makes theproduction of rational knowledge plausi-ble […] That is the original and genuinetask of constructivist theory.”

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Aristoteles (1985) Nikomachische Ethik.Felix Meiner Verlag: Hamburg.

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European Commission (2004) Innovation

Markus F. Peschl is professor for Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Science at the Dept. of Philosophy of Science, University of Vienna, Austria. He spent two years at the University of California, San Diego (UCSD, cognitive science, neuroscience, and philos-ophy department) and 1/2 year at the Uni-versity of Sussex for post-doctoral research. Furthermore, he studied philosophy for 1 1/2 years in France.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3 145

CONCEPTS


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Received: 5 January 2007Accepted: 2 March 2007


Ernst von Glasersfeld’s Limerick

the 1980s I went through a phase ofwriting limericks during idle moments

when I lacked something to read. The resultwas a set of 27 limericks about cybernetics(Umpleby 1992). I occasionally use the limer-icks in class to restate a theoretical point. Lim-ericks bring a smile and demonstrate thatcybernetics can be approached in a variety ofways. Below are three limericks from this col-lection. The last was written by Ernst von Gla-sersfeld. It seems Ernst believed that I wasoverly concerned with “reality” as opposed toperception, or at least that I had not capturedthe point that he was trying to make.

A seminal paper in cybernetics was thearticle

What the Frog’s Eye Tells the Frog’s Brain

by Jerome Lettvin, Humberto Maturana,Warren McCulloch, and Walter Pitts (1959).It demonstrated that the eye does not receiveinformation and then pass it to the brain forinterpretation. Rather, each neuron is a com-putational element, and only certain types ofsignals are perceived at all.

If you were an eyeball in pain,And you spied a cool pool down the lane,

But the rest of the bod Could just barely jog,

What would you then tell to the brain?

At a conference in Acapulco in 1980 Ernstvon Glasersfeld referred to the work on thevisual system of the frog (cf. Glasersfeld 1974).Apparently frogs will die of starvation if sur-rounded by immobile but quite edible flies, butif one rolls a bee-bee across a frog’s field ofvision, it will strike out with its tongue and

swallow it with relish. Hence the frog is con-structed to eat, not flies, but moving blackspecks of a certain size. I thought this was adelightful story and so wrote a limerick aboutit.

A rather dim-witted, large frogAte bee-bees I rolled down his log.

For me they were slugs,But for him they were bugs.

Will he sink when he jumps in the bog?

When Ernst read this limerick, he felt thatthe frog had been maligned. His purpose intelling the story had been to illustrate how thenervous system constructs a “reality.” Indefense of the frog, Ernst wrote the followinglimerick.

The beebees in Frog made a lumpl,Too heavy for him to jumpl; So he stood on his head

And dropping the leadHe pensively said,“There must be more than one bee in Umpl.”

References

Glasersfeld, E. von (1974) Piaget and the rad-ical constructivist epistemology. In:Smock, C. D. & Glasersfeld, E. von (eds.)Epistemology and education. FollowThrough Publications: Athens, GA, pp. 1–24. Reprinted in: Glasersfeld, E. von(1987) The construction of knowledge.Contributions to conceptual semantics.Intersystems Publications: Salinas CA.

Lettvin, J. Y., Maturana, H. R., McCulloch, W.S. & Pitts, W. H. (1959) What the frog’s eyetells the frog’s brain. Proceedings of theInstitute of Radio Engineers 47: 1940–1951. Reprinted in: McCulloch, W. S. (ed.)(1965) Embodiments of Mind. MIT Press:Cambridge.

Umpleby, S. A. (1992) Limericks aboutCybernetics. Cybernetics and Systems23(2): 229–239.

Copyright Note

Adapted from Umpleby (1992) with kind per-mission of Francis & Taylor Ltd.The cartoons were exclusively drawn for thefestschrift © by Mihaly Lenart.


Stuart A. Umpleby

A

The George Washington University (USA) <[email protected]>

In

anecdotal


OPINION

Stuart Umpleby is a professor in the Department of Management and Director of the Research Program in Social and Organizational Learning in the School of Business at The George Washington Univer-sity. He teaches courses in the philosophy of science, cross-cultural management, and systems thinking.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Above: Ernst von Glasersfeld in 1998 receiving the honorary doctorate from the Universität Klagenfurt, Austria (Photo: E. Martins).Below: Ernst von Glasersfeld in 2006 (with rector Michel Pigeon) receiving the honorary doctorate from the Univiersité Laval, Canada (Photo: Marc Robitaille).

Constructivist Foundations 2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3 Illustration by Mihaly Lenarthttp://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/journal/

Ernst, happy constructing bis hundert-und-zwanzig!

constructictivist foudautions 4

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