consti art iii section 5a

8/10/2019 Consti Art III Section 5a

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THE NEW ORDER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IIDIGESTS:ARTICLE III(BILL OF RIGHTS) 1

PROVI QUALITY CONTROL:CHATTO,MARCELO,RETIRADO

SECTION 5

NON-ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION

(Taken from p. 84 of the primer)To be allowable, government aid

(1) Must have a secular legislative purpose(2) Must have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion(3) Must not require excessive entanglement with recipient institutions

Thus, State-sponsored Bible readings and prayers in public schools havebeen invalidated for violation of (1) and (2) School District vs Schempp.

On the other hand, the lending of secular textbooks to parochial schoolchildren and the grant of construction aid for science buildings have beenallowed as satisfying (1) and (2) Board of Education vs Allen, Lemon vsKurtzman

Similarly, our Court has allowed the issuance of religious commemorativestamps as giving merely incidental benefits to religion.Aglipay vs Ruiz

However, in the same Lemon case, supra, salary payments and

reimbursements for secular textbooks and other instructional materials undera system involving close government supervision were invalidated as notsatisfying (3).

AGLIPAY vs RUIZ(FONACIER)

KEY TAKE-AWAY: The Court allowed for the issuance of religiouscommemorative stamps, even if there were incidental benefits to theChurch, since those benefits, if any, were NOT the primary aim andpurposeof the issuance of the stamps, the main purpose being to generate

profitand boost tourism.DATE/GR NO/SCRA: GR. No. L-45459 March 13, 1937 / 64 Phil. 201PONENTE: Laurel, J.PETITIONER: Gregorio AglipayRESPONDENT: Juan Ruiz

FACTS:

Petition: Mons. (Monsignor) Gregorio Aglipay (Supreme Head of thePhilippine Independent Church), seeks a writ of prohibition toprevent Juan Ruiz (Director of Posts) from issuing and sellingstamps commemorative of the 33rd International EucharisticCongress

Factual Antecedents: May, 1936 Director of Postsannounced he would be issuing and

selling stamps commemorating the celebration of the 33rdInternational Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholicchurch

Petitioner, considering it his civic duty, requested Vicente

Sotto to denounce the matter to the Pres. Despite petitioners protests, respondent publicly announcesthat he has sent the designs of the postage stamps to theUS for printing.

Design: "In the center is a chalice, with grape vine and stalks ofwheat as border design. The stamps are blue, green, brown, cardinalred, violet and orange

The government appropriated money for the stamps and expected togenerate a revenue of Php 1.6 million

Statute Involved: Section 23, subsection 3, Article VI of the Constitution provides: No

public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or

used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect,church, denomination, secretarian, institution, or system of religion,or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, orother religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest,preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or toany penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium.

Act No. 4052 of the Philippine LegislaturePosition of Petitioner/s:

The selling of these religious commemorative stamps are violativeof the Constitution for violating the separation of the Church andState

Position of Respondent/s:

No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibitingthe free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religiousprofession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever

be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil orpolitical rights.


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Was merely acting within the powers granted to him by Act No. 4052

ISSUE: W/N the selling of religious commemorative stamps are violative of

the Constitution

HELD/RATIO:NO

Court recognizes that the prohibition is being sought with basis of theprinciple of separation of church and state. This inclusion of thisprinciple in our Constitution is also why we have this idea ofReligious freedom.

Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that bindsand elevates man to his Creator is recognized.

Reinforced by the use of Divine Providence in thepreamble (Constitution of 1937, different in the 1987Constitution) - In other words the Government recognizesthat religion is a major influence of the people which iswhy they allow certain tax exemptions, holidays in

respect of certain religions, optional religious instructionin schoolsis allowed, etc.

Act No. 4052 calls for the appropriation of a sum of 60,000 pesosmade available to the Director of Posts to dispose of in a mannerdeemed advantageous to the Government

Printing new stamps falls within this. Money was used tocover the cost of plates and printing of postage stamps withnew designs. Approved by the President

The revenue generated by the stamps was 1,618,179.10,and what remains to be sold are worth 1,402,279.02.Prohibition of the sale of stamps would potentially deny theGovernment of 1,402,279.02 pesos.

Court rules that Act No. 4052 contemplates NO religious purpose.It only gives discretionary power to the Director of Posts to issuespecial postage if he deems it advantageous to the government.

Issuance of these stamps were not influenced by any particular sector church

They were NOT issued and sold for the benefit of theRoman Catholic church

Money derived from sales were not given to the church;purpose was to advertise the Philippines and attractmore tourists

Replaced Catholic Chalice with a map of thePhilippines - Focused more on Manila being the

SEAT of the Congress, NOT particularly theCongress itself

Although stamps are of religious character, if there was anybenefit from the propaganda received by the Church, it wasnot the aim and purpose of the Government

The resulting propaganda in favor of the church is merely incidental and should NOT frustrate the

main purpose of the law (which is to generateprofitand boost tourism)

Government should not be embarrassed in itsactivities simply because of incidental results.

Final Ruling Petition for the writ of prohibition DENIED

TARUC vs BISHOP(GARCIA)

KEY TAKE-AWAY: The expulsion/excommunication of members of areligious institution or organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the

officials, and the laws and canons, of said institution or organization.DATE/GR NO/SCRA:G.R. No. 144801, March 10 2005PONENTE: CORONA J.PETITIONER: DOMINADOR L. TARUC, WILBERTO DACERA, NICANORGALANIDA, RENERIO CANTA, JERRY CANTA, CORDENCIO CONSIGNA,SUSANO ALCALA, LEONARDO DIZON, SALVADOR GELSANO andBENITO LAUGORESPONDENT : BISHOP PORFIRIO B. DE LA CRUZ, REV. FR. RUSTOMFLORANO and DELFIN BORDASFACTS:Petition:

Petition to review the decision of the CA which dismissed the case

because of lack of jurisdictionFactual Antecedents: Petitioners are lay members of the Philippine Independent Church

(PIC), Socorro, Surigao del Norte Petitioners led by Taruc clamored for the transfer of their parish

priest, Fr. Rustom Florano for the reason that Fr. Florano's wifebelonged to the political party opposed to petitioner Taruc's. BishopDela Cruz found this reason flimsy so he did not give in to therequest.

Things worsened when Taruc conducted an open mass without theconsent of Bishop Dela Cruz during the town fiesta which wascelebrated by a certain Fr. Ambong who was NOT a member if theclergy of the diocese of Surigao and the credentials of the latter as a


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priest were doubtful. Bishop Dela Cruz declared petitioners expelled/excommunicated

from the PICon the following grounds: Disobedience to duly constituted authority in the church Inciting dissension For threatening to forcibly occupy the Parish Church causing

anxiety and fear among the general membership

Petitioners sought reconsideration before Obispo Maximo but thelatter said: "I do not intervene in your diocesan decision in asking Fr.

Florano to vacate Socorro parish" Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed

a complaint for damages with preliminary injuction against BishopDela Cruz before the RTC of Surigao.

They impleaded Fr. Florano and a certain Delfin Bodas onthe theory that they conspired with the bishop to havepetitioners expelled and excommunicatedfrom the PIC.

Respondents filed a motion to dismiss before the RTC on the groundof lack of jurisdiction but they were denied.

The CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and ordereddismissal of the case: The CA found it unnecessary to deal on the validity of

expulsion/excommunication of Taruc et al. said acts beingpurely ecclesiastical matters which the Court considers to beoutside the province of the civil courts

Statute Involved: Section 5, Article III

No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religionor prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exerciseand enjoyment of religious profession and worship, withoutdiscrimination or preference, shall forecer be allowed. No

religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil orpolitical rightsISSUE:

W/N the court has jurisdiction to hear a case involving theexpulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution

HELD/RATIO:NO

In our jurisdiction, the Church and the State are held to beseparate and distinct from each other.

