constitutional economics. the prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation –mueller –...
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Constitutional Economics
• The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation– Mueller – Theft as a “prisoner’s dilemma”– Why should theft be illegal?
• If you are not using your car and I steal it, aren’t I putting a resource to a higher valued use?
• No. I would be substituting a high transactions cost process for allocating resources involving anti-theft devices, police, courts, prisons, etc., for a low transactions cost process called a “sale”.
Constitutional Economics
• The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation– Mueller – Theft as a
“prisoner’s dilemma”– Pm = payoff to me– Py = payoff to you
Work
YOU
Steal
Work Pm = 10
Py = 10
Pm = 6
Py = 12
ME
Steal Pm = 12
Py = 6
Pm = 5
Py = 5
Constitutional Economics
• The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation– Mueller – Theft as a
“prisoner’s dilemma”– When we both work
we maximize our wealth (TW).
Work
YOU
Steal
Work Pm = 10
TW = 20
Py = 10
Pm = 6
TW = 18
Py = 12
ME
Steal Pm = 12
TW = 18
Py = 6
Pm = 5
Py = 5
Constitutional Economics
• The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation– Mueller – Theft as a
“prisoner’s dilemma”– When we both work
we maximize our wealth (TW).
– This is “negative sum” symmetrical game
Work
YOU
Steal
Work Pm = 10
TW = 20
Py = 10
Pm = 6
TW = 18
Py = 12
ME
Steal Pm = 12
TW = 18
Py = 6
Pm = 5
Py = 5
Constitutional Economics
• The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation
• The “Nash Equilibrium” of a prisoners’ dilemma game is TW = 10
Work
YOU
Steal
Work Pm = 10
TW = 20
Py = 10
Pm = 6
TW = 18
Py = 12
ME
Steal Pm = 12
TW = 18
Py = 6
Pm = 5
TW = 10
Py = 5
Constitutional Economics
• What we end up with is Hobbes’ “state of nature” where “everyman is at war with everyman, and life is nasty, brutish and short.”
Work
YOU
Steal
Work Pm = 10
TW = 20
Py = 10
Pm = 6
TW = 18
Py = 12
ME
Steal Pm = 12
TW = 18
Py = 6
Pm = 5
TW = 10
Py = 5
Constitutional Economics
• So, is there a way out of Hobbes’ “state of nature”?
Work
YOU
Steal
Work Pm = 10
TW = 20
Py = 10
Pm = 6
TW = 18
Py = 12
ME
Steal Pm = 12
TW = 18
Py = 6
Pm = 5
TW = 10
Py = 5
Constitutional Economics
• So, is there a way out of Hobbes’ “state of nature”?
• Sure, the usual route historically has been this way.
• Autocracy
Work
YOU
Steal
Work Pm = 10
TW = 20
Py = 10
Pm = 6
TW = 18
Py = 12
ME
Steal Pm = 12
TW = 18
Py = 6
Pm = 5
TW = 10
Py = 5
Constitutional Economics
• “The good old rule,the simple plan,Let him take who has the power,Let him keep who can.”
William Wadsworth, “Rob Roy’s Grave”
Work
YOU
Steal
Work Pm = 10
TW = 20
Py = 10
Pm = 6
TW = 18
Py = 12
ME
Steal Pm = 12
TW = 18
Py = 6
Pm = 5
TW = 10
Py = 5
Constitutional Economics
• Autocracy is more efficient than the “state of nature”
Work
YOU
Steal
Work Pm = 10
TW = 20
Py = 10
Pm = 6
TW = 18
Py = 12
ME
Steal Pm = 12
TW = 18
Py = 6
Pm = 5
TW = 10
Py = 5
?
Constitutional Economics
• Autocracy is more efficient than the “state of nature”
• But these alternatives represent “tyranny”.
Work
YOU
Steal
Work Pm = 10
TW = 20
Py = 10
Pm = 6
TW = 18
Py = 12
ME
Steal Pm = 12
TW = 18
Py = 6
Pm = 5
TW = 10
Py = 5
?
Constitutional Economics
• Autocracy is more efficient than the “state of nature”
• But these alternatives represent “tyranny”
• How do we get to here?.
Work
YOU
Steal
Work Pm = 10
TW = 20
Py = 10
Pm = 6
TW = 18
Py = 12
ME
Steal Pm = 12
TW = 18
Py = 6
Pm = 5
TW = 10
Py = 5
Constitutional Economics
• How do we get to here?.
