consti cases jimenez to guingona - wlc

7/27/2019 Consti cases Jimenez to Guingona - wlc

1/220

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-15905 August 3, 1966

NICANOR T. JIMENEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants,

vs.

BARTOLOME CABANGBANG, defendant and appellee.

Liwag and Vivo and S. Artiaga, Jr. for plaintiffs and appellants.

Jose S. Zafra and Associates and V. M. Fortich Zerda for defendant and appellee.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, for the recovery,

by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of money, by way of

damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang. Upon

being summoned, the latter moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the letter in question

is not libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged communication. This motion having been

granted by the lower court, plaintiffs interposed the present appeal from the corresponding order of

dismissal.

The issues before us are: (1) whether the publication in question is a privileged communication; and, if

not, (2) whether it is libelous or not.


2/220

The first issue stems from the fact that, at the time of said publication, defendant was a member of the

House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense, and that pursuant to the

Constitution:

The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and

breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress,

and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be

questioned in any other place. (Article VI, Section 15.)

The determination of the first issue depends on whether or not the aforementioned publication falls

within the purview of the phrase "speech or debate therein" that is to say, in Congress used in this

provision.

Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions,

such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in

session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts

performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official

discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to

perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question.1

The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the complaint

herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when

Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several

newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus

causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a

member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by His

Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely privileged.

Was it libelous, insofar as the plaintiffs herein are concerned? Addressed to the President, thecommunication began with the following paragraph:

In the light of the recent developments which however unfortunate had nevertheless involved the

Armed Forces of the Philippines and the unfair attacks against the duly elected members of Congress of

engaging in intriguing and rumor-mongering, allow me, Your Excellency, to address this open letter to


3/220

focus public attention to certain vital information which, under the present circumstances, I feel it my

solemn duty to our people to expose.1wph1.t

It has come to my attention that there have been allegedly three operational plans under serious study

by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists.

Then, it describes the "allegedly three (3) operational plans" referred to in the second paragraph. The

first plan is said to be "an insidious plan or a massive political build-up" of then Secretary of National

Defense, Jesus Vargas, by propagandizing and glamorizing him in such a way as to "be prepared to

become a candidate for President in 1961". To this end, the "planners" are said to "have adopted the

sales-talk that Secretary Vargas is 'Communists' Public Enemy No. 1 in the Philippines." Moreover, the

P4,000,000.00 "intelligence and psychological warfare funds" of the Department of National Defense,

and the "Peace and Amelioration Fund" the letter says are "available to adequately finance apolitical campaign". It further adds:

It is reported that the "Planners" have under their control the following: (1) Col. Nicanor Jimenez of

NICA, (2) Lt. Col. Jose Lukban of NBI, (3) Capt. Carlos Albert (PN) of G-2 AFP, (4) Col. Fidel Llamas of MIS

(5) Lt. Col. Jose Regala of the Psychological Warfare Office, DND, and (6) Major Jose Reyna of the Public

information Office, DND. To insure this control, the "Planners" purportedly sent Lt. Col. Job Mayo, Chief

of MIS to Europe to study and while Mayo was in Europe, he was relieved by Col. Fidel Llamas. They also

sent Lt. Col. Deogracias Caballero, Chief of Psychological Warfare Office, DND, to USA to study and while

Caballero was in USA, he was relieved by Lt. Col. Jose Regala. The "Planners" wanted to relieve Lt. Col.

Ramon Galvezon, Chief of CIS (PC) but failed. Hence, Galvezon is considered a missing link in the

intelligence network. It is, of course, possible that the offices mentioned above are unwitting tools of

the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge. (Emphasis ours.)

Among the means said to be used to carry out the plan the letter lists, under the heading "other

operational technique the following:

(a) Continuous speaking engagements all over the Philippines for Secretary Vargas to talk on

"Communism" and Apologetics on civilian supremacy over the military;


4/220

(b) Articles in magazines, news releases, and hundreds of letters "typed in two (2) typewriters only"

to Editors of magazines and newspapers, extolling Secretary Vargas as the "hero of democracy in

1951, 1953, 1955 and 1957 elections";

(c) Radio announcements extolling Vargas and criticizing the administration;

(d) Virtual assumption by Vargas of the functions of the Chief of Staff and an attempt to pack key

positions in several branches of the Armed Forces with men belonging to his clique;

(e) Insidious propaganda and rumors spread in such a way as to give the impression that they reflect the

feeling of the people or the opposition parties, to undermine the administration.

Plan No. II is said to be a "coup d'etat", in connection with which the "planners" had gone no further

than the planning stage, although the plan "seems to be held in abeyance and subject to future

developments".

Plan No. III is characterized as a modification of Plan No. I, by trying to assuage the President and the

public with a loyalty parade, in connection with which Gen. Arellano delivered a speech challenging the

authority and integrity of Congress, in an effort to rally the officers and men of the AFP behind him, andgain popular and civilian support.

The letter in question recommended.: (1) that Secretary Vargas be asked to resign; (2) that the Armed

Forces be divorced absolutely from politics; (3) that the Secretary of National Defense be a civilian, not a

professional military man; (4) that no Congressman be appointed to said office; (5) that Gen. Arellano be

asked to resign or retire; (6) that the present chiefs of the various intelligence agencies in the Armed

Forces including the chiefs of the NICA, NBI, and other intelligence agencies mentioned elsewhere in the

letter, be reassigned, considering that "they were handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano",

and that, "most probably, they belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique"; (7) that all military personnel now

serving civilian offices be returned to the AFP, except those holding positions by provision of law; (8)

that the Regular Division of the AFP stationed in Laur, Nueva Ecija, be dispersed by batallion strength to

the various stand-by or training divisions throughout the country; and (9) that Vargas and Arellano

should disqualify themselves from holding or undertaking an investigation of the planned coup d'etat".


5/220

We are satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support plaintiffs' action for damages.

Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the unnamed persons therein alluded to

as "planners", and that, having been handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano, plaintiffs

"probably belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique", it should be noted that defendant, likewise, added that

"it is of course possible" that plaintiffs "are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have

absolutely no knowledge". In other words, the very document upon which plaintiffs' action is basedexplicitly indicates that they might be absolutely unaware of the alleged operational plans, and that they

may be merely unwitting tools of the planners. We do not think that this statement is derogatory to the

plaintiffs, to the point of entitling them to recover damages, considering that they are officers of our

Armed Forces, that as such they are by law, under the control of the Secretary of National Defense and

the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in question seems to suggest that the group therein described as

"planners" include these two (2) high ranking officers.

It is true that the complaint alleges that the open letter in question was written by the defendant,

knowing that it is false and with the intent to impeach plaintiffs' reputation, to expose them to public

hatred, contempt, dishonor and ridicule, and to alienate them from their associates, but these

allegations are mere conclusions which are inconsistent with the contents of said letter and can not

prevail over the same, it being the very basis of the complaint. Then too, when plaintiffs allege in their

complaint that said communication is false, they could not have possibly meant that they were aware of

the alleged plan to stage a coup d'etat or that they were knowingly tools of the "planners". Again, the

aforementioned passage in the defendant's letter clearly implies that plaintiffs were not among the

"planners" of said coup d'etat, for, otherwise, they could not be "tools", much less, unwittingly on their

part, of said "planners".