"Give to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's" The expusion/excommunication of members of a religious institution

or organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials,

and the laws and canons, of said institution or organization. Citing Justice Samuel Miller

"All those who unite themselves to an ecclesiasticalbody do so with an implied consent to submit to theChurch government and they are bound to submit to it"

Citing the landmark case of Fonacier v CA In disputes involving religious institutions or organizations,

there is one area which the court should NOT touch:doctrinal and disciplinary differences

As regards petitioner's claim that they were not heard: Records show that Bishop Dela Cruz pleaded with

petitioners several times not to commit acts inimical to thebest interest of the PIC

They were also warned of the consequences of their actions.Final Ruling

Petition DENIED for lack of merit

GARCES vs ESTENZO(GUERRERO)

KEY TAKEAWAY:A statute by a local government intended to facilitate theworship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition of an image) is neitherillegal nor violative of the doctrine of separation of church and state. Thechurch cannot also take custody over an item if its not acquired by churchmoney/property.

The resolutions were NOT enacted for the purpose of favoring thechurch or any religion, NOR did it authorize the allocation of publicfunds for religious purposes. In fact, private funds were used topurchase the image. Since the Barangay is the owner of the said image,then it has the right to determine who shall exercise custody over it.

PETITIONER: ANDRES GARCES, Reverend Father SERGIO MARILAOOSMEA, NICETAS DAGAR and JESUS EDULLANTESRESPONDENT: Hon. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO, Presiding Judge of theCourt of First Instance of Leyte, Ormoc City Branch V, BARANGAYCOUNCIL of Valencia, Ormoc City, Barangay Captain MANUEL C.VELOSO, Councilmen GAUDENCIO LAVEZARES, TOMAS CABATINGANand MAXIMINO NAVARRO, Barangay Secretary CONCHITA MARAYA andBarangay Treasurer LUCENA BALTAZARG.R. NO./DATE: G.R. No. L-53487 May 25, 1981PONENTE:AQUINO, J.

FACTS:


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Petition: Petition to declare Resolutions 5, 6, 10 and 12 of the Barangay

Council of Valencia, Ormoc City void, as it is violative of the doctrineof separation of church and state

Factual Antecedents

The barangay council of Valencia, Ormoc City passed tworesolutions,

o Resolution 5: revives the celebration of the feast day of theirpatron saint, San Vicente Ferrer. It also provides thatthrough cash solicitations and donations, an image oftheir patron saint and also construction of waiting shedswill be attained

o Resolution 6: stipulates that the Chairman of the fiesta wouldbe the caretaker of the said image

Both resolutions passed a plebiscite (with 272 votes) and thecouncil also ratifiedthe same

During the fiesta, the image was temporarily placed in the Church,but when the caretaker tried to take it, Father Sergio MarilaoOsmea refused to give the same because church money was usedto buy the image

The council then passed two more resolutions:o Resolution 10, which authorized a hiring of a lawyer on

behalf of the Priest in a replevin (recovery) caseo Resolution 12, which appointed the barangay captain,

Manuel Veloso to represent the council in the replevin case During the replevin case the image was returned to the council, but

Father Osmena and three other petitioners (including Garces, whichis a member of the Aglipayan church) assailed the constitutionality ofthe 4 aforementioned resolutions

The trial court upheld the resolutions as valid, thus the appeal

Position of Petitioner: Petitioners contend that the resolutions of the barangay council

contravene the constitutional provisions on:o Separation of church and stateo Freedom of religion ando Prohibited use of public money to favor any sect or church.

Statute Involved:

Sec. 8, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution: "No law shall be maderespecting an establishment of religion"

Sec. 18[2], Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution: "no public moneyor property shall ever be appropriated, applied, paid, or used, directlyor indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,

denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or for theuse, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or otherreligious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest,preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or toany penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium

ISSUE: W/N Resolutions 5, 6, 10 and 12 are unconstitutional

HELD/RATIO: NO, the questioned resolutions do NOT directly or indirectly

establish any religion, nor abridge religious liberty, norappropriate public money or property for the benefit of any sect,priest or clergyman.

The image was purchased with private funds, NOT with taxmoney.The construction of a waiting shedis entirely a secularmatter.

The wooden image was purchased in connection with thecelebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, SanVicente Ferrer, and neither for the purpose of favoring anyreligion nor interfering with religious matters or the religiousbeliefs of the barrio residents.

If there is nothing unconstitutional in holding a fiesta and having apatron saint for the barrio,then any activity intended to facilitatethe worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and displayof his image) cannot be branded as illegal.

The image was acquired with private funds and is its privateproperty, not church money

The council has the right to take measures to recover possession ofthe image by enacting Resolutions Nos. 10 and 12.

Final Ruling: Finding that the petitioners have no cause of action for the

annulment of the barangay resolutions, the lower court's judgmentdismissing their amended petition is affirmed. No costs

SCHOOL DISTRICT vs SCHEMPP(KHO)

KEY TAKE-AWAY: Thegovernment should beneutral about religion; itprotects all but cannot promote or favor any.The State cannot forbid butit cannot likewise aid in the performance of religious functions.Ceremoniously reading from the Bible and reciting The Lords Prayer


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are clearlyexercises ofreligion, andto require theirperformance wouldviolate therights of the students.DATE/GR NO/SCRA: June 17, 1963 374 U.S. 203PONENTE: Clark, J.PETITIONER: School District of Abington Township, PennsylvaniaRESPONDENT: Schempp

FACTS:Petition: Appeal to the decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals which

upheld the policy that requires the students to read at least tenverses from the Bible and recite the Lords prayer

Factual Antecedents: At the beginning of the school day, students who attended public

schools in the state of Pennsylvania were required to read at leastten verses from the Bible

After completing these readings, school authorities required allAbington Township students to recite the Lord's Prayer. Studentscould be excluded from these exercises by a written note from their

parents to the school.Statute Involved: Art. 3, Sec. 5 First Amendment's Establishment Clause

prohibits the government from making any law respectingan establishment of religion.

Position of Respondent/s: Their rights under the 14th Amendment are violated as this policy

violates the First Amendment's Establishment Clause

ISSUE: W/N Pennsylvanias policy violates the students exercise of religious

freedom

HELD/RATIO:YES, the state-sponsored devotional exercises violate the EstablishmentClause

The Establishment Clause constrains government from involvingitself in religious matters

o Government action that promotes or inhibits religion violatesthe Constitution

o The State may NOT draft or conduct religious prayers inschools filled with captive audiences of children

No state law or school board may require that passages from the

Bible be read or that the Lord's Prayer be recited in the publicschools of a State at the beginning of each school day -- even ifindividual students may be excused from attending or participating insuch exercises upon written request of their parents

The ability of a parent to excuse a child from these ceremonies by awritten note was irrelevant since it did not prevent the school'sactions from violating the Establishment Clause

The test for assessing the violation of the Establishment Clause What are the purpose and primary effect of the enactment?

If either is the advancement of inhibition of religionthen the enactment exceeds the scope of legislativepower as circumscribed by the Constitution.

To withstand the structures of the EstablishmentClause there must be a secular legislative purposeand a primary effect that neither advances norinhibits religion.

