consti freedom writ

8/13/2019 Consti Freedom Writ

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The Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, October 7, 2008Puno, C.J.

FACTS:Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military men belonging to the CAFGU

on the suspicion that they were members and supporters of the NPA. the On August 13, 2007, brothersescaped and 10 days after their escape, they filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary

Restraining Order to stop the military officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and

other basic rights. While the said case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October

24, 2007. The Manalos subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their existing petition

as amparo petition. On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of amparo.

The Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP appealed to the SC seeking to reverse

and set aside the decision promulgated by the CA.

ISSUE:Whether or not there is a continuing violation of the Manalos right to security even after they have

escaped.

RULING:The Supreme Court ruled that there is a continuing violation of the Manalos right to security. xxx

The Writ of Amparo is the most potent remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and

security has been violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission by public officials or

employees and by private individuals or entities. xxx Understandably, since their escape, the Manalos have

been under concealment and protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty, and

security. The circumstances of respondents abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support aconclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even

executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of

amparo, the Court explained.

Darenn S. Ba-atEscrupulo JD-1


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Reyes vs. Gonzalez, G.R. No. 182161, December 3, 2009Leonardo-De Castro, J.

FACTS:In the morning of November 30, 2007, Reverend Robert Reyes together with fifty (50) others, were

brought to Camp Crame to await inquest proceedings. In the evening of the same day, the Department ofJustice (DOJ) Panel of Prosecutor, conducted inquest proceedings to ascertain whether or not there was

probable cause to hold petitioner and the others for trial on charges of Rebellion and/or Inciting to Rebellion.

On December 2, 2007, after finding probable cause against petitioner and 36 others for the crime of

Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors filed an Information

docketed as I.S. No. 2007-1045 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 150 of Makati City. On December

1, 2007, upon the request of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), respondent DOJ

Secretary Raul Gonzales issued Hold Departure Order (HDO) No. 45 ordering respondent Commissioner of

Immigration to include in the Hold Departure List of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) the

name of petitioner and 49 others relative to the aforementioned case in the interest of national security and

public safety. On December 13, 2007, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the charge for Rebellion againstpetitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause. On December 18, 2007, petitioners counsel Atty.

Francisco L. Chavez wrote the DOJ Secretary requesting the lifting of HDO No. 45 in view of the dismissal

of Criminal Case No. 07-3126. Petitioner further maintained that immediate recourse to the Supreme Court

for the availment of the writ is exigent as the continued restraint on petitioners right to trav el is illegal. The

petition for a writ of amparo is anchored on the ground that respondents violated petitioners constitutional

right to travel. Petitioner argues that the DOJ Secretary has no power to issue a Hold Departure Order

(HDO) and the subject HDO No. 45 has no legal basis since Criminal Case No. 07-3126 has already been

dismissed.

ISSUE:Whether or not the maintenance of petitioners name on the HDO list is an actual restraint of his

constitutional right to travel.

RULING:The Supreme Court ruled that the direct recourse of this case to the SC onsidering the provision

of Section 22 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo which reads:

Section 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. When a criminal action has been commenced, no

separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The reliefs under the writ shall be available by motion in thecriminal case.

The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available under the writ of amparo.

Pursuant to the aforementioned Section 22, petitioner should have filed with the RTC-Makati a motion to lift

HDO No. 45 in Criminal Case No. 07-3126. Petitioner, however, did not file in the RTC-Makati a motion to

lift the DOJs HDO, as his co-accused did in the same criminal case. Petitioner argues that it was not the

RTC-Makati but the DOJ that issued the said HDO, and that it is his intention not to limit his remedy to the

lifting of the HDO but also to question before this Court the constitutionality of the power of the DOJ

Secretary to issue an HDO. Even in civil cases pending before the trial courts, the Court has no authority to

separately and directly intervene through the writ of amparo.

The Supreme Court further ruled that petitioners apprehension is at best merely speculative. Thus, hehas

failed to show any clear threat to his right to liberty actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo. The

absence of an actual controversy also renders it unnecessary for us on this occasion to pass upon the

constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 17, Series of 1998



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Navarro vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121087, August 26, 1999Mendoza, J.