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192; Tenney vs. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367; Coffin vs. Coffin, 4 Mass 1.


6/220

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation


SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 106971 March 1, 1993

TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and LAKAS-NATIONAL UNION OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS (LAKAS-NUCD),

petitioners,

vs.

NEPTALI A. GONZALES, ALBERTO ROMULO and WIGBERTO E. TAADA, respondents.

NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION, petitioner-in-intervention.

Ricardo G. Nepomuceno for petitioners.

Gonzales, Batiller, Bilog & Associates for respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N


7/220

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

In motions separately filed by respondent Senator Wigberto E. Taada on October 27, 1992 and

respondents Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Senator Alberto Romulo on October 30, 1992,

said respondents moved for a reconsideration of our decision dated October 20, 1992, on the following

grounds:

Senator Taada alleges that:

1) The decision was premised on an erroneous appreciation of relevant factual precedents;

2) The decision ignored the reality of the multi-party system recognized both by the letter and

spirit of the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions;

3) It is mandatory to fill up twelve (12) seats in the Commission on Appointments;

4) The Senate did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it elected respondent Taada to the

Commission on Appointments.

In their Motion for Reconsideration/Clarification, Senators Gonzales and Romulo allege:

1) That the decision is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in the two cases of Coseteng

vs. Mitra, Jr. 1 and Daza vs. Singson. 2

2) It is mandatory to have twelve (12) members of the Commission of Appointments to enable it to

function as a constitutional body.

3) The Tolentino Compromise Formula was adopted by the Senate and accepted by all political

parties and must govern the selection of respondent Senators to the Commission on Appointments.


8/220

4) The election of the respondents Senators is in compliance with the multi-party system which

contemplates a realignment of political parties to remove fractional membership of any party in the

Commission.

On December 16, 1992, the petitioner-in intervention Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC) filed its

separate Comments to the Motions of respondents Senators while the petitioners filed on January 7,

1993 their separate Comments on the Motion of the respondents.

Considering the grounds set forth in the Motions of the respondents and in the light of the

reasons/arguments submitted in refutation thereof, We deny both Motions for Reconsideration on the

following grounds:

1) The decision is based on a simple interpretation and application of Article VI, Section 18 of the

1987 Constitution and We quote pertinent portions thereof.

It is an established fact to which all the parties agree that the mathematical representation of each of

the political parties represented in the Senate is as follows:

LDP 7.5

LP-PDP-LABAN .5

NPC 2.5

LAKAS-NUCD 1.5

It is also a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership onthe basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political parties. A literal

interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of application

than as above. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is

entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole

membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Senator Romulo. In so

doing one other party's fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter's


9/220

representation in the Commission on Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the

Senate. This is a clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate

that membership in the Commission be based on the proportional representation of the political parties.

The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of

one political party either the LAKAS-NUCD or the NPC.

xxx xxx xxx

We find the respondent's claim to membership in the Commission on Appointments by nomination and

election of the LDP majority in the Senate as not in accordance with Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987

Constitution and therefore violative of the same because it is not in compliance with the requirement

that twelve senators shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties

represented therein. To disturb the resulting fractional membership of the political parties in theCommission on Appointments by adding together two halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on

proportional representation because it will give the LDP an added member in the Commission by

utilizing the fractional membership of the minority political party, who is deprived of half a

representation.

The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character and does not leave

any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on proportional

representation; otherwise, the party with a majority representation in the Senate or the House of

Representatives can by sheer force of numbers impose its will on the hapless minority. By requiring a

proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments, Section 18 in effect works as a check

on the majority party in the Senate and helps to maintain the balance of power. No party can claim

more than what is entitled to under such rule. To allow it to elect more than its proportional share of

members is to confer upon such a party a greater share in the membership in the Commission on

Appointments and more power to impose its will on the minority, who by the same token, suffers a

diminution of its rightful membership in the Commission. 3

The membership of the late Senator Lorenzo Taada in the Commission on Appointments for the yearalluded to by respondents is not disputed. The questioned decision however refers to the former

Senator's Membership in the Commission during his first election as Senator in 1953-1954. 4 In the

following years the composition of the Commission on Appointments showed varying membership from

the Nacionalista Party and Liberal Party, not discounting the various coalitions of the rival groups within

their own ranks. During this period, his membership in the Commission was acquiesced to by the other

members of the Senate, including the Nationalista Party which had a fractional vote. His membership in


10/220

the Commission was never contested nor disputed by any party nor member of the Senate so that the

question of whether his sitting as member of the Commission was constitutionality valid or not never

reached the Court. The older Taada's membership in the Commission on Appointments cannot thus be

considered by respondent Senator Taada as a precedent sufficient to overrule the clear mandate of

Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution.

It is a matter of record that in the political ventures of the late Senator Lorenzo Taada, he had his

Citizens Party coalesce with the Nationalista Party and got himself elected as Senator under the banner

of the latter party. His election to the Commission was principally due to the alliance of his Citizens Party

with the Nationalista Party and not because he was elected thereto on the strength of his being the lone

representative of the Citizens' Party. 5 Senator Taada was included in the Nationalista Party ticket in

1953 until he parted ways temporarily with the same before the end of 1955. In 1959 he ran as a guest

candidate of the Nationalista Party for a term of 6 years and again got

re-elected in 1965 for another 6-year term under the Nationalista Party. The Nationalista-Citizens Party

coalition of 12 Senators in the Senate from

1965-1967 gave the coalition 6 members in the Commission on Appointments, including the late

Senator Lorenzo Taada. As early as those years, the Senate recognized the rule on proportional

representation in the Commission by resorting to a coalition of political parties in order to resolve and

avoid fractional membership in the Commission. This practice was repeated in

1968-1970 where the lone elected Senator of the Citizens Party was nominated and elected to the

Commission on Appointments as the Senator to complete a whole number in the proportional

representation to the Commission, with the late Senator Taada becoming the 16th Senator of theCoalition, enabling it to put 8 members in the Commission. Likewise, in 1970, the late Senator Taada

filled up the 18th membership of the Coalition to become the 9th member representing the Coalition in

the Commission.

The election of the late Senator Lorenzo Taada to the Commission on Appointments does not reflect

any practice or tradition in the Senate which can be considered as a precedent in the interpretation of

the constitutional provision on proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments. No

practice or tradition, established by a mere tolerance, can, without judicial acquiescence, ripen into a

doctrine of practical construction of the fundamental law. In the absence of judicial confirmation of theconstitutionality of the challenged legislative practice the repeated erroneous legislative interpretation

of a constitutional provision, does not vest power on the legislature. 6

2) We take note of an erroneous reference in our decision to the listing of the party affiliation of

the Senators based on the result of the election on May 11, 1992, giving the LDP only 15 members and


11/220

including Senator Teofisto Guingona as a member of the Lakas-NUCDP. Respondents, however,

accepted the fact that for purposes of determining the proportional representatives of each political

party to the Commission on Appointments, the basis thereof is the actual number of members of each

political party at the time of election of the members of the Commission on Appointments in the Senate.