The test for assessing the violation of the Free Exercise Clause Its purpose is to secure religious liberty in the individual by

prohibiting any invasions thereof by civil authority

it is necessary in a free exercise case for one to show thecoercive effect of the enactment as it operates against him inthe practice of his religion

Final Ruling The policy that requires the students to read at least ten verses from

the Bible and recite the Lords prayer is in violation of theEstablishment Clause

LEMON vs KURTZMAN(MASIGLAT)

KEY TAKE-AWAY: There are three (3) thin evils sough to be avoided bythe Establishment clause, namely sponsorship, financial support, andactive involvement. The test as to whether a statute goes against theReligion clause that are as follows:

o Statute must have secular legislative purposeo Its primary effect must NOT advance nor inhibit religiono Statute must NOT foster an excessive government

entanglement with religion.DATE/GR NO/SCRA: 403 U.S. 602 | June 28, 1971 PONENTE: Chief Justice BurgerPETITIONER: LemonRESPONDENT: Kurtzman

FACTS:


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Petition:

Appeals assailing the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania and aRhode Island statute providing state aid to church-related elementaryand secondary schools

Factual Antecedents:

Both statutes were challenged by the petitioners as unconstitutionalfor

o Rhode Island Statute Provides a salary subsidy of 15% to the teachers

annual wage in favor of non-public elementaryschools, including parochial schools

Eligible teachers must teach only courses offered inthe public schools, using only materials used in thepublic schools, and must NOT enagage in teachingany course in religion

o Pennsylvania Statute Provides reimbursement for the costs of teachers

salaries, textbooks, and instructional materialsinspecific secular subjects

Reimbursement is restricted to courses in specificsecular subjects, the textbooks and materials mustbe approved by the Superintendent, and no paymentis to be made for any course containing "any subjectmatter expressing religious teaching, or the moralsor forms of worship of any sect."

The complainants of the Act alleged that the church-affiliated schools are controlled by religiousorganizations, have the purpose of propagating andpromoting a particular religious faith, and conducttheir operations to fulfill that purpose.

Through both statutes, state aidhas been given tochurch-related

educational institutionsStatute Involved:

Pennsylvania and Rhode Island StatutePosition of Petitioner/s:

It is a violation of the Religion Clause in the First Amendment andDue process in the Fourteenth Amendment


ISSUE:

W/N the statutes were unconstitutional? YES

HELD/RATIO:YES

The test as to whether a statute goes against the Religion clausethat has been used over the years are as follows:

o Statute must have secular legislative purposeo Its primary effect must NOT advance nor inhibit religiono Statute must NOT foster an excessive government

entanglement with religion. Both statutes are unconstitutional under the Religion Clauses of the

First Amendment because it failed the third test as the cumulativeimpact of the entire relationship arising under the statutes involvesexcessive entanglement between government and religion.

The parochial schools have a significant religious mission; theyfoster an atmosphere of religious instructionand vocation

o Theymaintain substantial religious activity and are underchurch supervision and control; and the teachers thereinhave, in an understatement, the difficulty of being religiouslyneutral

o In order not to run afoul to the Establishment Clause,

the teachers subsidized must not inculcate religion, and ensuring compliance would cause the government to beexcessively entangled with the church.

The statutes likewise provide financial aid direct ly to church-related schools clearly in violation of the Constitution, and toascertain if the proceeds are dedicated to secular purposes wouldlikewise entail further excessive entanglement.

Rhode Island Program

With the mention of the conditions above it would inevitable require acomprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance toensure that these restrictions are obeyed and the First Amendment

otherwise respected. Unlike a book, a teacher cannot be inspected once so as to

determine the extent and intent of his or her personal beliefs andsubjective acceptance of the limitations imposed by the First

Amendment. These prophylactic contacts will involve excessive and enduring

entanglement between state and church. There is also a danger in the provision of the law that requires, in the

event that the total expenditures of an otherwise eligible schoolexceed this norm, the government to examine the school's records inorder to determine how much of the total expenditures is attributableto secular education and how much to religious activity.


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This kind of state inspection and evaluation of thereligious content of a religious organization is fraughtwith the sort of entanglement that the Constitutionforbids.

Pennsylvania Program

The SC accepted the allegations that the church-affiliated schoolsare controlled by religious organizations for the purposes of this

decision. The entanglement in the Pennsylvania program also arises from the

fact that restrictions and surveillance necessary to ensure thatteachers play a strictly non-ideological role and the state supervisionof nonpublic school accounting procedures required to establish thecost of secular, as distinguished from religious, education.

o Simply put, the state will be in excessive entanglements withthe church for them to make sure that the requirements ofthe Statute are complied with

In addition, the Pennsylvania statute has the further defect ofproviding continuing financial aid directly to the church-relatedschools.

o Historically, governmental control and surveillance measurestend to follow cash grant programso But here, the government's post-audit power to inspect the

financial records of church-related schools creates anintimate and continuing relationship between church andstate which the court deems as an excessive entanglement.

Broader Base of Entanglement

A broader base of entanglement of yet a different character ispresented by the divisive political potential of these state programs.

Partisans of parochial schools, understandably concerned with risingcosts and sincerely dedicated to both the religious and seculareducational missions of their schools, will inevitably champion this

cause and promote political action to achieve their goals; while thosewho oppose state aid, whether for constitutional, religious, or fiscalreasons, will inevitably respond and employ all of the usual politicalcampaign techniques to prevail.

It would be unrealistic to ignore the fact that many people confrontedwith issues of this kind will find their votes aligned with their faith.

Political fragmentation and divisiveness on religious lines are thuslikely to be intensified

Final Ruling:

Both statutes were declared unconstitutional

TILTON vs RICHARDSON(OAMINAL)

KEY TAKE-AWAY: The non establishment clause is not violated absent anyevidence of coercion directed at the practice or exercise of religious beliefs.DATE/GR NO/SCRA: 403 US 672 (1971)PONENTE: Mr. Chief Justice BurgerPETITIONER: Tilton et al. ( citizens and taxpayers of the United States andresidents of Connecticut)RESPONDENT: Richardson, Secretary of Healh, Welfare and Education, etalFACTS:Petition:

Petition for injunctionFactual Antecedents:

The US Congress passed the Higher Education Facilities Act whichauthorizes federal grants and loans to institutions of highereducation for the construction of a wide variety of academicfacilities subject to the condition that NO part of the subjectmay be used for sectarian instruction, religious worship, or theprograms of a divinity school for a period of 20 years. If thiscondition is violated then the state will have the right to recover thegrant based on its present value.

Petitioners contend that the act extends assistance to church relatedinstitutions which is a violation of the non establishment clause as 4church related colleges and universities in Connecticut havereceived grants under it.

Statute Involved:

The non-establishment clause of the US Constitution which isequivalent to Section 5, Article 3 of the Philippine Constitution.

Position of Petitioner/s:

The Act violates the non establishment clause by allowing churchbased schools to benefit from the grants


The act does not violate the non establishment clause

ISSUE:

W/N the Act violates the non establishment clause

HELD/RATIO:NO, the Act does not violate the non-establishment clause; however thegrace periodshould be struck down.

The Act reflects a secular legislative purpose


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o To give ample opportunity for the fullest development ofstudents who aspire for higher education

o This legitimate secular purpose is highly appropriate forgovernmental action

The administration of the Act does not foster an excessivegovernment entanglement with religion

o As opposed to that of Lemon vs. Kutzmanwhere teachers

were subsidized, the facilities themselves are religiouslyneutral; hence there is less tendency for entanglementasinspection requires minimal contact

o Evidence disclosed that the colleges and universities aremore inclined to providing the students with seculareducation, unlike the primary and secondary parochialschools that require participation with religious activities inLemon vs Kutzman; hence there is less risk of support forreligious activities

o The schools made no attempt to indoctrinate their students However, the 20 year restriction opens the door for religious use

after the grace period; hence it violates the Establishment

Clause. After the 20 year grace period, the properties partially orfully subsidized by the government may already be used for religiouspurposes; this is a violation of the Establishment Clause. The graceperiod should thus be struck down.

Final Ruling

Act does not violate the Religioin Clauses of the First Amendmentexcept part of paragraph 754 providing a 20 year limitation on thereligious use restrictions.