FACTS:Enrique Lingan and Stanley Jalbuena, both radio reporters went to a police station to report for a

blotter. During the course, a heated argument arose between police officer Navarro and the two reporters.Navarro then poked his cocked firearm on the face of Jalbuena. Lingan interfered, this then irked Navarro

and then and there hit Lingan with the handle of his pistol above the left eyebrow. This caused Lingan to fall

on the floor bloodied. Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record on tape the exchange

between petitioner and the deceased.

ISSUE:Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting the voice recording presented by the prosecution in

view of R.A. No. 4200, which prohibits wire tapping.

RULING:The Supreme Court ruled that Navarro has not shown that the trial court erred in according weight

to the testimony of Jalbuena.

SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private

communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to

secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly

known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however

otherwise described:

It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next

preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such

record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective

date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons;

or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof,

whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies

thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall

not be covered by this prohibition.

SEC. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or

meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by anyperson in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial,

quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.

Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications. Since the

exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.



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Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995Kapunan, J.

FACTS:Petitioner alleged that private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a

hostile and furious mood and in a manner offensive to petitioners dignity and personality, contrary tomorals, good customs and public policy. as shown in a secret recording of the conversation that was part of

a civil case filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Private respondent filed a criminal case before

the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled An Act to prohibit and

penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes.

ISSUE:Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a

private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation.

RULING:The Supreme Court ruled on the negative. First, legislative intent is determined principally from

the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied

according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation

would be either impossible or absurb or would lead to an injustice. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act

to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other

Purposes," provides:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private



known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however

otherwise described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the

parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder.

The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a

party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to

penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any".

Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a

communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will)

qualify as a violator". The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-

quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the

respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications.

Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.



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Waterous Drugs Corporation vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 113271, October 16, 1997Davide, JR., J.

FACTS:On August 15, 1988, Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner Waterous Drug Corporation.

On 31 July 1989, Catolico received a memorandum from WATEROUS Vice President-General Manager

Emma R. Co warning her not to dispense medicine to employees chargeable to the latter's accountsbecause the same was a prohibited practice. On the same date, Co issued another memorandum to

Catolico warning her not to negotiate with suppliers of medicine without consulting the Purchasing

Department, as this would impair the company's control of purchases and, besides she was not authorized

to deal directly with the suppliers. In its decision of 30 September 1993, the NLRC affirmed the findings of

the Labor Arbiter on the ground that petitioners were not able to prove a just cause for Catolico's dismissal

from her employment. It found that petitioner's evidence consisted only of the check of P640.00 drawn by

YSP in favor of complainant, which her co-employee saw when the latter opened the envelope. But, it

declared that the check was inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(1 and 2) of Article III of

the Constitution. It concluded:

With the smoking gun evidence of respondents being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional

right invoked by complainants, respondents' case falls apart as it is bereft of evidence which cannot be used

as a legal basis for complainant's dismissal.

ISSUE:Whether or not Saldaa's action of opening the envelope addressed to the private respondent is a

violation of her constitutional rights of privacy of communication.

RULING:The Supreme Court ruled that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable

searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that

the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an

invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities.



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Navarro vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121087, August 26, 1999Mendoza, J.

FACTS:Enrique Lingan and Stanley Jalbuena, both radio reporters went to a police station to report for a

blotter. During the course, a heated argument arose between police officer Navarro and the two reporters.Navarro then poked his cocked firearm on the face of Jalbuena. Lingan interfered, this then irked Navarro

and then and there hit Lingan with the handle of his pistol above the left eyebrow. This caused Lingan to fall

on the floor bloodied. Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record on tape the exchange

between petitioner and the deceased.

ISSUE:Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting the voice recording presented by the prosecution in

view of R.A. No. 4200, which prohibits wire tapping.

RULING:The Supreme Court ruled that Navarro has not shown that the trial court erred in according weight

to the testimony of Jalbuena.

SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private



known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however

otherwise described:

It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next

preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such

record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective

date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons;

or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof,

whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies

thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall

not be covered by this prohibition.

SEC. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or

meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by anyperson in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial,

quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.

Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications. Since the

exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.



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Ople vs. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998Puno, J.

