1. Hutchison Ports Phil, Ltd vs. Subic Bay Metropolitan Auth 339 SCRA 434

August 31, 2000

J. Ynares-Santiago

Facts:

On February 12, 1996, the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (or SBMA) advertised in leading national daily newspapers and in one international publication,[1] an invitation offering to the private sector the opportunity to develop and operate a modern marine container terminal within the Subic Bay Freeport Zone. Out of seven bidders who responded to the published invitation, three were declared by the SBMA as qualified bidders after passing the pre-qualification evaluation conducted by the SBMAs Technical Evaluation Committee (or SBMA-TEC). These are: (1) International Container Terminal Services, Inc. (or ICTSI); (2) a consortium consisting of Royal Port Services, Inc. and HPC Hamburg Port Consulting GMBH (or RPSI); and (3) Hutchison Ports Philippines Limited (or HPPL), representing a consortium composed of HPPL, Guoco Holdings (Phils.), Inc. and Unicol Management Services, Inc. All three qualified bidders were required to submit their respective formal bid package on or before July 1, 1996 by the SBMAs Pre-qualification, Bids and Awards Committee (or SBMA-PBAC).

All the consultants, after such review and evaluation unanimously concluded that HPPLs Business Plan was far superior to that of the two other bidders.[3]

However, even before the sealed envelopes containing the bidders proposed royalty fees could be opened at the appointed time and place, RPSI formally protested that ICTSI is legally barred from operating a second port in the Philippines based on Executive Order No. 212 and Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) Order 95-863. RPSI thus requested that the financial bid of ICTSI should be set aside.[4]

On August 15, 1996, the SBMA-PBAC issued a resolution rejecting the bid of ICTSI because said bid does not comply with the requirements of the tender documents and the laws of the Philippines. The said resolution also declared that:

The following day, ICTSI filed a letter-appeal with SBMAs Board of Directors requesting the nullification and reversal of the above-quoted resolution rejecting ICTSIs bid while awarding the same to HPPL. But even before the SBMA Board could act on the appeal, ICTSI filed a similar appeal before the Office of the President.

On September 19, 1996, the SBMA Board issued a Resolution, declaring HPPL as the winning bidder

Notwithstanding the SBMA Boards recommendations and action awarding the project to HPPL, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres submitted a memorandum to the Office of the President recommending that another rebidding be conducted.[11] Consequently, the Office of the President issued a Memorandum directing the SBMA Board of Directors to refrain from signing the Concession Contract with HPPL and to conduct a rebidding of the project.[12]

On July 7, 1997, the HPPL, feeling aggrieved by the SBMAs failure and refusal to commence negotiations and to execute the Concession Agreement despite its earlier pronouncements that HPPL was the winning bidder, filed a complaint[14] against SBMA before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, Branch 75, for specific performance, mandatory injunction and damages.

Complainant HPPL alleged and argued therein that a binding and legally enforceable contract had been established between HPPL and defendant SBMA under Article 1305 of the Civil Code, considering that SBMA had repeatedly declared and confirmed that HPPL was the winning bidder.

Motion of HPPL was denied by Olongapo RTC, hence petition in SC

Held: Petition dismissed for lack of meritAs a chartered institution, the SBMA is always under the direct control of the Office of the President, particularly when contracts and/or projects undertaken by the SBMA entail substantial amounts of money. Specifically, Letter of Instruction No. 620 dated October 27, 1997 mandates that the approval of the President is required in all contracts of the national government offices, agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations involving two million pesos (P2,000,000.00) and above, awarded through public bidding or negotiation. The President may, within his authority, overturn or reverse any award made by the SBMA Board of Directors for justifiable reasons. It is well-established that the discretion to accept or reject any bid, or even recall the award thereof, is of such wide latitude that the courts will not generally interfere with the exercise thereof by the executive department, unless it is apparent that such exercise of discretion is used to shield unfairness or injustice. When the President issued the memorandum setting aside the award previously declared by the SBMA in favor of HPPL and directing that a rebidding be conducted, the same was, within the authority of the President and was a valid exercise of his prerogative. Consequently, petitioner HPPL acquired no clear and unmistakable right as the award announced by the SBMA prior to the Presidents revocation thereof was not final and binding.