ZOBREST, ET AL. vsCATALINA FOOTHILLS SCHOOL DISTRICT

(RAPAL)KEY TAKE-AWAY: Government programs that neutrally provide benefits tocitizens without reference to religion do not violate the Establishment Clause.The childis the primary beneficiary, notthe school, and whatever benefitmay accrue to the latter[the school] is merely incidental.DATE/GR NO/SCRA: June 18, 1993 / 509 U.S. 1PONENTE: Chief Justice RehnquistPETITIONER: James Zobrest and his parentsRESPONDENT: Catalina Foothills School

FACTS:Petition:

Writ of Certiorari on petitioners request to respondent school toprovide for a sign language interpreter to James Zobrest in classes.


James Zobrest attended grades 1 through 5 in a school for deaf andgrades 6 through 8 in a public school operated by respondent. Whileattending such, respondent provided him with a sign-languageinterpreter

For religious reasons, Jamesparents enrolled him for the 9th

gradein Salpointe Catholic High School, a sectarian institution

When petitioners requested that respondent supply James theinterpreter at Salpointe, respondent referred the matter to the Court

Attorneyo The Attorney concluded that providing an interpreter on

the schools premises would violate the U.S.Constitution

o Respondent accordingly declined to provide therequested interpreter

Petitioners then instituted this action asserted that the Individualswith Disabilities Education Act(IDEA) and free exercise clause of

the First Amendment require respondent to provide James with aninterpreter and that the Establishment Clause does not bar suchrelief

The District Court refused to provide an interpreter for a deaf studentas allowed by the IDEA because he attends a Roman Catholicschool

o The school district claimed that it [providing James with aninterpreter] would promote his religious developmentandbenefitthe parochial schoolatgovernmental expense

Statute Involved:

Establishment Clause of the First Amendment: Congress shall makeno law respecting an establishment of religion...

Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment:...or prohibiting thefree exercise thereof...


IDEA and the Free Exercise Clause requires respondent school toprovide James an interpreter


The interpreter will give preference to the inculcation of the child tothe Catholic religion which then violates the Establishment Clause

ISSUE:

W/N the Establishment Clause prevents respondent from providing adisabled child with a sign language interpreter in order to facilitate hiseducation?


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HELD/RATIO:NO, the Establishment Clause does NOT prohibit the provision of asign-language interpreter to petitioner

Mueller vs. Allen and Witters vs Washington Dept. of Services forBlind - Government programs thatneutrally provide benefits to abroad class of citizens definedwithout reference to a religion arenot readily subject to an Establishment Clause challenge just

because sectarian institutions may also receive an attenuatedfinancial benefit

o The service here is part of a general governmentprogram that benefits ANY child qualifying as disabledunder IDEA, without regard to the sectarian/nonsectarian, orpublic/non-public nature of the school the child attends.

o Since IDEA creates no financial incentives for parents tochoose a sectarian school, an interpreters presence therecannot be attributed to state decision-making

Meek v. Pittenger and School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ballo In these cases, the challenged programs gave direct grants

of government aid-instructional equipment and material,

teachers, and guidance counselors-which relieved sectarianschools of costs they otherwise would have borne ineducating their students.

o The child is the primary beneficiary and the schoolreceives only incidental benefit

An interpreter, unlike a teacher or guidance counselor, neither addsto nor subtracts from the sectarian schools environment but justinterprets the material presented to the class as a whole.

No absolute bar of placing a public employee in a sectarian school.Final Ruling

Court of Appeals decision is REVERSED.

AGOSTINI, ET AL. vs FELTON, ET AL.(RONQUILLO)

KEY TAKE-AWAY: Such government-funded programs are neutral and aremade to favor the disadvantaged children regardless of their religion;presence of public school teachers in parochial schools does not violate theEstablishment Clause provided that adequate safeguards are in place. Thepresumption that the presence of public employees in parochial institutionstends to benefit the latter has been abandoned, hence, pervasive monitoringis no longer required. Overall, the program does not result in indoctrination, itdoes not discriminate based on religion, and it does not create excessiveentanglement; hence it is not abhorrent to the Establishment Clause.

DATE/GR NO/SCRA: June 23, 1997 / 117 S.C.T. 1997, 138 L.ED.2D 391PETITIONER: Rachel Agostini, et al.RESPONDENT: Betty Louise Felton et al.FACTS:Petition:

Petition to challenge a district courts ruling upholding the decision inAguilar v. Felton (473 U.S. 402, 413) prohibiting public school

teachers from teaching in parochial schools for disadvantagedchildren as a violation of the 1stamendments Establishment Clause.Factual Antecedents:

New York City had a program that sent public school teachersinto parochial schools to provide remedial education todisadvantaged childrenpursuant to Title I of the Elementary andSecondary Education Act of 1995.

In Aguilar v. Felton (473 U.S. 402, 413) it was ruled that the saidprogram was an excessive entanglement of the church and thestate which violated the 1stamendments Establishment Clause

10 years after the ruling, it was challengedby the petitioners thusthe case at bar.

Statute Involved: 1stamendmentEstablishment Clause

o One of the Religion Clauses of the 1stamendmento Generally been interpreted to prohibit:

1. Establishment of a national religion by Congress2. Preference by the U.S. governm ent of one rel igion

over another


They emphasized on the significant cost of complying withAguilar v.Felton (473 US 402, 413)

5 justices in Board of ed. of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist. v.Grumet asserted that the jurisprudenceset by Agui larshould be

reconsidered because it cannot be harmonized with the otherintervening jurisprudence set by the Supreme Court therefore it is nolonger a good law.

ISSUE:

W/N the New York Citys program is violative of the 1stamendmentsEstablishment Clause

HELD/RATIO:NO, the program is NOT violative of the 1

stamendments EstablishmentClause


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A federally funded program providing supplemental, remedialinstruction to disadvantaged children on a neutral basis is NOTinvalidunder the Establishment Clause when: (1) such instructionis given on the premises of sectarian schools by governmentemployees, (2) under a program containing adequate safeguards

The jurisprudence stated in School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball and

Aguilar v. Felton are no longer good law because of subsequentcases decided by the Supreme Court.o Contrary to Aguilars conclusion, placing full time

government employees on parochial school campuses doesnot have the impermissible effect of advancing religion

o Balls presumption that public employees placed onparochial school groundswill inevitably inculcate religionor that their presence constitutes a symbolic unionbetween the government and religion has already beenabandoned.

There was no evidence that shows that New YorkCity instructors teaching in parochial schools tried to

inculcate religion in their students.o Furthermore, Balls rule that all government aid thatdirectly aids the educational function of religiousschools is invalid is NO longer applied.

The program does not give aid recipients any incentive to modifytheir religious beliefs or practices in order to obtain program services.

The Aguilarcourt made an error in concluding that the programresulted in excessive entanglement between the church and thestate.

Grounds for Conclusion Reason forStriking Down Ground

The program would requirepervasive monitoring bypublic authorities to ensurethat employees did notinculcate religion

The jurisprudence set byZobrest abandoned thepresumption that publicemployees will inculcatereligion simply becausethey happened to be in asectarian environment.Therefore pervasivemonitoring is NO longerrequired

The program required Insufficient to create

administrative cooperationbetween the government andparochial schools

excessive entanglement

The program might increasethe dangers of politicaldivisiveness

Insufficient to createexcessive entanglement

Therefore, the program is NOT in violation of the 3 primary criteriaused by the court which are it should not:

o Result in governmental indoctrinationo Define its recipients by reference to religiono Create excessive entanglement

NOTE: The doctrine of stare decis is does not stop the court fromrecognizing changes in law and overruling previous decisions which arecontrary to more recent jurisprudence.

Final Ruling

Petition is GRANTED. Ruling in Aguilar v. Felton is reversed and setaside.