FACTS:In 1996, President Fidel Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 308, entitled Adoption of a

National Computerized Identification Reference System. A.O. No. 308 establishes for the first time aNational Computerized Identification Reference System. It does not simply implement the Administrative

Code of 1987. This administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of the citizenry vis-a-

vis the State, as well as the line that separates the administrative power of the President to make rules and

the legislative power of Congress. It deals with a subject that should be covered by law.

ISSUE:Whether or not A.O. No. 308 violates the right to privacy.

RULING:The Supreme Court struck down Administrative Order No. 308 emphasizing that the Court is not

per se against the use of computers to accumulate, store, process, retrieve and transmit data to improve our

bureaucracy. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into

the right to individual privacy. This right merely requires that the law be narrowly focused and compelling

interests justify such intrusions. Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and

well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions. A.O. 308 falls short of assuring that personal

information which will be gathered about our people will only be processed for unequivocally specified

purposes. The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. 308 may interfere with the individuals liberty

of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous

persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pavethe way for fishing expeditions by government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable

searches and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer

technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or

placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data encoded. They threaten the very abuses that

the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.



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TELEBAP vs. COMELEC, GR NO. 132922, April 21, 1998Mendoza, J.

FACTS:Petitioners, Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc.

(TELEBAP) and GMA Network, challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides:

Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as the Comelec

Time which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of

all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television

stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of

campaign.

According to the petitioners, while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure print space in

newspapers and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by

COMELEC free of charge. Thus it contends that Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to

provide free air time. Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing

COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it

stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that the primary

source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require

these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of private property.

ISSUE:Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 is valid.

RULING:The Supreme Court affirms the validity of Section 92 of B.P. No. 881. Accoring to the Supreme

Court, to affirm the validity of Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 is to hold public broadcasters to their obligation to

see to it that the variety and vigour of public debate on issues in an election is maintained. For while

broadcast media are not mere common carriers but entities with free speech rights, they are also public

trustees charged with the duty of ensuring that the people have access to the diversity of views on political

issues. This right of the people is paramount to the autonomy of broadcast media. To affirm the validity of

Section 92, therefore, is likewise to uphold the people's right to information on matters of public concern.

The use of property bears a social function and is subject to the state's duty to intervene for the common

good. Broadcast media can find their just and highest reward in the fact that whatever altruistic service they

may render in connection with the holding of elections is for that common good.



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ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp vs Comelec, G.R. No. 133486, January 28, 2000Panganiban, J.

FACTS:Comelec passed Resolution No. 98-1419 which states that "RESOLVED to approve the issuance

of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any other groups, its agents or representatives from conductingsuch exit survey and to authorize the Honorable Chairman to issue the same. TheResolution was issued

by the Comelec allegedly upon "information from [a] reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has

prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections and to make [an] exit

survey of the vote during the elections for national officials particularly for President and Vice President,

results of which shall be [broadcast] immediately. On May 9, 1998, this Court issued the Temporary

Restraining Order prayed for by petitioner. We directed the Comelec to cease and desist, until further

orders, from implementing the assailed Resolution or the restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if any. In

fact, the exit polls were actually conducted and reported by media without any difficulty or problem.

ISSUE:Whether or not the petition is moot and academic, because the May 11, 1998 election has already

been held and done with.

RULING:The Supreme Court rules that the issue is not totally moot. While the assailed Resolution referred

specifically to the May 11, 1998 election, its implications on the people's fundamental freedom of expression

transcend the past election. The holding of periodic elections is a basic feature of our democratic

government. By its very nature, exit polling is tied up with elections. To set aside the resolution of the issue

now will only postpone a task that could well crop up again in future elections. In any event, in Salonga v.Cruz Pano, the Court had occasion to reiterate that it "also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling

constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and

bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees." Since the fundamental freedoms of

speech and of the press are being invoked here, we have resolved to settle, for the guidance of posterity,

whether they likewise protect the holding of exit polls and the dissemination of data derived therefrom.



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Social Weather Stations Inc vs Comelec, G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001Mendoza, J.

FACTS:Petitioner SWS and KPC brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections

from enforcing Section 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 (Fair Election Act). Petitioner states that it wishes to conduct anelection survey throughout the period of the elections and release to the media the results of such survey as

well as publish them directly. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey

results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present

danger to justify such restraint.

ISSUE:Whether or not Section 5.4 of R.A. No. 900 is valid and constitutional.