7 In fact, respondents affirmed that the affiliation of Senator Guingona with the Lakas-NUCDP upheld

the doctrine enunciated in Daza vs. Singson, 8 recognizing changes in alignments of membership in theCommission based on changing political alignments at the time of the organization of the Commission

on Appointments. The issue therefore has no significance as an argument to set aside our decision.

3) Senator Taada was actually nominated by the LP because the house rules require that the

party must make the nomination. In fact he nominated himself as representative of the LP-LDP-LABAN.

It was the Majority Leader, an LDP Senator, (Senator Romulo) who presented the motion to elect

respondent Senator Taada (along with the Senators belonging to the other Minority parties NPC and

LAKAS-NUCD) as part of his function or duty to present for election and votation those previously

nominated by the various political parties. In nominating the twelve (12) Senators to the membership in

the Commission on Appointments, Senator Romulo moved:

Mr. President, pursuant to the Motion just approved, I have the honor to submit for election to the

Commission on Appointments the 12 Senators to compose its membership : Senators Angara, Herrera,

Alvarez, Aquino, Mercado, Ople, Sotto and Romulo for the LDP; Senators Tolentino and Osmea for

NPC; Senator Rasul, for Lakas-NUCD; and Senator Taada for LP-PDP, Mr. President. 9

4) This Court has ruled that, under Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution providing for a multi-

party system, entitlement to proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments requires

a minimum membership in each house. 10 The statement of this Court in Daza vs. Singson 11 to the

effect that "under the Constitutional provision on membership of the Commission on Appointments, the

members thereof are NOT limited to the majority and minority parties therein but extends to all the

political parties represented in each house of Congress", does not and should not be construed to mean

that all political parties, irrespective of numerical representation in the Senate, are entitled by

Constitutional fiat to at least one representation in the Commission. The Supreme Court in the

subsequent case of Coseteng vs. Mitra, Jr. 12 made this clear where it ruled that proportional

representation in the Commission on Appointments requires a minimum membership of a party in each

house. The mere presence of one Senator belonging to a political party does not ipso facto entitle such a

party to membership in the Commission on Appointments.


12/220

5) We have declared that the Constitution does not require that the full complement of 12

Senators be elected to the membership in the Commission on Appointments before it can discharge its

functions and that it is not mandatory to elect 12 Senators to the Commission. The overriding directive

of Article VI, Section 18 is that there must be a proportional representation of the political parties in the

membership of the Commission on Appointments and that the specification of 12 members to

constitute its membership is merely an indication of the maximum complement allowable under theConstitution. The act of filling up the membership thereof cannot disregard the mandate of proportional

representation of the parties even if it results in fractional membership in unusual situations like the

case at bar.

Section 18 provides, in part, as follows:

There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate as ex-officioChairman, twelve Senators, and . . . , elected by each house on the basis of proportional representation .

. . .

The respondent's contention that the use of the word "shall" in Section 18 indicating the composition of

the Commission on Appointments makes the election of the Senators mandatory, omitting that part of

Section 18 which provides that (they shall be) elected by each house on the basis of proportional

representation. This interpretation finds support in the case of Taada vs. Cuenco, 13 where this Court

held that the constitutional provision makes mandatory the election of the specified number of Senators

to the Commission on Appointments but also ruled that they should be elected on the basis of

proportional representation of the political parties. In case of conflict in interpretation, the latter

mandate requiring proportional representation must prevail. Such interpretation is the only correct and

rational interpretation which the court can adopt in consonance with its solemn duty to uphold the

Constitution and give effect the meaning intended by its framers to every clause and word thereof.

The Constitution does not require the election and presence of twelve Senators and twelve

Representatives in order that the Commission may function. Article VI, Section 18 which deals with the

Commission on Appointments, provides that "the Commission shall rule by majority vote of all themembers", and in Section 19 of the same Article, it is provided that the Commission "shall meet only

while Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to discharge such

powers and functions as are herein conferred upon it". In implementing these provisions, the Rules of

the Commission on Appointments provide that the presence of at least thirteen (13) members is

necessary to constitute a quorum, "Provided however, that at least four (4) of the members constituting

the quorum should come from either house". 14 Even if the composition of the Commission is fixed by


13/220

the Constitution, it can perform its functions even if not fully constituted, so long as it has the required

quorum, which is less than the full complement fixed by the Constitution. And the Commission can

validly perform its functions and transact its business even if only ten (10) Senators are elected thereto.

Even if respondent Senator Taada is excluded from the Commission on Appointments for violation of

the rule on proportional representation, the party he represents still has representation in the

Commission in the presence of house members from the LP-LDP-LABAN such as Congressman JuanPonce Enrile.

Respondents ask for a clarification of our statement which suggested a practical solution to break the

impasse in the membership of the Senate in the Commission on Appointments, which we quote:

. . . On the other hand, there is nothing to stop any of the political parties from forming a coalition with

another political party in order to fill up the two vacancies resulting from this decision. 15

The statement is merely a suggestion but not an exclusive solution. It is not part of the disposition of the

case. It does not contemplate a realignment of political parties, as otherwise this Court would have

explicitly said so. What we intimated is merely this: That those entitled to fractional memberships may

join their half-memberships to form a full membership and together nominate one from their coalition

to the Commission on Appointments. For example, the NPC and the LAKAS-NUCD may join their half-

memberships and jointly nominate one of their own Senators to the Commission. In the same way the

LDP and the LP-PDP-LABAN may nominate Senator Wigberto Taada to fill up the other slot to complete

the membership to twelve. But the latter, as a coalition, may not insist in electing both Senator Taada

and Senator Romulo to fill up two slots because this is certainly a violation of the rule on proportional

representation.

Who decides the question of proportionality? The power to choose who among them will sit as

members of the Commission on Appointments belongs to the Senate. The number of senators is fixed

by the Constitution to twelve, but the numbers of senators to be chosen must comply with the rule on

proportional representation. The question of who interprets what is meant by proportional

representation has been a settled rule that it belongs to this Court.

The acceptance by the Senate of Senator Tolentino's formula to settle temporarily the impasse

concerning the membership in the Commission on Appointments by leaving the final decision to the

Supreme Court is a Senate recognition that the determination of proportional representation under

Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution is a function of this Court.


14/220

Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before

this Court, it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by Constitutional mandate to decide. The

framers of our Constitution, in borrowing from constitutions of other states, thought it wise to vest in

the Supreme Court the role in final arbiter in cases of conflicts in the interpretation of the fundamentallaw. In this role, the Court serves as a check on the unbridled use of power by the legislative majority to

silence the minority. Democracy may breed but it will not sanction tyranny by force of numbers.