MITCHELL, ET AL. vs HELMS, ET AL.(SEA)

KEY TAKE-AWAY: Just because some of the beneficiaries of the programare religiously-affiliated, it does not automatically make it a law respecting anestablishment of religion. It passes the Agostini test; it does not result ingovernmental indoctrination (religious indoctrination attributable togovernmental action), it is made available neutrally and equally amongbeneficiariesregardless of religious affiliation, and it neither impairsnor

promotesthe same, and it allocates aid based on the private choices of thestudents as to which school to attend.DATE/GR NO/SCRA: June 28, 2000 530 U.S. 793PONENTE: Thomas, J.PETITIONERS: Guy Mitchell, et al.RESPONDENTS: Mary L. Helms, et al.

FACTS:Petition:

Petition to reverse the decision of the CA Fifth Circuit declaringChapter 2 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of1981 as unconstitutional


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Chapter 2 of the Educational Consolidation and Improvement Act of1981:

o Channels federal funds via state educational agencies tolocal educational agencies (LEAs)

o The LEAs lend educational materials and equipment topublic and private elementary and secondary schools to

implement secular, neutral, and nonideological programso The enrollment of each school determines the amount of

Chapter 2 aid it receives In Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, 30% of the Chapter 2 funds are

allocated for private schools, most of which are Catholic orotherwise religiously affiliated

Helms et al. filed a suit alleging that Chapter 2 violated the FirstAmendments Establishment Clause

The District Court ruled in favor of the respondents, saying thatChapter 2 had the primary effect of advancing religion because thematerials and equipment loaned to the Catholic schools were directaid and the schools were pervasively sectarian

o The DC relied on Meek v. Pittenger and Wolman v. Walter,in which programs providing many of the same sorts ofmaterials and equipment as does Chapter 2 were struckdown

o The DC Judge issued an order to prevent pervasivelysectarian schools in Jefferson Parish from receiving Chapter2 materials

o However, another DC judge reversed such order, basing hisdecision on Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist.

o While the respondents appeal was pending, the SC decidedAgostini v. Felton, which approved a program under Title I ofthe Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 that

provided public employees to teach remedial classes atreligious and other private schools The Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of the

respondents, hence this appealStatute Involved:

The First Amendments Establishment Clause- Congress shall makeno law respecting an establishment of religion...

Position of Respondents:

Direct, non-incidental aid to religious schools is always impermissible Provisions which grant to religious schools aid that is divertible to

religious use is always impermissible

ISSUE:

W/N Chapter 2 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Actof 1981 violates the establishment clause?

HELD/RATIO:No

To reach its decision, the SC used the 3 primary criteria established

inAgostinifor determining whether Government aid has the effectof advancing religion:

o Results in governmental indoctrinationo Defines its recipients by reference to religiono Creates an excessive entanglement

NOTE: Only the first 2 are discussed because the DCs holding thatChapter 2 does not create an excessive entanglement is not challenged

Chapter 2 does not result in governmental indoctrination, nor does itdefine its recipients by reference to religion

o In distinguishing between indoctrination that is attributable to

the State and indoctrination that is not, the Court hasconsistently turned to the neutrality principle: upholds aidthat is offered to a broad range of groups or persons withoutregard to their religion

o As a way of assuring neutrality, the Court has consistentlyconsidered whether any governmental aid that goes to areligious institution results from the genuinely independentand private choices of individuals (private choice principle)

o If private choices dictate distribution of aid, governmentcannot easily grant favors that might lead to a religiousestablishment

o Private choice also guarantees neutrality by mitigating

preference for pre-existing recipients that is inherent in anyaid programo Financial incentive to undertake religious indoctrination is not

present where aid is allocated on the basis of neutral,secular criteria, and is made available to both religiousand secular beneficiaries on a non-discriminatory basis(such as this one)

Direct, non-incidental aid to religious schools can be allowedo If the aid (even if direct) is neutrally available and first

passes through the hands (literally or figuratively) of privatecitizens who are free to direct the aid elsewhere, thegovernment has NOT provided any support of religion


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o There is NOreason why the Establishment Clause requiresthat aid pass literally through the hands of the citizens first(as provided inAgostini)

o The respondents reasoning on literal passing breaks downin the application of real-world programs

o Whether a program is labeled direct or indirect is anarbitrary choice that does not further the constitutional

analysis Provisions which grant to religious schools aid that is divertible to

religious use CAN BE ALLOWEDo The issue is not divertibility, but whether the aid itself has

an impermissible content (the aid should be secular,neutral, and non-ideological)

o In this case, the record indicates that Louisiana SEA andJefferson Parish have complied with the aid requirements

o Where the aid would be suitable for use in a public school, itis also suitable for use in any private school

o A concern for divertibility is misplaced because it isboundless, enveloping all aid no matter how trivial, and

does not bring about any realistic concern for preventing theestablishment of religiono Based on its past decisions, the Court has not accepted the

argument that all aid is forbidden because aid to one aspectof an institution frees it to spend its other resources onreligious ends

Meek and Wolmanare overruledFinal Ruling

The judgment of the (CA) Fifth Circuit is reversed.

ZELMAN, SUEPRINTENDENT OF PUBLIC

INSTRUCTION OF OHIO, ET AL.vsSIMMONS-HARRIS, ET AL.

(ZERRUDO)KEY TAKE-AWAY: Ohio Pilot Project Scholarship Program that gives tuitionaid and tutorial aid does NOT violate the non-establishment clause justbecause most of the students are enrolled in religious schools. Thelaw wasneutral regarding all aspects towardsreligion andconfers assistance to abroad class of persons regardless of theirreligious affiliation. Whateverincidental advancement of the religious missions of the parochial

schools cannot be attributed to the government whose sole aim was todistribute benefits amongthe students.

DATE/GR NO/SCRA: June 27, 2002PONENTE: CJ RehnquistPETITIONER: Zelman, Superintendent of Public Instruction of Ohio, et al. RESPONDENT: Simmons-Harris, et al. (Ohio taxpayers)

FACTS:Petition:

Petition for certiorari to the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuitdecision.


The State of Ohio implemented the Pilot Project ScholarshipProgram that provides tuition aid to students in Cleveland CitySchool Districtwherein majority of the 75,000 children enrolledin that district come from low-income and minority families.

The program offers two kinds of assistance:o Tuition aid for students to attend a participating public or

private school of their parents choice. The tuition aid isdistributed based on financial needand it depends on theparents to choose from any of the participating schools

o Tutorial aid for studentswho choose to remain enrolled inpublic schools

Both religious and nonreligious schools in the district may participatebut statistics showed that in the 1999 to 2000 school year, 82% ofthe participating private schools had religious affiliation and96% of the students who participated in the program wereenrolled in religious affiliated schools

The decision of the Sixth Circuit was that it did violate the non-

establishment clause

ISSUE

W/N the Ohio Scholarship Program violates the Non-EstablishmentClause as it coerces the parents to send their kids to religiousschools?

HELD/RATIONO

The Pilot Project Scholarship Program complies with therequirements for a valid government aid program:


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1. Must h ave a secular legis lat ive purpose

The program was enacted for a secular purpose of providingeducational assistance for poor children.

2. Must have a prim ary effect that neither advances nor inh ibits

rel igion

It is neutral with respect to religion and provides assistance

to a broad class of citizens. The only preference is that forlow-income families. The fact that the aid reaches religiousschools is incidental to the objective of the program and thechoice depends on the parents where to send their childrenfor school -- religious or non-religious school.

3. Must not require excessive entanglement with recipient

ins t i tu t ions

The parents are free to choose where to send their kids oncethey attain the scholarship -- whether in a private or public,religious or non-religious school

It does NOT promote enrollment in private religious schools . As

a matter of fact, it has financial disincentives such as:o Private schools receive only half of what the community

schools get.o If parents choose a private school, they have to still pay a

portion of the tuition.o Tutoring Aid is only offered to those in public schools.