There being no clear and unmistakable right on the part of petitioner HPPL, the rebidding of the proposed project can no longer be enjoined as there is no material and substantial invasion to speak of. Thus, there is no longer any urgent or permanent necessity for the writ to prevent any perceived serious damage. In fine, since the requisites for the issuance of the writ of injunction are not present in the instant case, petitioners application must be denied for lack of merit.[27]

2. Kilusang Mayo Uno vs. Director General, NEDA, 487 SCRA 623

April 19, 2006

J. Carpio

Facts:

On April 13, 2005, Pres. Arroyo issued EO 420 (REQUIRING ALL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS TO STREAMLINE AND HARMONIZE THEIR IDENTIFICATION (ID) SYSTEMS, AND AUTHORIZING FOR SUCH PURPOSE THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT THE SAME, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES)

EO 420 provides for the adoption of a unified multi-purpose identification system for government. This covers all government agencies and GOCCs that issue ID cards to their members. The data to be collected are limited to the following: name, home address, sex, picture, signature, date of birth, place of birth, marital status, names of parents, height, weight, 2 index finger and thumb marks, prominent distinguishing features, Tax Identification Number (TIN). NEDA will be responsible for the collection and in ensuring that each individuals right to privacy will not be violated.

Under EO 420, the President directs all government agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations to adopt a uniform data collection and format for their existing identification (ID) systems.Issues:

1.) WON EO 420 is a usurpation of legislative power by the President

2.) WON EO 420 infringes on the citizens right to privacy

Held:

Petitions are without merit. EO 420 is declared to be constitutional.Ratio:

1.) The issuance of EO 420 does not constitute usurpation of legislative power.At present, government entities like LTO require considerably more data from applicants for identification purposes. EO 420 will reduce the data required to be collected and recorded in the ID databases of the government entities. Government entities cannot collect or record data, for identification purposes, other than the 14 specific data. In contrast, the uniform ID format under Section 3 of EO 420 requires only the first five items listed in Section 3, plus the fingerprint, agency number and the common reference number, or only eight specific data. Thus, at present, the Supreme Courts ID contains far more data than the proposed uniform ID for government entities under EO 420. The nature of the data contained in the Supreme Court ID is also far more financially sensitive, specifically the Tax Identification Number.

Making the data collection and recording of government entities unified, and making their ID formats uniform, will admittedly achieve substantial benefits.

Under the constitutional power of control the President can direct all government entities, in the exercise of their functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID format to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the public. The Presidents constitutional power of control is self-executing and does not need any implementing legislation.

EO 420 is well within the constitutional power of the President to promulgate. The President has not usurped legislative power in issuing EO 420. EO 420 is an exercise of Executive power the Presidents constitutional power of control over the Executive department. EO 420 is also compliance by the President of the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.

Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them. In issuing EO 420, the President did not make, alter or repeal any law but merely implemented and executed existing laws. EO 420 reduces costs, as well as insures efficiency, reliability, compatibility and user-friendliness in the implementation of current ID systems of government entities under existing laws. Thus, EO 420 is simply an executive issuance and not an act of legislation.

EO 420 does not establish a national ID card system.

2.) EO 420 does not violate the right to privacy

Under EO 420, government entities can collect and record only the 14 specific data mentioned in Section 3 of EO 420.

On its face, EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity because it even narrowly limits the data that can be collected, recorded and shown compared to the existing ID systems of government entities. EO 420 further provides strict safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the data collected, in contrast to the prior ID systems which are bereft of strict administrative safeguards.

The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government entities.

In the present case, EO 420 does not establish a national ID system but makes the existing sectoral card systems of government entities like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and LTO less costly, more efficient, reliable and user-friendly to the public. Hence, EO 420 is a proper subject of executive issuance under the Presidents constitutional power of control over government entities in the Executive department, as well as under the Presidents constitutional duty to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.3. DENR vs. DENR Region 12 Employees, 409 SCRA 359

August 19, 2003

J. Ynares Santiago

Facts:

On November 15, 1999, Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources for Region XII, Israel C. Gaddi, issued a Memorandum[3] directing the immediate transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal (formerly Marbel), South Cotabato.

Respondents, employees of the DENR Region XII who are members of the employees association, COURAGE, represented by their Acting President, Baguindanai A. Karim, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato, a petition for nullity of orders with prayer for preliminary injunction.

On December 8, 1999, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining petitioner from implementing the assailed Memorandum.