The election of respondents Senators Taada and Romulo is a clear disregard of the constitutional

provision and when done over the objections of their colleagues in the Senate, constitutes a grave abuse

of discretion. We quote from our decision:

. . . The election of Senator Romulo and Senator Taada as members of the Commission on

Appointments by the LDP Majority in the Senate was clearly a violation of Section 18 Article VI of the

1987 Constitution. Their nomination and election by the LDP Majority by sheer force of superiority in

numbers during the Senate organization meeting of August 27, 1992 was done in grave abuse of

discretion. Where power is exercised in a manner inconsistent with the command of the Constitution,

and by reason of numerical strength, knowingly and not merely inadvertently, said exercise amounts to

abuse of authority granted by law and grave abuse of discretion is properly found to exist. 16

For lack of merit, the Motions for Reconsideration are DENIED with FINALITY.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon,

Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.


15/220

# Footnotes

1 187 SCRA 377 (1990).

2 180 SCRA 496 (1989).

3 Decision, pp. 6-10; Rollo, pp. 270-274.

4 See Taada vs. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957).

5 Ibid.

6 See Board of Trustees of Lawrence University vs. Outagame County, 136 N.W. 619 (1912); Amos

vs. Moseley, 77 So. 619 (1917), 11 AM JUR 700.

7 See Comment to Petition filed by respondents Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales, Senators

Alberto Romulo and Wigberto E. Taada, p. 10; Rollo,

p. 131.

8 Supra, note 2.

9 TSN, Session of August 27, 1992, Annex "E" of Petition, p. 29; Rollo, p. 111.

10 Supra, note 1.

11 Supra, note 7.


16/220

12 Supra, note 1.

13 Supra, note 4.

14 RULES OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, Chapter 3, Sec. 10.

15 Decision, p. 12; Rollo, p. 276.

16 Decision, pp. 12-13; Rollo, pp. 276-277.

EN BANC

DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON, G.R. No. 189466

Petitioner,

Present:

Puno, C.J.,

Carpio,

Corona,

Carpio Morales,

Velasco, Jr.,

Nachura,


17/220

- versus - Leonardo-De Castro,

Brion,

Peralta,

Bersamin,

Del Castillo,

Abad,

Villarama, Jr.,

Perez, and

Mendoza, JJ.

THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL

TRIBUNAL, PERFECTO C. LUCABAN,

JR., RONYL S. DE LA CRUZ

and AGUSTIN C. DOROGA,

Respondents.

x ---------------------------------------------- x

CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. G.R. No. 189506

PALPARAN, JR.,

Petitioner,

- versus -

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES


18/220

ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET),

DR. REYNALDO LESACA, JR.,

CRISTINA PALABAY, RENATO M.

REYES, JR., ERLINDA CADAPAN,

ANTONIO FLORES and Promulgated:

JOSELITO USTAREZ,

Respondents. February 11, 2010

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

These two cases are about the authority of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) to

pass upon the eligibilities of the nominees of the party-list groups that won seats in the lower house of

Congress.

The Facts and the Case

In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list

organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections.

Respondents Perfecto C. Lucaban, Jr., Ronyl S. Dela Cruz, and Agustin C. Doroga, all registered voters,filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against Aangat Tayo and its nominee, petitioner

Abayon, in HRET Case 07-041. They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the

House of Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors.


19/220

Respondent Lucaban and the others with him further pointed out that petitioner Abayon herself was

not qualified to sit in the House as a party-list nominee since she did not belong to the marginalized and

underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent congressional district representative.

She moreover lost her bid as party-list representative of the party-list organization called An Waray in

the immediately preceding elections of May 10, 2004.

Petitioner Abayon countered that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) had already confirmed

the status of Aangat Tayo as a national multi-sectoral party-list organization representing the workers,

women, youth, urban poor, and elderly and that she belonged to the women sector. Abayon also

claimed that although she was the second nominee of An Waray party-list organization during the 2004

elections, she could not be regarded as having lost a bid for an elective office.

Finally, petitioner Abayon pointed out that respondent HRET had no jurisdiction over the petition forquo warranto since respondent Lucaban and the others with him collaterally attacked the registration of

Aangat Tayo as a party-list organization, a matter that fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. It was

Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not Abayon who was just its

nominee. All questions involving her eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of

Aangat Tayo.

On July 16, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order, dismissing the petition as against Aangat Tayo

but upholding its jurisdiction over the qualifications of petitioner Abayon.[1] The latter moved for

reconsideration but the HRET denied the same on September 17, 2009,[2] prompting Abayon to file the

present petition for special civil action of certiorari.

In G.R. 189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group that

won a seat in the 2007 elections for the members of the House of Representatives. Respondents

Reynaldo Lesaca, Jr., Cristina Palabay, Renato M. Reyes, Jr., Erlinda Cadapan, Antonio Flores, and Joselito

Ustarez are members of some other party-list groups.

Shortly after the elections, respondent Lesaca and the others with him filed with respondent HRET

a petition for quo warranto against Bantay and its nominee, petitioner Palparan, in HRET Case 07-040.

Lesaca and the others alleged that Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as

party-list nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that

Bantay represented, namely, the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units


20/220

(CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards. Lesaca and the others said that Palparan committed gross

human rights violations against marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations.

Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was

actually the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed membership in the House of

Representatives. Palparan claimed that he was just Bantays nominee. Consequently, any question

involving his eligibility as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such question must be

brought, he said, before that party-list group, not before the HRET.

On July 23, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order dismissing the petition against Bantay for the reason

that the issue of the ineligibility or qualification of the party-list group fell within the jurisdiction of the

COMELEC pursuant to the Party-List System Act. HRET, however, defended its jurisdiction over the

question of petitioner Palparans qualifications.*3+ Palparan moved for reconsideration but the HRETdenied it by a resolution dated September 10, 2009,[4] hence, the recourse to this Court through this

petition for special civil action of certiorari and prohibition.

Since the two cases raise a common issue, the Court has caused their consolidation.

The Issue Presented

The common issue presented in these two cases is:

Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners

Abayon and Palparan as nominees of Aangat Tayo and Bantay party-list organizations, respectively, who

took the seats at the House of Representatives that such organizations won in the 2007 elections.

The Courts Ruling

Petitioners Abayon and Palparan have a common theory: Republic Act (R.A.) 7941, the Party-List System

Act, vests in the COMELEC the authority to determine which parties or organizations have the

qualifications to seek party-list seats in the House of Representatives during the elections. Indeed, the


21/220

HRET dismissed the petitions for quo warranto filed with it insofar as they sought the disqualifications of

Aangat Tayo and Bantay. Since petitioners Abayon and Palparan were not elected into office but were

chosen by their respective organizations under their internal rules, the HRET has no jurisdiction to

inquire into and adjudicate their qualifications as nominees.

If at all, says petitioner Abayon, such authority belongs to the COMELEC which already upheld her

qualification as nominee of Aangat Tayo for the women sector. For Palparan, Bantays personality is so

inseparable and intertwined with his own person as its nominee so that the HRET cannot dismiss the

quo warranto action against Bantay without dismissing the action against him.