The preponderance of religiously affiliated schools did not resultfrom the program.

o It was because there were really more religious privateschools in the district that led to the high percentage ofscholars enrolling in such institutions

o If we followed that argument of the respondents, then the

program would only be considered constitutional in thoseareas with a low percentage of religious private schoolswhich is not really the purpose of the program.

The law was neutral regarding all aspects towards religion andconfers assistance to a broad class of persons regardless oftheir religious affiliation

o Whatever incidental advancement of the religious missionsof the parochial schools cannot be attributed to thegovernment whose sole aim was to distribute benefitsamong the students.

Final Ruling:

Decision of Sixth Circuit is reversed. The Pilot Project ScholarshipProgram does NOT violate the non-establishment clause.

COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY vs AMERICAN CIVILLIBERTIES UNION

(ANGSIY)KEY TAKE-AWAY: The Non-establishment Clause prohibits thegovernmentfrom appearing to take positions regarding religious belief.The government must remain secular; it may recognize the holidayssecular aspects but it cannotgo as far as to suggest that the people praisethe Christian God for the birth of Jesus Christ .

The governmental action that unconstitutionally advances religion is thatwhich has the purpose or effect of "endorsing" religion. The prohibitionagainst governmental endorsement of religion "precludes government fromconveying or attempting to convey a message that religion ora particularreligious belief is favored or preferred."DATE/GR NO/SCRA:492 U.S. 573 No. 87-2050; Argued: February 22, 1989

--- Decided: July 3, 1989PONENTE:BLACKMUN, J.PETITIONER:County of AlleghenyRESPONDENT:American Civil Liberties Union

FACTS:Petition:

Petition for certiorari seeking to permanently enjoin the county fromdisplaying the creche in the county courthouse and the city fromdisplaying the menorah in front of the City-County Buildingon theground that the displays violated the Establishment Clause of theFirst Amendment


Concerns the constitutionality of two recurring holiday displayslocated on public property in downtown Pittsburgh:

1. A creche depicting the Christian nativity scene placed onthe Grand Staircase of the Allegheny CountyCourthouse, which is considered the "main," "mostbeautiful," and "most public" part of the courthouse

Displayed since 1981 was donated by the Holy Name Society, a Roman

Catholic group is a visual representation of the scene in the manger

in Bethlehem and includes figures of the infant
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Jesus, Mary, Joseph, farm animals, shepherds, andwise men

has at its crest an angel bearing a banner thatproclaims "Gloria in Excelsis Deo!" meaning Gloryto God in the Highest

used by the county as the setting for its annualChristmas carol program

2. A Chanukah menorah placed just outside the City-CountyBuilding The second display in question is 18-footChanukah menorah or candelabrum, which was placed

just outside the City-County Building. Such menorah is a symbolic representation of Chanukah, which is

an 8-day Jewish holiday that begins on the 25th dayof the Jewish lunar month of Kislev

stands next to a 45-foot decorated Christmastree

bears a sign with the mayor's nameand containingtext declaring the city's"salute to liberty"

District Court denied relief, relying on Lynch v. Donnelly stating that acity's inclusion of a creche did not violate the Establishment Clause.However the CA reversed, distinguishing Lynch v. Donnelly andholding that the creche and the menorah in the present case must beunderstood as an impermissible governmental endorsement ofChristianity and Judaism.

Hence, the instant petition.

Statute Involved:

AMENDMENT I: Congress shall make no law respecting anestablishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or

abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of thepeople peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for aredress of grievances.

Position of Respondents:

The displays of the creche and the menorah each violate theEstablishment Clause of theFirst Amendment.

ISSUE:1. W/N the display of the creche violates the Establishment Clause of theFirst Amendment.2. W/N the display of the menorah violates the same.

HELD/RATIO:1. YES,The creche display violates the Establishment Clause.

There is no doubt that the creche itself is capable of communicatinga religious message.

The Court referred to the Lynch casewhich teaches that governmentmay celebrate Christmas in some manner and form, but not in away that endorses Christian doctrine. Here, Allegheny Countyhas transgressed this line.

In the instant case, Alleghany County has chosen to celebrateChristmas in a way that has the effect of endorsing a patentlyChristian message as made evident in the sign Glory to God forthe birth of Jesus Christ.

The governmental action that unconstitutionally advances religion isthat which has the purpose or effect of "endorsing"religion

o the prohibition against governmental endorsement of religion"precludes government from conveying or attempting toconvey a message that religion or a particular religiousbelief is favoredor preferred"

2. NO, the menorah does not violatethe Establishment Clause. BLACKMUN, J., dissenting

o The menorah display does not have the prohibited effect ofendorsing religion given itsparticular physical setting

o Having been displayedright beside a Christmas tree andasign saluting liberty, itdoes NOT impermissiblyendorseboth the Christian and Jewish faiths, but simplyrecognizes that both Christmas and Chanukah are partof the same winter holiday season, which has attained asecular statusin our society

Grand Staircase creche Lynch Case creche

nothing in the context of the displaydetracts from the creche's religiousmessage

comprised a series of figures and objects,each group of which had its own focal point

the creche stands alone, it is the singleelement of the display on the GrandStaircase

Santa's house and his reindeer were objects

of attention separate from the creche, andhad their specific visual story to tell. Also, a"talking" wishing well was the center ofattention separate from the creche
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o By virtue of the its size and being displayed in the centralposition, the Christmas tree is clearly the predominantelement

o The government's association with a religious symbol doesnotrepresent sponsorship of religious beliefs, but simply arecognition of cultural diversity

OCONNOR, J.,dissenting

o By including the menorah with the tree, however, and withthe sign saluting liberty, the city conveyed a message ofpluralism and freedom of belief during the holiday season

o In permitting the displays of the menorah and the creche, thecity and county sought merely to "celebrate the season,"and to acknowledge the historical background of theChanukah and Christmas holidays

Final Ruling:

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in part andREVERSED in part, and the cases are remanded for furtherproceedings.

Justice Kennedy, White, and Scalias Concurring and Dissenting Opinion: Both displays are not violative of the Establishment Clause. Two principles limiting the government's ability to recognize and

accommodate religion:1. it may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any

religion or its exercise2. it may not, in the guise of avoiding hostility or callous

indifference, give direct benefits to a religionin such a degreethat it, in fact, establishes a state religion or tends to do so

In the instant case, there is no suggestion that the government'spower to coerce has been used to further Christianity or Judaism, orthat the city or the county contributed money to further any one faith

or intended to use the creche or the menorah to proselytize. It is further declared that where the government's act of recognition

or accommodation is passive and symbolic, any intangible benefitto religion is unlikely to present a realistic risk of establishment.Thus, the use of both displays is permissible.

CAPITOL SQUARE REVIEW AND ADVISORYBOARD, ET AL. vs PINETE, ET AL.

(BUENDIA)

KEY TAKE-AWAY: Religious expression cannot violate the EstablishmentClause where it (1) is purely private and (2) occurs in a traditional ordesignated public forum, publicly announced and open to all on equal terms.

The display sought by the Ku Klux Kulan belongs to protected speech as asecular private expressionto be made in a place designated as a publicforum. The reasonable observer could NOT possibly interpret the

symbol to be endorsed by the government given the public nature ofCapitol Hill.