RULING:The Supreme Court rules that Section 5.4 of R.A. No. 900 constitutes an unconstitutional

abridgment of freedom of speech, expression, and the press. Section 5.4 lays a prior restraint on freedom

of speech, expression, and the press by prohibiting the publication of election survey results affecting

candidates within the prescribed periods of fifteen (15) days immediately preceding a national election and

seven (7) days before a local election. Because of the preferred status of the constitutional rights of speech,

expression, and the press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity Indeed, any

system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its

constitutional validity. . . . The Government thus carries a heavy burden of showing ju stification for the

enforcement of such restraint. There is thus a reversal of the normal presumption of validity that inheres in

every legislation.



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In Re: Petition to Annul En Banc Resolution A.M. 98-7-02-SCRicardo C. Valmonte and Union of

Lawyers and Advocates for Transparency in Government [ULAT], G.R. No. 134621, Sept. 29, 1998

FACTS:Petitioners claims that this Court committed an act of judicial legislation in promulgating ResolutionA.M. 98-7-02-SC, entitled, "Re: Guidelines on the Conduct of Demonstrations, Pickets, Rallies and Other

Similar Gatherings in the Vicinity of the Supreme Court and All Other Courts. They charge that this Court

amended provisions of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 880, otherwise known as "the Public Assembly Act," by

converting the sidewalks and streets within a radius of two hundred (200) meters from every courthouse

from a public forum place into a "no rally" zone. Thus, they accuse this Court of violating the principle of

separation of powers.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court committed an act of judicial legislation in promulgating

promulgating Resolution A.M. 98-7-02-SC.

RULING:The Supreme Court rejects the arguments of the petitioner. Public places historically associated

with the free exercise of expressive activities, such as streets, sidewalks, and parks, are considered, without

more, to be public fora. In other words, it is not any law that can imbue such places with the public nature

inherent in them. But even in such public fora, it is settled jurisprudence that the government may restrict

speech plus activities and enforce reasonable time, place, and manner regulations as long as the

restrictions are (1) content-neutral, (2) are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and

(3) leave open ample alternative channels of communication.

Contrary therefore to petitioners impression, B.P. Blg. 880 did not establish streets and sidewalks, among

other places, as public fora. A close look at the law will reveal that it in fact prescribes reasonable time,

place, and manner regulations. Thus, it requires a written permit for the holding of public assemblies in

public places subject, even, to the right of the mayor to modify the place and time of the public assembly, to

impose a rerouting of the parade or street march, to limit the volume of loud speakers or sound system and

to prescribe other appropriate restrictions on the conduct of the public assembly. The existence of B.P. Blg.

880, however, does not preclude this Court from promulgating rules regulating conduct of demonstrations in

the vicinity of courts to assure our people of an impartial and orderly administration of justice as mandated

by the Constitution. To insulate the judiciary from mob pressure, friendly or otherwise, and isolate it frompublic hysteria, this Court merely moved away the situs of mass actions within a 200-meter radius from

every courthouse. In fine, B.P. Blg. 880 imposes general restrictions to the time, place and manner of

conducting concerted actions. On the other hand, the resolution of this Court regulating demonstrations

adds specific restrictions as they involve judicial independence and the orderly administration of justice.

There is thus no discrepancy between the two sets of regulatory measures. Simply put, B.P. Blg. 880 and

the assailed resolution complement each other. We so hold following the rule in legal hermeneutics that an

apparent conflict between a court rule and a statutory provision should be harmonized and both should be

given effect if possible.



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AM 01-4-03-SC Radio TV Coverage of the Trial in Sandiganbayan, June 29, 2001Vitug, J.

FACTS:The travails of a deposed President continue. The Sandiganbayan reels to start hearing the

criminal charges against Mr. Joseph E. Estrada. Media seeks to cover the event via live television and liveradio broadcast and endeavors this Court to allow it that kind of access to the proceedings. On 13 March

2001, the Kapisanan ng mga BroadKaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), an association representing duly franchised

and authorized television and radio networks throughout the country, sent a letter requesting this Court to

allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former

President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full transparency in

the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history." The request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N.