But, although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization

that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the

Constitution,*5+ identifies who the members ofthat House are:

Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and

fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned

among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their

respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided

by law, shall be elected through a partylist system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties

or organizations. (Underscoring supplied)

Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: members x x x who shall be

elected from legislative districts and those who x x x shall be elected through a party-list system of

registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. This means that, from the

Constitutions point of view, it is the party-list representatives who are elected into office, not their

parties or organizations. These representatives are elected, however, through that peculiar party-list

system that the Constitution authorized and that Congress by law established where the voters cast

their votes for the organizations or parties to which such party-list representatives belong.

Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are treated in like

manner. They have the same deliberative rights, salaries, and emoluments. They can participate in the

making of laws that will directly benefit their legislative districts or sectors. They are also subject to the

same term limitation of three years for a maximum of three consecutive terms.


22/220

It may not be amiss to point out that the Party-List System Act itself recognizes party-list nominees as

members of the House of Representatives, thus:

Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of

representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national,

regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens

belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack

well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of

appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of

Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party

system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the

House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature,

and shall provide the simplest scheme possible. (Underscoring supplied)

As this Court also held in Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. Commission on Elections,[6] a party-list

representative is in every sense an elected member of the House of Representatives. Although the

vote cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its

nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives.

Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications and grounds for

disqualification of party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A. 7941, echoing the Constitution, states:

Sec. 9. Qualification of Party-List Nominees.No person shall be nominated as party-list representative

unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a

period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and

write, bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90)

days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the

election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty

(30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of

thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue until the expiration of his term.


23/220

In the cases before the Court, those who challenged the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and

Palparan claim that the two do not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that they

ought to represent. The Party-List System Act provides that a nominee must be a bona fide member of

the party or organization which he seeks to represent.*7+

It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nomineethe need for

him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his party-list organizationin the context of

the facts that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparans relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay,

respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented interests that they presumably embody.

Petitioners Abayon and Palparan of course point out that the authority to determine the qualifications

of a party-list nominee belongs to the party or organization that nominated him. This is true, initially.

The right to examine the fitness of aspiring nominees and, eventually, to choose five from among themafter all belongs to the party or organization that nominates them.[8] But where an allegation is made

that the party or organization had chosen and allowed a disqualified nominee to become its party-list

representative in the lower House and enjoy the secured tenure that goes with the position, the

resolution of the dispute is taken out of its hand.

Parenthetically, although the Party-List System Act does not so state, the COMELEC seems to believe,

when it resolved the challenge to petitioner Abayon, that it has the power to do so as an incident of its

authority to approve the registration of party-list organizations. But the Court need not resolve this

question since it is not raised here and has not been argued by the parties.

What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution[9] provides that the HRET shall be the

sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House

of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are elected members of the

House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear

and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party

or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and

assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over electioncontests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.*10+

The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the

petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction

over the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.


24/220

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the consolidated petitions and AFFIRMS the Order dated July 16,

2009 and Resolution 09-183 dated September 17, 2009 in HRET Case 07-041 of the House of

Representatives Electoral Tribunal as well as its Order dated July 23, 2009 and Resolution 09-178 dated

September 10, 2009 in HRET Case 07-040.

SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice


25/220

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.


ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO


ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA


LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO



26/220

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE P. PEREZ


JOSE C. MENDOZA

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the

above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the

opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice


27/220

[1] Rollo (G.R. No. 189466), pp. 147-148.

[2] Id. at 25-26, Resolution 09-183.

[3] Rollo (G.R. No. 189506), pp. 53-54.

[4] Id. at 83-84.

[5] Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which

shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their

respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall

be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be

Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on

the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations

registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal

shall be its Chairman.

[6] G.R. No. 177271, May 4, 2007, 523 SCRA 1, 16-17.

[7] Republic Act 7941, Section 9.

[8] Republic Act 7941, Section 13.

[9] Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which

shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their

respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall

be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be

Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on

the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations

registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal

shall be its Chairman.

[10] Seeres v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 178678, April 16, 2009.


Supreme Court

Manila


28/220

EN BANC

JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG,

Petitioner,

- versus -

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NAPOLEON N. CAMERO and RENALD F. VILLANDO,

Respondents.

x -------------------------------------------- x

LOUIS C. BIRAOGO,

Petitioner,

- versus -

HON. PROSPERO NOGRALES, Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the

Philippines, and JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG,

Respondents.

x---------------------------------------------x

OLIVIA P. PARAS,


29/220

Petitioner,

- versus -

HON. PROSPERO NOGRALES, in his capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives; HON. ROBERTO

NAZARENO, in his capacity as Secretary General of the House of Representatives; HON. RHODORA

SEVILLA, in her capacity as Deputy Secretary General for Finance of the House of Representatives; THE

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG,

Respondents.

x ------------------------------------------- x

RENALD F. VILLANDO,

Petitioner,

- versus -


30/220

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG,

Respondents.

G.R. Nos. 178831-32

G.R. No. 179120


31/220

G.R. Nos. 179132-33


32/220

G.R. Nos. 179240-41

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,

QUISUMBING,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

CARPIO,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CORONA,

CARPIO MORALES,

TINGA,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BRION, and


33/220

PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:

April 1, 2009

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J.:

Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a

Member of the House of Representatives, the jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral

Tribunal begins

over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications, and mere allegation as to the

invalidity of her proclamation does not divest the Electoral Tribunal of its jurisdiction.

At the core of these contentious consolidated petitions are: (1) the Joint Resolution[1] of the

Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division dated May 17, 2007, disqualifying Jocelyn D. Sy

Limkaichong (Limkaichong) from running as a congressional candidate for the First District of Negros

Oriental; (2) the COMELEC En Banc Resolution[2] dated June 29, 2007, affirming her disqualification; and

(3) the COMELEC En Banc Resolution[3] dated August 16, 2007, resolving that all pending incidents

relating to her qualifications should now be determined by the House of Representatives ElectoralTribunal (HRET).

The facts are uncontroverted. On March 26, 2007, Limkaichong filed with the COMELEC her

Certificate of Candidacy[4] (COC) for the position of Representative of the First District of Negros

Oriental.


34/220

In the following weeks, two (2) petitions for her disqualification were instituted before the

COMELEC by concerned citizens coming from her locality. On April 4, 2007, Napoleon Camero, a

registered voter of La Libertad, Negros Oriental, filed the petition for her disqualification on the ground

that she lacked the citizenship requirement of a Member of the House of Representatives. The petition,which was docketed as SPA No. (PES) A07-006,[5] alleged that she is not a natural-born Filipino because

her parents were Chinese citizens at the time of her birth. On April 11, 2007, Renald F. Villando, also a

registered voter of the same locality, filed the second petition on the same ground of citizenship,

docketed as SPA (PES) No. A07-007.[6] He claimed that when Limkaichong was born, her parents were

still Chinese citizens as the proceedings for the naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father, never attained

finality due to procedural and substantial defects. Both petitions prayed for the cancellation of

Limkaichong's COC and for the COMELEC to strike out her name from the list of qualified candidates for

the Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental.