DATE/GR NO/SCRA: 515 U.S. 753 (1995)PONENTE: SCALIA, J.PETITIONER: Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board, et. al.RESPONDENT: Vincent Pinette, Donnie Carr and Knights of the Ku KluxKlan

FACTS:Petition:

Petition for Certiorari to the US CA for the sixth circuit


Ohio State Law makes capitol Square, the State-house plaza inColumbus, a forum for discussion of public questions and forpublic activities

Ohio State Law gives the Capitol Square Review and Advisory Boardresponsibility for regulating access to the square

To use the square, a group mustfill out an application formb andmeet several speech neutral criteria

In the instant case, Ku Klux Klan officer Donnie Carr filed anapplication to the Board to place an unattended cross on thesquareduring the 1993 Christmas season

o Board deniedthe applicationupon advice of the counsel, in

a good faith attempt to comply with the Ohio and USConstitutiono They were denied based on the theory that, given the

proximity of the square to the seat of government, thesymbolcould be interpretedto mean that the governmentwas endorsing a said religion

The District Court entered an injunction, requiring issuance of therequested permit, and the Board permitted the Klan to erect its cross

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment, adding to a conflict amongthe Courts of Appeals as to whether a private, unattended display ofa religious symbol in a public forum violates the EstablishmentClause


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Statute Involved:

First Amendment to the US Constitution (Establishment clause inbold) - Congress shall make no law respecting an establishmentof religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridgingthe freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the peoplepeaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redressof grievances.

Ohio Admin. Code Ann. 128-4-02(A) (1994) makes the squareavailable "for use by the public... for free discussion of publicquestions, or for activities of a broad public purpose"

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 105.41 (1994), gives the Capitol SquareReview and Advisory Board responsibility for regulating publicaccess.


They justify that the closing of Capitol Square to respondents crossis because of the state interest in avoiding official endorsement ofChristianity as required by the Establishment Clause.

The forums proximity to the seat of government may producethe perception that the cross bears the States approval

Position of Respondent/s: Respondents contend that we should treat this as a case in which

freedom of speechin presenting the cross was denied because ofthe State's disagreement with that message's political content, ratherthan because of the State's desire to distance itself from sectarianreligion

ISSUE:

W/N a State violates the Establishment Clause when it allows aprivate party to display an unattended religious symbol in atraditional public forum located next to its seat of government

HELD/RATIO:NO. The Ku Klux Klans religious display in Capitol Square belongs toprotected speech, particularly secular private expression.

As private expression, not one made by the government, suchshould be allowed

Capitol Square is a traditional public forum so the Board mayregulate the concern of the Klans expression there ONLY if suchrestriction is necessaryand serves a compelling state interest

o Compliance with the Establishment Clause may be astate interestbut that interest is not implicated in this caseas evidenced by:

Lamb's Chapel - "no realistic danger that thecommunity would think that the District wasendorsing religion or any particular creed

Widmar - Once we determined that the benefit toreligious groups from the public forum was incidentaland shared by other groups, we categoricallyrejected the State's Establishment Clause defense.

o Petitioner Boards attempt to distinguish this case fromLambs chapel and Widmar is to no avail. Theyargue thatthe proximity of the cross to the seat of governmentmay cause the misperception that the cross bears theStates approval under the Endorsement Test. Thishowever has no antecedent in the Court EstablishmentClause jurisprudence.

o Theendorsement testasks whetherthesubject of the testwas either expression by the government itself or elsegovernment action alleged to discriminate in favor ofprivate religious expression or activity

Allegheny County - held that the display of a

privately sponsored crche on the "Grand Staircase"of the Allegheny County Courthouse violated theEstablishment Clause.

Given a traditional public forum, publicly announcedand open to all on equal terms, erroneousconclusions of state endorsement do NOT count

Justice O Connor, Souter, and Breyer concluded that the State hasnot presented a compelling justification for denying respondentspermit.

o The reasonable observer is the personification of acommunity ideal of reasonable behavior, determined bythe effective social judgment, whose knowledge is not

limited to information from viewing the challengeddisplay but also to the general history of the place inwhich the display appears.

In the case at bar, the reasonable observer couldNOT possibly interpret the unattended cross asone endorsed by the government given thepublic nature of Capitol Square

The Board had other alternative means which would not haveinfringed upon the free exercise of religion and of expression

o The Board could have a required a disclaimer to precludeany inference that the cross demonstrated governmentendorsement or restricted all private, unattended displays to


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one area of the square with markings that it is a forum formprivate speech without state endorsement

Final Ruling

The Judgment of the CA is affirmed.

ISLAMIC DAWAH COUNCIL vs OFFICE OF THE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY(BULLO)

KEY TAKE-AWAY: The classification of food as halal is a religiousfunctionand CANNOT be done by the State. That would mean the Muslimcommunity would adhere to state interpretation of the Quran and the Sunnah-- which is unconstitutional. The government, in granting OMA exclusiveauthority to perform the classification, clearly encroached upon the freeexercise of religion.

DATE/GR NO/SCRA: GR NO. 153888, July 9, 2003PONENTE:CoronaPETITIONER: ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,

herein represented by PROF. ABDULRAFIH H. SAYEDY.RESPONDENT: OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY of the Officeof the President of the Philippines, herein represented by HON. ALBERTOG. ROMULO, Executive Secretary, and the OFFICE ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS,herein represented by its Executive Director, HABIB MUJAHAB HASHIM.FACTS:Petit ion:

Petition for Prohibition on EO 46Factual Antecedents:

Islamic Da'Wah Council of the Philippines (IDCP) is a non-governmental organization that extends voluntary services to Muslimcommunities. It claims to be a federation of national Islamic

organizations and an active member of the Regional Islamic DawahCouncil of Southeast Asia and the Pacific (RISEAP) and the World

Assembly of Muslim Youth. The RISEAP accredited IDCP to issue halalcertifications in the

country

NOTE: Halal certificationsguarantee that food products do not contain pork orany of its derivatives

Then in 2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issuedEO 46 creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and

designating respondent Office on Muslim Affairs (OMA) tooversee its implementation

o OMA received EXCLUSIVE AUTHORITY to issue halalcertificates and other related services.

o All other halal certificates NOT issued by OMA weredeemed illegal

OMA warned Muslim consumers to only buy products with its official

halal certification. OMA also wrote letters to food manufacturersasking them to secure halal certification only from OMA IDCP lost revenue when food corporations stopped securing

certificates from them; hence, this petition for prohibition.Statute Involved:

Art. 3 Section 5 and Section 10 EO 46


EO 46 Violates separation of Church and State. No law impairing the obligationsof contracts shall be passed.

IDCP was losing revenuebecause manufacturers stopped seekingtheir halal certifications

Position of Respondent/s: OMA deals with the societal, legal, political and economic concerns

of the Muslim community as a national cultural community not areligious group.

OMA seeks to protect and promote Muslim health and healthconsciousness.

Having no central governing body for halal might give rise toschemers who classify halal fraudulently just for profit.

ISSUE:

W/N EO 46 violates the separation of Church and State.

HELD/RATIO:YES

EO 46 is unconstitutionalo Classifying a food product as halal is a religious function

because the stndards used are drawn from the Quran andIslamic beliefs. Moreover, muslims would be subject tostate interpretationsof halal, the Quran, and Sunnah. Thisis not allowed

o Freedom of religion can only be infringed for the preventionof immediate and grave danger to the security and welfareof the community. The government has to show the


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immediacy and seriousness of the threat - there is nonehere.

o State cannot deprive muslim organizations of their right toclassify what is halal.

o There are enough regulatory bodies to endure the safetyand check the quality of food products.

RA 7394 The Consumer Act of 1992 designates

the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFD) of the DOH toensure standards of quality for food. It also designates the Dept. of Trade and Industry to

protect consumers against deceptive and unfair saleand trade.

Administrative Code of 1987 gives the National MeatInspection Commision (NMIC) of the Dept. of

Agriculture the power to inspect slaughtered meat.o The court also disagrees that this might give rise to

schemers, it believes the muslim community can discern foritself which organizations are competent and reliable incertifying halal.

Final Ruling

Petition for prohibition is granted.

SORIANO vs LAGUARDIA(CUBACUB)

KEY TAKE-AWAY: The exercise of religious freedomcan be regulatedbythe Statewhen it will bring about the clear and present danger of somesubstantive evilwhich the State is duty bound to prevent. The interest of thegovernment in protecting children who may be subjected to petitionersinvectives must take precedence over his desire to air publicly his dirtylaundry. Also, the fact that he came out with his statements in a televisedbible exposition program does not automatically accord them the character ofa religious discourse.