• Historically, we can’t (or, at least, we never have).
Work
YOU
Steal
Work Pm = 10
TW = 20
Py = 10
Pm = 6
TW = 18
Py = 12
ME
Steal Pm = 12
TW = 18
Py = 6
Pm = 5
TW = 10
Py = 5
Constitutional Economics
• How do we get to here?.
• Historically, we can’t (or, at least, we never have).
• Revolution!! Off with their heads!!
Work
YOU
Steal
Work Pm = 10
TW = 20
Py = 10
Revolu-tion
Pm = 6
TW = 18
Py = 12
ME Riot, Mayhem
Coup de etat
Steal Pm = 12
TW = 18
Py = 6
Pm = 5
TW = 10
Py = 5
Constitutional Economics
• How do we get to here?.
• Historically, we can’t (or, at least, we never have).
• Logically, how would we want to do it?
Work
YOU
Steal
Work Pm = 10
TW = 20
Py = 10
Pm = 6
TW = 18
Py = 12
ME
Steal Pm = 12
TW = 18
Py = 6
Pm = 5
TW = 10
Py = 5
Constitutional Economics
• The way we get out of Hobbes’ “state of nature” is with a social contract
Constitutional Economics
• The way we get out of Hobbes’ “state of nature” is with a social contract
• A social contract defines a modus vivendi – the way we live.
Constitutional Economics
• The way we get out of Hobbes’ “state of nature” is with a social contract
• A social contract defines a modus vivendi – the way we live.
• A modus vivendi is an accommodation of divergent private values, e.g., religion, through some accepted common social value, e.g., tolerance of religious differences.
Constitutional Economics
• The American colonial experiment was almost all about religious accommodation:– Pilgrim Puritans - New England
Constitutional Economics
• The American colonial experiment was almost all about religious accommodation:– Pilgrim Puritans - New England– Catholics – Chesapeake
Constitutional Economics
• The American colonial experiment was almost all about religious accommodation:– Pilgrim Puritans – New England– Catholics – Chesapeake – Quakers – Pennsylvania
Constitutional Economics
• The American colonial experiment was almost all about religious accommodation:– Pilgrim Puritans – New England– Catholics – Chesapeake – Quakers – Pennsylvania– All dissenters from the Anglican Church
• Contrast this religious tolerance to Islam’s view of “Dhimmis”
Constitutional Economics
• A key concept in Judeo – Christian – Islamic religions is property– “Thou shall not steal.” Etc.
• In Hobbes’ “state of nature” no man nor his property is safe
• To secure the right to property, individuals need civil liberties.
Constitutional Economics
• John Rawls’ “A Theory of Justice” proposes an objective for framing a social contract or constitution.
Constitutional Economics
• John Rawls’ “A Theory of Justice” proposes an objective for framing a social contract or constitution: the “Rawlsian Difference Principle.”
• Maximize the welfare of the least well off member of the community
Constitutional Economics
• John Rawls’ “A Theory of Justice” also proposes a process for framing a social contract or constitution: the “veil of ignorance.”
• Behind of “veil of ignorance” decision makers choosing rules should not know whether they will be the least well off or most well off member of the community.
Constitutional Economics
• John Rawls’ “A Theory of Justice” also proposes a process for framing a social contract or constitution: the “veil of ignorance.”
• Behind of “veil of ignorance” decision makers choosing rules should not know whether they will be the least well off or most well off member of the community.
• Think of a game of poker.
Constitutional Economics
• John Rawls’ “A Theory of Justice” also proposes a process for framing a social contract or constitution: the “veil of ignorance.”
• Behind of “veil of ignorance” decision makers choosing rules should not know whether they will be the least well off or most well off member of the community.
• Think of a game of poker.• Rawls’ proposal is very “Madisonian”
Constitutional Economics
• Rawls and numerous commentators believe that the Difference Principle makes a case for income equality.
Constitutional Economics
• Rawls and numerous commentators believe that the Difference Principle makes a case for income equality.
• Does it really?
Constitutional Economics
• Rawls and numerous commentators believe that the Difference Principle makes a case for income equality.
• Does it really?
• This would suggest a high degree of risk aversion and perceived lack of opportunity.
Constitutional Economics
• Rawls and numerous commentators believe that the Difference Principle makes a case for income equality.
• Does it really?
• Would you rather be the poorest person if everyone is equally poor or if there are some wealthy people?