In her separate Answers[7] to the petitions, Limkaichong claimed that she is a natural-born Filipino

since she was born to a naturalized Filipino father and a natural-born Filipino mother, who had

reacquired her status as such due to her husband's naturalization. Thus, at the time of her birth on

November 9, 1959, nineteen (19) days had already passed after her father took his Oath of Allegiance on

October 21, 1959 and after he was issued a Certificate of Naturalization on the same day. She

contended that the COMELEC should dismiss the petitions outright for lack of cause of action. Citing

Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections,[8] she averred that a petition filed before an election,

questioning the qualification of a candidate, should be based on Section 78,[9] in relation to Section

74[10] of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC),[11] and not under Sections 68[12] and 74 thereof in relation

to Section 1,[13] Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure[14] and Section 5,[15] paragraph C (3.a) of

COMELEC Resolution No. 7800.[16] She also contended that the petitions were dismissible on the

ground that they were in the nature of a collateral attack on her and her fathers citizenships, in

contravention of the well-established rule that attack on one's citizenship may only be made through a

direct action for its nullity.

The COMELEC consolidated the two (2) petitions and re-docketed them as SPA Nos. 07-247[17]

and 07-248,[18] entitled IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO DISQUALIFY JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG

FROM HER CANDIDACY AS FIRST DISTRICT REPRESENTATIVE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL (herein referred to asthe disqualification cases), which remained pending on May 14, 2007, when the National and Local

Elections were conducted.


35/220

After the casting, counting and canvassing of votes in the said elections, Limkaichong emerged as

the winner with 65,708 votes[19] or by a margin of 7,746 votes over another congressional candidate,

Olivia Paras[20] (Paras), who obtained 57,962.

On May 15, 2007, Paras filed with the COMELEC a Very Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene and

to Suspend the Proclamation of Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong as Winning Candidate of the First District of

Negros Oriental.[21]

In a Joint Resolution[22] dated May 17, 2007, the COMELEC Second Division granted the

petitions in the disqualification cases, disqualified Limkaichong as a candidate for Representative of the

First District of Negros Oriental, directed the Provincial Supervisor of the COMELEC to strike out her

name from the list of eligible candidates, and for the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) to suspend

her proclamation. In disposing the cases, the COMELEC Second Division made the followingratiocination:

On the substantial issue of whether respondent Jocelyn Sy-Limkaichong is disqualified to run for

the congressional seat of the First District of Negros Oriental on the ground that she is not a natural-

born Filipino, we hold that she is so disqualified.

Petitioners have successfully discharged their burden of proof and has convincingly shown with

pieces of documentary evidence that Julio Ong Sy, father of herein respondent Jocelyn Sy-Limkaichong,

failed to acquire Filipino citizenship in the naturalization proceedings which he underwent for the said

purpose.

An examination of the records of Special Case No. 1043 would reveal that the Office of the

Solicitor General was deprived of its participation in all the stages of the proceedings therein, as

required under Commonwealth Act No. 473 or the Revised Naturalization Law and Republic Act No. 530,

An Act Making Additional Provisions for Naturalization.

x x x

The documents presented by petitioners showed that the OSG was not furnished copies of two

material orders of the trial court in the said proceedings. One was the July 9, 1957 Order granting his


36/220

petition for naturalization and the other was the September 21, 1959 Order declaring Julio Ong Sy as a

Filipino citizen.

Moreover, from a perusal of the same page 171 of the OSG logbook, we have determined that

the OSG did not receive a notice for the hearing conducted by the trial court on July 9, 1959, prior to its

issuance of the September 12, 1959 Order declaring Julio Ong Sy as a Filipino citizen.

As correctly pointed out by petitioners, this was fatal to the naturalization proceedings of Julio

Ong Sy, and prevented the same from gaining finality. The leading case in the matter is Republic v. Hon.

Gabriel V. Valero, 136 SCRA 617 (May 31, 1985), wherein the Supreme Court declared:

And as though that was not enough, the hearing prior to the oathtaking of respondent Tan wasconducted without the required notice to the Solicitor General. It is true, as it appeared later, that Fiscal

Veluz, Jr. was authorized by the Solicitor General to represent the Government in the hearing of the

application for naturalization. That authority, however, does not extend to Fiscal *Veluzs+ right to

appear for the State in the hearing preparatory to the oathtaking. Private respondent Tan was therefore

under legal obligation to serve copy of his motion to be allowed to take his oath of allegiance as a

Filipino citizen upon the Solicitor General which was not done.

Respondent argues that upon his taking of the Oath of Allegiance, Julio Ong Sy became a Filipino

citizen for all intents and purposes, with all the rights appurtenant thereto.

This argument does not hold water, as was held by the Supreme Court in the same case of

Republic v. Valero, supra:

That private respondent Tan had already taken his oath of allegiance does not in any way legalize

the proceedings relative thereto which is pregnant with legal infirmities. Compounding these

irregularities is the fact that Tan was allowed to take his oath even before the expiration of the thirty

(30)-day period within which an appeal may be made thus making the said oath not only highly

improper but also illegal.

In the same case, the Supreme Court added:


37/220

To sustain the same would be to sanction a monstrosity known as citizenship by estoppel. The

grant of naturalization under such circumstances is illegal and cancellation thereof may be had at any

time. Neither estoppel nor res judicata may be set up as a bar from instituting the necessary

proceedings to nullify the certificate of naturalization so issued.

Another glaring defect in the said proceedings was the fact that Julio Ong Sy took his Oath of

Allegiance on October 21, 1959, which was exactly thirty (30) days after his declaration as a naturalized

Filipino.

Even granting that the OSG was notified of the September 21, 1959 Order, this was still one day

short of the reglementary period required under Sections 11 and 12 of C.A. No. 473, above-cited.

The thirty-day reglementary period is so required under the law so that the OSG could make

known his objections and to appeal from the order of the trial court declaring the petitioner a

naturalized Filipino citizen. This is also the reason why a copy of the petitioners motion to take his oath

of allegiance has to be furnished to the OSG.

The respondent insists that naturalization proceedings are in rem and are binding on the whole

world.

She would have been correct had all the necessary parties to the case been informed of the same.

The OSG, being the counsel for the government, has to participate in all the proceedings so that it could

be bound by what has transpired therein. Lacking the participation of this indispensable party to the

same, the proceedings are null and void and, hence, no rights could arise therefrom.

From all the foregoing, therefore, it could be seen that Julio Ong Sy did not acquire Filipinocitizenship through the naturalization proceedings in Special Case No. 1043. Thus, he was only able to

transmit to his offspring, Chinese citizenship.


38/220

Respondent Jocelyn Sy-Limkaichong being the daughter of Julio Ong Sy, and having been born on

November 9, 1959, under the 1935 Philippine Constitution, is a Chinese national, and is disqualified to

run as First District Representative of Negros Oriental.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are GRANTED and Jocelyn D. Sy-Limkaichong is declared as DISQUALIFIED

from her candidacy for Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental.