DATE/GR NO/SCRA: March 15, 2010 G.R. No 164785PONENTE: VELASCO, Jr., J.PETITIONER: Eliseo F. SorianoRESPONDENT: Ma. Consoliza P. Laguardia, in her capacity as Chairpersonof the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB), theMTRCB, et al.FACTS:Petition:

Motion for Reconsideration by petitioner assailing the April 2009decision of the Supreme Court which imposed a 3 month suspensionon the show, Ang Dating Daan.


August 24, 2004 (around 10pm), petitioner uttered the followingwords on his show Ang Dating Daan: Lehitimong anak ngdemonyo; sinungaling; Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa

putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doonyung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O,masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa

putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong

ito Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical

affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and sevenother private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC)against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast.

The MTRCB sent petitioner a notice of the hearing on August 16,2004 in relation to the alleged use of some cuss words in the August10, 2004 episode ofAng Dating Daan.

After a preliminary conference in which petitioner appeared, theMTRCB, by Order of August 16, 2004, preventively suspended theshowing ofAng Dating Daanprogram for 20 days.

On September 27, 2004, in Adm. Case No. 01-04, the MTRCB

issued a decision finding respondent Soriano liable for his utterancesand thereby imposing on him a penalty of three (3) monthssuspension from his program,Ang Dating Daan.

On a decision dated April 29, 2009, the SCmodified the MTRCBdecisionby imposing the suspension on the show Ang DatingDaaninstead of petitioner Soriano.

Statute Involved:

Art. III, Sec 4 of the 1987 Constitution No law shall be passedabridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, orthe right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition thegovernment for redress of grievance.


Petitioner argues that the suspension thus imposed constitutes priorrestraint and an abridgement of his exercise of religion and freedomof expression.

The Honorable Court should have rendered its decision in light of thesurrounding circumstances why and what prompted herein petitionerto utter those words.

The Court should adopt a hands-off approach to the conflict betweenhim and the Iglesia Ni Cristo.


ISSUES:1. W/N the suspension is a form of prior restraint.


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2. W/N the Court erred in ruling that his utterances did not constituteexercise of religion and in finding the language used as offensiveand obscene.

3. W/N the Court should have applied its policy of non-interference incases of conflict between religious group and that the Court shouldnot have penalized the television program for the acts of petitioner.

HELD/RATIO:

1. NO, the decision of the court does not constitute as prior restraintbut partakes of the nature of subsequent punishment for pastviolation committed by petitioner in the course of the broadcast ofthe program on August 10, 2004.

To merit a "G" rating, the program must be "suitable for all ages,"which, in turn, means that the "material for television [does not],contain anything unsuitable for children and minors, and may beviewed without adult guidance or supervision. As previouslydiscussed by the Court, the vulgar language petitioner used onprime-time television can in no way be characterized as suitablefor all ages, and is wholly inappropriate for children.

2. NO, the actions of the petitioner were not in the exercise of his

religion and the words he used were obscene. Petitioners position may be accorded some cogency, but for the fact

that it fails to consider that the medium he used to make hisstatements was a television broadcast, which is accessible tochildren of virtually all age.

The interest of the government in protecting children who may besubjected to petitioners invectives must take precedence over hisdesire to air publicly his dirty laundry.

As emphasized in Gonzalez v. Kalaw Katigbak, the freedom ofbroadcast media is, in terms of degree of protection it deserves,lesser in scope, especially as regards television, which reachesevery home where there is a set, and where children will likely be

among the avid viewers of the programs shown. There is nothing in petitioners statements subject of the

complaints expressing any particular religious belief, nothingfurthering his avowed evangelical mission.The fact that he cameout with his statements in a televised bible exposition program doesnot automatically accord them the character of a religious discourse.

The defining standards to be employed in judging the harmful effectsof the statements petitioner used would be those for the averagechild, not those for the average adult. The average child would notbe concerned with colorful speech, but, instead, focus on the literal,everyday meaning of words used. It was this literal approach thatrendered petitioners utterances obscene.

The so-called "safe harbor" of 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m., adverted to inthe Action for Childrens Television case as the time whereinbroadcast of indecent material may be permitted, is believedinapplicable here. There is no legislative enactment or executiveissuance setting a similar period in the Philippines wherein indecentmaterial may be broadcast.

3. NO, the Court cannot take a hands off policy on this matter. The

religious program per se is not beyond the review of the MTRCB. In Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, the Court iterates the rule that

the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the Statewhen it will bring about the clear and present danger of somesubstantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e. seriousdetriment to the more overriding interest of public health, publicmorals, or public welfare.

o For when religion divides and its exercise destroys, theState should not stand still.

Final Ruling

The petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.ABAD, J. DISSENTING (This is also in the Casebook!)

Justice Abad is of the opinion that the more appropriate penalty would be toraise Ang Dating Daans restriction classification. The MTRCB classifyprograms to protect vulnerable audiences. It can change the present G orGeneral Patronage classification to PG or with Parental Guidance only forthree months. This can come with a warning that should the program committhe same violation, the MTRCB can make the new classification permanentor, if the violation is recurring, cancel its programs permit.Main Issue:Whether or not the Court is justified in imposing the penalty ofthree-month suspension on the television programAng Dating Daanon theground of host petitioner Sorianos remarks about Iglesia ni Cristos Michaelprostituting himself when he attacked Soriano in the Iglesias own televisionprogram.

Held: NO, suspending the Ang Dating Daantelevision program is theequivalent of closing down their churches to its followers. Their inabilityto tune in on their Bible teaching program in the evening is for them likegoing to church on Sunday morning, only to find its doors and windowsheavily barred.

1. A tiny moment of lost temper. Petitioner Sorianos Bible ministry has been on television

continuously for 27 years since 1983 with no prior record of useof foul language.

2. Not obscene.


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A quarter-of-a-year suspension would probably be justified whena general patronage program intentionally sneaks in snippets oflewd, prurient materials to attract an audience to the program.

3. Merely borders on indecent. The word puta or prostitute describes a bad trade but it is not

a bad word. The world needs a word to describe it. A policy thatplaces these ordinary descriptive words beyond the hearing of

children is unrealistic and is based on groundless fear. From the larger picture, Soriano appears to have been provokedby Michaels resort to splicing his speeches and making it appearthat he had taught inconsistent and false doctrines to hislisteners.

The Court appears to have given a literal meaning to whatSoriano said. The Court would deprive the Ang Dating Daanfollowers of their nightly bible teachings for a quarter of a yearbecause their head teacher had used figures of speech tomake his message vivid.

4. The average child as listener The Court claims that, since Ang Dating Daancarried a general

patronage rating, Sorianos speech no doubt caused harm to thechildren who watched the show. The average Filipino child would have been long in bed by

the time Ang Dating Daan appeared on the televisionscreen. It is not likely that they would give up programs ofinterest to them just to listen to Soriano drawing a distinctionbetween faith and work or action.

5. Disproportionate penalty The abridgment of speechthree months total suspension of the

Ang Dating Daantelevision bible teaching programcannot beregarded as indirect, conditional, or partial. It is a direct,unconditional, and total abridgment of the freedom of speech, towhich a religious organization is entitled, for a whole quarter of ayear.

In the American case of FCC, a parent complained. He wasriding with his son in the car at 2:00 in the afternoon and theyheard the grossly indecent monologue on radio. Here, noparent has in fact come forward with a complaint that hischild had heard petitioner Sorianos speech and washarmed by it. Courts decision will not be a victory for thechildren but for the Iglesia ni Cristo, finally enabling it to silencean abhorred competing religious belief and its practices.

consti art iii section 5a

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