Sarino in his letter of 05 April 2001 to the Chief Justice and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and

Attorney Ricardo Romulo. On 17 April 2001, the Honorable Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formally

filed the instant petition,3 submitting the following exegesis: "The foregoing criminal cases involve the

previous acts of the former highest official of the land, members of his family, his cohorts and, therefore, itcannot be over emphasized that the prosecution thereof, definitely involves a matter of public concern and

interest, or a matter over which the entire citizenry has the right to know, be informed and made aware of.

"There is no gainsaying that the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public

concern, as in the instant cases, can best be recognized, served and satisfied by allowing the live radio and

television coverage of the concomitant court proceedings. "Moreover, the live radio and television coverage

of the proceedings will also serve the dual purpose of ensuring the desired transparency in the

administration of justice in order to disabuse the minds of the supporters of the past regime of any and all

unfounded notions, or ill-perceived attempts on the part of the present dispensation, to railroad the instant

criminal cases against the Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada." Public interest, the petition further

averred, should be evident bearing in mind the right of the public to vital information affecting the nation.

ISSUE:Whether or not to grant the request for Radio-TV coverage of the trial of in the Sandiganbayan of

the plunder cases against the former president Joseph E. Estrada.

RULING:The Supreme Court ruled that the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right

to public information outweigh the fundamental rights of the accused along with the constitutional power of a

court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial. Rule 53 of the Federal Rules ofCriminal Procedure forbids the taking of photographs during the progress of judicial proceedings or radio

broadcasting of such proceedings from the courtroom. A trial of any kind or in any court is a matter of

serious importance to all concerned and should not be treated as a means of entertainment. To so treat it

DEPRIVES THE COURT OF THE DIGNITY which pertains to it and departs from the orderly and serious

quest for truth for which our judicial proceedings are formulated. With the possibility of losing not only the

precious liberty but also the very life of an accused, it behooves all to make absolutely certain that an

accused receives a verdict solely on the basis of a just and dispassionate judgment, a verdict that would

come only after the presentation of credible evidence testified to by unbiased witnesses unswayed by any

kind of pressure, whether open or subtle, in proceedings that are devoid of histrionics that might detract

from its basic aim to ferret veritable facts free from improper influence,8 and decreed by a judge with anunprejudiced mind, unbridled by running emotions or passions. An accused has a RIGHT TO A PUBLIC

TRIAL BUT IT IS A RIGHT THAT BELONGS TO HIM, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can

be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly

condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago.



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Iglesia ni Cristo vs. CA, G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996Puno, J.

FACTS:This is a petition for review on the decision of the CA affirming action of respondent Board ofReview For Moving Pictures and Television that X-rated the TV Program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" classifying it

not for public viewing on grounds that they offend and constitute an attack against other religions which isexpressly prohibited by law. Respondent contends the Board acted without jurisdiction and in grave abuseof discretion by requiring them to submit VTR tapes and x-rating them and suppression of freedom ofexpression. Trial court rendered judgment ordering the Board to give petitioner the permit for their TVprogram while ordering petitioners to refrain from attacking and offending other religious sectors from theirprogram. In their motion for reconsideration the petitioner prays for the deletion of the order of the court tomake them subject to the requirement of submitting the VTR tapes of their programs for review prior toshowing on television. Such motion was granted. Respondent board appealed before the CA whichreversed the decision of the lower court affirming the jurisdiction and power of the board to review the TVprogram. In their petition for review on certiorari, petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Board overreviewing of their TV program and its grave abuse of discretion of its power to review if they are indeedvested with such.

ISSUE:Whether or not the "ang iglesia ni cristo" program is not constitutionally protected as a form ofreligious exercise and expression.

RULING:The Supreme Court affirmed the jurisdiction of the Board to review TV programs by virtue of thepowers vested upon it by PD 1986. On the account of suppression of religious freedom, the court ruled thatany act that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption of invalidity. The burden lies upon the Boardto overthrow this presumption. The decision of the lower court is a suppression of the petitioners freedom ofspeech and free exercise of religion. Respondent board cannot censor the speech of petitioner Iglesia niCristo simply because it attacks other religions. It is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent animmediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious

freedom may be justified. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring aboutespecially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religiousspeech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil.Thus the court affirmed the jurisdiction of the Board to review the petitioners TV program while it reversedand set aside the decision of the lower court that sustained the act of respondent in x-rating the TV programof the petitioner.