The Provincial Supervisor of the Commission on Elections of Negros Oriental is hereby directed to strike

out the name JOCELYN SY-LIMKAICHONG from the list of eligible candidates for the said position, and

the concerned Board of Canvassers is hereby directed to hold and/or suspend the proclamation of

JOCELYN SY-LIMKAICHONG as winning candidate, if any, until this decision has become final.

SO ORDERED.[23]

The PBOC received the Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division on the evening of May

17, 2007, and accordingly suspended the proclamation of Limkaichong.[24]

The following day, or on May 18, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution No. 8062[25] adopting

the policy-guidelines of not suspending the proclamation of winning candidates with pending

disqualification cases which shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution

of the involved cases.

On May 20, 2007, Limkaichong filed with the COMELEC a Motion for Reconsideration of the Joint

Resolution of May 17, 2007 and Urgent Motion to Lift the Order Suspending Proclamation.[26]

On May 22, 2007, Limkaichong filed another motion for the lifting of the directive suspending her

proclamation, insisting that she should be proclaimed as the winner in the congressional race pursuant

to COMELEC Resolution No. 8062.[27] On same date, Villando, one of the petitioners in the

disqualification cases, filed an Urgent Manifestation Clarifying COMELEC Resolution No. 8062 with

Motion,*28+ praying that the COMELEC should not lift the suspension of Limkaichongs proclamation.


39/220

On May 25, 2007, the PBOC, in compliance with COMELEC Resolution No. 8062, reconvened and

proclaimed Limkaichong as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the First

District of Negros Oriental.[29]

Thereafter, or on May 30, 2007, Paras filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Nullify and/or Annul the

Proclamation of Jocelyn Sy-Limkaichong as First District Representative of Negros Oriental in relation to

the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division,[30] stating, among others, that

Limkaichong's proclamation violated the earlier order of the COMELEC Second Division suspending her

proclamation. The petition, docketed as SPC No. 07-211, was dismissed by the COMELEC First

Division,[31] ratiocinating that the disqualification cases were not yet final when Limkaichong was

proclaimed. Accordingly, her proclamation which was valid or legal, effectively divested the COMELEC

of its jurisdiction over the cases. The COMELEC First Division explained its ruling in this wise:

The Commission has made its intention in issuing Resolution No. 8062 very clear in that there shall be no

suspension of proclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualification cases involving, among

others, issues of citizenship. As the disqualification cases involving Limkaichong were still pending

reconsideration by the en banc, the underlying policy which gave rise to the issuance of the Resolution:

to respect the will of the Filipino electorate, applies to the suspension of proclamation of the winning

congressional candidate for the First District of Negros Oriental.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is dismissed.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis ours)

Dissatisfied, Paras moved for the reconsideration of the above Resolution.[32]

Meanwhile, in a Resolution[33] dated June 29, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc, in an equally divided vote

of 3:3, denied Limkaichongs motion for reconsideration of the Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second

Division in the disqualification cases. The pertinent portions of the Resolution denying her motion

reads:


40/220

Anent the issue of jurisdiction, We rule that the Commission has jurisdiction to rule on

Respondent Limkaichongs Motion for Reconsideration notwithstanding her proclamation as it is only

this Commission, and not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which has jurisdiction

to review resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC, whether issued by a division or en banc. As stated

by the Supreme Court in the leading case of Codilla v. De Venecia, G.R. No. 150605, December 10, 2002,

respondent herself seasonably challenged the validity of the resolution of the Second Division in hermotion for reconsideration. Hence, the issue of respondents disqualification was still within the

exclusive jurisdiction of the Comelec En Banc to resolve, and HRET cannot assume jurisdiction on the

matter, to wit:

To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the Resolution of

the COMELEC Second Division was seasonably challenged by the petitioner in his Motion for

Reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Comelec En Banc to resolve.

Hence, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.

In Puzon v. Cua, even the HRET ruled that the doctrinal ruling that once a proclamation has been

made and a candidate-elect has assumed office, it is this Tribunal that has jurisdiction over an election

contest involving members of the House of Representatives, could not have been immediately

applicable due to the issue regarding the validity of the very COMELEC pronouncements themselves.

This is because the HRET has no jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC, whether

issued by a division or en banc.

Finally, in disposing the Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration with Partial Motion for

Reconsideration filed by intervenor Olivia P. Paras praying that she be proclaimed as the winning

candidate for First District Representative, suffice it to say that in the same case of Codilla v. De Venecia,

supra, the Supreme Court held, thus:

More brazen is the proclamation of respondent Locsin which violates the settled doctrine that the

candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the

winning candidate is disqualified. In every election, the peoples choice is the paramount considerationand their expressed will must, at all times, be given effect. When the majority speaks and elects into

office a candidate by giving him the highest number of votes cast in the election for the office, no one

can be declared elected in his place. In Domino v. COMELEC, this Court ruled, viz.:


41/220

It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to

suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed winner and

imposed as representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through

their ballots that they do not choose him. To simplistically assume that the second placer would have

received that (sic) other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voters. He could

not be considered the first among the qualified candidates because in a field which excludes thequalified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed.

x x x

The effect of a decision declaring a person ineligible to hold an office is only that the election fails

entirely, that the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified winner to the repudiated

loser because the law then as now only authorizes a declaration in favor of the person who has obtaineda plurality of votes, and does not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be

declared elected. In such case, the electors have failed to make a choice and the election is a nullity. To

allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the elective position despite his rejection by

the electorate is to disenfranchise the electorate without any fault on their part and to undermine the

importance and meaning of democracy and the peoples right to elect officials of their choice.

All told, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of this Commission (Second Division) in

its Joint Resolution promulgated on May 17, 2007.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Motion for Reconsideration of Respondent Jocelyn Sy-

Limkaichong is hereby DENIED.

The Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration with Partial Motion for Reconsideration filed by

Intervenor Olivia P. Paras praying that she be proclaimed as the winning candidate for the First District

Representative of Negros Oriental is hereby denied for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[34]


42/220

On July 3, 2007, Limkaichong filed in the disqualification cases against her a Manifestation and Motion

for Clarification and/or To Declare the Petitions as Dismissed in Accordance with Section 6, Rule 18 of

the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.[35] She contended that, with her proclamation, her having taken her

oath of office and her assumption of the position, the COMELEC was divested of jurisdiction to hear the

disqualification cases. She further contended that, following Section 6,[36] Rule 18 of the COMELEC

Rules of Procedure, the disqualification cases would have to be reheard, and if on rehearing, no decisionwould be reached, the action or proceedings should be dismissed, because the COMELEC En Banc was

equally divided in opinion when it resolved her motion for reconsideration.