TC denied motion for reconsideration of petitioner

Issue: WON DENR Secretary has authority to reorganize the DENR

Held:

The power of the President to reorganize the National Government may be validly delegated to his Cabinet Members exercising control over a particular executive departmentRespondents cannot, by means of an injunction, force the DENR XII Regional Offices to remain in Cotabato City, as the exercise of the authority to transfer the same is executive in nature.

Doctrine of qualified political agency: Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.Doctrine (of qualified political agency) is corollary to the control power of the President as provided for under Article VII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:

Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

Applying the doctrine of qualified political agency, the power of the President to reorganize the National Government may validly be delegated to his cabinet members exercising control over a particular executive department.Similarly, in the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of the President for the latter had not expressly repudiated the same.4. PASEI vs Torres (GR No. 98472, August 19, 1993)

August 6, 1992

J. Grino Aquino

PASEI - Philippine Association of Service Exporters - PASEI is the largest national organization of private employment and recruitment agencies duly licensed and authorized by the POEA, to engaged in the business of obtaining overseas employment for Filipino landbased workers, including domestic helpers.

On June 1, 1991, as a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids employed in Hong Kong, DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of "Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong" (p. 30, Rollo). The DOLE itself, through the POEA took over the business of deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers.

Pursuant to the above DOLE circular, the POEA issued Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1991, dated July 10, 1991, providing GUIDELINES on the Government processing and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to Hong Kong and the accreditation of Hong Kong recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers.

On August 1, 1991, the POEA Administrator also issued Memorandum Circular No. 37, Series of 1991, on the processing of employment contracts of domestic workers for Hong Kong.

On September 2, 1991, the petitioner, PASEI, filed this petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned DOLE and POEA circulars and to prohibit their implementation for the following reasons: grave abuse of discretion, DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, and requirements of publication were not complied with.

Held: Petition granted (only on the grounds that it didnt comply with publication requirements, NOT grave abuse of discretion and DOLE and POEA circulars being contrary to Constitution)

Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities.

The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is not unconstitutional, unreasonable and oppressive. It has been necessitated by "the growing complexity of the modern society" (Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, 79). More and more administrative bodies are necessary to help in the regulation of society's ramified activities. "Specialized in the particular field assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice" (Ibid.).

It is noteworthy that the assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the recruitment and deployment of Filipino landbased workers for overseas employment. A careful reading of the challenged administrative issuances discloses that the same fall within the "administrative and policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred" upon the respondents (People vs. Maceren, 79 SCRA 450). The power to "restrict and regulate conferred by Article 36 of the Labor Code involves a grant of police power (City of Naga vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 898). To "restrict" means "to confine, limit or stop" (p. 62, Rollo) and whereas the power to "regulate" means "the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with due regard for the interests, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons" (Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation vs. Alcuaz, 180 SCRA 218).

The questioned circulars are therefore a valid exercise of the police power as delegated to the executive branch of Government.5. Tondo Medical vs CA (GR No. 167324, July 17, 2007)

July 17, 2007

J. Chico Nazario

On 24 May 1999, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order No. 102, entitled "Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health," which provided for the changes in the roles, functions, and organizational processes of the DOH. Under the assailed executive order, the DOH refocused its mandate from being the sole provider of health services to being a provider of specific health services and technical assistance, as a result of the devolution of basic services to local government units.Petitioners contended that a law, such as Executive Order No. 102, which effects the reorganization of the DOH, should be enacted by Congress in the exercise of its legislative function. They argued that Executive Order No. 102 is void, having been issued in excess of the Presidents authority.8 Executive Order No. 102 was enacted pursuant to Section 17 of the Local Government Code (Republic Act No. 7160), which provided for the devolution to the local government units of basic services and facilities, as well as specific health-related functions and responsibilities.7(No mention of any lower court decision)

The Court of Appeals denied the petition due to a number of procedural defects. Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that the petitioners assertion that Executive Order No. 102 is detrimental to the health of the people cannot be made a justiciable issue. The question of whether the HSRA will bring about the development or disintegration of the health sector is within the realm of the political department.

Furthermore, the Court of Appeals decreed that the President was empowered to issue Executive Order No. 102, in accordance with Section 17 Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

Petitioners also claim that Executive Order No. 102 is void on the ground that it was issued by the President in excess of his authority. They maintain that the structural and functional reorganization of the DOH is an exercise of legislative functions, which the President usurped when he issued Executive Order No. 102.28 This line of argument is without basis.

Issue: WON EO 102 is void (No.)Held: This Court has already ruled in a number of cases that the President may, by executive or administrative order, direct the reorganization of government entities under the Executive Department.29 This is also sanctioned under the Constitution, as well as other statutes.

Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, clearly states: "[T]he president shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices." Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of Executive Order No. 292, also known as the Administrative Code of 1987 reads:

SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office - The President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may take any of the following actions:

(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the immediate offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another;

(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from other Departments or Agencies; and

(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other Departments or agencies.

In Domingo v. Zamora,30 this Court explained the rationale behind the Presidents continuing authority under the Administrative Code to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. The law grants the President the power to reorganize the Office of the President in recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his or her office "to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency." To remain effective and efficient, it must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner the Chief Executive deems fit to carry out presidential directives and policies.

The Administrative Code provides that the Office of the President consists of the Office of the President Proper and the agencies under it.31 The agencies under the Office of the President are identified in Section 23, Chapter 8, Title II of the Administrative Code:

Sec. 23. The Agencies under the Office of the President.The agencies under the Office of the President refer to those offices placed under the chairmanship of the President, those under the supervision and control of the President, those under the administrative supervision of the Office of the President, those attached to it for policy and program coordination, and those that are not placed by law or order creating them under any specific department. (Emphasis provided.)

Section 2(4) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code defines the term "agency of the government" as follows:

Agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of the Government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein.

Furthermore, the DOH is among the cabinet-level departments enumerated under Book IV of the Administrative Code, mainly tasked with the functional distribution of the work of the President.32 Indubitably, the DOH is an agency which is under the supervision and control of the President and, thus, part of the Office of the President. Consequently, Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of the Administrative Code, granting the President the continued authority to reorganize the Office of the President, extends to the DOH.

The power of the President to reorganize the executive department is likewise recognized in general appropriations laws. As early as 1993, Sections 48 and 62 of Republic Act No. 7645, the "General Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1993," already contained a provision stating that:

Sec. 48. Scaling Down and Phase Out of Activities Within the Executive Branch.The heads of departments, bureaus and offices and agencies are hereby directed to identify their respective activities which are no longer essential in the delivery of public services and which may be scaled down, phased out, or abolished, subject to civil service rules and regulations. x x x. Actual scaling down, phasing out, or abolition of activities shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the purpose by the Office of the President. (Emphasis provided.)

Sec. 62. Unauthorized Organizational Changes. Unless otherwise created by law or directed by the President of the Philippines, no organizational unit or changes in key positions in any department or agency shall be authorized in their respective organizational structures and be funded form appropriations by this Act.

Again, in the year when Executive Order No. 102 was issued, "The General Appropriations Act of Fiscal Year 1999" (Republic Act No. 8745) conceded to the President the power to make any changes in any of the key positions and organizational units in the executive department thus:

Sec. 77. Organized Changes. Unless otherwise provided by law or directed by the President of the Philippines, no changes in key positions or organizational units in any department or agency shall be authorized in their respective organizational structures and funded from appropriations provided by this Act.

Clearly, Executive Order No. 102 is well within the constitutional power of the President to issue. The President did not usurp any legislative prerogative in issuing Executive Order No. 102. It is an exercise of the Presidents constitutional power of control over the executive department, supported by the provisions of the Administrative Code, recognized by other statutes, and consistently affirmed by this Court.6. Biraogo vs Phil. Truth Commn (GR Nos. 192935, 193036, Dec. 7, 2010)

December 7, 2010J. Mendoza

Facts:

The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution6 as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor.7The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives.

The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap." The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency.

To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need for a special body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the previous administration.

Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).

As can be gleaned from the above-quoted provisions, the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an "independent collegial body," it is essentially an entity within the Office of the President Proper and subject to his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body is one.8Barely a month after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1, the petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions.

Petitioners President is not authorized by Consti to create a Truth Commission

Issue: WON Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled "Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010" is unconstitutional

Held: Petition granted - Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution (But is a valid exercise of executive power)

Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. As stated above, the powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution.53 One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed.The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained.

It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. And if history is to be revisited, this was also the objective of the investigative bodies created in the past like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, the Melo Commission and the Zenarosa Commission. There being no changes in the government structure, the Court is not inclined to declare such executive power as non-existent just because the direction of the political winds have changed.

The Presidents power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed is well recognized. It flows from the faithful-execution clause of the Constitution under Article VII, Section 17 thereof.56 As the Chief Executive, the president represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He has the authority to directly assume the functions of the executive department.57