2 fold aspects of religious profession and worship namely:

1. Freedom to believe (absolute)2. Freedom to act on ones belief where an individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions affecting

the public, this freedom to do so becomes subject to the regulation authority of the state.



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Soriano vs. La Guardia, G.R. No. 164785, April 29, 2009Velasco, JR., J.

FACTS:On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan,

aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate butalmost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents,all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast.Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioners remark, was then a minister ofINC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.

ISSUE:Whether or not Sorianos statements during the televised Ang Dating Daan part of the religiousdiscourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III.

RULING:The Supreme Court ruled that under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, andconsidering the adverse effect of petitioners utterances on the viewers fundamental rights as well aspetitioners clear violation of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly susp ended him fromappearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months.

Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioners suspension was an undue curtailment of hisright to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent punishment. Aside from the reasons givenabove (re the paramountcy of viewers rights, the public trusteeship character of a broadcasters role and thepower of the State to regulate broadcast media), a requirement that indecent language be avoided has itsprimary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There are few, if any,thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language.



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Newsounds Broadcasting Networks Inc. vs. Hon. Caesar Dy, G.R. Nos. 170270 & 179411, April 2, 2009

Tinga, J.

FACTS:On 15 January of 2003, petitioners applied for the renewal of the mayors permit. The followingday, the City Assessors Office in Cauayan City noted on CDCs Declaration of Real Property filed for 2002confirmed that based on the existing file, CDCs property was classified as commercial. Due to this refusalby Maximo to issue the zoning clearance, petitioners were unable to secure a mayo rs permit. On 16January 2003, petitioners filed their applications for renewal of mayors permit for the year 2003, attachingtherein the DAR Order. Their application was approved. However, on 4 March 2003, respondent FelicisimoMeer, Acting City Administrator of Cauayan City, wrote to petitioners claiming that the DAR Order wasspurious or void, as the Regional Center for Land Use Policy Planning and Implementation (RCLUPPI)supposedly reported that it did not have any record of the DAR Order. Petitioners were thus able to continueoperations until 10 June 2004, the day when respondents yet again closed the radio stations. This closureproved to be more permanent. These are two petitions for review involving the same parties, the caseshaving been consolidated by virtue of the Resolution of this Court dated 16 June 2008. Both petitionsemanated from a petition for mandamus filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cauayan City, thepetition having been dismissed in a Decision dated 14 September 2004 by the Cauayan City RTC, Branch2. Consequently, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and anappeal to the RTC decision. The appellate court ruled against petitioners in both instances.

ISSUE:Whether or not there is a violation of the petitioner's freedom of expression.

RULING:The Supreme Court is of the position that the actions of the respondents warrant heightened orstrict scrutiny from the Court, the test which we have deemed appropriate in assessing content-based

restrictions on free speech, as well as for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the politicalprocess, of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rightsas expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection. The immediate implication of the application ofthe strict scrutiny test is that the burden falls upon respondents as agents of government to prove that theiractions do not infringe upon petitioners constitutional rights. As content regulation cannot be done in theabsence of any compelling reason, the burden lies with the government to establish such compelling reasonto infringe the right to free expression.



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Hector Villanueva vs. PDI, G.R. No. 164437, May 15, 2009Quisumbing, J.

FACTS:On May 11, 1992, the national and local elections were held as scheduled. When results came out,

it turned out that petitioner failed in his mayoralty bid. Believing that his defeat was caused by thepublication of the above-quoted stories, petitioner sued respondents PDI and Manila Bulletin as well as their

publishers and editors for damages before the RTC of Bais City. Respondents disclaimed liability. They

asserted that no malice can be attributed to them as they did not know petitioner and had no interest in the

outcome of the election, stressing that the stories were privileged in nature. On April 18, 1996, the trial court

rendered a decision in favor of petitioner that the defendants Philippine Daily Inquirer, [Inc.] and Manila

[Daily] Bulletin Publishing Corporation with their respective officers are liable [for] damages.

ISSUE:Whether or not the respondents are liable for malicious and imputing statements to the petitioner.

RULING:The Supreme Court ruled that the concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom

of the press and that privileged communications must be protective of public opinion. Fair commentaries on

matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander.

The doctrine of fair commentmeans that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is

deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false

imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public

person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a

public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false

supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that

the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts.


consti freedom writ

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