On an even date, Paras wrote the House of Representatives informing it of the COMELEC En Banc

Resolution dated June 29, 2007 upholding the Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division dated

May 17, 2007, which disqualified Limkaichong as a congressional candidate.[37]

In the interim, then Speaker of the House of Representatives Jose de Venecia, Jr. (De Venecia)

allowed Limkaichong to officially assume the office as a Member of the House of Representatives on July

23, 2007, as shown in the Journal of the House of Representatives.[38]

Despite Limkaichongs repeated pleas for the resolution of her manifestation and motion for

clarification,[39] the COMELEC did not resolve the same. Hence, on August 1, 2007, she filed with this

Court a Petition for Certiorari[40] under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure docketed as G.R. Nos. 178831-32 praying for the annulment of the May 17, 2007 Joint

Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division and the June 29, 2007 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc

in the disqualification cases for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of

jurisdiction. She averred that since she was already proclaimed on May 25, 2007 as Representative of

the First District of Negros Oriental, had assumed office on June 30, 2007, and had started to perform

her duties and functions as such, the COMELEC had lost its jurisdiction and it is now the HRET which has

jurisdiction over any issue involving her qualifications for the said office.

On August 16, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc ruled on Limkaichongs manifestation and motion for

clarification,[41] with the following disquisition:

In view of the proclamation of Limkaichong and her subsequent assumption of office on June 30,

2007, this Commission rules that all pending incidents relating to the qualifications of Limkaichong

should now be determined by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in accordance with the

above-quoted provision of the Constitution.


43/220

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission resolved, as it hereby resolves, that all

pending incidents relating to the qualifications of Jocelyn S. Limkaichong as Member of the House of

Representatives should now be determined by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis ours)

On August 24, 2007, Louis Biraogo (Biraogo), as a citizen and a taxpayer, filed with the Court a

Petition for Prohibition and Injunction with Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining

Order[42] under Section 2, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, docketed as G.R. No. 179120,

seeking to enjoin and permanently prohibit: (a) De Venecia from allowing Limkaichong to sit in theHouse of Representatives and participate in all its official activities; and (b) Limkaichong from holding

office as its Member.[43]

Meanwhile, on August 28, 2007, Paras has instituted before the Court a Petition for Quo

Warranto, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order

and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction[44] under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, docketed

as G.R. Nos. 179132-33, seeking, among others, the ouster of Limkaichong from the House of

Representatives on account of her disqualification and for the holding of special elections to fill the

vacancy created by such.[45]

On even date, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution[46] denying Villando's

motion to suspend the proclamation of Limkaichong, which denial was affirmed by the COMELEC En

Banc in a Resolution[47] dated February 1, 2008.

On September 5, 2008, Villando also filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari and Injunction

with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order[48] under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of

Civil Procedure, docketed as G.R. Nos. 179240-41, contending, among others, that the COMELEC En

Banc gravely abused its discretion in issuing the August 16, 2007 Resolution[49] because it still acted on

Limchaikongs manifestation and motion for clarification, notwithstanding that the same was not set for

hearing and considering that its June 29, 2007 Resolution had already become final and executory.


44/220

As the four (4) petitions are interrelated, the Court resolved to consolidate them in its Resolutions

dated September 4 and 11, 2007.

The Court heard the parties in oral argument on August 26, 2008, during which the following issues

were tackled:

1. Whether the proclamation of Limkaichong by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Negros Oriental

is valid;

2. Whether said proclamation divested the Commission on Elections of jurisdiction to resolve the issue

of Limkaichong's citizenship;

3. Whether the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal shall assume jurisdiction, in lieu of the

COMELEC, over the issue of Limkaichong's citizenship;

4. Whether the COMELEC Second Division and the COMELEC En Banc correctly ruled that Limkaichong is

disqualified from running as a Member of the House of Representatives on the ground that she is not a

natural-born citizen;

5. Whether the COMELEC disqualification of Limkaichong is final and executory; and,

6. Whether the Speaker of the House of Representatives may be compelled to prohibit Limkaichong

from assuming her duties as a Member of the House of Representatives.

On same day, the Court required the parties to simultaneously file within twenty (20) days their

respective memoranda, after which the petitions shall be deemed submitted for resolution, with or

without the memoranda.


45/220

Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides for the qualification of a Member of the

House of Representatives, thus:

Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born

citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read

and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall

be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day

of the election.

When Limkaichong filed her COC, she stated therein that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. It

was not true, according to the petitioners in the disqualification cases, because her father remained a

Chinese citizen at the time of her birth. The COMELEC Second Division has sided with Camero and

Villando, and disqualified Limkaichong to run as a congressional candidate in the First District of Negros

Oriental for having failed to comply with the citizenship requirement. Accordingly, her proclamation

was ordered suspended notwithstanding that she obtained the highest number of votes during the

elections. Nonetheless, she was proclaimed by the PBOC pursuant to the policy guidelines of COMELEC

En Banc Resolution No. 8062, and she has since assumed her position and performed her functions as a

Member of the House of Representatives.

I

Whether Limkaichongs proclamation was valid.

The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. The COMELEC Second Division rendered its Joint

Resolution dated May 17, 2007. On May 20, 2007, Limkaichong timely filed with the COMELEC En Banc

her motion for reconsideration as well as for the lifting of the incorporated directive suspending her

proclamation. The filing of the motion for reconsideration effectively suspended the execution of the


46/220

May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution.[50] Since the execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution was

suspended, there was no impediment to the valid proclamation of Limkaichong as the winner. Section

2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:

Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration.A motion to reconsider a decision,

resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days from the promulgation thereof.

Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends the execution for implementation of the decision, resolution,

order and ruling.

In G.R. Nos. 179132-33, Paras, however, maintained that Limkaichong was a Chinese citizen who was

disqualified to run as a congressional candidate by way of a final judgment of the COMELEC. With that,

her proclamation was questionable and the same was done in open defiance of the Joint Resolution

dated May 17, 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division. She also stressed that Limkaichong's

proclamation was procedurally defective, it appearing that one of the PBOC members was not present

on May 25, 2007, and that it took place in a restaurant and not at the provincial capitol. Finally, she

argued that Limkaichongs proclamation was void in accordance with the Court's pronouncement in the

case of Codilla v. De Venecia.[51]

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Comment on the petition of Paras, expressing its

support for the position taken by the latter.

A perusal of the arguments advanced by Paras and the OSG does not sway the Court to rule against the

validity of Limkaichongs proclamation. No less than the COMELEC First Division has sustained the


47/220

validity of her proclamation when it dismissed, by way of a Resolution dated June 29, 2007, the petition

filed by Paras to nullify the proclamation. Not only that. The COMELEC First Division has also adopted

Limkaichongs argument that following her valid proclamation, the COMELECs jurisdiction over the

disqualification cases has ceased and that the same should be threshed out in the proper proceedings

filed before the HRET. Notably, the dismissal of Paras petition was affirmed by the COMELEC in its

Omnibus Order dated January 28, 2008.

In addition, the validity of Limkaichong's proclamation is in accordance with COMELEC En Banc

Resolution No. 8062. The disqualification cases filed against her remained pending as a result of her

timely motion for reconsideration. Villando (in G.R. Nos. 179240-41), however, maintained that

Resolution No. 8062 is invalid; hence, it could not be used as basis to validate Limkaichong'sproclamation. He argued that it must be publish

consti cases jimenez to guingona - wlc

Documents